000 REPUBLIC v. SERENO (BALISONG) (OSRN) through its then-Chief, Atty. Richard Pascual inquired as to CJ Sereno’s SALNs.
In
11 May 2018 | Tijam, J. | Inhibition; Quo Warranto; Impeachment
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida
RESPONDENTS: Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
SUMMARY: A petition for quo warranto was filed by the OSG assailing the appointment of CJ Sereno as
Chief Justice on the ground that she failed to prove her integrity during the nomination process as she
failed to comply with the SALN requirements of the JBC. Several groups and individuals filed Motions
for Leave to Intervene, among them Senators De Lima and Trillanes. CJ Sereno filed a Motion to Inhibit
against six Justices. The Republic argues that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy, as the Constitution
does not make impeachment the exclusive mode of unseating an impeachable officer; (2) the petition is
not time barred as prescription cannot run against the States; and, (3) that, at the time of her appointment,
CJ Sereno was not of “proven integrity” she not having filed the required SALNs asked for by the JBC. CJ
Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme Court, and that
the word “may” pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment proceedings and not to the non-
exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time barred considering that the one-year period
has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that the Doblada doctrine, which state that the non-filing of
the SALN must be proven as fact by the person alleging its absence, should be applied in this case; (4) she
and the record-holding offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (6) her
appointment is a political question; and, (6) the SALN requirement does not go into the requisite “proven
integrity” but merely an instrument in its determination. The Issues before the Court are Whether the
Motions for Intervention are proper. NO — Intervention is not a matter of right but rests on sound
discretion. The intervenors must establish the requisite legal interest. Whether the Motions for Inhibition
are proper. NO — The movant must prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto
against an impeachable officer. YES — The Impeachment and quo warranto materially differ and can
proceed independently of each other. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalid
appointment or election may be questioned. Whether the petition is dismissible on the ground of
prescription. NO — Prescription does not run against the state. Whether CJ Sereno is eligible for the
position of Chief Justice. NO — The filing of SALNs is a Constitutional and statutory requirement that
goes into the requirement of “proven integrity.” Whether CJ Sereno is a de facto officer removable
through quo warranto. YES — CJ Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from the office, other than by impeachment is justified. Whether CJ Sereno violated the sub
judice rule and is administratively liable. SUBJECT TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER — The Court, in jealous
regard of judicial independence, cannot simply overlook the open and blatant defiance of the sub judicie
rule.
DOCTRINE: Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, provided
that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present, when the subject act or omission was
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold
office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
1. The Chief Justice post was vacated in 2012. The JBC Announced that candidates for Chief
Justice are required (a) for those in government service, to submit all previous SALNs; and (b)
for those in the private sector, to submit SALN as of Dec. 31, 2011; and, execute a waiver in
favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank accounts.
2. Then-Assoc. Justice Sereno was nominated by members of various legal and evangelical
groups. She accepted the nomination. However, the Executive Officer informed the JBC that
she had not submitted her SALNs for a period of 10 years (1996-2006) covering her
employment in the UP College of Law. The Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination
response, CJ Sereno sent a letter to the JBC requesting that her requirements be treated similar
to those from the private sector alleging that (a) it is infeasible to get hold of the 15-year old
records, (b) that UP has cleared her of all academic/administrative responsibilities, (c) she is
considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government service anew from
August 2010, her appointment as Associate Justice. Said letter, however was not examined by
the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated by the JBC En banc nor the Executive
Committee.
3. CJ Sereno was listed as Applicant No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she had
“COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS. Letter 7/23/12 — considering that her government records
in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve
all those files.” She was interviewed for the post, was shortlisted, appointed by President
Aquino, and took her oath of office.
4. In August 2017, Atty. Larry Gadon filed with the House of Representatives - Justice
Committee a complaint for impeachment agains CJ Sereno fro culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged
that CJ Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs citing certifications from the
UP Human Resource Development Office that only SALNs for intermittent years were filed by
CJ Sereno and the certification from the Office of the Ombudsman that there is no SALN filed
for the years 1999-2009.
5. The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine probable cause. During those
hearings, incumbent and retired SC Justices were invited as resource persons. The SC en banc
authorized the appearance of the Justices under strict confidentiality notice. Among the Justices
who appeared before the Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted (a) CJ
Sereno’s bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary Decentralized Office, (b) the
suspicious issuance of the TRO in the Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege
of Members of the Court to nominate for vacant judicial posts, and (d) the clustering of the
Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice Peralta who testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson
of the Council that nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice Bersamin; (4) Justice Tijam; and, (5)
Justice Jardeleza.
6. CJ Sereno went on leave in order to prepare her defense for the “impending” impeachment
trial.
7. The Office of the Solicitor General initiated the instant case for quo warranto asking the court
to declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold office for failing to regularly disclose her assets,
liabilities, and net worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures show that she does
not possess “proven integrity” demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.
8. The Republic argues that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy, as the Constitution does not
make impeachment the exclusive mode of unseating an impeachable officer; (2) the petition is
not time barred as prescription cannot run against the States; and, (3) that, at the time of her
appointment, CJ Sereno was not of “proven integrity” she not having filed the required SALNs
asked for by the JBC.
9. CJ Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme
Court, and that the word “may” pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment
proceedings and not to the non-exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time
 barred considering that the one-year period has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that
the Doblada doctrine, which state that the non-filing of the SALN must be proven as fact by
the person alleging its absence, should be applied in this case; (4) she and the record-holding
offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (6) her appointment is
a political question; and, (6) the SALN requirement does not go into the requisite “proven
integrity” but merely an instrument in its determination.
10. Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed Motions for Leave to
Intervene echoing some or all of CJ Sereno’s arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed
a similar motion alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court from the Senate
Impeachment Court.
11. CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza,
Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified
before the House Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for his purported
insinuations of CJ Sereno’s psychological fitness during the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also
prayed that the Motion for Inhibition be by the SC En banc without the participation of the
Justices who are asked to inhibit.
12. During the pendency of the case, and while she was on leave, CJ Sereno appeared in various
fora and accepted several speaking engagements on the issue of judicial independence, and
such other matters.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the Motions for Intervention are proper. NO — Intervention is not a matter of right
but rests on sound discretion. The intervenors must establish the requisite legal interest.
2. Whether the Motions for Inhibition are proper. NO — The movant must prove the ground of
bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence.
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto
against an impeachable officer. YES — The Impeachment and quo warranto materially differ
and can proceed independently of each other. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by
which an invalid appointment or election may be questioned.
4. Whether the petition is dismissible on the ground of prescription. NO — Prescription does not
run against the state.
5. Whether CJ Sereno is eligible for the position of Chief Justice. NO — The filing of SALNs is a
Constitutional and statutory requirement that goes into the requirement of “proven integrity.”
6. Whether CJ Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto. YES — CJ Sereno
has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other
than by impeachment is justified.
7. Whether CJ Sereno violated the sub judice rule and is administratively liable. SUBJECT TO
SHOW CAUSE ORDER — The Court, in jealous regard of judicial independence, cannot
simply overlook the open and blatant defiance of the sub judicie rule.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED
from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is OUSTED and
EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council
is directed to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
Propriety of Motions for Intervention
1. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that
may be affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of right but addressed to the sound
discretion of the court upon compliance with the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b) that
no delay or prejudice should result.
2. Movant-intervenors failed to establish the required legal interest which must be of a direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
of the judgment. The interest must be actual or material.
3. Movant-intervenors’ sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in any way, come within the
purview of the concept of “legal interest” contemplated under the Rules to justify the
allowance of intervention. Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ motions are anchored on the
contingency of the filing of the Articles of Impeachment.
4. The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo warranto proceeding, by its
nature, is one brought by a person claiming to be entitled to the usurped office.
Propriety of Motions for Inhibition
5. The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give judges unfettered discretion to
decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when
the charge is without basis. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only
exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice.
6. In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to
voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the
hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of
respondent does not make them disqualified to hear the instant petition. Their appearance
thereat was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to
investigate the impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not be doubted. Their
appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully
 observed the parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing,
should be carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an
adverse attack against respondent.
7. A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the
manifest intent of the statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect the
constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public accountability.
8. As to the act of wearing a red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and Bersamin's
prejudice against her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no basis, whether in logic or
in law, to establish a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate's performance of
adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red piece of clothing was
merely coincidental and should not be deemed a sufficient ground to disqualify them.
9. Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag function kung
isa ay diktador,” is clearly a hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court be
if any of its Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in
Justice Bersamin’s remark that he was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the
collegiality of the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’ “privilege” to recommend
nominees to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this
statement to a personal resentment as respondent regards it.
10. Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on Justice also contradicts
respondent’s allegation that Justice Peralta’s apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent
caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas
Peralta, from the list of applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta
has made it clear during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has already
moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to protect
prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
11. Justice Martires has not suggested that she suffers from some mental or psychological illness.
At most, his questions and statements were merely hypothetical in nature, which do not even
constitute as an opinion against respondent.
12. Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and partiality on the part of the
Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent’s motions for inhibition must perforce fail.
Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a
judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing
justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor, should not be
abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Prescription of action for Quo Warranto
Jurisdiction over Petition for Quo Warranto
13. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the
Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no
less than a Member of the Court. The issue is of transcendental importance, is one of first
impression, and of paramount public interest.
14. The origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.
Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment
is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the
breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the
public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules.
15. Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing
and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thus, there is no forum shopphing in the instant case as the
nature and purpose of the remedies are different, and there is yet no impeachment trial.
16. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses
the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election
of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election
of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot
otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
17. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it
preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
18. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a
quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
19. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent will eventually be
tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to lose power is to abdicate it.
20. When the Solicitor General himself commences the quo warranto action either (1) upon the
President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to
believe that there is proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or suffers an act which
is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) an association acts as a corporation without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of
his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are
upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary quo warranto petition.
 21. It is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of
duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its
character as a sovereign.
22. It is but more prudent to afford the Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to
present their cases for a proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing the
petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate consideration in
providing for a one-year prescriptive period was public interest, so is it the same consideration
which prompts this Court not to act nonchalantly and idly watch title to the public office in
question be continuously subjected to uncertainty. Indeed, dismissal of cases on technicality is
frowned upon especially where public interest is at the other end of the spectrum.
Ineligibility as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice
23. The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with
its own rules. The Court's supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with
its own rules and procedures.
24. The nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the
JBC's actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from
resolving. Questions of policy or wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government." It does not involve a question of policy but simply a determination, based on
facts, of whether a candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not.
25. The SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the Constitution and made more emphatic
by its accompanying laws and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one who
fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws; and one who violates the
Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be a person of integrity as such equation is
theoretically and practically antithetical. The obligation of members of the Judiciary to file
their respective SALNs is not only a statutory requirement but forms part of the mandatory
conduct expected of a judge so that an “honorable competent and independent Judiciary exists
to administer justice and thus promote the unity of the country, the stability of government, and
the well-being of the people.”
26. While the U.P. HRDO, as the concerned personnel division, produced respondent's SALNs for
1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these very same SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received
by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. Even then, the Court presently receives the
certified copies of said SALNs as evidence of the existence and the filing thereof. The
existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof
constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
27. When the respondent is called upon at the suit of the State to show by what warrant he assumes
to exercise the functions of a public office, the burden of proving his title rests upon the
respondent. When, however, the respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office, it is
only at that time that the burden of evidence shifts to the State. In a quo warranto proceeding,
the burden rests on the defendant or respondent, as against the State at least, to show his right
to the office from which it is sought to oust him. Moreover, since the object of such
proceedings is to test the actual right to the office, and not merely a use color of right, it is
incumbent upon the respondent to show a good legal title, and not merely a colorable one, for
he must rely wholly on the strength of his own title.
28. Being on leave from government service is not synonymous with separation from government
service. Suffice to say that one does not cease to become a government employee only because
one takes an official leave. On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public officials and
employees are required to file a SALN.
29. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to
submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in
obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or whose years in
government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713. The
clearance issued by UP HRDO hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs. The import of said
clearance is limited only to clearing respondent of her academic and administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the
date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such could not, by any stretch of imagination, be
considered as compliance with the SALN requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer,
performing ministerial and administrative duties, could not have certified respondent's
compliance with the filing of SALNs which is a statutory, and not merely an administrative,
requirement.
30. The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant's fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of
candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as
Chief Justice, which are now matters of public record and also determined to be constituting
probable cause for impeachment. Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot
be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
De facto Officer
31. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de
facto officer. As such, respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and
her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of
a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive
position of Chief Justice. Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office,
the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and
exclusion of respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the
Office of the Chief Justice.
Sub judice Rule
32. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to members of the Bar and of the
Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
33. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation of due process when she
herself chose to litigate her case before the media. when aggressive actions are taken against
the Judiciary as an institution and clouds of doubt are casted upon the people's faith in the
administration of justice, especially so when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar,
this Court cannot be apathetic to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing
to do is to stand and deal with it head on.