Civil Procedure Digests:

Candido vs Macapagal

Facts: Petitioner Candido instituted an action with the RTC to annul the Deed of
Extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale. Candido filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that the peititoners failed to comply with the mandatory barangay
conciliation. RTC Judge Macapagal dismissed the complaint of the petitioners on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioner’s failure to comply with the mandatory
barangay conciliation process required by PD 1508. Petitioner Candido filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Candido and the other defendants od
the civil case reside in different municipalities and cities.

Issue: WON barangay court has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who
reside in different municipalities and cities.

Ruling: No because the barangay court or “lupon” has jurisdiction over disputes
between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities.

Where some of the other co-defendants reside in barangays of municipalities, cities

and provinces different with that of the complainant, conciliation is not required.
The action may be filed directly in court.

San Miguel Village School vs. Pundogar and Trino

Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Village School filed a complaint, after the Lupon signed
a certificate to file action with the notation for “respondent cannot be contacted ”, to
the RTC, for breach of contract against Defendant Trino. The defendant suddenly
stopped teaching at the school. The case was decided in favor of San Miguel Village
School. Four months later, Defendant Trino filed a petition for relief from judgment
from the prior court with Judge Pundogar alleging that the previous court had no
jurisdiction to render its decision because there was no barangay conciliation. Judge
Pundogar granted the relief sought.

Issue: WON failure to comply with the requirements of PD 1508 affects the
jurisdiction of the court that tried the action.

Ruling: No because conciliation procedure required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement. 3Failure of a plaintiff to go through the conciliation
procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the sufficiency, or the
maturity or ripeness of the plaintiffs cause of action and the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but
rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity.
Besides, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural
requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely manner, that is,
at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for
dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely
motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the
effect of waiver of such defense.

Galuba vs Laureta

Facts: The defendants ceded to the petitioner all their rights and interest over a
house and lot. When the balance remained unpaid, the parties brought the matter
before the barangay captain and entered an amicable settlement whereby they
agreed to pay the remaining balance in monthly installment and that non-
compliance would mean execution in accordance with the Barangay Law. A month
later, filed an annulment of the amicable settlement because it was discovered that
the house he had bought was encroaching on the adjoining lot.

Issue: WON the annulment of the amicable settlement after one month is valid.

Ruling: Invalid because Section 12 of PD 1508 provides that failure to repudiate the
settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits respectively set shall
be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds.

Vital- Gozon v CA

Facts: In 1987, by virtue of E.O. 119 issued by then Pres. Cory Aquino, a
reorganization of the Ministry of Health was effected. At the time of such
reorganization, Dr. Alejandro Dela Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National
Children’s Hospital. In February 1988, Dr. Dela Fuente received a notice from the
Deparment of Health that he would be re-appointed as Medical Specialist II. Such a
position was considered as two ranks lower than his previous position of Chief of
Clinics. This prompted Dr. Dela Fuente to file a protest with the DOH Reorganization
Board. The protest was ignored. Dela Fuente then filed a case before the CSC. In the
meantime, the position of Chief of Clinics (then changed to Chief of Medical
Professional Staff) were turned over and thereafter exercised by a Dr. Merencilla.
CSC ruled in favor of Dr. Dela Fuente. It ruled that Dr. Dela Fuente is deemed having
retained his previous position. Neither an MR nor an appeal was filed assailing such
a decision thereby rendering the decision as final and executory. Months have
elapsed but still there was no action on the part of Vital-Gozon et. al. to execute the
decision of the CSC. CSC also told him that they believed they have no coercive
powers to enforce their own decision. This prompted Dela Fuente to file a petition
before the CA to compel Vital-Gozon et. al. to restore him to the position of Chief of
Clinics and pay him his backwages plus damages for Vital-Gozon’s refusal to comply
with the CSC resolution. CA granted the decision insofar as his restoration to his
former position but denied insofar as the grant of damages ruling that the petition is
not the correct vehicle to claim such damages not the CA is the correct forum for
such relief. CA also took note to representation by the SolGen of Dr. Vital-Gozon
saying that pursuant to the ruling in Urbano and Co cases, the SolGen is not
authorized to represent her. MR was filed by Dela Fuente arguing that CA has the
power to grant damages in a mandamus action by virtue of BP 129 which gave the
SC, CA and RTCs concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions and that CA was given
the power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To
require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to
that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law. CA eventually granted the MR
and ordered setting a date for reception of evidence on the la Fuente's claim for
damages. It based its judgment on the last phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which
expressly allows the award of damages in a mandamus petition.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.

Held:

Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in
a mandamus action “commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.” The provision makes plain that the damages are an
incident, or the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in failing and refusing to do
the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical
counterpart provision. The Solicitor General’s theory that the rule in question is a
mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for
damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the
omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated
separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to
the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

Issue: WON the SolGen is authorized to represent Vital-Gozon in this case

Held:
Yes. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to,
is quite clear to the effect that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to
represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. This observation should
apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages
arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code).
Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil
suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office
of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit
for damages. Here, Dr. Vital-Gozon is not charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted
for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General.