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Rogeline R.


Block B

CASE #79


G.R. No. 155306 | 2013-08-28



Petitioner and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) sought to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast Philippines, Inc. A certification
election was conducted on December 29, 1995. Out of the 223 valid votes cast, petitioner garnered 109
votes while NLMS-Olalia received 112 votes and 2 votes were for “No Union.” Thus, the Med-Arbiter who
supervised the certification election issued an Order dated January 9, 1996 certifying NLMS-Olalia as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of respondent company. Meanwhile,
NLMS-Olalia demanded to collectively bargain with respondent company. The latter rejected petitioner’s
demand, insisting that it would negotiate a collective bargaining agreement only with whichever union is
finally certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. Nevertheless, NLMS-Olalia went
on strike on April 1, 1997 until it was temporarily restrained eight days later. Subsequently, on June 5,
1997, petitioner filed its own notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Respondent company opposed petitioner’s move and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioner was not the certified bargaining agent and therefore lacked personality to file a notice of strike.
Thereafter, the parties were able to make concessions during the conciliation-mediation stage in the
NCMB which led petitioner to withdraw its notice of strike. In this connection, the NCMB issued a
Certification dated July 31, 1997 which states that certified that there is no new Notice of Strike filed by
the same union.

On July 21, 1997, however, petitioner’s members staged a “sit-down strike” to dramatize their demand
for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to discriminate against them.
As no one complied with the memorandum within the 24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly
terminated the service of the participants in the “sit-down strike” on July 22, 1997. Consequently, on July
23, 1997, petitioner staged a strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal
lockout against respondent company and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, in the NLRC.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit which the NLRC and CA affirmed.

1. Whether NLRC commited gross and grave abuse of discretion?
2. Whether it constitutes union-busting and unlawful lock-out which amounts to reinstatement and full
payment of backwages?

1.No.Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion,
the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the Decision dated July 1,
2002 of the Court of Appeals was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition
for certiorari. Aside from a general statement in the Jurisdictional Facts portion of the petition and the
sweeping allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the general enumeration of the grounds of the petition,
petitioner failed to substantiate its imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. No argument was advanced to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment
capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Petitioner did not
even discuss how or why the conclusions of the Court of Appeals were made with grave abuse of
discretion. Instead, petitioner limited its discussion on its version of the case, which had been already
rejected both by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Thus, petitioner failed in its duty to demonstrate with
definiteness the grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. No. Petitioner’s case rests on the alleged discriminatory acts of respondent company against
petitioner’s officers and members. However, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held that there was no
sufficient proof of respondent company’s alleged discriminatory acts. Thus, petitioner’s unfair labor
practice, union-busting and unlawful lockout claims do not hold water. Moreover, the established facts as
found by the NLRC are as follows: the “sit-down strike” made by petitioner’s officers and members on July
21, 1997 was in violation of respondent company’s rules, and petitioner’s officers and members ignored
the opportunity given by respondent company for them to explain their misconduct, which resulted in the
termination of their employment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the said findings were supported by
substantial evidence. This Court finds that such ruling of the appellate court is not grave abuse of
discretion, nor could it be considered wrong.
CASE #91

MAINLAND CONSTRUCTIONS, CO., INC., et. al, petitioners,


MILA C. MOVILLA, ERNESTO MOVILLA, JR et.al, respondents.

G.R. No. 118088 | 1995-11-23




Mainland Construction Co., Inc. is a domestic corporation where its principal line of business is the general
construction of roads and bridges and the operation of a service shop for the maintenance of equipment.
Respondents on the other hand, are the surviving heirs of complainant, Ernesto Movilla, who died during
the pendency of the action with the Labor Arbiter.

Ernesto Movilla, who was a Certified Public Accountant during his lifetime, was hired as such by Mainland
in 1977. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Administrative Officer with a monthly salary of
P4,700.00. On April 12, 1987... the Board of Directors elected Ernesto Movilla as Administrative
Manager.[3] He occupied the said position up to the time of his death. On April 2, 1991, the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted a routine inspection on petitioner corporation and found
that it committed such irregularities in the conduct of its business. On the basis of this finding, petitioner
corporation was ordered by DOLE to pay to its thirteen employees, which included Movilla, the total
amount of P309,435.89, representing their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay differentials,
unpaid wages and 13th month... pay. All the employees listed in the DOLE's order were paid by petitioner
corporation, except Ernesto Movilla.

On October 8, 1991, Ernesto Movilla filed a case against petitioner corporation and/or Lucita, Robert, and
Ellen, all surnamed Carabuena, for unpaid wages, separation pay and attorney's fees, with the
Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration, Branch XI, Davao City. Ernesto Movilla died
while the case was being tried by the Labor Arbiter and was promptly substituted by his heirs, private
respondents herein, with the consent of the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment on June 26, 1992, dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The NLRC ruled that the issue in the case was one which involved a labor dispute between an
employee and petitioner corporation and, thus, the NLRC had jurisdiction to... resolve the case.

ISSUES: Whether the controversy presented by complainant is intra-corporate in nature and is within the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission?

No. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a factual question and public respondent's
findings are accorded great weight and respect as the same are supported by substantial evidence. Hence,
we uphold the conclusion of public respondent that Ernesto Movilla was an employee of petitioner

It is pertinent to note that petitioner corporation is not prohibited from hiring its corporate officers to
perform services under a circumstance which will make him an employee. Moreover, although a director
of a corporation is not, merely by virtue of his position, its employee, said director may act as an employee
or accept duties that make him also an employee. 15

Since Ernesto Movilla's complaint involves a labor dispute, it is the NLRC, under Article 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, which has jurisdiction over the case at bench.
CASE #103


Petitioners, Chairperson, versus KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166920 | 2007-02-19



Klaus Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident of New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had
been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water supply and sanitation. PaciCon
Philippines, Inc. (PPI) herein petitioner, is a corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI is to engage in the business of providing
specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. It is also a subsidiary of Pacific
Consultants International of Japan. Jens Peter Henrichsen, director of PCIJ, is based in Tokyo, Japan.
Henrichsen commuted from Japan to Manila and vice versa, as well as in other countries where PCIJ had
business. PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. In
1997, Schonfeld is employed by PCIJ through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and
Sanitation Department. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary is
to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ. Respondent Schonfeld however received a letter from Henrichsen
informing him that his employment has been terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI has not been
successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines. By electronic mail however, Henrichsen
subsequently informed him to stay put in his job after August 5, 1999 until such time that he would be
able to report on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Schonfeld then
eventually filed money claims, unpaid salary, leave pay air fare from Manila to Canada and cost of
shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially settled the money claims but refused to pay the rest.

This prompted Schonfeld to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen
with the Labor Arbiter. In his complaint, he alleges that PPI failed to notify DOLE of its decision to close
one of its departments which resulted in his dismissal, and that they failed to notify him that his
employment was terminated after August 4, 1999. PPI moved to dismiss on the following grounds: 1. The
LA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, 2. the venue was improperly laid. Further, it averred that
respondent Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was
also employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan. Under
lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo. Lastly, under Section 12 of the General
Conditions of Employment attached to his letter of employment, any employment related dispute should
be brought before London Court of Arbitration.

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?


Yes. The Court ruled that the settled stipulationsregarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case
of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan is that while they are considered valid and enforceable,
venue stipulations in a contract do not as a rule, supersede the general rules set forth in Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, in the absence of any qualifying words. In this case, they should merely be considered an
agreement on national forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but
rather, permissive.
In this case, no restrictive words are provided such as "solely", "only", "exclusively in this court".
Further, petitioners' insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be
rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the
application of the principle for the following reasons: (1) the Labor Code does not involve forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, (2) the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is properly considered as defense. (3) In Bank of
America v. NT & SA Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so, provided that the following
requisites are met: 1. that the Philippine Court is the one to which the parties may conveniently resort to,
2. that the Philippine Court is in a position to make intelligent decision as to the law and the facts, and 3.
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.