MARITIME LAW - COGSA CASES

1. Elser v. CA
96 Phil. 264, G.R. No. L-6517, November 29, 1954; J. Bautista Angelo
[Stipulation contrary to COGSA – void]
2. Ang v. Compania Maritima
133 SCRA 600, G.R. No. L-30805, December 26, 1984; J. Aquino
[Prescription of action, not of loss but of misdelivery]
3. Dole Philippine v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-61352, February 27, 1987; J. Narvasa
[Demand, effects thereof in prescription under COGSA]
4. Sea Land Service v. IAC
G.R. No. 75118 August 31, 1987, J. Narvasa
[Stipulation as to amount of recovery vis a vis COGSA]
5. Maritime Agencies v. CA
187 SCRA 846, G.R. No. 77638 July 12, 1990, J. Cruz
[Agent of the charterer; liability]

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1. Elser v. CA
96 Phil. 264, G.R. No. L-6517, November 29, 1954; J. Bautista Angelo

Syllabus:

1. CARRIERS; PROVISIONS OF BILL OF LADING CONTRARY TO CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY

SEA ACT ARE NULL AND VOID.—Clause 18 of the bill of lading in question provided that
owner should not be liable for loss or damage of cargo unless written notice thereof was
given to the carrier within 30 days after receipt of the goods. However, section 3 of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that even if a notice of loss or damage is not given as
required, "that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within
one year after the delivery of the goods." Which of these two provisions should prevail?
Held: Clause 18 must of necessity yield to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act in view of the proviso contained in the same Act which says: "Any clause,
covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship
from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods * * * or lessening
such liability otherwise than as provided in this Act, shall be null and void and of no
effect." (Section 3.) This means that a carrier cannot limit its liability in a manner contrary
to what is provided for in said Act, and so clause 18 of the bill of lading must of necessity be
null and void.

2. ID.; ID.; WHEN CAN CARRIER BE DISCHARGED FROM LIABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE.—
A carrier can only be discharged from liability in respect of loss or damage if the suit is not
brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should
have been delivered.

3. ID.; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT; EXCEPTION CONCERNING ITS APPLICABILITY;

CASE AT BAR.—Granting arguendo that at the time the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936
J. Robert Miranda Gozun
was accepted and adopted by the Philippine Government, the Philippines was still a
territory or possession of the United States and therefore the trade between the two
countries was not a foreign trade, still said Act is applicable to the present case it appearing
that the parties have expressly agreed to make and incorporate the provisions of said Act
as an integral part of their contract of carriage. This is an exception to the rule regarding
the applicability of said Act.

Facts:

It appears that in the month of December, 1945 the goods specified in the Bill of Lading
marked as Annex A, were shipped on the 'S.S. Sea Hydra,' of Isthmian Steamship Company,
from New York to Manila, and were received by the consignee 'Udharam Bazar and
Co.', except one case of vanishing cream valued at P159.78. The goods were insured
against damage or loss by the 'Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.' `Udharam Bazar and Co.' Inc.,
who denied having received the goods for custody, and the 'International Harvester Co. of
the Philippines,' as agent for the shipping company, who answer that the goods were
landed and delivered to the Customs authorities. Finally, 'Udaharam Bazar and Co.' claimed
for indemnity of the loss from the insurer, 'Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.', and was paid
by the latter's agent 'E. E. Elser Inc.' the amount involved, that is, P159.78.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioners have already lost their right to press their claim
against respondent because of their failure to serve notice thereof upon the carrier within
30 days after receipt of the notice of loss or damage as required by clause 18 of the bill of
lading which was issued concerning the shipment of the merchandise which had allegedly
disappeared. In this respect, the court said that, "appellant unwittingly admitted that they
were late in claiming the indemnity for the loss of the case of the vanishing cream as their
written claim was made on April 25, 1946, or more than 30 days after they had been fully
aware of said loss."

Question:

Is the Court of Appeals correct?

Answer:

No. Clause 18 must of necessity yields to the provisions of the Carriage of

Goods by Sea Act in view of the proviso contained in the same Act which says: "any
clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the
ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods . . . or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this Act, shall be null and void
and of no effect." (section 3.) This means that a carrier cannot limit its liability in a
manner contrary to what is provided for in said act. and so clause 18 of the bill of
lading must of necessity be null and void.

2. Ang v. Compania Maritima

133 SCRA 600, G.R. No. L-30805, December 26, 1984; J. Aquino

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

Syllabus:

Prescription; Common Carriers; Damages; Action for damages for misdelivery of cargo
by an ocean-going vessel is not one-year, but 10 years from date cause of action
accrued, as distinguished from loss of cargo.—In the American Steamship Agencies
cases, it was held that the action of Ang is based on misdelivery of the cargo which should be
distinguished from loss thereof. The one-year period provided for in section 3(6) of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act refers to loss of the cargo. What is applicable is the four-
year period of prescription for quasi-delicts prescribed in article 1146(2) of the Civil
Code or ten years for violation of a written contract as provided for in article 1144
(1) of the same Code. As Ang filed the action less than three years from the date of the
alleged misdelivery of the cargo, it has not yet prescribed. Ang, as indorsee of the bill of
lading, is a real party in interest with a cause of action for damages.

Facts:

Ang on September 26, 1963, as the assignee of a bill of lading held by Yau Yue
Commercial Bank, Ltd. of Hongkong, sued Compania Maritima, Maritime Company of the
Philippines and C.L. Diokno. He prayed that the defendants be ordered to pay him solidarily
the sum of US$130,539.68 with interest from February 9, 1963 plus attorney's fees and
damages.

Ang alleged that Yau Yue Commercial Bank agreed to sell to Herminio G. Teves
under certain conditions 559 packages of galvanized steel, Durzinc sheets. The
merchandise was loaded on May 25, 1961 at Yawata, Japan in the M/S Luzon a vessel
owned and operated by the defendants, to be transported to Manila and consigned "to
order" of the shipper, Tokyo Boeki, Ltd., which indorsed the bill of lading issued by
Compania Maritima to the order of Yau Yue Commercial Bank.

[BOL issued by CM to the order of Tokyo Boeki -> indorsed to Yau Yue Bank ->
indorsed to Ang]

Ang further alleged that the defendants, by means of a permit to deliver imported
articles, authorized the delivery of the cargo to Teves who obtained delivery from the
Bureau of Customs without the surrender of the bill of lading and in violation of the
terms thereof. Teves dishonored the draft drawn by Yau Yue against him.

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation made the corresponding protest
for the draft's dishonor and returned the bill of lading to Yau Yue. The bill of lading was
indorsed to Ang.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ang's complaint on the ground of lack of
cause of action. Ang opposed the motion. As already stated, the trial court on May 22, 1964
dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription since the
action was filed beyond the one-year period provided in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

 3. Dole Philippine v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-61352 February 27, 1987; J. Narvasa

Syllabus:

Mercantile Law; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; Prescription; Written extrajudicial

demand by the creditor does not toll the running of the one year prescriptive period
under the Act.—These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the
fact that the question has already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position
taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President
Lines, Inc. There, in a parallel factual situation, where suit to recover for damage to
cargo shipped by vessel from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than two years after
the consignee's receipt of the cargo, this Court rejected the contention that an
extrajudicial demand tolled the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Period to file an action even under a new period having
already lapsed without filing the action, the right of action had prescribed.—Moreover,
no different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that a
written extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
The demand in this instance would be the claim for damage filed by Dole with Maritime on
May 4, 1972. The effect of that demand would have been to renew the one-year
prescriptive period from the date of its making. Stated otherwise, under Dole's theory,
when its claim was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive period was
interrupted—"tolled" would be the more precise term—and began to run anew from
May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one (1) year counted from that date
within which to institute action on its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the
new period lapse without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11,
1973, more than one month after that period had expired and its right of action had
prescribed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tolling of the prescriptive period cannot be equated
with indefinite suspension; Case at bar.—Dole's contention that the prescriptive period
"*** remained tolled as of May 4, 1972 *** (and that) in legal contemplation *** (the) case
(Civil Case No. 96353) was filed on January 6,1975 *** well within the one-year
prescriptive period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act," equates tolling with
indefinite suspension. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration.

Facts:

The case relates to a claim for loss and/or damage to a shipment of machine parts sought to
be enforced by the consignee, appellant Dole Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter caged Dole)
against the carrier, Maritime Company of the Philippines (hereinafter called Maritime),
under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

1. The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody
of the consignee on December 18, 1971;

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

2. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the
plaintiff with the defendant vessel on May 4, 1972;

3. On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 91043, embodying three (3) causes of action
involving three (3) separate and different shipments. The third cause of action therein
involved the cargo now subject of this present litigation;

4. On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order in Civil Case No.
91043 dismissing the first two causes of action in the aforesaid case with prejudice and
without pronouncement as to costs because the parties had settled or compromised the
claims involved therein. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this
case now was likewise dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the
settlement. The dismissal of that complaint containing the three causes of action was upon
a joint motion to dismiss filed by the parties;

5. Because of the dismissal of the (complaint in Civil Case No. 91043 with respect to
the third cause of action without prejudice, plaintiff instituted this present complaint on
January 6, 1975.

Dole's claim for loss or damage made on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial
demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll
prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. To much the same
effect is the further argument based on Article 1176 of the Civil Code which provides that
the rights and obligations of common carriers shag be governed by the Code of Commerce
and by special laws in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code.

Question:

Is the petitioner’s contention correct insofar as demand tolls the prescriptive period
for filing an action under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act?

Answer:

No. The Supreme Court in previous cases already decided that in a case governed
by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
on prescription should not be made to apply.

4. Sea Land Service v. IAC

G.R. No. 75118 August 31, 1987, J. Narvasa

Syllabus:

Transportation; Contract of Carriage; Damages; Liability of a common carrier under a

contract of carriage is governed by the laws of the country of destination.—Since the
liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a
contract of carriage is governed by the laws of the country of destination and the

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines, the
liability of petitioner Sea-Land to the respondent consignee is governed primarily by
the Civil Code, and as ordained by the said Code, suppletorily, in all matters not
determined thereby, by the Code of Commerce and special laws. One of these suppletory
special laws is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, U.S. Public Act No. 521 which was
made applicable to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from
Philippine ports in foreign trade by Commonwealth Act No. 65, approved on October
22, 1936.

Same; Same; Liability; A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the
value of goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a
greater value in binding. Art 1759-c.c. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered
by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if
it is reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed
upon.—Nothing contained in section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act already
quoted is repugnant to or inconsistent with any of the just-cited provisions of the Civil
Code. Said section merely gives more flesh and greater specificity to the rather general
terms of Article 1749 (without doing any violence to the plain intent thereof) and of Article
1750, to give effect to just agreements limiting carriers' liability for loss or damages which
are freely and fairly entered into.

Same; Same; Consignee by making claim for loss on the basis of the bill of lading, to all
intents and purposes accepted said bill.—Private respondent, by making claim for loss on
the basis of the bill of lading, to all intents and purposes accepted said bill. Having done so,
he—"x x x becomes bound by all stipulations contained therein whether on the front or the
back thereof. Respondent cannot elude its provisions simply because they prejudice him
and take advantage of those that are beneficial. Secondly, the fact that respondent shipped
his goods on board the ship of petitioner and paid the corresponding freight thereon shows
that he impliedly accepted the bill of lading which was issued in connection with the
shipment in question, and so it may be said that the same is binding upon him as if it had
been actually signed by him or by any other person in his behalf. x x x"

Facts:

On or about January 8, 1981, Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land for brevity), a foreign
shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines, received from
Seaborne Trading Company in Oakland, California a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing
the business name used by Paulino Cue in the wholesale and retail trade which he operated
out of an establishment located on Borromeo and Plaridel Streets, Cebu City.

The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment, no value was indicated
in the bill of lading. The bill described the shipment only as "8 CTNS on 2 SKIDS-
FILES. 1 Based on volume measurements Sea-land charged the shipper the total amount of
US$209.28 for freight age and other charges. The shipment was loaded on board the MS
Patriot, a vessel owned and operated by Sea-Land, for discharge at the Port Of Cebu.

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

 Clause 22, first paragraph, of the long form bill of lading customarily issued by Sea-
Land to its shipping clients 14 is a virtual copy of the first paragraph of the foregoing
provision. It says:

22. VALUATION. In the event of any loss, damage or delay

to or in connection with goods exceeding in actual value $500 per
package, lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not
shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, the value of the
goods shall be deemed to be $500 per package or per customary
freight unit, as the case may be, and the carrier's liability, if any, shall
be determined on the basis of a value of $500 per package or
customary freight unit, unless the nature and a higher value shall be
declared by the shipper in writing before shipment and inserted in
this Bill of Lading.

(At the back of the BOL) If a value higher than $500 shag have
been declared in writing by the shipper upon delivery to the carrier
and inserted in this bill of lading and extra freight paid, if required and
in such case if the actual value of the goods per package or per
customary freight unit shall exceed such declared value, the value
shall nevertheless be deemed to be declared value and the carrier's
liability, if any, shall not exceed the declared value and any partial loss
or damage shall be adjusted pro rata on the basis of such declared
value.

The shipment arrived in Manila on February 12, 1981, and there discharged in
Container No. 310996 into the custody of the arrastre contractor and the customs and port
authorities. Sometime between February 13 and 16, 1981, after the shipment had been
transferred, along with other cargoes to Container No. 40158 near Warehouse 3 at Pier 3 in
South Harbor, Manila, awaiting trans-shipment to Cebu, it was stolen by pilferers and has
never been recovered.

On March 10, 1981, Paulino Cue, the consignee, made formal claim upon Sea-Land
for the value of the lost shipment allegedly amounting to P179,643.48. Sea-Land offered to
settle for US$4,000.00, or its then Philippine peso equivalent of P30,600.00. asserting that
said amount represented its maximum liability for the loss of the shipment under the
package limitation clause in the covering bill of lading. Cue rejected the offer and thereafter
brought suit for damages against Sea-Land in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch X.7 Said Court, after trial, rendered judgment in favor of Cue, sentencing Sea-Land to
pay him P186,048.00 representing the Philippine currency value of the lost cargo,
P55,814.00 for unrealized profit with one (1%) percent monthly interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid, P25,000.00 for attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as litigation
expenses.

Sea-Land appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That Court however

affirmed the decision of the Trial Court xxx in all its parts

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

Question:

Were the lower courts correct in their judgment?

Answer:

No. There can be no doubt or equivocation about the validity and enforceability of
freely-agreed-upon stipulations in a contract of carriage or bill of lading limiting the
liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and
inserts it into said contract or bill. This pro position, moreover, rests upon an almost
uniform weight of authority.

5. Maritine Agencies v. CA
187 SCRA 846, G.R. No. 77638 July 12, 1990, J. Cruz
MARITIME AGENCIES & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and UNION INSURANCE SOCIETY OF CANTON, LTD., respondents.
&
UNION INSURANCE SOCIETY OF CANTON, LTD., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONGKONG ISLAND CO., LTD., MARITIME AGENCIES & SERVICES, INC., and/or VIVA
CUSTOMS BROKERAGE, respondents.

Syllabus

Civil Law; Contracts; Common Carriers; The responsibility for cargo loss falls on the
one who agreed to perform the duty involved in accordance with the terms of most
voyage charters.—A voyage charter being a private carriage, the parties may freely
contract respecting liability for damage to the goods and other matters. The basic principle
is that “the responsibility for cargo loss falls on the one who agreed to perform the duty
involved” in accordance with the terms of most voyage charters.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle is true in the present cases where the charterer
was responsible for loading, stowage and discharging at the ports visited while the
owner was responsible for the care of the cargo during the voyage.—This is true in the
present cases where the charterer was responsible for loading, stowage and discharging at
the ports visited, while the owner was responsible for the care of the cargo during the
voyage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A voyage charter being a private carriage, the parties may freely
contract respecting liability for damage to the goods and other matters. The basic principle
is that "the responsibility for cargo loss falls on the one who agreed to perform the duty
involved" in accordance with the terms of most voyage charters.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption is that the goods were damaged or lost during
the voyage as a result of negligence or improper stowage.—Nevertheless, this ruling
cannot benefit Hongkong, because there was no showing in that case that the vessel was at
fault. In the cases at bar, the trial court found that 1,383 bags were shortlanded, which

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

could only mean that they were damaged or lost on board the vessel before unloading of
the shipment. It is not denied that the entire cargo shipped by the charterer in Odessa was
covered by a clean bill of lading. As the bags were in good order when received in the
vessel, the presumption is that they were damaged or lost during the voyage as a result of
their negligent or improper stowage. For this the ship owner should be held liable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Period for filing the claim is one year in accordance
with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.—But we do agree that the period for filing the
claim is one year, in accordance with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. This was adopted
and embodied by our legislature in Com. Act No. 65 which, as a special law, prevails over
the general provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of actions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The one-year period in the cases at bar should
commence on October 20, 1979 when the last item was delivered to the consignee.—
The one-year period in the cases at bar should commence on October 20, 1979, when the
last item was delivered to the consignee. Union’s complaint was filed against Hongkong on
September 19, 1980, but tardily against Macondray on April 20, 1981. The consequence is
that the action is considered prescribed as far as Macondray is concerned but not against
its principal, which is what matters anyway.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Agency; As regards the goods damaged or lost during
unloading, the charterer is liable therefor, having assumed this activity under the
charter party “free of expense to the vessel”; Principle that the agent shall be liable for
the act or omission of the principal only if the latter is undisclosed well-settled.—As
regards the goods damaged or lost during unloading, the charterer is liable therefore,
having assumed this activity under the charter party “free of expense to the vessel.” The
difficulty is that Transcontinental has not been impleaded in these cases and so is beyond
our jurisdiction. The liability imposable upon it cannot be borne by Maritime which,
as a mere agent, is not answerable for injury caused by its principal. It is a well-
settled principle that the agent shall be liable for the act or omission of the principal
only if the latter is undisclosed.

Facts:

Transcontinental Fertilizer Company of London chartered from Hongkong Island

Shipping Company of Hongkong the motor vessel named "Hongkong Island" for the
shipment of 8073.35 MT (gross) bagged urea from Novorossisk, Odessa, USSR to the
Philippines, the parties signing for this purpose a Uniform General Charter dated August 9,
1979.

Of the total shipment, 5,400.04 MT was for the account of Atlas Fertilizer Company
as consignee, 3,400.04 to be discharged in Manila and the remaining 2,000 MT in Cebu.

The goods were insured by the consignee with the Union Insurance Society of
Canton, Ltd. for P6,779,214.00 against all risks.

Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. was appointed as the charterer's agent and
Macondray Company, Inc. as the owner's agent.

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

 The vessel arrived in Manila on October 3, 1979, and unloaded part of the
consignee's goods, then proceeded to Cebu on October 19, 1979, to discharge the rest of the
cargo. On October 31, 1979, the consignee (Atlas) filed a formal claim against
Maritime, copy furnished Macondray, for the amount of P87,163.54, representing C & F
value of the 1,383 shortlanded bags.

On January 12, 1980, the consignee filed another formal claim, this time against
Viva Customs Brokerage, for the amount of P36,030.23, representing the value of 574
bags of net unrecovered spillage.

These claims having been rejected, the consignee then went to Union, which on
demand paid the total indemnity of P113,123.86 pursuant to the insurance contract.
As subrogee of the consignee, Union then filed on September 19, 1980, a complaint for
reimbursement of this amount, with legal interest and attorney's fees, against Hongkong
Island Company, Ltd., Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. and/or Viva Customs
Brokerage. On April 20, 1981, the complaint was amended to drop Viva and implead
Macondray Company, Inc. as a new defendant.

On January 4, 1984, after trial, the trial court rendered judgment holding the defendants
liable as follows:

(a) defendants Hongkong Island Co., Ltd., and its local agent Macondray & Co., Inc. to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P87,163.54 plus 12% interest from April 20, 1981 until the whole
amount is fully paid, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs; and

(b) defendant Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc., to pay the plaintiff the sum of P36,030.23,
plus 12% interest from April 20, 1981 until the whole amount is fully paid, P600.00 as
attorney's fees and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.9

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision on
November 28, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, finding the charterer

Transcontinental Fertilizer Co., Ltd. represented by its agent Maritime
Agencies & Services, Inc. liable for the amount of P87,163.54 plus
interest at 12% plus attorney's fees of P1,000.00. Defendant Hongkong
Island Co., Ltd. represented by Macondray Co., Inc. are accordingly exempted
from any liability.

The Court of Appeals modified the judgment, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, finding the

charterer Transcontinental Fertilizer Co., Ltd. represented by its agent
Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. liable for the amount of P87,163.54
plus interest at 12% plus attorney's fees of P1,000.00. Defendant Hongkong
Island Co., Ltd. represented by Macondray Co., Inc. are accordingly exempted
from any liability.

J. Robert Miranda Gozun

Queries:

a. In G.R. No. 77638, Maritime pleads non-liability on the ground that it was
only the charterer's agent and should not answer for whatever
responsibility might have attached to the principal. It also argues that the
respondent court erred in applying Articles 1734 and 1735 of the Civil Code in
determining the charterer's liability.

b. In G.R. No. 77674, Union asks for the modification of the decision of the
respondent court so as to make Maritime solidarily and solely liable, its
principal not having been impleaded and so not subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts.

Held:

As a mere charterer's agent, it (Maritime) cannot be held solidarily liable

with Transcontinental for the losses/damages to the cargo outside the custody
of the vessel. Notably, Transcontinental was disclosed as the charterer's
principal and there is no question that Maritime acted within the scope of its
authority.

J. Robert Miranda Gozun