Environment and Planning A 2009, volume 41, pages 2324 ^ 2341

doi:10.1068/a40342

Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change:

technocentrism, ecocentrism, and the carbon economy

Ian Bailey, Geoff A Wilson

School of Geography, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, England;
e-mail: ibailey@plymouth.ac.uk, geoff.wilson@plymouth.ac.uk
Received 12 December 2007; in revised form 14 July 2008; published online 6 August 2009

Abstract. The carbon economy has emerged over the last decade as an important but controversial
development in the harnessing of economics to address the challenge of climate change. In this paper
we utilise the concepts of policy change and transition theorisations to analyse carbon commodifica-
tion within the broader range of possible responses to the climate problem. We argue that the
neoliberal, technocentric, and ecological modernisation values underpinning the carbon economy
create serious obstacles for the incorporation of alternative or complementary transitional strategies,
particularly those involving ecocentric changes, into mainstream policy. From this we contend that a
more holistic approach to the conceptualisation of change processes is needed, and that transition
theory provides a useful lens for identifying and assessing existing constraints and future possibilities.

1 Introduction
Mounting warnings about the impacts of human activities on the global climate system
have led to widespread calls for radical thinking and action to manage the causes and
effects of accelerated climate change (Demeritt, 2001). Helm (2003), the prominent
climate economist, for instance, wrote that
``just as the experience of the unemployment of the 1930s required a reinvention of
much of macroeconomics, climate change will need new thinking too'' (page 349).
Similarly, in the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change it was noted that:
``Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest and
widest-ranging market failure ever seen. The economic analysis must therefore be
global, deal with long time horizons, have the economics of risk and uncertainty at
centre stage, and examine the possibility of major, non-marginal change'' (Stern,
2007, page i).
Despite this shared conviction about the need for change, virtually every aspect of
how actually to respond to climate change remains open to debate. For example, to
what extent should policy be pitched towards mitigation or adaptation, and (how)
should this change over time? Which technologies should be prioritised for future
energy provision, transportation, and industrial activities? How should international
trade and security relations be reformed to better align poverty alleviation, food
security, and climate protection objectives? How should water, forest, and other natural
resources be managed to accommodate future scarcity? And to what extent should
strategies be technologically or behaviourally driven?
The carbon economy (defined here as any measure that seeks to assign commodity
values and create markets for greenhouse-gas emissions) has emerged over the last decade
as a major development in the reharnessing of economics for climate protection. For many
analysts, emissions trading, carbon taxes, and voluntary carbon offsets have become
strategies of first choice because of their claimed ability to deliver economically efficient
reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions (Grubb and Ferrario, 2006). Yet, for others the
carbon economy's affinities with the ``ideological commitments, discursive representations,
and institutional practices'' of neoliberalism (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004, page 276;
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2325

see also Bakker, 2005; Castree, 2006; 2008a; 2008b; Heynen et al, 2007a), and its
associated preference for market-led and technology-led solutions to environmental
problems, remain highly controversial.
Whichever viewpoint one takes, important questions remain as to how and why the
carbon economy has gained ascendancy over alternative transition pathways (partic-
ularly those that favour more ecocentric forms of behaviour), its implications in
shaping and constraining responses to climate change, and the likelihood of carbon
commodification achieving lasting climate protection. The purpose of this paper is to
explore the carbon economy and alternative responses to the climate problem as part
of broader transitional processes. Specifically, we utilise models of policy change and
ideas from transition theory to examine the ideological roots of the carbon economy,
its relationship with ecocentric responses to climate change, the extent to which the
carbon economy represents a genuine paradigm shift, and options for future transitions
towards decarbonised economies. These issues are examined at a general level to reflect
broad conceptualisations of how transitional processes operate and the common issues
that societies must consider in deciding how to respond to climate change, although
specific examples from UK, European, and international climate policy are utilised to
illustrate our points.
Two main arguments are proposed. The first is that understanding the carbon
economy requires deeper analysis of its place within the broader range of possible
responses to climate change. As such, the scientific and social construction of the
carbon economy needs interrogation to clarify its purposes, characteristics, and posi-
tion within possible ways of managing climate change. This leads into our second
argument, that the carbon economy exhibits a strong privileging of neoliberal and
technocentric values that creates serious obstacles for the contemplation of alterna-
tives, particularly more ecocentric ways of curbing greenhouse-gas emissions.(1)
Although carbon commodification can be viewed as radical in some respects, its
ideological leanings suggest a more conservative approach and even a reproduction
and reinforcement of current paradigms that could set the agenda for climate responses for
decades to come (Heynen et al, 2007a). This may be a costly decision unless the carbon
economy does, indeed, offer viable solutions or a broader outlook on transitional pathways
to decarbonised economies is developed.
In section 2 we review key theoretical frameworks used to conceptualise policy and
social change, focusing specifically on paradigm changes and transition theory. In
section 3 we then examine climate response strategies currently holding prominence
in political and business circles, as expressed in Pacala and Socolow's (2005) multiple-
wedge approach to stabilising carbon emissions. In addition to reviewing its specific
prescriptions we assess the scientific constructions and technocentric leanings of the
wedges approach. We also establish links between these leanings and the carbon
economy, and discuss their implications for ecocentric responses to climate change.
In section 4 we investigate the transitional properties of the carbon economy, interro-
gating its polyvalence and also how the neoliberal, market-led ideologies underpinning
it constrain consideration of alternatives and create path dependencies in transition
choices to a low-carbon economy at both institutional and individual levels. We con-
clude by reflecting on the role and implications of the carbon economy in transitional
responses to climate change.
(1)We note here Castree's observations (2006; 2008a; 2008b) about the need for scholars of the
neoliberalisation of nature to define their objects of analysis and evaluative schemata carefully. We
do not claim that the carbon economy is inherently misguided (as this is unknowable at this point);
rather, we argue that its totalising logic is problematic in the context of developing broad-based
and imaginative strategies to manage climate change.
2326 I Bailey, G A Wilson

2 Conceptualising transitional pathways: ideology, policy, and paradigm change

Despite widespread agreement on the need to develop a substantially decarbonised
society, opinions range from those who emphasise reforming economies to accommo-
date the social and environmental costs of climate change, to those who advocate the
wholesale rejection of contemporary capitalism for some alternative or hybrid mode
of societal organisation (Beckerman, 1995; Dahle, 2007; Dryzek, 1997; Lewis, 1992;
Lomborg, 2001). Either way, such transformations are likely to involve emergent
transitions and intermediary states, as policy makers and civil society consider options
and review the outcomes of decisions. In this section we sketch out how existing
theorisations of transitional processes help to interpret current responses to climate
change by placing them within their wider ideological and political contexts. In so
doing we acknowledge our selective use of perspectives we feel are especially helpful in
deciphering transition processes, while accepting that useful alternative perspectives
could also be brought to bear (see, for example, Dahle, 2007; Dryzek, 1997).
The relationship between ideas and policy change has been investigated from various
disciplinary vantage points (see Dryzek, 1997; Hall, 1993; Jordan et al, 2003; Oliver and
Pemberton, 2004; Richardson, 2000; Sabatier, 1999), but has produced general agreement
about the difficulties of making causal connections between ideas, ideologies, and policy
choices because of the complex interactions between ideas, interests, actors, and institu-
tional processes in public policy making (Bailey, 2007; Howlett and Lindquist, 2004;
Richardson and Watts, 1986). Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which ideas and ideol-
ogies insinuate themselves and interact with other dimensions of decision making
remain critical to understanding policy change (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004).
Of these numerous theorisations, Hall's (1993) classic model of paradigm shifts
nevertheless remains one of the most influential. Hall suggested three main orders of
policy change: (i) alterations to the calibration of existing instruments (first-order
change); (ii) the adoption of new instruments (second-order change); and (iii) goal
alteration (third-order change). Third-order change, Hall argued, entails a strategic
shift in both the intellectual framework of policy development and, potentially, the
attitudes and ideological beliefs of wider society. This may affect not only policy goals
and instruments, but also policy makers' perceptions of core social and political values.
For this reason, Hall (1993), Carter (2004), and Jordan et al (2003) equated third-order
changes to paradigm shifts that extend change beyond the ordinary policy agenda,
in extreme cases to revolutionise the basis and practice of public policy.
Hall contended that such transitions may occur when a once-stable policy para-
digm ceases to provide adequate solutions to a key policy problem. Policy makers are
likely first to address the problem by adjusting existing instruments [incremental first-
order change (Dryzek, 1997)]. If these fail to reassert paradigm stability by solving the
problem, new instruments may be deployed (second-order change); however, mounting
evidence of policy failure may trigger an increasingly open political contest between
competing ideas, the possible displacement of the old paradigm, and the institutional-
isation of victorious ideas as a new paradigm. Oliver and Pemberton (2004) argued,
however, that Hall's model failed to capture the capacity of paradigms to defend and
reinvent themselves and maintained that paradigm change is a more iterative, evolu-
tionary, and uncertain process. Defence of established paradigms may include, for
instance, partial integration of new ideas without the wholesale rejection of old
ones and punctuated evolution of the paradigm to maintain its broad appeal (Richardson
and Watts, 1986). Although Oliver and Pemberton conceded that exogenous shocks may
force decision makers and society at large to confront the inadequacies of the prevailing
paradigm, their basic contention remained that policy and social change involves a
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2327

complex interplay of institutions, actors, interests, policy legacies, and policy styles (also
Richardson, 2000).
While this perspective emphasises the importance of competing ideas and ideolo-
gies, its lack of resolution about the processes by which certain frames of thinking gain
prominence, and how choices are made or precluded, is addressed more directly by
transition theory, which offers a complementary framework for contextualising the
temporal and spatial dimensions of transitional processes. Although frequently termed
a theory (Rotmans et al, 2002), it is better understood as a quasitheory that articulates
concepts and insights about the nature of transitional processes, but which lacks the
internal consistency or predictive capacity to be a coherent theory (Burawoy, 1985;
Pickles and Smith, 1998). Wilson (2007) thus depicts transition theory as a general
``framework that attempts to understand and unravel the socio-economic, political,
cultural and environmental complexities of societal transitions'' (page 14)
that are comprised of structured coherences (paradigmatic states) interspersed with
periods of more fluid organisation, challenging of accepted practices, and contestation
of core ideas. Transition theory is used as shorthand for the remainder of this paper.
In terms of understanding responses to climate change, transition theory is particularly
useful in identifying transitions as ongoing processes of change between competing states
within a spectrum of decision-making boundaries that shift continually over time (Wilson,
2007). These boundaries may be defined in terms of outcomesöa move from carbon
profligacy to carbon constraintsöor as a struggle between competing paradigms. On one
extreme of this particular spectrum would lie Promethean/Cornucopian discourses that
dominated mainstream thought in the West for several centuries and which held
``economic growth as the normal condition of a healthy society'' (Dryzek, 1997,
page 46).
This econocentric orientation has taken various guises, including Fordism, state socialism,
and neoliberalism, which McCarthy and Prudham (2004) describe as
``the most powerful ideological and political project of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries'' (page 275).(2)
We refer to these orientations as the `neoliberal technocentric' end of the decision-
making spectrum (figure 1).
The link between neoliberal technocentrism and ecological modernisation discourses
and ideologies warrants particular attention in terms of the resonance of their proposed
`solutions' to climate change. As Barry (2003) highlighted, ecological modernisation
denotes a form of environmental politics that is essentially `positive' or `optimistic' towards
human capabilities to deal with environmental problems. Hajer (1995) suggested that
ecological modernisation represents a greening of modernity akin to Beck's (1992) notions
of reflexive modernisation, which enables a deradicalisation of sustainable developmentö
an approach that has been particularly evident in Germany and the Netherlands, where
ecological modernisation was first mooted (Mol, 2003). Originating in neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, ecological modernisation advocates that tackling environmental problems
can be a win ^ win situation that generates financial profits under the banner of ``prosperity
while protecting the environment'' (Harper, 2008). Ecological modernisation, therefore,
suggests that competitiveness and economic growth are compatible with environmental
protection (Barry, 2003), with solutions to climate change driven by more or `better'

(2) We recognise here the crudeness of depicting neoliberalism as a homogenous extralocal ideology

given the many forms of neoliberalisation project taking place around the world (Castree, 2006;
Mansfield, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002). However, McCarthy and Prudham (2004) argued that
this does not mean neoliberalism lacks identifiable dimensions, beliefs, discourses, and practices
[see Castree (2008a; 2008b) for discussions of the coalescing logics and amorphousness of
neoliberalism, and their implications for research].
2328 I Bailey, G A Wilson

modernisation, not reduced economic growth or industrial output. Modernisation itself

is seen to offer responses to environmental problems that have ensued from neoliberal
modernisation (Mol, 2003).
Although econocentric ideologies have sought to react to environmental issues
through concepts such as sustainable development, critics of neoliberalism and ecological
modernisation argue that their emphasis on markets, commodification, and competition
ill equips them to deal effectively or equitably with social and environmental issues
(Bakker, 2005; Heynen et al, 2007a; 2007b; Liverman, 2004).(3) Various `resistance' move-
ments based around deeper-green ideologies (survivalism, green romanticism, and green
radicalism) have, thus, stressed the need for a fundamental shift in social and economic
values toward more ecocentric responses to environmental problems (figure 1) (Dryzek,
1997). We refer to these as the `radical ecocentric' end of the decision-making spectrum.
It is important to note here that many economists and politicians have responded
by asserting that commodifying natural resources provides the most effective and
cost-efficient means of correcting past market failures through the promotion of
both technological advances and behavioural changes (Beckerman, 1995; Lewis, 1992).
What differs particularly along the decision-making spectrum are the types of behav-
iour change undertaken and their motivation. The discussion below will highlight that
neoliberal technocentric behaviour change is characterised, by and large, by economic
incentive structures and the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies rather than
reduced demand for energy services. In contrast, radical ecocentric action is more
likely to be driven by personal or social values and to include reduced demand for
energy, although even this distinction is not precise.
Having identified the range of neoliberal technocentric and radical ecocentric possi-
bilities, transition theorists conceptualise transitions as a series of evolutionary decision
points, each of which becomes the starting point for future decisions and transitional
stages towards a decarbonised economy (Pickles and Unwin, 2004). Such transitions are
continual (an end point of total stability is never reached) but may involve periods of
gradual change or more abrupt departures from previous orthodoxies (Wilson, 2007).
Another critical feature is the contingent nature of structuring and restructuring that
takes place ``within complex articulations of local, regional, national and globalizing
contexts'' wherein
``histories, political economies, discursive formations, and institutional assemblages
and practices each comprise complex articulations of universalizing and particula-
rizing processes'' [Pavlinek and Pickles (2000, page 22, our emphasis); see also
Peck and Tickell (2002) and Castree (2006), for commentaries on the geographical
specificities of neoliberalism].
Green romanticism/ Sustainable Prometheanism/
survivalism development ecological modernisation

Radical Neoliberal
ecocentrism technocentrism

Figure 1. A radical ecocentric and neoliberal technocentric spectrum of decision making.

(3)We are grateful for the insights on distinctions between effective (multifariously defined)
and equitable carbon commodification provided by attendees at a workshop on `The Ethics of
Markets in Nature' hosted by the Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Centre for
the Environment in July 2007.
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2329

From this, several possible transition trajectories towards a low-carbon economy can
be identified, which resonate broadly with Hall's policy change typology. These include:
linear transitions involving a steady movement from one set of values or goals to
another; stepped transitions (transitional ruptures) involving more abrupt paradigm
changes but also intraparadigmatic experimentation with novel policies or instruments;
failed transitions (where transitional processes occur but lead ultimately to the previous
pathway), and less predictable patterns of change characterised by nonunidirectional
random shifts, or multiple transition pathways, taken by different actors (Deleuzian
transitions) (Wilson, 2007).(4) Transition theory also draws from academic traditions
like new institutionalism to stress the importance of: (i) system memory in facilitating
and mediating the learning and adaptation to new circumstances; and (ii) the path
dependencies created by ideological commitments, political, institutional, and social
legacies, which filter the learning and choice-making options considered and exercised
(Grabher and Stark, 1997; Jordan et al, 2003; Rotmans et al, 2002; Stark, 1992).
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical conceptualisation of transition pathways to a decar-
bonised economy. It shows a spectrum of decision making (discussed in relation to
the carbon economy in the next section) bounded by the extremes of radical ecocen-
trism and neoliberal technocentrism. It then suggests that decision-making pathways
occur within specified boundaries of the `possible' (transitional corridors), where some
`radical' actions (highlighted, for example, as paths b1 or c1) are unlikely as they do not
receive large-scale support from a society embedded within a specific paradigm. It also
shows that decision making within these transitional corridors usually follows a bell-
shaped curve centred broadly against the middle of the decision-making corridor.
Thus, the further a decisional pathway varies from the `norm', the greater resistance
it is likely to face.
However, the figure also highlights how transitional change may occur through
shifts from decision-making corridors close to the neoliberal technocentric end of the
spectrum (stage 1) towards pathways closer to radical ecocentrism in stage 3. The three
distinctive `transitional stages' depicted are separated by possible changes in both
Radical
ecocentrism Ecocentric action and thought

Boundary of
decision-making b3
Spectrum of decision making

corridor
' 3
ble b2 a3
i n ka
th ay Path
`un athw 2b
b1 p dependency
1 a2
Bell-shaped a1 2a
curve of 0
decision-
making c3
possibilities Transitional
c1 c2 rupture
Transitional stage 1 Transitional stage 2 Transitional stage 3
Neoliberal
technocentrism
Technocentric action and thought

Time
Figure 2. Transitional shifts, decision-making corridors, and transitional ruptures.

(4)Deleuzian transitions may be a useful way of characterising the principle of shared but differ-
entiated responsibilities enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol and national climate strategies (see Kerr,
2007).
2330 I Bailey, G A Wilson

transitional direction and transitional corridors (eg between stages 1 and 2), or by
a `transitional rupture' (between stages 2 and 3) where action and thought shift
abruptly `upwards' towards more radical ecocentric approaches (or, equally, down-
ward). However, stage 3 highlights thatöalthough it is qualitatively distinct from
stage 2ötransitional directions never leave the realm of the possible defined by transi-
tional corridors, which is why some overlap exists in transitional corridors between
individual transitional stages. This constraint is usually referred to as `path depend-
ency' or `lock-in' effects, highlighting that once a system or ideology accepts certain
ways of doing things (eg the neoliberal technocentric pathway of climate change
solutions discussed later) it is difficult to shift rapidly towards a different trajectory
(eg the global localisation processes and energy descent pathways based on radical
ecocentric ideologies) (Wilson, 2007). Transitional ruptures, therefore, tend only to
occur within the bounds of what society deems to be the `parameters of the possible'
at any time (Giddens, 1984; Rotmans et al, 2002).
Some of the attractions of this framework, therefore, are its foci on: (i) ``the con-
tingencies of transitions'' (Pickles and Unwin, 2004, page 14) expressed through
interactions between local, regional, national, and global actors and contexts; (ii) the
power relations in politics, ideology, culture, and behaviour that contribute to securing
the continuation, stability, or disruption of particular ideologies and their effects in
creating predictable, but never deterministic, transitional behaviours (Lipietz, 1992);
(iii) the bounded nature of near-term and long-term choice possibilities; and (iv) the
way that successive choices can progressively alter boundaries through incremental
progression or more significant ruptures. Hudson (2000), however, also cautioned that
``it remains an open question whether a revolutionary shift from one paradigm to
another can be achieved through incremental change and evolutionary reforms
to existing development trajectories or whether it requires a rapid quantum leap
from one trajectory to a qualitatively different one'' (page 17)
(ie the transitional rupture between stages 2 and 3 in figure 2). For human systems
attempting to address climate change, such a quantum leap is difficult to envisage
given the multidimensional uncertainties of the issue and the complexity of forecasting
the effects of decisions and often unpredictable human adjustment strategies across
time and geographical contexts (Diamond, 2006). Despite these questions, we refer to
figure 2 at points in the discussion to help to explain current constraints and oppor-
tunities in tackling climate change and, in particular, to explain the persistence of
transitional pathways close to the neoliberal technocentric end of the decision-making
spectrum.
Although we maintain that conceptualisations of policy change and transitions
provide useful frameworks for analysing the role of the carbon economy within
broader transformative processes, we also share Shove and Walker's (2007) concerns
about overstylising transitions as conscious and controllable processes. First, one
cannot presuppose some kind of orienting vision for transitions that emanate from,
and are interpreted in, different ways, by a broad constituency of institutional and
social actors. Critical questions here include: when, how, and by whom are goals
defined and subjected to critical scrutiny; what processes of problem abstraction have
taken place and what are their implications; how are commitments defined; which
cultural and political assumptions are made; and how are the institutional and prac-
tical side-effects of such framings evaluated? Second, close attention is required to the
mechanisms through which goals are reinvented or refined in the light of events, and
also to what is monitored, how frequently and on what scale. Third, meta-analysis
of transitions can struggle to explain developments that appear to head in opposite
directions. An obvious case in the climate policy context is the increase in demand
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2331

for air travel compared with the reductions in industrial emissions achieved in the UK
as a result of the shift from coal-based to gas-based energy generation and the
regulation of industrial emissions (Bailey, 2007). Understanding these apparent `contra-
dictions', Shove and Walker argued, requires analysis of the coevolving dynamics of
countervailing trends that muddy the neatness of transitions, and also of how previ-
ously important sociotechnical practices are eroded and innovations are diffused.
Finally, Shove and Walker (2007) note the tendency for sustainability to be
``tacitly defined as a matter of resource management, efficiency, and ecological
modernisation and, again by implication, transitions in that direction require the
transformation of current systems of provision'' (page 768).
In practice, and as will be discussed further, such templates frequently underemphasise
the influence of lifestyles and patterns of demand on the fate of technological innova-
tions, hampering the establishment of causal links between interventions (market or
regulatory) and outcomes.
These are important questions in that any theoretical constructs which seek to
represent the transitional processes involved in constructing a decarbonised world
run the risk of oversimplifying highly complex and contested realities. This is partic-
ularly true of the carbon economy, which, as other papers in this issue demonstrate,
has multiple visions, values, problem definitions, politics and modi operandi. While this
suggests that universalised transition theorisations have limited utility, O'Sullivan
(2004, page 291) argued that ``admitting `all models are wrong' is akin to the realization
in post-structural social science that multiple competing accounts of the same settings
are possible'' (page 291), and that the real value of such frameworks is their ability to
become ``geographical narratives ... describing how the world is, and how it might be.''
Such frameworks are, thus, better thought of as ``thought experiments, where the
necessary and contingent implications of theories can be examined'', without making
spurious claims about precision or predictive capacity (O'Sullivan, 2004, page 291).
With these caveats in mind, in the next section we examine the carbon economy as part
of wider strategic responses to climate change and critically scrutinise its ideological
underpinnings, discursive representations and institutional practices.

3 Averting dangerous climate change: wedges science

Over the past thirty years many discourses have permeated debates on how to respond
to environmental threats. These range from Cornucopian denial of environmental
limits to Promethean and ecological modernisation approaches that stress the capacity
of technology and `better' modernisation to overcome environmental problems, and, at
the other extreme, to ecocentric approaches such as green radicalism, bioregionalism,
green rationalism, green romanticism, and survivalism, with sustainable development
ambiguously straddling the middle ground (see figure 1; see also Daly and Cobb, 1990;
Dryzek, 1997; O'Riordan, 1976). Although considerable overlap exists between the diag-
noses and approaches of these discourses (especially their attempts to claim the central
ground of sustainable development) (Dahle, 2007), a broad distinction between neo-
liberal technocentrism and radical ecocentrism remains useful in identifying the outer
boundaries of possible responses to climate change, as well as the graduated spectrum
of discourses involving progressively greater or lesser emphasis on technocentric or
ecocentric responses.
Despite this, prescriptions for dealing with greenhouse-gas concentrations have
tended to be dominated by technocentric solutions, and increasingly since the signing
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, by the use of market instruments like the Clean
Development Mechanism and emissions trading aimed at stimulating technology devel-
opment and diffusion without damaging economic performance. In contrast, more
2332 I Bailey, G A Wilson

ecocentric solutions (those focusing on transforming social values and behaviour,

economic relocalisation, and/or quasireligious conceptions of human-nature relation-
ships) have tended to remain niche resistance movements [see Devall and Sessions
(1985), Fox (1995), Schumacher's (1973) classic Small is Beautiful, and Trainer (1985)
as examples of ecocentric writings, and Beckerman (1995), Bookchin (1998), Lomborg
(2001), and Simon and Kahn (1984) as examples of critics of deep ecological philoso-
phies]. The reasons for this dominance reside at least partly in the embeddedness of
Promethean discourses and their discursive devices (faith in technology and the expect-
ation of increasing affluence) in mainstream society (Dahle, 2007; Dryzek, 1997; Hajer,
1995; Pielke, 2006). Drawing on our earlier discussion on transitional pathways, this
Promethean pathway has survived relatively unchallenged and has arguably been rein-
forced by economic globalisation and neoliberalism, whereas radical ecocentric outlooks
sit uneasily with currently perceived global realities and personal lifestyle preferences.
Wide-scale and profound changes in consumption patterns and expectations therefore,
perhaps, become effectively `unthinkable' pathways `outside' the transitional corridors
shown in figure 2.
Turning specifically to climate response strategies, one of the most influential and
widely debated examples of the ecological modernisation approach is the so-called
`wedges model' developed by Pacala and Socolow (2005) and Socolow et al (2004).
Pacala and Socolow (2005) postulate that, based on current trends, global carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions from human activities are likely roughly to double between
2004 and 2054, leading to a tripling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations compared with
preindustrial levels (c. 1750). Such concentrations, they predict, are
``likely to be accompanied by significant global warming, rising sea levels, increased
threats to human health, more frequent extreme weather events, and serious
ecological disruption'' (Socolow et al, 2004, page 8)
and seriously compromise the economic prospects of our grandchildren (Helm, 2003).
Although the scientific `certainty' of these projections must be set against Demeritt's
(2001) dissection of the indeterminacy of climate science and
``the ways that scientific judgements about climate models ... have both reinforced and
been reinforced by certain political considerations about managing it'' (page 327),
they provide the foundation for Pacala and Socolow to explore strategies to stabilise
CO2 concentrations at 500  50 parts per million, a figure construed to
``prevent most damaging climate change'' (Pacala and Socolow, 2005, page 968).
From this, they:
``idealize the 50-year emissions reductions as a perfect triangle ... . Stabilization is
represented by a `flat' trajectory of fossil fuel emissions at 7 GtC [Gigatonnes of
carbon]/year, and BAU [business as usual] is represented by a straight-line `ramp'
trajectory rising to 14 GtC/year in 2054. The `stabilization triangle', located
between the flat trajectory and BAU, removes exactly one third of BAU emissions''
(page 968).
The stabilisation triangle is then divided into fifteen `wedges', each representing a
known technology that is already deployed on an industrial scale and has the potential
to contribute at least one wedge towards stabilising CO2 concentrations. These are
based on the premise that no single option exists that could achieve climate stabilisa-
tion and, thus, that the most realistic and acceptable strategy is to pursue multiple
wedges simultaneously (ie Deleuzian transitions). The wedges are grouped into five
themes: energy efficiency; fuel shifts; nuclear fission; renewable energies; and forests
and agriculture (see table 1).
Two striking features of this analysis are the extent to which Pacala and Socolow's
indicative strategy relies on technological solutions and how many of their underlying
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2333

assumptions mirror `optimistic' ecological modernisation views about the most suitable
way to tackle carbon balances. The final column of table 1 estimates the balance
between behaviour changes and technological advances needed for each wedge, and
suggests that the majority of wedges rely predominantly on the mass uptake of highly
nascent or contested technologies.(5) Conversely, few of the wedges emphasise ecocen-
tric types of behaviour changes that constrain fossil fuel consumption without the
introduction of cleaner technologies. It is plausible that many of these technologies
will achieve mass market status within the timeframes envisaged, although Pacala and
Socolow also skirt over controversial debates, such as the net carbon budgets or
broader sustainability implications of biomass fuels, doubling of nuclear capacity,
or afforestation projects in developing countries (Mathews, 2007; Pielke, 2006). Simi-
larly, little is said about the problems of scaling up technologies or their application
Table 1. Strategies to reduce carbon emissions from 2004 to 2054 by 25 gigatonnes of carbon
(GtC) (adapted from Pacala and Socolow, 2005, page 970).

Effort by 2054 for one wedge, relative to 14 GtC/year business as usual Technological
solution/
behaviour
change
Energy efficiency and conservation
Increase reduction in economy-wide carbon intensity by additional 0.15% per Technological/
year (eg increase US goal of 1.96% reduction per year to 2.11% per year) behaviour
Increase fuel economy for 2 billion cars from 30 to 60 miles per gallon (mpg) Technological/
behaviour
Decrease car travel for 2 billion 30 mpg cars from 10 000 to 5000 miles per Behaviour
year
Cut carbon emissions by one quarter in buildings and appliances projected Technological/
for 2054 behaviour
Produce twice today's coal power output at 60% instead of 40% efficiency Technological
(current 32%)
Fuel shift
Replace 1400 GW 50% efficient coal plants with gas plants (four times Technological
current gas power)
Introduce Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) at 800 GW coal or 1600 GW Technological
natural gas (compared with 1060 GW coal in 1999)
Introduce CCS at plants producing 250 Mt hydrogen (H2)/year from coal or Technological
500 MtH2/year from natural gas (compared with 40 MtH2/year today from
all sources)
Introduce CCS at synthetic fuels plants producing 30 million barrels a day Technological
from coal, if half of feedstock carbon is available for capture
Nuclear fission
Add 700 GW of nuclear power capacity (twice current) Technological
Renewable energies
Add 2 million 1 MW peak windmills (50 times current capacity) Technological
Add 2000 GW peak photovoltaic (700 times current capacity) Technological
Add 4 million 1 MW peak windmills (100 times current capacity) Technological
100 times current Brazil or US ethanol production, using one sixth of world Technological
cropland
Forests and agricultural soils
Reduce tropical deforestation to zero and create 300 Mha new plantation Behaviour
annually (2 times current)
Apply conservation tillage to all cropland (10 times current) Behaviour

(5)We recognise the imprecision and subjectivity of this classification but maintain that the
strategies explored in the Socolow and Pacala wedges retain a strong technocentric focus.
2334 I Bailey, G A Wilson

in different geographical contexts, except to note that these should be investigated

(Socolow et al, 2004).
It is important to note that our aim is not to criticise the appropriateness of an
analysis which the authors admit provides only a broad overview of the utility of
adopting multiple strategies to deal with climate change. Rather, we seek to demonstrate
the tendency of current science-based prescriptions to offer technocentric solutions
framed largely within an ecological modernisation paradigm. As with initial assump-
tions about `safe' climate stabilisation levels, consciously or otherwise, Pacala and
Socolow's wedges defend the status quo of neoliberal capitalism and its associated
values of individualism, continued collective and personal accumulation, and privileged
modes of socioeconomic organisation via the promulgation of largely technocentric
solutions and assumptions about win ^ win scenarios. This legacy also prescribes and
circumscribes the boundaries of transitional corridors in the near to medium term by
according greater status to the `knowable' (known technologies being implemented
somewhere at an industrial scale) and the measurable (Oreskes, 2004), but leaves
alternative possibilities, especially those entailing energy (as opposed to carbon) frugal
behaviour, relocalisation, or just more reflexive globalisation underexplored and less
likely to be incorporated into political responses.
Turning directly to the carbon economy, the authors are relatively nonspecific
about the mechanisms to deliver each wedge, aside from noting that:
``Most advocates ... agree that it is too early now to settle on just a few `winner'
strategies, that the relative attractiveness of strategies will differ from one region to
another, that environmental problems associated with scale-up ought to be inves-
tigated, that subsidy of early stages is often merited, and that choices among mature
alternatives should be determined mostly by market mechanisms'' (Socolow et al,
2004, page 19, our emphasis).
Again our purpose is not to critique the logic of this statement but, rather, to draw
attention to the framing of climate solutions through the rhetoric of scientific objectiv-
ity, and to the potential of this to coproduce and reinforce certain social and ideological
predispositions about appropriate tactics for curbing emissions. Pielke (2006) argued
that Pacala and Socolow's proposed first steps should not be confused with a compre-
hensive stratagem. Nevertheless, the trajectory has important implications for which
options are prioritised, the means of delivery selected, the path dependencies created,
and the general direction of social transition (figure 2). Having established this, in the
following section we examine the carbon economy as a specific outcropping of neo-
liberal technocentric framings of climate solutions and their relationship to transition
theorisations.

4 Theorising the carbon economy as a transitional process

Although the array of measures that comprise the carbon economy can be connected
broadly to neoliberal ideologies in the sense that they all seek to ascribe market values
and create markets for carbon emissions, enormous heterogeneity exists in the way
carbon is being commodified at different institutional levels across different regions of
the world. At least three variants of carbon commodification can be identified: (i) the
formally governed international carbon economies established under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to facilitate compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol [Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), and international emissions trading]; (ii) regional and national so-called new
environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), like the EU and other emissions trading
schemes (ETS), national carbon and energy taxes, and proposals for personal carbon
allowances in the UK, which are again (or will be) formally regulated with often
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2335

mandatory participation, emissions limits, or government-created carbon prices; and

(iii) the numerous voluntary carbon offset (VCO) schemes that encourage individuals
and organisations to compensate their emissions by purchasing carbon credits gener-
ated by emissions reductions elsewhere. Further variations also exist in the types of
response elicited by each instrument. For example, the CDM allows the generation
of carbon credits from a variety of emissions-reduction and sink-enhancing activities.
Similarly, carbon and energy taxes and emissions trading are nonspecific as to how
targeted sectors reduce emissions; thus, technological solutions feature prominently
but more ecocentric forms of behaviour change are also possible. As such, in keeping
with Peck and Tickell's (2002) and Castree's (2006) observations about the dangers of
assuming a hegemonic and homogeneous neoliberalism, understanding the full con-
sequences of the carbon economy for transitional responses to climate change requires
disaggregation of these carbon commodification processes.
In general terms, nevertheless, the upsurge in the use of market mechanisms to
address market failures corresponds with Hall's (1993) concept of second-order change
and Oliver and Pemberton's (2004) notion of the punctuated evolution of existing
paradigms to solve a new policy problem. By the same token, the faith apparently
being placed in carbon commodification by international and national institutions,
corporations, and individuals suggests the reproduction and `locking in' of neoliberal,
market-driven logics as an accepted methodology for dealing with climate change.
Carbon commodification can, thus, be seen as a partial assimilation of a new idea
(the need to curb human interference with the climate system) into the prevailing
paradigm, with framing of the problem and its solutions in the context of preexisting
discourses (the promise of economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness)
(Bakker, 2005; Heynen et al, 2007b), rather than the adoption of less `conventional'
strategies that focus, for example, on economic relocalisation or direct behavioural
constraints to reduce fossil-fuel consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions (Hopkins,
2008). One can argue, therefore, that this reproduction and reinforcement of neoliberal
and ecological modernisation rhetoric largely shapes current transitional corridors
shown in figure 2. Even if a major transitional rupture were possible (eg dramatic
relocalisation), it is unlikely that the new transitional trajectory would completely leave
the path dependencies and transitional corridors established by the currently predomi-
nant neoliberal ideology (ie stage 3 in figure 2). Although these are not axiomatically
antagonistic to radical ecocentric responses, the neoliberal ethos underpinning the
carbon economy would seem only to accommodate behavioural adjustments that are
consistent with other tenets of the paradigm and the self-regulating capacity of markets
and individual liberty to pursue wealth accumulation (Harvey, 2005; McCarthy and
Prudham, 2004). It is possible, likely even, that carbon commodification will generate
price pressures on economies and consumers to change behaviours radically, but it
remains an explicit aim that these should be less expensive than alternative approaches
(Beckerman, 1995; Daly and Cobb, 1990; Helm, 2003).
It is also apparent that the `decision node' which took place at the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, where the EU dropped its opposition to carbon markets in an attempt to
keep the USA in the Kyoto fold, had far-reaching implications in terms of: (i) estab-
lishing carbon commodification as a legitimate way of responding to climate change;
and (ii) encouraging governments to begin experimenting with different carbon com-
modifying techniques to protect the environment and economies. This cascade effect
has had the effect of depoliticising carbon commodification as a means of addressing
climate change, leading arguably to the foreclosure of democratic debate except at the
margins, and the creation of a market-autocratic form of governance (Swyngedouw,
2005). It may also establish the parameters of transitional corridors for years to come,
2336 I Bailey, G A Wilson

if for no other reason than the time that environmental economists suggest is required
for the effects of carbon markets to be fully felt. This stretches to at least 2012 in the
case of the Kyoto mechanisms and 2020 for the EU ETS (Commission of the European
Communities, 2006). Concerns about double regulation, meanwhile, have also discour-
aged (although not entirely precluded) the adoption of alternative measures. VCOs may
be a rather shorter lived phenomenon as consumers see more sectors coming under
mandatory schemes (eg power generators and aviation under the EU ETS) and decide
they do not need to atone twice for their travel and gadgetry habits. Whether organisa-
tional investors in VCOs, the CDM, and JI will make similar choice is less certain, and
will depend on the cost of carbon under different schemes, their ability to acquire
sufficient allowances to meet statutory obligations, and their capacity to innovate.
Either way, the more ephemeral VCOs are perceived to be, the more likely it is that
their focus will be on quick gains (measured either in carbon savings or profits) and,
potentially, ill-judged projects (van Kooten et al, 2004).
Turning to the transitional properties of the main forms of carbon commodifica-
tion identified above, their heterogeneity suggests obvious Deleuzian tendencies, in that
different actor groups have placed differing emphases on neoliberal technocentric and
radical ecocentric transformations. The more formally regulated carbon trading
schemes tend to stress (albeit heterogeneously) technofixes that reinforce pathways
towards the lower end of the decision-making spectrum in figure 2öwhether related
to emissions reduction or carbon capture and storageöpermitting participants to
comply with commitments without undertaking radical behavioural changes. There
are, of course, limits to this with formally regulated trading schemes. For instance,
the EU ETS required that national allocation plans for Phase 2 include limitations
on the percentage of emissions allocations that affected installations can discharge
using CDM and JI units. Similarly, the additionality principle adopted in the Kyoto
Protocol restricts the extent to which affected states can discharge their emissions
reduction responsibilities through flexibility mechanisms (Kerr, 2007).
The array of national and regional NEPIs (carbon and energy taxes and ETS)
introduced during the past decade is more difficult to categorise in terms of their
transitional orientations towards technocentric and ecocentric types of behaviour res-
ponse, because most are relatively nonspecific as to how polluters should respond to
government-created carbon prices and markets. An important distinction nevertheless
exists here between taxes and emissions trading. Once a carbon price is established via
a tax, polluters are free to decide how much tax they wish to pay and, thus, their level
of emissions reduction. In contrast, emissions trading schemes like the EU ETS, the
UK's new Carbon Reduction Commitment and the proposed Australian ETS operate
on a `cap-and-trade' basisöwith governments establishing emissions caps, allocations
to affected sectors, and penalty payments for exceeding allocations öbut, thereafter,
markets determine the distribution of emissions reductions. Thus, most NEPIs retain a
strong element of government control and can encourage both forms of response.
Most early taxes and trading schemes nevertheless targeted a relatively narrow
range of sectors (major industrial firms and power generators), and were designed to
provide financial incentives for companies to develop and diffuse new technologies.
Evaluations of these instruments have been mixed. For example, the House of Com-
mons Environmental Audit Committee's (2008a) enquiry into the UK's climate change
levy concluded that the tax had produced a minimal impact on innovation because the
price incentives created by the tax were inadequate to make major investments in new
technologies financially worthwhile (ie to overcome inertia effects). Interestingly, the
report and other research suggested that the main reductions in business emissions
came from consultations on the tax, which raised awareness of energy issues, and the
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2337

climate change agreements, which offered firms a tax discount in return for meeting
legally binding energy efficiency targets (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006). However, these
tended to come from already-planned investments and operational improvements
rather than stimulating significant new technological investment.
More recently, debates in the UK and other countries have begun focusing on per-
sonal carbon allowances (PCAs), a form of carbon trading that explicitly targets personal
behaviour, but still within a market-driven format. Under PCAs, individuals would
be allocated carbon credits for necessary energy purchases, with those who use less than
their allocation selling their surplus credits to higher carbon users. The House of Com-
mons Environmental Audit Committee (2008b, page 3) offered a generally encouraging
assessment of PCAs, arguing that emissions savings from business and industry would be
meaningless without equal reductions by households and individuals, and that ``existing
initiatives are unlikely to bring about behavioural change on the scale required.'' It added,
however, that PCAs could only make a significant contribution if the public was per-
suaded; (i) that it is essential to reduce emissions; (ii) that this could only be achieved by
individuals taking personal responsibility; and (iii) that PCAs are a fair and effective way
of reducing emissions. How personal emissions savings are achieved remains unclear,
although they are likely to include both technological (eg replacing high-energy appliances
with low-energy ones) and other behaviour responses (eg reducing thermostat tempera-
tures), and the net carbon balance of people replacing appliances or cars before they
become obsolete may be difficult to establish.
VCOs target personal values and behaviours the least of any of the carbon com-
modification techniques discussed in this paper, since they make no attempt to limit
personal emissions, except perhaps indirectly through awareness raising. It is more
likely that they disconnect consumption from emissions by promising remote emissions
savings which, particularly in the case of VCOs for personal carbon footprints, involve
minimal scrutiny by the individual buying them, although moves exist to create codes
of conduct for VCO providers (Go«ssling et al, 2007). Nevertheless, as Bumpus and
Liverman (2008) identify, both the Kyoto mechanisms and VCOs rely on exchanges of
carbon reductions for capital, and on glocalised interactions and forms of governance
which have the potential to weaken the veracity of claimed reductions and the con-
ceptual link between behaviour and environmental impacts. The neoliberal assurances
implicitly transmitted to consumersöthat markets and technologies developed `some-
where' will solve the problemöand to traders and other organisationsöthat carbon is
a legitimate commodityöcan be seen as further normalising
``the intellectual, discursive, and ideological lineage which helps to lend at least the
appearance of coherency and consistency'' (Heynen et al, 2007a, page 5)
to the carbon economy in order to circumvent tensions between the individualism and
libertarianism of neoliberalism and the `collective-through-personal responsibility'
ethos of more radical ecocentric approaches to issues like climate change.

5 Conclusions
The carbon economy has emerged over the last decade as a major feature of govern-
mental, private sector, and individual strategies to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.
However, despite its apparent dominance, major questions remain about the appro-
priateness and effects of the carbon economy as a strategic response to climate change.
In this paper we have utilised concepts from policy change and transition theory to
situate and analyse the carbon economy within the wider context of possible transitional
responses to the problem of rising greenhouse-gas concentrations, with a particular
focus on its ideological underpinnings and role in steering a transition trajectory
between technocentric and ecocentric responses to rapid climate change.
2338 I Bailey, G A Wilson

Scientific assessments and political declarations on climate change have repeatedly

stressed the need for prompt and radical action to constrain the damaging effects of
human-induced climatic changes. Strategies like Pacala and Socolow's wedges
approach put forward an ambitious but scientifically informed and pragmatic agenda
to achieve climate stabilisation through multiple emissions-saving and sink-enhancing
activities. However, when viewed in the context of possible responses identified by
transition theory frameworks, the narrowness of these options, and their leaning
towards ecological modernisation rhetoric and practices, become apparent in terms
of their strong reliance on technological innovations, `optimistic' win ^ win assumptions,
and the use of neoliberal-style market instruments to deliver emissions reductions.
These stand in stark contrast to the more `pessimistic' and life-changing options
suggested by radical ecocentrism. Although it is clear from the preceding discussion
that not all carbon commodification devices target technocentric innovations and that
some explicitly seek to elicit behavioural responses of a more ecocentric, demand-
limiting natureöa move that may be gathering momentum with debates on PCAs
and tradingötheir continued emphasis on markets to deliver change reveals a hidden
conservatism amid the seemingly radical changes taking place in climate governance.
Viewed from this perspective, the carbon economy represents a punctuated evolution
in neoliberal-capitalist ideologies in response to past failings that, as well as rescripting
neoliberal values and practices, is reproducing and reinforcing them through the partial
assimilation of environmental sympathies into `mainstream' governance paradigms (Oliver
and Pemberton, 2004). This also draws attention to the overlapping nature of paradigms
that often lie submerged beneath stylised portrayals of polarised ideologies. Transition
theory, we would argue, is particularly helpful in deciphering these through its emphasis
on how decision nodes create and alter trajectories between ideological extremes.
Advocates of carbon commodification often stress the flexibility and freedom of
choice that market-based instruments (whether regulatory like carbon taxes and emis-
sions trading or `free' market like VCOs) bring to climate policy. However, from a
transition-theory perspective, the promarket leanings of the carbon economy may
also be contributing towards a narrowing and hardening of the `boundaries of the
possible' within the range of possibilities shown in the bell-shaped curve in figure 2
in terms of the political energies and funding directed towards different transitional
options to address climate change. The practical and political difficulties of a radical
shift toward ecocentric climate responses are well known. However, past and current
decision nodes that have contributed to the ascendancy of the carbon economy appear
to be establishing new path dependencies, which may, in turn, create delays and
difficulties in altering trajectories if current strategies fail to produce major emissions
reductions. With future climate security at stake, in this respect the carbon economy
may represent one of the biggest theoretical ^ ideological experiments in history.
This does not mean that the concept of commodifying carbon as a means of climate
protection is inherently misguided, although, as other papers in this volume indicate,
there are good reasons to be apprehensive about current practices. However, perhaps
the most worrisome aspect of the carbon economy is the extent to which the logics and
system memory of neoliberal ecological modernisation appear to be depoliticising
and dedemocratising climate policy through scientific and econocentric discourses
that exclude consideration of alternative strategies from the political and social main-
stream (Shove and Walker, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005). Arguments about economic
efficiency (a key illustration of how dominant paradigms define terms of debate) aside,
there are few reasons why carbon commodification cannot be energetically pursued
alongside other approaches [be they reorienting aspirations towards greater carbon
frugality or reforms to the spatial organisation of economies, as suggested by the
Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change 2339

relocalisation movement (Hopkins, 2008)]. As Grubb (2004) noted, identified technologies

hold much promise in providing a rich portfolio of options matched to the major
sectors of energy production, conversion, and use. However, he adds that, although
carbon pricing and trading may help to secure some low-carbon investment, over-
coming the full range of issues that have created and perpetuated the world's current
dependence on fossil-based fuels will require policies that span the innovation chain
and enable nonstate actors and policy makers to think beyond the relatively narrow
decision corridors currently prioritised by the carbon economy. Similarly, during a
recent workshop on the carbon economy at the Environmental Change Institute,
University of Oxford, Steve Rayner argued that, if we accept the Pacala and Socolow
wedges as a sensible response to the absence of a single `silver bullet' solution to
climate change, similar diversity should be applied in the solutions that are given
serious consideration and policy support.
In this endeavour, the systems-thinking approach of transition theory provides a useful
framework not only for exploring the dominant ideologies and countermovements that
frame and constrain transitional processes, but also for assessing the transitional options
available over different timescales and the connections that existöor can be nurturedö
between apparently polarised positions. This does not mean that transition theory makes
transitions like that towards lower carbon economies any less contingent or contested, but
it may contribute towards a more systematic and reflexive view of existing constraints and
future possibilities.
Acknowledgements. We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Economic and
Social Research Council (R000223774) and the British Academy. We are also grateful to Rob
Hopkins and James Sidaway for their many useful insights, and the anonymous referees for
excellent suggestions regarding the reframing of the environmental decision-making spectrum
in figure 1, and the Cartographic Resources Unit for excellent artwork. All remaining errors,
misinterpretations, and partialities are our own.
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