Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Stephen Marrin is a Lecturer in the Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
at Brunel University in London. He has a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the Uni-
versity of Virginia and is a former Intelligence Analyst in the CIA.
Studies in Intelligence Series
General Editors: Richard J. Aldrich
and
Christopher Andrew
Tet 1968
British Military Intelligence in the Understanding the Surprise
Crimean War, 1854–1856 Ronnie E. Ford
Stephen M. Harris
Intelligence and Imperial Defence
Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence British Intelligence and the Defence of
in World War II the Indian Empire 1904–1924
Edited by David Alvarez Richard J. Popplewell
Espionage
Knowing Your Friends Past, Present, Future?
Intelligence Inside Alliances and Edited by Wesley K. Wark
Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War
Edited by Martin S. Alexander The Australian Security Intelligence
Organization
An Unofficial History
Eternal Vigilance Frank Cain
50 years of the CIA
Edited by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Policing Politics
Christopher Andrew Security Intelligence and the Liberal
Democratic State
Nothing Sacred Peter Gill
Nazi Espionage against the Vatican,
1939–1945 From Information to Intrigue
Studies in Secret Service based on the
David Alvarez and Revd.
Swedish Experience, 1939–1945
Robert A. Graham
C. G. McKay
Stephen Marrin
First published 2011
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2011 Stephen Marrin
The right of Stephen Marrin to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-0-415-78068-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-81020-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents
Preface viii
Notes 151
Select bibliography 174
Index 178
Preface
Academic scholars and intelligence analysts are members of the same family;
perhaps distant cousins. The production of academic scholarship and the produc-
tion of finished intelligence analysis is similar, relying on the individual’s ability
to acquire information (research), evaluate that information (think), and com-
municate findings (write and speak). Yet at the same time there is a significant
difference between scholars and analysts.
I know about both the similarities and differences firsthand. In 1996, after
graduating from Colgate University with a bachelor’s degree in political science,
I began working at CIA as an analyst. I was hired based on my demonstrated
academic strengths, but at CIA discovered subtle but important differences
between the two fields. Academia exists to develop knowledge, and places a lot
of emphasis on underlying causal forces and their effects. The same cannot be
said about intelligence organizations, which are in the business of creating useful
knowledge. While they need to have some understanding of underlying causal
forces, or drivers, they are more interested in communicating the implications or
significance of events than devoting much time or energy to building causal
models. That, after all, is the role of academicians.
Some practitioners are able to find positions where they can productively
employ the skillset of the academician in pursuit of organizational goals, but I
was more fascinated by studying the practitioners themselves. As an undergradu-
ate at Colgate University, I wrote a senior thesis on the causes of intelligence
failure and an honors thesis on the future roles and missions of the US intelli-
gence community. Then later, while working at CIA, I also became fascinated
by the analytic process itself, including methods and practices. So I left CIA to
pursue graduate and doctoral studies at the University of Virginia, acquiring a
MA degree from the Department of Politics in 2002 with a thesis on CIA’s train-
ing program for new analysts, and a PhD in 2009 with a dissertation evaluating
the intersection of analysis and decision.
As a student of intelligence analysis for almost 20 years now, I have looked
at, studied, and written about intelligence analysis from many different perspec-
tives. This book pulls together much of the thinking and writing I’ve done over
the past ten years on the methods and processes of intelligence analysis and how
they can be improved.
Preface ix
More than half the content of this book is original, with the other half relying
on earlier writings that have been revised and updated. Specifically, Chapters 1,
2, and 9 have not been published elsewhere. Most of Chapters 3 and 4 on the art
and science of intelligence analysis are original, but a small subset of material
was drawn from “Adding Value to the Intelligence Product” in Handbook of
Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch Johnson (Routledge, 2006), and
“Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition?” as published in the
American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Summer 2007). Most of Chapter
5 on the value of analytic teams is original, but a section of it was previously
published as a chapter titled “Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institu-
tional Obstacles” in Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best
Practices, edited by Russell Swenson (Joint Military Intelligence College’s
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, May 2003). Additionally, sections of
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 were drawn from articles published in the International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; specifically “Training and
Educating US Intelligence Analysts,” Vol. 22, No. 1. (Winter 2008–2009);
“CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts,” Vol. 16, No. 4
(Winter 2003/2004); “Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the
Medical Profession,” Vol. 18, No. 4. (2005); and “Modeling an Intelligence
Analysis Profession on Medicine,” Vol. 19, No. 4. (Winter 2006–2007).
I would like to thank each of the publishers for permission to reprint portions
of these previously published articles. In addition, I would also like to thank
Mercyhurst College for a research grant providing additional time to research
and write the book, as well as the able research assistance of Aleksandra Bielska
whose diligent work was much appreciated.
Finally, as a requirement related to my prior employment at CIA, this book
has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US
Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the
author’s views.
1 Bridging the gap between
scholarship and practice
The answers to all of these questions have potential relevance for the practice
and improvement of intelligence analysis, but the answers derived here are not
drawn from experience alone but rather experience combined with knowledge as
derived from the intelligence studies literature. In other words, the goal here is to
see what we can learn from others, including those who came before us.
2 Describing intelligence analysis
Garst and Gross go on to say that “armed with knowledge of the area or topic, and
in possession of a mass of information, the analyst must make sense out of informa-
tion that is often fragmentary, ambiguous, contradictory, and subject to deception.”4