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BATTLE OF JITRA

INTRODUCTION

1. Some two months before the fall of Singapore, the history of East Asia was forever

transformed by the surprising attack across the Malay Peninsular. The sole objective was

the capture of Singapore by land. Within a few days of the landing of the invasion forces,

the fate of Asia will be played out on the field nearby a town called Jitra.

2. The Battle of Jitra which lasted less than two days will ultimately foretell the

density that waits that the British and combined Commonwealth Forces in Malaya. The

battle deserves a place in modern military history as it represent the first time ever an Asian

power has subdued white troops in ground combat. It was also the first time that the Allies

witnessed the explosive and penetrative power of a combined arms Army in Asia. All of

which will happen first in the Battle of Jitra. The final outcome of which would testify to

the supremacy of the army of the "Land of the Rising Sun".

3. Supremacy at Jitra was shown in the manner where the Japanese reinforce battalion

infantry supported by armour, engineers, artillery and air working in harmony as one team

utilising exceptional tactics decimated the British defending forces. The operational art of

the Japanese forces allowed them to further dictate the term and condition of battle.

Japanese supremacy also showed in their deftness in devising a military strategy

guaranteeing their tactical and operational advantage on the fields of Jitra. British Forces
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did have successes at the operational and tactical level but all of them, as this study will

show, pale in comparison to the Japanese accomplishments across the spectrum of warfare.

4 The value of the Battle of Jitra as a lesson for the Malaysian Army cannot be

overstated. The battle itself provides an in depth and concise tutorial on conventional

warfare tactics executed brilliantly by unconventional minds. Moreover, the invaders were

fighting on a terrain and environment quite dissimilar to their native lands. Thus, it is

essential that the Malaysian Army understands the underlying formula and art which

brought victory to the Japanese.

5. In 1941, the strength of the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft was increased from

100 to 250. In addition to this, Japanese had conducted mass recruitment to boost their

manpower, establishing the biggest and strongest army in the region. The Japanese Army

was well motivated and committed to the course of “ freeing all East Asia”. Their plan was

superb, immaculate and perfectly executed. It was indeed a masterpiece, which was held in

high esteem even in the military circle of modern times. The troop selected was well trained

and had been active in China. They spearhead the attack on Jitra and Kota Bharu. They

were well conditioned to undertake jungle warfare and familiar with the terrain of Malaya.

AIM

6. The aim of this paper is to analyze the battle of Jitra, which will focus on tactics,

command and control as well as the lesson learnt from the campaign.

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SCOPE

7. The scope of this paper will encompass the following aspects:

a. The Japanese strategy and plan.

b. The British strategy and plan.

c. The battle

d. Analysis of the battle

e. Lesson learnt.

f. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND

8. The Battle of Jitra saw the first defeat of the mighty British in Malaya. Many more

followed later and finally resulted in the defeat of Singapore. The Malayan campaign was

anticipated to take 100 days to complete by the Japanese, however much to their surprise,

it only lasted 70 days. The Battle of Jitra itself lasted only 4 days, starting on the 10th and

ended on the 13 December 1941.

9. Jitra became relevant in the defence of Northern Malaya as it was north of the Alor

Setar aerodrome, which became the main reason for the defence location. In addition, it

controlled the critical junction which fork towards the state of Perlis and the main road to

Thailand. Thus, for lack of a better position, the 11 Indian Division was task to defence

Jitra.

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JAPANESE STRATEGY AND PLAN

10. Operationally, the Japanese Army required the deployment of the invasion force

quickly on the peninsular as to destroy the defending forces. Its operation plan had to

conform with the need to defeat enemy resistance in positions which he chose to hold, and

the same time be flexible enough to deal with enemy counter measures in such manner as to

leave no doubt of the issue1. In selecting to destroy the enemy in detail, the Malayan

command and its forces represented the centre of gravity for the campaign.

11. During September and October 1941, the Japanese Army planners agreed on the

troops and Comanders for the Malayan Campaign and on the general scheme of

manouvres. In view of its importance, they assigned to campaign the best ground force, the

25th Army had the most experience in amphibious operations and the strongest air unit, the

3rd Air Group and the fastest transport that were available. General Yamashita, the forceful

and imaginative officer with extensive experienced in command, was appointed the

commander of this force.

12. The 25th Army had 3 infantry divisions totaled of 50,000 men, a tank group of at

least 80 medium and 100 light tanks and strong artillery elements. To meet the special

requirement imposed by the Malaya terrain, a number of support unit were assigned to the

campaign. These included not only additional heavy engineer elements, but also several

units specifically organized and equipped to assist their troops in providing mobility. The

actual strength of the force committed was probably about 80,000 combat and combat

1
Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore: 1941-1942- The Japanese Version, (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1960): p. 33.
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support, and approximately 30,000 line of communication troops. The 3rd Air Group had

some 450 planes, naval strength included more than a score of cruisers and destroyers and

few submarines.

13. The operation would begin with surprise landing at three points: Singgora and

Patani in Thailand, and Kota Bharu at the north-eastern of Malaya coast as shown at

Annex A. The choice of these targets had been practically dictated by Malaya's terrain and

road network, which admitted no other point of entry for military forces within the

protective range of Japanese land-based aircraft.

14. During the initial stages of the attack, Japanese aircraft would operate from bases in

Southern Indochina. The Air Group would destroy the British air power in Northern

Malaya to provide cover to the invasion convoys. The Imperial Guard Division, the third

divisions assigned to the 25th Army will be moving over-land into Thailand through

Indochina. After occupying Bangkok and seizing local airfields, it will shift south along the

railway in stages to join the 25th Army. Then it would support the 5th Division in the main

drive down the western coast of Malaya towards Singapore.

15. The Japanese would thus throw small but superior forces against widely scattered

points along the thin British defence line. Once assured of air supremacy, they would drive

for Singapore as fast as possible. The advance south would be protected on both flanks and

overhead by the Japanese sea and air power. The entire operation would takes 100 days

and December 8th was set as the date for the opening ceremony2.

2
Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore 1941-1942, (Oxford University Press, 1988): page 92 and 93.
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BRITISH STRATEGY AND PLAN

16. Britain, in hindsight did not utterly leave Singapore defenceless. In fact, evidence

showed that they develop Singapore as a fortress. This fortress was capable of sheltering

the entire British fleet3. The planning for the base proceeded on the assumption that it

would have to be defended against only a naval assault4. Since the Malaya was still

undeveloped, lacking good roads and amenities, British did not pursue to strengthen its

defence from the peninsular side believing that such an invasion from land could be

neutralised by the Royal Navy. The British Army would then seek to delay the invasion

force on land until reinforcement could arrive from Britain. Thus, the operational

assumption of the British forces cantered on the aspect of time.

17. On August 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke Popham has formulated a

plan by considering the possibility of occupying a part of Isthmus of Kra. He thought that

due to the narrow land of Isthmus of Kra had some of the advantages on his assessment.

By advance into Southern of Thailand area would be able to meet Japanese on beaches to

forestall their possession near Singgora and Patani. Base on that the Matador Plan has been

construct5.

18. Major General Murray Lyon's of 11th Indian Div had been task to execute the

primary responsibility of the Matador Plan. 6th Brigade and 15th Brigade had most

3
Stanley L.Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore: The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942,(London: Robert
Hale&Co, 1975): p. 39.
4
Stanley L.Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore: The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942,(London: Robert
Hale&Co, 1975): p. 43
5
Keogh E.G, Tanah Malayu 1941-1942, ( Terjemahan Daripada Buku Malaya 1941-1942) page 31.
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concentrated their force in Northern Kedah in order to be prepared to strike Singgora or to

occupy a defensive position south of border at Jitra to cover Alor Setar airfield. 15th

Brigade at Kroh supported by a battalion drawn from Penang made up a column called

Krohcol to protect their east flank and important task to hold Patani - Kroh line and

occupy position called "The Ledge".

19. Actually Jitra is not a good location to be occupied in order to conduct a defensive

battle. Anyway it was the only tactical location which can be nominated in order to defense

Alor Setar airfield. There were two approaches toward Jitra, which is the Singgora road

and another road coming down from North West. Major Gen D.M Murray Lyon tried to

ensure to cover approaches which is so many instead of concentrating his defense along

this avenue. Therefore, Murray Lyon decided to site two brigade forward with the recently

released from III Corps reserve, the 28th Brigade commanded by Brigadier Carpendale in

depth. In support of this operation were two batteries of the 155th Field Regiment, a

battery of the 22nd Mountain Regiment and three batteries of the 80th Anti-Tank

Regiment. The division deployed into Jitra on the evening of the 8th December1941.

20. The 15th Brigade on the right was responsible for about a quarter of this distance is

jungle, swamps, and flooded paddy field and rubber estates. On the other part, the 6th

Brigade to the left was stretched thinly along the rest of the line, most of which consisted

of deep swamp, with a single battalion extended some 5 1/2 miles inland from the coast. Of

the two forward battalions of the 15th Brigade, the 2/9 Jats Regiments extended from the

hills on the right flank of the position to a point exclusive the main road. On the left were

the 1st Leicester, whose front included both the main road and Perlis roads. West of the
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latter they linked up with the 2nd East Surrey Regiment, the right battalion of the 6th

Brigade whose front included the wooded Pisang salient forward of the Alor Changlih

canal. On their left the 2/16 Punjab Regiment was responsible for the whole front from the

railway to the sea. It had permanent position on the railway and coast only and patrolled

the several miles of paddy and marsh, which joined together. The remaining battalion of

the 15th Brigade, the 1/14 Punjab, had the role of delaying the enemy between the frontier

and Asun and of occupying an outpost position at Asun, subsequently coming into brigade

reserve. The outpost position of the 6th Brigade at Kampong Imam on the Perlis road was

to be held by the reserve battalion, the 1/8 Punjab Regiment less two company which, as

we have already seen, had been sent forward into Thailand to make contact and delay the

enemy. Several batteries of artilleries provided support. The 28th Brigade from the 3rd

Corps, released to Murray Lyon when Matador was called off, was put as divisional reserve

at Ipoh6. British troops disposition are shown at Annex B

THE BATTLE

21. A few hour before dawn on 10th, forward element of Lt Gen Takuro Matsui of 5th

Div, advancing to Singgora-Jitra road in order to cross the border to Malaya7. The

objective was the Perak river. Immediate objective was the 11th Indian Division at Jitra.

First contact on the Dec 10th, Col Saeki armed reconnaisance detachment, still leading the

5th Division advance, meet forward elements of Brigadier K. A Garret 15th Brigade astride

the Singgora road south of the border and force them back. Saeki kept up the pressure

6
Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan Vol 1, ( London: Her Majesty Stationer Office, 1957 ), p. 89
7
Ibid, p. 170.
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during the day, and by evening was opposed by a battalion of Punjabi troop concentrated

about a mile north of Jitra. The Japanese did not attack Percival's main Jitra position until

midnight. The Punjabi had blown up small bridge and causeway as they fall back, but it was

clear that demolition alone could not stop the Japanese. To gain time for more work on the

Jitra defense, Jen Murray Lyon ordered the Punjabi to hold Japanese north of the town until

12th. To assist the Punjabi battalion, a Gurkha battalion from 28th Brigade as the reserve

was put into position astride the road at Asun, midway between Jitra and the advance

Punjabi unit.

22. Meanwhile Maj Gen Saburo Kawamura , commander of the Japanese 9th Brigade

and overall in charge in the attack on Jitra was become increasingly concern about the

delay caused by the British demolition. He attached additional tanks and engineers to

Saeki's force and ordered him to move forward rapidly as he could to capture bridge and

other critical points before the defender had time to blow them up.

23. Saeki attack on the morning of the 11th and by early afternoon the heavy rain

soaked Punjabi and once more retreating under the heavy downpour. The Punjabi had

broken contact but just after 1630 hours about 2 mile above Asun, Saeki advance unit

regained it with a vengeance. A column of medium tanks and motorised infantry strike the

retreating Punjabi, crushed their initial defence and drove through the entire battalion. Anti

tank gun might had halted the attack but still limbering up for the withdrawal to Asun.

Saeki's tanks smashed ahead, over running guns, vehicle and whatever infantry who tried to

stop them.

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24. Half an hour had passed but in the growing twilight, the Japanese tanks were

approaching the bridge before Asun, which held by Gurkha battalion. The rain soaked

demolition charge but the Gurkha managed to knock out the leading tank with gunfire.

This blocked the road and temporarily halted the Japanese armoured. Saeki's infantry

however outflanking the Gurkha, opening the way by a renewed advance by the entire

Japanese column. This force quickly overwhelmed the battered defenders and by evening

had reached the main position in Jitra.

25. To the west forward element of the 6th Brigade still not under pressure, was falling

back to avoid outflanked and joint in to defence Jitra. The premature demolition of a bridge

by an inexperience and nervous young officer force the withdrawing troops to leave most

of their vehicles, anti tank guns and artillery behind. These losses clearly increased Murray

Lyon's difficulties in Jitra.

26. As it sensing the British disarray, Colonel Saeki pushed ahead. Patrols probe the

Jitra defences after dark on December 11th, and at about 2030 hours a column of tanks

attacked the center of 15th Brigade position. With the heavy fight and confused in the

continuos rain and exaggerated report of enemy progress led Carpendale, the commander

of 15th Brigade to believe that the situation was worse. In his concern he did not check

with Murray Lyon, but called immediately on Brigadier William Lay, commanding the 6th

Brigade for reinforcement. During the course of the night, Lay sent Carpendale a battalion

and a half Punjabi troops, amounting to his entire brigade reserve. Carpendale committed

them, practically as soon as they arrived, to meet renewed and heavier Japanese blows.

Saeki by now, has also deployed his entire force including reserve. Under heavy shelling the
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Japanese attempt to remove the British demolition charges, while tanks and infantry probed

forward on the road and rifleman waded waist-deep through the swamp to an effort to

outflank the defenders. The Japanese had solidified and somewhat increased their

penetration of Carpendale's line, but could go no further. Carpendale had managed to halt

the enemy, yet lack the power to eject them.

27. During the morning of December 12th, the fighting at Jitra was confused, bloody an

indecisive. The 15th Brigade, reinforced by element from the 6th Brigade and a newly

arrive artillery regiment, continue to bear the brunt of the action in the flooded swamp. By

mid afternoon, the Japanese advance appeared to be halted. Nevertheless, a large and

dangerous gap had been torn in the Jitra line. Enemy pressure continued, confusion and

doubt were growing among the defenders. Attempt to close the gap and when this failed,

attempt to form a new line below it, brought more casualties and increased disorder. False

report of a Japanese armoured attack did not improve the matters.

28. The British defeat at Jitra was a costly one, and more so because the Japanese had

accomplished it with a small force. An aggressive assault had proved too much for Murray

Lyon's extended defenses and inexperienced troop. Saeki's command, a reconnaissance

detachment supported by artillery, engineers and light and heavy tanks. The whole force

numbered roughly about 500 men and had done most of the damage with a single battalion

of infantry joining in at the end. Together they reduced the 15th Brigade, from 2500 to 600

men inflicted seriously lose on the 6th Brigade, and destroy the equivalent of a battalion of

the 28th Brigade. They captured great quantities of weapon vehicles and communication

equipment together with more than 3000 prisoners. The 11th Division, exhausted and badly
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shaken, with no ready replacement for men and equipment, were hard-pressed to continue

as an effective fighting force. Jitra cost Japanese 27 life and 83 wounded 8. Saeki

breakthrough is shown at Annex C.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

29. By the own account, even the Japanese commanders acknowledged that the British

position at Jitra was a tough nut to crack. Their post-battle assessment of the British

position revealed the following characteristic:

a. The primary emphasis was on the anti tank defence and the terrain

was exploited to its maximum advantage.

b. The position had substantial depth and consisted of several lines.

c. Along with efficient exploitation of the terrain the British had

paid considerable effort in organizing fire line which had impressive result

during the battle.

d. The Jitra position had thoroughly planned communication trenches wire

obstacles. The approaches to the defence position were also strengthened by

having reserve demolition on bridges. Other form of demolition had also been

well prepared in advance.

e. The first line position were built in such a way to make a best use of the

jungle, rubber plantation and other natural environment to serve as camouflage

from air attack as well as to reduce the destructive potential of artillery fire on

the position.

8
Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore 1941-1942, (Oxford University Press, 1988): page 124
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30. Despite this wide and broad defence, a Japanese force less than a brigade

equivalent supported by tank company managed to force the British 11th Division from its

well prepared defensive position within 36 hours. The comparative analysis of the various

factor leading up to and during the battle have come up with some interesting finding and

conclusion. In sum the finding and conclusion has variously confirm either adherence or

ignorance of established principle in the conduct of warfare, strengthened the need for

thorough preparation and planning or surface new technique adopted in order to suit the

tactical situation or environment. These strong point and shortcomings will be portrayed

from both the Japanese and British camps

JAPANESE SUCCESS

31. The overwhelming Japanese success at Jitra is a classic example of sheer guts

motivated by an instinct for national survival but not at the expense of ignoring the

principal and art of warfare. The essence of the Japanese success is foresight and

thoroughness in planning, flexibility, good leadership and other contributing factors which

have totaled up to determination in fulfilling the given tasks and objectives.

32. Prior to the preparation of the invasion of Malaya, Japanese had taken pain to

meticulously prepare the ground for their invading force. These included the following:

a. Intelligence Operation. Japanese intelligence operatives had infiltrated

and openly mingled in the Malayan environment as early as 1930s. They were
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mainly the retired soldiers from the Sino-Japanese and Ruso-Japanese wars

who established themselves as businessman, photographers, barber and etc.

Through shrewd orchestrations of their activities, they manage to infiltrate every

level of Malayan lifestyles that they, became a familiar sight forming part of

Malayan social and economic background. They were thus able to move freely the

length and breath of the country without raising suspicion as to their clandestine

intelligence gathering activities. These activities included collecting tactical

intelligence concerning the ground, weather and British force order of battle and

engineer intelligence providing obstacles to be encountered a long likely route of

advance. Due to effectiveness of their intelligence gathering, the Japanese Imperial

Army was able to stage a mock invasion of Malaya during training on a similar

stretch of terrain of Indochina and China.

b. Reconnaissance by Ground Comanders. Just prior to the invasion

several higher ranking commanders took the risk of making a ground

reconnaissance themselves along the chosen route of advance from South of

Thailand all the way into Malaya. By these, the Japanese have shown their

total dedication and sense of responsibility to the task in hand and gain a first

hand view of the terrain which will prove invaluable in their appreciation and

detailed planning for battle.

c. Pre-positioning of Local Resources. In conjunction with the engineer

intelligence obtained, the Japanese operatives within Malaya had made adequate

preparation on the ground for the logistic requirements foreseen particularly for

engineer tasks. These included pre-positioning local resources such as timber near
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river or bridges to enable the engineer to construct improvised bridges or repairing

bridges damaged by demolition. Jungle route was also cleared to enable the vehicle

to pass and contingencies prepared besides muddy tracks which would bog vehicle.

d. Realism in Training. The Japanese emphasis on training was approach in a

realistic manner. It was conducted in Indochina and designed to acclimatize troops

to the Malaya environment. As to familiarize them to the type of terrain expected

which include mountain, jungle and swampy terrain as well as to condition troops to

live of the terrain and survive on meager ration. The training also included

simulation of the actual invasion, which were thoroughly rehearsed.

e. Psychological Conditioning of Troops. Japanese troops were psyched to

be totally patriotic to the national course. To this end, they were indoctrinated to

fanatical levels, which committed them to sacrifice their lives for what they believe

to be necessary to their national survival.

33. During the battle of Jitra, the Japanese invading force had conformed to the

principle of war and basic consideration of advance such as the followings:

a. Surprise. The British were taken by surprise when the Japanese offensives

were spearheaded by medium and light tanks. The British had appreciated that the

Malaya terrain is generally untankable country. Although contingencies had been

adopted to deal with the tank threat in the form of making available anti tank

weapons, there was no thought given to bring in tanks which are the most effective
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weapon to counter or combat tanks.

b. Flexibility and Maintenance of Momentum. These two principles were

applied when Japanese force used organic and local transportation to get to their

objectives. The used of engineer ahead of tanks to repair or build bridges and

breach other obstacles also helped to maintain the momentum of advance.

Flexibility was exercised in varied form. The Japanese avoided frontal attacks and

resorted to flanking manouvres wading through swamps and difficult terrain or

resorted to night attack when the opposition was to strong for frontal attack.

Ground commanders were also given freedom of action to decide form of action to

be undertaken without reference to the next higher commanders. Fresh troops were

ejected for each new attack phase thus helping to maintain the momentum.

c. Maintenance of Morale. The Japanese troop were highly motivated,

disciplined and spurned on by their successes in the other theatre of war. Constant

rotation of assaulting troops in the attack on the British position and the low

casualties suffered also helped to maintain high morale with a resulting high

tenacity for combat.

34. Other factor which helped in the Japanese success were as follows:

a. Japanese Characteristics. The Japanese were by nature was very humble,

while the British boasted the impregnability of Singapore and their supremacy in

the Far East. Japanese humility enshrouded avail of secrecy on their intentions and
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at the same time propped their determination to defeat the British. Survival instincts

and strong sense of patriotism and loyalty to the country and the Emperor further

shored up the Japanese political will. The troops themselves were mainly drawn

from the Boshita clan known for their fierce traditional fighting qualities.

b. Survivability. The Japanese are used to tough life due to scarcity in even

the staple diet. With a little training, the Japanese soldier can easily adapt himself to

survive on meager food ration. An elaborate logistical back up to sustain the

Japanese invasion in this direction was therefore not very necessary except for the

resources utilized in the supply of ammunition and other battle paraphernalia.

c. Competent Leadership. The higher level commanders of the Japanese

Imperial Army tasked to invade Malaya were handpicked by General Staff. The

commander of the Japanese invasion force for Malaya was General Tomoyaki

Yamashita, a bold and reliable commander noted for this determination, vision and

courage. He had been trained in Germany to learn the technique of conducting a

"blitz", which he judiciously employed in the Malayan campaign with remarkable

success. He was assisted by a group of equally dedicated and experienced general at

the lower formations.

d. Air Superiority. The Japanese enjoy the air superiority over Malaya by

four to one. Their "zero fighters" were especially superior in performance thanks to

the German who assisted by sending hundreds of aircraft engineers and technicians

to Japan to help develop the aircraft. The air superiority enabled the Japanese to
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enhance their speed and momentum of advance with little interference from the

RAF.

THE BRITISH FAILURE

35. The British defence of Jitra fall apart not because of poor siting of the defence but

due to the lack foresight in planning and underestimation of the Japanese capabilities. The

Japanese themselves had attested to the good defence layout and were surprised that the

British did not hold out much longer.

36. The main factors that contributed to the defeat at Jitra are identified as follows:

a. Poor appreciation. The British had wrongly appreciated the ground with

the conclusion that the country is untankable. Whilst it is true that tanks cannot

move cross-country over swamps, muddy paddy field and jungle, there were

reasonably good roads and a network of tracks which the Japanese used to punch

through the British defence. The British were so certain that there would be no

Japanese tanks that the Punjabi Regiment was not psychologically prepared and

worse still cannot even recall what a tank looks like that they panicked and were

very demoralized at the first sight of Japanese tanks. Even if the British had

appreciated rightly, it is doubted that tanks would be made available to Malayan

Command as their priority for tanks was given to Europe and North Africa.

b. Poor Communication. The communications system was a best chaotic. At

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the height of the battle, communications between headquarters and units were

frequently lost. With the resultant breakdown, essential orders were not executed

and commander lost command and control of their units with serious

consequences. For example when the 2/1 Gurkha Rifles position became untenable,

the company commander deceases to withdraw his companies. When the order did

not reach the forward troops they stayed and fought on until they were

overwhelmed. Thus resulting the destruction of the whole battalion. Similarly, when

1st Division decided to withdraw on the night of 12th December 41, others were

either delayed or failed to reach the respective units.

c. Lack of Air Support. The British had only 158 aircraft off all types in

Malaya and Singapore. The serviceability ratio further reduced the number of

airworthy aircraft to one third at any one time. Of these two, most were recall to

concentrate on the defence of Singapore. With no effective air cover, the 11th

Division was at the mercy of the Japanese Air Force.

d. Lack of Training. Acclimatization of troops and proper training in the new

environment was not given to the British forces. They were particularly susceptible

to night attack by the Japanese who mastered the art through training and

maximized the attack at night to create confusion and panic among the British

troops.

e. Preparation of the Defence. Units under 11th Division were given two

tasks that were defending Jitra and Operation Matador with the latter given high
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priority. The consequence to this was that precious time was lost which should have

been put to better used in preparing the defence of Jitra. Virtually, all the defence

task such as construction of pill box were undertaken by the soldiers as money was

not available to utilize civilian labour. Hence, in the little time that was available,

the defence preparation was far from adequate or completed by the time of the first

Japanese on slaughter.

f. Morale of Troops. Most of the troops and particularly those from India

were still fresh and not fully trained. Their inexperience, unfamiliarity with the new

environment coupled with the fact that some have not even seen a tank, combined

to affect their morale, which was at a low degree.

g. Underestimation of the Enemy. Whether due to typical British snobbery

or otherwise, the fact remains that they had grossly underestimated the Japanese

potentials, capabilities and ingenuity. The British were also victims to their own

propaganda campaign designed to portray the impregnability of the Singapore

fortress which was given wide publicity and coverage in the mass media. They had

also given the impression that they had both naval and air superiority in the Far

East. What they had not calculated was perhaps that hostilities opened up in other

theaters in Europe and North Africa also shared the same military assets and was

given higher priority thereby greatly depleting the resources earmarked or that

could be spared for the Malaya Command. The false sense of superiority was

quickly diminished when the Japanese defeated the British forces at the very first

encounter and in subsequent encounters leading up to Jitra. With that, the morale of
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the British forces dropped rapidly.

37. Apart from the above, certain basic principles of war and basic considerations of

defence were ignored which spelt disaster for the British. Some of these were:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The British under Murray Lyon are

not sure whether to go on the offensive or defensive until the cancellation of

Matador two days before the action at Jitra 9. The offensive and defensive operation

needs different preparations. This forced Murray Lyon to deploy two battalions

forward of Jitra position where the Japanese later destroyed both and thus reduced

their combat power at the main position.

b. Offensive Action. Even in the defence, the British Forces at Jitra did not

think and act offensively. It requires commanders at all level to be alert to

opportunities for unexpected offensive action, such as local counter attack, that will

set back to the attacker and deter him.10 The shortage of available forces is one of

the reason for the lack of offensive action. The unexpected and unauthorised

movement of the unengaged brigade's reserve forces, and the committal of the

depth brigade to the right forward denied Murray Lyon's offensive option.

c. Concentration of force. The force level required for the defence of Jitra

was grossly inadequate. In the light of shortcoming, the 11th Division was given an
9
Stanley L. Falk, The 70 Days to Singapore: The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942, ( London: Robert Hale &
Co, 1975): page 124
10
Australian Army, Formation Tactics, Manual of Land Warfare, Headquarters of Training and Command,
1987.
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area that too wide to defence resulting a dispersal of troops, which could hardly put

up a credible defence. The Japanese advance was made relatively easy as they were

able to exploit weaknesses cause by lack of depth in the defence.

d. Cooperation. General Percival who was the GOC did not have full

cooperation from General Gordon Bennett of the Australian Imperial Forces who

had wanted his forces to be utilized as a formation by itself. The Far East Air Chief

Marshal Sir Robert Brooke Popham dealt primarily of the matters of major military

policy and strategy. The former was more interested in defending South Johore the

latter was seeking to increase the range of its aircraft seawards. On the other hand,

Gen Yamashita had overriding command and authority over both the navy and

airforce as well as given full cooperation by the service commanders.

d. Economy of Effort. The Japanese Army had used maximum local resources

in order to achieve their aim. The British failed to use all the advantages as a

colonial of Malaya.

e. Security. The Japanese plan and strategic are very secrecy and only

revealed their plan at the last moment of the operation but the British plan on the

other hand were very carelessly handled by their commanders.

f. Surprise. The Japanese are very unpredictable during the campaign. The

attack conducted was planned in such way to deceive the British by using their

surprise tactics throughout the operation.

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g. Flexibility. The Japanese force could easily adopt themselves to the

environment and terrain of Malaya. The training and preparation were conducted

for sometimes before the war exploded.

h. Administration. The British Forces was disorganised and the soldiers

moral were low. The commanders failed to upgrade the spirit of the soldiers. Many

commanders were inefficient. Those who were not, hampered by this administrative

system. Whereas the Japanese commanders were very anticipate and determined.

i. Use of Ground. The layout of the Jitra defence lacks of all round defence.

The Japanese who launched an attacked from the flank move frequently that only

to deal with the British troops in the selected objectives with little or no added

weight of fire or interference from other neighbouring defended positions or units.

There were also large gaps between units like for example that between 15th

Brigade and 6th Brigade astride the main road Changlun-Jitra. With their mobility

and armoured protection, the Japanese were able to penetrate right through the

British defensive area and devide the opposition forces and launch smaller scale

attacks on the devided forces.

j. Used of Reserves. The British committed their reserve too early and when

the time come for them to be used when it was needed most, there was hardly any

left. Counter attacks could thus hardly take off the ground leaving no option but to

withdraw the embattled and fatigued units. The Japanese on the other hand injected
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fresh troops before each assault thus overcoming troop fatigue and thus maintaining

high morale and combat efficiency at the same time.

LESSON LEARNT

38. The battle of Jitra provides some lessons worth learning. These cannot only be

derived from the British shortcomings and failures but also from the success of the

Japanese forces and their strong points. To be fair to the British, it is acknowledged that

certain shortcomings were not due to the doings of the military leaders and planners but

imposed on them as a result of Britain's other strategic considerations and interests in other

parts of the world. Similarly, some of the factors that led to the Japanese success were not

due to military brilliance but perhaps due to gross oversight by the opposition as well as an

element of luck. The good example was the case of Operation Matador which was not

triggered off as planned.

39. Passive Defence. The British were heading for defeat even during the planning

stages of the defence of North Malaya. The concept of the defence was merely to delay the

Japanese advance to buy sufficient time until the British Navy can sent down sufficient

reinforcement for Singapore. By that the British were already quite sure in their mind to

fight the defence at all cost at Singapore. A better approach could have been to hold an

aggressive defence posture marked by counter attacks to force the Japanese back across

the Thailand/ Malaya border. Such action would have drained the opposition’s resources,

momentum, and moral and will through prolong combat.

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40. Anti-infiltration Tactics. An extension of the passive defence was that the British

allowed the Japanese sufficient freedom of movement to choose the time and approach of

attack conducive to him. The British forces were quite content to just await the Japanese to

take the initiative. There was no attempt made to dominate gap and swampy areas by

manned outpost or fire. In the absence of such cover, the Japanese were able to use these

gaps to infiltrate and by-pass the main defence and cut off the British forces from the

flanks.

41. Reserve Demolition must be Authorized and Coordinated at the highest level.

The Malayan environment constituted a challenge to any advancing column whether on

foot or mounted. This is inhospitable jungles and mountainous terrain, swamps and

numerous rivers to contend with. Bridges are especially useful for both the withdrawing as

well as the advancing forces. Reserve demolition to destroy bridges must therefore be

authorized and coordinated at the highest level. Any premature detonation by unauthorized

person is bound to foul up with the withdrawal of friendly forces. These was clearly and

evident in the case of the Perlis road bridge, which forced the withdrawing troops to

abandoned their trucks, guns, other heavy equipment and vital supplies such as

ammunition and petrol which latter were secured and used by the Japanese.

42. Anti-armour Defence. In conventional warfare, it is unthinkable that tanks would

not be employed. The emphasis in this type of warfare is speed, mobility and firepower,

which are contributed by a tank. The British completely overlook to this point and

unforgiveable for their mistake.

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43. Air Support. Similar to the above, the Japanese air assets were far superior

compared to British. In the face of this shortcoming, the air situation was made more

unfavourable by inadequate anti-aircraft gun. Hence the Japanese fighter and bombers had

almost unobstructive command of the skies and easy access to ground targets.

44. Night Attack and Close Combat. The Japanese were well prepared and trained

for night attack and close combat while the British forces had very little training or

experience in this two aspect. A post mortem of the Jitra battle by the Japanese concluded

that because of these two factors, they would have taken a longer time and suffered more

casualties to break through the three line defensive position.

45. Flanking Move and Attack. The same post-mortem also concluded that it is more

desirable to move into the enemy’s flank by passing through jungles and marshy areas

where the attack would be least expected by the defenders. As such, this route would

contribute to the element of surprise rather than could have been achieved by a frontal

attack.

46. Aggressive Stance. The Japanese adopted every aggressive stance in the attack.

Even in the face of heavy fire or against heavier odds, the Japanese were determined to

push through despite the casualties. The Japanese doctrine accepted such loses as long as

the momentum could be maintained.

47. Commitment of local. The British, despite being the colonial master of Malaya
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totally disregarded the role that could have been undertaken by the locals. Locals can

provide valuable assistance such as intelligence on the enemy and terrain, guide and even

manpower. The Japanese on the other hand befriended the local well before the invasion

and subsequently relied on the native population for the battle requirements.

CONCLUSION

48. In the battle of Jitra, the Japanese showed themselves resourceful and masters of

infiltration tactics. They attacked in the traditional Japanese manner without regard to lose.

The British was grossly disorganized and ill-trained to be put into effective use when

hostilities broke out. The success of the Japanese was mainly due to their thorough

planning and determined execution. They maximized on the element of surprise, speed,

deception, mobility, aggressiveness and concentration of force. In the final analysis, it was

the British failure to adhere to the principle of war. The Japanese vision and motivation that

led to the most humiliating defeat of the British forces.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Australian Arrmy, Formation Tactics, Manual of Land Warfare, Headquarters Training

Command, 1987.

Tsuji, Colonel Masanobu. Singapore: The Japanese Version, Singapore: Oxford University
Press, 1988.

Owen, Frank. The Fall of Singapore. Sydney: Pan Books, 1960.

Percival, Lieutenant General. The War in Malaya, New Delhi: M.K. Sagar, 1971.

Falk, Stanley L. Seventy Days to Singapore: The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942, London:
Robert Hale & Co 1975.

Smyth, Sir John. Percival and the tragedy of Singapore. London: Mac Donald, 1971.

Allen, Louis. Singapore 1941-1942, London: Davis-Ponyter Limited, 1977.

Lt Kol Prof Madya Dr Ahmad Fawzi Basri. Pertempuran Jitra (Battle of Jitra) 11-13
Disember 1941, Sintok: Sekolah Pembangunan Sosial Universiti Utara Malaysia.

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