Special Proceedings Law Case Digest

Nov. 22, 2018

Lloyd V. Sanchez
Submitted by:

Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs CA and Lourdes Pacana

Facts:
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1 hectare parcel of land under the name of Juan Gabatan.

In a complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged she is the sole owner of the lot, having inherited from her deceased
mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero, the only child of Juan Gabatan and Laureana Clarito. Furthermore, respondent
alleged that upon death of Juan Gabatan, the lot was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan and, his wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. Respondent also claimed that prior to Hermogena's death, she demanded for the return of
the land but to no avail. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same.

Petitions denied respondents claim that her mother, Hermogena, was the daughter of Juan Gabatan because Juan died
single and was survived by a brother and two sisters, among them is Teofilo.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners appealed the decision to the CA but was affirmed.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents
claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial.

The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property.
However, before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of Juan Gabatan.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. The
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

Issue:
Is it proper for the Court to determine the rightful heir? Or should a special proceeding be commenced to properly
determine the heir?

Ruling:

General Rule:

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

Exception by jurisprudence:

In the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in proceeding for
annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs.

...to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding....

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Petition is Granted, the civil case may proceed in determining the rightful heir. No commencement of a special
proceeding needed.

Saludo vs American Express

Facts:
Aniceto Saludo filed a complaint for damages against American Express Internation, Inc. (AMEX) and its officers
Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations.

Saludo is a Filipino citizen, a member of the House of Representative and a resident of Ichon, Macrohonm Southern
Leyte. Defendant is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services based Makati City.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card
and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience,
wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as
a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.
In their answer, respondent raised affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue and that it
should dismiss the complaint because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte and that petitioner was not allegedly
a resident thereof as evidence by his community tax certificate. Petitioner asserted that any allegation refuting his
residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district
thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint.
The trial court found that the complaint is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents on the ground
that the fact alone that the petitioner at the time he filed the complaint was and still is the incumbent Congressman of
the the said district of Leyte.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the ground that venue was improperly laid in the court because not one of
the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte and that petitioner was not a resident thereof based on his community tax
certificate which was issued at Pasay City. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding the venue was improperly laid because not one of the parties was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

Ruling:
Yes.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it
is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence
(or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had
his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the
domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because
"residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.”

Montaer vs Sharia District Court

Facts:

Petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr.,
Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died

Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court

In the said complaint, respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2)
the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan
is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated
value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.

Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the
estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court
has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic;

The Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer,
Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.

Issues:

Does the Sharia Court lack jurisdiction over petitioners who are non-muslims?

Ruling:

No.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims:

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition. The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind
the courts to treat it according to the said designation.

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the
estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim, such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.

The Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation
that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after
hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an
ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the
court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the
parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We
reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding.

Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent
and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the
fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a
civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a
civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a
civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a
party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.