Nationalism As Political Paranoia in Burma

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL
PARANOIA IN BURMA
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NATIONALISM AS
POLITICAL
PARANOIA IN BURMA
An Essay on the Historical
Practice of Power
by Mikael Gravers
CURZON
NIAS Report series 11
First published in 1993
by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
Second edition, revised and expanded,
published in 1999
by Curzon Press
15 The Quadrant, Richmond Surrey TW9 1BP
© Mikael Gravers 1993, 1999
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Gravers, Mikael
Nationalism as political paranoia in Burma : an essay on the
historical practice of power. - (NIAS reports ; no. 11)
1 .Nationalism - Burma 2.Buddhism - Burma 3.Burma - Ethnic
relations 4.Burma - Politics and government
I.Title
320.9'591
ISBN 0-203-63979-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-67899-0 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 07007 0980 0 (Hbk)
ISBN 07007 0981 9 (Pbk)
ISSN 1398-313x
CONTENTS
Preface to the 1993 Edition vii

Preface to the 1999 Edition ix
Acknowledgements xii
Abbreviations xiv
Introduction 1
1. The Colonial Club: ‘Natives Not Admitted!’ 5
2. The Violent Pacification’ of Burma 9
3. Buddhist Cosmology and Political Power 15
4. The Colonisation of Burmese Identity 21
5. Buddhism, Xenophobia and Rebellion in the 1930s 33
6. Two Versions of Nationalism: Union State or Ethnicism 43
7. Buddhism and Military Power: Two Different Strategies 55
—Two Different Thakins
8. Ne Win’s Club 69
9. Aung San Suu Kyi’s Strategy 75
10. Nationalism as the Practice of Power 81
11. The Rules of the Myanmar Club since 1993 87
12. Buddhism and the Religious Divide among the Karen 89
13. U Thuzana and Vegan Buddhism 99
14. Buddhism, Prophecies and Rebellion 103
15. Autocracy and Nationalism 117
vi
16. Historicism, Historical Memory and Power 127

17. A Final Word—But No Conclusion 135
Epilogue 143
Appendix 1: Theoretical Concepts 149
Appendix 2: Karen Organisations 155
Glossary 157
Bibliography 161
Index 171
MAPS
1. Burma xv
2. Exduded Area 1946 28

3. Karen and Mon States 60
4. Myit Szone 92
PREFACE TO THE 1993 EDITION
This essay is an elaborated version of a paper presented at a seminar in

honour of Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at Lund
University, Sweden, on 9 December 1991. It is part of a research
project aiming at an identification and analysis of those historical
processes in Burma which have made ethnic opposition escalate into an
unending nationalistic struggle—a struggle that has reduced politics in
Burma to extreme violence.
*****
As preparation for anthropological fieldwork in Thailand from 1970 to
1972 I spent two months in intensive learning of the Pwo Karen
language at the Baptist mission in Sangkhlaburi near the Burmese
border. I had three teachers. One was Ms Emily Ballard, a long-time
missionary in Burma and a brilliant linguist. The other two were a well-
known Christian Karen politician Saw Tha Din and his wife. They came
to Thailand as refugees and worked for the mission. After the sessions
with the Pwo Karen spelling book and grammar, Saw Tha Din
explained Karen nationalism during the colonial era and after
independence. He gave a vivid and strong impression of how potent the
mixture of ethnic self-consciousness, religious affection and nationalism
can be in a colonial situation.
The endeavours of the Karen National Union, a visit to one of the
Burman guerrilla camps belonging to forces loyal to U Nu and under
the command of Bo Yan Naing (one of the famous thirty comrades),
and a meeting with Mon leader Nai Shwe Kyin came to mind whilst I was
working at the India Office Library and Records in London (now called
the Oriental and India Office Collections) in May 1988. Amnesty
International had just published a report on Burma, documenting the
torture and killing of Karen civilians, and Rangoon was about to
explode in anger and repression. Whilst reading secret reports on
religious and ethnic rebellions in the middle of the last century, it struck
viii
me how the conflict and the violence in Burma have been ingrained in
social relations and their cultural expression during the last two centuries.
History in itself cannot explain the violence of today, but the tragic
developments since 1988 have made the need for an analysis of the
roots of Burmese nationalism even more urgent This essay is, however,
a preliminary contribution based primarily on the works by renowned
scholars on Burma and its focus is more on theoretical explanation than
on a detailed historical account. Except for information collected during
my stay in Thailand and a short visit to Burma in 1972, I have relied on
written sources and documents, mainly in English. Hopefully, I have
not misappropriated the insights of the valuable works on Burma to
which I am referring.
I am grateful to NIAS for inviting me as a guest researcher in May
1992—it was a very stimulating visit. I am indebted to the India Office
Library and Records, London, and especially to dr Andrew Griffin for
his kind and valuable assistance in locating important documents. The
Department of East Asian Languages at the University of Lund inspired
me to continue this work by the very timely celebration of a genuine
non-violent nationalist (Aung San Suu Kyi). Last but not least, I must
express my thanks to the Research Foundation at Aarhus University,
Denmark, for financially supporting the English-language editing of this
manuscript.
May peace soon strike the peacock in Burma!
PREFACE TO THE 1999 EDITION
Since the initial publication of this book, I have been pleasantly

surprised by the interest and the positive assessments that it has
received, although it was—and remains—a brief and incomplete sketch
of Burma’s history and a preliminary analysis of nationalism.
I was even more surprised and delighted when the Journal of Asian
Studies (vol. 5, no. 3, 1994) published a review of the book by
Professor James F. Guyot. He rightly concludes that my analysis of
nationalism does not come through clearly in the text. Nationalism and
theories of nationalism are indeed difficult to handle in a brief
presentation, especially when the history concerned is as complex as
Burma’s. I have added six new chapters in an attempt to take the
analysis one step further. But it is clear, as I stated in the first edition,
that my view is one from afar. Although I have recently collected
additional information along the Thai-Burmese border and have had
intensive discussions with Burmese people living in Europe as well as
with colleagues, this book is not an attempt to write a history of modern
Myanmar/Burma or to assess the complexity of the changes since 1988.
It is an analysis of nationalism, ethnicity and power in the history of
Burma from an anthropological perspective.
A Burmese friend, Brenda Pe Maung Tin (Daw Tin Tin Myaing), has
kindly drawn my attention to the term kala (‘South Asian’, ‘Indian’)
which I have used to mean ‘foreigner’ or ‘Westerner’. In the beginning
of the colonial period the term was used for everyone who came from
India, including the British. This usage is found in English literature
written during and immediately after the colonial period and has a
highly problematic connotation in the modern context. Today kala
refers to a person of South Asian ethnic origin. But it was also used as a
derogatory term for Aung San
Suu Kyi in an article in the official New Light of Myanmar entitled
‘Feeling Prickly Heat, Instead of Pleasant Cool’: Pretty little wife of the
x
white kala (U Phyo 30 May 1996). I apply it metaphorically as a

simplification of cultural differences within a nationalistic discourse.
However, this simplification and the negative connotations are
misleading when interpreted as a common modern expression. In the
first edition, the term appears as a historical concept as well as an
analytical concept. I should have emphasised this. In this revised edition
I shall replace kala with more appropriate terms when necessary.
In her review published in the journal Crossroads (vol. 8, no. 2,
1994), Mary Callahan rightly criticises my use of the word kala. Dr
Callahan states that I have used the term to comprise the ethnic
minorities. That is, however, not true. Although the Christian Karen, in
the opinion of many Burmese, became a divisive force allied to
foreigners, and lost their original identity through adopting a foreign
religion, they were not collectively called kala. Dr Callahan fails to
recognise that the aim of my book is to analyse nationalism and power
in their historical context. I did not argue, as Dr Callahan states, that the
xenophobic rhetoric of the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC, renamed the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in
1997), is shared by the majority of the population. However, the
rhetoric, still applied by the SLORC, cannot be dismissed as a mere
bravado having no effect on civil society. The often xenophobic
language contains a strong symbolic violence. It is the strategy of the
SLORC to gain support and simultaneously to create fear by this
dominating discourse of nationalism. It is unfortunate that in this context
resistance releases more repression in the name of the Myanmar nation.
As another Burmese friend, Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, explained to me:
‘During Ne Win’s rule, I did not think of the difference between Burma
as the nation, as the state, and as the military regime.’ The three
elements melted into a single identity not to be questioned. This is
precisely how the interpellation of xenophobic propaganda works in
Burma and in other places where nationalism is appropriated by
autocratic regimes. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991) has a clear understanding
of this mechanism and its effects: it derives from fear and it generates
fear. The memory of past resistance generates fear and releases
violence; the memory of past violence is the fear of new violent acts, ad
infinitum. The result of the nationalistic policy and its
repressive character is that social practices in Burma move into a grey
zone of dissemblance: neither compliance nor genuine participation;
neither direct dissent nor open resistance. The grey zone is ruled by
fear, distrust, rumours and gossip. It is probably filled with secret
imaginings that are beyond the reach of this analysis; we cannot know
xi
who listens to the rhetoric, what is internalised by whom and who

remains indifferent. A dialogue between the military and the opposition
seems extremely difficult after ten years of confrontation. Dialogue
without a belief in compromise and reconciliation is futile.
I have not had the opportunity like Dr Callahan to study the
Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) and its history from inside its archives in
Rangoon. However, the SLORC seems to control the Tatmadaw and
also has supporters outside the army. Although the SLORC suffered a
spectacular defeat in the 1990 elections, they obtained about 25 per cent
of the votes (albeit a mere nine or ten seats) in the countryside. The
open economy may also have turned some of the new entrepreneurs into
at least tacit supporters. Otherwise, without some support amongst
civilians as well as within the army, it would be difficult for the SLORC
to preserve its totalitarian control. Of course, a tacit support in
performing daily duties to earn a living and out of fear of reprisals is not
the same as ideological consensus.
Further, in her review Mary Callahan claims that there is a ‘Gravers
pro-democracy project’ in the book. However, it has to be appreciated
that the democracy project belongs exclusively to the people of Burma!
As regards the fate of democracy in Burma since 1948, the reviewer,
perhaps unintentionally, confirms my point that even during the
democratic period after independence, politics turned violent due to the
complexity of ethnic conflicts, religion, nationalism and rivalries within
the Myanmar political parties. Despite the turmoil, the Burmese have
participated in four elections between 1948 and 1962. No one, including
the present author, would blame the violence and all other misfortunes
in Burma on the colonial era. On the other hand, no one would deny
that the colonial policy and practice are extremely important to self-
perception and historical interpretations in Burma.
The new chapters include an update of events and an assessment of
the role of Buddhism in recent developments, which also include the
split within the Karen National Union and the formation of a Buddhist
Karen organisation. The analyses of nationalism, ethnicity, resistance
and violence are related to a recent anthropological discussion of social
and historical memory to demonstrate the importance of the past on the
present. I have made a few changes to the original text; I have also
added new references and data.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
By courtesy of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark,

who awarded me a grant from his Research Fund, I was able to visit the
Karen people in Thailand and collect information on the role of religion
in the present context. I am very grateful for this support. It was with
great kindness and and with patience that many Karens in Wa Ga Gla of
Uthaithani province and in the town of Sangkhlaburi in Kanchanaburi
province, as well as in other places, answered the questions posed by
the anthropologist. I shall always be indebted to them for their
friendship and help.
Unfortunately, I arrived in Sangkhlaburi six months after Saw Tha
Din died in 1995 at the age of 99. His daughter, Olivia, kindly received
me in his house and shared her memories of her father since 1970. Saw
Tha Din was a genuine representative of the Karen nation as it
developed in colonial Burma and in the days of Independence when
cooperation and mutual tolerance were still possible.
At the British Library Oriental and India Office Collections, London,
Patricia Herbert, the Curator, helped me to locate interesting documents
and shared her profound knowledge of Burma and its history.
Suggestions and advice from Brenda Pe Maung Tin, a former lecturer
in French at the Foreign Languages University, Rangoon, have been
crucial to the revision. Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, Executive Director at the
Water Research and Training Centre for a New Burma, Delft, Holland,
has supplied valuable information to update the book.
I am, as well, indebted to Thomas Lautrup from the Department of
Ethnography and Social Anthropology at the University of Aarhus for
his critical review of the manuscript.
Thanks are also due to the staff of NIAS Publishing who helped to
bring the present revised edition to its completion.
xiii
Last but not least, I am grateful to Anders Baltzer JØrgensen for his
cooperation and the exchange of knowledge and anecdotes during our
fieldwork in 1970–72, and in 1996, because
[in doing fieldwork] a high level of linguistic competence is

obviously an advantage but a flair for friendship is more
important than an impeccable accent or a perfect lexicon (Edmund
Leach 1982:129).
ABBREVIATIONS
ABKNA All Burma Karen National Association

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIA Burma Independence Army
BNA Burma National Army
BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party
CPB Communist Party of Burma
DDSI Directory of Defence Services Intelligence
DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
DKBO Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation
DSI Defence Services Institute
GCBA General Council of Burmese Associations
KCO Karen Central Organisation
KNA Karen National Association
KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army
KNU Karen National Union
KYO Karen Youth Organisation
NLD National League for Democracy
OIOC Oriental and India Office Collections
PVO People's Volunteer Organisation
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
UKO United Karen Organisation
USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association
YMBA Young Men's Buddhist Association
xv
Map 1: Burma
xvi
INTRODUCTION
Since 1988 Burma has gained notoriety for the extreme violence used
by its military regime. The country has long been in Amnesty
International’s spotlight, while refugees tell of unimaginable torture,
rape and killing of civilians. The Nobel Peace Prize of 1991 was therefore
a well-placed tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi and the fight for democracy
through non-violent methods. Unfortunately, it was also a reminder of
the widespread breaches of human rights which take place in Burma.
We are sadly reminded of George Orwell’s description of the colonial
era in his 1936 novel, Burmese Days, which includes scenes that point
prophetically to the present situation with foreboding accuracy.
But why has this beautiful country, synonymous with Oriental
exoticism, turned away from the world and isolated itself in gratuitous
violence which, in the media, has been compared to Sadam Hussein’s
Iraq, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea and Ceausescu’s Romania?
In many of their reports, observers have referred to the fact that the
country’s problems are self-created. These problems are defined in such
stereotypical terms as military dictatorship, socialism, and totalitarian
one-party rule. The comparison made with the above-mentioned
regimes is telling and simple, yet explains nothing about the specific
conditions in Burma’s historical, social and cultural development that
have brought about the current situation. Many wondered how
Buddhists, with non-violence as their ideal, could perpetrate so many acts
of cruelty. Typically, reporting has focused on pseudo-psychological
explanations in the treatment of how nonviolence and non-confrontation
bring about an accumulation of aggressive feelings, which in turn find
expression in an almost volcanic eruption of violence.1 On the basis of
such theories and superficial comparisons with other violent regimes,
there is a pressing need for a detailed examination of the background of
this development, especially at this point in time when nationalism,
2 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA
ethno-religious conflict, and the division of states capture our attention

through the carnage left in their wake.
The initial explanation of Burma’s present situation must be sought in
the legacy of the colonial era, or rather in the nationalistic paranoia
which was generated by developments following independence in 1948
—a politically orchestrated paranoia linking fear of the disintegration of
both union and state with the foreign takeover of power and the
disappearance of Burmese culture. In this way the legacy of the colonial
era has been used as the rationale for isolation and the use of violence.
Burma has been gripped by a strong, almost religious nationalism
which has retained the expunging of the colonial heritage as its key
motivating force. This belief, which has legitimated the army’s
autocratic regime under General Ne Win since 1962, has not allowed
the creation of a more democratic society. Foreign influence must be
kept out with force and violence. Thus, the colonial era’s model of
society seems to have stunted the country’s development since the
regime has focused on this model in a manner bordering on paranoia.
During the last thirty years of military rule, this strategy has equated all
foreign presences with colonialism and imperialism, as reflected in state
propaganda. At the same time the regime has sought to keep Burmese
traditions within what could be called a modern version of the
traditional autocratic political structure.
This strategy has generated fear of change and fear of all foreign
influences and imported ideas. Aung San Suu Kyi describes this
deadlock: ‘[the] fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it’, and
adds that the population’s fear and feelings of humiliation must be
counteracted if change is to be possible. She uses Buddhist concepts in
her criticism of the regime, such as the four selfish qualities (agati)
which corrupt thought and thereby obstruct ‘the correct path’:
corruption by desire, hatred, aberration due to ignorance, and fear.
Corruption and fear are important elements in the relations of power in
Burma, and Aung San Suu Kyi says that these negative qualities must
be fought by all and in all individuals. She tries to inculcate civil courage
in a population that has been subdued by 3,000–5,000 killings,
imprisonment, violent torture, and the forced removal of entire areas of
1. For example, D. D. Gray’s article in the Danish newspaper Information (9

September 1988), entitled ‘De fredelige buddhister kan vaere både politisk
aktive og voldelige’ [The peaceful Buddhists can be both politically active and
violent] (Associated Press).
INTRODUCTION 3
Rangoon.2 She is therefore seen as the politician who stands purely in

her nationalism in opposition to Ne Win ‘the Culprit’ (as she describes
him) who is the symbol of corruption, the abuse of power and violent
oppression. She symbolises the spirit of her father, Aung San. The
regime accuses her of being in collusion with ‘foreigners’, namely the
British colonial power amongst others.
In this book I shall attempt to identify the relationship between some
of the factors contributing to this complex historical process: Burmese
nationalism’s fear of foreigners; a colonial era marked by violence; the
role of Buddhism in nationalism; the ethnic minorities; and an
autocratic political tradition. In analysing these historical conditions, I
intend to apply a simplification in the form of abstract models and
condensed descriptions. (The theoretical concepts are outlined in
Appendix 1.) This is at the risk of repro ducing colonialism’s and
nationalism’s one-sided understanding of the ‘essence’ of development.
Essentialisation is precisely the primary function of nationalism by
producing a simplification of a historical process. Its theory and
historical memory collapse complexities into a monolithic and
primordial model of the past in the present. Repeating the rhetoric of
nationalism runs the risk of making the same simplification. But there is
need for a more abstract, theoretical analysis of the generative elements
and contradictions of the processes. Such analyses are often absent in
the typically voluminous works on Burma, wherein the dominant
elements of Burmese development tend to be buried by detail.3
Whether or not it is possible to pin down some of the ingredients of
nationalism and the strategies of power will become evident on closer
examination of the country’s history. Initially the social hierarchy can
be considered by using ‘the club’ as a symbol of colonial society. The
club was not only a representative symbol, it was also a model of the
fundamental properties of the colonial system: a division of labour and
power based on race, class and culture as natural criteria of division.
2. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:180–185).

3. See M. Smith (1991:492)—an extremely important and very detailed
document.
4
1.
THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES
NOT ADMITTED!’
In any town in India the European club is the spiritual

citadel, the real seat of the British power, the Nirvana for
which native officials and millionaires pine in vain.1
Whilst one of Orwell’s characters in Burmese Days says that he hates

Orientals and that any hint of friendship towards them is an instance of
horrible perversity, the Burmans themselves were not too fond of these
‘foreigners from the West’2 who had conquered them and excluded them
from any share of power. In Rangoon, which the British had
transformed into the capital with straight streets and Victorian
architecture, there were three influential clubs: the Pegu, the Boat and
the Gymkhana. The Pegu Club was dominated by senior officials from
the Civil Service and the other two by the mercantile establishment.
Neither money nor high status could assure a Burman’s access to one of
the leading clubs in the capital. Race was the unavoidable criterion.3 To
the male colonisers the club and not the home was the centre of social
life.4 When Burma closed its borders to the outside world following the
1. G. Orwell (1977:17).
2. Kala pyu, ‘white kala or ‘English kala’. The term was used in the beginning
of the colonial period and referred to the fact that the colonisers came from
India. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42) and Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:4). A modern term
for ‘foreigner’ or ‘foreign national’ is nyaing-gan khar thar, ‘alien’ or ‘outsider’
is ta zein.
3. See N.F. Singer (1995) on the clubs in Rangoon, and C. Allen ed. (1987:
116), for a broader discussion of the relevance of club life for the colonial
power. There were clubs which admitted native members, but this always
created controversy. As a criterion, class was subordinate to race. Anglo-Indians
had their own clubs.
6 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’
military coup of 1962, this logic was turned on the foreigners from the
West: ‘The club is only open to Burmese.’5
British colonial policy was based upon the notion of the colonial
power’s determining role in keeping the country together with its many
different ethnic groups: Burmans, Mon, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin,
Rakhine, and immigrant Chinese and Indians—a multi-ethnic society
which the British believed that their Pax Britannica had served to gather
and save from despotism and ethnic conflict.
In Orwell’s book, the Indian doctor Veraswami praises the Pax
Britannica which Flory, the book’s main character, dismisses as ‘Pox
Britannica’. ‘We steal from Burma’, says Englishman Flory, whereas
the Indian admires ‘the white man’s burden’. The Burman protagonist
in Burmese Days, U Po Kyin, is portrayed as a parasite who exploits the
system through unbelievable intrigues. The Englishman has lost his
innocence and has become ‘the reluctant imperialist’, whilst the Indian
doctor and the Burman aspire to membership of the club with the pukka
sahib (the real gentleman). The Indian states (with his kala accent): ‘In
the club, practically he is a European, no calumny can touch him.’ A
club member is sacrosanct.6 He considers the Orientals to be inferior:
‘we have no humour; the British on the other hand modernise the
country.’ But he loses the battle for membership in the local club to the
unscrupulous scoundrel, U Po Kyin, who sees the Indian as a foreigner
hindering Burmese participation in the struggle for power. This cocktail
of apartheid, ambivalence and unscrupulous use of all avenues of power
has never been portrayed with more precision than in Orwell’s
masterpiece. The tragedy of Burma is that these contradictions still
occupy centre stage, long after the British went home. Pukka sahib and
his white man’s burden continue to haunt Burma—or more correctly,
are used as a spectre to legitimate tyranny and isolation.
A couple of grotesque examples illustrate this. Ambivalence in
attitudes to the English language, which was absent from the school
4. Furnivall (1956:307).
5. The term Burmese is used here to signify a citizen of the Union of Burma,
regardless of ethnic origin. A Burman is a member of the ethnic majority group.
See Glossary for further explanation.
6. G. Orwell (1977:45). Flory’s pessimistic view of Burma does not offer the
Burmese much hope for the future, and in fact strikes a chord with those who
blame all problems on the colonial era: ‘In fact, before we’ve finished we’ll
have wrecked the whole Burmese national culture. But we’re not civilising them,
we’re only rubbing our dirt on to them.’ (Ibid: 40.)
NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 7
curriculum for many years until reintroduced in 1981 when Ne Win’s

daughter Sanda failed an English university’s entrance exam - if the
rumours in circulation are true—is one such case. Foreign culture,
especially Western, is largely kept out. This applies also to individual
persons, for example Aung San Suu Kyi’s husband, who is English. The
regime dismisses the claim that Burma can be ruled by someone
married to a ‘foreigner’, one whose children therefore cannot be
considered Burmese.7 The constitution of 1982 defines citizenship as
one-dimensional: one has to prove that his/her ancestors lived in Burma
before the colonisation began in 1824, and that they belonged to one of
the indigenous ethnic groups. Indians, Chinese and Eurasians can only
obtain ‘associate citizenship’ and cannot hold high office. This attempt
to exploit the fear of foreign influence and the ambivalence still found
in relation to the former colonial power and to ethnic or national identity
form one clear symptom of Burma’s problematic condition.
Important incidents in Burma’s history show how the fear of losing
cultural identity, combined with the use of violence in the battle against
colonialism and for independence has developed. However, in order to
place these examples in the context of modern nationalism and the
present regime, it is necessary to outline how the Burmans regarded the
intrusion of colonialism into their lives. They saw the British as a threat
not just against their culture and religion, but also against the unity and
totality of the universe itself with its central tenents based on Buddhist
cosmology. Within this view of the world, to lose one’s religion,
language and culture is symptomatic of a loss of control of political,
economic and social relations. The universe is literally thrown askew. In
other words, Burman ethnic identity is not only culturally defined, but
also refers to an existence in a cosmological totality and in accordance
with its laws. This is a unified model, where all parts are largely
mutually dependent in direct relations of cause and effect. Without
central control there would be chaos.
The British colonial model—‘plural society’—was based on the
principle of ‘divide and rule’, where racial, ethnic, religious, social and
economic differences and contradictions were allowed to develop. The
central power controlled these contradictions via India, and the unity in
this world was found in the Empire and its global market. The local
7. In the colonial era it was considered almost treason for a British person to
marry a Burmese.
8 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’
society and culture were rendered subordinate to a common division of

labour.
These two models and their collision connect some of history’s most
important generative contradictions. Such models can also function as
heuristic aids in analysing and identifying the central tendencies in
Burma’s nationalistic strategies.8
8. In the description above, there is, of course, no suggestion that all Burman
and British actions in practice were and still are governed by reference to such
‘models’ and their rationale. The ‘models’ are analytical tools to explain
strategies—and strategies are expressions of the rationale in the producdon of
practice and in the perception and representation of historical processes (cf.
Bourdieu, 1990:131).
2.
THE VIOLENT ‘PACIFICATION’ OF
BURMA
The confrontation between the Burman world and British imperialism,

which escalated through incompatibility and intransigence, culminated
in the British conquest and ‘pacification’ of the last remnants of the
kingdom.
Pacification’ was an important concept in the language of
colonisation. The British believed that the country could only become
civilised and attain a democratic constitution, through which the
population would learn how to rule themselves, if the colonial power
was successful in introducing ‘peace’ to the country and in quelling all
armed resistance. This was brought about by the abolition of the
‘Oriental despotism’ in 1886, exemplified by the kingdom according to
the colonial power. King Thibaw and his family were driven into exile
in India. He and his queen Supayalat - nicknamed ‘soup-plate’ by
British soldiers—were taken in a narrow bullock carriage to the navy
steamer Thoorea whilst the British soldiers waved cheerfully and sang.1
Thibaw remained in exile until he died in 1916.
Great Britain had already conquered half of the kingdom in 1826 and
in 1852, and had taken over trade in rice, teak, precious stones, etc.
During the 1824–26 war, the British took over the great Shwe Dagon
pagoda in Rangoon and permitted their soldiers to enter while still
wearing their boots—a blatant act of profanity as Buddhists remove
their footwear when entering religious areas and their homes as a mark
of respect. In 1852 the British again attacked the fortified pagoda—the
central and unifying symbol for both Buddhism and the kingship. As the
soldiers swept across the countryside they ransacked pagodas for their
gold and silver Buddha statues.
1. E.C. V. Foucar (1946) gives a detailed, although somewhat antiBurmese,

description of the humiliating end of the monarchy.
10 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA
The British continued to insist on wearing shoes when entering

monasteries and pagodas, which they used to garrison soldiers during
‘pacification’. In 1886, the palace in Mandalay was renamed Fort
Dufferin and part of the palace, which had been a Buddhist monastery,
became the Upper Burma Club for the British officers. In the words of
Foucar: The hall of audience would serve admirably as the garrison
church…[the] altar before the Lion throne’ (1946:160). A monk who
proclaimed himself as ‘the ruler of the universe’ (setkya mìn), in
accordance with the Burman tradition of resistance, attempted to
overthrow the foreign occupation of the palace, but to no avail. The
centre of the state had now ceased to exist and the peacock throne was
transferred to Calcutta and placed on exhibition in a museum there.2
The British thereby concluded the political and cultural humiliation
of the Burman people, whose conceptual system was endorsed by the
all-dominating Buddhist cosmology. The removal of the king and his
throne signalled the end of the Burman kingdom and of Burman
Buddhist culture as everlasting and universal entities. According to the
cosmology, Buddhism and dhamma rule will decline before the new
Buddha arrives. The lack of recognition given to a leader of the Sangha
(thathanabaing) by the British was an obvious sign of imbalance in the
sacred-profane universe.
During the ‘pacification’ programme of the 1880s the British met
with tough resistance from the guerrilla forces, which in some cases
were led by monks. The monastic orders (Sangha) did not participate
directly in the rebellion, insofar as monks are not permitted to
circumvent the principle of non-violence. A monk, as a member of the
Sangha, must refrain from taking part in secular activities. But restraint
was not possible in situations where the monastic order was left without
influence due to a lack of royal protection and regular gifts from the
royal court and officials. The rebelling monks were therefore seen as
defending Buddhist teachings and the world order against collapse.3
Hence the Burmans considered them to be legitimate rebels. This
cosmological order was, as we shall see, based to a large degree upon
harmony between the religious and political spheres. The colonial
2. The peacock is still an important national symbol. It was used by the rebels
on their flag in 1886; the nationalists used the flag in the 1930s; and it is still
used by demonstrating students. Originally the dancing peacock was a symbol of
royal authority and an emblem on the throne in the informal audience hall
whilst the lion was the emblem on the throne in the official hall (Htin Aung,
1965: xi).
forces regarded the rebel monks as criminals, so-called dacoits, an

Anglo Indian term for gangs of armed robbers. In the colonial
perception the resistance was not a planned or even conscious act of
rebellion but dacoity: The Burmese had a traditional and hereditary love
of desultory fighting, raiding, gang robbery; and their inordinate
national vanity preserved vivid recollection of the time when they were
a conquering race.4
If the monks had to reject the ideal of non-violence in order to
resurrect the cosmos, then the British in turn employed the scorched-
earth policy in order to bring about ‘pacification’. Villages and stocks
of rice were burnt daily and the rebels were executed. A single military
unit was able to report the burning of forty-six villages, 639 houses and
509 Ibs of rice. Rewards were given for the capture of the monks
leading the rebellion. The rebels’ relatives were rounded up and
interned. The colonial power used the Christian minority, amongst
others the Christian Karen, to fight against the rebels. The Christians
presented the heads of monks and pocketed the reward.5 Hundreds of
dacoits—resistance fighters—were executed, including women and
children, in a village near Bassein. Rudyard Kipling visited the British
troops in 1889 and narrated the atrocities in his poem The Grave of a
Hundred Heads’. It is based on the soldiers’ recollections of the
massacre in the village of Pabengmay. These selected verses should
suffice to give an impression of the barbarism of the head-hunting
during ‘pacification’:
They made a pile of their trophies

High as a tall man’s chin,
Head upon head distorted,
Set in a sightless grin,
Anger and pain and terror
Stamped on the smoke-scorched skin.
3. The opposition between the withdrawn holy order of Buddhism and its
secular political dimension is thoroughly analysed in Tambiah (1976) and Ling
(1979). The main work on the Sangha and state in Burma is Mendelson (1975).
4. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 1907, vol. 5, p. 176. Oriental
and India Office Collections, British Library, London.
5. The ‘pacification’ has been described by Chief Commissioner Sir Charles
Crosthwait (1968 [1912]), who participated; see also D. Woodman (1962), M.
Adas (1982), and M. Aung-Thwin (1985).
12 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA
Subadar Prag Tewarri

Put the head of the Boh [‘chief]
On the top of the mound of triumph,
The head of his son below
With the sword and the peacock-banner,
That the world might behold and know.
Then a silence came to the river,
A hush fell over the shore,
And Bohs that were brave departed,
And Sniders squibbed no more;
For the Burmans said
That a kullah’s head Must be paid for with heads five score.6
The Christian participation is certainly an element in the explanation of

many monks’ active participation in the rebellion. The colonial power
believed that its primary assignment was to thwart the rebels, whom
they considered politically illegitimate. The Burmans fought not only
against a foreign occupying force but also against the disintegration of
their entire social and cultural order, as defined by Buddhist cosmology.
A proclamation from the Royal Council of Ministers (Hluttaw) of 7
November 1885 makes this clear:
Those heretics, the English kalas, having most harshly made

demands calculated to bring about the impairment and destruction
of our religion, the violation of our national traditions and
customs, and the degradation of our race, are making a show and
preparation as if to wage war upon our state. To uphold the
religion, to uphold the national honour, to uphold the country’s
interests, will bring about threefold good—good of our religion,
good of our master, and good of ourselves, and will gain for us
the important result of placing us on the path to the celestial
regions and to Nibbana [Nirvana].7
Thus the Burman resistance leaders regarded the war as religious.

This is demonstrated in an order issued by the Myinzaing Prince:
6. See Htin Aung (1965:210–211). Kullah is used by Kipling to mean

white man, i.e., British. Kipling made a single very brief visit to Rangoon
and Moulmein.
The heretic, savage, and lawless kalas have now entered Burma
and are destroying religious edifices, such as pagodas,
monasteries. And the kalas are using in the profane way the white
umbrellas and other insignia which belong only to royalty.8
This period entered Burman historical representation as the complete

humiliation of their society, a literal trampling upon their religion and
culture, and the distortion of their universe. Religion and violence
combined as a representation of colonial subjugation. This violence in
the broad sense of the word is both the destruction of life and property
by force and the act of intervention using the freedom of some to
deprive others of their freedom and identity. The memory of the
historical experience from the colonial ‘pacification’ is crucial to an
analysis of the present nationalism. It is thus relevant to compare the
above-cited proclamation with a recent one from the SLORC. Although
the context is different, the rhetoric points indirectly to history:
Not only the Tatmadaw [army] but also each and every citizen is
dutybound to safeguard independence, sovereignty—Myanmar
exercising basic rights most suited for custom, culture of [the] national
peoples.9
7. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42). She writes from a Burmese point of view and
emphasises the invasion not merely as a territorial and political annexation but
as an attempt to destroy culture and society.
8. Ni Ni Myint (1983:194) shows that the resistance was organised before
Thibaw was exiled. Myinzaing Prince, a son of King Mindon, included Shan,
Kachin, Palaung and Karen in his force and fought under the peacock banner
around Mandalay. Monks were crucial in organising his resistance.
9. New Light of Myanmar, 6 June 1997.
14
3.
BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND
POLITICAL POWER
In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects Buddhism as a religious

order. The monastic order (Sangha) cannot exist without the state’s
protection and gifts. In return, the monks secure king and laymen access
to religious merit—the accumulation of which improves their kamma
(karma). This is realised through ceremonies and gifts to monks or,
better still, through the building of pagodas. However, the ruling power
is ‘hot’1—it may be necessary to use violence in the defence of the
country. The king might autocratically order the execution of rebellious
relatives and officials. In return, the monks must keep the precepts
regarding ahimsa (non-violence); that is, they must not kill living
creatures. Then, like now, monastaries and monks protected against
arbitrary tyranny. Monasteries were a source of sanctuary, and monks
could intercede for someone who was condemned or who had to pay an
inordinately large amount of tax.
The cosmos is thus divided into a sacred and a profane sphere, which
are closely linked and mutually dependent. Both are subordinate to
dhamma2 or the law or teaching of existence, its beings, its order and its
physical and metaphysical powers, as recognised by the Buddha. But it
is important to emphasise that the state and the exercise of power do not
in themselves have a religious character.
On the contrary, they can be seen as being antithetical to Buddhist
ethics, expressing one of the worst evils of existence.
1. Secular power can be described as ‘hot’ compared with the religious sphere,
where Buddhism is a means to avoid violence and anger.
2. Dhamma covers several different conceptual areas and can only be translated
in context. Its content embraces the following: ‘correct behaviour, morality,
doctrine, the law of nature and its conditions’, as related in the teachings of the
Buddha.
Buddhist cosmology is a total model, which covers all aspects of

existence, including ethical and ontological principles.3 But in the
process of institutional elaboration, the Sangha is, in a manner of
speaking, a sanctuary from secular society. Here, men live in celibacy
and obey the 227 disciplinary rules and the optimal practice of ethical
rules. Laymen, on the other hand, can make do with five to eight basic
rules. The monks within the Sangha maintain justice so that the
monasteries do not become sanctuaries for criminals, swindlers or
usurpers. However, it was quite normal that a new king would try to
secure control of the Sangha. This took the form of the application of
more stringent rules, whereby disobedient or opposing elements were
purged. The next step was to build pagodas and raise spires on the top—
forming an umbrella-like crown (htì). This is a sign of glory (hpòn) and
power and can be compared with the king’s crown. But the concept of
hpòn is also included in the Burman word for monk (hpòngyi- ‘great
glory’). In this case the word implies, on the contrary, a spiritual and
moral honour achieved through asceticism and knowledge of dhamma.
The monastic order and kingship were thus two separate parts of the
cosmos. The king’s hpòn, as a sign of great kamma, can be read in his
personal abilities and behaviour. This also applies to political leaders to
this day. The monastic order, on the other hand, is an unchallengeable
and open zone with equal access for all laymen who seek to attain
religious merit (kutho) regardless of rank, wealth and power. The
Sangha is divided up into different sects with different views on dhamma
and rules for their monks, whilst each separate monastery possesses a
great deal of autonomy.4
Prior to the colonial era the monastaries functioned as schools where
boys learnt to read and write. Learning was synonymous with learning
dhamma and being indoctrinated in the Buddhistic cosmological and
ontological principles. Earlier, monks enjoyed great respect locally.
They were wise men who knew astrology, alchemy and medicine. Such
a hsaya (teacher) was an important person in the local society.
3. See Appendix 1 concerning the following concepts: cosmology, ideology,

model and ontology.
4. Mendelson (1975:58) describes the Sangha as an aggregation of individual
ascetics rather than a church. Monks belong to monasteries (kyaung) and branch
monasteries (taiks) dominated by six main sects.
BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 17
Royal Power
The monarchy was absolutist and dynastic. It was based upon
endogamy; the queens were often the kings’ half-sisters. There was also
a harem, where daughters of officials and tributary vassals lived. Some
of the concubines came from minority groups. Accession to the throne
was often accompanied by a palace revolution which tended to be a very
bloody affair, where queens and concubines sought to get their sons into
power.5
The king and his council (hluttaw) controlled trade in all important
produce such as rice, timber and precious stones. They also made
decisions on war, peace and the moving of the capital. But to gain and
retain power, the king had to administer his absolutist monarchy in
accordance with Buddhistic cosmology and ethics which dictate a
number of attributes. He must be a dhammaraja and rule in accordance
with dhamma and the ten royal attributes.6 The king’s most important
task was to protect Buddhism, to ensure welfare and prosperity, and to
show charity. Peace, prosperity and the absence of natural catastrophes
depended upon the laity and monks being content with their lot.
Harmony in the universe provided the laity with the possibility of
accumulating religious merit. As mentioned earlier, this underlined the
view that the king possessed honour (hpòn-daw—‘royal glory’) as an
expression of good merit both in earlier incarnations and his present
existence.
A person became a mìn (king or leader) because he had a kamma
(kan) which made him leader. The king was ‘Lord of glory and Lord of
Kamma’ (hpòn-shin-kan-shiri). Through his prestigious status as a
cakkavatti (‘ruler of the universe’ or setkya mìn in Burman), the king
could maintain law and order in the cosmos. Conversely, dissension and
lack of welfare were indicators of declining hpòn and kamma. The
5. The last king, Thibaw, executed eighty members of the royal family on his
accession to the throne in 1879. In 1884 he executed the rest of the royal family
(around 200), who had been imprisoned. In this way European historical
representations of ‘oriental despotism’ were confirmed. The Burmans gained a
reputation as a gruesome and violent people. See for example Jesse (1946).
6. The ten rules, or rather ideals, relevant for a dhammaraja are as follows:
almsgiving, observance of the Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude,
gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the use of violence in
the relationship with the people, forbearance, and non-opposition against
people’s will (Maung Maung Gyi, 1983:21; Michael Aung-Thwin (1983:54);
Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:171–173).
driving force of the cosmos was not conceptualised as an autonomous,

self-centred ego, but rather kamma was the result of earlier and present
interactions. These human interactions are in turn connected with
individuals’ knowledge of dhamma, their intention and practice in
relation to the ethical rules. Whilst kamma follows on from earlier
incarnations, it can be increased/decreased in accordance with changing
conditions. The state, the king, officials, peasants, men and women are
all subordinated to the law—but in a hierarchy of accumulated reward.
Kamma is thus the central ontological principle. Nevertheless, a stable
economy and peace were the fundamental criteria ensuring the
collective possibilities for the individual accumulation of kamma. The
king was at the top of the hierarchy, a natural auto crat, but, as with
everything in the cosmos, he was subject to its law of impermanence.
Furthermore, the king was the lord of the land and the water’, that is
the lord of all living things. He also stood at the head of the thirty-seven
nats—spiritual ancestors, often of royal descent and including a Shan
king and a prince from the Mon people. These spirits, which also
include the victims of the palace revolutions, can disturb the living if
they are not included in the sharing of religious merit. The nats presided
by Thagya Mìn (Indra) are guardians of the royal household (the state)
and of the households of commoners. The Shwezigon Pagoda in Pagan
is the ceremonial headquarters of the thirty-seven nats and thus the
most important royal symbol.7 By including local spirit cults and their
leaders in some instances, Burmese dynasties maintained a formal
hegemony over the minorities. Conversely, these local cults and their
leaders often borrowed elements from the dynastic model and Buddhist
cosmology. In times of decline, princes, monks or peasants could claim
to possess the royal attributes—as long as they could convince others of
the righteousness of their claim. These pretenders to the throne, called
mìn laùng (‘king in the making’), sought to prove that they had
potential as cakkavatti, dhammaraja and kammaraja, that is, that they
possessed the necessary religious merit. Burma’s history is alive with
individuals calling themselves mìn laùng and seeking to legitimate
rebellion by applying Buddhist cosmology and its rules.
The model thus contains two genealogical principles, both of which
incorporate relations with spirits/forebears and kinship relations with
persons of dynastic birth. And yet it is important to stress that ethnic
origin was not a significant factor in relation to a mìn laùngs credibility.
7. Htin Aung (1959).

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 19
Mon, Karen and Shan have all performed this role. The important factor
in relation to power was whether or not the individual declared himself
to be a Buddhist, namely one who pays respect to the Buddha by trying
to live in accordance with ethics (sila) and the giving of alms (dana).8
The cosmology could always credit or discredit a ruler or a rebel. A
situation with deteriorating welfare as well as higher taxes, conflicts and
violence, or famines and natural catastrophes can signal the end of a
dynasty and the approach of a new era of peace and prosperity. The
concepts and ideals of the Buddhist cosmology are universal and
everlasting, and they constitute a total model of the society and for its
future development. The cosmology implies a utopian vision of a
coming Buddha (bodhisattd), who is to appear approximately 5,000
years after Gautama (i.e., within the next 2,500 years). The coming
Buddha is called Ariyametteya.
During the last part of this era the Buddhist ethics of sila and dana
will degenerate, and war and misfortune will prevail. A setkya mìn has
to clean the immoral and chaotic world and prepare the revival of
dhamma before the coming Buddha can enter the world.
Both kings and mìn làung rebels have ascribed to themselves the
attributes of setkya mìn and bodhisatta. Secular power and the universal
ethics of Buddhism are thus closely interrelated in this model. These
elements could be interpreted as support for an autocratic ruler who has
the ability to re-establish the world order of dhamma, including ethics
and communal welfare. The autocratic element in this model inhered in
the fact that all central practice of power can in principle be legitimised
as necessary for the maintenance of the dhamma kingdom as a unified
entity, with regards to kamma and harmony, so that the kingdom can
receive the coming Buddha. Individuals, regimes and their attributes can
thus be brought into dispute, whereas the above-mentioned regularities,
which both connect and disconnect the sacred and profane parts of
existence, legitimise the use of violence when the dhamma kingdom is
threatened.
8. Until recently, most of the scholars writing on Burma’s history have

maintained that ethnicity was the main contradiction in pre-colonial society, and
that Burmans were becoming culturally dominant. Analyses by Lieberman
(1978) and Taylor (1982) have shown that ethnic oppo sitions were subordinate
to that between Buddhist and non-Buddhist, i.e. whether or not the population in
question held a position in relation to religion and state, or were not included in
these tributary relations. However, there were some cultural differences in
ceremonies and rituals between ethnic groups in their practice of Buddhism.
This model for a total cosmic-ontological-political unity has survived

despite the attempt by a foreign power to destroy it, thereby making it
the quintessence of both Burman (ethnic) cultural identity and a part of
modern Burman nationalism. We shall return to this at a later point.
The British made radical inroads into the universe of dhamma, as
they abolished the monarchy and withdrew official support for
Buddhism and the Sangha. Thus, a foreign power intervened directly in
dhamma and kamma and therefore in the conditions that facilitated the
existence of society, culture and individuals, as laid down through
cosmology and ontology. Colonialism usurped not only power but also
the order of the world itself. This intervention was a key influence on
the construction of Burma’s modern social identity.
4.
THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE
IDENTITY
To be Burman (bama) today refers to language, literature, tradition,

history, etc. This summarises a modern sense of nationality more or less
in the form of an imagined community (Anderson 1991). But in the old
state and kingdom the dominant identity was determined by (a) whether
one was a Buddhist, and (b) whether one was a member of an alliance with
the ruling dynasty, that is, the place one occupied in the tributary
hierarchy. This could be as part of the king’s court (officials, craftsmen
and soldiers), or as supplier of tribute via local officials, or as a more
distant vassal, who supplied a symbolic tribute from afar. Finally, a
large part of the population were bonded ‘slaves’.1 Most were bonded
(indentured) labourers, who could buy their freedom, unlike the
prisoners of war. The population around the capital was often ethnically
mixed: Burmans, Shan, Mon and other minorities, as well as prisoners
of war from Siam (Thailand). Identity and status within the tributary
system were inseparable.
The character of the regime was experienced by the population
entirely through local officials and how these officials patronised their
clients amongst the peasants. Most of the king’s men liable to corvée
lived around the capital whilst, for example, the Karen in the mountains
paid tribute only occasionally in natural resources or as suppliers of
provisions to the army. They held a peripheral position but not because
of ethnic identity; the Buddhist Pwo Karen held a prominent position in
the southern kingdom dominated by the Mon people until 1750.
1. Hierarchy of commoners (following Aung-Thwin, 1984): Ahmudan: ‘bearer

of duty’, conducted Crown service, which included military service (corvée);
Hpaya kyun: glebe bondsmen working for the monasteries; Athi: non-bonded;
they paid capitation tax in natural resources or money; Kyun: bonded
individuals (‘slaves’).
The individual’s place in this system was therefore dependent on the

following criteria: kamma from earlier lives and present accumulated
religious merit, combined with tributary status and rank. As stated
above, there was a connection between kamma and status in this life.
Therefore status as a Burman would be unthinkable without
acknowledging Buddhism as a shared frame of reference. How—and
how much—one practised one’s religion was, on the other hand, not as
decisive as accepting the Buddhist dhamma and subjecting oneself to
cosmology and recognising its legitimacy. But what of culture as a
criterion for identity? Culture was apparently subordinate to religion
and tributary status. This did not prevent Burmans from considering
certain minorities such as some of the Karen, as wild and uncivilised,
but this status was assigned predominantly to non-Buddhists.
The teachings and cosmology of Buddhism are universalistic and, to
my knowledge, do not discriminate on the basis of ethnic differentiation.
It is a modern phenomenon to elevate culture as the dominant and
exclusive marker of identity. In Burma, the Buddhist cosmology was
decisive for social, political and cultural identity. This identity was
revealed when threatened by external forces, namely when the harmony
between the sacred and the profane worlds was broken and when a
foreign religion (and power) contested the indigenous model of the
universe. Therefore, the important role of Buddhist cosmology in
defining the dominant identity as based on Burman cultural values is
best explained through the confrontation with the Christian
missionaries. Whilst Buddhism and Christianity both claim to be
universalistic systems of ideas, their confrontation in the colonial
context expressed a particularistic cultural clash. This paradox seems to
be extremely important in understanding the present xenophobia in
Burma.
Christian Intervention
American Baptist missionaries came to Burma in 1813. They did not
receive permission to convert Burmans and had no success until the
intervention of the British. King Bagyidaw would not allow conversion
because the Baptists demanded a total break with Buddhist thought, not
just with ceremonies and the monks’ and Buddha’s teachings but also
with cosmology and ontology themselves. In such circumstances,
Christian Burmans were not simply people who broke with Burman
culture and religion—they were disloyal citizens of the Buddhist
kingdom of Burma. Foreigners could certainly practise their own
THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE IDENTITY 23
religion but on condition that they did not intervene in the dhamma-
ruled universe.
This is extremely important for understanding the Burmans’ self-
identification in relation to the surrounding world, not because the
notions of the last century persist unchanged but because reference to
this tradition is woven into present political strategies and models.
According to Father Bigandet, Christian Burmans were labelled kala
(‘foreigners’); the comparatively few Burmans who converted were
permanently placed outside of society as aliens: they lost their
nationality after they turned away from the religion of their ancestors.2
The king asked the Missionary Judson about the Christian Burmans:
‘Are they real Burmans? Do they dress like other Burmans?’3 The king
quickly perceived that Christian fundamen-talism and its absolute
demand for subjugation were a forewarning of attempts to conquer
Burma by both usurping the cosmological order itself and changing the
culturally defined content. The Baptists would not allow any reverence
for monks, be it in the form of gift-giving in return for religious merit or
education in the monasteries. This was regarded as idolatry and meant
expulsion from the Baptist sect. For missionaries, Burma was controlled
by an idolatrous despotism and tyranny, which inhibited salvation and
civilisation. They did not hide their intention to convert the whole world
into the disciples of Jesus. Whilst demanding total subjugation, the
missionaries also began to reorganise everyday life and work. Work
was measured by time and the sabbath was to be observed. This was
followed by the teaching of European culture, from learning the English
language to ideas on order and cleanliness and ‘shaking hands’—an
important part of the Christian, civilised identity.4 This identity was
based on an auto nomous self, subjugated to a belief in salvation, and
marked by morality and hard work. In this way, Burman culture became
synonymous with paganism and something less civilised, which was
incompatible with Christian identity.
2. ‘The few natives that became converts … were called Kalas, because in the
opinion of the Burmese they had embraced the religion of the Kalas and had
become bonafide strangers, having lost their nationality’ (Bigandet, [1887]
1996:4). See also H. Trager (1966).
3. Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1823, vol. 4, p. 215.
4. See Comaroff and Comaroff (1989), where a similar process in South Africa
is portrayed and precisely analysed; and Asad (1993), who ties together
Christianity and power.
Seen from a Buddhist Burman perspective, Christianity was, and still

is, intolerant, arrogant and absolutist. Christian conversion thus
generated fear of estrangement from what defined Burman identity as
well as the foundation of the kingdom and its subjects among other ethnic
groups (Shan, Mon, Karen and others). If large sections of these
minorities now became like the foreigners, the Europeans could easily
assume power. This is exactly what happened in the three colonial wars
of conquest in 1824, 1852 and 1885. Even though the king forbade
missionaries from handing out books and missions from operating in the
areas of the country he controlled after 1826, this could not prevent the
conversion of those Karen who were not well versed in Buddhism.
These Sgaw Karen from the delta of the Irrawaddy River in the south of
Burma held the lowest position in the dynastic hierarchy. Apparently
they had no direct protectors amongst state officials and as such they
saw not only deliverance but also advancement through the ranks of
power in their alliance with the Baptists.
When the British invaded the kingdom in 1852, which was an event
brought about in part by intrigues created by some missionaries, the
Christian Karen aided the army, killing or capturing many Burmans.5
The Burmans took revenge by burning many of the Christian villages
and crucifying a Karen pastor. Such events prefaced a religious war—an
important part of the colonialisation process. Thus religion was brought
into politics as something irretrievably connected with ethnio-national
identity, and which had to be protected through the use of violence. The
anti-colonial struggle developed into a fundamentalistic nationalism,
and a struggle for survival which legitimised the use of violence. The
following decades bore witness to constant clashes between Christians
and Buddhists. Missionaries disrupted Buddhist cere monies by
arrogantly undermining the monks’ authority and entering into
arguments with them, while Christians were abducted and their villages
were ransacked.
In 1856 a large rebellion was started around Bassein in the Irrawaddy
Delta by a Karen mìn laùng (‘king in the making’). The rebellion spread
and thousands of Buddhist Karen from the mountains in the Salween
area joined forces with some Kayah and Shan. The Karen built a pagoda
5. See Pollak (1979). Immediately before the war the Burmese governor of
Rangoon and the American missionary Kincaid had a flerce argument. The
governor said: ‘Christianity is aimed to destroy every other religion. You are
getting all people over to your side, for you make them think well of you and
your doctrine’, Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1852, vol. 32, p. 69.
in the mountains on top of which they raised the symbol of royal power,
the spire (htì). It was to be the end of foreign rulers—a Karen was to be
king. According to prophecy, a Karen king would come to rule over
Pegu, an old royal city northeast of Rangoon—a king who would, it
must be stressed, follow dhamma and the cosmological principles. The
British were thus forced to enter a difficult and bloody guerrilla war
against the Buddhist Karen and their allies, who also attacked the
Christian Karen. The colonial power described this mìn laùngas an
‘adventurer and evilly-disposed person’,6 a bewildered and ignorant
Karen who exploited the weakened state of the Burman kingdom in
order to achieve personal power (see Chapter 14).
The religious violence culminated in 1887 during the final conquest.
As mentioned previously, an exceptional event occurred after King
Thibaw was sent into exile: monks in their yellow robes engaged
directly in the organisation of guerrilla troops. The foreign element was
to be hunted and driven out. In return the missionaries requested and
received weapons from the British: ‘We are belligerent’, ‘God is with
us, tyranny and Buddhism are a dying monster’, they enthusiastically
exclaimed. The rebels killed Christians and burned villages. The army
reciprocated and Christian Karen captured monks or delivered their
heads for a reward of 25 rupees. Many heads were delivered, including
that of a leading monk (Mayangyung hpòngyi), whose head alone
fetched a reward of 5,000 rupees—a small fortune. ‘It is Buddhism in
arms against Christianity’, a missionary said.7
This mixture—expressing itself as a religious war with ethnic
connotations—constituted a monstrosity that in later years, right up
until independence, was a permanent element of Burmese nationalism.
Religion and ethnicity were, as mentioned above, not excluded from the
Burman understanding of self-identity prior to the arrival of the British
and the missionaries; however, they were not exclusive criteria.
Furthermore, ethnicity was not connected with political independence
6. Burma Gazetteer, 1910, Salween District, vol. A, p. 2. The same source calls
the rebellion ‘a most formidable insurrection’. On the other hand, some
missionaries and officials denounced the leader as yet another Karen prophet—a
vulgar impostor, making a lot of noise. There was no evidence supporting the
notion that the Burman king was behind the rebellion, or that there was general
discontent in relation to the tax system. Only the most insightful of colonial
officials and missionaries located the roots of this strategy in the cosmology and
understood the meaning and seriousness which was underlined by a
simultaneous rebellion in India, the so-called great Sepoy mutiny.
as in the European construction of ethnic and national identity,

synonymous with an autonomous and nation-state. However,
colonisation in Burma brought with it the developments occurring
within European nationalism.
Karen Nationalism
The Karen National Association (KNA) was founded in 1881 as an
association of Baptist churches.8 It was the forerunner of the present
Karen National Union (KNU), and sought the leading role in a pan-
Karen nationalist movement. It played a key role in the run-up to
independence, with the aim of attaining an independent state protected
by the colonial power. The KNU organised the 1949 rebellion, which
now seems to have entered its final phase after fifty years of fighting.
During the 1880s, Christianity gained a foothold amongst the Kachin
of northern Burma. This was the beginning of the Kachin independence
movement. Following ‘pacification’, the British began to govern Burma
in different areas, whereby Kayah’s small principalities were conceived
of as independent states (called Karenni)? formally placed outside the
colonial administration; Shan, Kachin and part of the Salween district
came to be known as the ‘excluded area’ in relation to ‘Ministerial
Burma’ (see Map 2 overleaf showing excluded frontier areas in 1946).
This model was based on ethnic pluralism, that is to say, joint economy
and politics in conjunction with the British Empire, but with cultural
segregation as the criterion of internal political administration.
This division was argued by reference to indirect rule via the Shan
princes (sawbwas) and Kachin duwas (chiefs). In 1922 the Shan princes
agreed to combine their principalities (möng or muang) to form a
federation. By entering into a federation, the sawbwas lost control over
education and the police. Nevertheless they agreed because they were
7. See Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1886, vol. 66.

8. See Appendix 2 on the Karen organisations. See further Gravers (1996b), on
the history of Karen nationalism.
9. According to Crosthwaite (1968:202), who headed the administration of
‘pacification’ in the 1880s, Eastern Kayah had to accept a tributary status under
the British queen, ‘in accordance with established custom’. The territories
classified as ‘excluded’ by the British previously enjoyed a high degree of
independence, although they were part of the Burmese kingdom at the time of
annexation, and thus considered part of the royal domain. The British still
regarded these as independent states.
worried about losing their hereditary rights and being totally integrated
into Burma proper.
The colonial power thus divided the country according to a mountain-
valley dichotomy, which was both political and cultural. The mountains
comprised ‘the frontier areas’ with their ‘tribal’ peoples, who had not
yet reached a sufficiently civilised state to be included under the same
administration policy as ‘Ministerial Burma’, which was a part of India.
The mountain peoples were under the direct rule of the British
governor.10
Following ‘pacification’, the flow of immigrants from India and China
increased significantly. The Indians were soldiers (sepoys),
moneylenders and casual labourers. The Indian moneylenders increased
their landownership in the rich Irrawaddy Delta during the 1930s world
crisis, as low prices on the world market forced the Burmans into
irrevocable debt. Prior to the Second World War there were
approximately one million Indians in Burma and over half of the
population of Rangoon was Indian.11 Between one-third and a quarter
of the Indian population fled from the Japanese whilst those remaining
adjusted themselves to their new sahib, with a willingness not approved
of by the Burmans.12 The Chinese population, in turn, numbered
approximately 350,000 prior to the war. They were involved
particularly in trade.
Thus the Burmans could easily ascertain with bitterness that other
ethnic groups dominated many areas of employment: doctors, nurses
(often Karen women who were also preferred as nannies), soldiers and
seasonal farm workers. British firms employed Indians and Karen rather
than Burmans. This trend in immigration, together with the colonial
power’s use of Indians in many of the lower administrative positions,
created yet another ethnic and—in part—religious opposition, which
can still be felt, for example, in the great upsurge of anti-Muslim
agitation and conflict in Arakan since 1991, which sent 300,000 people
into Bangladesh as refugees.
Constant strikes and demonstrations against the colonial power took
place in 1938. Tensions between Indians and Burmans also appeared in
10. See Silverstein (1980) on the British policy of divide and rule.
11. Taylor (1987:127).
12. According to U Maung Maung (1989:69–70), a general feeling of delight
pervaded the country on the forced departure of the British and their Indian
‘servants’ in 1942.
Map 2: Excluded Area 1946 (Source: Tinker, 1983–1984)

the form of an unpleasant mixture of religious and racial/ethnic

opposition. Newspapers expressed the fear that mixed marriages
between Indian Hindus or Muslims and Burman women would lead to
the women being forced to renounce Buddhism. Such marriages came
to be regarded as a threat to religion and ‘racial identity’. However,
inter-marriages were quite rare, but the mixture of economic
exploitation by Indian chettyar or chetti-kala (moneylenders), race,
religion and culture challenged the population with an alarming force
and during the ensuing riots more than 1,000 people died.13
In 1931 Burmans numbered approximately 17,000 in the public
administration while there were 14,800 Indians and 1,644 Eurasians. The
Indians and Eurasians (descendants of the British and Burmese)
dominated the middle ranks under the British in the rail and post
services. The Karen played a comparatively prominent role within the
military, police and health services, and as teachers -especially the
Christian Karen, who comprised approximately 15 per cent of the Karen
population. Eurasians numbered approximately 20,000 and were
dependent upon the charity of the British to procure education and
employment. On the whole they were better educated than Burmans but
they were nevertheless social outcasts. Orwell describes these ‘half-
castes’ and their social position in Burmese Days (p. 117), when Flory
has to answer to whether or not one socialises with them: ‘Good
gracious, no. They’re complete outcasts.’ They could be used to guard
Burman prisoners or as clerks but they were looked down upon by both
sides.
This multi-ethnic colonial model has been labelled the ‘plural
society’ and has been defined and critically assessed by colonial official
J.S. Furnivall:
Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and
language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but
only in the market-place. There is a plural society, with different
sections of the community living side by side, but separately,
within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there
is a division of labour along racial lines…the union cannot be
dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.14
13. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:10) has commented upon the significance of this
fear. She says that mixed marriages were a blow against ‘the very roots of
Burmese manhood and racial purity’. See also KhinYi (1988:96).
Thus, the colonial power established its hegemony with an inbuilt

doomsday prophecy: when the colonial union model disintegrates,
everything collapses into chaos. It is precisely this fear which has
fuelled the last thirty years of military rule. This model contained an
acknowledgement of cultural differences, due to different stages on the
evolutionary ladder, leading necessarily to a division of labour based on
race. As we shall see later on, race still plays a role in nationalist
political rhetoric.
The pluralistic model’s division of labour was also reflected in class
relations. The middle classes were dominated by Indians, while
prominent Burman political leaders in the 1930s were often dependent
on Indian financial backing of their political ventures. These leaders
were usually lawyers and rarely independent businessmen. In addition,
the Indians were interested in allying themselves with Burman
politicians in order to assure their influence in banking and trade
circles.15
The wholesale trade in provisions and medicine was dominated by
Indians (as was banking and moneylending). Obviously the Europeans
controlled the large oil, timber, mining and transport firms. This
unequal class relationship can be proved by examining the taxation
system in Rangoon, where the Indians contributed 55 per cent of all
taxes, the Europeans 15 per cent and the Burmans 11 per cent.16 The rest
came from all other groups. This distorted development is an important
factor that has augmented the ethnic race-related oppositions and
emphasised that the kala controlled everything. This was also
demonstrated by the composition of the student body. The educational
system favoured Christians via the mission schools. In the 1930s two-
thirds of university students came from the minority ethnic groups,
including Indians, who, for example, comprised one-third of the
medical students.17
In the nineteenth century, the British attempted to use the monastic
schools to teach English, geography and mathematics, but many monks
were opposed to this as they considered these subjects as anti-Buddhist.
14. Furnivall (1956:304, my emphasis). Furnivall’s Fabianism inspired some of

the young Burman nationalists. He was U Nu’s advisor in the 1950s.
15. Taylor (1981, 1987) proves the political importance of the poorly developed
Burman middle class and the Indian influence on Burman politics, at times
underlined by economic support. The disclosure of this connection cost Ba Maw
his position as prime minister in 1939.
The primary goal of the Christian schools was to promote conversion to

Christianity and only thereafter to educate and civilise. The colonial
power, however, wanted education to be a part of the division of labour
and colonial rule. The missionaries created deeper ethnic divisions by
favouring those minority groups they converted, namely the Karen,
Kachin and Chin. In the 1930s, they realised that if Buddhist Burmans
acquired greater influence or even independence, this policy could work
against their interests. Futhermore, educational policy became the
fundamental issue of the Burman national movement, which was led by
students. Thus the colonial power realised quite early on that the
division of labour along racial lines resulted in unintended opposition.
In order to create a united identity out of this plurality, a ‘committee to
ascertain and advise how the imperial idea may be inculcated and
fostered in schools and colleges in Burma’ was founded in 1917. This
consisted of eight British senior officials, four missionaries and only
two Burmans. Symbols such as the Union Jack and the national anthem
were to be promoted, as was Burma’s own history and literature—as
part of the Empire. A sense of ‘unity of Empire’ was to be created: one
Empire—many cultures; one hegemonic identity above the many.
This political and economic policy of divide and rule, with its total
opposition between the club mentality notion of ‘segregation’ and the
unification of the pluralistic society within a single union, expressed
itself in the form of a hegemonic set of conventions and stereotypes
whereby ethnic, religious and cultural differences became the yardstick
of national identity and political power. Some examples taken from the
period preceding the Second World War will show how xenophobia and
fear ingrained themselves in the ruling mentality.
16. Taylor (1987:133–36).

17. The division of students in Rangoon University according to religion
indicates the following: Buddhists 32.2%, indigenous Christians 14.5%,
Europeans and Anglo-Burmans 9.9%, Hindus 29.8%, Muslims 5.3% and others
(encl. Sikhs) 8.0% (Bless, 1990:252). His book includes a well-documented
analysis of the division of labour under colonial rule.
32
5.
BUDDHISM, XENOPHOBIA AND
REBELLION IN THE 1930S
Following the ‘pacification’ and its humiliation of the Burman social

order, Buddhism returned as a political medium in 1906 when the
Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) was established in
response to Christian dominance.1 The YMBA was an imitation of the
YMCA but it was a political organisation meant as an alternative to
Christian influence. It was especially attractive to young Burmans who
had been educated in the West. The YMBA’s goal was to halt Western
influence and to regain respect for Burman culture as well as for
Buddhism. This was achieved through ‘no footwear in the pagodas’
campaigns, for example. However, the Buddhist and anti-Christian
content was soon reinforced with agitation against foreign power and
presence.
At first, the movement’s founders, who were mainly young
barristers, were careful not to provoke the colonial power nor to be
accused of sedition in the event of securing employment for themselves.
These young men, with Ba Pe at the fore, were legislators and reformers
who demanded Burmese participation in government. U Maung Maung
has described the YMBA as an alternative to the most powerful of the
British clubs: ‘The Rangoon YMBA had become by 1908 not the
Buddhist counterpart of its Western archtypical association but really
the Burman equivalent of the British Pegu Club.’2
The YMBA was the first sign of a political awakening in Burma after
1885 but with time the organisation became more radical and internal
conflict arose between the reformists and the boycott movement led by
1. It was probably modelled after the YMBA established in Sri lanka in 1889 as
part of the Buddhist revival lead by Dharmapala and influenced by the
Theosophical Society. YMBA was anti-Christian and nationalistic.
2. U Maung Maung (1980:4).
the monks. The monks became active yet again. The best known was U
Ottama, who had lived abroad for a number of years. Whilst in India he
had been inspired by Gandhi’s strategy of non-violence and boycotts. In
the 1920s he agitated for the implementation of this strategy, playing
upon the fear that Buddhism would disappear under foreign rule. He
pointed to the fact that taxes were used to finance Christian schools,
whilst the monks lost prestige and were going through difficult times
because of a diminution in the size of gifts in the form of food, clothing
and money given to the monastries. Many young monks sought to
follow in his footsteps. On seeing that monks were again acting
politically, the British became afraid and accused U Ottama of inciting
violent revolution.3
He was imprisoned on a number of occasions and died a martyr in
prison in 1939. The Sangha openly demonstrated its support for U
Ottama when he was imprisoned for the first time in 1921. His boycott
strategy gained great public support and people were encouraged to
wear homespun clothing. It is not difficult to imagine the contrast
between these outfits and the lawyers in their European attire,
attempting to construct a form of self-determination on British territory.
This example of contrast between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ has
left a deep impression on Burmese nationalism.
These developments emphasised an important theme: ‘Out with all
foreign influence’, which according to Buddhism generates greed,
hatred, drunkenness and theft. Christianity was said to initiate
inequality, which again implied that Buddhism placed all as equals in
relation to dhamma and kamma, The Burmans saw the Indian
moneylenders of the chettyar caste (chetti-kala in Burman) as
exemplifying this inequality, comprising a special category of landlords
in the 1930s. As the monks reminded the public, there had been no
landlords prior to this.
3. There was some confusion amongst the British in relation to the politicised
monk. A romantic wave, inspired by the official and author Fielding-Hall,
regarded Buddhism as a humane and relatively equal alternative to Christianity:
‘a very beautiful religion’ (Fielding-Hall, 1906:250). In contrast, others, such as
the colonial official J.G. Scott (Shway Yoe), regarded Buddhism as an obstacle
to pure economic goals and the rational accumulation of profit, namely more in
line with the later Max Weber-inspired analysis of Buddhism. Sarkisyanz
(1965: 115) compares Fielding-Hall with Johann von Herder, the German
philosopher who is the father of romantic cultural relativism.
BUDDHISM, XENOPHOBIA AND REBELLJON IN THE 1930S 35
The regression of Buddhism—organisationally and in terms of

content—paralleled the economic crisis, where up to 75 per cent of the
peasants in the rich rice-exporting Irrawaddy Delta were in debt and 30–
40 per cent had lost their land, mostly to chettyars. According to
dhamma, this chain of cause and effect is self-reinforcing, in that hate
creates violence, which in turn creates more hate, which cannot
disappear when people cease adhering to Buddhist ethics. Therefore the
source of the disintegration of the universal order can only be located in
foreign intervention, as apparent in Christian culture and the capitalist
world market.
During the 1920s and 1930s there were multitudes of Buddhist and
nationalist groups and associations which gathered under the umbrella of
the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). These
associations (known as wunthanu athin—‘patriotic associations’4) were
often based at local level and involved many monks, who amongst other
things called for the boycott of legal proceedings against U Ottama and
of elections to those councils controlled by the colonial power. More
than 10,000 village associations were formed all over Burma as a
reaction to the headmen appointed by the government since 1887 as a
part of the ‘pacification’ programme.5
The Hsaya San Rebellion

Burma was administered as a part of India until 1937. The colonial
power did not consider the Burmese to be mature enough to participate
in the government as was the case in India (called dyarchy).6 Although
the dyarchy was introduced in India in 1922, self-determination was
definitely not on the cards in Burma. Christian Karen supported the
colonial power in this view. An internal crisis and the lack of tangible
results of the boycott, coupled with reform strategies, led to riots and
rebellion.
4. U Maung Maung (1980:14) and Taylor (1987:193) translate wunthanu as

‘supporting own race’ i.e. the upholding of Burman tradition by buying Burman
and boycotting British goods.
5. Herbert (1982:8).
6. Under the dyarchy the British appointed the governor, who with his council
controlled defence, law and finance, whilst executive au-thority with respect to
areas such as health, agriculture and education was partly transferred to self-
government.
The most significant rebellion after 1885 took place in 1930 and was
also associated with both an economic crisis and religious agitation. The
rebel leader, Hsaya San,7 a member of the YMBA and of a local
Buddhist organisation under the GCBA, used the attributes and symbols
of a future leader (mìn laùng) found in the cosmology. He is said to
have been a crowned king on a ruby-inlaid throne in a ‘palace’ with all
the symbols of royal power, and used tattooing as a medicine aimed at
rendering his soldiers invulnerable. He acted as one who would re-
establish the order of dhamma in the universe and prepare for the
coming of the next Buddha. But first, foreigners and non-Buddhists
must be driven from the land.
The colonial authorities focused on the royal proclamations and
symbols. However, some of the proclamations appear only in Western
sources although based on a notebook and diary claimed by the police to
have been written by Hsaya San. He denied that it was his diary. The
use of concepts such as mìn laùng (king-to-be), cakkavatti (universal
ruler), and dhammaraja (righteous king) is not literally the same as
proclaiming to be royal or king of Burma. Hsaya San used the title of
president of his Galon Association.8
The 1930 rebellion is portrayed in many books and articles, mostly
because of its exotic features visible in the form of symbols and magic,
but also as a pre-revolutionary peasant uprising. The British considered
the rising to be a clear sign of superstition and the power that ignorance
exerted upon these uncivilised peasants, and believed the monks to be
its instigators. The motivating force of the uprising was, however, still
thought to be the resurrection of the traditional order of things, with
Buddhism and an autocratic rule existing side by side yet separated into
spheres of sacred and profane. In order to achieve this, all foreign
influence must be erased. In a prayer for the soldiers following a
parade, Hsaya San proclaimed:
In the name of our Lord [Buddha] and for the Church’s [Sangha]
greater glory I, Thupannaka Galon Raja [Hsaya San’s royal title],
7. The title hsaya is translated as ‘teacher’, ‘lord’, or ‘doctor’, i.e. a learned and
respected man, who is both well versed in Buddhism and traditional medicine,
and in some cases also in alchemy.
8. Patricia Herbert has shown in her important and critical reappraisal of the
rebellion in 1982 that Hsaya San made no claim to royal descent. The colonial
power focused on the leader figure and not on the real causes of the rebellion.
declare war upon the heathen English who have enslaved us.
Burma is for the Burmans—the foreigners removed the king and
destroyed the religion, they are usurpers; we have never taken
another country.9
Other proclamations are more direct:
All the inhabitants who reside in Burma: it is for the economic

prosperity of Rahan [monks] and inhabitants, so also in the
interest of the religion of our Lord that I have to declare war.
English people are our enemies.10
Although the model was based on the traditional cosmology it

encompassed the modern nationalist essentialism: ‘Burma for
Burmans.’ This ethnic-national content was not dominant in the
historical mìn laùng rebellions, where locality, tributary patronclient
relationships with local officials, dynastic kinship and the ideal royal
attributes were more important than an exclusive and bounded,
ethnically based state power.
However, as important as the traditional cosmology was for Hsaya
San, an equally decisive cause of the rebellion was economic misery.
The rebels first attacked the British-appointed village headmen who
collected taxes and fines and often appropriated the possessions of
villagers who were unable to pay. The British were very quick in
attributing the rebellion to the Burmans’ ignorance and superstition, as
perceived to be mirrored in their culture. The colonial power denied the
Burmans a subjective practice based on their historical experience and
reduced the causes to pseudo psychological explanations:
As regards the causes it is well known: 1) that the Burman is by

nature restless and excitable; 2) that in spite of a high standard of
literacy the Burman peasantry are incredible ignorant and
9. Collis (1938:274). Collis was a judge in Burma. He was a good observer who
possessed sympathy for the Burmese and a critical attitude vis-à-vis the
inequalities created by colonialism. In his account of the Hsaya San rebellion, U
Maung Maung (1980) has corrected those representations of the resurrection
inspired by cultural relativity, representations which portray it solely as an
expression of Burman traditionalism. See Glossary for the meaning of Galon in
Hsaya San’s title.
10. Cited in Herbert(1982:6).
superstitious, the belief in the efficacy of charms and tattooing as

conferring invulnerability being still widespread.11
The causes were not only purely cultural, although the strategy was
formulated in terms of the cosmological rules. The rebellion was
mediated through cultural symbols and concepts whilst economic crisis
and political desperation fuelled it.
In 1929 Hsaya San had participated in a survey of the peasants’ living
conditions which had been carried out by the GCBA. He recommended
that the peasants should resist the taxation system, which did not allow
any reductions during economic crises. In addition, he claimed that the
peasantry should have free access to timber and other forest produce for
household use.12 When the GCBA refused to recognise these demands,
Hsaya San began to plan the rebellion. It was the demand for aid to
repay debts and for simple survival that mobilised thousands living off
the land to support him.
The peasants would often rather the than to live in such a hopeless
situation, where they were exploited by all sides and where the
authorities had closed access to cheap loans. The peasants were victims
of sales by official order, whereby arrogant officials (Burman) met up
with Indian soldiers and auctioned off the land to chettyars, who thus
controlled more than a quarter of the most important rice-producing
areas. But of course they only did this in order to appease the banks, to
whom they themselves owed money.
It is not difficult to understand the demonstration of power and
humiliation that this constellation of foreign forces represented in the
eyes of the peasants. When the GCBA, weakened by corruption and
division, would not support a violent rebellion, the initiative was taken
up by local leaders. It is also significant that the monks’ political,
‘worldly’ activity led them to break the rules of celibacy and use of
money, thus bringing about the collapse of the GCBA.
The rebellion spread quickly and comprised a number of local
insurrections without much intermediate coordination. The army sent
10,000 infantry soldiers against the peasants, who had few guns and
who, to begin with, trusted in the magic protective power of their tattoos
and so allowed themselves to be mown down. Entire villages were
11. Government of Burma 1931, Report on the Rebellion in Burma up to 3 May

1931, p. 10.
12. See Bryant (1998:136) on the role of the forest in the Burmese resistance.
forcefully transferred to concentration camps and the leaders of

Buddhist groups were arrested, even if they were not involved in the
rebellion (only one monk in a yellow robe was reported to have been
involved). What is significant, however, is that it became a religious
war when a unit comprising 1,600 Christian Karen and Chin were party
to quelling the rebellion. Hsaya San was hanged along with 127 others,
allegedly at least 3,000 rebels died or were wounded and 9,000 were
interned.13 Hsaya San’s symbols were used by politicians who were
responsible for the introduction of an autocratic political system. Prime
minister Dr Ba Maw allowed himself to be proclaimed ‘sole ruler’
(adipadi) with titles such as ‘lord of the power’, ‘great king’, ‘dictator’
(anashin mingyi kodaw), when the country came under Japanese
occupation. He was Hsaya San’s lawyer during legal proceedings. At
least the nationalists had now learnt that symbols and amulets were not
enough for the fight against the colonial power.
Nationalism
The political nationalism that existed up until the Japanese occupation
bore the mark of Buddhist influence and was mixed with Marxism and
Fabianism by the students. In 1937 they formed a book club called
Naga-Ni (The Red Dragon’) and acquired Western literature on
nationalism, national socialism and Marxism. The students came to play
a leading role in the Dobama Asiayone party—‘We the Burmans
Association’ was founded in 1930 immediately before the rebellion and
included among its membership Aung San, U Nu and other Thakins
(‘masters’). This title, which was otherwise reserved for the British
colonial masters (Sahib in India), was thereby symbolically repossessed
by the young nationalists. According to Aung San Suu Kyi, the term
‘race’ became associated with Thakin, ‘a race of masters’.14 In part, this
was in keeping with the spirit of the 1930s and is unpleasantly echoed
in the language of today. In fact, one could talk of a direct counter-
image to the English racial hierarchy as manifested by the ‘club’. The
young nationalists sought a synthesis between Burman tradition and
13. Diverging figures are given, however: U Maung Maung (1980:261) reports
that 580 were executed and 890 deported; Herbert (1982:2) says that 1,389 were
deported; and Sarkisyanz (1965:163) writes that 12 were decapitated. Official
British figures were lower.
14. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:130–33).
modern Western political thought. This synthesis also included

ideological oppositions (socialism and fascism), which mirrored the
political developments in Europe.
Dobama Asiayone, which became the gathering place for up-and-
coming political leaders, was founded following intense disturbances in
Rangoon in 1930, when Indian dockers and their families were killed by
angry Burman workers enraged by the fact that these kala took jobs
from Burmans. The clashes cost 250 lives and more than 2,000 were
injured. The crisis of the 1930s started a war of survival between a
growing Burman proletariat and the Indian workers. The Burman
dockers broke strikes and allowed themselves to be exploited by the
British, moving through the streets shouting ‘dobama’—‘we the
Burmans’. The students took up the battle-cry and the Dobama
Asiayone’s first slogan ran along the lines of ‘race, language, religion’.
According to Aung San Suu Kyi, language, culture and society needed
to be saved from extinction. In the beginning, the movement bore the
mark of Buddhism and nationalism, but developed more in the direction
of a left-wing organisation up until the split in 1938.
During the strikes, slogans such as the following were used: ‘Burma
is our country, Burmese is our literature and language. Love our
country, cherish our literature and uphold our language.’15 They also
shouted: ‘Master race we are, we Burmans’, a clear provo cation, and
the leaders were often interned on charges of ‘sedition’.
One of the most significant political actions was the student boycott
of lectures and examinations in the 1920s and in 1936. They protested
against the Western-oriented, elitist and authoritarian educational
system. With U Nu as leader of the student organisation, the tyrannical
university college principal was successfully removed. The students
gained both public sympathy and experience during these activities.
Whilst Thakins had at first been regarded as too radical and arrogant,
they were now seen as heroes.
In 1938 a serious split took place within the ranks of the Dobama, the
cause being the question of whether or not the leaders should participate
in elections and accept an allowance for their political work. This, of
course, was regarded as total collaboration with the colonial power,
15. The history of the Dobama movement is described in detail by U Maung

Maung (1980) and Khin Yi (1988). Slogans are quoted in Khin Yi (1988:5, 63).
The movement encompassed all ethnic groups despite its nationalistic overtones
and racial preferences. Thus some Indians were also included in its
membership.
which did not believe in the Burmans’ capacity for self-government.

The British Chamber of Commerce dominated political decision-
making so much that democracy in the Western sense of the word
became seriously undermined during this period.
When one reads of the 1938–39 strikes and demonstrations, the
number of similarities with the events of 1988–89 is striking, despite the
fact that conditions have changed over the years: students bearing the
peacock flag and monks standing side by side with workers and
peasants; police violence whereby seven monks were murdered in
Mandalay in 1939; and finally the storming of the Dobama’s
headquarters, situated near the Shwe Dagon pagoda, by the police.
Again the police marched into the pagoda with their boots on. This
profanity unleashed yet another wave of strikes and protests in defence
of the religious essence of Burman identity and against foreign
invasion.
Through this growth in nationalism, freedom and independence
became directly associated with the expulsion of all foreign influence.
The aim was to free what was Burman from foreign capitalist and
imperialist dominance. However, a clear alternative model and strategy
—which could have functioned as an antidote to xeno phobia and ethnic
division generated by the colonial administration—were not
formulated. The Dobama movement’s socialism dealt mainly with
nationalising the economy and boycotting the National Assembly and
British products.
The Japanese, with their notions of Asia as a greater East Asian co-
prosperity sphere, and an autocratic government, added to the more
problematic side of nationalism. And yet the Japanese delivered the
powerful alternative which the Thakins lacked.16 The young Burman
nationalists used the Japanese to gain training, weapons and power with
the aim of achieving total independence, although they later rebelled
against the Japanese. How much influence Japanese political thought
and fascist ideology have had is difficult to ascertain, but there are at
least three areas where such influence is likely
16. The history of the political parties and the Japanese occupation encompasses
many important details that cannot be dealt with here. I refer the reader to an
English and a Burman portrayal of the situation, the two most important sources
published in recent years. With their opposing views, they provide a good
picture of the complex conditions of this period (Tinker, 1983–84 and U Maung
Maung, 1989). U Maung Maung himself participated in the events as Aung
San’s aide-de-camp.
1. in the rule of the ‘lord of power’ (Anashin Mingyi) Ba Maw with

his catchphrase of ‘one blood, one voice, one command’;
2. in the militant organisation of state and society; and
3. in the idea of the corporate state, within which all oppositions
between classes and ethnic groups are removed to form one nation.
Aung San did support an autocratic state whilst he was in Japan in

1941, and he reached the rank of major general in the Japanese army.17
The effect of the various nationalist strategies and the search for a
genuine shared identity in this period can be summarised as follows:
nationalism was ingrained in all spheres of social life, resulting in all
parties, including communists and socialists, having to deal not only
with the special Burman ethnic and religious identity, but also with the
foreign threat against this identity, before discussion of alternative
political models could commence. The nationalist politicians were thus
caught in the trap of nationalism: that the preservation of the cultural
past as eternal and natural even if this has to be achieved by the use of
violence and bloodshed - inhibits the creation of a new pluralistic
consensus.
17. Silverstein (1972:14).

6.
TWO VERSIONS OF NATIONALISM:
UNION STATE OR ETHNICISM?
When Burma was close to independence, Aung San, the then leader,
nationalist and champion of liberty, said that monks must desist from
taking an active part in political life. They must concentrate on the
Buddhist message of charity and non-violence; this must be their
contribution to the country. He preferred this traditional role, where
religion as an institution (the Sangha) looked after religious functions,
kept its own ranks in order and refrained from politicising:
We must draw a clear line between politics and religion, because

the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion and
politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.1
Also he warned against integrating animism, astrology and alchemy into

Buddhism. His ideal was a philosophy and ontology containing the
‘great truths’ as a universal religion, free from political intrigue,
superstition and fraud. Demands for Buddhism to be made the state
religion were rejected. This was clearly addressed to politicised monks
and sects—also to politicians who plotted to harness the Sangha for
their own political ends. In a speech in 1946 Aung San addressed ‘the
reverend Sanghas’ thus:
You are inheritors of a great religion. Purify it and broadcast it to

all the world … [carry the message] of love and brotherhood,
freedom of religious worship, freedom from fear, ignorance.2
1. Cf. Donald Smith (1965:118). Aung San’s attitude to Buddhism is discussed

by his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991:8.
Aung San also had the clear goal that all ethnic groups should be
included in a united Burma, even if this involved positive
discrimination. Aung San’s definition of national identity is therefore
interesting since the present regime has followed it and it is cited in
the Burma Socialist Programme Party’s manifesto from 1962: A

nation is a collective term applied to a people irrespective of their
ethnic origin, living in close contact with one another and having
common interests and sharing joys and sorrows together for such
historic periods as to have acquired a sense of oneness. Though
race, religion and language are important factors, it is only their
traditional desire and will to live in unity through weal and woe
that binds a people together and makes them a nation and their
spirit a patriotism.3
This representation is—including its bombast—a reply to British

policy, where race/ethnicity and national identity were coupled
together. But Aung San did not view a unitary state as feasible; he
favoured a union of the different ethnic groups as equal participants and
with special rights accorded to the national minorities. Aung San’s
definition was also a direct reply to the Christian Karen who, during a
visit to London in 1946, attempted to convince the British to grant them
an independent state.4 They stressed at that time that they were a nation
with its own pure ethnic culture and civilisation, as the following
passage written by Saw Po Chit, a member of the Karen delegation to
London, depicts:
2. Silverstein (1972:55; emphasis added). Freedom from Fear is the title of

Aung San Suu Kyi’s book.
3. Quoted in the Burma Socialist Programme Party: The System of Correlation
of Man and his Environment’ (1963:50; emphasis added). Aung San quoted
Stalin’s definition of a nation from a speech of 1947: ‘A nation is a historically
evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture’. Aung San
considered that only the Shan and the Burmans met all the criteria for a nation
as a community according to this definition (Silverstein, 1972:96; 1980:142).
4. See Appendix 2. During the Round Table Conference in 1931–32, the Karen
representative Thra Shwe Ba claimed that the Karen were the aborigines of
Burma and had arrived before the Burmans. See document (CMD 4004 vi 233)
in the Oriental and India Office Collection, British Library, London. On the
making of Karen nationalism, see Gravers (1996b).
TWO VERSIONS OF NATIONALISM 45
It is a dream that Karen and Burman can ever evolve a common

nationality, and this misconception of one homogeneous Burmese
nation…will lead Burma to destruction.
Karens are a nation according to any definition. We are a nation
with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, language,
literature, names, nomenclature, sense of value and proportion,
customary laws and moral codes, aptitudes and ambitions; in
short we have our own distinctive outlook on life. By all canons
of international law we are a nation.5
This is an especially particularistic definition in clear opposition to

Aung San’s definition which emphasises the unifying and universal
features. By ‘civilisation’, the Karen meant emphatically that they were
more civilised or rather educated in the modern, Western understanding
of the term, as well as being Christian. They pointed out, moreover,
several serious episodes during the Second World War where the
Burman army and young nationalists had killed many Christian Karen
near Papun in the Salween district and in the town of Myaung Mya in
the Delta. These confrontations increased the existing mistrust between
the Karen and the Burmans, and the current of events demonstrated
clearly the mix of ingredients which unleashed the conflict.
It was the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under Aung San and the
young nationalists that helped the Japanese army drive the British out.
The BIA, trained by the Japanese, led the country to occupation in the
hope of an impending independence. However, they harboured
suspicions that the Karen still supported the fallen colonial power.
The Karen had contact with the British Force 136, the Far Eastern
branch of the SOE (Special Operations Executive) that carried out
weapons drops. It has been suggested that in the Salween district
bordering Thailand alone, some 12,000 Karen received weapons during
the course of the war. Moreover, almost half of the Burma Rifles in the
1930s were Karen (ca. 1,500–2,000 men).6 Most returned to their
villages with their weapons after the British had retreated back to India.
5. Karen’s Political Future, (1945–47:170; emphasis added). The term Karen

originates from Burman (Kayin) and Mon and is a shared reference for several
ethnic groups: Sgaw, Pwo, Kayah, Pa-o, and a number of smaller groups. There
are both similarities in language and culture and large local variations between
and within these groups.
6. The British recruited amongst the ethnic minorities. At the close of the war
the British Burman Army was 22,000 men strong. of these 3,000
Therefore, the Karen were suspected of plotting uprisings with British

help. The British Major Seagrim and two other British officers from the
Burma Rifles hid in the Salween district and tried to organise a Karen
guerrilla unit as part of Force 136. Helped especially by Christian
Karen, Seagrim’s presence unleashed violence and terror from the BIA
and the Japanese army against all Karen in the area until ‘Grandfather
Longlegs’, as the Karen called Seagrim, surrendered to the Japanese and
was executed. He is still a legend because the Karen saw him as the
younger white brother of their mythology,7 who returned their lost book
of wisdom. He appealed to Karen millenarian expectations and for
many Karen in the mountains he reflected all the ideals of a traditional
leader. This ideal lives on in spite of Christian influence. The Salween
district was in fact the centre for one of the most extensive mìn laùng
uprisings in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 14).8 But for the
Burmans, Seagrim’s presence confirmed fears that foreigners would
still prevent the formation of an independent nation and state.
In the Irrawaddy Delta city of Myaung Mya, rumours of paratroopers
and an uprising amongst the Karen generated a conflict which cost the
lives of 1,800 Karen and an unknown number of Burmans and Indians.
In this region around half of the population were Karen and a majority
of these were Buddhist Pwo. This is where most of the Karen elite came
6. [cont.] were Chin, 2,000 Kachin, 2,000 Karen and only 200 Burman. The rest
were Indians and Gurkhas. The Karen had relatively more officers. The Burman
Indepence Army (renamed the Burman National Army in 1943) under Aung
San had around 12,000 armed men. Around 1,000 Karen participated in the
Anti-Fascist Alliance of Aung San (M. Smith,1991:440, n. 26). Compare with
figures from 1942 in Taylor (1987:100).
7. In a Karen myth of creation, brothers from other ethnic groups preserved
their copy of the book of knowledge, given by the creator of the universe, while
the Karen lost his in a swidden field. The Karen expects that his white brother will
return with this golden book. See Gravers (1996b, 1998) on the missionary
interest in this myth.
8. One can ask how Christianity and the younger white brother match up with
the strong emphasis on national and ethnic oneness in the definition quoted
above. The prominent Karen politician Saw Tha Din gave me the answer during
a discussion in Thailand in 1971: ‘We regard Christianity as our rediscovered
religion—not as foreign.’ According to the Christian Karen, the British gave the
Karen law and order whilst the American Baptist missionaries gave them back
their religion. Tradition and modern civilisation are therefore of compatible
dimensions. Saw Tha Din was with the Karen delegation in London in 1946 and
present to formulate the quoted definition of the Karen nation. On Saw Tha
Din, see Gravers (1996b).
from, especially from the Christian Sgaw. They were educated as

lawyers, administrators, officers and teachers. The well-known Karen
politicians, including Sir San C. Po, lived here. There were in turn more
class divisions than in the mountains, as some of the large landowners
in the Delta were Karen, and thus shared pro-British interests with many
Indians who had not fled.9 The BIA attempted to tone down the
contrasts with calls like: ‘Karen, we are of the same flesh and blood—
but the Chinese and Indians are kala [foreign].’ All ethnic groups were
promised protection if they handed in their weapons. However, the
Karen did not dare hand in their weapons on account of rumours of rape
and murder of other Karen. Rumours that the Karen hid British soldiers
unleashed retaliatory attacks, killings and the burning of Karen villages.
The BIA was undisciplined and led by officers who were young,
inexperienced and poorly armed.
Amongst the Karen, the older and more moderate leadership had to
accept being pushed to one side in favour of a new, more militant
leadership. A Buddhist Pwo Karen (Shwe Tun Kya) attracted a large
following by appearing as cosmology’s ‘ruler of the universe’ (setkya
mìn) with the sarne tattoos as Hsaya San. Another well-known Karen
politician, San Po Thin, started a group named after one of the Karen
cultural heroes, Tho’ Mèh Pha (Toh Meh Pah), a ‘Moses’ who would
return to lead the Karen to their promised land. According to the myth,
Tho’ Meh Pha walked ahead, while his family attempted to cook and
eat snails. They took their time and lost the trail and contact with their
leader. For the Karen, the myth symbolises their position
metaphorically as orphans, that is, a people without a leader.10
Following rumours that the Karen were to be exterminated, two leaders
launched an attack on Myaung Mya. The Burmans replied by murdering
those Karen who sought sanctuary in the town’s Catholic churches. A
former Karen minister and his English wife were amongst those killed.
The Japanese ended the bloodbath by murdering more than 1,000 Karen.
According to the then prime minister, Ba Maw, this was Japanese
revenge for the killing of one of their officers.11 He suggests racial
conflict as the cause, brought about by the British colonial system. In
9. Dorothy H. Guyot in McVey (1978:206), gives the following numbers for

Myaung Mya: 50,000 Sgaw, of whom half were Christian; 101,000 Pwo,
including 9,000 Christians; 28,000 Indians; and 289,000 Burmans. She
mentions, moreover, that Aung San Suu Kyi’s maternal grandfather, Po Nyein,
who attempted to mediate together with other elder Karen, was Pwo Karen and
Buddhist.
his memoirs he wrote that the Burmans were aggressive, and the
minorities never forgot such actions because of fears of extermination.
Even today such memories of ethnic vendetta poison any attempts at a
dialogue. Ethnic differences were marked by rumour, mistrust and the
dominance of a political strategy central to which was the anticipation
and forestalling of the others’ conspiracies and insurrections. There
was, however, some substance to several of the rumours, for instance
the dropping of paratroopers and the murder of Karen people. The
Christian Karen leaders have since referred to these events as evidence
that they cannot live together with the Burmans, who have such barbaric
tendencies.12
In this way the image of enmity was cemented: the Karen as the fifth
column for the ‘white foreigners’ with their colonialism and Christian
missions; the Burmans as uncivilised barbarians. This enmity developed
despite cooperation between Christian and Buddhist Karen leaders and
the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) during the war.
However, ethnicism ultimately overcame this cooperation across class,
ethnic and religious lines leading up to independence. Violent events of
this kind are inscribed on the collective memory and have an
unfortunate tendency to be retrieved to justify revenge. A bond literally
inscribed in blood is a condition not easily reversed, as for example
could be seen in the Serb-Croat relationship during 1992–93.
10. This myth still plays a large role among the Christian Sgaw Karen in the
KNU, who use the myth to define what a Karen is, namely a descendant of this
legendary figure. See Jonathan Falla (1991:11–12); Gravers (1996b: 253).
11. There is disagreement with this ending of events. According to Guyot,
1978, it was a Burman force led by an otherwise admired Colonel Zuzuki who
wantonly murdered before requesting that the Karen behave themselves.
According to the Christian Karen leader, Saw Tha Din, he contacted the
Japanese and stopped the killings. But Zuzuki, who had been a spy in pre-war
Burma, often covered his tracks through the use of his Burman nom de guerre
(Bo Mo Gyo) and there seems to be a lack of evidence of his participation in the
events. Confusion and imprecise sources have added the massacre to other
gruesome Burman actions. Guyot (1978:227) interviewed Zuzuki, who counted
1,000 dead. See also Morrison (1946), who portrayed Sea-grim’s heroics and
has interviewed one of the leaders of the uprising. Jan Becka (1983), casts light
on the affair seen from Burman sources, while Ba Maw (1968), gives a balanced
account. The suggestion is that the Japanese gave the Burmans a free hand to
kill—and stopped the bloodbath when the Karen unconditionally threw them-
selves at their feet.
The Panglong Agreement

When independence came, the Shan and Karenni states (and from 1950
the Kayah state) acquired the status of autonomous states within the
union, with the right to withdraw from the union. Kachin was a
similarly autonomous state, whilst Chin acquired the status of a ‘special
division’. However, the Karen initially acquired Salween district alone
as a special region. In return they received a comparatively large number
of mandates in the constituent assembly (twenty out of 210 seats).
Although the different Karen groups were very much in disagreement
over the conditions for a state, the Karen National Union (KNU)
continued to persevere with demands for larger areas and claims on
districts where the majority of the population were Burman or Mon (see
Appendix 2). They could have struck a deal with Aung San if some of
the Baptists had not been so implacable in their demands.13
During the negotiations in Panglong in the Shan states, the British
tried to the last to secure Burma’s status as a dominion within the
Commonwealth—or at the very least to ensure control in Frontier Areas’
and with the minorities. The power behind this aspect of the
negotiations was the director for the Frontier Areas Administration, the
ethnographer H.N. C. Stevenson. He attempted to mobilise the pro-
British leaders against Aung San’s young supporters and the AFPFL in
the border states. He intervened time and again in Burma and England
until he was recalled from his position. Maung Maung relates of one of
many incidents which occurred in the Kayah states on their national day
in 1946. Aung San and Saw Ba U Gyi (leader of the KNU) were guests.
Stevenson appeared unannounced and asked Aung San what he was
doing there, since a Burman in an independent state required British
permission to enter. He received the answer: ‘to take these people from
you.’ This story was reported in a newspaper.14
12. Discussion with Saw Tha Din in Sangkhlaburi, Thailand, 1971–72. See M.
Smith (1991:63), where Saw Tha Din repeats his version of the events in an
interview. It seems impossible to ascertain the correct version.
13. See Tinker (1983–84) and U Maung Maung (1989). Here, documentation
from the negotiations is presented from different angles. The documents marked
Karen’s Political Future in the India Office Library (M/4/3023) show that the
Karen were not only split on account of religion and political allegiance (for or
against the AFPFL), but that the local differences meant just as much as to be
classified as Karen by the outside world. The Karen in the Delta often had
completely different experiences to the mountain dwellers in Salween.
Regardless of the reliability of such accounts, a situation like this is

symptomatic of British intervention in the negotiations and the relations
between the ethnic groups. Stevenson and the Frontier Area
Administration are remembered by Burmans as demons, who sowed
dissent and destroyed Aung San’s ideas of a union state. Amongst the
Christian Kayah and Kachin he is remembered as the one who advised
them to stay out of the union.15 Support for ethnic nationalism and
separation caused a split between and within the Kayah, Karen and
Kachin, both among Christians and Buddhists and across political or
local allegiances. To complicate the problems, the Kayah and Shan
princes (sawbwas) claimed that the pre-colonial relationship with the
Burman monarchy had been personal and tributary between the king
and the princes and not one of national interdependence. The Burmans
argued that these tributary states were ruled by the British as part of
Burma and India.
This divisive process can be called ethnicism (for the term, see
Appendix I): the process of state formation which not only emphasises
ethnic groups but creates further internal differentiation of ethnic groups
or generates completely new ethnic categories, for example using
religious criteria as a base. During the negotiations in Panglong, the
British played upon the Pax Britannica there and used divide-and-rule
tactics, which previously had secured the Shan princes their positions.
The Burmans’ fear of foreign intervention and control was soundly
based. Only the great confidence instilled by Aung San ensured an
agreement in 1947.16 When the Panglong conference took place in
February, the Karen were absent—they convened for an All Karen
Congress in Rangoon and were not subsumed under the ‘spirit of
Panglong’. The Conference agreed to cooperate on the political freedom
of internal administration amongst the minorities, and Aung San
promised to secure cultural and democratic rights for the ethnic groups.
However, the conference also confirmed the politics of ethnic
difference, and when independence came in 1948 the inconsistencies in
14. U Maung Maung (1989:252).

15. See S. Carr in Bangkok Post, 13 October 1985. The following account from
the social anthropologist, Edmund Leach, who worked amongst the Kachin
during the beginning of the Japanese occupation as an ethnographer and British
officer, is part of the legend of Stevenson: ‘I got shunted into a crazy cloak and
dagger outfit run by H.N. C. Stevenson.’ Stevenson is described as a parody of a
007 agent ‘who had had some training in anthropology under Malinowski’
(Kuper 1986: 377). Stevenson wrote a monograph on the Chin people in 1943.
the different conceptions of national identity and political union were

brought sharply and implacably into focus.
Differences in ethnicity and religion had been so deeply ingrained
into nadonalism that every political action had to be placed in reladon to
past stereotypes and violent events. This is fundamental for
understanding the developments up to the coup of 1962 and leading to
the violence of 1988. Fear that someone is planning to take revenge or
taking undue advantage is enough to bolster xenophobia and provide a
fertile ground for political paranoia.
The Legacy of Aung San

With the murder of Aung San in July 1947, Burma probably lost the
politician who most clearly understood the dangers of making ethnicity
and religion the cornerstones of nadonalism and of incorporating this
mixture in the state apparatus. Both ethnic divisions and fear of foreign
influence had grown during the war and just before independence, not
least through the many British attempts to keep the country within the
Empire. The role of the Karen, especially the demands of the Christian
Karen (including continued British protection of a Karen state), created
anxiety. On top of this came disclosures abut the complicity of British
officers in Aung San’s murder.
Several high-ranking officers had allowed the murderers access to
ammunition dumps. The opportunist politician, U Saw, was convicted
and hanged for murder. The British officers were convicted of having
supplied weapons but managed to slip away during the Karen uprising
in 1949. The whole case left a foul stench of conspiracy in its wake. The
soldiers who carried out the shooting down of Aung San and six other
politicians came from a regiment where Ne Win17 was a major and
second-in-command to a British officer. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that Ne Win had anything to do with the case.18 On the other
hand, one suspects the British of exploiting the political contradictions
between Burman leaders and the Burmans suspected that British
business interests were behind this exploitation.19 In this way
independence did not lead to any genuine liberation from the past;
rather, it heralded the arrival of a paranoia, where every occurrence
reeked of foreign involvement. This found clear expression in the Karen
16. The agreement is cited in Saimong Mangrai (1965:309). This work is a

detailed study of the history of the Shan states during colonial times.
uprising of 1949 commanded by Christian Karen; the communists’

uprising of the same period; the remnants of the Kuomintang army on
the rampage in the 1950s; the influence too of the Chinese, the Indians,
the USA/CIA, and the former colonial power. The latter great mix of
foreign elements in the country’s political life is, in my opinion, an
important reason why Burma failed to develop an alternative model
which could have reconciled an ethno-religious plurality.
The Karen uprising only confirmed to the Burmans that the
foreigners were behind all the misfortunes that plagued the country. The
British had handed over leadership of the army to Karen officers
(several of whom were Sandhurst graduates) and allowed the setting up
of the Karen Defence Organisation. The older Karen leaders, including
Saw Tha Din, and neutral Buddhists had, however, warned against the
uprising. Many of the Karen officers stayed neutral, even though a
majority of Karen battalions took part in the uprising, including a
Kachin battalion. The result was an internal division amongst the
Karen, but at the same time every Karen was categorised as a potential
rebel. This picture has not changed even though it was primarily the
Christian Karen who gave the impetus to the uprising after 1955. The
Christian Karen entered an alliance with the Kuomintang army, but they
were cheated out of promised weapons. British officers who
sympathised with the loyal Karen also sought to help them with
weapons but without great success.20 The KNU was consequently in
collusion with foreigners after independence.
17. Ne Win was chairman of the Revolutionary Council 1962–74, President of

Burma 1974–81, and Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)
1962–88.
18. U Maung Maung (1989:315–29) says that the British counted on U Saw
splitting the AFPFL and isolating Aung San. They supplied all the evidence
against U Saw and his contacts to officers and a member of the British Council.
Intelligence officers had U Saw under surveillance prior to the murder. See the
Rance Papers (Mss Eup. F. 169/ 20e OIOC, London). U Saw, a rich
industrialist and owner of the newspaper The Sun, clearly hoped that the British
would install him as leader. Many in Britain maintained that Aung San and his
colleagues amongst the Thakins were fascist collaborators and not real
nationalists. A recent book by Kin Oung (1993) does not offer any substantial
new in-formation.
19. In his personal account, J.F. Cady (1983:75) says that the atmo sphere was
tense amongst the British: ‘Members of the revived AllEuropean Gymkhana
and Pegu Clubs were critical of both the Governor and London, and their
evaluation of Mountbatten bordered on anathema.’
After Aung San’s murder, Thakin U Nu took over as leader of the

AFPFL, the anti-fascist organisation which included the Communist
Party, the Socialist Party and independent nationalists.21 The
communists were excluded from the AFPFL in 1946 on account of their
unwillingness to promote a negotiated settlement with the British. The
communist rebellion in 1948 was joined by almost half of the People’s
Volunteer Organisation (PVO), an organisation formed by Aung San to
absorb and control 15,000–20,000 resistance fighters. They were armed
by the Burma National Army in 1945 to fight the Japanese army. The
PVO and regular soldiers, who were not enlisted in the post-war army,
posed a security threat to the state. After the death of Aung San, half of
the PVO joined the communist rebellion, together with three battalions
from the army. Significantly, the 4th Burma Rifles, commanded by
Brigadier Ne Win, remained loyal to the government when the army
was divided by complex political and personal disagreements.22
Aung San and U Nu had both been interested in Marxism. Aung San
is considered to have been one of the co-founders of the Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) in 1939, although he withdrew from the party
after a few months. U Nu supplied the first Burmese translation of Marx
in 1937; at that time, U Nu, like other nationalists, believed that
Marxism was compatible with Buddhism. This compatibility was a
basic element in the Socialist Party’s ideology, primarily in that
Buddhism and Socialism both oppose greed and exploitation. The
communists, on the other hand, considered that Buddhism was an opiate
of the worst kind for the masses.
Marxism, as expressed by the Communist Party, was thus a threat
against religion. The socialists, however, discussed socialism in the form
of general welfare, as the material base which would realise the ethical
ideals of Buddhism, and whether it was mind or matter which was
decisive. This debate, which can still be traced through Ne Win’s
Burma Socialist Programme Party’s ideology, appears somewhat
confusing to Westerners, but in fact covers the important question of
20. See Martin Smith (1991) for details on the Karen uprising and foreign
involvement. The Karen force was estimated at 10,000 at the beginning of the
revolt. See also Tinker (1967:47); ‘Burma and the Insurrections’ (1949
Government report).
21. This is a necessary simplification, as many individuals held competing
affiliations. Aung San was the leader of the AFPFL and was not aligned to the
parties which established the League.
how religion and the state institutionally and ideologically should relate
to each other in the social order.
The nationalists sought to put together a political model and a
theoretical base which could unite the traditional order with a modern
national state in a peculiar synthesis. The military has since attempted to
expound this synthesis as something genuinely Burmese and something
with which everyone was in agreement. I shall return to this problem
later.
22. See interview with Colonel Chit Myiang, Burma Debate, vol. 4, no. 3,
1997, pp. 11–24.
7.
BUDDHISM AND MILITARY
POWER: TWO DIFFERENT
STRATEGIES—TWO DIFFERENT
THAKINS
After independence the army and the Buddhist order became the two
decisive institutions and opposite poles in developments. In the
beginning the army and the Sangha were partners in the bulwark
against communism, foreign influence and ethnic divisiveness. They
thus became synonymous with nation, state and national identity for the
Burmans; however, this interlinking did not create unity, rather the
opposite. The two different models and strategies that were dominant
after independence can now be compared in an attempt to show how the
above contradictions were played out.
The following presentation is a simplification focused on Aung San’s
two ‘heirs’. Essentially, the aim here is to draw attention to the
important differences.
VlSIONS OF A BURMAN NATION

U Nu, who was Prime Minister in 1947–58 and 1960–62, allowed
Buddhism and the Sangha to participate directly in the exercise of
political power. The aim was a democratic welfare state based on the
Buddhistic utopian vision of a general condition of plenitude.1 Socialism
and nationalisation were therefore necessary means to realise Buddhist
cosmology and ontology in the form of religious merit and kamma.
Buddhism would be the state religion, thus running a clear risk of
placing other religions held by various minorities outside of Burmese
national identity.
U Nu, like U Ottama and Hsaya San before him, played the role of a
monk as political leader. He observed memorial services for those two
1. The Burman version can be seen in Shway Yoe (1882, vol. 1:106–116). See
also Gravers (1986:55).
religious nationalists. Special rights for ethnic minorities appeared to

him as a continuation of the divide-and-rule policy of imperialism.2
Ne Win gave the army the leading role in the exercise of state power,
combining a centrally planned economy with a welfare state economy.
This system incorporated both socialist ideas and echoes of the traditional
autocratic model and its redistribution of wealth via the patron-client
relationship. However, elements of the corporate state appear to have
entered the model. In this model Buddhism is institutionally separated
from the state apparatus but is still under political control when its own
self-discipline slackens. Ethnic and religious differences are totally
subordinated. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)
proclaimed both the central control of the economy and that only man,
the living being of reason, plays a determining role in changing the
history of society. The slogan ‘Man Matters Most’ was proposed in the
programme of the BSPP in 1963, as well as a study of the interaction of
material and spiritual life. This can be seen as an attempt to include the
ontological principles of Buddhism. All people are subject to the same
natural and historical laws and material conditions.
The law of impermanence in Buddhism is referred to in the
programme and seen as a correlation of material and spiritual forces,
but change should not end in exploitation and chaos. It has to be guided
and controlled by the BSPP and the Revolutionary Council. State,
nation and society are one and patriotism will prevent that unit from
being fragmented by internal differences.
Both these models of the national state have used the army in their
strategies to protect the social order and Buddhism against communist,
foreign intervention and the dissolution of the Union. The combination
of nationalism and military organisation began even before the creation
of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and the Japanese occupation.
Perhaps then, it is not so strange that Ne Win, as commander-in-chief of
the army, came to be Burma’s autocratic ruler, a situation similar in
other post-colonial states. However, what became of the more
pluralistic, democratic model that Aung San attempted to include in his
union state?
2. U Nu attempted to negotiate with the Karen, whom he found both intransigent

and undiplomatic. He deemed that there must be cooperation or the conflict
would continue: ‘Any controversy on the mistakes of each other will be
endless’, he said in an almost prophetic statement in a 1949 radio broadcast (Nu
1949:191).
BUDDHISM AND MILITARY POWER 57
U Nu
In 1954 U Nu inaugurated the Sixth Great Buddhist World Council. The
Fifth Council had been held by King Mindon in Mandalay. The year
1956 was considered to be the 2,500th year since the death of the
historical Buddha—and therefore halfway to the coming of
Ariyametteya (bodhisatta), the next Buddha. The period was repleted
with signs, not least the many uprisings in the country and the tumult of
the Cold War in Europe, China, Vietnam, etc. All these effected a
strengthening of religious myths and meanings of pro phecy. According
to prophecy, before the next Buddha’s arrival the world would
disintegrate into greed and violence.
U Nu approved the building of a World Peace Pagoda in connection
with the World Council’s meeting. The Council met in an artificial cave
with room for 10,000 people in imitation of the first meeting from the
time of the first Buddha.3 Texts of the Buddha’s discourses were
translated and re-released by 1,129 senior, learned monks. Relics were
collected from Sri Lanka, and 2,000 prisoners released in a collective
amnesty. In all, this was a large and expensive enterprise which would
bring prestige for both the country and its leader, U Nu. But it also
promoted strong demands from some leading monks (hsayadaws) to
make Buddhism the state religion.
Already in 1950 the Sangha had achieved great influence and was
being delegated an advisory role to U Nu. An anti-communist
propaganda war organised in a cooperative move between monks and
the army, with support from the Ford Foundation. Missionary work was
carried out amongst the minorities, although U Nu feared that the
monks’ direct participation would be dangerous for the state. Buddhism
also became part of the school curriculum. The aim of making
Buddhism a superordinate political ideology was to promote unity,
peace and progress, and to counter what U Nu considered the root of all
conflicts: selfishness and greed. Inspired by Fabianism, he had earlier
noted similarities between Buddhism and socialism; now he rejected
Marx’s materialism and revolution.
In speeches and at ceremonies U Nu blended Buddhism and Burman
belief in spirits (nat) with politics.4 At times U Nu was a monk; indeed,
the administration itself, according to critics, could not be distinguished
from one long Buddhist ceremony. The biggest problem, however, was
3. Dalton in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 1970.

that the monastic order, the Sangha, was divided into different sects.
The young monks began to organise themselves along political lines on
the right-left spectrum, where sect and ethnic allegiance (Burman, Mon,
Shan, Karen) also played a part. This brought the monks into conflict,
especially when they had to respond to political decisions and advise the
government, for example on religious education. In the name of
pluralism, U Nu had allowed the teaching of Christianity and Islam, to
which the Sangha leadership very much opposed: 8,000 monks had
demonstrated in Mandalay against this decision.
There were violent episodes among the monks themselves, and
several were arrested whilst in possession of weapons. In the politicised
atmosphere of the 1950s the discipline within the Sangha was poor.
This was probably because the state did not restrain, but on the contrary
breathed life into activism in the name of religion and nationalism.
Several monks held communist attitudes but many more were on the
opposite wing—the extreme right which defended class-ridden society
as a consequence of differences of kamma. Politicisation awoke
dissension within the army and the Socialist Party (within the AFPFL)
and U Nu had to hand over power to the army and General Ne Win from
1958 to 1960. The Christian Karen and Kachin were naturally worried
and Muslim Indians in Mandalay were attacked by monks. The 1947
constitution said (paragraph 4, 2) that
the abuse of religion for political purposes is forbidden and any

act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred,
enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or
sects is contrary to this constitution and may be made punishable
by law.5
When U Nu subsequently changed course in his policy towards

minorities and began to promise independence to the Arakan and the
Mon, as well as greater independence for the Shan and the Kayah, there
4. The commander-in-chief, Ne Win, asked the elder monastic leaders

(hsayadaws) their advice on offerings to nats. They answered: ‘Give presents to
the monks instead.’ This was an indirect criticism of U Nu, who was also
criticised in the newspapers for ‘primitivism’. But animism figured as a religion
in line with Buddhism, Christianity and Islam in the preliminary draft of the
1947 constitution, in paragraphs 20–21 on religious freedom.
5. Maung Maung (1961:260f).
was yet again a feeling of division and disintegration. Ethnic and

religious contradictions increased and enhanced nationalistic
contradictions, and two mosques were destroyed. The year 1961 saw the
start of the Kachin uprising; one reason for it was that the Christian
Kachin saw the proposal for Buddhism to be made the state religion as
further evidence of the Burmanisation of the country. There was also
dissension in the Shan states where an uprising had begun in 1959. Both
the Shan and the Kachin reacted against military high-handedness.
Meanwhile, the Karen were still in rebellion.6 In these circumstances,
the army and Ne Win feared that the Shan states would be taken over by
communists.
Enter Ne Win
This policy change split the AFPFL and created the base that allowed the
army to take power in 1962 with support from the Socialist Party. The
coup occurred witth the closing of a ‘Federal Seminar’, the aim of
which was precisely to solve the edinic problems. All participants were
arrested.7 U Nu had won the election of 1960 with only 52 per cent of
the vote, but Ne Win now stood as the nation’s saviour—almost as a
cakkavattin or a mìn laùng—the one who had stopped the growing
religious and edinic split and who had stemmed foreign influence. Ne
Win had demonstrated the latter in fighting the invading Kuomintang
army but he went further and laid down prohibitions against all foreign
cultural dominance, from beauty contests and horse racing to the Ford
and Asia Foundations and English language teaching. Films, books and
magazines were purged of un-Burman influences. Another important
action to halt foreign influence was the limiting of the Christian missions.
After 1963 foreign missionaries were no longer welcome in Burma;
their schools and hospitals were nationalised and they could not
maintain connections with foreign missionary societies. The Baptists
moved to Thailand and continued their unofficial support of the
Christians in the Karen National Union, which for a period also
contained a socialist group.
6. A Karen state had been established in 1951 by an amendment to the

constitution. A large part of it was occupied by the rebels. Its main town,
Papun, was retaken by the army in 1955.
7. Lehman (1981:2).
Map 3: Karen and Mon States (Source: Amnesty International 1988)

Ne Win sought to press the minorities to give away their

constitutional right to autonomy and to stop their many rebellions. He
believed that this could be achieved partly by taking over more of the
local administration in the states and by installing his party organisation
and the army, and partly by establishing a shared social and cultural
identity through a national day, publications, etc. A new constitution in
1974 made clear the unity within the territory, where all groups could
move freely.8 The constitution endorces Aung San’s definition of a
nation as a historic community (as quoted earlier). This definition was
used by Ne Win to legitimise a centralised regime as a base for a unitary
state.
ONE PARTY, ONE STATE, ONE NATION

Before returning to Ne Win’s model of society, let us examine the
sequence of events that triggered off the political violence of the 1950s:
• It could be argued that the 1947 constitution merely extended the

colonial state.
• The union government continued to be the government of former
ministerial Burma; the upper chamber of nationalities (fifty-three
Burman seats and seventy-two minority seats) had no power; the
administration relied upon former colonial officials or persons
appointed politically.
• Corruption was widespread.
• The AFPFL was a coalition of parties and groups ridden with
factionalism.
• The government had no means to control the many armed groups and
the escalating warlordism.
• The Second World War had caused extensive damage and hampered
economic restoration.
8. The first constitution gave citizenship in the union to all ‘indigenous races’,
but a special right of residence in the specific states on ethnic criteria, if one could
prove birthright in the area during British colonisation. This connection gave
further rights to seek full citizenship (see Maung Maung, 1961, Ch. 2, iv). But
this complicated rule did not evidently give a Burman immediate right freely to
reside in, for example, the Shan states.
It is clear that there was no single determining cause, but that the
ensuing chaos facilitated the rationale and ideology of a strong
corporate state, organised in a manner similar to, and governed by, the
military. Thus the obstacles to reintegration were identified as liberal
democracy and Western culture—the works of the British became the
main target ten years after independence. In this way, the constitution
itself was not the real problem. The ‘culprit’ was located in the practice
of politics, where the use of force and violence became a cultural and
natural part of every action. The dreadful thing is that several
generations have experienced only such a way of life. Today, freedom
is still considered possible through the use of violence as a means to limit
the freedom of others or to take their lives. Democracy has become a
strange, foreign concept that is totally unrelated to any form of practice.
Parliamentarianism was quickly done away with. According to Ne
Win, it was not suitable for Burma and was being misused. Socialism,
combined with Buddhist concepts, was presented in the book Systems of
Correlation between Man and His Environment.9 Here it was
underlined in the text that there was no suggestion of a religious
programme. Politics and religion should exist separately but in
correlation.
According to the programme, spiritual life and man’s reason play a
determining role in changing the history of society. ‘Matter and mind’
(rupa and nama) are identified as the central correlations. The book
applies the cause-effect principles (nidanas) of Buddhism, which are a
chain of mutually dependent, ontological elements (spiritual-material;
ignorance-wisdom; birth-death; etc.). Despite this placing of man in
focus, reason and man must be ruled from the centre, otherwise negative
qualities such as hatred and greed are released in a destructive chain
reaction. The programme rejected egalitarianism and declared it an
impossibility. Many have attempted to see Buddhism and socialism in
this programme as a union of religion and politics10—but there is in fact
discussion of a clear separation of state and religion in accordance with
the ideas of Aung San.
Buddhism applies here purely ontologically, that is, formulating
principles for a shared way of living to which we are all subordinated,
9. Burma Socialist Programme Party (1963).

10. See Sarkisyanz (1965,1978). I have attempted to analyse Buddhism as a
medium for political models and models of identity, while maintaining that
religion and politics are separate fields (Gravers 1996a).
but not in the functional or institutional sense as in the monarchist

period. On the other hand, critics who looked for Marxism in the
programme were amazed that dialectic had been substituted by chains
of cause and effect, which did not identify the main contradictions
within a hierarchy. Even though the model seems to be an attempt at a
syncretism of traditional autocracy and a modern political centralism, it
must be understood as a modernist version of the Burmese way. Those
who suggest that this model is just the old autocracy, or pure and simple
Leninist communism, can find both pros and cons for their argument. It
is important, however, that critics do not overlook intentions. This
model was largely believed to be a genuine Burman attempt to stop what
had already developed into a maze of conflicts. In fact, central to the
programme seems to be corporate thinking: a middle road between
bourgeois democracy and communism, between right and left, where all
classes and ethnic groups unite and function under a central leadership
controlled by the army. This would create harmony between individual
and social forces.
After the coup, Ne Win removed a number of religious-based
prohibitions, for instance against pest eradication and eating meat from
old cows. He also stopped the official worship of spirits. More
importantly, he attempted to control the Sangha. He gave his support to
the most ‘fundamentalist’ sect, Shwegyin, from the old royal city of
Amarapura. This sect was known to support strong discipline, and in
1965 convened a meeting of all the sects. The purpose was to hinder
rebels, especially members of the banned Communist Party, from hiding
behind the monks’ yellow robes. For Ne Win, every politicised monk
was a communist and every communist a representative of foreign
influence. This intervention brought about demonstrations by monks in
Mandalay which ended with several hundred arrests. Ne Win expressed
the view that he did not need the support of the Sangha to improve
living conditions; monks ought not to get involved in politics. Peace
was made, but without much satisfaction amongst the monks. Ne Win
only succeeded in implementing a limited registration of monks,
nevertheless the Sangha’s role in politics was sharply reduced until
1988–89.
In 1980, following advice from the Shwegyin sect, he held a Sangha
convention. Here, the full registration of monks was implemented and a
number of ‘false’ monks were thrown out. In addition, amnesty was
granted to 4,000 people, including many rebels (Karen amongst others)
and to the exiled U Nu who, with foreign help, had fought Ne Win from
bases in Thailand since 1970.11 Now U Nu was engaged to edit
Buddhist texts and Ne Win openly gave gifts to the monks and began a
large pagoda-building project behind the Shwe Dagon pagoda. The new
pagoda (Maha Vizeya) was not yet finished when Ne Win raised a htì
(spire), which symbolises power. In so doing, he appealed to the
Buddhist cosmology and, like the kings, he attempted to purify
Buddhist teaching, perhaps to accumulate religious merit. Even though
Ne Win is hated, there are probably many who would attribute his
political power and long survival as leader to the possession of a large
and robust kamma. I have, however, not come across the term hpòn
(glory; honour) in any discussions about Ne Win.
In Ne Win’s case, power is synonymous with a personalised form of
autocracy. However, he has not built a modern personality cult like
Stalin and Mao. On the contrary, he has lived a secluded life, like a king,
yet without using the symbols and titles connected to a royal person, as
Ba Maw did in his position as a dictator during the war. Ne Win has not
openly assumed the guise of a ‘ruler of the universe’ (cakkavatti) or a
‘righteous ruler’ (dhammaraja)—probably intentional since such claims
could easily backfire and intrude on his exercise of power.
Nevertheless, he has ruthlessly eliminated his rivals in the Thakin
group.
Economic policy has similarly been based on a centralism which has
more in common with the corporate state’s management than with
northern European welfare socialism.12 Foreign firms had to leave the
country, and the production of oil, minerals and gems was nationalised
together with trade, especially in foodstuffs. The nationalisation of land
and the currency reform of 1965 drove approximately 200,000 Indians
out of the country. Burman peasants, however, acquired the right to use
the land which could not be sold, rented out or mortgaged. The reason
was to help one million tenants who were Burmans, while half of the
big landowners were kala, especially Indians. Later in 1970,
cooperatives were established.
11. Amongst the homecomers was the communist and rebel, Thakin Soe, who
was decorated, and also Brigadier Hanson Kya Doe, a Sandhurst-educated Pwo
Karen who had cooperated with Aung San in the resistance against the Japanese
and had not participated in the Karen rebellion in 1949. In the 1960s he had
joined U Nu’s rebel forces in Thailand. Arch-enemies and old Thakin comrades
returned home as a sign of Ne Win’s reconciliatory intentions. However, they
all had to refrain from political activity!
12. The economic system and its development are described in Silverstein
(1977, 1989) and Taylor (1987).
While the country sought to keep foreign economic influence out, the
unofficial market thrived and kept Burmans supplied with material
goods smuggled in from Thailand. This made up perhaps as much as
four-fifths of domestic consumption and had a turnover equal to, or
even higher than, official trade. This type of economy favours those
corrupt bureaucrats who accept bribes and have the means to buy. The
system has been compared with the old monarchic tributary relationships
where the client gives presents (let-saung) to the patron, that is the
official, in order to receive protection or a service of some kind.
However, the modern patron-client system is based on a much more
tightly controlled system of surveillance by the military intelligence
services of a modern autro cratic regime. The state now has much
greater control over all sections of society than before colonialisation.
The similarity probably lies in the fact that the patron-client relationship
was a pervasive system of exchange of favours and protection, and was
fundamental to maintaining the prevailing conditions of power, whereas
modern conditions also constitute a kind of system of redistribution,
whereby benefits supposedly trickle down to all in the hierarchy of
power. On the other hand, Ne Win has used greed as a reason to dismiss
close associates and to reveal their wide-scale smuggling operations and
waste. This autocratic style obviously invites a comparison with the
monarchist autocracy. Surveillance under Ne Win became more and
more widespread with the addition of various secret intelligence
services.13
Others have also used the informal market to their advantage,
especially the Christian Karen on the border with Thailand. The Karen
National Union (KNU) financed its battle for a state by taxing smuggled
goods on the border crossings under its control. This source of income
has now vanished, however, since the army destroyed the Karen bases
in Burma and allied itself with Thailand. In return, Thailand’s army has
itself acquired lucrative contracts on valuable teak and other timber
concessions in Burma. The Burman army has swallowed an estimated
35–50 per cent of the national budget in recent years, and there is
conjecture that the regime is now involved in opium smuggling to pay
for an expansion of the armed forces. Burma is one of the world’s
largest producers of opium and heroin despite years of help from the
USA to eradicate poppy cultivation.14
13. See Lintner (1989).

With Burma in debt and in the pockets of Japanese and American

firms, and the Thai army and China who bartered weapons for timber,
Ne Win continued to speak of foreign influences which threatened
independence. He stepped down and disbanded the Burma Socialist
Programme Party, yet he still was ‘the culprit’, as Aung San Suu Kyi
called him. Anecdotes were rife in the international media, not least
concerning his belief in astrology and numerology. He was presented as
a quick-tempered mystic, close to being irrational and despotic. He did
not execute associates, but punished the disobedient and took the
relatives of fleeing associates as hostages. He also retired many leading
military figures. The army’s violent conduct and its use of forcibly
conscripted porters to transport supplies are also among the features
reminiscent of the pre-colonial past. But here the problem is rather the
soldiers’ minimal education and their contempt for ‘foreign traitors’,
Karen and others, who are forced to work as military porters and pushed
on until they the of exhaustion.15 The BBC, among others, has claimed
that the army used methods learnt from the Japanese during the Second
World War.
Ne Win granted amnesty to prisoners in connection with religious
events, whilst he also allowed widespread use of torture. Nevertheless,
these despotic traits alone do not explain this extreme nationalism and
violence. Certainly he was eccentric but he was also a wily and hard-
driven politician who worked behind the scenes with a hard-nosed
‘logic’. This ‘logic’ must be viewed in relation to the colonial period
and independence in 1948. The anecdotes which emphasised his
irrational traits were rather a symptom of the reigning paranoia and the
difficulties of getting rid of the brutal military dictatorship and its ever-
present secret service.16
It is thus tempting to see Ne Win’s regime as a continuation of the
traditional autocracy. Maung Maung Gyi even tries to show that Ne
Win bases his rule on ‘the mediaeval Burmese mind’, which has not
changed in spite of British colonialisation. He thus makes Burman culture
an eternal, unchanging mental substance and an inheritance they can
never escape: ‘General Ne Win’s authoritarian political style merely
14. On the economic situation see Steinberg in Silverstein (1989). Burma

acquired the status of a ‘Less Developed Country’ (LDC) in 1987.
15. Amnesty International (1988, 1991).
16. The anecdotes were retold in Linter (1989) and Badgley (1989).
cashed in on this vast store of built-in attitudes and values of the

Burmese society that are supportive of this rule pattern.’17
Maung Maung Gyi’s analysis is based on the assumption that the
Burmans can be subordinated to one definite mental archetype. The same
construction can be seen in Lucien Pye, who divides the political world
into two levels: ‘One level is characterised by gentleness, religiosity and
a compelling need to elucidate the qualities of virtue. The other is
characterised by violence, malicious scheming and devious thinking.’18
This type of representation ends with reducing the Burmans to an
almost schizophrenic mental essence. That the past plays a role as one
of the models for current politics is clear but that does not mean that the
past continues and determines everything in the present. Maung Maung
Gyi overlooks discontinuity in the process: the showdown between
colonialisation and ‘feudalism’, which is Ne Win’s and his generation’s
declared nationalist objective. Therefore, it is important to point out the
complex syncretic elements in the post-colonial development; there is
no singular explanation based in culture and tradition. Jon Wiant warns
against such a historicist interpretation of the use of symbols: The study
of political symbolism skirts along the edges of historicism and carries
with it the danger of seeing the old in everything which purports to be
new or revolutionary.’19 Even though there is reference to the past, and
old terms are applied, this is not synonymous with Burmans being
trapped in a culture and a mentality from the past which appears as pure
atavism.
What is significant is the ambiguity in the use of the past—both as a
positive search for ‘the Burmese way’ and as evidence of the present
regime’s negative behaviour. Both positions are closely linked to the
continued confrontation with colonialisation and everything foreign, and
act as important concepts in the discourse on power and opposition. The
past is an enormously complex picture for the present and is full of
17. Maung Maung Gyi (1983:3).

18. Pye (1969:136). Spiro (1992:202) takes this theory to its psychocultural
extreme: These four types of behaviour (political violence, crime, insurgency
and political factionalism) are symptomatic of a disposition to hostility that is
found in the Burmese male personality.’
19. Wiant (1981:71). See also Keesing (1985) for an important analysis of
language, culture and tradition as modern constructions which refer to the
colonial past, and where in the analysis there is a need to distinguish between
these models, including the use of the categories of the past and the past-in-
present the models represent.
ambivalence. It is not necessarily a direct agreement between the use of

cultural expressions (conventional metaphors and models) and social
form. This also applies to ideological stereotypes. Ne Win was fond of
calling all his opponents communists, for example. On the other hand,
the outside world has attempted to label the regime and its political and
economic system - but is it socialism, Marxism, traditional autocracy, or
a syncretism? There is no meaning in calling the economy syncretic if
this implies a harmonising of oppositions between a planned economy
and an informal economy.20 Syncretism may be found in the ideology
and the model, but in reality it is a centralised, autocentric political
economy where contradictions are increased in spite of intentions
towards welfare and harmony.
There is not much doubt that opposition to the regime in the last few
years has been largely provoked by the economic crisis, which in turn is
connected to the cost of beating down rebellion. A radical
demonetisation in 1987 renewed 70 per cent of the currency, and the
loss of savings enraged people, especially the urban population.
Simplified summaries of Burma’s development involve a risk of
reductionism and should be viewed with due caution. This applies also
to the following comparison, where I shall return to Orwell and the
Colonial Club. This example is used as a summation because all sources
are in agreement about the great importance attached to the clash with
colonialism. The colonial order has stood as a direct antithesis to the
present order in the political discourse.
20. Hoadley (1991:14).

8.
NE WIN’S CLUB
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to compare Ne Win with Orwell’s

protagonist, U Po Kyin, the Burman opportunist in Burmese Days, who
spared no means in achieving his goals. And yet Ne Win is said to
express both the ruthlessness and ambivalence encapsulated in this
character, who was refused membership in the white Thakins’ club. He
takes such a delight in hating the club and not having access to it that he
must form one for himself and his people. Burma’s dilemma is perhaps
that Ne Win persuaded many to join this ‘club’, whether they were
members of the party or not. Since then it has been impossible to leave
the club without being called a traitor to the country and a non-Burman.
Peasants and the kin of soldiers have probably been the strongest
supporters. Officers have acquired positions in all sectors of trade and
bureaucracy. At least ten million have been members of the different
organisations of the party and surely not all of these could have been
forced into this, but studies of social life are lacking which could
illuminate the nature of the regime’s support.1
Clearly the strategy has been to banish the conflicts existing during
the colonial era, to create a link with the past and to create harmony.
The price of all of this has been the emergence of total control of
plurality and individuality.
Ne Win’s state model as an absolute, corporative entity was most likely
a mixture of traditional dynastic practice of power, Leninism and the
Japanese autocratic mode, which he learnt during the war. First and
foremost, however, it was meant as a Burman alternative and the
complete antithesis of the colonial order. That is to say, we must take
statements such as ‘we the Burmans’ and ‘the Burmese way’ at face
value. This is the essence of the model.
The ‘club’ provided proper members with advantages while those
who were against it were labelled aliens and outsiders. And finally, the
entire foreign world entered a conspiracy and bestowed the Nobel Peace
Prize upon Aung San Suu Kyi. On its borders twentythree minority
groups, Burmans in exile, and representatives of the Sangha have
formed a Democratic Alliance for Burma. Here again the foreigners’
influence can be seen.
Everything that has occurred in relation to this regime in recent years
has merely served to consolidate the following self-fulfilling prophecy:
unless one controls foreign influence in the economy, religion and the
ethnic minorities, there will be an imbalance in the universe and
‘without centralism society will tend towards anarchism’.2
Ne Win’s problem was that he used up the symbolic capital he
inherited from Aung San and which he ought to have transformed in the
interest of the state. Incidentally, he was not chosen as the heir just the
opposite in fact, as other Thakins warned Aung San against making Ne
Win his highest commanding officer.3 The administration of this
legacy, his kamma and control of the universe have crumbled. Not only
have the monks demonstrated in the streets of Rangoon, they have
refused gifts from military persons and their families, which in effect is
the same as refusing them access to the accumulation of religious merit
and thereby securing their kamma. The military killed many monks
during these demonstrations and numerous new pagodas have been
constructed to balance out the negative religious merit which such
murders cause.
The greatest problem faced by the regime, however, was that a well-
developed, democratic tradition to form an alternative to fundamentalist
nationalism was not to be found. In this context it is perhaps possible to
prove Maung Maung Gyi right when he says that the traditional Burman
concepts pertaining to power as personal attributes, rather than
attributes of systems, have been retained since independence.4
Democratic possibilities, which could perhaps have been developed
via the party, the local councils and in the new constitutions, were
1. ‘Military influence in national life means not only the influence and weight
of the military in the technical sense, but the influence and weight of the social
stratum from which the latter (especially the junior officers) mostly derives its
origins’ (Gramsci, 1971:214).
2. Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (1963:31). Note that the prophecy
pertaining to anarchy could also be found in the plural society model. And yet
individual freedom and initiative as prerequisites of development were
mentioned in the BSPP’s programme. Notions of creating harmony between
different social forces are present in all statements but are seldom successful.
3. U Maung Maung (1989:86).
NE WIN’S CLUB 71
annihilated by repression as a result of fear of division and foreign

influence. More than a hundred political parties went forward into the
1990 election; many of them came from ethno religious backgrounds. As
is common knowledge, the parliament never met and all opposition
politicians have either been arrested or fled the country. Thirty elected
members of parliament from the National League for Democracy
(NLD) went into exile in 1990 and formed the National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma, which includes an alliance with
ethnic minority organisations. The leader is Dr Sein Win.
A special indicator of the paranoiac nature of this development is to
be seen in relation to Burmans married to foreigners, such as Aung San
Suu Kyi. They are not regarded as being proper Burmans and, worse
still, their children are of mixed race and their loyalty to the state is put
in doubt. In 1991 the regime asked politicians and officials to answer
more than 300 questions in order to test their loyalty. Included was the
question of whether or not a person married to a foreigner could be
Burma’s leader. About 15,000 civil servants were dismissed after the
upheavals.
Is this racism? Yes, there is a very close connection between fear of
what is foreign on the one hand and racism (allowing blood relations
combined with cultural factors to be the deciding factor) on the other.
Aung San Suu Kyi writes, as mentioned in her interesting analysis of
Burmese literature and nationalism, that the Burmans regarded their
‘racial survival’ as being threatened by Chinese and Indians—not just
because of the differential favouritism of the colonial powers, but
because they married Burmans.5
But where has all this talk of race come from, whereby commentators
say the regime has ‘rediscovered’ a political weapon?6 From Burman
culture and ethos, as maintained by Aung San Suu Kyi, or from
colonialism? Or is it perhaps a mixture of both, whereby race is made
synonymous with culture and ethnicity? Let us turn yet again to the
Colonial Club and quote Maurice Collis:
Rangoon society was wholly English and it was composed of the

members of the three great clubs, the Pegu, the Boat and the
4. To the Burmans, awza (authority), gon (prestige) and ah-na (power) reside in
a person and not in the laws (Maung Maung Gyi, 1983:174).
5. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:104).
6. Steinberg (1992:147).
Gymkhana. Nobody but a European could be elected to these

clubs. Wealth or attainments or character was irrelevant; only race
counted.7
The distinctive feature of the club was loyalty; no fraternising with the
others. A parallel is clearly to be seen in Ne Win’s mixture of national
identity, race and political loyalty. The following quotation is from a
speech he made in 1979, the content of which he recently repeated:
Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being
disloyal to the race and country but are being loyal to others. If
people of pure blood act this way, we must carefully watch people
of mixed blood. Some people are of pure blood, pure Burmese
heritage and descendants of genuine citizens. Karen, Kachin and
so forth are of genuine pure blood. But we must consider whether
these people are completely for our race, our Burmese people:
Our country, our Burma.8
Xenophobia combined with racism expresses not only something

traditionally Burman/Burmese or even something natural and inherent
in humanity. In this particular context it expresses the colonialised
subject’s feeling of powerlessness and fear of losing all control of his
universe. This presentation, which uses a terminology derived from
European race theory, has been inculcated within the collective memory
and experience via the club model;9 it is a racism and fear of otherness
created in history and as part of a social process. But it is dangerous to
justify a subjective application as a natural part of an ethnic group and
its essential cultural substance. In recent years, more than ever, this
linkage and its essentialism legitimised war and massacres of other
ethnic and religious groups. A tendency to see the ethnic-national as
linked to the natural bonds of blood can also be traced in the rhetoric
used by supporters of the Karen National Union: ‘Perhaps the genes of
7. Collis (1938:68; emphasis added). Likewise, the Anglicised Karen had their
club in Rangoon: the Karen Social and Services Club. The president was Saw
Tha Din.
8. Quoted in M. Smith (1991:37; emphasis added). In this case I must trust that
the translation is correct.
9. See E. Balibar’s essay ‘Racism and Nationalism’ Balibar and Wallenstein
(1991:37–69).
NE WIN’S CLUB 73
the Karen babies in their mothers’ wombs had undergone so drastic a

change that a Karen born of woman [sic], naturally had an ingrained
sense to be wary of a Burma (n) (quoted ad verbatim).’10
The politics of ethnic difference is also explicit in a recent pamphlet
from the KNU: ‘It is extremely difficult for the Karens and the
Burmans, two peoples with diametrically opposite views, outlooks,
attitudes and mentalities, to yoke together’11—an echo of the statements
from 1946.
Whilst repeating the national virtues, to which the missionaries were
party with their emphasis on high morals, truth, hospitality, etc., the
KNU’s rhetoric stresses the fact that ethnic differences are absolute and
fundamentally irreconcilable in that they are almost genetically
determined. Yet, it would appear that the KNU has also begun to
understand that it will be difficult to realise an independent state.
Therefore federalism is now discussed intensively among Burman
students who have fled the country.
Nationalism, as it is thought of by the Burmans and some of the
minority groups (particularly the Karen), is a form of self-indulgence,
whereby the use of power and violence is merely its media. One is
continuously referred to the past, not least to the colonial legacy with its
corpses and ghosts. It is precisely the fight against this past which fuels
the military dictatorship and it was with just such a war in mind that
Aung San warned against ‘wasting time and energy attacking and
blaming the imperialists for all the ills of the nation now that power was
back in the hands of her people’.12 In a speech given in 1946, Aung San
emphasised that Burman nationalism did not imply isolation from the
world: The one fact from which no nation big or small can escape is the
increasing universal interdependence of nations.’13
To open the ‘club’ for all in Burma, also for foreigners, and to
destroy this paranoia will be Aung San Suu Kyi’s tough legacy. She is
obviously conscious of the problems arising due to the plural ethnic
hierarchy:
10. ‘The Origins of the Karen: An Official History’, Appendix 1 in Michael

Lonsdale, The Karen Revolution in Burma (undated) quoted from Ananda Rajah
(1990:130). Lonsdale was probably the forest officer who helped the KNU
during the insurrection. See M. Smith (1991:114).
11. The KNU, The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom (July 1992:14).
We cannot have the attitude of ‘I’m Kachin; I’m Burman’…we

must have the attitude that we are all comrades in the struggle for
democratic rights…like brothers and sisters. If we divide ourselves
ethnically, we shall not achieve democracy for a long time.14
The question is how to evade the hierarchism of the past. This is

perhaps the key to mental and ideological ‘decolonisation’. In the
meantime the horrors continue with the expulsion of Muslims from
Arakan and the attempts to raze the Karen bases to the ground.
13. Silverstein (1972:91). This warning was neglected by Ne Win and also by
the present regime. Since 1962 the earlier pro-Japanese speeches of Aung San
have been quoted extensively.
14. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:231). Speech in Kachin state in 1989.
9.
AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S STRATEGY
When nations fail, the woman’s influence again appears.

She leads, she drives, and the men follow (Fielding Hall
1906:268).
Ethnicism is a serious problem which must be solved. But it is quite

clear that Aung San Suu Kyi’s primary objective is to bring demo cracy
to the fore. To this end, she has appealed to the army ‘which my father
formed’ and which, as Aung San emphasised, is to serve the entire
nation and the people. This leads Ne Win to reply that the army has held
the nation together and saved it from dissolving into chaos. Aung San
Suu Kyi wants the monks to support demo cracy but, like her father, she
would probably not make Buddhism the state religion. Ne Win could
have objected to this by drawing attention to the fact that the democratic
parties incited the monks to participate actively in politics, something
which is considered illegal. As mentioned earlier, the monks in
Mandalay have refused gifts from military personnel and their families
since 1991, thereby cutting these people off from the accumulation of
religious merit for their kamma.
Aung San Suu Kyi is attempting to construct an interesting combination
of liberalism, humanism and Buddhism—all universal ideals which cut
through cultures and national parameters. The liberal element in
Buddhism is that all individuals must have, in principle at least, an
equal chance to acquire religious merit, according to the existing
preconditions. Each individual is responsible for the administration of
these preconditions according to the ethics of Buddhism. The humane
aspect is stressed by equating Buddhism with the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The Buddhist principle of non-violence (ahimsa) and the entire
ethical system (avoidance of hatred, lies, greed, etc.) are reminiscent of
universal human rights. The following is quoted from Aung San Suu
Kyi’s Preamble to the above Declaration:’‘ [whereas it is essential] if a
man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected
by the rule of law.’1
Clearly this refers to the actual situation. The regime has answered
that human rights are incompatible with Burman culture. Like all talk of
democracy, human rights are merely an expression of foreign meddling.
However, democracy is the main goal of Aung San Suu Kyi’s strategy,
and she compares it with Buddhism and its ideals of a righteous
monarchy (dhammarajd). As mentioned earlier, the ideal ruler must
provide welfare and must not oppose the will of the people (avirodhd).
In this case one must remember that the opposite attributes legitimised
rebellions led by mìn laùng (pretenders to the throne). The implicit
reference to the regime cannot be missed, but it is the comparison
between a democratic leader and an autocratic monarch that is more
problematic. Aung San Suu Kyi explains this comparison by stating that
the population has not had access to international political analyses.2
This is a wise strategy, which precisely identifies the cause of the
violence: an absolute abuse of power which is against all conceivable
universal, humane principles. Aung San Suu Kyi utilises tradition but
universalises its ideals. The message is clear both in Burma and
internationally. Cosmopolitan norms of identity without thereby
rejecting traditions are a good antidote to the regime’s paranoia and
violence. Cosmopolitanism involves a plurality of strategies for social
and cultural identities, which can be used across cultures and nations
(states).3 These strategies mirror themselves in a plurality of identities,
regardless of whether or not they incorporate universal norms. They are
communicated via the media as consumerism, emigration, tourism, etc.,
and provide a flexibility and freedom of choice in an open terrain whilst
simultaneously containing references to tradition and uniqueness. This
pluralism, however, is open to interpretation and applicable in different
cultural contexts. Aung San Suu Kyi risks that such openness will be met
by criticism from those sectors of the population who still fear foreign
influence and who emphasise the collective and corporate Burman

2. Ibid. (1991:167–79).
3. For a discussion on new global identities, see Featherstone (1990) and Lash
and Friedman (1992).
AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S STRATEGY 77
identity. She might also attract international criticism quite easily by not
granting independence to the minorities. There are no easy solutions in
this balancing act between (a) ethnic differences, (b) national unity, and
(c) international relations and influences. She is quite literally the heir
of that nationalism whose extreme fundamentalism she has been trying
to remove:
As nationalism in Burma was fundamentally a part of the

traditional ethos, nationalistic movements also sprang from
Burmese sources, even though they were inevitably influenced by
western ideas and institutions.’4
Nationalism is fundamental because it is part of the tradition and thus a

mental essence which is perhaps impossible to remove.
This somewhat circular argumentation is often posed in the current
debate on nationalism. But will nationalism in its most violent form
ever disappear? There is a lack of agreement regarding this matter in
mainstream debates on nationalism. Anthony Smith is of the opinion
that the chances are small, whilst Eric Hobsbawm comforts us by saying
that this evil will not last for ever.5
The real problem is that the term ‘nationalism’ is used to refer to
many different political conditions. Conflicts all over the world are
classified as nationalistic whilst national identity and nationalism are
proclaimed to be the most fundamental and universal questions of all
time. Smith poses the question in the following manner:
Why have national identity and nationalism become fundamental

in the modern world? First because of their ubiquity. If any
phenomena are truly global then they must be the nation and
nationalism.6
Nationalism is widespread because it is fundamental, and vice versa.

Perhaps this is a somewhat tautological statement, but it does not mean
that nationalism is an independent, evil agent. In
4. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:104; emphasis added).

5. A.Smith (1991:175): ‘It must be apparent by now that the chances of
transcending the nation and superseding nationalism are at present slim’ (i.e.
despite a growing cosmopolitanism); Hobsbawm (1992:8).
6. A.Smith (1991:143).
Burma this is basically because nationalism is ingrained in social

relations and in the history and cultural expressions of these. Globally,
however, it acquires its fundamental nature via a universal discourse on
power. Thus, it is important to consider these two levels of the national,
both as a global discourse and as concrete studies of different
nationalisms, and finally how the discourse and the particular histories
are interrelated.
A’COLONIZED’ CONSCIOUSNESS?
Is it possible to isolate the causes of Burma’s miserable situation and
identify some basic characteristics in the process? A single explanation
cannot be selected—and it is no use proclaiming Ne Win to be ‘the
culprit’ or using the regime’s own subjective explanation of foreign
intervention in the history of the country. The dominant problem in
Burma’s nationalism is that everyone has to subject themselves to the
‘hierarchisation’ of the social order whereby classification takes place
according to race, culture/ civilisation, religion and ethnicity/
nationality. The process of identification and construction of identity is
determined by this order of classification. The military regime has
monopolised the modes of social and cultural classification and
identification. They represent the past, the present and the future by
naming what is Burman and Burmese, and what is national or alien.
Plural society and its concepts are embedded in social relations, in
models and in cultural symbols. The social order and its hierarchy are
contained within all other models and strategies, in debates and
propaganda, and in everyday life since independence, to the extent that
the Burmese are confined within the labyrinth of this order.
Comaroff and Comaroff (1989) have called this process ‘colonizing
consciousness’; however, colonisation cannot fully overcome the
consciousness contained in the collective memory and thus achieve sole
access to and domination of all knowledge and practice. I do not believe
that the colonial models and categories have completely colonised the
consciousness and the collective memory, but rather that historical
experience still encompasses the imaginations of the nation, its political
discourse and other social practices. It would be more correct to say that
its society has not been liberated from the influence of colonial models
and concepts. When these models from the past are resisted they are
simultaneously kept alive in the social memory. I would prefer to
conceptualise the term in a slightly more abstract manner:
an ‘occupation’ of social and culturally expressed experience and
AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S STRATEGY 79
practice in relation to the political system. There are some, including

Michael Aung-Thwin, who have maintained that Burma has still not
found itself after colonisation, and that its independence was not at all
real.7 I feel that it would be more correct to say that Burma’s society has
not escaped from the showdown with the colonial era and its models of
society.
Cosmology, ontology and ideology, with their religious and ethnic
contents, have been connected in totalising and universal models which,
by referring to the past prophecies signify either a unity or a chaos. It is
in this juxtaposition that we can trace the influence of the colonial era in
the form of the chaos prophesied in Furnivall’s model of ‘plural
society’.
The dominant political discourse in Burma has been preoccupied with
cultivating its distorted order of society as being of central importance
to its future, and of claiming nationalism as a quasi-religious solution to
this disorder. That this interpretation of the situation is dominant is
stressed by the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi, in presenting her political
alternative in terms of Western democracy and liberalism, will have to
communicate her model via Buddhist concepts. This is because large
sectors of the population have been isolated from international debate,
and might criticise Aung San for seeking to introduce an alien political
system and of undermining the ‘Burmese way’. She may also find it
difficult to escape this self-reinforcing argumentation of nationalism.8
7. Aung-Thwin (1989:33).
8. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:167–79). In her entire presentation she not only
calls forth the nationalistic heritage of her father but appears as a person with
the authority and prestige to match the male, military power, and also as one
who wishes to harmonise the universe.
80
10.
NATIONALISM AS THE PRACTICE
OF POWER
What can Burmese history tell us about nationalism, ethnicity and

religion as ingredients in the exercise of power, which displays
increasingly similar features globally? As stated in the introduction, the
comparison of surface phenomena alone easily ends by reproducing
ahistoric explanations and the rhetoric of subjective nationalism.
However, the process by which nationalism in Burma was created
shows us several general tendencies which can possibly establish the
basis for a comparison.1
The first element that I shall emphasise is that nationalism amongst
the Burmans and Karen sought to take over the traditional cosmological
model, or at least part of it, and thereupon modernise it. With this, a
linkage appears which has often confused analyses of Burma’s history.
The ‘Burmese way’ has been presented as an ideological mish-mash, a
window-dressing, complete with deprecating comments about Ne Win,
when it has proved impossible to find an alternative clear label. On the
other hand, in the West there has often been an uncritical glorification
of the ethnic rebels and the oppressed minorities’ heroic battle for
independence.
The Christian Karen used features of the traditional model, those
concerning leadership for example, but proclaimed the British as father
figures, providing law and order, whilst the motherly American
missionaries helped them rediscover their lost religion and God. They
built an imagined community with the white brother and his white
man’s burden, which separated them from the Burmese context.
1. For example, a comparison can be made with the former colony of Fiji,
where the preservation of the indigenous Fijian culture was used by the military
to suppress the other half of the population, the Indians, who came to Fiji as sugar
plantation workers during the colonial period. The ‘traditional’ chiefly culture,
which the military claimed to save, is also a product of the same colonisation.
82 NATIONALISM AS THE PRACTICE OF POWER
Burman nationalists sought to keep the past in the present in their

imagined community: theirs was an alternative to the colonial order.
The aim was to repair the break in continuity which the colonisers had
caused. The nationalists showed this historically without recognising
that the use of history, as a holistic unit consisting of cultural, linguistic
and racial values presented as a natural essence of existence, was in fact
ingrained in the colonial power’s ‘club model’ and its ideas of a pluralist
society and racial separation. At the same time, Burman nationalism has
been a struggle against the European model of a nation. But in order to
distance itself from the colonial model, Burman nationalism has had to
emphasise its perpetual historical existence as Burman or even as
Burmese cultural essence, undistorted by foreigners. On the other hand,
the independent nation is also conceived as modern in its own terms. This
is the fundamental contradiction of nationalism in Burma. The pluralist
society concept of colonial Burma made ethnicity into a segregational
force that hampers any models not based exclusively on cultural
differences. Moreover, it has been countered by a hegemonic and
autocratic model.2
The search for an unchanged fragment of the history is obvious in the
use of cultural symbols: the spire on the pagoda; the old royal symbol
of the peacock on the flag; pictures of Aung San, etc. It would be easy
to conclude that the past alone was the model for independence and for
developments after that. However, the meaning of these cultural
symbols—namely that ‘we are the legitimate heirs to this power’—is
used by all parties. Nevertheless, because these symbolic meanings
pointing back to primordial origins are now so enmeshed with violence,
this connection completely dominates as a motivating force and blocks
attempts to formulate a strategy that does not insist on difference, original
culture and religious cosmological thinking. The power of the symbols,
however, lies not in the symbols per se, but in the way they legitimise
and transfer other forms of power and domination. Nationalism is
constructed on such symbolic power which distils history (see Chapter
16).
2. Chatterjee (1993) provides an important discussion on the nationalist

predicament of post-colonial societies. Must their imagination of a nation
forever remain colonised?
POWER AND VlOLENCE

Bruce Kapferer has shown how nationalism, as exemplified by Sri
Lanka and Australia, both takes over religion and takes on the character
of a fundamentalist religion itself. Nationalists often declare their
nationalism to be a higher form of religion.3 In this process nationalism
appears in place of religion as the dominant medium for political
battles, and acquires an existential mark as something fated: either fight
and the for the cause, or perish. Violence is thus almost unavoidable
when religion becomes the substantial element of nationalism and
determines identity. Religion often offers universalistic and
fundamentalist ideas to the model and its strategies. But nationalism is
not religion and neither nationalism nor religion is in itself an agent of
history. Nationalism is a summarising designation for the process, its
models and strategies. Hence, its prominence as a motive force. It is up
to concrete and comparative analyses to determine when nationalism
turns hegemonic. One shared feature of nationalistic models and
strategies, however, seems to be the genealogical base, i.e. that they
linearly represent the past in the present.
If we dig deeper into the political tumult in Burma and its models and
strategies, we find the factors that condition the theoretical and the
concrete practice of power as accumulated in historical experience—the
factors that make it possible to see the models as more than descriptions,
or rationalisations, of definite actions. A central factor is the
subordination to these either/or models and strategies, which has
marked Burma and created such enormous paranoia. All actions are
subject to the Burman-foreigner dichotomy; they must fit into the loyal
or alien categorisation. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia are caught up in
every political debate or action. Xenophobia has become ingrained in
the practice of power, the motive force behind action and reaction
(opposition and repression, coercion and consensus, etc.).
To take a recent example, in the 1990 parliamentary elections,
involving more than one hundred parties, the opposition won 80 per cent
of the seats. The military arrested those opposition candidates elected,
on the pretext of the threat to the country’s security posed by the
opposition and its contacts with foreign, ‘subversive’ forces. Amongst
those forces, the BBC, communists and Christian Karen were named.
3. Kapferer (1988:5, 1989).

84 NATIONALISM AS THE PRACTICE OF POWER
Michel Foucault has described this technique of power with graphic

irony:
The exercise of power can produce as much acceptance as may be

wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind
whatever threats it can imagine. In itself the exercise of power is
not violence; nor is it consent which, implicitly, is renewable. It is
a structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions.4
This is a total blocking of alternative political practice; where the

subject’s fear is invoked at a mere signal from the rulers, who have
gradually established themselves as the prime mover in this process.
This hierarchy of power is reduced to a small group of officers who
unleash a regime of fear and of whom only rumours reach the wider
public. Individual and group actions are totally blocked, and those who
try to protest will always have to resist getting caught up in ethnic and
religious divisions. Moreover, they must be alert to the possibility of
secret service agents in their midst. The corporate state creates a need
for a violent regime, when power and control over the chaotic
nationalist schisms must be preserved at all cost. In this total
xenophobia, ethics and lives are sacrificed for the sake of unity.
Even in opposition to such a regime, the tendency is to adopt the
same techniques of power and use them in opposition. Chopped-off
heads of soldiers and secret service agents are displayed, and the KNU
are not known for taking many Burmans as prisoners.5 This is deeply
disquieting and puts Aung San Suu Kyi’s Freedomjrom Fearin a new
perspective. Nothing short of a miracle is required if Burma is to end
this violence and find an alternative model. This is hard to hold on to
when power is exercised so totally; in all its gruesome truth it is worse
than Orwell’s universe. Yet here we can in fact reminisce with Orwell
on the implications of history for this development—and not least
certain historians’ interpretations used as apologies for committing such
atrocities. There is no political violence which does not assert a
historical and cultural right.
The above elements can also be seen in Europe over recent years,
possibly best expressed in the former USSR and in the former
Yugoslavia, where the situation is approaching private warlordism.
Therefore it is dangerous to see the cause as naturally inherent in the
4. Foucault (1988:214; emphasis added).

culture, in the blood, in the history or in the individual. This approach is

certain to call up the next violent response, and the one term can easily
appear in the other’s place: culture instead of race, and so on.
This tendency to naturalise culture and ethnicity, I believe, can be
used as a basis for comparison. With this starting point we can investigate
how people subordinate their identity and their living conditions to what
we term nationalism, and how power is generated behind this label.
Nationalism per se cannot be compared. It has become a superordinate
term for the complex processes where ethnicity and cultural and
religious conditions create models and strategies for the division of
power, both within states and internationally.
A more concrete comparison of the role of the military in the states of
Southeast Asia also seems important. In spite of great differences, the
military wishes to represent both nation and state and to hinder a
democratic pluralism. The military, nationalism and different versions of
the corporative state, as opposed to cosmopolitan strategies in the
population, seem to be central areas of conflict requiring analysis.
5. See Jon Swain in the Sunday Times Magazine (28 June 1992). A particularly
bloody execution of an alleged Burman spy, killed with a knife by a Karen
soldier, is recounted. The authenticity of the scenario is difficult to assess,
however, and the accompanying photographs have been blamed for
sensationalism.
86
11.
THE RULES OF THE MYANMAR
CLUB SINCE 1993
Since 1993 much has changed yet much is the same. The State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has opened its door to foreign
investments and invited tourists to Burma. However, the regime still
expresses fear of foreign influence, Western culture in particular, and its
military intelligence maintains a tight surveillance of contacts between
Burmese and foreigners. Violence and repression have become
integrated into daily life.
In Rangoon and Mandalay old buildings have given way to modern
hotels and shops. New cars congest the streets. The two main characters
of the current ‘Burmese Days’ sit on their respective sides of Inya lake,
largely confined to their houses. On the north side, isolated in his
fortified house, the ailing Ne Win still wields some influence, although
he is rarely mentioned on national days and has had his portraits
removed from public offices. In 1996 Ne Win received a courtesy visit
from President Suharto. On the south side, in University Avenue, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from her house arrest in July 1995 and
has been receiving visitors from the international community. On
Saturdays she has regularly addressed rallies in front of her house
although her husband and sons have not recently been allowed to visit
her. In October 1996 the SLORC prevented a meeting in her house of
delegates from the National League for Democracy. More than 500
party members were arrested and the road near her house was blocked
by security forces to prevent visits and rallies. In November of the same
year a mob attacked her car with stones. She blamed the attack on
members of a SLORC mass organisation, the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA). Before the attack, the senior general
of the SLORC, in a speech to the USDA leaders, called for the
elimination of ‘destructive elements’ who surrender the sovereignty of
Burma. At another USDA rally, the Minister of Railways is said to have
urged the members to kill Aung San Suu Kyi. At the time of writing she
is virtually isolated and confined to her house.
In December 1996 students took to the streets for the first time since
the uprising of 1988–89. They carried photos of Aung San and
demanded freedom, justice and fair government, and the right to form
student unions.1 The Lone Htein riot police dispersed the 1,500–2,000
students, arrested hundreds, and closed the universities. Although
students and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have kept a
tactical distance, Aung San Suu Kyi’s house was blockaded and the
SLORC immediately blamed the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi for
instigating the demonstrations, and accused her of conspiring with
communists, neo-colonialists and exiled groups. Aung San Suu Kyi is
still classified by the SLORC as an alien and a ‘destructive element’ in
her native country. Thus, she is denied admittance to the ‘club’.
Although the economy is undergoing a SLORC-instigated programme
of modernisation, the modern civil liberties are not allowed in the
Myanmar club. A large number of NLD members have been arrested
and detained since December 1996 in an attempt to quash the
opposition. The situation in 1997 is such that chances of dialogue and
democratisation have receded.
The following chapters do not pretend to be a complete updated
analysis of the changes since 1993. I have chosen to focus on the ethnic
struggle and in particular on the Karen; on the role of religion, and on
the nationalism practised by the SLORC. The analysis contained in the
new chapters aims to demonstrate how ethnic opposition and
nationalism have been gradually encompassed and ‘overdetermined’ by
religion, and how historical memory is expressed and performed via
religion and mass mobilisation.
1. It is ironic that Aung San is both a student hero and nationalist, as well as the
founder of the armed forces who have feared, beaten and killed students since
1962.
12.
BUDDHISM AND THE RELIGIOUS
DIVIDE AMONG THE KAREN
Religion remains an important medium in the formulation of political

strategies and identities in Burma.1 On 25 December 1996 a bomb
exploded near the Kaba Aye Pagoda and the Maha Pasana Cave built
for the Buddhist Synod in 1956 north of the Inya Lake in Rangoon.
General Tin Oo, Secretary-2 of the SLORC had just visited the site. The
explosion killed five people and injured seventeen, including policemen
and members of the USDA.2 The Maha Pasana housed a tooth relic of
the Buddha which was transferred from China on loan to Burma to
promote good relations between the two countries. The relic was to be
taken to Mandalay for ninety days before being returned to China on 5
March 1997.
Pagodas of the tooth relic have been constructed in Rangoon and
Mandalay by prisoners forced to earn merit in this way. The
construction was supervised by Khyin Nyunt, head of military
intelligence and secretary of the SLORC, a protégé of Ne Win who is
also given the title ‘National Races Secretary-1’. The regime has been
eager to pay respect to the monks and to restore pagodas after killing
and jailing several monks during the uprising of 1988–90. More than
300 monasteries were raided by troops and about 200 monks3 are
serving sentences in the infamous Insein Prison. The SLORC has
warned the clergy against subversive acts from the National League for
Democracy (NLD). However, some senior monks seem to support the
regime, and support from the Buddhist Sangha is still necessary to
1. See Matthews (1993); Tin Maung Maung Than (1993). In a recent article I
have attempted to examine the politicial role of religion in the latest history of
Burma (Gravers 1996a).
2. A letter-bomb later killed Tin Oo’s daughter. In April 1998 two students were
sentenced to death, presumably for plotting the assassinations.
legitimate any regime. Those who construct a pagoda gain much merit,
and such spectacular merit contains a substantial amount of symbolic
power.
No political practice is possible without involving Buddhism -and
Buddhism has been politicised to a degree where no religious act is
apolitical. Thus, the SLORC is active in organising elaborate
ceremonies to award titles to leading monks while controlling the
monasteries and checking any dissent. Headlines in the New Light of
Myanmar, 16 March 1997, read: ‘Secretary-1 attends Htìdaut-hoisting
in Rakhine State’, that is, the hoisting of the pagoda top spire or
umbrella (htì), a powerful Buddhist symbol. In addition, Buddhism can
be used more directly as a political weapon, for instance when members
of the NLD were banned from ordination as monks in September 1996.
4 Such a discriminating decree is contradictory to Sangha rules. Dissent
and opposition among the monks is found mainly in Mandalay and

Rangoon, where in March 1997 monks demonstrated in front of Muslim
mosques. They stoned the mosques following rumours that a Muslim
had raped a Buddhist girl. The truth behind the rumours is not clear, but
the Muslims in Burma are mostly of Indian origin (i.e. kala) and thus
provide a scapegoat easily recalled from historical memory. Such
rumours are related to fear and violence, and generated by the
repressive rule. However, this incident, amongst others, shows that
religion is an important field of struggle in Myanmar. The regime seems
to have some support amongst the rural clergy, as we shall see below.
The enormous symbolic power contained in Buddhist texts,
ceremonies, rituals, pagodas and paraphernalia (amulets, icons and
other items) is ingrained in the social relations and organisation of
Burmese society, as well as in the historical memory shared by the
population. Buddhism is a central pillar in the organisation and
distribution of power—not merely as an ideological function but also as
a distinctive social practice. Individual monks, as previously mentioned,
3. The exact number of monks in Burma is uncertain. In his Introduction to

Aung San Suu Kyi (1997: xii), Alan Clements mentions a figure of 1 million;
however, a figure somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 is more likely.
4. See the February 1997 report from the Buddhist Relief Mission entitled The
Almsbowl remains overturned’. The title refers to the reaction from monks to the
SLORC’s killing of monks during the rebellion. By ‘overturning the almsbowl’,
i.e. by refusing gifts, the monks would not return religious merit to soldiers and
their families. This rare ritual boycott is tantamount to religious ostracism.
BUDDHISM AND THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE 91
were active in the anti-colonial struggle and nationalist movements, as

well as in the rebellion of 1988.
During the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, a well-known Burmese
monk named Rewata Dhamma, who was based in Britain, acted as a
mediator between her and the SLORC. After her release, Aung San Suu
Kyi visited the famous Karen (or Pa-o) monk, Thamanya Hsayadaw (U
Vinaya), who lives north of Pa-an in the Karen state. He is a vegetarian
and thousands of pilgrims visit him every year. The place is known as a
peaceful sanctuary for Karen. Aung San Suu Kyi has recently become a
vegetarian and practises meditation learned from U Pandita, another
renowned monk. In a new book she directly combines politics and
Buddhism. Buddhism and its active compassion (karund) are seen as a
necessary spiritual dimension in the process towards democracy. The
term metta (loving-kindness) is often used in her speeches and articles.5
According to Alan Clements, the interviewer, Aung San Suu Kyi has
been compared to a female bodhisatta. However, she emphatically
denies that she has reached that high spiritual state.
Meanwhile, in the mountains of the Salween region in the Karen
state, yet another eminent monk has played a crucial role in the split
between Buddhists and Christians within the Karen National Union
(KNU) in 1994–95. The name of the monk is U Thuzana and he bears
the title of Hsayadaw Myaing Gyi Ngu. He is the leading monk in the
Myaing Gyi Ngu monastery which is situated at the confluence of the
Salween and Yunzalin Rivers (see Map 4 overleaf). U Thuzana is a Pwo
Karen and his monastery is situated in a region dominated by Buddhist
Pwo Karen.
In December 1995 the religious conflict between Christian and
Buddhist Karen, which evolved during the colonial period, erupted and
caused a serious split within the KNU and the Karen National
Liberation Army (KNLA). The Buddhist Karen formed a
Democratic Karen (Kayin) Buddhist Organisation (DKBO) and a
Democratic Karen (Kayin) Buddhist Army (DKBA). With the support of
the Burmese army, the DKBA conquered Manerplaw, the KNU
headquarters, in January 1995.6
The conflict between the Buddhist and Christian Karen has its roots
in the Karen nationalist movement. The leadership of the KNU has been
dominated by Christian Karen since the wartime Karen Central
Organization was split in 1947—one faction favoured staying in the
5. Aung San Suu Kyi (1995, 1997).

Map 4: Myit-Szone
Union of Burma, the other wanted a separate state.7 The Karen Youth
Organisation and the Buddhist Karen Association did not join the boycott
of elections called for by the KNU but were in favour of a peaceful
agreement on Karen autonomy. However, during the fifty years of
nationalist struggle to form an independent Karen State, the KNU also
drew support from Buddhist Karen. In fact, the Buddhists comprised
about 70–80 per cent of the field soldiers in the KNLA, whereas most
of the leadership and the commissioned officers were Christian Karen.8
The current president of the KNU, Bo Mya, is a Seventh-Day
Adventist, but it is the Baptists who form the major Christian
denomination in the KNU. The Buddhist KNLA soldiers are mostly
recruited from the poorer villagers and do not have the same degree of
education as the Christians. They are at the lower end of the power scale
and although they did not benefit from the KNU taxation and trade, they
still had to take the brunt of the fighting and the repressions from the
army. In all, they comprise the lower classes among the Karen and for
years their resentment against the paternalistic, autocratic and rich KNU
leadership has increased. Buddhism has thus become the collective
identity of subversion for the frustrated subalterns among the Karen
nationalists.
In April 1989, the spiritual leader of the Buddhist resistance against
the KNU, began to build a pagoda in the area where the Salween River
bends and is met by the Moi River, which forms the Thai-Burmese
border (see Map 4).9 On the north side of the bend is the Karen village
of Thu Mwe Htar (or Thu Moe Tar). This zone was of great strategic
importance to the KNU military control of its border bases, including
Manerplaw.
U Thuzana had already constructed other pagodas in the area called
the Myit-Szone (confluence of rivers). He had permission from the
KNU to build the pagoda in Thu Mwe Htar, but Bo Mya would not
allow him to paint the pagoda white since it is situated on a mountain
top and could be used by the army as a landmark to direct its cannon
fire and air strikes against the KNU headquarters below. U Thuzana was
ordered not to build a monastery and allow monks to live there since the
KNU considered the area to be a fighting zone. The KNU also tried to
restrict visits to the pagoda so as to prevent SLORC infiltration.
Nevertheless, U Thuzana was able to attract at least a thousand Karen
from the villages and monasteries in the Salween area. They supported
the building of the pagoda, and his followers included Buddhist soldiers
from the KNLA; some even left the KNLA and their families to become
monks.
According to the detailed analysis in the New Nation Journal, Colonel
Saw Charles is said to have bullied the Buddhist soldiers in the KNLA
6. The history of the Karen and the recent political struggles have been viewed
almost exclusively from the Christian KNU position, for example Falla (1991),
M. Smith (1991,1994) and Gravers (1996b). The writings, including my own,
have focused on the ‘folklorist’ interpretations of Karen myth and history. Little
is known about the life of the Karen majority in the central areas of Burma.
7. On the historicalsourcesof Karen nationalism,see Gravers (1996b). See also
Appendix 2 on the various Karen organisations.
8. The KNLA had an estimated 10,000 soldiers at the start of the rebellion. The
force has recently been estimated at 4,000 and is rapidly dwindling.
for some time. He alienated many Karen whilst he was in charge of

Hlaing Bwe township, U Thuzana’s native place, during the 1980s. Saw
Charles is related to the wife of Bo Mya and was promoted not for his
achievements but because of his influential relatives. He has been
accused of rape, murder and excessive taxation. He forced villagers to
support the KNU before he was recalled to headquarters. Surprisingly,
he was sent by Bo Mya to investigate the pagoda in Thu Mwe Thar.
In recent years the KNU seems to have forced villagers to pay money
and to send young men to the KNLA. A former captain in the KNLA
told me that he had to collect taxes from villagers and would have to
take hostages if the payment was refused. It is no wonder that U
Thuzana was able to attract support. He had been involved in a religious
committee under the KNU in the 1970s, but opposed the often high-
handed practice of some of the KNU officers.
The KNU became even more suspicious of U Thuzana and his plans
when he was able to supply food for the Karen worshippers at the hill
pagoda in Thu Mwe Htar. The worshippers were not forced to be
porters for the army, as is common practice, and they travelled freely
with a certificate issued by the monk. These Karen, however, stopped
supporting the KNU, and Saw Charles was once again sent in by Bo
Mya. He dispersed the worshippers who came to inaugurate the pagoda
and some were beaten up by Saw Charles’s men. The Buddhist Karen
then staged a protest march to Manerplaw. Buddhist KNLA soldiers
also protested, but when a Christian colonel threatened to shoot down
the htì (umbrella), when this symbol of Buddhist spiritual power was
being raised on the top of the pagoda, the conflict escalated.
A pagoda (zedi) with htì symbolises the Buddha (Gautama), the
previous Buddhas, the future Buddha (bodhisattd), the universal
monarchs (cakkavatti) who precede the bodhisatta, and the monks
(sangha).10 It signifies accumulated merit of these figures, as well as of
the donors. The mere idea of shooting at the htì represents a gross
sacrilege. After failed negotiations with Bo Mya, U Thuzana and his
monks withdrew from Thu Mwe Htar. He and his supporters had also
asked permission to build a pagoda in Manerplaw, the KNU
headquarters—and the refusal of permission underlined a feeling of
inferiority compared to the strong Christian presence there. There were
monks in Manerplaw, but they seemed not to represent the Buddhist
villagers in the Salween area. In an attempt to control U Thuzana, Bo Mya
demanded that the leading monk in the KNU, called Rambo Hsayadaw
(U Zawana), an ally of Bo Mya, should be placed in Thu Mwe Htar.
The Buddhist Karen had for some time complained of being

repressed, discriminated against and segregated by Bo Mya and the
Christian leadership. This time they were determined to act if their
demands were not met. Whilst U Thuzana proclaimed that he withdrew
to a mountain monastery in seclusion to meditate for forty-nine months
[sic]- the Buddha meditated for 49 days after Enlightenment—about
500 local militia and Buddhist KNLA soldiers mutinied in December
1994. The army and the mutineers took advantage of the situation and
easily overran Manerplaw. The KNU withdrew, burning all buildings
except the religious shrines.11 When the mutiny began, Bo Mya sent a
message in a paternalistic style, as the great grandfather ‘calling back
his beloved ones who had drifted away, our sons and grandchildren...
we leaders are the parents of the soldiers'- but all in vain.12
In January 1996, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)
began attacking Karen refugee setdements in Thailand. They were
easily identified by their yellow headbands (kho per baw in Sgaw
Karen) and were probably supported by soldiers from the Burmese
army.13 They burned houses, took hostages and tried to force refugees
back to Burma. They told the refugees that they could live peacefully in
monasteries supervised by U Thuzana and they would get sufficient
supplies of food provided they stopped fighting. The DKBA soldiers
also attempted to identify pastors of the Seventh-Day Adventist
denomination; this shows their obvious hatred towards Karen with the
same religion as Bo Mya. Refugees reported that soldiers carried
amulets with U Thuzana’s picture and urged them to come and drink his
‘magic medicine’ and take an oath in his monastery, Myaing Gyi Ngu.
The idea was to unite all Karen and stop the fighting. In 1997, the
DKBA continued its raids on refugees, burning most of the houses and
looting and killing in camps around Mae Sot, where between 30 and 50
per cent of the Karen refugees are Christians. The Thai army has not
attempted to stop the raids. The then Thai government of former Prime
Minister Chavalit, also the former head of the army, has remained on
friendly terms with the SLORC. The Thai government is worried that the
SLORC may occupy parts of the undemarcated border in the mountains
and forests. Since the 1950s the KNU has functioned as a convenient
buffer. In March 1997, the KNU lost the last forward bases inside Burma,
10. See Chapter 3.

11. Manerplaw had been the headquarters of the KNU and its administrative
centre since 1975.
including the new headquarters in Htee Ka Pler and 15,000–20,000

additional refugees are on the move towards settlements in Thailand.
Recently the KNLA soldiers were reported to have surrendered their
weapons. The weapons and the officers were pictured in the SLORC
newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar 12 March 1997. The soldiers—
allegedly from the 6th Brigade of the KNLA—were greeting Khin
Nyunt, Secretary-1 in the town of Kya-in. The caption read: ‘They
exchanged arms for peace.’ The surrender of weapons is an act that is
considered a betrayal to the Karen national revolution (cf. the KNLA
slogan ‘Give Liberty or Death’). The KNLA followed the four rules of
the late President Saw Ba U Gyi: ‘Surrender is out of the question;
recognition of the Karen state; retain our weapons; decide our political
destiny.’ The recent surrender of weapons has been belittled by the
KNU spokesman, Ner Dah, who is also Bo Mya’s son. He said that they
were just people who had committed adultery and therefore were
excommunicated from the the KNU. Christian fundamentalist leaders in
the KNU have administered harsh punishments upon young Karen for
engaging in pre-nuptial sexual relations. A former officer told me that
young relatives of the leaders evaded the ten-year jail sentence for
partaking of forbidden fruit. Moreover, promises of payment and
rewards for frontline fighting often did not materialise, thus widening
the gap between leaders and subalterns.
Bo Mya is near retirement and may be replaced by Shwe Saing, the
vice-president. But Shwe Saing is loyal to Bo Mya, who has been
rejecting proposals from the SLORC to end the fighting, unlike fifteen
or so other edinic groups who have agreed to do so since 1993.14 A
ceasefire before a political solution is reached is considered a betrayal
of the Karen revolution. Within the KNU there is a growing weariness
of the conservative and hardline leadership of Bo Mya—the time of 71-
year-old former Force-136 guerrilla is running out. The colonial legacy
of Karen nationalism seems to be waning at last as the nationalism of
the 1940s has been overtaken by the harsh political realities. The young
generation is not prepared to live as a nation in exile with no prospects
other than continuous violence and death. They are not willing to
12. The paternalistic rhetoric refers to Christian Karen interpretation of myths.

They lost their way and their leader and became orphans (Gravers 1996b: 253).
13. Lay people and soldiers use the yellow colour of a monk to signify the
democratic distribution of religious values. But the headband could be inspired
by fundamentalist images of holy warriors.
sacrifice their lives whilst leaders enjoy profits from cross-border trade
and the sale of rare timber to Thai firms.
This is the background to the split, and although the SLORC is
supporting the DKBO, the schism is not merely a SLORC plot; religion
and inequality lie at the heart of the conflict. However, we should not
conclude that nationalism will disappear, as its roots in the history of
Burma reach very deep. The following point made by George Orwell in
1947 after the formation of the KNU is still valid: ‘The fact is that the
question of the minorities [in Burma] is literally insoluble as long as
nationalism remains a real force.’15 However, nationalism in the present
conjuncture has been overtaken by its embedded religious oppositions.
The SLORC is using Buddhism to ‘Burmanise’ minority areas, while
Aung San Suu Kyu views Buddhism as a fulcrum for democratisation.
U Thuzana and his vegan movement is part of the same trend whilst
representing a reaffirmation of a historic Karen identity and a strong
Buddhist tradition amongst the Karen. The SLORC and the DKBO, as
well as Aung San Suu Kyi, are demonstrating, albeit with different aims,
that Buddhism constitutes an important medium for new strategies and
models in the political struggle.
14. Amongst these are the Kachin Independence Organisation, the largest of
ethnic armies, as well as Kayah, Pa-o, Mon, Padaung (or Kayan), Shan and Wa.
However, the Kayah (Karen-ni) has resumed fighting following extensive
relocations of civilians by the SLORC and a split within the KNU. The KNU has
attempted to persuade these groups to take up arms again—a move which may
have released the final offensive from the SLORC.
15. Orwell (1970:326).
98
13.
U THUZANA AND VEGAN
BUDDHISM
U Thuzana is a disciple of a famous Karen monk and vegetarian, U

Vinaya, who is known as the Thamanya Hsayadaw. Thamanya is the
name of a hill and a monastery where U Vinaya resides north of Paan
town. More than 400 monks and women ascetics live there.1 However,
U Thuzana has never acquired his master’s profound wisdom. U
Thuzana is not a learned Buddhist scholar who can recite the discourses
of Buddha, although he has other important qualifications and is part of
a long tradition of Buddhist leaders amongst the Karen in Burma. He
became known for his vegan ideas—he eats only fruit and vegetables
and does not allow the killing of animals and, by simplifying Buddhist
ethics into the essentials of loving-kindness and non-violence, he is able
to appeal to the common people in their endless experience of violence.
His message and basic rules for his followers in Myaing Gyi Ngu
Temple are:
1. No politics.
2. The five Buddhist precepts strictly observed.2
3. No anger; no fighting.
4. No discussion of religious differences.
5. No gossip.
1. Thamanya Hsayadaw is not involved with the Democratic Karen Buddhist

Organisation. He is venerated by wide segments of Burmese society and
distributes free food to Karen and Pao villagers living near his residence.
2. The five precepts (sild) are: ‘I undertake the rule of training to refrain from
destroying life;…taking what is not given;…wrong-doing in sexual desires;…
false speech;…intoxicants.
These rules were originally formulated by the Thamanya Hsayadaw,

and this policy is said to be so popular that it has even attracted
Christians who have become vegan. To achieve a peaceful mind one
must live life as a vegan and avoid the killing of animals. Meditation in
seclusion is another crucial means to secure merit and peace. In
particular, these vegan ideas are popular amongst the Karen and
contain, as we shall see in the following chapter, an important symbolic
value amongst the Buddhist Karen. Being a vegan is part of the
preparations for the coming of the bodhisatta and a new era of peace
due to a Buddhist revival. This message, the simple rules, and the
longing for peace have no doubt attracted the more than 2,000 families
who live around the monastery.
The Myaing Gyi Ngu Monastery is the base of the Democratic Karen
Buddhist Organisation (DKBO) and U Thuzana has distributed flyers
and leaflets with his policy, featuring his round stamp showing the Nan
Oo pagoda in the temple. In the stamp is written the name of his
Buddhist association, Wai-Ya-Wissa, and the place ‘Myaing-Gyi Ngu
Old City’. ‘Old city’ refers to the remains of old ramparts surrounding
the temple of the important confluence of the Yunzalin and Salween
Rivers; they are probably fortifications and a small town dating from the
Mon kingdom. The use of the place and name signifies that it is a site of
historical and political importance and not just an ordinary monastery.
The place gives the impression of being affluent, with new and
renovated buildings. One informant explained that the monastery gave
the impression of a palace. Persons who carry a letter with its stamp are
not bullied by the Burmese army, and Karen are not forced to be porters
for the army. When Burma was in turmoil in 1988, this area remained
remarkably peaceful. In this way U Thuzana was obviously able to
attract considerable gifts from followers.
U Thuzana possesses a traditional symbolic prestige and power. He is
said to have crossed a particularly strong current in a small boat, and
once after meditation he became invisible. He can also predict the
winning numbers in the Thai lottery—a popular but probably illegal
pastime under the present regime. However, his most important
prediction is that once fifty pagodas have been built in the Karen state,
there will be peace. This prophecy is crucial in legitimating the informal
political role of U Thuzana who, paradoxically, has ‘no politics’ at the
top of his agenda. His pro phecy signals a hpòn (glory) based on a
model of symbolic power applied in previous struggles.
U Thuzana belongs to the small but very influential sect within the
Burmese Sangha, the Shwegyin Nikaya. It is known for its strict
U THUZANA AND VEGAN BUDDHISM 101
adherence to the 227 Vinaya rules of conduct for monks. The members
of the sect emphasise discipline, study and meditation, often in reclusion
like the forest monks. Shwegyin monks are ascetics: they stay out of
politics and do not participate in worldly affairs. They cover both
shoulders with the yellow robe and follow the Theravada idea that a
young monk becomes a disciple of an older, learned monk. In this way
they form lineages of teachers, just as U Thuzana is related to
Thamanya Hsayadaw. In principle, the line can be traced back to
Buddha. The Shwegyin sect was formed in 1856 during the rule of King
Mindon who reformed and disciplined the Sangha. The leader of the
sect supported King Mindon and helped to consolidate his power whilst
the king lent prestige to the sect. Later the Shwegyin monks withdrew
from monastic life in a final reclusion. The sect had approximately 17,
000 monks in 1980.3 During the rule of Ne Win and the Burma
Socialist Programme Party there was close contact between the regime
and the Shwegyin sect; Ne Win supported the sect and apparently used
it to control the Sangha.
A declaration from the Shwegyin Nikaya in 1921 significantly
emphasises the central elements of U Thuzana’s programme: ‘Members
of the Shwegyin Nikaya shall take upon themselves the duty to preach
religion to lay people to promote peace and eliminate sin.’4 U Thuzana
may eventually make use of the Shwegyin tradition—directly or
indirectly—to legitimate his ambiguous role as ascetic monk and patron
of the DKBO. However, he could also refer to the Buddhist Karen
tradition of ‘prophets’ and mìn laùngs in the Salween-Yunzalin region.
It must be emphasised that I have not seen any information stating that
U Thuzana poses as mìn laùngor as a bodhisatta.5
U Thuzana’s vegan movement is an intervention into the Westernised
KNU leadership and its nationalism, and it is an intervention on behalf
of the poor and marginalised Karen in the mountains. Whilst
democracy, economic development and consumption may be high on
the political agenda in Rangoon, the Karen in the border areas are
craving for peace and food. U Thuzana may be able to provide what the
KNU has failed to do. His religious model also mixes tradition and
3. SeeThanTun (1988:165).
4. ThanTun (1988:174).
5. A person does not have to declare himself a mìn laùng or a coming Buddha to
evoke the ideas of a new leader. His position and its legitimation depends on the
recognition from his followers. See Herbert (1982).
modern ideas to overcome the religious divide amongst the Karen. The
following historical background is not an attempt to interpret the
present as if the past were repeated in the present. What is important is
the general role of Buddhism as a medium for social, cultural and
political changes in times of profound crises and upheavals—a remedy
to stop the violence and restore peace according to Buddhist
cosmology. And within this scheme is the long tradition of expecting
the coming of the bodhisatta called Ariyametteya.
14.
BUDDHISM, PROPHECIES AND
REBELLION
In early 1856 the htì was hoisted on a pagoda situated on a hill above
the site of the present Papun town. Today Papun is the main town in this
Karen-dominated area. In the mid-1950s it was the capital of the KNU
Kawthulay state but was taken by the Burmese army in 1955.
The htì raised in 1856 signalled the start of a long Buddhistinspired
rebellion considered by the colonial government to be anti-British and
instigated by King Mindon who came to power in 1853, the year after
the second Anglo–Burman war. At that time the Salween area was not
yet under British control, but Baptist missionaries had travelled on the
Yunzalin and Salween Rivers since the 1830s, and they had met a
famous Karen religious leader, known by the American Baptist
missionaries as ‘the prophet Areemaday’, that is, the name of the
coming Buddha.1 His Karen name was Ta Bu Pho and he was a Sgaw
Karen. He was probably a local religious leader, a bu kho in Sgaw
Karen (boung kho in Pwo Karen), meaning the ‘head of merit-making’.
A boung kho is a lay religious leader, dressed in white, which
symbolizes purity and peace. He observes the Buddhist precepts strictly
and organises ceremonies at village pagodas which are unrelated to
monasteries and do not involve monks. An important part of the
ceremony, as it is still practised, is to fasten small wax candles, flowers
and josssticks at the pagoda. Then libation water is poured onto the
ground as a message to the earth goddess, Hsong Th’Rwi, the central
spiritual figure: she is the temporary guardian of Buddhism as the proxy
for Indra (cakkavatti) until Ariyametteya arrives with peace, prosperity
and a revival of the Buddhist ethic.2 This tradition is still alive amongst
Karen in Burma and in Thailand.3 The missionaries visited the ‘prophet
Areemaday’ in 1833 and in 1837. He wished to ally himself with the
1. See Judson (1833:39–44); F. Mason (1862).

mission, sent presents to the Baptist missionaries, and invited a teacher

to start up a school. However, he rejected conversion and his followers
became increasingly hostile towards the missionaries. He had followers
in the whole region as far as Moulmein and attracted Karen from all
parts of Burma. He proclaimed himself a mìn laùng, joined with the
Kayah chief (sawbwa) of Baw Lahkè, and fought against a Burmese
force in 1844–46. At that time the area was still tributary to the Burman
king. Areemaday was killed in battle, and many of his followers were
slaughtered.4
According to the influential Baptist missionary and scholar, Francis
Mason, the boung khos often transformed into mìn laùngs and launched
prophecies that the time of Ariyametteya was approaching, that a new
righteous king would appear and cleanse the immoral world (as
described in Chapter 3). The Karen shared this belief with their
Buddhist neighbours, although they kept their own particular type of
leadership and ceremonies.
The mìn laùngs and their messengers sometimes came from villages
far away and travelled widely to bring the new tidings. Some of the
leaders were former monks or forest monks, yathe (ruesi or rsi in
Sanskrit), that is, hermits who live totally outside of society as ascetic
recluses and are often said to possess supernatural powers (not unlike
those attributed to U Thuzana). Among the Pwo Karen in Uthaithani
province in Thailand, the legend of ayatheis still the foundation of the Lu
Baung sect (yellow thread sect),5 The yathe (eing hsai in Pwo) known
as Th’ Hsoeng Ne Dje instructed the Karen to stop feeding on and
offering domestic animals to the spirits. Instead they should build
2. Hsong Th’Rwi is the Indian earth-god Visundhara; Wathonday in Burman.

When Mara, the evil tempter attacked the Buddha immediately before his
Enlightenment, Hsong Th’Rwi, who witnessed Buddha’s good deed, wrung her
long hair and the water swept away Mara’s warriors. The myth signifies the
victory of Buddhism; and the libation water poured on the ground called upon
Hsong Th’Rwi to confirm meritorious acts. See the beautifully illuminated
legend in Herbert (1992).
3. For example, the Telakhoung and Lu Baung movements in the Burma-
Thailand border regions. See Andersen (1981); Gravers (1994; 1998) ;Stern
(1968).
4. F.Mason (1862) calls the bu kho and mìn laùng ‘imposters, who with religious
pretentions cover political projects’. And missionary Vinton, who travelled with
Mason, wrote: ‘The Karen in all this region have a tradition that God is about to
visit this world in human form. Numbers have inquired if Mr Vinton is that
god’ (Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1836, vol. 16, p. 295).
BUDDHISM, PROPHECIES AND REBELLION 105
pagodas and put up a protective pole called the th’doengwith an

umbrella-like htì on the top. These poles are placed on and around the
pagoda, near the house, and in the fields to protect against spirits and to
signify that the Buddhist precepts are being observed. The pagoda
(glongin Pwo) is made of sand and bamboo. Boungkhos were installed
as the daily supervisors of religion and morality, and as ceremonial
leaders. The main purpose of the boung kho and his wife (boung mü) is
to uphold the Buddhist ethic until the coming of Ariya (Ariyametteya),
the Buddhato-be. They organise and lead the ceremonies at full moon,
and abstain from eating meat during the four lunar phases. The
legendary yathe, Th’ Hsoeng Ne Dje, is seen as the powerful figure who
liberated the Karen from burdensome acts of demerit controlled by the
spirits. The boungkho and the yatheare considered by the Karen to be
less corruptible than the monks in a monastery, and they actually work
hard to prepare for the coming of the future Buddha, whereas the monks
have easier lives. Their work of merit does not depend on monks,
although a yathe and a boung kho may visit a monastery to pay them
respect. The Karen are more easily impressed and convinced by a
charismatic and active outsider than by an intellectual, withdrawn and
learned monk. However, a figure like U Thuzana seems to fulfil both
roles.
Thus, a yathe would carry sufficient symbolic power to be able to
convince villagers of the approaching Ariyametteya and to revive
Buddhism, whereas it would probably be more difficult for a locally
known person to convey a convincing prophecy and to distance himself
from worldly attachments. The Karen would sometimes look upon a
monk (a member of the Sangha) in the monastery as a figure with less
kamma and hpòn than a yathe (the ascetic outsider), and less than a
boungkho (an insider and guardian of knowledge). Religious knowledge
and charisma are constantly assessed by the villagers and not by the
Sangha. Boung khos are disciples of older boung khos and often succeed
their fathers—all are disciples of Th’ Hsoeng Ne Dje. However, a
5. ‘Sect’ is not a precise translation; ‘movement’ would be a better term. The

Pwo concept lu baung s’raung means ‘Lu Baung’s collective act’, i.e. religious
work; and the yellow thread refers to a string around the wrist. It protects the
owner and is a sign that one follows the Buddhist precepts. It is a crucial
symbol of ethnic identity of a Ga Phloung Lu Baung, a ‘Yellow Thread Pwo
Karen’. There is no overarching organisation or leadership of Lu Baung. Boung
khos are ranked according to age and how many years they have functioned as
leaders.
boung kho or a boung mü must accumulate symbolic capital in order to

be elected and accepted as leader.6
When the time was near, the leader would urge people to respect the
precepts, to become vegetarians, and to gather and clear out the roots of
the religious decline—in particular to strengthen the moral precepts.
The leader of the 1856 rebellion claimed to be related to the previous
mìn laùng who had raised the htì and initiated rebellions since the fall of
the Mon kingdom in 1757 when the Karen were allied with the Mon
king against the Burman king, Alàung Hpayà.7
British intelligence sources from 1856 mention the names of nine
Karen leaders dating back at least a hundred years. They appear to have
followed a kind of dynastic line. The leader of the rebellion in 1856 was
Saw Dwe Gow (Tso Duai Kow) from Papun who gathered a large
following in a camp surrounding the pagoda above Papun. The pagoda
and the camp were visible from the river and decorated with coloured
flags. Here he had collected an arsenal of weapons, mainly spears and
crossbows, but also muskets. When British officers and the sepoys
entered the camp after his withdrawal they found a large compound
with the pagoda in the centre. Next to the pagoda was a pyatthat, a hall
where Saw Dwe Gow received his followers and their donations.8 There
were several barracks for the men. No exact number for his armed
followers is given in the colonial intelligence reports but estimates from
a few hundred to 2,000 have been given. However, all Buddhist Karen
supported the Karen mìn laùng who also proclaimed himself hpayà
laùng, the coming Buddha. He was said to possess the thirty-two signs
and eighty marks demonstrating his hpòn. He and his guerrilla army
ambushed the British forces in the mountains and made traps of sharp,
pointed and poisoned bamboo. They attacked the army with big stones
when it passed through ravines. The guerrillas quickly withdrew and the
army had to attack ‘these marauders and deluted savages’ uphill ‘with
hearty cheers; the Karen yelled and screamed in return’. Numerous
Indian soldiers and British officers were killed and wounded in this
6. A woman can function alone as a religious leader.

7. This alliance has been subject to guesswork among scholars on the ethnic
identity of the groups involved. See the highly speculative theory in Brailey
(1970). The point is that a mìn laùng or dhammaraja is a leader because of
particular religious and personal qualities whereas ethnicity is secondary
(Lieberman 1978).
8. The pyatthat was connected with royalty and the hall or pavillion normally
had a seven- or nine-tiered roof. It was used for audiences and had a throne.
guerrilla war between 1856 and 1860. The Karen rebels came close to
the important town of Shwegyin and threatened the Christian Karen
loyal to the British.
Saw Dwe Gow withdrew to Kayah where he had an ally in the
sawbwa (chief) of Eastern Kayah state. His rebel army included not
only Sgaw and Pwo Karen but also Kayah and Shan. This fact is crucial
because it demonstrates that the rebellion was more of a religious-
political project than an ethnic insurrection by religious fanatics, as the
colonial and missionary sources termed it. Saw Dwe Gow was never
captured by the large military expedition sent into the Salween area in
1858. He was probably killed by the Thais of Chiangmai. Reading the
intelligence reports on the mìn laùng reminds one of the Scarlet
Pimpernel—They seek him here, they seek him there, … [they] seek
him everywhere’—but they never encountered the mystical figure. It
was an essential part of his tactics not to get involved in violent
confrontations himself! The British forces burned numerous villages
and granaries and took the rice. Even in 1861 when Mason travelled
along the Yunzalin River, the area was largely deserted. The
missionaries were not welcomed by the Karen. Francis Mason had
urged the commissioner to distribute guns among the Christian Karen
for self-defence, but the British feared that the recently converted Karen
would apostatise and join the rebellion.
A few months after the rebellion broke out in Salween, a Karen mìn
laùng appeared in the Bassein area in western Burma. He was said to
have come from the mountains in eastern Burma and to possess
supernatural powers. His men had been tattooed by him as a protection
against bullets. He issued ‘royal proclamations’ and his programme was
the same as Saw Dwe Gow’s:
He proclaims that the Karen have a natural right to this country,

which was formerly held by their ancestors, since which time it
has been conquered by four nations: the Puthees [Chinese],
Talaings [Mon], Burmese and English, but the time has now
arrived for the Karens to assert their rights and reconquer the
country.9
Both leaders said they would ‘drive the kullahs out’, namely the
foreigners (kho la in Pwo Karen; probably borrowed from the Burman
kala), and establish a new dynasty in Pegu, the ancient capital of the
Mon kingdom.
At this time missionaries had collected myths and traditions from

among the various Karen groups and had edited them as if they signified
the advent of Christianity. One verse often included in their journals and
books goes as follows:
The Talain [Mon] Kings had their season;

The Burman kings had their seasons;
The Siamese kings had their seasons;
And the foreign kings will have their season;
But the Karen king will yet appear.
When he arrives there will be only one king;
And there will be neither rich nor poor.
Everything [sic] will be happy,
And even lions and leopards will lose their savageness.10
This verse is obviously part of the mìn laùng-Ariyametteya tradition

among the Karen and was cited in the years preceding the rebellion. To
the Baptist missionaries, however, it contained clear Christian
connotations and pointed to a kingdom based on Christian/Western
civilisation.
It was a common belief amongst colonial officials that the leaders of the
rebellion had attended missionary schools. The reasons for the
rebellions were many. The Karen resisted the relatively high poll taxes
exacted by the colonial government. Some were opposed to foreign
rule, or the Christian missionaries, but first and foremost the rebellions
were Buddhist-inspired projects to reestablish a righteous social order
and regain control of the universe. While the missionaries’ accounts and
more recent analyses have emphasised the millenarian aspects and the
9. The rebellion is reported in letters from colonial in Burma to the government

in Calcutta, see India Political and Foreign Proceedings (1856-1858) in the
Oriental and India Office Collection, British Library, London. See also Stoll
(1861); he was the first officer to be stationed in the Papun area after the
rebellion. The missionary accounts are found in Baptist Missionary Magazine
(vol. 36-38, 1856-58).
10. E.B. Mason (1862: 85). On the historical role of the mission among the
Karen, see Gravers (1996b). More than a century later, the Pwo Karen in
Uthaithani, Thailand, would cite the following verse when remembering the
past: ‘When the Burman dies, and the white foreigner (kho la) goes home - the
Karen shall eat, eat…’
defensive reaction, the rebellions were just as much an attempt by the

rebels to obtain political and religious control of their own world.
There were many other rebellions led by mìn laùngs in this part of
Burma, involving all ethnic groups. One important rebellion took place
in 1843 in Daloung, near the present border with Thailand. The mìn
laùng was a Mon, and the Karen in the area joined his movement. The
leader, known as Nga Pyan (nga meaning ‘inferior’, ‘criminal’) in the
report from his trial, gained influence by raising funds to build pagodas.
When followers gathered around him, he declared war against the
English. His royal proclamations referred to the symbols of Indra
(cakkavatti), and he declared that the poor and suffering people would be
taken care of and live a quiet and happy life under his reign. He was
eventually jailed for life.11
In 1867–68, a new Karen mìn laùng appeared in Papun and attempted
to mobilise the Karen in the Salween area. His name was Maung Dee
Pah and he referred to his predecessor, Saw Dwe Gow. Saw Dwe Gow
had repaired the pagoda built by Ta Bu Pho (the ‘prophet Areemaday’),
and Ta Boo Pho’s sons joined Saw Dwe Gow; all nine Karen mìn
laùngs revered Saw Qwe Ran, the great mìn laùng from Papun, whom
the Karen expected to return one day. This was indeed a long—almost
dynastic—tradition of rebellion.
When the British colonised the last part of Burma in 1885 and
‘pacified’ the mountains, they encountered resistance from monks: ‘It is
a trait in their national character to have religious prophets to stir up
amongst them’, concluded the Baptist missionary, D.L. Brayton, in a
report to Commissioner Phayre. I would prefer to say that it is a model
of society, including a historical experience, to which the Karen turn in
times of crisis.12
After ‘pacification’, Christian Karen police were stationed in Papun
and the missionaries obtained a foothold in the Salween area, although
it remained a predominantly Buddhist region. In 1938, a Sgaw Karen
leader, known as Phu Gwe Gow (Pu Kwe Kow means ‘honest
Grandfather’) built a monastery near Kler Doe Kya in the Papun Hills,
in the Salween district, and called it Wey Mau Kow (‘Kingdom of
Heaven’). The colonial officers called him an ‘enlightened agitator’,
11. ‘Report of a Trial for Rebellion, held at Moulmein by the Commissioner of

Tenasserim. Communicated by Sudder Deway Adawlut’. Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Socieiy of Bengal, new senries, vol.14, no. 2, 1845, 14, no. 2,1845, pp.
747–55. See Sarkisyanz (1968–69) on other similar movements.
who formed a syncretistic movement mixing Christianity, animism and

Buddhism. Phu Gwe Gow gained support from older Karen and called
for the Salween district to be made independent. He was killed by
Force-136 Karen during the war.13
During the negotiations leading to the independence of Burma, the
Karen from Salween were divided and submitted several different
proposals to the Frontier Area Committee, with the aim of
demonstrating that this area had its own particular history. Even among
the Christian Karen there was disagreement, and some broke away from
the Karen National Union (see Appendix 2).
It is in the context of this historical background that U Thuzana’s
movement should be assessed. He has not claimed to be a mìn laùngor a
bodhisatta, but he has the religious qualities and the symbolic power to
become a leader who can refer to this long tradition in an implicit way;
a leader whom the Karen can identify as belonging to this tradition.
However, he is also a monk of a modern and different political context.
Thus, it is important to emphasise that history is not a mere repetition of
a culturalreligious schema shared equally amongst all actors.14
Likewise, we cannot explain events of the past by situating them in a
modern political struggle. The context of the rebellions of 1856 was of
another order. The historical memory of the Buddhist Karen in the
Salween area today may not include any details of these past events
except the Buddhist precepts, the building of pagodas, the raising of the
htì, the ceremonies and the ascetic ideals of the yathe, such as
meditation and vegetarianism. These are experiences shared and
recollected, and embody a mode of imagining a better future by looking
to the past. For example, the hoisting of the pagoda htì is satiated with
royal symbolic power: the future ruler would be the person who put the
htì on the new pagoda. Actually, the same act executed by Secretary-1
Khin Nyunt or U Thuzana can be interpreted to radiate a traditional
mixture of prestige (goun), glory (hpòn) and power (and), as well as
religious merit (kutho).
12. It is a model shared with other Buddhists in Burma. See Sarkisyanz (1965;
1968). However, the model has been used in very different pro jects throughout
history. The Hsaya San rebellion was also a modern nationalistic movement.
13. See Karen’s Political Future M/4/3023, and M. Smith (1991:437, note no.
49).
14. Cf. Ortner (1989:127–29).
The Karen population has been involved in continuous struggles

characterised by contradictory social classifications: as a nation versus
the Burmans/Myanmar; as ethnic subgroups within the category
‘Karen’ (Sgaw, Pwo, Kayah, Pa-o, Padaung), and outwardly against
Burman, Mon, Shan (Thai); as religious denominations—Christian
(Baptist, Seventh-Day Adventist, Catholic), Buddhist ‘sects’
(Telakhoung, Lu Baung), and ‘animists’; between the wealthy and
educated on the one hand, and the poor with less education on the other;
between leaders and subalterns; and between exiles and those who
stayed and endured. In all, this is a skewed world divided into
compartments of opposing social and cultural categories. It is in this
historical context that Christianity and Buddhism have emerged as
‘remedies’ to remake the compartmentalised world into a unitary order
by excluding all that is divisive from the agenda and by stressing the
universal ethical religious values. The Karen memory of the past,
however, differs according to social position and experience, although
the feeling of being a people scattered, divided and without leadership is
widely shared. This memory is often expressed by using orphans as a
metaphor for the ancestors who lost not only their way, but also their
leader, their knowledge and their religious wisdom.15
U Thuzana’s movement is basically a struggle against ethnicism and
nationalism. However, it is a sad fact that it is also totally dependent on
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Moreover, it is
difficult to reconcile U Thuzana’s claim of promoting loving-kindness,
non-violence, and non-political practice with his alleged role in ordering
the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to attack refugee camps
in Thailand and kill Karen.16 However, what appears to be a paradox is
not necessarily contrary to Buddhism as, long as a monk does not
directly order the killings. Before peace can be restored the righteous
leader has to straighten out the skewed world—by force if necessary.
The universal monarch (cakkavatti) may use fire, wind or water as the
appropriate means, according to the cosmological legends (see
Chapter 3).
The history of the Karen has witnessed an abundance of vio lence.
When the Karen turn to religious expectations it is not because they are
predetermined by the particular rationality of a cultural-religious
schema in a millenarian tradition, but because they have used and
15. The image of the orphan is widely used in publications on the Karen. See Falla
(1991); Fink (1995:24).
reformulated the religious schema in their historical memory of social

experiences during a long and violent political process. Violence, in
turn, is explained in Buddhist ethics as an outcome of evil and
demeritorious roots such as hate and greed.
When a leader hoists the htì and everyone joins in the ceremony with
candles, flowers and joss-sticks, the recollection of the past is part of the
ritual. A boung kho includes acts of merit from the past, the kamma of
parents and grandparents in his prayers. Thus, the kamma and glory of
the yathe, and the boungkhoand mìn laùng of the past enter the stream of
the present as symbolic power. Buddhism as such cannot in itself
legitimise political power: however, merit and glory are potent signs of
a coming leader. Thus, U Thuzana may not refer to mìn laùng,
cakkavatti, bodhisatta or other figures. The historical memory and the
collective recollection of the participants will decide the degree to
which of the legendary elements can be revitalised. In other words,
those elements must appear as genuine representations of Karen history
and identity which can encompass a majority. One informant noted that
U Thuzana looks like one who wants to make use of these images of
leadership and power from the past, for example the style of the
monastery, perhaps not as a ruler himself but as the maker of one. Only
time will tell but U Thuzana is obviously aiming to be the master of
religion and collective memory. Furthermore, religions, in this case
Buddhism, are not merely models for an afterlife or models of the
present social order in the way religion has commonly been analysed.
Religion among the Karen appears as both historical memory of social
practices and as a medium of political power.17
It is too early to reach a more definitive conclusion about the DKBA
and U Thuzana, and I may have placed too much emphasis on the
history and the symbolic practice, neither of which is shared or
remembered by all Karen. However, the study of symbolic practice and
historical memory in all its ethnographical richness is crucial to the
understanding of power.18
Ethnicity and ethno-nationalistic rebellion may be moving down on
the political agenda, whereas religion is taking the top position.
However, it is unlikely that ethnicity can be removed from historical
16. Major Toe Hlaing from the DKBA explained to journalists that U Thuzana
is the policy leader and General Yaw Het is the military chief of the Buddhist
Karen. Toe Hlaing claimed that U Thuzana ordered the DKBA to cease the
attacks on refugee camps, thus indicating that a monk is capable of giving
military orders (Bangkok Post, 1 and 9 May 1995).
memory and social identity in the near future, since it is such an integral
part of the same historical memory. In 1992 the SLORC pronounced
that ‘the theory of the big races’, i.e. the eight major ethnic groups of
the colonial time, has been fading from day to day, and claimed that the
‘135 ethnic groups or national races’ of Burma will obtain a local
autonomy at district level, but will still be controlled by the regional
State Law and Order Restoration Councils and the army.19 A closer look
at the list of the 135 national races reveals that the terms are Burman
and taken state by state: for example the Pa-o or Taungthus are listed as
belonging to the ‘Kayin (Karen) national races’ as well as to the the
‘Shan national races’. The Karen ‘national races’ consist of twelve
groups, but do not include the Kayah. In this way the regime uses
ethnicity and ethnic differences politically to disguise its programme of
‘Myanmarisation’ or ‘Burmanisation’, where Burman culture, language
and the Burman way of Buddhism are absolutely hegemonic. The
device seems to be: rule, classify and divide.
Villagers in Kayah, Kachin and Karen states have been forcibly
removed from infrastructure projects or fighting zones.20 Christian
Chin, Kachin and Karen villagers are often prohibited from conducting
their religious ceremonies, and Christian Chin children are said to have
been taken to Buddhist monasteries in Rangoon.21 Such acts leave little
hope for forgiving and forgetting ethnic struggles of the past. The
Myanmar Ngaing-Ngan, the ‘Union of Myanmar’, modelled on the
SLORC, is an example of an organisation synonymous with Burman
culture and nation, where the regime controls the social and cultural
classifications of every single actor. It may be a transitional hegemony,
as described by the Kachin scholar Maran La Raw. He and other elite
members of the ethnic minorities in exile are strong proponents of a
federalism whilst still defending the national identity and integrity of
the minorities.22 They refer to the Panglong Agreement from 1947 with
Aung San and emphasise the memory of the ‘Panglong spirit’ of
17. On the debate on social/historical memory, see Connerton (1989); Gillis

(1994); Appendix 1.
18. Cf. Comaroff and Comaroff (1992); Ortner (1995).
19. Steinberg (1992:226). Steinberg believes it will end the discussion of
federalism and that it offers certain potential advantages for the smaller groups
(ibid.: p. 227).
20. See M. Smith (1994).
cooperation and dialogue. At least it was legitimate to negotiate the

wishes of the minorities.
It is interesting to read the historical recollections of the two Kayah
leaders, Abel Tweed and Ted Buri. In an interview, they stated that
Kayah always remained outside the state of Burma—or at least was semi-
independent.23 Likewise, Maran La Raw talks about learning from
history and stresses that the Kachin did not become a minority under
British rule, that they were not integrated into the colony, but they were
among the co-founding nationalities of independent Burma.24 Kayah
and Kachin are both outside Burma, yet also nationalities of independent
Burma! This is the ethnic predicament: the contradiction between a
primordially constructed identity and the fixed boundaries of the
modern nation-state. The British muddled the issue by defining
excluded areas.
However, this historical memory of ethnic elites cannot ignore the
fact that the multi-ethnic union did not prevent inter-ethnic and
nationalistically inspired fights. The most serious problem to deal with
in the future is thus the contradictory mixture of claims and demands
based on ethnicity and a political union of equal democratic rights.
Perhaps that is why Aung San Suu Kyi is somewhat opaque when
speaking about these questions:
We will include all the ethnic groups based on Union spirit.

Everyone will have equal rights. The equal rights that I am
referring to here is for the ethnic groups. Before I address this, I
would like to mention that we also need equal rights among those
in Burma. All of us who are citizens should have special rights.25
21. See Burma Debate (vol. 3, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1996).

22. Ibid. Among the Chin, the number of Christians has increased significantly
during the military rule. Recently, 40,000 have fled to India because of forced
labour and religious persecution.
23. Kayah was actually defined as a non-British territory until independence,
although from 1935 it was directly under the control of the British governor.
24. See interview in Burma Debate (vol. 3, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1996).
The ethnic representatives in exile of the post-war generation may refer

to the Panglong spirit’ in vain, since the new leaders inside Burma, such
as U Thuzana, may indeed fail to include the ethnicity of the past in
their search for new models.
25. Speech from February 1996 (Burma Debate, vol. 4, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1997:
22).
116
15.
AUTOCRACY AND NATIONALISM
Nationalism is a major theme of this book because it has been a

dominant feature of Burma’s history. However, the presentation and
analysis of the first edition of this book showed that nationalism is
embedded in other, more or less cognate subjects and features of Burma,
such as colonialism, religion and politics, ethnicity and ethnicism, as
well as other subjects that are not included in this book, for instance
language, literature and eco nomics. The reason is that the nation and
nationalism are modern ways of imagining state, society and culture in
the form of unity and identity. Thus, nationalism canot be analysed per
se; only as specific ways of imagining this unity and identity, and
always from specific positions of power in a social hierarchy.1 Theories
of nationalism may inform the analysis and the discussion, but a
reification of nationalism as if it were an autonomous agent in history
produces erroneous conclusions. Nationalism is not a force above the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Burma’s history,
and the SLORC and the army are major agents of violence, rather than
nationalism as such. To make nationalism an agent in itself is a gross
fallacy, which unfortunately has entered the debate recently. For
example, Anthony D. Smith states that nationalism has the capacity to
generate widespread terror and destruction, and, further, that it functions
as the unrivalled socio cultural framework, based on the historic ethnic
community (‘ethnie’) of the modern nation-state.2 Such functionalism
cannot explain the particular way in which the SLORC manipulates nation
alism and history to construct a symbolic power with its rhetoric, and
uses symbolic violence to orchestrate its use of physical violence.3
1. For a discussion of theories of nationalism related to Asia, see TØnnesson

and Antlöv (1996, Introduction).
2. A.D. Smith (1995:159).
118 AUTOCRACY AND NATIONALISM
How then to explain the continued fierce nationalism of the SLORC—

the logic of the generals? It could be argued that a regime with so much
blood on its hands would obviously cling to power at any price. This is,
of course, part of the explanation, but there are other important reasons.
If the SLORC is unable to promote modernisation, economic growth
and stability, as have been promised, the internal corporate solidarity of
the Tatmadaw (army) may easily collapse and the SLORC may lose its
direct and indirect support in the civil society. A new bankruptcy, as in
the 1980s, and a new uprising could undoubtedly create chaos. Events
in 1988 show that the behaviour of the Tatmadaw and the historic
experience of violence could make the SLORC’s prophecy a dire reality:
without the army, Burma would end in turmoil and lose its
independence. It is precisely from this circular process of evils that
nationalism gains its meaning as a forceful ideological interpellation as
well as a dreadful reality. Although many in Burma are not convinced
by the SLORC’s rhetoric, and many may find it utterly repellent,
nationalism cannot be dismissed as a spent force. The rhetoric is an
instrument of discipline within the army and SLORC-controlled
organisations, and it carries the threat and fear of high-handed violence
to the rest of the population. Even though only a minority, mostly in the
countryside, listen to and agree with the SLORC’s ideology, the entire
population is intimidated, coerced, and subdued by its nationalism and
autocracy.
Obviously, I cannot claim to have evidence of first-hand knowledge
while writing from a distance, and the SLORC’s rhetoric, although an
important practice, is indeed no explanation in itself. I shall, however,
try to render probable the hypothesis outlined above.
In 1993 the SLORC formed the nationalist organisation known as the
Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA). It appears to be
modelled on the organisations and mass mobilisation from the time of
the now-defunct Burma Socialist Programme Party. People are more or
less coerced to participate in the mass rallies and marches led by student
bands. The USDA claimed to have reached a membership of more than
seven million. Its aims are:
• non-disintegration of the union;

• non-disintegration of national unity;
3. Neither ethnicity nor nationalism is a self-generating force although they may

be seen as such by political regimes and their adversaries.
• perpetuation of sovereignty;
• promotion and revitalisation of national pride; and
• the emergence of a prosperous, peaceful and modern nation.
It has a moral code centring on patriotism, duty and loyalty, yet it also
offers free courses in computer training, management and Buddhist
culture.4 Traditional culture and Buddhism are widely promoted by the
SLORC, and the generals regularly present gifts to monks, support the
building of new pagodas, and renovate the old ones. By using a mixture
of tradition and modernity, the SLORC is mobilising under the tight
control of the army. The generals are the patrons of the USDA and their
new clients may be an important agency when the new constitution is
ready. However, they may also be used in violent acts. USDA members
are believed to be behind the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi in her car in
1996. One of the USDA’s functions is to guard against anyone who
disturbs the stability of Myanmar. Thus, the USDA will continue to
combine what is nationally correct with violence against deviancy.
Simultaneously, the SLORC has continued its xenophobic nationalist
rhetoric and practices. For example, accusations against Aung San Suu
Kyi for collaborating with foreigners (including diplomats, journalists
and her husband, Michael Aris) against Burma’s interests. According to
articles in the government newspaper the New Light of Myanmar, Aung
San Suu Kyi is ‘inciting violence’ and collaborating with countries and
foreign forces hostile to Burma. Her statements and calls for the boycott
of investments and other sanctions are seen by the SLORC as an
attempt to destabilise the nation and to disrupt economic development.
There is no doubt that the military regime is genuinely afraid of losing
control and thereby losing power—and perhaps their heads. In
December 1995 the New Light of Myanmar compared Aung San Suu
Kyi to the traitor, Maung Ba Than, who in 1885 helped the British to
conquer Mandalay and bring the independent kingdom of Burma to an
end. The article concluded: ‘Young patriots will destroy the traitor.’5
Colonialism, imperialism and the humiliating loss of independence are
historical memories used as warnings for the political opposition, also
implying the loss of cultural and national identity. However, the
Tatmadaw is portrayed as the historical saviour:
4. On the USDA see David Steiberg (1997); the Bangkok Post Sunday (22
January, 1996:2); and James Guyot (1996:268). Officials have to be members.
Tatmadaw has rescued Myanmar people from the hands of the

British and the Japanese; strenuously striven for emergence of the
Union of a Myanmar; safeguarded the union of Myanmar from
collapse at a time when Yangon was the only place left
unvanquished, and prevented the union from disintegration in
1988.6
‘The army is the nation!’ This, then, is the rallying cry despite the
intruding Western culture, missionary schools and the lack of respect
towards Buddhist monks. Despite disunity and ethnic division, the
British colonialists did not succeed in destroying the cultural core of
Burma according to the army’s historical memory, a point which is
crucial to the present nationalism of the SLORC in the New Light of
Myanmar.
Another crucial instrument conveying the nationalism of the SLORC
is the National Convention, which has been in and out of session and
working on a new constitution since 1993. The convention is dominated
by the regime and its proposals are censored. A mere 15 per cent of the
delegates are elected. Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for
Democracy (NLD) withdrew its eightysix delegates in 1995,
complaining that the SLORC censored the debate. The NLD was then
expelled from the convention. Some of the proposals would have
prevented a person with long-term residency outside Burma from ever
becoming president of the union: Aung San Suu Kyi would thus be
excluded from that position. Some of the six objectives of the
convention are the same as those of the USDA:
1. non-disintegration of the Union;

2. non-disintegration of national solidarity;
3. consolidation and perpetuation of sovereignty;
4. emergence of a genuine multi-party democracy system;
5. development of the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality
in the future state;
5. On Maung (or U) Ba Than, a clerk of the British Chief Commissioner’s

office who was masquerading as a prince. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:91).
6. The New Light of Myanmar (May-July 1996:5). Aung San is described
as the architect of the nation and the organiser of the army. Ne Win’s role
is positively assessed.
6. participation of the Tatmadaw in the leading role in national

politics in the future state.
Obviously, the military does not intend to relinquish its power. When
Aung San Suu Kyi withdrew from the convention with the ninety-one
delegates of the NLD in October 1995, the Secretary-1 of the SLORC,
Khin Nyunt, branded the opposition in these words: ‘Adopted sons and
daughters of the colonialists, [who] under external influence are
attempting to cause the disintegration of the union and the loss of
independence.’7 To be anti-SLORC is to be anti-national. What we see
here is the continuous construction by the SLORC of proofs of an
impending disaster. Within this scheme, Aung San Suu Kyi cannot act
without delivering the evidence of collapse and disaster. The character
of the political process, particularly its nationalism, seems to render a
dialogue impossible. The logic of the generals is based on the definitive
and irrevocable dismissal of their opponents, and their democratic
reasoning and values. And vice versa: Aung San Suu Kyi and her party
cannot endorse any of the policies of the SLORC.
In July 1996 the official media urged Aung San Suu Kyi to abandon
politics altogether and leave the country—‘people were afraid other
women would follow her and marry foreign men’. The attacks
continued through September: ‘They [destructive elements] are
disrupting politically the peace and tranquillity, hindering economic
progress achieved and forcing the people to become hungry and
destitute’, said Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of the SLORC.
This kind of nationalistic rhetoric and strategy propagated by the
SLORC could be seen as a mere window-dressing for its extreme
repression. However, it is a mode of control in itself and not just a way
to create legitimacy, since it is a fundamental part of exercising absolute
power over the civil society of Burma. In its nationalism, the SLORC
conveys the message that the regime controls the order of its realm
completely, and that no one else is allowed to intrude or challenge their
rule. This message is communicated not merely to the population in
general, but to the Tatmadaw in particular, so as to strengthen the
internal unity of the armed forces. State, army and nation have a unitary
structure in the SLORC’s social model.
7. Cited in Guyot (1996:268). Khin Nyunt is the head of the powerful military
intelligence, Directory of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI), and has close
relations with Ne Win.
Any challenge to power will bring disaster to Burma—and the

dreadful truth is that the prophecy will almost certainly be fulfilled if
the Tatmadaw lose control. No doubt the regime fears an eco nomic crisis
which could be a major reason for a new upheaval, like the one in 1988.
A shortage of oil and a decline in the rice harvest causing a sharp rise in
prices have been reported. In 1996 exports amounted to less than half
the value of imports in 1995. Exports seem to have fallen by 50 per cent
since 1993, whereas debt is increasing and credit is being extended.
Foreign reserves are as low as they were after the rebellion and seem to
be almost depleted. Inflation is estimated to increase by 30–40 per cent
a year. Recently the exchange rate of kyat went from 170 to 250 to the
US dollar.8 Tourism has failed despite the ‘Visit Myanmar Year in 1996'
campaign. This economic decline, if it continues, could destabilise
Burma. In the view of the SLORC it is caused by alien and hostile
forces working inside and outside Burma.9
Burma’s economy is not easily analysed since official figures are
unreliable. The following brief summary is only meant to outline the
important reasons for the SLORC’s nationalism. However, the SLORC
way to modernity reveals some major problems.
Garment industry
This is presumably one of the biggest money earners in Burma, but may
be hit hard by sanctions. It is probably attracting investment from former
low-wage countries in Asia.
Forestry: teak and other hardwood

This is a major economic resource. Big money-earners and logging have
increased significantly since 1992. China and Thailand are the main
importers while Europe (Scandinavia in particular) and the USA are the
main importers of furniture. The increased logging is a threat to the
largest virgin forest in the region. Before the army took control of the
8. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (7 August 1997), an

economic crisis, like the one in 1988, is imminent. Inflation has been on the
increase ever since.
9. See figures in the Christian Science Monitor (12 November 1996); the Far
Eastern Economic Review (Yearbook 1996); and Burma Debate (vol. 3, no. 4,
1996).
border with Thailand, the Karen National Union sold teak to Thai
logging companies. The bitter irony is that Karen villagers are moved
out of an area in Tenasserim province, which is to be declared the
Myinmaylekhat Nature Reserve, with support from the Worldwide Fund
for Nature.10
The Yadana pipeline

The Yadana (‘treasure’) pipeline in Tenasserim, a joint project
involving Unocal (USA), Total (France), the Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise (MOGE; owned by the Burmese state), and the Petroleum
Authority of Thailand. It will supply Thailand with gas and become the
biggest enterprise in Burma, with an estimated turnover of US$400
million a year when completed. The construction has resulted in the
relocation of Karen villagers and has involved forced labour.11
Opium produetion and the heroin trade

These have been growing alarmingly since 1988 and have had a
profound impact on the economy. The alliance between the SLORC and
big drug traffickers such as Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han has resulted in
millions of dollars being laundered via state enterprises and recycled via
the construction of hotels. The earnings could be as high as the official
earnings on legal exports. Some of the money may have been used to
buy weapons for the expansion and modernisation of the army. At the
same time, the country is facing an explosive rise in the number of drug
addicts and HlV-infected victims. The WHO has estimated the number
of addicts to be 500,000.12
Rice prodnction
Rice production has seen an expansion of irrigated areas and a
significant rise in the production of paddy. The Irrawaddy Delta is
10. The Nation (13 April 1997); Rainforest Relief’s International (24 March,
Internet message). See also Bryant (1997).
11. See Earth Rights International: Total Denial A Report on the Yadana
Pipeline Project in Burma (1996); the Los Angeles Times, (25 November 1996);
Asia Week (3 May 1996).
12. See People of the Opiate’ in The Nation (16 December 1996).
producing about 60 per cent of all rice. However, the SLORC is taking
up to 25 per cent of the harvest—an increase from 11 per cent—at a
special low rate to secure cheap provisions for the army and state
employees. The peasants are facing poverty and deteriorating living
conditions.13 At the same time there has been a fall in the export of
agricultural products.
<< >> << >> << >> << >> << >>
These economic changes are steeped in with repression and a rapidly
growing inequality, not to mention the problem of corruption and mafia
methods. A mixture of patron-client favours and the use of blatant force
is adding to the internal dissension and may result in new upheavals. To
control and contain the impact of this drive to modernity, the SLORC is
using nationalism as a counterbalance and a uniting force.
Thus, if nationalism in Burma is the rationale for historical processes
and their changing social and cultural conditions, it can be considered as
a megaforce, a total model of nation, state and power as a corporate,
sovereign unit. The often abusive language used to debase Aung San
Suu Kyi is a spell of purification deployed by a xenophobic,
nationalistic regime to cleanse the community by first explaining the
dangers of the aliens (foreigners and ethnic minorities), then by
exposing their forces and plots. In other words, the political opponent is
also made culturally ‘unclean’.14 The xenophobic rhetoric summarises
the logic of the generals: ‘If we lose control, Burma will collapse.’ In
reality, the real threat to the SLORC is certainly not alien culture but
rather national bankruptcy. If the economy is seriously in decline, the
SLORC will possibly lose support amongst its own clients, military as
well as civilian. These clients have benefited from the open economy
and they have tested the modern global culture of consumption—they
have gained since the days of Ne Win and therefore have something to
lose; and the majority may become ‘hungry and destitute’ as Khin Nyunt
predicted. Sanctions, if effective, will have an impact on everyone, not
just the poorest sections of society. At the time of writing, the USA and
the EU have restricted visas for Burmese, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s call
for an economic boycott have gained support in some EU governments
13. See The Nation (24 January 1997).

14. This mechanism is often seen in extreme nationalism. Anthony D. Smith
(1995:69) has described cultural purification in these terms: ‘The politization of
native culture often went hand in hand with the purification of the community.
This meant, first of all, jettisoning all “alien” cultural traits …’
and in the USA, where economic sanctions are already under way.
Whereas such sanctions may not disrupt the economy completely after
Burma was admitted into the Association of Southeast Nations
(ASEAN) in July 1997, and when Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
England, France, Japan, Korea and China continue their economic
involvement and investments, they may still have internal
repercussions.15 It is within this logic that we should place the words of
General Than Shwe when he said that the country would be ruined if
priority were given to ‘such superficial things as human rights’.
The SLORC seems to turn its rage over Western criticism inwards
against the opposition. Sanctions could thus backfire and damage the
opposition, as indicated by a supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi: ‘We lived
under self-imposed isolation for decades. Ma Suu (Aung San Suu Kyi)
says we have to tighten our belts and think about politics. But there are
no more notches to tighten in our belts.’16 No doubt a proportion of the
population, mostly in the cities, considers investment and growth as
important elements of normalisation after the Ne Win era and its
‘paranoia of economic colonialism’. On the other hand, if the SLORC
cannot control foreign influence entering the country via investments,
its own xenophobia may equally turn into a self-made boomerang, for
example in Mandalay, where local traders resent the influx of Chinese
and fear that Burma will become a Chinese colony and Mandalay a
‘Chinatown’.
Although investment and international contacts are welcomed, several
Burma scholars seem to agree that there is concern amongst the
Burmese that the opening of the country to investments and tourism
may have negative consequences for Burman culture.17 Thus, the
SLORC’s rhetoric may strike a chord, even though it has a shrill sound
to foreign ears, as demonstrated in the following quotes from the
official media: ‘Vigorous efforts [are] being made for the preservation of
our cultural identity and national personality’ [apparently the meaning
is Burman culture], and further: ‘[To] ensure our great Myanmar
15. On foreign investments, see Bray (1995); Thailand invests in roads, and Thai
companies in livestock and poultry production. Other foreign investments are
placed in sugar and rubber plantations.
16. Quoted in ‘A Reporter at Large, BURMA’ in the New Yorker (12 August
1996, p. 13). See Ma Thanegi’s critique in Far Easterm Economic Review, 9
February 1998, p. 30.
17. SeeTaylor (1995:246).
country, which has a great cultural tradition, is not influenced by

Western culture’.18 Thus, the need to modernise whilst preserving
culture is central to the ideology of the SLORC.
Nationalism, even in its most extreme expressions and practices, then
is the condensation of economic, cultural, political and social relations
into specific conjunctures of power. From this definition we may be
able to interpret the rhetoric, the seemingly erratic actions, and the
violent repression which have dominated Burma for decades. In this
process, as well as in the present situation, history is a crucial theme.
18. Quoted in Steinberg (1992:229).

16.
HISTORICISM, HISTORICAL
MEMORY AND POWER
To settle the debts of history, all-out efforts are being made for all round
national development’, said the leader of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC), General Than Shwe, at a meeting of the
Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) in April 1997.
‘Settling the debts of history’ is indeed an essential element in the
worldview of the SLORC and the army. Editing the past in the present
is an important instrument in most political struggles, particularly when
nationalism is heading the political agenda. Historical memory as social
recollection serves to create models of the past by meticulously
recalling collective experiences as if they were of direct consequence to
the present situation.
In Burma the fear of losing control and independence is constantly
invoked by the SLORC in their references to colonisation,
neocolonialism and the chaos during the post-independence rebellions.
The historical memory is used to recall and emphasise cultural identity
and moral values from past struggles.1 Memorising history, as
orchestrated by the SLORC, aims to create fear of losing an identity
authenticated by the past. The awareness of continuous problems in
preventing the nation and the state from collapsing is, obviously, an
important part of the social memory of post-war generations in Burma.
In particular, the act of renaming the country Myanmar is an act of
controlling historical symbolism and represents a break with
colonialism. Thus, history is a representation which becomes a part of
the present reality. Memory of the past is used simultaneously to create
a break with the colonial past and a continuity of tradition. Historical
memory is always trapped by the political conjunctures of the present.
In Burma it is a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around high modernity and its
1. On the concept of social/historical memory, see Appendix 1.

128 HISTORICISM, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND POWER
multiple risks of instability and infringement on culture and collective

order. Hence, historical memory is a crucial basis for social and cultural
identification in Burma.
Protection of political independence and cultural identity is thus seen
as part of the same struggle to maintain control and sovereignty. The
Tatmadaw (army) still claims to be the one and only historical force
capable of protecting independence and preventing the union from
disintegration. This is difficult to argue against because the army has
ruled autocratically since 1962. It has suffered innumerable losses in the
civil wars since 1948. The last major struggle against the opium king
Khun Sa and his Mong Tai army, which ended in 1995, resulted in the
death or injury of 1,500 officers and soldiers (Bangkok Post, 3 October
1996). Only in recent years has the army acquired modern equipment.
Being a member of the Tatmadaw means risking your life for both
subalterns and officers. Consequently the Tatmadaw may have a firm
conviction that all economic and political privileges that soldiers and
families stand to gain are reasonable rewards for hardship and the
common loss of life.
At present, around 500 army families are believed to be at the top of
an extended patron-client system. Admission to lucrative trade and jobs
depends on this system’s formal and informal networks. The War
Veterans Organisation and its members 125,000 members in 1988—are
active in the trade and services sectors. As of 1996, the army was
increasing and its number was approaching 400,000 active soldiers.2
The USDA, the aforementioned nationalist organisation, is also
involved in business ventures, including the control of the Pin Lon
Yadana gem market which returns considerable profits.3 In this way, the
SLORC is building a corporate solidarity and can secure some support
by providing a living and access to modern consumption for those who
support the regime.4 In the wake of the rebellion in 1988 between 4,000
and 5.000 civil servants and government officials were dismissed for
lack of loyalty. Besides jobs and trade, bribes and corruption are
increasingly a problem for foreign companies, adding to the costs, as
well as for ordinary citizens frequenting hospitals and even schools.5
2. Guyot (1996:261); Far Eastern Economic Review (Yearbook 1996) estimates

286,000.
3. Members of the USDA also have to do voluntary work and pay a small
membership fee. See Steinberg (1997).
4. See Tin Maung Maung Than (1993).
Thus, it is of crucial importance to the SLORC to be able to balance the

patron-client system and the open economy. This intricate balance may
determine the fate of the regime.
Although I have not seen a detailed analysis of the patron-client
structure in its present form,James F. Guyot (1994) and Tin Maung
Maung Than (1993) have contributed significantly to an understanding
of the system. Tin Maung Maung Than emphasises the corporate
character of the army, which developed during the 1950s and 1960s.
The army not only assumed the role of paramount defender of unity by
taking power; it also created the Defence Services Institute (DSI) in
1951, originally a welfare organisation which expanded into a corporate
economic business enterprise, the largest multi-enterprise concern in
Burma.6 Today, a company owned by the Ministry of Defence, known
as Union of Myanmar Holding Co., is the largest, with a capital
estimated at a fifth of GNP.7 It is fair to say that military personnel are
able to benefit, directly or indirectly, from most investments and trade,
and that earning a living means abiding by the present order. This is
perhaps the most crucial source of power to the SLORC, and if the
economy expands so does their power. Very little trade can be done
outside the corporate system of the DSI and the USDA.
Within this structure of power, the SLORC relies on the historical
memory of society and the control of the official memory of past
events. A major part of the Burman population has grown up under
military rule. During this period the dominating model of society
encapsulated state, nation, union and the Tatmadaw within a singular
and unitary imagination of Burma; and the historical roots of this
imagination have been Aung San, the Thakins, and the Burma
Independence Army (BIA), the legitimate political, nationalist force of
Burma. The BIA, the Japanese-organised anti-colonial army, later
became the Burma National Army (BNA) which fought the Japanese.
The BNA, led by Ne Win, is the origin of the modern Tatmadaw.
Interestingly, four of the National League for Democracy (NLD)
leaders are BIA veterans, a fact emphasised in a recent presentation of
the NLD leadership.8 The Tatmadaw, in its own eyes, is the undisputed
centre of national unity, since it represents the continuity of Burmese
5. Bangkok Post (15 October 1996).

6. Tin Maung Maung Than (1993:34). The DSI is involved in shipping, banking,
hotels and commerce.
7. Guyot (1994:131).
history. The army will thus claim its legitimate role by recalling the
struggles of the 1940s, the 1950–60s, and recent years. The SLORC has
monopolised the ceremonies surrounding Independence Day (4
January), Union Day (17 February), Army Day (27 March), and
Martyrs’ Day (19 July), commemorating Aung San. Rituals, signs and
symbols are controlled as well as the participants. Dissent is demonised
as a ‘destructive element’ and seen as a threat to unity and stability. The
Tatmadaw will memorise its role, whenever necessary, as the
legitimisation of its practices, and within its historical memory,
nationalism is seen as the major instrument of unity. The following
extract is from a speech by the SLORC chairman, General Than Shwe
on Armed Forces Day, 27 March 1997:
It is necessary for you, Comrades, to remember that our nation

fell into servitude because we did not have an army. The Thirty
Comrades strove to establish the Myanmar Tatmadaw. From this,
you, Comrades, will find in history evidence of how crucial a
modern army is for a nation to regain its independence and how
crucial it is for a nation to remain a sovereign entity.9
This historicist memory can be traced back to colonial times and post-
independence, and is expressed in the writing of John Furnivall, who
envisaged a disrupted and chaotic Union of Burma in 1948 and
prescribed nationalism as a probate cure: ‘One was to make a bold stand
on the principle of nationalism as the only means available for
dominating economic forces.’10 In Furnivall’s view, however,
nationalism also implied ‘cultural relations with the modern world’. The
reason was that: ‘England opened up Burma to the world but did not
open up the world to Burma.’11 Instead the army turned inward and
excluded modernity and its global cultural forms. The SLORC can be
viewed as an extreme continuation of this political strategy by the use
8. Burma Debate (vol. 3, no. 3, 1996). These include U Tin U, former Chief of
Staff and Minister of Defence. He was dismissed by Ne Win and spent seven
years in jail.
9. New Light of Myanmar (28 March 1997).
10. Furnivall (1956:158). See Taylor (1995) for an interesting assessment of
Furnivall’s influence on post-independent Burma and the bankruptcy of 1988.
From a Burmese view, echoing Furnivall, U Khin Maung Nyunt (1994:13)
writes: ‘Without tradition, a nation will have no roots and its identity will be
lost. Without modernity a nation will stagnate and decay.’
of xenophobic nationalism and a cultural fundamentalism to control

strong, modern economic forces. However, modernising and preserving
traditional culture are not contradictory in the ideology of the SLORC. It
follows a strategy believed to be a genuine Burman way to
modernisation. The bankruptcy of Ne Win and the Burma Socialist
Programme Party is seen as resulting from economic mismanagement,
corruption and a lack of control of the national cultural realm. The
drastic demonetisation in 1987 was the last straw: an ill-equipped army
in an endless struggle against ethnic insurgents, suffering humiliating
losses, whilst a small elite prospered and travelled abroad, eroded the
historical legitimacy of the previous regime, even within the army.
Thus, the socialism of the Ne Win era was naturally replaced by a
nationalism which signifies the historical memory of the experience
from the era of independence.
Unfortunately, the sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU as a
response to human rights issues, only seem to confirm the SLORC’s own
prophecy—since Burma has survived colonialism as well as twenty-six
years of total isolation it may well be able to do so in the future. The
Western world is viewed as hostile and unwilling to allow Burma its
place in the world. History is thus represented as repetitive cycles in
which nationalism is a necessary and natural bulwark against hostile,
alien, neo-colonial forces. I would contend that this combination of
historicism and nationalism has some foundation in sections of a
population still largely denied access to global discourses and confined
within a unitary model of state, nation and regime. Economic
development in itself, whilst controlled by the SLORC, will not
promote democracy.
Another important aspect of historical memory and nationalism is the
violent state of Burmese society. Violence was also an integral part of
colonial rule and of post-independence and is therefore seen as the
logical consequence of all major political conflicts and confrontations.
It has been ingrained in the historical memory of generations and
experienced in their everyday situations—often mistakenly interpretated
as if violence were a natural part of a ‘national character’. The
nationalism of today evokes past violence, of the struggle against a
foreign colonial power and its culture. In the rhetoric of nationalism,
historical memory is used to structure the social practices of the present.
The SLORC’s power is based on this legacy, which anticipates
11. Furnivall (1957: xiv).

repression and violence as an inherent logic. The extensive use of

violence, forced labour, forced conscription of children and forced
resettlement, documented in volumes by humanitarian organisations,
originates in the nationalism of fear propagated by the regime as a
means of ensuing its own survival.12 It is within this context I consider
social memory and history to be crucial mechanisms in generating and
perpetuating violence. Violence in Burma has become a total social and
cultural experience entering daily life. In the name of the nation,
religion, ethnicity and democracy, violence is branded on to body and
soul; inculcated via metaphors and in gestures; in all, as objective facts
as well as subjective experience. Nationalism is thus considered a
necessary and natural antidote to this ill. At the same time violence
generates autocracy and corporatism, and it appears as the total rejection
of all that conflicts with its self-identity. However, as firmly stated in
this book, violence is not a collective psychological or cultural essence
in the Burmese population; it is social practice of a specific regime
generated over a long historical process.
The predicament facing the opposition is that the SLORC has forced
it to enter into its nationalistic discourse although the National League
for Democracy is contesting the SLORC’s ideo logy. This dilemma can
be seen most clearly in the proposal from the National Council of the
Union of Burma (the opposition in exile) for a new constitution of a
Federal Union of Burma. The proposal (draft) is actually based on the
very difficult definition of nation and national states comprising eight
major ethnic categories (Burman, Mon, Shan, Karen, Kayah, Kachin,
Chin and Arakan). Article 37 states that’ [e]ach ethnic group shall have
one state only’. But what about the Pa-o, the Wa, the Sgaw, and the Pwo
Karen? Moreover, the draft suggests that new nationalities, states and
national autonomous regions may be included in the final version.
However, ethnic rights are not necessarily synonymous with democratic
rights—they are often trapped in the historical memory of past ethnic
struggles. Thus, to reify ethnicity and cultural differences as the
political substance of states may prolong conflicts. Such ethnicism
carries the memory of past violence. On the other hand, a genuine local
12. On human rights issues, see the Amnesty International reports Myanmar
—‘In the National Interest’. Prisoners of Conscience, Torture, Summary Trials
under Martial Law, Images Asia’s No Childhood at All A Report about Child
Soldiers in Burma; and Total Denial by Earth Rights International & Southeast
Asian Information Network, 1996—to mention but a few documents with the
same distressing information.
autonomy preventing Burman dominance has to be achieved. This is a

real and difficult dilemma for all parties.
134
17.
A FINAL WORD—BUT NO
CONCLUSION
The nationalism of today’s Burma differs from the nationalism of the anti-
colonial struggle, as well as from the nationalism of 1947 immediately
before independence, when ethnicism began to determine the future. In
the 1940s nationalism meant liberation from a foreign coloniser; since
independence, nationalism has become a remedy for preserving a union
as one unitary state. The present nationalism does not anticipate freedom
since that has become a fearful expression of imminent division and the
collapse of the union. Whereas the nationalism of 1947 was an
anticipation of modernity including democracy, the nationalism of today
signifies endless autocracy and corporate modernity in the SLORC
model, while some of the ethnic movements envisage democracy and
federalism. Within this process there is a plurality of imaginations of a
nation and a national identity—identities often based on a subjectively
defined, ethnic core. There is, however, one crucial change: all minority
groups have given up demands for exclusive territorial space. This
leaves cultural and religious autonomy as the most crucial claims at the
moment. According to Partha Chatterjee (1993), in Burma, and in other
countries with anti-colonial nationalism, culture and religion were
separated from the material domain as social practices not directly
controlled by the colonisers. This separation left a ‘cultural core’ and
images of an essential identity intact, as seen from the indigenous
nationalists’ point of view. Interestingly, this observation is not merely
confirmed by the SLORC in its nationalism, but also by Aung San Suu
Kyi: ‘While Indian nationalism was essentially a product of British rule,
there had always existed a traditional Burmese nationalism arising from
Burma’s cultural homogeneity.’1 And part of this homogeneity was, and
is, Buddhism: ‘To be a Burmese is to be a Buddhist.’2
The aim of nationalism, then, was to eradicate the colonial policy of
difference and fragmentation and to replace this policy with egality and
unity. However, new differences were generated during this process. The
key to understanding the diversity and the changes in Burma, however,

does not lie in general definitions of nationalism but in the historical and
political process of which nationalism is an overarching designation as
well as an ingrained substance. Since 1993 it has become evident that
the SLORC’s nationalism is an attempt to cleanse the historical memory
and place all historical merit in the Tatmadaw—remembering and
celebrating the army while forgetting Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.3
The SLORC is actually trying to orchestrate a Burman nationalism of
both continuity and discontinuity with the past. The military regime aims
to represent the past in the present as a singular social and cultural
identity, and thus prevent the Burmese from entering the modern world
where claims of the right to self-identification are top of the agenda. It
is a self-assured SLORC identity of being modern in a Burmese—and a
non-Western—way.
The historical memory is simultaneously the source of empowerment
of diversified identities amongst the ethnic groups. The regime is
attempting to control ethnic classifications by modernising the ethnic
categories into ‘135 national races’ whilst ‘Burmanising’ their societies
and cultures in terms of their own identity politics. It is a bureaucratic
mode of controlling the ethnicism of the past. The outcome is a
hegemonic order where even a banal gesture or utterance is arbitrarily
ruled as a deviance from the desired order. The new nationalistic
hegemony is shifting the remnant memory of a democratic time into
oblivion.
A nation and a national identity are the outcomes of a process
combining historical memory, cultural and religion-dominated
discourses, ontological experience and rationalised actions; they are not
natural properties primordialised in groups and individuals, although
such claims of primordial attachment often are politically important.
Their representations are the result of political conjunctures and the
distribution of power, and their classifications are always contested and
reformulated.4 As we have seen in the history of Burma, nationalism
1. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:103). I am not sure that Indian nationalists and
researchers such as Chatterjee would agree with the comparison between India
and Burma.
2. Ibid.:83.
3. Have the common Burmese begun to lose interest in the NLD and are they
wary of foreign interference and boycotting? These are pertinent and painful
questions to evaluate in the coming years.
A FINAL WORD—BUT NO CONCLUSION 137
characterises this process and its complexity. In today’s Burma the

process is undergoing both a forced amnesia of collective memory and
an analysis of the past and of identities. When social memory is denied
a civil space and is paralysed by fear; when it is relegated to the private
sphere, then the past becomes a minefield. Identity and its formation are
closely linked to history and social memory. And as this process
becomes ingrained with violence and fear, then giving in to the
simplified nationalistic model of the regime may well appear as a
reasonable defence and the lesser evil. However, this does not
necessarily mean agreeing with that model and its definition of a social
and cultural order. In summarising the nationalism of the SLORC we
can identify the following mechanisms:
• Nationalism of the present is an outcome of past struggles and strives

to control the social memory of the past and the representations of
the nation in history.
• Nationalism is used as a technique to discipline the elite (in
particular the Tatmadaw); to inculcate the corporate model of
Myanmar society; and to protect its unity against internal and alien,
evil forces. It is the moral legitimisation of the control of the
population in all areas of life, public as well as private, i.e. the total
social and cultural space.5
• Nationalism is a mechanism whereby autocracy is rationalised as a
means to generate modern economic and technological development
in the Burman way.
• Nationalism is a mode of determining and controlling social and
cultural systems of classification, in particular ethnicity and religion.
The blunt use of physical force is thus combined with symbolic
violence (a violence not always recognised), which forces people to
participate in the way the SLORC classifies and represents identity
as nation, history, culture and religion.
4. Whereas there may be no universal form of a nation or nationalism, it

should not prevent the use of theoretical concepts to identify general
mechanisms of nationalism. For a brief and preliminary outline of concepts,
see Gravers (1995).
5. For example, guests who stay overnight in a private home have to be
reported to local authorities; a song or an utterance interpreted as a critique of
the regime can lead to jail; contact with a foreigner is restricted and under
surveillance.
• National, ethnic and religious identity are highly politicised and

related to violence of the past and the present. In the longer historical
process, nationalism appears to have dehumanised violence and
suffering under the guise of protecting the unity of the nation, the
state and the Tatmadaw and is subsumed within a hegemonic national
identity. This development is not particular to Burma but is also seen,
for example, in the Balkans.
According to Benedict Anderson (1991), the dawn of nationalism

brought the dusk of religious models of society. In Burma and in many
other countries this prediction of modernity and its idea of progression
have not materialised—for the simple reason that the self-identification
of modernity has been built on the idea that the past must disappear and
make room for the new order and its models. However, religions like
Buddhism and Christianity in Burma combine universal and particular
values, as well as collective and individual ideals. They provide
schemes for communal actions and personal merit, healing, or good
fortune; and finally religion combines past traditions with present
practices, thus balancing the modern with the traditional. Religion
appears in the legitimation of power and of resistance—as a continuous
fulcrum of the political process. Thus, there is no religious revival in the
sense of an opposition to modernity or to the nation-state, nor merely a
crisis of authority, as some modernist scholars seem to believe.6 But in
the case of Burma there is a failure of and a seemingly profound distrust
in the Western model of modern social order and its plurality of
identities. That is the basis of the political paranoia.
The role of Buddhism in Burma is complex. As a crucial ingredient in
nationalism it has constructed a bridge of memory over the fragmented
world of the colonial era. Buddhism is still legitimising power as well
as resistance, and it is a part of the model for a peaceful and righteous
world in the NLD and among the Buddhist Karen. Buddhism combines
the present and the future with the past. However we should not
conceive Buddhism (or nationalism) as a scheme structuring all actions
or explaining all events. Religion is rather a medium for a collective
assessment of the world, thus enabling people to bring some common
6. See, for example, Keyes, Kendall and Hardacre (1994, Intro duction). They
state that the recent development in Asia first appeared in Europe and later
spread. Such views tend to overlook regional and local processes. Modernity is
no longer generated by a European hegemony.
sense into it. In this way, religion is also a medium for the present
political struggles, providing a common conceptual and semantic
ground for interpretations of social practices, as well as for legitimising
these practices. Examples here include the publication by the military of
lists of donations by officers to monasteries; and Aung San Suu Kyi’s
insistence that democracy and engaged Buddhism need not be separated
in politics. She criticises un-Buddhist attitudes such as complacency
which she calls ‘a dangerous feeling’.7 All parties in Burma can agree
upon Buddhist concepts of compassion, peace and non-violence. In this
way Buddhism is the neutral common-sense medium connecting to a
social order of the past. However, it can also be used to construct
models for one-dimensional identification, fundamentalism and
violence against other religions or denominations. Moreover, to classify
acts as unBuddhist could draw religion further into the present struggle
and add to the symbolic violence of nationalism—in the same way as acts
have been classified as unpatriotic. Although traditional Buddhism as a
field of merit is considered relatively secluded from worldly affairs—a
non-political vantage-point from which political extremism can be
criticised—it harbours the memory of past struggles against colonialism,
mìn laùng prophecies and rebellions as well as U Nu’s personal
appropriation of Buddhism and his efforts to make it a state religion in
the 1950’s.8
Ironically, it seems as though the army and the NLD agree to mix
politics and Buddhism openly, whilst some Karen use it to withdraw
from the violent world and its disenchantment. The regime will soon
open a Theravada University for the Buddhist Mission, and one reason
behind this could be the promotion of the army’s model of law and
order in minority areas.
Since 1998, Buddhism has increasingly been related to the political
struggle and its central issues, namely democracy, auto cracy, nation
and ethnicity. This mixture and its ingredients are not necessarily
compatible; on the other hand, Buddhism could be the fulcrum for a
future reconciliation and a dialogue, provided all parties openly agree to
and carefully reflect on their uses of religion as a political medium and
as symbolic power. Power in Burma is not merely concentrated within
institutions, it is also highly concentrated around a few persons.
However, often power relations are not transparent. For the majority of

8. See further Gravers (1996a).
people, power is too dangerous to challenge openly. They are more or

less confined to the grey zone of dissimulation, fear, disillusion,
indifference, forced amnesia, subdued identities and indifference.
One of the fundamental properties of existence according to
Buddhism is suffering; the words from the dhammapada verse 278
announce: ‘All existing things are involved in suffering. He who knows
and perceives this ceases to be in the thrall of grief.’ Indeed, grief may
be relieved by acknowledging its causes, but we know that the memory
of extensive and extreme collective sufferings such as slavery,
colonialism, genocide, war and upheavals tend to be passed on through
generations: victims are mourned, heroes commemorated, losers
marginalised and the rest may either join the powerful or suffer in
seclusion. We also know that violence as an element of modern
existence has become highly organised and supported by complex
technological inventions. A recent, important anthropological debate on
social suffering comes close to the Buddhist saying above: ‘Suffering is
one of the existential grounds of human experience; it is a defining
quality, a limiting experience in human conditions. It is also a master
subject of our mediatised times.’9 In the case of Burma, suffering has
been a common social experience since colonial times. All sides in the
internal conflicts over the last fifty years have suffered: the soldiers
without legs and work; the raped women; the incarcerated; the exiled;
the resettled; those under surveillance; the loss of lives, of relatives’
health, of homes: the list seems endless. No proclamation of rights or
universal ethics and no intervention can heal the overwhelming
traumatic experiences. Only a persistent effort of communication and
the mutual will to eliminate the causes and practices of violence can
initiate the process of reconciliation. The routinisation of collective
suffering must be stopped by reducing the use of violence, physical as
well as symbolic, in all areas of life, and particularly within the state, its
bureaucracy and organisations. Simultaneously, nation alism and its
practices must be contained because they have become to indentify
violence. Whilst we may have to accept that suffering is a fundamental
human condition, we do not have to accept violence and political
paranoia in the name of nationalism and primordialism.
9. Kleinman et al (1997:1).
‘BURMESE DAYS’ FOREVER?

A new bankruptcy might topple the SLORC, whereas a coup and a new
leadership would probably not alter the deadlocked situation. However,
what is most distressing about the regime and the impasse is that
another generation is being systematically deprived of the experience of
democracy and the ability to recollect and reformulate their historical
memory of different social practices. Fear and violence are continuously
and heavily ingrained in the social and personal memories. Only via a
prolonged social and cultural exchange with the rest of the world, as
well as shared power between the Tatmadaw and civil society, can
enduring and positive changes come about. Until then Burmese Days
remains an accurate description of the agonising powerplay still at work
in Burma, whilst the white foreigner seems utterly exorcised and outside
the influence of his former imperial domain. Nevertheless, describing
and analysing this tragic history at least means resisting the amnesia.
‘Who controls the past controls the future: Who controls the present
controls the past.’ In Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston must
repeat this party slogan, and is further interrogated:
‘Does the past exist concretely, in space?’

‘No.’
‘Then where does the past exist, if at all?’
‘In records.’
‘And- ?’
‘In minds. In human memories.’
‘In memory … we, the party, control all records, and we
control all memories. Then we control the past, do we not?’
‘But how can you stop people remembering things ’? cried
Winston …10
10. Orwell (1982:99; emphasis added).

142
EPILOGUE
In November 1997, the SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC). The SLORC’s last proclamation
emphasised peace, modernisation and development, rather than law and
order. Moreover, the new council announced ‘the emergence of a
discipline-flourishing democratic system’.
Five ministers from the former government were not reappointed and
were later kept under house arrest on charges of corruption, while the
leading figures from the SLORC retained their positions. Secretary-1
Khin Nyunt is the apparent strongman of the SPDC. He controls the
intelligence organisations, education (as chairman of the Myanmar
Education Committee), religious affairs and development in minority
areas—all crucial and conflictridden spheres of society. On the other
hand, Myo Nyunt, who chaired the National Convention Convening
Commission preparing a new constitution, and who was minister of
religious affairs, lost his posts. He is an officer from a poor family, with
a rudimentary education, but proud of his background. The winner in
the latest round of the power struggle has been Khin Nyunt, who is
close to Ne Win.
On the surface, the changes resemble an anti-corruption campaign.
General Than Shwe, head of the SLORC and SPDC, has given guidance
to service personnel in the ministries to ‘avoid corruption and red-
tapism’. Among the dismissed were the ministers of trade and
commerce, forest and agriculture, and tourism—all notoriously corrupt.
However, it could also be considered as a move against persons in the
elite who have had more than their fair share of the cake. Their advisers
and followers have been arrested and their families and friends are
under surveillance and cannot leave the country. Thus it is an action
against parts of the patron-client system.
The flourishing Westernised nightlife seems to be restricted. Children
of the ruling elite appear to be among those who indulged in it.1
144 EPILOGUE
Khin Nyunt appears as the one who cleared out the bad elements but
the economy is rapidly deteriorating as evidenced by a number of signs:
rising inflation; rice crops damaged by flooding; investments slowed by
the crisis in Asia; and an uncertain future for an estimated 700,000–800,
000 illegal Burmese immigrant workers in Thailand.
In September 1997, the 86-year-old Ne Win paid a visit to President
Suharto in Indonesia. Although it was a private visit he travelled with a
military entourage, and the visit has been interpreted as a sign that the
SPDC is looking to the Indonesian model of regulated democracy. It is
also a sign of the unchanging hierarchy in Burma and an old man’s
guidance of his protégé.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) was allowed to hold its
annual meetings in September across the country and there were more
than 700 visitors to Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound. There has also
been a meeting between the government and the NLD; Aung San Suu
Kyi, however, was not invited. At the same time, NLD party activists
have been arrested and denied their right to have lawyers for their
defence. One of the arrested is said to be the brother-inlaw of Khin
Nyunt. Aung San Suu Kyi remains effectively confined to her house and
all visitors are registered and controlled by the military; her husband
and sons were refused visas for a Christmas visit. She is a reported to
have become a vegan.
Small groups of Karen National Liberation Army soldiers and their
families have continuously been ‘exchanging weapons for peace’, as it
is described in The New Light of Myanmar. They surrender their
weapons to the Tatmadaw and in return they receive accommodation,
food and money. Lawlessness and sense of insecurity have increased in
the overcrowded Karen refugee camps in Thailand. The Thai authorities
are considering repatriation and are now fully cooperating with the
UNHCR. In March 1988 the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army attacked
two camps in Thailand and burnt 1,500 shacks. Two refugees were
killed and about 9,000 were made homeless. Khin Nyunt, secretary-1 of
the SPCD, urged the Thai commander in chief to take action against the
the DKBA, and claimed that Rangoon had nothing to do with that army.
It is difficult to say whether the DKBA is now acting outside the control
of the Tatmadaw. It seems unlikely, although they may have supporters
among Buddhist Karen settled in Thailand and the DKBA has probably
1. The Guardian, 22 December 1997.

gained control over some of the logging trade along the border. This
may enable the DKBA to operate more independently.
A crucial event was the defection in April 1988 by Padoh Aung San,
member of the KNU ten-member Central Executive Committee. He was
in charge of the economic department and was thus the highest-ranking
member of the KNU who has so far surrendered to SPDC. The New
Light of Myanmar wrote that he was received by Thein Swe, the head of
the Office of Strategic Studies, the most powerful organisation within
the complex system of intelligence organisations, and directly under the
control of Khin Nyunt.2 At the press conference following the surrender,
Padoh Aung San described the split within the KNU and accused its
leader, General Bo Mya, of being ‘thoughtless and ruthless’ and of
ordering the killing of dissident KNU members.3 The regime has
consolidated its position and grip on power, aided by the admission to
ASEAN which is fully occupied with the economic crash.
The boycott and the economic crisis in ASEAN have had a serious
impact on the economy. Prices have risen by 45 per cent while the kyat
is rapidly losing value. The price of rice alone has increased 25 per cent
in one year. With bankruptcy looming, Myanmar is likely to return to
isolation and unending misery, so it is urgent to compromise in order
that the boycott may be lifted. The boycott has aggravated the living
conditions. Myanmar has alarming high mortality rates for women in
childbirth and after abortion, in addition to widespread malnutrition.4
The SPCD is still repeating the well-known nationalistic rhetoric and
considers Myanmar as a national and cultural island in a sea of neo-
colonial monsters. Significantly, the Union Solidarity Development
Association now has 7.5 million members and is extending its
organisation and influence to most social issues: education, Buddhism,
management, information technology and so forth. The USDA
2. See Andrew Selth (1997) on the hierarchy of intelligence organisations. The

Office of Strategic Studies is headed by well-educated officers who are able to
monitor international affairs and control areas such as ethnic affairs, drugs
policy, environment and the surveillance of the NLD.
3. These accusations could be somewhat tainted, but I have no doubt that they
signify the dire situation of the KNU leadership. Padoh Aung San indicates that
many Karen favour an agreement and peace. Padoh Aung San participated in
negotiations between the SLORC and the KNU in 1996. Those who are able to
stay behind in Thailand are the economically well-off, with houses and farm
land. Among Padoh Aung San’s group there were seventy officers, including
one colonel and one major, and 134 members of their families.
146 EPILOGUE
continues to warn against internal traitors (i.e. Aung San Suu Kyi) and
external destructive interference.
Western countries are using the Internet to spread disinformation

with intent to destabilise some developing countries. The Internet
creates cultural problems—and it is essential for Myanmar people
to preserve and adhere to Buddhist ethics and try not to lose their
culture, (Khin Nyunt in the New Light of Myanmar, 9 January
1998).
In terms of political hegemony, the growth of this organisation may be

significant. People are more or less forced to join the USDA and leave
the NLD to avoid interrogation and arrests. Although the hegemony is
not based on popular support for the regime, it stands to gain from a
drive against wild nightlife, corruption and conspicuous consumption.
The USDA may achieve temporary success by awakening the historical
disposition among a majority of poor people against negative foreign
influences.
The social memory of the past is firmly controlled by the armed
forces, as seen in the ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth
anniversary of independence. How will it be possible to construct an
alternative identity to resist this hegemony, its forced memory and its
phobic nationalism?
As the anniversary of the 1988 uprising was approaching, Aung San
Suu Kyi left her house to meet NLD members in Bassein. The army
stopped her car on a bridge twice and forced her to return to Rangoon
after several days in the car. She has also called for the convening of the
parliament elected in 1990. The SPDC has accused her of disrupting the
stability of the state. A demonstration by students was quickly dissolved
and several students were arrested. Foreigners distributing leaflets were
expelled. This proved to the SPDC that there is a foreign meddling in
Myanmar’s internal affairs which aims to destabilise the country.
Although there have been talks between the SPDC and the NLD, the
regime refuses to have direct talks with Aung San Suu Kyi. In June,
they accused her of insulting her father’s memory and warned that she
could be another Ngo Dinh Diem, the South Vietnamese prime minister
assassinated in a CIA plot in 1963.
4. See R.Carier (1997) who describes it as a silent emergency.

After calling for the convening of the parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi
formed a political committee of NLD and minority delegates. The
committee declared that all laws enacted since 1988 had no legal basis.
The army reacted immediately by detaining 7–800 NLD members in state
guest houses. Secretary-1, Khin Nyunt, formed a Political Affairs
Committee of 16 officers, including several from the important Office
of Strategic Studies. Mass meetings were organised in all states,
resulting in declarations from so-called peace groups, including the
DKBA, Union Karen League and other ethnic organisations,
condemning the move by Aung San Suu Kyi. She and the NLD were
accused of disruption of peace, stability and national unity. Aung San
Suu Kyi was also accused of unlawful actions and of jeopardising
internal security. The regime is virtually dissolving the NLD by forcing
its members to resign: a strongly worded statement from a meeting in
Rangoon declared that it was time to drive Aung San Suu Kyi out of the
country and to punish the NLD which was accused of betraying the
nation. Meanwhile, Khin Nyunt urged teachers to ‘promote a high
moral and nationalist outlook among the youth’ and to ‘keep vigil’
against what he called ‘destructionists’ cunning schemes to disrupt the
peaceful pursuit of education’. The universities were still closed in
October 1998.
In November, an exhibition to ‘Revitalise and Foster Patriotic Spirit’
opened, and Khin Nyunt outlined its objectives:
• to promote patriotic spirit and national pride;

• to preserve traditions and origin, lineage and national character;
• to enable the young generation to learn true historical events.
The Tatmadaw is depicted as safeguarding the nation from

disintegration and neo-colonialism.5
«»«»«»«»«»
Is this recent development a sign of escalating paranoia and a prelude to
violent action? Does it mean that the opposition’s force has petered out
and that the majority of Burmese are fed up and increasingly indifferent
to the political struggle?
If this is the case, the possibilities for dialogue may be fading, as
nationalism becomes more and more fundamentalist in its rhetoric and
actions.
5. The New Light of Myanmar, 13 October 1998.

148
APPENDIX 1: THEORETICAL
CONCEPTS
The following is a short elaboration of the theoretical concepts that are

used more or less explicitly in the analysis. They are outlined here so as
not to disrupt presentation.1
Model
This concept refers to the general characteristics attributable to a
society. Actors may refer to universal and eternal values based in
culture which ostensibly hold society together and seem to determine its
change. A model refers to the generating principles of society
theoretically condensed. Therefore a model refers to a dominant frame
of reference for both practice and its evaluation. However, I do not use
the model as a substitute for structure—the order of things; rather, it is
the way this order and its properties can be identified and used as a basis
for the analysis and explanation of practices and processes of society. A
model then does not necessarily provide the explanation of specific
individual actions and subjective motives or behaviour, nor such
properties which determine action. A model can thus be seen as the
condensation of the motivating forces in a particular society, and a
mode of communicating these forces.
1. Sources: Leach (1964); Geertz (1966); Gramsci (1971); Stirrat (1984);

Kapferer (1988, 1989); Comaroff (1989); Connerton (1989); Ortner (1989);
Bourdieu (1990); Featherstone (1990); Balibar and Wallerstein (1991);
Friedman 1992; Asad (1993); Gillis (1994); Wilmsen and McAlister
(1996);Jenkins (1996, 1997).
Power
Two important concepts used in the text are hegemony and symbolic
power derived from A. Gramsci and P. Bourdieu. I use hegemony as the
political legitimate power representing and defining the interests of all
social strata and groups, and coercing the whole population of a state to
join the practices and corporate ideology of a regime. Social and cultural
classifications are mono polised and strictiy controlled.
Symbolic power and violence are more or less recognisable. They are
embedded in the nationalistic rhetoric, in ceremonies and rituals, as well
as in the symbols used by a regime and an opposition to define identity
historically and culturally. Signs and symbols are not coercive by
themselves, but by signifying potential actions of physical violence they
thus create fear.
Strategy
This signifies the general notion that there is a logical coherence in
practice whose meaning and intention are raised above momentary
considerations by reference to the content of one or more models.
Collective strategies bind models with actual religious and political
practice. However, strategies are not just instrumental agents; they
unfold depending on context and thereby act as correctives which relate
back to models and concrete events. This applies both to the exercise of
power and to the establishment of identity, where collective actions are
planned and executed with and against others.
Cosmology
The term cosmology is often, but not exclusively, rooted in the
religious, that is, the order of the universe (and the world) in which
religion has its foundation. Cosmology includes models of the earthly
life and of the life beyond, of past and eternity, of physical and
metaphysical laws that span all existence (animals, spirits, humans),
myths, prophecies, etc. Cosmology is not used in the sense of a cultural
code determining action. It is seen as a living tradition of knowledge; a
schema recognised collectively -but not evenly known or agreed upon
by all. Cosmology must be studied and analysed as a social practice and
not merely as a symbolic system. Concepts and symbols of a cosmology
form a powerful medium when they are presented in political struggles.
APPENDIX 1: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 151
Ontology
Being in the world—a ‘design for living’; the manner in which
existence meaningfully unfolds according to the ethics of a religious or
philosophical system. The meaning here is the disposition which
conditions the organisation and ruling of the individual’s practice. It
must be emphasised, however, that it is not conceived as an inherent
psychic essence determining practice although ontology is often
invoked by nationalists as such a timeless device. This ordering of life
puts historical experience in perspective. Ontology is the logic used to
guide ourselves and to navigate our way through life. This is often
marked by principles of cosmology and religious myth and ethics, but it
is also affected by technological or bureaucratic rationalisations,
statistics, laws, etc.
In religious fundamentalism, identity is understood as being rooted in
the very nature of being and in the cosmos, and thus largely beyond
human agency. In this way, ontology and cosmology, merging with
nationalism, can form a fundamentalistic model and a powerful political
mechanism.
Ideology
I use this term when referring to the political order. Ideologies are models
for political organisation, power and domination (from auto cratic to
democratic systems, and between resistance and liberation). Ideology
often includes elements from cosmology and ontology, when
individuals are interpellated by a hegemonic order. This happens
through the mass mobilisation and staging of large events and
ceremonies (national days, etc.). Ideology in this sense expresses the
attempt of a regime to subordinate and control cosmology and ontology,
and to prescribe a social and cultural identity.
Identity
Identity is the sense of belonging to something shared in relation to
society, culture or religion. It is the establishment of the subjective. Yet
this belonging is not just an independent, individual (free) recognition:
it is also something largely ascribed by others -often powerful others—
in the process whereby individuals are subordinated to hierarchy. All
identity is, in principle, individual but arises in the relationship between
the individual, society and culture, namely in the space between self-
identification and public identification, between individual and

collective identity. Identity is always defined through shared frames of
reference and expressions of social relations. It also comprises modes of
classification and categorisation using culture and social status within
specific historical contexts. Identity cannot be isolated with a definite,
uniform content that covers all collectivity. Identity changes constantly
in content and in connection with situations and social relations. Thus,
in the analysis, we must avoid using the concept of identity as if it
constituted a substance above the social relations and the politics of
difference, which make and remake ethnic, national and other identities.
Cosmology, ontology and ideology find expression in different
strategies but realise a shared, although not necessarily uniform or
unambiguous, frame of reference for the creation of identity. It must be
emphasised that identity is established with its point of departure in
many different strategies: ethnicity, nationality, the individual’s status
and prestige via occupation, symbolic capital, consumption, and many
other ingredients.
Ethnicity and Nationality

These are general appellations for shared frames of reference that
appear to represent the whole collectivity in time and space and that
establish rules and boundaries for membership. Nationalism can be said
to be a ‘nationalisation’ of individual and ethnic categories and groups
under a collective frame of reference of the state, which gives members
a genealogically fixed right to community. The ‘national’ marks the
generalising of a power situation, where differences must be
subordinated to state power and a regime’s rule of the social hierarchy.
Theories and strategies of nationalism are thus always suspended in the
contrast between particular and universal tendencies. They classify
something typically human and an especially individual essence
signifying one nationality or another. Identity, in relation to ethnic or
national characteristics, is therefore generally ambivalent and difficult
to grasp of both for participants and in an analysis. The theories, concepts,
models and rhetoric in nationalism resemble one another, while history
and social models seldom do.
Ethnicism
Ethnicism is an equally dominating phenomenon, often linked with or
directed against the national state, a division into ethnic groups and
APPENDIX 1: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 153
categories. This process could be called the ‘privatisation of

nationalities’, that is, the separation or seclusion of groups from nation-
states in the name of ethnic freedom. It is a manifest form of ethnic
opposition, where cultural differences are classified as primordial and
antagonistic.
Ethnicism contains both a reconstruction of historical groups and the
establishment of completely new groups, where cultural frontiers and
cultural content are changed. The processes occur globally but are
marked simultaneously by particular characteristics. Nationality and
ethnicity have possibly become such widespread designations precisely
because we can all identify ‘our’ genuine membership through the
universal convention of the designations. Ethnicity has thus been
elevated to a primary human right, especially in Western societies, and
cultural and religious particularism have gained influence within the
world order. This raises questions about historical rights to homelands;
an ethnic clean-up often accompanies ethnic liberation. Culture and
liberation easily become a cover for warlordism and racism. Ethnicism
and its demand for ethnic freedom are not only a dominant right but a
dominant ‘disorder’ in the ‘new world order’. This paradox is based on
a historicism and culturalism reaching back to the ethnic hierarchies of
old empires. Ethnonationalism often applies primordialism to legitimate
claims of autonomy. Cultural identity thus becomes the foundation of
political rights (cf. the Karen). The politics of difference can
dramatically change the cultural and social identities that were the
origin of process.
Social/Historical Memory
Cosmology, ideology, identity—these categories all relate to, and are
encompassed by, the modes in which we recollect society in historical
narratives, discussions and commemorations as part of our social
practice: in ceremonies, rituals, organisations, etc. Social memory and
the process of social and historical collection include a concerted
forgetfulness or enforced amnesia.
Historical memory is crucial to defining identity, legitimising
classiflcations of identities within a nationalist ideology, or rendering
subjective concepts of, for example, an ethnic movement authentic.
Social memory thus is the practice of actualising the past in the
present by activating a recollection, collective as well as individual. The
social and historical memory becomes manifest in both actions and in
representations. Without the social act of recollecting the past we would

not be able to define what is identical in the present.
Shared memory is thus a substantial part of social and cultural
identities. In this way social memory and identity are important sources
of empowerment—in the forms of nationalism, ethnicity or religious
movements. Unfortunately, the recent anthropological debate on
identity tends to define identity as a pure social or cultural construct,
devoid of historical memory. It is also important to emphasise that social/
historical memory is not seen as uniform consciousness, bounded and
shared by all. It is always contested and interpreted—whilst imagined in
terms of essence and continuity. This is why social/historical memory is
important in explaining nationalism and ethnicity.
APPENDIX 2: KAREN
ORGANISATIONS
The Karen and their organisations1 have played a crucial role in Burma
—a tragic and some would say disproportionately important role. Thus,
before presenting the various organisations, it is relevant to outline
briefly the causes of this often divisive and violent role in the history of
Burma.
Before and during the negotiations for independence, the
expectations among the Karen, in particular the elite, rose dramatically.
They imagined that they were a nation in every sense of the word and,
as such, had legitimate claims for an autonomous state. When the Karen
leaders returned empty-handed after receiving much sympathy in
London in 1946, they still expected help from their ‘younger, white
brother’. However, they received no reply at all to their unrealistic
claims on territory, including the present Karen State of Tenasserim and
part of the lowland where the Karen were not a majority. Saw Tha Din
said that it suited the British well to be confused when the Karen
organisations flooded London with contradictory memos and proposals.
The British, who blamed the Karen for a lack of coherent leadership,
could then leave the problems to the Burmese, not realising that Karen
unity totally depended on external decisions. Saw Tha Din and other
leaders were bitter and emphasised that had the British told them their
proposals were unrealistic, they would have changed their strategy!
Instead, the rising radical nationalism placed the Karen in a position
outside constructive policy and reinforced their own self-image of being
orphans. The uncertainty, confusion, mistrust and fear generated during
the Japanese occupation were encompassed by the increasingly self-
1. Sources: Karen’s Political Future (1945–1947); Burma Government (1949).

Trager (1966); F. Tinker (1967, 1983–84); U Maung Maung (1989);M.Smith
(1991).
assured Karen national identity. It fuelled the radical nationalism among

the younger leaders. Moreover, the Karen were armed. The great
expectations, the uncertainty and confusion also generated divisions
amongst the Karen. The various Karen organisations reflect their
political diversity, despite the fact that they strongly imagined a Karen
nation in the making in 1947.
The Karen National Association (KNA), established in 1881, mainly
included the local Karen Baptist associations, but was seen as the
beginning of Karen national unity by their American and English
supporters. The Karen Central Organisation (KCO), comprising all
Karen organisations, was formed in 1942 to cooperate with the Burmese
government in preventing further inter-ethnic fighting and suppression
from the Japanese. After the unsuccessful negotiations in London, the
KCO split in February 1947 into the Christian Karen National Union
(KNU), the Karen Youth Organisation (KYO), which was affiliated to
Aung San’s political organisation (AFPFL), and the Buddhist-oriented
All Burma Karen National Association (ABKNA), established in 1922.
U Maung Maung (1989:346) says that the ABKNA in the 1920s was
equally as strong as the Christian KNA.
In June 1947 the KNU formed the Karen National Defence
Organisation (KNDO) and began issuing weapons in preparation for the
rebellion in 1949. The Karen who remained loyal to the union
government organised themselves into the Union Karen League within
the AFPFL, and a small organisation named the Karen Congress,
representing a minor fraction of KNU, did not join the rebellion in
1949. In the Salween district the hill Karen joined the United Karen
Organisation (UKO). It was renamed the Papun United Karen
Organisation in 1947 and vowed to keep the KNU and the KNDO out
of the district. Interestingly, the Papun UKO included all nationalities of
the district. The leaders were former Force-136 fighters who had helped
Major Seagrim during the Second World War. They opposed the
affluent lowland Karen and their unrealistic demands, and acted
independently. The Papun UKO signed an agreement with U Nu, and
one of the leaders was shot by the KNU. In 1953, a pro-communist and
antireligious party, the Karen National United Party, was formed by
leftwing KNU leaders. It had a significant role in the KNU’s struggle
until the mid-1970s. In 1995 the Democratic Karen Buddhist
Organisation (DKBO) was formed.
GLOSSARY
adipadi: sole ruler.

agati: the wrong path—as distinct from Enlightenment (bodhi).
ahimsa: non-violence.
ana: power.
Ariyametteya: (Pali) or Mettaya (Sanskrit: Maitreya); the name of the
coming Buddha (bodhisattd), who is waiting in the Tusita heaven.
Bama/Burman/Burmese: Bama means Burman or Burmese and is related
to the words Mranma and Myanmar. Myanmar is used by the present
regime as the name of the country and to denote one common national
identity, that is, a Burmese identity including all ethnic groups. The
nationalists in the Dobama organisation used Bama to describe the
whole population, including ethnic minorities. The British used
Burman and Burmese with both denotations. Burmese seems to be the
most widely used of the two terms in English and American
publications. In the 1950 census, Bama was used for all indigenous
groups and Burmese for the majority group. This distincdon creates
confusion and complications, but since it is widely applied in the
literature, I have maintained Burman (Bama) for the ethnic group, its
members, language and culture. Burmese signifies a citizen of the
union and is used in a broad sense to describe things that belong to the
country. However, there are several instances where the use of this
dichotomy is disputable, and it is clear that non-Burman ethnic groups
will deny belonging to a common Burmese identity. I have not found
any reason to use Myanmar instead of Burma, as does Amnesty
International for instance, and I do not intend to endorse the
interpretations made by the present regime. They often translate
Myanma tuin ran sa, ‘son of Burma’, into ‘national race of Burma’—
indeed a perpetuation of conventional colonial language.
bodhisatta: (Pali), bodhisattva (Sanskrit); the Buddha-to-be (hpayà
laung in Burman).
boung kho: (Pwo Karen); bo khu (Sgaw Karen): head of religious merit,
a religious leader.
boung mü (I use the letter ü to indicate that the sound is between uand
y): female leader.
Burman names (towns etc.): Rangoon=Yangon; Bassein=Pathein;
Irrawaddy=Ayeyawady; Salween=Thanlwin; Pegu=Bago; Arakan
State/Arakanese=Rakhine.
cakkavatti: (Pali; Sanskrit: cakravartin)\ world conqueror; the universal

monarch, who is to arrive immediately before the coming Buddha.
Setkyamin in Burman. From setkya (cakka): celestial wheel and mìn:
king.
chettyar: (Burman: chetti-kala): moneylender.
dana: giving alms; charity (reciprocity).
dhamma: doctrine; the teachings of the Buddha; right (the law); law of
the universe; cause and effect; the nature of existence; ultimate reality.
dhammaraja: righteous king, who rules according to the dhamma and its
ten rules: almsgiving, observance of the precepts, liberality, rectitude,
gentleness, self-discipline, control of anger, avoidance of the use of
violence, forbearance, and non-opposition against the people’s will.
Dobama Asiayone: ‘We the Burmans’ organisation/party. The name of
the nationalist movement in the 1930s.
Galon: (Sanskrit: Garudd)\ mythical bird, the enemy of the Nagas
(‘serpents'). A symbol of Saya San’s rebellion. Later used as symbol
by right-wing political groups.
hluttaw: the king’s council of ministers.
hpòn: glory. Associated with spiritually or morally superior beings.
Combined with kutho: religious merit, and kamma. Also charisma (in
relation to political power).
hpòngyi: great glory (i.e., field of great merit); ordained monk. hsaya:
teacher, astrologer, alchemist.
hsayadaw: royal teacher, head of a monastery.
htì: umbrella; the top spire crowning a pagoda, especially on royal
pagodas, symbolising the king’s crown and rendering his power
legitimate.
kala: (‘caste’) foreigner (from India); kala pyu: white foreigner
(sometimes spelled kullah). The British regarded the word as an
abusive term.
kamma: (Pali) actions; karma (Sanskrit); kan (Burman).
karuna: active compassion.
kutho: religious merit. (Pali, kusala: wholesome; skilful).
metta: active goodwill, loving-kindness.
mìn laùng: king in the making; pretender to the throne leading a rebellion.
Myanmar: see bama/Burman/Burmese.
nat: spirit. The thirty-seven nats are terrestrial guardian spirits of the
royal family and the state. They signify both central power and local
control. Their lord is Thagya (Sakka), i.e., the god Indra, and their
official abode is Mt. Popa south of Pagan.
nidanas: (Pali) link; a chain of dependent origination. A Buddhist
concept of the fundamental logic of existence with ignorance as the
primary root. It relates consciousness to cravings, mind to matter, etc.
In the last instance birth and life depend on kamma.
GLOSSARY 159
sahib: Mr, Sir, master (i.e., the British), an Anglo-Indian title; pukka
sahib real gentleman.
Sangha: (Pali) assembly of monks; the monastic order (founded by the
Buddha).
Sawbwa: (saohpa or chao fa in Shan/Thai) prince in the Shan and Kayah
states.
sepoy: native soldier (Anglo-Indian).
setkya mìn: see cakkavatti.
Shwegyin: Buddhist reformist sect originated in Shwegyin town in the
nineteenth century.
sila: moral precepts and practice in Buddhism.
Tatmadaw: (Burmese) ‘armed forces’. The Burman term is widely used
in English.
Thakin: master, lord; equivalent to sahib. Title of the nationalists in the
1930s and 1940s.
Thathanabaing (thathana is sasana in Pali, translated as religion): one
with authority over religion; head of the Sangha appointed by the king.
Wunthanu athin: nationalist association or group under the General
Council of Buddhist Associations (GGBA).
yathe: (Burmese from Sanskrit rsi) a holy sage, hermit. Person living in
seclusion having achieved a high spiritual attainment. Pwo Karen: eing
hsai
zedi: (Burmese from Pali: cetiya): pagoda, stupa. Building derived from
the traditional burial mount for Buddhist saints.
160
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170
INDEX
Agati 2, 156 See also Ariya Metteya 18, 56, 90,

Ahimsa 13, 74, 156 94, 99–101, 109, 111, 157
Ana (power) 110, 156 Bo Mya 92, 93, 96, 144
Anderson, Benedict 20, 137 Boung kho 102, 103, 104–105, 110,
Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League 157
(AFPFL) 48, 52, 57, 58 Buddhism, 13–19, 21, 54, 56, 57
Ariya Metteya (Ariya). in the 1947 Constitution 57
See also bodhisatta 18, 56, 102, and nationalism 42, 137
103, 104, 107, 156 and SLORC 88–90
Armed forces. See Tatmadaw and socialism 53, 55, 61
ASEAN 124, 144 Buddhist concepts. See agati, ahimsa,
Aung San 38, 41, 42, 44, 49, 50–53, avirodha, dana, kamma, karuna,
72, 73 kutho, metta, sangha, sila.
on Buddhism 42 Buddhist World Council 56
on nation, nationalism 44 Burma Independence Army (BIA) 44,
Aung San Suu Kyi 70, 78, 118, 119, 46, 128
120, 124, 143, 145, 146 Burman/Burmese (Bama) 156
on Buddhism xv, 74, 90, 138 Burman names 157
on ethnicity 73, 114 Burmanisation 112–113
on human rights 74–75 Burma Rifles 44, 53
on nationalism 2, 7, 39, 76, 133– Burma Socialist Programme Party
135 (BSPP) 53, 55, 61–62
Aung-Thwin, Michael 78
Avirodha 75 Cakkavatti, 9, 17, 18, 35, 46, 63, 94,
102, 108, 111, 157
Ba Maw 38, 47 Chatterjee, Partha 133
Bama (Burman), 156 Chettyar, moneylender 28, 34, 37,
Baptists. 157
See also missionaries and Karen Chin in 113
vi, 21–22, 58, 103 Chinese 129
Bodhisatta. Christianity 21–23, 33, 137,
Club, colonial, 2, 3, 9, 31, 71
171
172 INDEX
Myanmar 85–87 General Council of Buddhist

Ne Win’s 68–70 Associations (GCBA) 34, 35, 37
Colonialism. See plural society Guyot, James viii, 128
Colonisation.
See also pacification 23, 25–26, Hluttaw, (king’s council) 11, 16, 157
30 Hpòn, (‘glory’) 15, 16, 63, 99, 110,
‘Colonizing consciousness’ 75 157
Commanroff, Jean & John L. 77 Hasya San, rebellion 34–38
Communist Party 53 Htì, (pagoda final) 15, 63, 89, 94,
Communist rebellion 52 102, 104, 105, 110, 157
Corporate state and society 41
Cosmology, Buddhist 10, 11, 15, 18, Identity 75, 76, 77, 113, 136–137,
19, 21, 36, 102–105, 149 150
Cultural classification 77 cultural 21, 22, 125, 126, 135
essentialism 71, 81, 85, 123, 130, ethnic 20, 110
133, 145 Karen 111
national 25, 28, 133
Dacoit 10 Indians.
Dana 18, 157 See also chettyar 26, 28, 29–30,
Defense Services Institute (DSI) 128 63
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Indra (Thagya Mìn) 17, 102
(DKBA) 92–97, 110, 111, 143–144
Democratic Karen Buddhist Organ- Japanese occupation 40–41, 44–48
isation (DKBO) 92–97, 99, 100
Dhamma, 9, 13–15, 16, 19, 35, 157 Kachin 25, 26, 52, 58, 113
Dhammaraja 16, 17, 35, 63, 75, 157 Kala viii, 11–12, 22, 30, 39, 89, 107,
Dobama Asiayone ‘We, the Burmans 158
Association’ 38–40, 157 Kamma (karma) 16, 17, 19, 57, 70,
74, 110, 158
Economy 121–124, 144 Kapferer, Bruce 82
Ethnicity, 112, 152 Karen Buddhist 90, 92–97, 97, 110
and politics 44, 47, 48, 50, 58, 72, Christian 10, 23–24, 28, 38, 44–
73, 110, 112–113, 131, 132, 135 48, 52, 72, 79, 90–97, 106
Ethnicism 50, 133, 152–153 organisations 154–155
Eurasians 28 prophet 103
Europeans 29–30 Pwo 46, 102
Excluded areas 25, 27 rebellion (1856) 24, 102
refugees 143
Foucault, Michel 83 Sgaw 46, 102
Force-136 (SOE) 44, 109 uprising (1949) 51
Furnivall, J.S. 29, 129–130 Karen National Association, KNA 25,
155
Galon 35, 36, 157 Karen National Liberation Army,
KNLA 90–96, 143
Karen National Union, KNU 48, 49, National League for Democracy
72, 90–97, 100, 109, 144, 155 (NLD) 70, 87, 89, 119, 143, 145–
KNU border trade and tax 64, 94 146
Karuna 90, 158 Nationalism, 85, 115, 125, 136–137,
Kayah (Karenni) 25, 27, 48, 49, 113 150, 152, 154
Khin Nyunt 88, 89, 120, 123, 141, Burman 36, 38–41, 72–73, 76–81,
146 123, 129–131, 133, 146
Kipling, Ruyard 10–11 concept of. See Models Karen 25,
Kuomintang 51 79, 97
Kutho (merit) 15, 110, 158 rhetoric, ix–x, 2, 117
religion 82, 97
Mandalay 9, 57, 62, 74, 88, 89 SLORC 117, 120, 126–131, 133–
Manerplaw 91, 93–95 137
Maran La Raw 113 New Light of Myanmar 89, 95, 118,
Maung Maung Gyi 65–66, 70 119, 143, 144
Marxism 53 Ne Win 2, 51, 53, 55, 57, 58–70, 71,
Memory, historical/social 110, 111– 74, 143
112, 113, 126–131, 135–136, 140, Nu, U 39, 52, 54, 55, 56–58, 63
145, 153
Metta 90, 158 Office of Strategic Studies 144
Mindon, King 100, 102 Ontology 150
Mèn laùng 17, 18, 24, 75, 100, 158 Ontological 15, 17, 21, 61–62
Burman 35 Orwell, George xv, 3–5, 28, 68, 97,
Karen 103, 105–109, 111 140
Mon 108 Ottama, U 33
Missionaries 21–23, 58, 102, 103,
106 Pacification, British 8–12
Models 78, 79, 81, 111, 126, 147 Pagoda 8, 17, 24, 63, 88, 93, 94, 102,
autocratic 18–19, 62, 68, 133, 136 104, 108,
concept of corporate state 60–62, Panglong Agreement 48–49, 50, 114
83, 136 Papun 102, 105, 108, 109
nationalistic 53, 55, 77 Paranoia (political) 50, 73, 82–83,
Mon 105 137, 146
Monks 9, 15, 23, 33, 56, 57, 62, 70, Patron-client relations 20, 55, 64,
88, 90, 93, 97 127–128, 141
Monarchy 13–19 Peoples Volunteer Organisation
Muslims 28, 57, 89 (PVO) 52–53
Myaing Gyi Ngu 90, 97, 99 Plural Society 7 29, 77
Myaung Mya 46 Power 2, 64, 82–83, 110, 120, 128,
Myit Szone 91, 93 137, 139, 140, 149
concept 149
Nat (spirits) 17, 57, 158 royal 16
National Coalition Government of the symbolic 70, 90, 99, 105, 110,
Union of Burma 131 117, 129, 149
174 INDEX
Pye, Lucien 66 Thamanya, Hsayadaw 90, 97

Thibaw, King 8
Race 39, 70–72, 85, 112 Tin Maung Maung Than 128
Rebellion 9, 75. Tho Mèh Pha 46
See also Hsaya San ; Thu Mwe Htar 93
Karen Thuzana, U 90, 93–95, 97–100, 109,
110–111
Sangha 9, 13, 15, 54, 56, 57, 62, 89,
94, 105, 158 Union Solidarity Development
Salween 26, 90, 93, 102, 109 Association (USDA) 85, 117, 126–
San C. Po, Sir 46, 128, 145
Saw Charles 93–94 six objectives of 118
Saw Ba U Gyi 49, 96
Sawbwa, 158 Vegan 97, 99
Kayah 106 Vegetarian 90
Shan 26 Violence xv, 12, 23, 66, 75, 83, 117,
Saw Po Chit 44–44 118, 130–131, 139
Saw Tha Din vi, xi, 52 154
Saw, U 51 Wunthanu Athin, (nationalist
Seagrim, Major 45, 155 association) 34, 159
Setkya mìn. See Cakkavatti
Shan, State 26, 27, 49 Xenophobia 21, 31, 50, 71, 82, 83,
Shew Dagon Pagoda 8 118, 123, 124, 129
Shwegyin sect 62, 100, 158
Sila 18, 104, 158 Yathe 103–105, 110, 111, 159
Smith, A.D. 76 Young Men’s Buddhist Association
State Law and Order Restoration (YMBA) 31, 35
Council (SLORC) 85, 87, 95–97, Yunzalin 90, 102, 106
112, 113, 115, 117–121, 123–125
National Convention 119–120
Social/historical memory 126–
131, 135
State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC) 141, 145
Stevenson, H.N.C. 49
Strategy, concept 149
Suffering (social) 139
Tatmadaw, Armed Forces 12, 54, 74,

127, 135, 136, 137, 143–144, 158
and nationalism 117, 119, 121
and social memory 129
Thakin 38–40, 54, 158
Than Shwe, 126, 129

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Preface to the 1993 Edition vii

16. Historicism, Historical Memory and Power 127

2. Exduded Area 1946 28

This essay is an elaborated version of a paper presented at a seminar in

Since the initial publication of this book, I have been pleasantly

white kala (U Phyo 30 May 1996). I apply it metaphorically as a

who listens to the rhetoric, what is internalised by whom and who

By courtesy of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark,

[in doing fieldwork] a high level of linguistic competence is

ABKNA All Burma Karen National Association

ethno-religious conflict, and the division of states capture our attention

1. For example, D. D. Gray’s article in the Danish newspaper Information (9

Rangoon.2 She is therefore seen as the politician who stands purely in

2. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:180–185).

In any town in India the European club is the spiritual

Whilst one of Orwell’s characters in Burmese Days says that he hates

curriculum for many years until reintroduced in 1981 when Ne Win’s

society and culture were rendered subordinate to a common division of

The confrontation between the Burman world and British imperialism,

1. E.C. V. Foucar (1946) gives a detailed, although somewhat antiBurmese,

The British continued to insist on wearing shoes when entering

forces regarded the rebel monks as criminals, so-called dacoits, an

They made a pile of their trophies

Subadar Prag Tewarri

The Christian participation is certainly an element in the explanation of

Those heretics, the English kalas, having most harshly made

Thus the Burman resistance leaders regarded the war as religious.

6. See Htin Aung (1965:210–211). Kullah is used by Kipling to mean

This period entered Burman historical representation as the complete

In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects Buddhism as a religious

Buddhist cosmology is a total model, which covers all aspects of

3. See Appendix 1 concerning the following concepts: cosmology, ideology,

driving force of the cosmos was not conceptualised as an autonomous,

7. Htin Aung (1959).

8. Until recently, most of the scholars writing on Burma’s history have

This model for a total cosmic-ontological-political unity has survived

To be Burman (bama) today refers to language, literature, tradition,

1. Hierarchy of commoners (following Aung-Thwin, 1984): Ahmudan: ‘bearer

The individual’s place in this system was therefore dependent on the

Seen from a Buddhist Burman perspective, Christianity was, and still

as in the European construction of ethnic and national identity,

7. See Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1886, vol. 66.

Map 2: Excluded Area 1946 (Source: Tinker, 1983–1984)

the form of an unpleasant mixture of religious and racial/ethnic

Thus, the colonial power established its hegemony with an inbuilt

14. Furnivall (1956:304, my emphasis). Furnivall’s Fabianism inspired some of

The primary goal of the Christian schools was to promote conversion to

16. Taylor (1987:133–36).

Following the ‘pacification’ and its humiliation of the Burman social

The regression of Buddhism—organisationally and in terms of

The Hsaya San Rebellion

4. U Maung Maung (1980:14) and Taylor (1987:193) translate wunthanu as

Other proclamations are more direct:

All the inhabitants who reside in Burma: it is for the economic

Although the model was based on the traditional cosmology it

As regards the causes it is well known: 1) that the Burman is by

superstitious, the belief in the efficacy of charms and tattooing as

11. Government of Burma 1931, Report on the Rebellion in Burma up to 3 May

forcefully transferred to concentration camps and the leaders of