Redistricting Paper Wash U Law Clinic 2017

LOOKING
TOWARD
2022
A Best Practices Study for Redrawing
Saint Louis City’s Ward Map
Prepared by Meg Bruyns, Emily Friedman, Tobin Raju, and Zack Smith
Washington University School of Law Urban Revitalization Clinic
Presented at Washington University School of Law on April 21, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 3
REDISTRICTING IN THE CITY OF SAINT LOUIS ..................................................................... 4
A. A Brief History of the Board of Aldermen and Redistricting in Saint Louis .......................... 4
B. Board Bill No. 31 and Referendum R .......................................................................................... 5
C. Drawing the 2011 Ward Map .................................................................................................... 6
CRITERIA FOR REDISTRICTING ............................................................................................. 7
A. Constitutional, State, and Local Criteria ..................................................................................... 7
B. Federal Voting Rights Act .............................................................................................................. 8
OVERARCHING VALUES TO CONSIDER IN REDISTRICTING .............................................. 10
A. Transparency ..................................................................................................................................10
B. Public Engagement ........................................................................................................................12
C. Independence .................................................................................................................................13
TYPES OF REDISTRICTING ENTITIES AND HOW OTHER CITIES HAVE DRAWN THE LINES 14
(1) City Council .......................................................................................................................................14
(2) Advisory Commission .......................................................................................................................16
(3) Politician Commission .......................................................................................................................17
(4) Independent Commission or Person .............................................................................................. 19
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE ............................................................................ 31
NEXT STEPS ........................................................................................................................ 38
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 40
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... 41

Looking Toward 2022: A Best Practices Study for Redrawing Saint Louis City’s Ward Map
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report consolidates the Urban Revitalization Clinic’s research regarding best practices for
municipal redistricting, including our review of the range of redistricting entities used in other cities.
This report makes four primary recommendations:
1. St. Louis should employ an independent citizens commission to draw the new ward map.
2. This independent citizens commission should implement policies to ensure transparency and
independence.
3. Public participation must be included in the commission’s redistricting process.
4. There should be fail-safe mechanisms in place, in the event that the commission’s map is challenged or
the commission is unable to produce a final map.
It also suggests next steps for how to implement an independent citizens commission in St. Louis, either
through the passage of an ordinance in the Board of Aldermen or through a ballot initiative.
Values
Redistricting can be a contentious and complicated process. To better serve the citizens impacted by
redistricting, the line drawing process should respect and embrace three overarching values: transparency,
public participation, and independence from political actors. A transparent redistricting process results in
increased public trust and ensures that boundary lines are being drawn according to legal requirements,
community expectations, and in the best interests of citizens—not political actors. Public engagement enables
redistricting entities to incorporate resident and stakeholder concerns into their decision-making. Public
involvement aids redistricting entities in conceptualizing local communities and defining boundaries that reflect
resident preferences. Independence from incumbents in the redistricting process can reduce the partisan and
self-interested considerations that have traditionally guided the process. It also ensures that redistricting
decisions are made according to accepted principles, not political considerations.
Case studies
We provide seven case studies of redistricting processes in other cities. Of these case studies, the
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission in Austin, Texas comes closest to the type of redistricting entity
that scholars identify as ideal. It does so for three reasons. First, it is comprised of diverse, politically-
independent members. Second, its process is politically-independent and transparent. Third, the Commission
encourages and is responsive to public participation.
Legal Requirements
The ward map must comply with a number of Federal, State, and local legal requirements. These
include the requirement that wards, based upon the 2020 census, contain roughly equal populations and are
as compact as possible. Further, the ward boundaries must be drawn using contiguous straight lines. Prudent
redistricting will also attempt to preserve communities of interest. Additionally, the Federal Voting Rights Act
requires that minority populations have the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. To accomplish that
end, the map must preserve majority-minority districts.
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Redistricting Entities
In most jurisdictions, members of the legislative body are responsible for redrawing the boundaries of
the districts in which they serve. This method, however, is not the only model available for redistricting nor is it
the most desirable. In some places, commissions rather than incumbents carry out municipal redistricting. These
commissions can be grouped into three categories: advisory commissions, politician commissions, and
independent commissions.
Advisory commissions are comprised of members selected by legislators. They do not have the
authority to adopt district maps. Instead proposed plans must be submitted to the legislature for approval.
Politician commissions are made up of elected officials or their designees and have varying levels of authority
to adopt district maps. Independent commissions are comprised of members who are neither public officials
nor legislators. Independent commissions can be divided into two subcategories: non-citizen commissions and
citizen commissions. Non-citizen commissions are made up of political appointees, whereas non-political
appointee citizens serve on citizen commissions. Independent commissions have varied authority over
implementing the final redistricting plan.
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Looking Toward 2022: A Best Practices Study

for Redrawing Saint Louis City’s Ward Map
By Meg Bruyns, Emily Friedman, Tobin Raju, and Zack Smith
Washington University School of Law Urban Revitalization Clinic
INTRODUCTION
This study is the result of the Urban Revitalization Clinic at Washington University School of Law’s
semester-long research on municipal redistricting best practices. We embarked on this research because Saint
Louis City will be consolidating its wards in 2022 which will require the ward map to be redrawn. We believe
that the period leading up to this change is a prime moment for Saint Louis City to reflect on how it has
previously drawn ward maps and how it could improve this process in the future. The process is especially ripe
for reexamination because there is a growing national trend toward more independent and transparent
redistricting processes.
This study outlines best practices for redistricting and makes concrete recommendations about how
Saint Louis City could conduct its process in the future. Specifically, we recommend the City adopt an
independent citizens redistricting commission. We also provide recommendations on next steps for how to
implement it.
The best practices and the recommendations we make are based on our research into the values that
should ideally guide redistricting and our case studies of the redistricting process in other cities. Our
recommendations are just that—recommendations, not mandates. This study is intended as a public good we
hope will jump-start meaningful conversations in Saint Louis about the importance of the redistricting process.
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REDISTRICTING IN THE CITY OF SAINT LOUIS

A. A Brief History of the Board of Aldermen and Redistricting in Saint
Louis
Saint Louis City’s Board of Aldermen (hereafter the “Board”) was created through the 1914
adoption of the Saint Louis City Charter (hereafter “Charter”).1 Article IV, Section I vests the City’s legislative
power in a board of 28 aldermen and one president.2 Under the 1914 Charter, all 28 aldermen were
elected to serve the City as “at-large” members.3 Aldermen’s status as “at large” members was necessary to
comply with a Missouri state law requiring “cities of a certain size to have at least one legislative chamber at
large.”4 After this state law was eliminated in 1934, an amendment was put before voters to have aldermen
elected to represent each of the City’s 28 wards.5 Voters were told that this change would “likely result in
greater interest on the part of the Aldermen in the affairs of his own ward” and would increase the possibility
of minority representation on the Board.6 This 1941 amendment was overwhelmingly successful with 67.4% of
voters and twenty-four of the City’s twenty-eight wards voting “Yes.”7 Accordingly, Article IV, Section I was
amended to require each of the 28 aldermen to be elected by “qualified voters of the ward he or she is a
candidate to represent.”8 When this amendment occurred, the City’s population was at its peak of
between 816,048 and 856,796 people9 with approximately 29,872 constituents per alderman.
After reaching its zenith in 1950, the City’s population began to decrease and between 1950
and 1960, 106,770 people left the City.10 In recognition of this decline, City voters were asked for the
first time to reduce the number of aldermen to 15—seven serving the City at large, seven representing
wards, and one president.11 The voters rejected this change in 1957.12 A 1981 board bill sponsored by
two Republican board members never passed the proposal stage.13 In reaction to this, a citizen initiative
was placed on the ballot in 1983;14 this initiative, however, was again ultimately rejected by over half of
the City’s voters.15
Over the next three decades, the number of constituents per alderman decreased from 16,171
in 1980,16 to 14, 167 in 1990,17 and 12, 435 in 2000.18 In reaction to this dramatic decline, major
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overhauls to City government were suggested and placed before the voters in 2004;19 City voters again
rejected this change.20 By the end of the decade, the City’s population had declined to 319,29421 with
approximately 11,403 constitutes per aldermen.22 Voters were again asked to amend the Charter to
reduce the Board’s size. Finally, in 2012, after being asked for 55 years to do so, over 60 percent of
voters approved the amendment to the Charter;23 the City’s Board would be reduced by half.24
B. Board Bill No. 31 and Referendum R

The 2012 amendment to the City’s Charter began as Board Bill No. 31, a bill introduced by
Alderwoman Phyllis Young of the 7th ward.25 When first introduced, this bill sought to reduce the Board to
“a body of twelve (12) aldermen representing twelve (12) wards….”26 The bill was co-sponsored by
Aldermen Conway, Wessels, Howard, Florida, Baringer, Roddy, Davis, Ogilvie, Cohn, and Krewson.27 In
the Legislative Committee, the number of aldermen was later increased to “a body of fourteen (14)
aldermen representing fourteen (14) wards….”28 Some of the benefits cited as reasons to reduce the
Board’s size were increased efficiency,29 increased productivity,30 better communication between
constituents and their representatives,31 cost savings,32 and a shift to looking at issues from a city wide
prospective.33
The proposal, however, was not without critics. Some feared an increase in constituents would
decrease an alderman’s ability to focus on an individual constituent’s problems34 and worried it will be
easier for big businesses35 and donors36 to have a greater influence on the legislative process. Others
wondered if splitting neighborhoods between aldermen would impede development37 or why this move
should be made as it is in discord with regional standards.38 The bill was ultimately passed in a vote of
2139 to 7,40 and was quickly signed by Mayor Slay. When it was placed on the November ballot, 61.5%
of the City’s 128,522 voters approved of the amendment.41
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C. Drawing the 2011 Ward Map

To facilitate the reduction in the Board’s size, the City’s legislative map will need to be redrawn. The
last time the City’s ward boundaries were redrawn was in 2011.42 This redistricting occurred after the
2010 federal census, which necessitated adjustments to equalize the number of continuants per ward in
response to significant population loss in the City between 2000 and 2010.43 The map produced by the
Board was created by the Board's Legislative Committee and later voted on by the entire Board; the
final boundaries have been codified in City Code 2.12.010.44 Exactly what the Board considered when it
chose where to place the ward boundaries has not been publicly released. Nonetheless, the starting point
for a conversation about new ward boundaries in preparation for a reduction from 28 to 14 wards is the
2011 map.
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CRITERIA FOR REDISTRICTING

The ward reduction will occur after the 2020 census data is released. A new City ward map must be
drawn to facilitate this reduction. The final map must comply with a number of federal, state, and city
laws. The redistricting effort can also be guided by criteria identified by Supreme Court case law and
normative considerations. These criteria are: equal population, compactness, contiguity, preserving
communities of interest, and respect for minority representation.45
A. Constitutional, State, and Local Criteria

The Supreme Court has declared that district populations must be roughly equal in number.46 It is
generally accepted that local legislative districts can have a total population deviation between districts
of 10%.47 In addition to the equal population standard, the Supreme Court has identified four
“traditional” redistricting criteria that may guide redistricting.48 These are: contiguity, compactness,
respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest.49 Contiguity and
compactness are geographic measures of representational fairness.50 To satisfy the contiguity criteria
“every part of the district [must be] reachable from every other part without crossing the district
boundary.”51 Compactness will generally be achieved if a district has a regular shape with constituents
living relatively close to each other.52 The Supreme Court53 has also found that, when possible, the
preservation of existing political units, like voting precincts, and geographic boundaries—such as census
tracts—should be used as redistricting criteria.54 Communities of interest are “groups of people in a
geographic area who share similar interests and priorities—whether social, cultural, ethnic, economic,
religious, or political.”55 This criteria is described as the most difficult to quantify,56 and for this reason
many states do not treat preservation of communities of interest as a redistricting requirement.57 While
these “traditional” criteria are not always legally mandated, they are “prudential feature[s] of good
districting schemes.”58
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Ordinance Number 69185 requires the total number of wards to be reduced to 14 in the year
2022.59 The boundaries of these wards must be “based upon the 2020 decennial census of the United
States of America, and each decennial census thereafter….”60 The boundaries for these wards, which will
be established by ordinance,61 must “comprise as nearly as practicable, compact and contiguous territory
within straight lines, and contain as nearly as may be the same number of inhabitants….”62 These
boundary requirements are required by Missouri State Constitution Art. III §§ 4, 5, 7. The final map must
“be adopted before the end of the calendar year next succeeding the year the census is taken, with an
effective date of the first day of the subsequent calendar year.” 63 In the 2022 context, this means a
map must be finalized by December 31, 2021 with an effective date of January 1, 2022.
B. Federal Voting Rights Act

The Voting Rights Act prohibits voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race or
membership in a minority group. Section 2 of the Act is specifically concerned with “vote dilution,”64
practices that interfere with a minority population’s opportunity to participate in the electoral process.65
The Act also requires the drawing of districts in a way that preserves majority-minority districts: majority-
minority districts are districts where a majority of the eligible voting population is comprised of minority
groups.66 The Act also requires that majority-minority districts have a reasonable opportunity to elect the
candidate of their choice.67 District maps may be subject to a legal challenge under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, if, when considering the totality of the circumstances and the unique social historical
character of the region, minority voting power to elect candidates of their choice is decreased.68 The City
of St. Louis has been accused of violating the Voting Rights Act for vote dilution on two occasions.69 Courts
employ a test and multi-factor analysis when determining whether minority voting power has been
unlawfully-diluted. Generally, when voting is polarized along racial lines and historically disadvantaged
and large, geographically compact minority groups have “less opportunity than other members of the
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electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice,”70
redistricting plans may violate the Voting Rights Act.71
Courts will also look to whether minority groups control substantially fewer districts than their
share of total voting age population would indicate. For example, if a minority group comprised 20% of
a region’s total population, then 20% of the districts should afford minority groups an effective
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Jurisdictions that are required to preserve majority-
minority districts must draw districts with a proportion of minority population that gives minority groups
effective political power.72 Accounting for differences between majority and minority groups in voter
turnout, population age, and other factors, districts may have to be comprised of more than 50% minority
population in order to give minority groups effective control to elect representatives of their choice.73 In
some cases the Department of Justice has required districts that are made up of 65% minority
members.74
The 65% standard has been used as a useful shorthand for complying with Section 2, the 65%
standard is not however a strict legal requirement.75 Courts will look to the unique demographic and
electoral history of a jurisdiction to determine the appropriate minority population percentage needed to
comply with Section 2.76 In 1995, the Eighth Circuit noted that the 65% rule77 had achieved “general
acceptance” in affording minority groups a “reasonable” chance to elect candidates of their choice.78 The
Eighth Circuit, citing a Seventh Circuit case which used 1980 census data,79 explained that “ [the] figure is
derived by augmenting a simple majority with an additional 5% for young population, 5% for low voter
registration and 5% for low voter turn-out, for a total increment of 15%”80—for a total of 65% minority
population. The current status of this 65% standard and the data on which it is based is uncertain.81
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OVERARCHING VALUES TO CONSIDER IN REDISTRICTING

The drawing of legislative district maps can significantly affect the representation and services
received by an area’s residents and may also greatly alter the political landscape of an area. Balancing
these two considerations through the redistricting process has been a struggle in many jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, redistricting efforts are often criticized as being guided by incumbents’ concerns for reelection;
the interests of citizens are often treated as an afterthought.82 Increasing transparency, public involvement,
and independence from political actors in the redistricting process can soften the partisan and self-interested
considerations that some have said traditionally guide the process and act as a barrier to effective
representation.83 Increasing transparency and public participation aids the redistricting entity in conceiving of
how the public views the boundaries of their community; allows the redistricting entity to gauge the reaction to
their proposed district map; encourages members of the public to become engaged in redistricting issues; and
increases the effectiveness of political representation for the district.84 Independence from political actors
increases the likelihood that appropriate considerations will guide line drawing decisions. Together
transparency, public participation, and independence from political actors enables redistricting to lead to the
effective and fair representation of citizens.85
A. Transparency
In many jurisdictions, redistricting efforts are conducted in secret with little public explanation of the
reasoning behind the final map.86 Historically, this is how redistricting has occurred in Saint Louis.87 The
problem with this approach is that it can result in a cloud of distrust surrounding the process and resulting map.
This distrust can be reduced by implementing policies that promote transparency through the decision-making
process.88 Such transparency protects the interests of citizens and legitimizes redistricting entities.
Transparency is an essential element in creating a fair and legitimate process.89 This is because it
allows the public to act as a check on the redistricting entity and hold its members accountable for their
decisions. As the public can monitor the process, it can ensure legal requirements and community expectations
are satisfied.90
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Policies that increase transparency in redistricting typically come in two forms: “data transparency”
and “process transparency.”91 Data transparency refers to the availability of population and geographic
data and metadata that serve as the underlying inputs for a redistricting map, as well as the software that
processed that data.92 A good example of effective data transparency is California’s Statewide Database,
an independent database that makes political, demographic, and redistricting data available to the public.93
The data available on the database is the same data used by California’s redistricting commission.94
Additionally, support and training is also provided for individuals who want to use the data.95
Process transparency relates to the availability of information regarding the redistricting process.96
This information includes factors redistricting entities consider when drawing lines, the “structure and timeline of
the decision process, the information considered, alternatives explored in good faith, [and] individuals and
experts consulted during the process.”97 California’s independent redistricting commission is also a good
example of appropriate process transparency.
The California Redistricting Commission has taken several steps to prevent the negative perceptions
associated with opaque processes. First, it requires the redistricting commission to conduct all meetings and
make all decisions in public.98 Second, all comments and data must be “on the record” for immediate and
widespread public distribution.99 Third, all commission meetings must be open to the public and video
recordings of the meetings made available online.100 Finally, the commission is required to produce a report
accompanying the final map that justifies and explains its choices.101
Suggestions on how redistricting can be made more transparent were recently released by the
American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution.102 This proposal calls for decision-making entities to
make their redistricting proposals and the criteria used to formulate those plans publicly available. This
includes any demographic, electoral, community, and geographic data used by the redistricting entity.
Additionally, any software and inputs used to create a map should also be made available to the public and
accompanied by tools and easily understood instruction manuals to make the software user friendly.103
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B. Public Engagement
Redistricting can have a significant impact on local populations and the responsiveness of their
representation. Since members of the public are often better situated to anticipate any possible negative
effects line drawing may have on specific areas, their input is essential to creating the best map possible.104
Public engagement is essential for determining local identity, preferences, and needs. To accurately
assess community preferences, community members and relevant stakeholders should be consulted throughout
the process.105 For example, as firefighters and police officers have previously expressed frustration with the
number of wards, they would likely be interested in shaping the composition of future wards. Other
stakeholders, including business leaders and entities that provide municipal services, may also be interested in
contributing to the process.106
Scholars have encouraged the redistricting process follow the “all-affected principle.”107 This
principle argues that democratic institutions protect their legitimacy by protecting the right of those who are
affected by a decision to participate in making it.108 Participation should be more than a formality and should
be more substantial than merely allowing for a public comment period. Area scholars have pointed to the
Fergusson Commission’s approach to community meetings and engagement as a good model for any
redistricting body to follow. The community engagement component should explain the redistricting process to
citizens as well as the goals redistricting should accomplish in order to allow citizens to participate
meaningfully.
Citizens, especially those who have been typically disenfranchised in the current ward system, should
have the opportunity to voice their concerns. One local scholar has suggested adopting a process modeled on
the Participatory Budgeting Process—in which ordinary citizens decide on spending projects. Citizens identify
spending priorities; delegate and create specific spending proposals with the help of experts; citizens vote on
the proposals; and the city implements the voter-approved proposals. This model has been described as an
accurate way to reflect community priorities and may be adapted to redistricting efforts.109
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Finally, the availability of GIS technology has made it practical for individual citizens to propose their
own redistricting maps and influence redistricting entity decisions.110 Some redistricting entities have
attempted to maximize this type of public participation by ensuring all drawing is done in public meetings.111
As suggested both by a local scholar112 and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,113 sufficient public engagement
requires any software used to draw the lines be made available to the public for members of the community
to mock up their own district maps.
C. Independence
Public confidence in the redistricting process is generally highest when the entity deciding the map is
independent from those whose political futures are reliant on the outcome of redistricting maps.114 These
independent entities do the best job of ensuring normative criteria are given preference over political self-
interest.115 Increasing the independence of a redistricting body minimizes conflict of interest issues inherent to
legislative-led redistricting efforts116 and allows political actors to avoid the “political quagmire” of
legislative redistricting.117 By maintaining independence from politics, the public perceptions of the process
and decision-making entity will be significantly improved.118
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TYPES OF REDISTRICTING ENTITIES AND HOW OTHER CITIES HAVE DRAWN

THE LINES
Redistricting is often a controversial, contested, and complicated effort.119 Redistricting entities
can be broken into four categories: (1) City Council (2) Advisory Commission (3) Politician Commission and
(4) Independent Commission (subdivided into Non-Citizens Commission and Citizens Commission) or
Person. A case study review of the redistricting processes in different cities—Cleveland, Dallas, Louisville,
Toronto, San Francisco, New York City, and Austin—illustrates how different types of redistricting entity
work. We chose these cities because they are each notable examples of different types of redistricting
entities. Though the type of redistricting entity tends to dictate the extent to which the process is political,
the following case studies demonstrate that policies which promote the desirable redistricting values of
transparency, public engagement, and independence can be baked, to varying degrees, into all of these
entities.
(1) City Council

The first type of redistricting process is one run by a municipality’s legislative branch. In most
jurisdictions, the legislative body is responsible for redrawing the boundaries for the districts and wards
in which they serve.120 Because the St. Louis Board of Aldermen or city officials have historically drawn
the City’s ward maps, this is the redistricting process that St. Louis has historically used. This is not the
exclusive method for redistricting nor is it the most desirable. City councils are the most politicized
redistricting entities because “the process will be mired in personal and political self-interest.”121 Council
members are more likely to draw the lines in ways that will ensure their continued place in office and
maintain or bolster their district’s status.
C ASE S TUDY : C LEVELAND ’ S 2013 C ITY C OUNCIL -R UN P ROCESS

In 2008, Cleveland voters approved a charter amendment that empowered the City Council to
draw the ward map.122 When redistricting occurred in 2013, then-Council President Martin J. Sweeney
largely controlled the process.123 A local newspaper characterized the process as controversial, noting
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that it “provoked bitter feuds between members, resident protests in council chambers, intervention of
state legislators and the threat of legal action on behalf of Hispanic voters.”124
According to the same newspaper, Sweeney met behind closed doors with a consultant, Bob
Dykes, regarding the map and “would only show his colleagues their own ward boundaries, which
changed dramatically from week to week in some cases.”125 Dykes stated that his stakeholder outreach
was robust, noting that his “phone was on and his door open.”126 However, at least one councilman
complained that when he tried to discuss his district’s potential boundaries, he was bounced between
Sweeney and Dykes and told that the “map was in flux.”127 In-fighting was rampant among council
members.128 For example, Sweeney publicly accused another council member of “stealing his ward map
from Dykes’ office and leaking it to the media.”129 Ultimately, the proposed map was only revealed to
the full Council one week before Council voted on it.130
Members of the public also complained about the process. Critics of the plan protested at a
Council meeting by wearing duct tape over their mouths with the words “No Voice” written on it.131
However, Sweeney and Dykes were at least partially responsive to public input. At a Council meeting,
the chairman of a Cleveland nonprofit that empowers the local Hispanic community cautioned that
changes to a particular ward could violate the Voting Rights Act.132 The Council subsequently revised that
ward to increase its Hispanic population.133
The Council ultimately approved the proposed map.134 If it had failed to do so, the Cleveland
Charter requires the Mayor to submit a map to the Council within ten days.135 If the Council does not
reapportion the wards within this ten-day period, then the Mayor’s map becomes effective.136
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(2) Advisory Commission

Occasionally, commissions rather than incumbents carry out municipal redistricting.137 The first of
these commissions is the advisory commission. Advisory commissions assist the legislative body and
incumbents in drawing boundary lines. They may suggest district lines to the legislature but ultimately it is
within the discretion of the legislature whether to adopt the proposed boundaries.138 Advisory
commissions have been employed in municipal redistricting in Los Angeles, Dallas, Albuquerque,
Sacramento, Mesa, and San Jose.139 City council members commonly appoint commission members, and
political considerations frequently dominate the selection process.140 Advisory commission members can
often be legislators. These advisory commissions differ from legislature and city council led redistricting
only in that the entire legislature is not involved in the effort and their inability to implement a map on
their own.141 These commissions often produce redistricting plans that reflect the preferences of the
incumbents who appointed the commissioners.
Backup commissions—a variant of advisory commissions—assume redistricting duties if the
legislative body is unable to agree on a districting plan.142 State and municipal approaches to backup
commissions vary widely. In some states the backup commission is comprised of one member, the
Secretary of State. In some municipalities, advisory commissions submit a plan to the city council that is
automatically adopted unless the city council adopts a different plan.143
Advisory commissions and their various forms, while creating some degree of separation between
legislators and redistricting advisory commissions, do not have complete autonomy over the process and
therefore do not guarantee the absence of legislator influence.144 Although city council appointed
advisory commissions provide some separation from the city council, these commissions are subject to
influence by the council because the council retains control over final map approval.145
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Case Study: Dallas’ 2010 Advisory Commission

The Dallas Charter requires the creation of an advisory commission for redistricting.146
Each member of the city council appoints one commission member; the mayor designates the
commission chair.147 The Charter urges the city council and mayor to ensure that the appointees
are both geographically and racially diverse.148 Additionally, there are qualifications that the
appointees must meet and restrictions placed on them following their service. For example, they
must be registered to vote and cannot run for city council in the general election following their
commission service.149
Ultimately, the city council has the final say over the map. The commission files a
recommended map with the mayor, who then presents it to the city council.150 The council can
either adopt the plan, or modify and adopt it.151
The Charter also prohibits city council members from communicating with commission
members or the commission’s staff regarding redistricting.152 During the 2010 redistricting cycle,
however, local media reported that council and commission members did not follow this
requirement.153 According to a Dallas Morning News editorial, the Commission’s chairwoman
noted that, “questionable behavior by certain commission and council members had tailed the
process with backroom negotiations.”154 This kind of politicking is characteristic of advisory
commission processes because the members are directly appointed by—and have ties to—city
council members.155
(3) Politician Commission

The third type of redistricting entity is the politician commission. Politician commissions
differ from legislature-led redistricting because the entire legislature is not involved in the
process. Instead they are comprised of smaller groups of city councilors of other elected officials
rather than the entire legislative body. Typically, select members of the legislature, other elected
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officials or their designees156 are selected by their colleagues or judges.157 Politician commissions
are not independent from the influence or elected officials and incumbents but are autonomous—
their plans do not need approval from the legislature.158 Politician commissions can be either
partisan or bi-partisan depending on the composition of the legislature and the rules that govern
the selection of commission members.159 Politician commissions that are truly bipartisan can lead to
bargained outcomes between political parties. Some scholars who advocate politician commissions
argue that redistricting is an inherently political endeavor, and as such should be bargained
between political actors.160 However, if redistricting is a political act, it is a unique political act
that changes the political landscape: “legislators who are placed in charge of trading off various
competing redistricting considerations are also the same individuals who stand to gain the most,
personally and directly, by including certain residents and excluding others--whether those
residents are voters, supporters, or rivals.”161
CASE STUDY: LOUISVILLE’S 2011 AD HOC METRO COUNCIL COMMITTEE

A Metro Council Ad Hoc Committee comprised of Metro Council members carried out Louisville’s
2011 redistricting. Initially, a Metro Council working group researched the process and had preliminary
discussions with the County Attorney’s office about the legal criteria for redistricting.162 The Metro Council
President then formally assembled the Metro Ad Hoc Committee on Redistricting.163 The committee held
seven meetings—all open to the public—and six regional meetings to “provide information about
particular districts and gather public comment and input.”164
The Committee sought counsel on legal standards for redistricting by from both the County
Attorney’s office165 and J. Gerald Hebert, a noted election law and redistricting attorney.166
Although there was initially some discussion of consulting independent demographers, it seems that
the Committee and city staff essentially drew the lines themselves with some consultation from
local stakeholders.167
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The Metro Council unanimously approved the Ad Hoc Committee’s redistricting plan.168
Notably, in a lawsuit against the Metro Council alleging that the redistricting violated the Voting
Rights Act and Kentucky law, the pro se plaintiffs argued in part that an independent commission
should have performed the redistricting.169 The Western District of Kentucky held that this claim
failed because the relevant Kentucky statutes said nothing about an independent commission.170
(4) Independent Commission or Person

Independent Commissions are comprised of neither public officials nor legislators. A benefit of an
independent commission is that it can alleviate partisan deadlock without completely ignoring political
considerations.171 These independent commissions vary in membership and redistricting authority.172 Two
variants of independent commissions exist: independent non-citizens commissions and independent citizens
commissions.173 The main distinction between the two subsets of independent commissions is the
compositions of their members. Independent non-citizens commission members are typically experts in the
field of redistricting or have some other political expertise, whereas independent citizen commissions
emulate the jury system—where non-expert citizens participate in the effort.174 While independent non-
citizens commissions are not necessarily less independent than independent citizens commissions, the
practicalities of selecting individuals with expertise often results in legislators selecting members of non-
citizens commissions. Independent citizens commissions are much less likely to be appointed by legislators.
Both types of independent commissions have varied authority to implement redistricting plans and
independence from incumbents. Separation from legislator influence and the authority to implement a
plan has important consequences for the commission’s effectiveness at preventing incumbents from
choosing their voters rather than voters choosing their representatives.175
The final map produced by independent commissions is treated differently across jurisdictions. A
majority of jurisdictions with independent commissions do not require legislative approval of commission-
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produced maps.176 Among independent commissions there exists variety in autonomy: the independent
commission’s plan may be enacted automatically without action from the legislature; the legislature may
reject the plan, and, if successive plans are rejected, the legislature may take over the process; the plan
may require super majority approval and allows the judiciary to draft a plan if a super majority is not
met; the legislature may make limited amendments to the plan by a two-thirds vote; or requiring a
judicial panel to approve the plan.177 The involvement of political actors in an independent commission
may satisfy a desire for elected officials to ensure the process meets the needs of their constituents.178
The method of member selection is the second important distinction in independent commissions.
Electing members of an independent commission has significant costs179 and is likely impractical—
organizing a special election and campaigning for selection would be more costly than appointing
commissions members; it would also risk politicizing a process which aims to be independent from
politics.180 Because of these difficulties, jurisdictions have found creative ways to select commission
members in an equitable and transparent manner by adopting a procedure similar to jury selection.181 In
some independent commission permutations, commission members are selected by members of the
legislature,182 others allow legislators to select commission members from a group of names curated by a
politically balanced body,183 and others only allow legislators to strike names from a pool of potential
members, giving legislators no power to select commission members.184 Commission independence is
maximized when using the latter method to select members.185 This pool selection method has been
implemented by the State of California and City of Austin for their independent commissions. In both
jurisdictions, the pool of potential commission members is carefully vetted to remove unqualified
individuals and those with conflicts of interests.186
Redistricting through an independent commission has the benefit of avoiding conflicts of interest
typical in legislator dominated processes.187 Independent commissions soften the personal interests that
influence traditional redistricting efforts. Members of independent commissions whose job security are not
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reliant on the outcome of redistricting plans are less likely to be influenced by personal considerations—
this disinterest encourages substantive and procedural fairness.188 Independent commissions do not
guarantee districts will be drawn in the most equitable and desirable way; ultimately the substantive
benefits of the plan will be determined by the goals and factors the commission considers. Independent
commissions do, however, assure the predominate goal and factors are not “legislator self-interest.”189
In addition to removing political influence, independent commissions often result in more
competitive districts, which increases legislator responsiveness to constituent preferences and increases
voter participation.190 Independent commissions may also result in legislative efficiencies, removing a
difficult task such as redistricting from the legislator’s duties allowing them to focus on more substantive
issues of governing.191 Commission independence from political actors and autonomy to implement the
plan without city council approval are two measures by which independent commissions should be judged.
(a) Non-Citizens Commission

Case Study: Louisville’s 2000 academic process
During its 2003 city-county merger, Louisville authorized one politically-appointed academic to
redraw its district lines. A November 2000 referendum vote consolidated the City of Louisville and
adjacent county into a single government, run by a mayor and 26-member Metro Council.192 Before the
merger, a mayor and 12-member Board of Alderman ran the City.193
The Kentucky state statute that governed the merger stipulated an academic process for drawing
the new districts. It delegated this task to Bill Dakan, a University of Louisville geographer194 who had
done work on hypothetical Louisville redistricting maps.195 The state statute stipulated that Dakan’s final
plan must be approved “as submitted and without amendment.”196
Because Dakan was solely entrusted with the process, he had a great deal of latitude. In drawing
the districts, he relied on both professional and personal criteria.197 Although formally Dakan had full
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decision-making power, he was open to suggestions and comments.198 However, it is unclear how much
outside input he actually received and to what extent (if any) he incorporated it into his final plan.
The state legislature chose the academic process for several reasons including Dakan’s research
on a hypothetical merger199 and because the newly formed Metro Council would not have incumbents.200
One state legislature stated that, “[r]ather than allow redistricting to become a divisive political
issue…the General Assembly thought it would be better to let a supposedly objective academic do it.”201
Some were critical of this decision, though. For example, a University of Louisville political science
professor argued that, “redistricting was by its very nature meant to be a political process.”202 He
elaborated by noting that, “‘[s]pecialists are usually advisers. A government body can say, ‘Here are our
values and issues, guide us.’ But that’s not the case here.’”203 And, a city Alderwoman was “somewhat
frighten[ed] that one man [was] drawing the districts.”204
Case Study: Toronto’s 2013-2016 consultant team process

Toronto’s City Council recently reassessed its ward boundaries using a team of consultants,
known the Toronto Ward Boundary Review (“TWBR”), with the Council retaining final control over
map adoption.205 The rationale for using third-party consultants was to avoid the legal challenges
that had followed previous redistricting efforts.206 The City Manager stated that the TWBR
process was to “be managed in a manner consistent with the arm’s length principle to ensure that
the review is objective, independent and unbiased and will withstand possible appeals to the
Ontario Municipal Board or Divisional Court.”207 Through a Steering Committee, the City
monitored deliverables, and provided strategic advice, data and information, as needed by the
TWBR.208 To this end, the City answered procedural questions from the public—for example, the
deliverables schedule—and directed the public’s substantive questions about the process to the
TWBR.209
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The TWBR consisted of the Canadian Urban Institute, two consultancy firms with ward-
boundary review experience, and a private consultant specializing in research, policy analysis
and strategic planning.210 There was also an advisory panel with a municipal lawyer, a public
health professor, a politics and public administration professor, the Vice President and Director of
the Toronto Association of Business Improvement Areas, and a former Ontario Municipal Board
member.211
The TWBR’s process for creating its ward boundary proposals began with submission of a
work plan and research report to the City Council for approval. The TWBR then conducted an
initial round of civic engagement and public consultation, and submitted an option report with
several potential maps. It conducted a second round of engagement and consultation to gather
opinions about the options. It then submitted a final report, an additional information report, and
a supplementary report.212 The total cost for the TWBR was $800,050 Canadian ($599,513
USD).213
The TWBR’s two rounds of civic engagement and public consultation included social media,
print advertisements, online survey, public meetings, and meetings with the mayor, each council
member, and key stakeholders.214 Despite a robust media and social media campaign, the public
meetings were poorly attended: 192 people attended twelve public meetings during Round One,
with some attending more than one meeting.215 Survey efforts were more successful, with 608
people completing the TWBR’s survey.216 The survey questions included:
o Do you have any concerns related to the current boundaries of your Ward?
o Do the boundaries of your Ward divide any communities of interest?
o Current Toronto wards range in population between approximately 45,000 and 94,000.
What do you think the population of a Toronto ward should be, so that a Councillor can
effectively represent the ward?
o From your point-of-view are there any issues regarding the boundaries of any other Ward or
Wards?
o Do you have any other comments regarding Toronto’s ward boundaries? Please describe.
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According to Lisa Cavicchia, Program Director at Canadian Urban Institute, the TWBR also
posed the above questions to each councillor in interviews during both civic engagement and
public consultation rounds.217 Finally, during Round Two, the team held an additional twelve public
meetings.218
The Toronto City Council retained decision-making authority over the final map in that it
had the power to adopt or reject any of the TWBR’s options. The City Council ultimately adopted
the map that both the councillors and the public favored in the Round Two survey.219 It is unclear
how the Council would have proceeded had it rejected all of the TWBR’s options because the
2006 City of Toronto Act does not include “specific guidelines or criteria for…conducting ward
boundary reviews.”220 As noted above, an appeals process through the Ontario Municipal Board
would have been available.221 This appeal process would allow the Board to affirm, amend or
repeal the map.222
Case Study: San Francisco’s 2010 Redistricting Task Force

The San Francisco Charter mandates that, when redistricting is required, the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors must convene and fund an autonomous, nine-person redistricting task force.223 The Mayor,
Board of Supervisors, and Elections Commission each appoint three task force members.224 Each task
force is responsible for community education about the redistricting process, data collection, soliciting
community input, and producing maps.225 Although its members are politically appointed on a partisan
basis—because San Francisco is Democratically-controlled—the task force has final discretion over how
the lines are drawn.226
Sonia Melara, a lecturer at San Francisco State University School of Social Work and 2010 Task
Force Mayoral appointee, noted that removing the final decision from the Board of Supervisors is
essential to the task force’s independence.227 She emphasized that independence and transparency are
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highly important and baked into the process.228 For example, San Francisco’s Sunshine Ordinance
regarding public access to local government meetings ensures transparency by requiring that all meetings
of local agency legislative bodies be open to the public.229 Additionally, in 2011—before the 2010 Task
Force was convened—the Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance governing the appointee’s conflicts
of interest disclosures.230 The ordinance required appointees to disclose “all investments and business
positions in business entities and income from any source which manufactures or sells supplies, materials,
equipment or professional services of the type used by the Redistricting Task Force.”231
To make its appointments, the Elections Commission solicited applications from the general
public.232 It ultimately considered and interviewed 28 applicants.233 The Commission required that its
three appointees meet the following minimum criteria:
1) Be registered to vote in San Francisco and have voted in San Francisco at least once since
January 1, 2006;
2) Represent San Francisco’s diverse population;
3) Have not been paid by a political campaign since January 1, 2006;
4) Not currently be a direct hire employee of an elected official of the City and County of
San Francisco;
5) Have general knowledge of San Francisco’s neighborhoods and geography;
6) Have flexible schedule for attending meetings; and
7) Not have a conflict of interest that is prohibited under conflict laws applicable to other
City officers.
Melara reported that public engagement in the redistricting process was robust. The Task Force
elicited public opinion by holding a meeting in every major neighborhood in the city, running ads in
different languages in small, neighborhood newspapers, and connecting with neighborhood organizations
and coalitions.234 They also invited members of the public to submit their own maps and provided a
website devoted to training on how to do so.235
The Task Force received over 1,300 public comments,236 including several full maps.237 Melara
reported that the Task Force incorporated this input into the map and balanced it with the legal
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requirements for redistricting.238 They were able to do so because the public input largely focused on
specific boundary lines rather than the district’s racial makeup, as San Francisco’s neighborhoods are
almost all racially diverse.239 Melara also believes that the partisan nature of the appointments works in
San Francisco because it is Democratically-controlled.240 She noted that a city with different party
divisions may be well-served by nonpartisan appointments.241
However, Democratic Party dominance did not mean that the redistricting process was entirely
depoliticized. Local media speculated that some Task Force members could try to draw the lines to make
it more difficult for progressive Democrats to be elected.242 Indeed, some unsuccessful Board of
Supervisors candidates applied for 2011 Elections Commission appointments and may have had political
designs.243 Some San Francisco media viewed “appointments to the commission [as] heavily influenced by
‘the power circles of business, politics, labor and nonprofit groups.’”244 But, the minimum qualifications
imposed on appointees in 2011 seemed to lessen this problem to some extent.245
Case Study: New York City’s 2010 Districting Commission

The New York City Charter provides for an autonomous, politically-appointed 15-member
Districting Commission.246 The political party with the largest City Council delegation appoints five
commission members,247 the political party with the second largest delegation appoints three,248 and the
mayor appoints seven.249 Officers and employees of the city or any city agency, lobbyists, employees of
lobbyists, federal, state and local elected officials, and political party officers are disqualified from
serving.250 The Commission must have at least one resident of each New York City borough and have
members of Voting Rights Act-protected racial and language minority groups represented in proportion
to their population in the city.251
The Charter also has some polities to ensure transparency: it provides that the Commission must
hold one or more public hearings at least one month before it submits its plan to City Council.252
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Accordingly, the Commission must make the plan available for public inspection and comment at least one
month before such a hearing.253
Despite the Commission’s existence, the City Council has some power over the final districting plan.
The Commission must submit its plan to the City Council. This plan is deemed adopted unless, within three
weeks, the Council adopts a resolution objecting to it.254 If the Commission receives objections, it prepares
a revised plan, makes it available for to the Council and public for inspection and comment, holds public
hearings, and prepares and submits the final redistricting plan to the Council.255
In the 2010 districting round, the Commission held three rounds of public hearings—each involved
a separate public hearing held in each of New York City’s five boroughs.256 In total, 1,150 people
attended these meetings and the Commission heard testimony from 230 of them.257 The Commission also
posted public comments on its website,258 and solicited and posted full maps from the public.259 When the
Commission submitted its final plan, the Council accepted it without objections.260
However, despite efforts to make New York’s redistricting politically independent and
transparent, there was controversy and political jockeying during 2010 process. The Commission
withdrew the preliminary map that it initially submitted to the City Council in light of public outcry and
requests from Council members that it do so. The outcry occurred because the map would have allowed a
scandal-plagued politician to mount a Council seat bid.261 Additionally, some questioned the Commission’s
independence. For example, a member of a local progressive organizing group voiced concern that the
“commission has primarily focused on protecting the interest of incumbents.”262 Indeed, Commission
members were allowed to and did meet with City Council members, the minutes from these meetings were
not made public, and City Council members testified at public hearings.263
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(b) Independent Citizens Commission
Although the entities described supra in subsection (a) are considered to be independent by most
redistricting scholars because they are not comprised of elected officials, independent citizens
commissions are the most independent because they do not have political appointees.264
Case Study: Austin’s Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

In 2012, Austin voters approved Proposition 3, a ballot referendum changing the city’s charter to
require that a politically independent citizens redistricting commission draw a new ten-district, single-
member council map.265 A group called Austinites for Geographic Representation (“AGR”) proposed and
campaigned for Proposition 3.266 Managed by a retired Democratic political consultant,267AGR’s
grassroots campaign raised at least $108,000 dollars268 and gathered 33,000 signatures to get the
referendum question on the ballot.269
The Austin Charter now defines the structure of and redistricting process employed by the
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission.270 Per the Charter, the Commission shall:
(1) Conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment
on the drawing of district lines;
(2) Draw district lines according to the redistricting criteria specified…; and
(3) Conduct themselves with integrity and fairness. This selection process is designed to produce a
commission that is independent from influence by the City Council and is reasonably
representative of this city's diversity.271
Each Commission has fourteen members who have been continuously registered in Austin for five or
more years preceding appointment. One member must be a student enrolled in an Austin university
or community college who also resides in and is registered to vote in Austin.272 Each member, except
the student, shall have voted in at least three of the last five city of Austin general elections.273
The commissioners are selected through a rigorous application process. The city auditor
publicizes the application process for both commission members and independent Applicant Review
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Panel auditors in a manner that will attract diverse candidate pools.274 The auditor removes any
candidates for either position who have conflicts of interest.275 The auditor selects three independent
auditors at random to serve on the Applicant Review Panel,276 which then selects277 and submits a pool
of 60 commission candidates to the City Council. Each council member may then strike one person from
the pool.278 The city auditor then randomly selects eight commission members from the 60-person pool;
these eight members then choose the Commission’s other six members in a manner that will ensure
diversity.279
Several measures aim to keep commission members politically independent, including restrictions
on subsequently holding elected or appointive public office, or working as a consultant or receiving a
competitive bid from the city for ten years following commission service.280 The commission also cannot
consider any incumbent or potential candidate’s residence, or favor any incumbent, potential candidate
or party’s when drawing the lines.281
Transparency measures are also built into the process. The Commission is subject to state and
city open meeting requirements. Additionally, commission members and staff cannot communicate about
redistricting outside of a public hearing unless the communication adheres to the aforementioned
requirements.282 Commission records and all data that it considers are public records.283
In terms of public engagement, the Charter requires the Commission to implement an open
hearing process for public input and deliberation, and to solicit broad public participation.284 To do
this, the Commission is required to hold public hearings in each council district.285 The Commission also
must publish its preliminary plan, subsequently hold public hearings and provide a comment period.286
Additionally, it must vote on a proposed final plan, and subsequently hold two public hearings
regarding this plan.287 The Commission is required to hold these hearing rounds throughout the city.288
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Finally, the Commission runs a website where the public could submit comments, and where these
comments are posted along with public hearing testimony.289
The Austin City Council does not have the power to change the Commission’s final plan.290
However, if the Commission fails to adopt a final plan, the City Attorney must petition state court for an
order prescribing the boundary lines.291
In 2013, the Senior Auditor in the Texas State Auditor’s Office, an auditor from the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, and the “audit senior manager” from an accounting firm served on the
Applicant Review Panel.292 The panel fielded 554 applications.293 The eventual Commission members
included an economist for the Texas Comptroller of Public Accountants, the Director of the Latino/Latin
American Studies Center at Austin Community College, and a local small business owner.294 The
Commission held 40 open meetings, including 14 public hearings throughout the city, and solicited oral
and written testimony.295 Public input included 532 in-person testimonials from 418 people, seven
“invited presentations” by 22 speakers, and 556 emails and letters.296 The operation cost, including
staff, legal counsel and mapping expert, was $200,000.297
Quick reference: redistricting entity elements designed to increase transparency, public engagement, and
independence
- Transparency and community engagement measures

o Make redistricting entity meetings open to the public
o Hold public hearings, preferably across the city
o Elicit public comment and map submissions at meetings and through public outreach (website,
surveys, etc.)
o Post public comments and map submissions to redistricting entity’s website
- Independence measures
o Qualifications for autonomous or independent commission members
§ Voter registration/voting requirements
§ Free from immediate personal stake in the redistricting
§ No conflicts of interest, including no immediate personal stake in the redistricting
§ Diversity
§ Local knowledge
o No communication between city council and redistricting entity
o Decision-making power removed from city council
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Based on the foregoing research contained in this Report, this section outlines our recommendation
for St. Louis to adopt an independent citizens redistricting commission model to conduct its redistricting
process. This commission model largely tracks Austin’s Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission as
well as incorporates some process elements used in other cities. We are recommending an independent
citizens commission because it best serves the values that our research suggests redistricting processes
should embody: independence from political forces, transparency, and public participation.
Recommendation 1.0: St. Louis should employ an independent citizens

commission to draw the new ward map.
This Commission should have between 9 and 14 people and be composed of Commissioners who
are diverse across area of residence within the City, age, gender, and race and ethnicity in a manner
that reflects St. Louis’ racial and ethnic make-up. As the redistricting process is not specifically outlined in
the Charter, either a new ordinance, or an amendment to Ordinance 69815 will be required to create an
independent citizens commission. Attached, as Appendix 1, is a recommended ordinance setting forth the
framework for a Saint Louis City Independent Citizens Commission.
Recommendation 1.1: There should be commissioner eligibility requirements.

To serve, independent commission members must meet the following eligibility requirements:
§ Each commissioner, except for the student commissioner, should be a registered voter in the
City of Saint Louis for at least three (3) consecutive years immediately preceding the
date of appointment.
§ Each commissioner, except for the student commissioner, must have voted in at least three
(3) of the last five (5) Saint Louis City general elections held immediately preceding the
date of appointment.
§ One commissioner must be a student enrolled in either a community college or university
located in Saint Louis City at the time of appointment who resides and is registered to
vote in Saint Louis City.
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§ Each commissioner should have general knowledge of the City's neighborhood and
population groups.
§ Each commissioner must be free of conflicts of interest. For the purposes of this section, a
conflict of interest arises if, in the five years preceding the date of appointment, an
applicant or their spouse has:
§ (A)(i) Been appointed to, elected to, or have been a candidate for state or City office;
§ (ii) Served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political party or of the

campaign committee of a candidate for elective state, county or city office;
§ (iii) Been a registered state or local lobbyist;
§ (iv) Contributed or bundled one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in aggregate to

candidates for City of Saint Louis elective office in the last City election.
§ (B) A person who has been, within the three (3) years immediately preceding the date of
application: a paid employee of the City of Saint Louis; a person performing paid
services under a professional or political contract to the City of Saint Louis, to the Board
of Aldermen of the City of Saint Louis, or to any member of the Board of Aldermen of
the City of Saint Louis; any Controlling Person of any such consultant; or a spouse of any
of the foregoing.
§ Each commissioner shall be ineligible—for a period of 10 years beginning from the date
of appointment—to hold elective office in the City of Saint Louis. Each commissioner shall
be ineligible, for a period of three (3) years beginning from the date of appointment, to
hold appointive public office for the City of St. Louis, to serve as paid staff or as a paid
consultant to the City of St. Louis, the Board of Aldermen or any member of the Board, or
to receive a non-competitively bid contract with the City of St. Louis. This three year ban
on having a paid consultancy or entering into a non-completely bid contract applies to
all commissioners individually and to all entities for which the commission is a controlling
person.
Recommendation 1.2: Adequate time must be given to the Independent

Commission to allow it to make an informed decision.
Under the current ordinance, a new map must be completed by December 31, 2021. The
independent commission should be in place a year prior to the election for the new 14-person Board of
Aldermen.
Recommendation 1.3: Auditors should recruit candidates.

Recruitment and requests for applications should be made by independent auditors both in the
City Journal as well as mediums accessible to a diverse range of City residents. These mediums include,
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but are not limited to: local newspapers, neighborhood newsletters, and Internet sites like Nextdoor.
Broad outreach is necessary to ensure that the candidate pool reflects the City’s population as closely as
possible. The application period should be held open for no less than thirty (30) days to allow for
adequate time to advertise the position.
Recommendation 1.4: Commissioners should be selected

through a multi-step process.
1. When the application period is closed, a list of applicants should be sent to a third party, such
as the Missouri State Auditor or a third-party auditing firm. This third party will ensure that all applicants
meet the above eligibility requirements and will remove all non-conforming applications.
2. The auditors will draw fifty applications at random from this pool of eligible candidates and
present this list to the Board of Aldermen.
3. Each Aldermen can strike one candidate from consideration. Aldermen must make their
decisions on who should be removed from consideration within 30 days.
4. Depending on the commission size decided upon, the auditors will draw at random roughly half
the number of commissioners from the remaining pool.
5. The selected commissioners will then convene and select the remaining commissioners from the
auditor’s applicant pool. This selection will not be at random, and will be done with the goal of ensuring
and balancing the commission’s diversity.
Recommendation 1.5: The Commission should have limited support staff.

To ensure that the Commission can effectively complete its task, it will require several staff members.
1. Staff liaison: The staff liaison can be a City employee. He or she will assist the Commission
with procedural questions and facilitate access to the 2020 census information and all
necessary City records and data.
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2. Attorney: The Commission will require its own attorney to advise it on questions of law
regarding the redistricting. Although this attorney may assist in writing the Commission's final
findings of facts, he or she should not influence where ward boundaries are drawn.
3. Redistricting consultant: A consultant specializing in redistricting should assist the Commission.
Funding for this consultant may be available through grants available specifically for
redistricting processes.
Recommendation 1.6: The Commission, not the Board, should be the

ultimate decision maker.
Before formulating the final map, the Commission should present a tentative map to the Board.
The Board will then have the opportunity to make objections to the map. The Commission can choose to
accept or reject any of the recommendations made by the Board. The Commission may choose to respond
with its reasons for not following the recommendation. The Commission then submits a final map, which will
be codified without changes into the City Code. This process follows that used by the New York City
Redistricting Commission.
Recommendation 2.0: Implement Transparency and

additional independence measures
Recommendation 2.1: The Commission’s communications regarding the
redistricting process must be subject to Missouri’s sunshine law.
Subject to limited exceptions, such as attorney-client privilege, communications between the
Commission’s staff members and the Commission, between Commissioners, and between Commissioners
and the public should be subject to Missouri Sunshine law (RSMo §610 et seq.)
Recommendation 2.2: All Commission meetings and hearings must be public.

All Commission meetings and hearings must be public to ensure that the redistricting process is
transparent and to safeguard against backroom dealing, even among independent citizen commissioners.
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In addition, the Commission should post minutes from its meetings and public hearings, as well as the
public testimony it receives, to a Commission website.
Recommendation 2.3: The Commissioners and Commission support staff may

not communicate with the Board of Aldermen regarding redistricting.
To ensure that Commissioners are free of political pressure, Commissioners and Commission
support staff cannot communicate with Aldermen or Board staff regarding redistricting.
Recommendation 2.4: The Commissioners cannot consider incumbents’ or

political parties’ interest when drawing the map.
To ensure the Commission is truly independent from political interests, it cannot consider any
incumbent or potential political candidate’s place of residence in drawing the wards. The Commission also
shall not draw any wards to favor or discriminate against any incumbent, political candidate, or political
group.
Recommendation 2.5: The Commission should make public all data and
software used in drawing the map.
To ensure the process is fully transparent and open demographic and population data should be
made available on a public website. The software used to process this data and produce maps should
also be made available to the public along with instructions on its use to allow the public to submit map
proposals.
Recommendation 3.0: Public participation must be included in the

redistricting process.
Public participation is an important component of redistricting. To ensure public participation in
the redistricting process, the independent citizens commission should attempt to hear from as many
members of the public and community stakeholders as possible.
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Recommendation 3.1: The Commission should run a website.

This website would ensure that the public has access to information about the process, including
minutes and recordings of all meetings, data the Commission is using to draw its map (see Rec. 3.3), and
Commission map drafts. Additionally, this website should have an area for the public to comments about
the process, submit their own maps, and generally communicate with the Commission.
Recommendation 3.2: The Commission should collect public input through

public meetings held throughout the City and a survey.
To ensure participation in the process by a diverse range of City residents, at least one meeting
should be held in each defined City area. For example, defined areas could include the six City police
districts.
The Commission should also gather public input to help it formulate the overarching values and
goals of the redistricting, such as what types of communities of interest exist and where ward boundaries
should be drawn. This can be done through public survey and public meetings.
Recommendation 3.3: Members of the public should be able to

submit their own maps.
To give the Commission a sense of what different community interest groups value, members of the
public should be able to submit their own maps. This could be done through the Commission's website,
email or through a drop box at public meetings. Members of the public should be given basic guidance
on what to consider when creating a map.
Recommendation 3.4: The preliminary map should be

presented for public feedback.
When the Commission has a preliminary map, it should make it available to the public. The
Commission should hold a public hearing to allow for public comment on this preliminary map, before the
Commission submits it to the Board of Alderman for objections.
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Recommendation 4.0: There should be a fail-safe mechanism and the

Commission should produce findings of fact.
Recommendation 4.1: The Commission should produce findings of fact

with its final maps.
In the event the map is challenged in court, findings of fact will help to assist the reviewing court
in determining whether applicable federal, state, and local laws have been followed in the redistricting
process.
Recommendation 4.2: If the Commission is unable to produce a final map, the

Mayor should be required to do so.
Following the model used by the New York City Redistricting Commission, if the Commission is
unable to produce a final map, the Mayor should be required to do so within a specified period of time.
Page 37
NEXT STEPS
An independent citizens commission could be created either through the passage of a new
ordinance or through the passage of a citizen initiative.
Option 1: Passage of an Ordinance Through the Board of Aldermen

The passage of an ordinance, such as the one attached in Appendix 1, would require the
introduction of a board bill.298 This will require either a member of the Board or the Mayor to sponsor
the bill.299 The timeline for introducing this bill will depend on when the Board’s President has “established
the last day for introducing bills.”300 Before this bill is formally introduced, the President of the Board will
assign it to a committee301 where it could later be amended, substituted, or left unchanged.302 The
committee will issue a report with its recommendation for the bill to pass, not pass, or pass with
amendments.303 If the bill is recommended to pass, it will be perfected and eventually be put for a vote
before the Board.304 To become a law, a majority of the Board must vote yes305 and the Mayor must
sign the bill.306
Option 2: Creation of a Citizen Ballot Initiative

Alternatively, City residents could instigate a ballot initiative to either amend the City’s Charter or
pass an Ordinance requiring that an independent citizens redistricting commission conduct the City’s
redistricting; such an initiative has the “same effect as if adopted by the board of aldermen and
approved by the mayor.”307 In the case of a charter amendment, the initiative process would begin
with a filing of a petition—and a copy of the proposed amendment—with the signatures of ten percent
of all persons who were registered to vote in the preceding mayoral election.308 In the April 4, 2017
election, there were 196,868 registered voters.309 Therefore, for inclusion on the ballot, the petition
would require at least 19,687 signatures. For a proposed ordinance, a petition with the signatures of
five percent of registered voters—or 9844 people--is required.310Once on the ballot, “the nature of the
Page 38
proposed ordinance” will be listed.311 Voters can then choose to vote “Yes” or “No” on the ordinance or
amendment.312 If a majority of the voters vote “Yes” then the initiative becomes law.313
Community Outreach to Aid in Implementing an Independent Citizens

Commission
To implement an independent citizens commission, it is important to begin a citywide dialogue on
the issue of redistricting. One way to gauge the community’s interests and thoughts on this issue is to
conduct a survey. A sample survey has been attached as Appendix 2. The survey can be distributed
through a variety of mediums and community groups—such as at monthly ward meetings, neighborhood
meetings, nonprofits, churches, and online.
Page 39
CONCLUSION
With St. Louis’ 2022 ward consolidation in sight, it is a prime moment for a local conversation
about how the accompanying redistricting process should unfold. Our study outlines considerations and
best practices for redistricting, with a focus on what type of entity should conduct the process. Based on
our research, we recommend Saint Louis adopt an independent citizens redistricting commission, similar to
the one in Austin, Texas. After a robust local dialogue about redistricting, this change could be
accomplished either through passage of an ordinance in the Board of Aldermen or through a ballot
initiative. We hope this study fosters such a conversation.
Page 40
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Washington University School of Law Urban Revitalization Clinic would like to thank all those individuals
who contributed to creation of this paper. We are grateful for their support and expertise.
Special thanks to: Lisa Cavicchia, of the Canadian Urban Institute, for her insight into the recent Toronto
redistricting process; Professor Clarissa Hayward of Washington University’s Political Science Department for
her discussion on the “all-affected principle” and participatory budget processes; Associate Professor Patricia
Heyda of the Sam Fox School at Washington University for a valuable discussion on mapping communities of
interest; Professor Daniel Mandelker of Washington University School of Law for his insight into local
government and understanding of many of the City’s unique challenges; Sonia Melara, of San Francisco State
University, for her insight into San Francisco's 2010 redistricting; Professor Molly Metzger of Washington
University’s Brown School for her insights on community engagement in St. Louis; Dr. Kenneth Warren of Saint
Louis University for his expertise and guidance on the legal requirements of redistricting in St. Louis; and
Professor Todd Swanstrom of University of Missouri St. Louis for his valuable insights and discussion of the
democratic principles that should govern the redistricting process.
And our warmest thanks to Tino Ochoa, Ryan Rippel, and Brian Weaver for their invaluable support and
guidance throughout this project.
Meg Bruyns, Emily Friedman, Tobin Raju, and Zack Smith
Washington University School of Law Urban

Revitalization Clinic
Page 41
1 History of the Board of Aldermen, STLOUIS-MO.GOV, https://www.stlouis-

mo.gov/government/departments/aldermen/about/board-of-alderman-history.cfm.
2 Charter, Article IV, Section 1 (1943).
3 Alex Ihnen, Young to Attempt to Shrink City of Saint Louis Aldermen from 28 wards to 12, NEXTSTL.COM, (April 26,
2012), https://nextstl.com/2012/04/young-to-attempt-to-shrink-city-of-st-louis-board-of-aldermen-from-28-
wards-to-10/.
4 LANA STEIN, ST. LOUIS POLITICS: THE TRIUMPH OF TRADITION, 59 (2002).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 63-64.
7 Id. at 58, 62..
8 Charter, Article IV, §1 (1943).
9Population history of St. Louis from 1830 to 1990, B.U. EDU,
HTTP://PHYSICS.BU.EDU/~REDNER/PROJECTS/POPULATION/CITIES/STLOUIS.HTML For a visual representation of the change

in the City’s population and composition, see Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the American City,
http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/map/.
10 Population history of St. Louis from 1830 to 1990, supra note 9.
11 David Hunn, St Louis Board of Aldermen votes to reduce itself, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,(July 7, 2012),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louis-board-of-aldermen-votes-to-reduce-
itself/article_f6e12c38-b48e-5832-8170-f13fca13c94d.html.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 By 1980, the City’s population declined by 27% to 453,085., St. Louis County , Missouri 2007-2012 Factbook,
at 1, available at
http://stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/Maps%20and%20GIS/Fact%20Book/Fact%20Book
%202007-2012/2007-2012_FactBook.pdf.
17 In 1990, the City’s population decreased by 12% to a total of 396,685. Id.
18 The 2000 census showed a 12% decrease in population and a total population of 348,189. Id.
19 Hunn supra note 11.
20 Id.
21 Id
22Quickfacts St Louis city, Missouri (County), US CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/SEX205210/29510; For a visual representation of the change in

population by ward, see David Hunn, St. Louis aldermen begin redistricting city wards,S T. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May
1, 2011)(showing between 2000 and 2010, 3 wards lost more than 20% of their population, 9 wards lost
between 10-19.9%, 12 lost between 0-9.9%, 2 gained up to 10% and 2 saw a population increase between
10.1% and 20%.).
23 For a breakdown of votes by Ward, see Alex Ihnen, Understanding St. Louis: Proposition R by Ward,
NEXTSTL,(Nov. 9, 2012), https://nextstl.com/2012/11/understanding-st-louis-proposition-r-ward-by-ward/.

24 Charter, Article IV, §1 (2012).
25 David Hunn, St. Louis aldermen seeking to cut the number of St. Louis aldermen, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (April 26,
2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louis-aldermen-seeking-to-cut-the-number-of-
st/article_a468c42e-8fc4-11e1-9b5b-0019bb30f31a.html. The 7th ward represents all or part of the Compton
Heights, Downtown, Downtown West, Fox Park, Kosciusko, Lafayette Square, LaSalle Park, McKinley Heights, Near
North Riverfront, Peabody Darst Webbe, and Soulard neighborhoods. Ward 07 Alderman Jack Coatar, ST. LOUIS-
MO.GOV, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/aldermen/ward-7/
26 Board Bill 31(as introduced April 27, 2012) available at https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/internal-
apps/legislative/upload/boardbill/BB311.pdf.
Page 42
27 Many of these aldermen were affected by the 2011 redistricting, discussed infra in Part C.
28 City Ord. #69185 (2012) available at https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/internal-
apps/legislative/upload/Ordinances/BOAPdf/69185.pdf.
29 Rachel Lippmann, Proposition R Asks St. Louisans: 'Do You Want To Cut The Number Of Aldermen?', ST. LOUIS PUBLIC
RADIO, (Oct. 31, 2012), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/proposition-r-asks-st-louisans-do-you-want-cut-number-

aldermen#stream/0 (“It's a means of making government more efficient….”) See also,St. Louis American endorses,
THE ST. LOUIS AMERICAN(Nov. 1, 2012) (“ Any reduction in citizen access to their aldermen would be more than
compensated for with a more efficient legislative process, which is essential to creating a more competitive
environment for broader-based economic development.”).
30Lippmann, supra note 29. ("It's about changing our job description, strengthening what we do legislatively, what
we do with oversight….”).
31Id. (“I think that if you have a smaller board, there will be more communication between members of the
board, in terms of what grander-scale project can they undertake as a unit.").
32 Id. ("Any time we want to make a change in city government, we’re always thrown back the challenge, ‘well,
why don’t you cut your board, rather than pick on us?'" Young says. "So that's what we're doing.") See also the
Editorial Board, Editorial: Want fewer aldermen? Here’s your chance, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, (Oct. 30, 2012)
http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/editorial/editorial-want-fewer-aldermen-here-s-your-
chance/article_e1c20de6-b110-505e-934d-466dd5327b41.html, (Theoretically, by eliminating 14 aldermanic
salaries (currently $37,000) and benefit packages (including a $4,200 expense allowance), the city could save
some money. Arguing with employees about budgets and pensions might become easier if the old “cut the number
of aldermen first” ploy is removed.”).
33 Id. (“it might attract more serious candidates with broader, citywide perspectives on issues. As Mr. Conway said,
‘Cities that are on the move realize that antiquated ways are not the way to move forward.’”).
34 Lippmann supra note 29 (“"Over here, it's stress. It's trouble. And there's disparity here, there's apathy here,
there's wrong here," Moore said. "We're not solving the problems now, how are we going to solve them with
double the people?").
35Id. (“member unions were also concerned that fewer aldermen would open the door to the influence of big
money.”).
36 Marie Ceselski, Proposition R to cut number of aldermen won’t help St Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 1,
2012) (“Under Prop R, the size of each ward will double and the cost of running for alderman will skyrocket.
Campaigning for alderman will no longer be about mailers and knocking on doors. Candidates will have to raise
big money for TV and radio advertising. That is very scary considering the amount of money Rex Sinquefield has
to interfere in our affairs.”).
37“Prop R does not guarantee that neighborhoods and parks will remain intact during redistricting. The same
political process and horse trading will occur. If you think it would be good for downtown or your neighborhood to
be in one ward, sorry, Prop R doesn't get you any closer.” Id.
38 “Do we have too many aldermen? Not by local standards. The combined population of municipalities, excluding
villages, in south St. Louis County and west St. Louis County is 292,369. The combined number of wards is 78. The
combined number of councilmen is 162. Each of our 28 aldermen represents 11,404 people. In Wildwood,
population 35,517, each councilman represents 4,440 people but each citizen gets two councilmen. Should Prop R
pass, Wildwood will have a larger municipal legislature than St. Louis.” Id.
Page 43
39 The following Aldermen voted for the bill: Flowers from the second ward, Triplett from the 6th ward, Young from
the 7th ward, Conway from the 8th ward, Ortmann from the 9th ward, Arnowiz from the 12th ward, Wessles from
the 13th ward, Howard from the 14th ward, Florida from the 15th ward, Baringer from the 16th ward, Roddy from
the 17th ward, Davis from the 19th ward, Schmid from the 20th ward, French from the 21st ward, Boyd from the
22nd ward, Vaccaro from the 23rd ward, Oglivie from the 24th ward, Cohn from the 25th ward, Carter from the
27th ward, Krewson from the 28th ward, and Board President Reed.
40 The following Aldermen voted against the bill: Troupe from the 1st ward, Bosley from the 3rd ward, Moore from
the 4th ward, Hubbard from the 5th ward, Villa from the 11th ward, Kennedy from the 18th ward, and Willamson
from the 26th ward.
41 For a breakdown of votes by Ward, see Alex Ihnen, Understanding St. Louis: Proposition R by Ward, NEXTSTL
(Nov. 9, 2012), https://nextstl.com/2012/11/understanding-st-louis-proposition-r-ward-by-ward/.
42 David Hunn, St. Louis aldermen begin redistricting city wards, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (May 1, 2011),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louis-aldermen-begin-redistricting-city-
wards/article_46179cdb-a54b-5fc5-8c2f-5507d895a082.html.
43 Id.
44 City Code 2.2.010(2011), available at
https://www.municode.com/library/mo/st._louis/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2EL_CH2.12WA_2.12.01
0BOES.
45 Justin Levitt, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 44 (2010)[hereinafter Brennan Center
Report]; Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77-107 (1985); see
also Jeanne c. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO L.J.
1547 (2005).
46 Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying equal population standard to local government).
47 Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 44.
48 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (racial gerrymandering case finding redistricting plan discriminated
on the basis of race).

49 Id.
50 Fromer, supra note 45 at 1547.
51 Grofman, supra note 45 at 84.
53 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
55 Id. 45 at 56.
56 Grofman, supra note 45 at 86.
57 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, 106-08 (2010), available at
http:/redistrictingonline.org/uploads/Redistrictinglaw2010.pdf.
58 Fromer, supra note 45 at 1579.
60 Id.
61 This will require both a majority of aldermen to agree and for the Mayor to sign this bill. See Charter Art. IV
§§17,18 (1914).
63 Id.
64 Practices that diminish minority group’s political influence. Daniel P. Okaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election
Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S. CAR. L. REV. 689 (2006).
Page 44
65 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION: REFORMING REDISTRICTING
WITHOUT REVERSING PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 3, available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/IRC_Report.pdf. [hereinafter NAACP, IRC]
66 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. ET AL., THE IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING IN YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE
TO REDISTRICTING 5, available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/Impact%20of%20Redistricting%20in%20YOUR%20Community%202
010.pdf [hereinafter NAACP, Impact].
67NAACP, Impact, supra note 66 at 5.
68 Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1041, 1048 (2013) [hereinafter Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire].
69 African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1995) (circuit court
affirmed Eastern District of Missouri summary judgment in favor of City of St. Louis in action brought against St.
Louis for violating Voting Rights Act for vote dilution); Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir.) 1996 (dismissing
vote dilution claim against City of St. Louis on grounds of claim preclusion).
70 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1010-13 (1994).
71 When considering the totality of the circumstances courts will consider factors listed in the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report on the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. The “Senate Factors” include: 1. The history of
discrimination in the jurisdiction; 2. Degree of racial polarization in voting; 3. The extent to which political
subdivisions have used voting practices that discriminate against minority populations; 4. Whether minorities are
denied access to candidate slating processes; 5. Extent minorities experience discrimination in socio-economic area
such as education and health; 6. Extent to which campaigns make racial appeals; and 7. Frequency with which
minority groups have been elected to office in the jurisdiction. S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29
(1982).
72 Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire, supra note 68 at 1057.
73 Id. at 1048.
74 Jack Quinn, Congressional Redistricting in the 1990s: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
1 Geo. Mason U Civ. Rts. L.J. 207, 236-37 (1990); Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire, supra note 68 at 1048.
75 Jack Quinn, Congressional Redistricting in the 1990s: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
1 Geo. Mason U Civ. Rts. L.J. 207, 236-37 (1990).

76 Id.
77 Known as the Gingles three-part test. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See also Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors of Hinds County, Mississippi, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977); UJO, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
78 African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 1348 fn. 4 (8th Cir. 1995).
79 Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir.1983).
80 Id.
81 Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire, supra note 68 at 1057-58.
82 Hulme v. Madison Cnty., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044, 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
83 Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1042 (2015) [hereinafter Halberstam, Beyond Transparency]; David G. Oedel et al., Does
the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship?, 54 VIL. L REV. 57, 67 (2009); Micah
Altman et al., Principles in Transparency and Public Participation in Redistricting, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2010),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/principles-for-transparency-and-public-participation-in-redistricting/.
84 Altman et al., supra note 83.
85 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-68 (1964).
86 See Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 41.
87 David Hunn, St. Louis aldermen begin redistricting city wards, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (May 1, 2011),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louis-aldermen-begin-redistricting-city-
wards/article_46179cdb-a54b-5fc5-8c2f-5507d895a082.html.
88 Halberstam, Beyond Transparency, supra note 83 at 1007, fn. 1.
89 Michael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform in Local Redistricting, 11 ELECTION L.J. 446, 465
(2012) [hereinafter Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform].

90 Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform, supra 89 at 453.
Page 45
91 Id. at 463.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 466
97 Id. at 464.
98 Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 40. Conversations between commission members and staff are not
subject to the distribution requirement.

99 Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 41
100 Id.; Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform, supra note 89 at 467.
102 Altman et al., supra note 83
103 Id.
105 MICHAEL KEATING, Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and Public Choice in THEORIES OF
URBAN POLITICS 118 (David Judge et al. eds., 1998).

106 KEATING, supra 105 at 118.
107 Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for Reconsidering How Human Rights Obligations Are
Applied to Military Security Firms, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 87 (2012).
108 Id.
109 Interview with Professor Clarissa Hayward of Washington University.
110 Halberstam, Beyond Transparency, supra note 83 at 1048.
111 Id. at 1050 California’s CRC conducted thirty-four public meetings all over the state, made recordings and
transcripts of the meetings available online, and created a forum to accept public comments. The CRC also made
redistricting software available to the public for use in citizen-created maps.
112 Interview with Dr. Kenneth Warren.
113 NAACP, Impact, supra note 66.
114 Jeffery C. Kubin, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 860 (1997).
115 Justin Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (2011).
116 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812 (2012).
117 Jeffery C. Kubin, supra note 114 at 858.
118 Id.
119 Kendra L. Carberry, Redistricting: A Municipal Perspective, 31- Feb COLORADO LAWYER 49 (2002).
120 Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 20; Steve Bickerstaff, Independent Redistricting Commissions for U.S.
Cities: Redistricting Need Not Be a Quintessentially Political Process, 7 available at

https://dallascityhall.com/government/meetings/DCH%20Documents/charter-review-
commission/RedistrictingCommission-ArticleII_011714.pdf. “Of these 46 cities, the overwhelming majority allow the
city council to draw its own districts.”
121 Bickerstaff, supra note 120 at 7.
122 CLEVELAND, OH., CODE ch. 5 § 25.
123 Leila Atassi, Proposed Cleveland City Council ward map approved; Cimperman, Polensek vote “No,”
CLEVELAND.COM, Mar. 26, 2013,

http://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/index.ssf/2013/03/proposed_cleveland_city_counci.html.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Atassi, supra note 123.
129 Id.
130 Id.
Page 46
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Atassi, supra note 7.
134 Id.
135 CLEVELAND, OH., CODE ch. 5 § 25.
136 Id.
137 Bickerstaff, supra 120 at 8; NAACP, IRC at 65 .
139 See Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform, supra note 89 at 446.
140 Bickerstaff, supra 120 at 8.
142 Id. at 21; Bickerstaff, supra 120 at 9.
144 Id. at 9; Halberstam, Beyond Transparency, supra note 83 at 1048.
145 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 9; Halberstam, Beyond Transparency, supra note 83 at 1048 (2015).
146 DALLAS, TEX., CHARTER ch. IV, § 5(b)(1) (2015).
147 Id.
148 Id.
151 Id.
153 Editorial, Dallas redistricting process tainted by political, backroom deal-making, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept.
2011, http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2011/09/12/editorial-dallas-redistricting-process-tainted-
by-politics-backroom-deal-making.
154 Id.
155 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 8.
156 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1816 (2012).
157 Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Apr.
15, 2017).
158 Cain, supra note 116 at 1816.
159 Bickerstaff, supra note 120 at 7-11.
161 Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, supra note 115 at 513, 518.
162 Video, Louisville Metro Council Ad Hoc Committee on Redistricting Meeting (May 16, 2011),
http://louisville.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=2588.
163 Metro Council approves redistricting plan, WAVE 3 NEWS (2011),
http://www.wave3.com/story/15897637/metro-council-approves-redistricting.
164 Wright v. Louisville Metro Council, No. 3:11-CV-712-H, 2012 WL 2089529, 1 (W.D. Ky. June 8, 2012).
165 LOUISVILLE METRO COUNCIL, METRO COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, MINUTES FOR MAY 16, 2011
(2011).
166 LOUISVILLE METRO COUNCIL, METRO COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, MINUTES FOR JULY 11, 2011
(2011).
167 LOUISVILLE METRO COUNCIL, METRO COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, MINUTES FOR JUNE 6, 2011
(2011); LOUISVILLE METRO COUNCIL, METRO COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, MINUTES FOR JUL. 11, 2011
(2011); Video Louisville Metro Council Ad Hoc Committee on Redistricting Meeting (June 6, 2011),
http://louisville.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=2611; Video, Louisville Metro Council Ad Hoc
Committee on Redistricting Meeting (Jul. 11, 2011),
http://louisville.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=2648.
168 WAVE 3 NEWS, supra note 163.
169 Wright, supra note 164, at 6.
170 Id.
Page 47
171 Ryan P. Bates, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55
DUKE L.J. 333, 338 (2005).
172 Bates, supra note 171 at 338.
173 Id. at 338.
174 Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, supra note 115 at 532.
176 Bates, supra note 171 at 347 fn. 86 (a few states require varying levels of legislative approval for the plan).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, supra note 115 at 532-39.
180 Id.
181 Id.
183 Id.; Brennan Center Report, supra note 45 at 22 (in many state jurisdictions members of the legislature select
members of the commission).

185 Id..
186 Id.; Bickerstaff, supra note 120 at 14-15
187 Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, supra note 115.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 539.
190 Bates, supra note 171 at 353.
191 Id. at 353-54.
192 JEFF WACHTER, ABELL FOUNDATION, A 10-YEAR PERSPECTIVE OF THE MERGER OF LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY:
LOUISVILLE METRO VAULTS FROM 65TH TO 18TH LARGEST CITY IN THE NATION 7 (2013).
193 Id. at 2.
194 WACHTER, supra note 192, at 17.
195 MICHAEL JONES, The Whole World in His Hand: William Dakan, in SECOND-HAND STORIES: 15 PORTRAITS OF
LOUISVILLE 115 (2006).

196 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67C.135.
197 Kevin Hyde, U of L and Louisville Metro – A Partnership, U OF L: THE MAGAZINE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, Fall
2003, http://louisville.edu/ur/ucomm/mags/fall2003/metrogov.html. The professional criteria included balancing

populations, making sure that each district had a precinct, and protecting minorities’ interests. Id. Dakan’s personal
criteria included balancing major political parties, keeping established neighborhoods and communities intact as
much as possible, and making the districts as compact as possible. Id.
198 JONES, supra note 195, at 117.
199 Id. at 115.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 116.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 114.
205 TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW, BACKGROUND RESEARCH REPORT 1 (2014).
206 Skype Interview with Lisa Cavicchia, Program Director, Canadian Urban Institute (Mar. 2, 2017).
207 CITY OF TORONTO, DRAW THE LINE: TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW PROJECT WORK PLAN, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND
PUBLIC CONSULTATION STRATEGY 4 (2014).

208 Id. at 5.
209 Skype Interview with Lisa Cavicchia, supra note 206.
210 Consultant Team, TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW, http://www.drawthelines.ca/team/.
211 Id.
212 PowerPoint Presentation, Toronto Ward Boundary Review to Toronto City Council (Nov. 8-10, 2016),
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2016/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-98214.pdf.
Page 48
213 CITY OF TORONTO, supra note 207, at 4.

214 Stay Informed!, TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW, http://www.drawthelines.ca/team/.
215 ROUND ONE REPORT: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT + PUBLIC CONSULTATION, TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW 1 (2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/55c8eefde4b0873e4e73af45/14392
31741768/RoundOneReport.TWBR.150402.pdf.
216 Id.
217 Skype Interview with Lisa Cavicchia, supra note 206.
218 ROUND ONE REPORT: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT + PUBLIC CONSULTATION, TORONTO WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW 9 (2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/56b4f6dbc2ea514e40c85edc/14547
00254510/TWBR+Round+2+Consultation+Report+FEB+2016.pdf.
219 Tracking Status, TORONTO CITY COUNCIL,
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX18.2.
220 BACKGROUND RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 205, at 4.
221 Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act, 2006, 38:2 § 127 (Can. Ont.).
222 Id.
223 S.F., CAL., CHARTER art. 13, § 13.110(d).
224 Id.
225 Redistricting Task Force, San Francisco Redistricting Task Force Overview, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 2
(2011),
http://sfgov.org/ccsfgsa/sites/default/files/2010%20Census%3A%20Redistricting%20Task%20Force/Task_Forc
e_Overview_Letter_Nov_2011___f600.pdf.
226 The Charter stipulates that: “[t]he Board of Supervisors may not revise the district boundaries established by the
Task Force.” S.F. CAL. CHARTER, art. 13, § 13.110(d).

227 Id.
228 Phone Interview with Sonia Melara, Lecturer, San Francisco State University School of Social Work (Mar. 7,
2017).
229 S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 67. The City Attorney’s Office provided guidance to the Task Force regarding this
Ordinance. Phone Interview with Sonia Melara, supra note 228. However, the city attorney did not advise on
substantive aspects of the process: a consulting company hired by the City led the commission through the legal
requirements and the process of drawing lines. Id.
230S.F., CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOV’T CONDUCT CODE § 3.1-397 (2011).,
HTTP://WWW.SFBOS.ORG/FTP/UPLOADEDFILES/BDSUPVRS/ORDINANCES11/O0094-11.PDF.
231 Id.
232 THE ELECTIONS COMMISSION CALLS FOR APPLICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, SAN
FRANCISCO ELECTIONS COMMISSION,
http://sfgov.org/electionscommission/ftp/meetingarchive/www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx-page=2644.html.
233 Joshua Sabatini, Jockeying begins for seats on San Francisco redistricting panel, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, May 9,
2011, http://www.sfexaminer.com/jockeying-begins-for-seats-on-san-francisco-redistricting-panel/.
234 Phone interview with Sonia Melara, supra note 228.
235 2010 San Francisco Redistricting Task Force, Your Turn to Draw the Lines, San Francisco!, CITY AND COUNTY OF
SAN FRANCISCO,
http://sfgov.org/ccsfgsa/sites/default/files/2010%20Census%3A%20Redistricting%20Task%20Force/Your_Turn
_to_Draw_the_Lines-RDTF__94d1.pdf.
236 2010 SAN FRANCISCO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://sfgov.org/ccsfgsa/sites/default/files/2010%20Census%3A%20Redistricting%20Task%20Force/rdtf_final
_report__0ca9.pdf.
237 Phone Interview with Sonia Melara, supra note 228.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
Page 49
242 Redistricting San Francisco: hyper-local politics, HAPPENING HERE (Feb. 2, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://happening-
here.blogspot.com/2012/02/redistricting-san-francisco-hyper-local.html.
243 Sabatini, supra note 233.
244 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 9 (quoting Rachel Gordon, Redistricting Task Force Gets 3 More Nominees, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 24, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/SF-redistricting-task-force-gets-3-

more-nominees-2366859.php.).
245 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 9 nt. 32.
246 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A (2003).
247 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50(1) (2003).
248 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 50(2) (2003).
249 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 50(4) (2003). The party enrollment, if any, of the mayor’s appointments
must be such that people enrolled in a single political party are not in the majority on the commission. Id.
250 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 50(5) (2003).
251 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 50(7)(b) (2003).
252 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 51(b) (2003).
253 Id.
254 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 51(d) (2003).
255 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 2-A § 51(f) (2003).
256 Public Meetings and Hearings, NEW YORK CITY DISTRICTING COMMISSION,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dc/html/meetings/meetings.shtml.
257 NEW YORK CITY DISTRICTING COMMISSION, THIRD ROUND PUBLIC MEETING TRANSCRIPT 3 (2013).
258 Id.
259 Review Public Submissions, NEW YORK CITY DISTRICTING COMMISSION,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dc/html/review/submissions.shtml.
260 Press Release, New York City Districting Commission, Districting Commission Files Final Districting Plan to the City
Clerk (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dc/downloads/pdf/2013_03_04_press_release.pdf.

261 Ross Barkan, What is Going on With City Council Redistricting? A Primer, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 2013,
http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/elections/4169-what-is-going-on-with-city-council-redistricting-a-
primer.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 See e.g., Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 1 n. 1. Bickerstaff defines a truly independent redistricting commission
as one that is both autonomous from city council in terms of composition and decision-making power and politically
independent through the manner in which the members are selected. Id.
265 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 1 nt. 2. Voters approved the referendum, Proposition 3, by a vote of 60 percent
to 40 percent. David Loewenberg, Proposition 3 passes, seeks more geographical representation, THE DAILY TEXAN,
Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2012/11/07/proposition-3-passes-seeks-more-
geographical-representation.
266 Id.
267 Linda Curtis Bio, INDEPENDENT TEXANS, http://indytexans.org/about/bios/.
268 Ken Martin, Proposition 3 Campaign Relies on Grass Roots, THE AUSTIN BULLDOG, Oct. 21, 2012,
http://www.theaustinbulldog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233:proposition-3-campaign-
relies-on-grass-roots&catid=3:main-articles.
269 We were “Austinites for Geographic Representation” and You Helped!, AUSTINITES FOR GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION,
http://citizensdistricting10-1.org/about-us/.
270 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3 (2012).
271 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(C) (2012).
272 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(D)(1) (2012).
273 Id.
274 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(I)(1) (2012).
275 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(I)(4)-(5) (2012). Within the preceding five years, candidates for either position
or their spouses cannot have been city or state elected officials, political appointees or candidates; been an
Page 50
officer, employee or paid consultant of a political party or city or state campaign committee; been a registered
state or local lobbyist; or contributed or bundled $1,000 or more in local political contributions. AUSTIN, TEX.,
CHARTER art. II, § 3(I)(3)(a) (2012). Candidates for either position must also not have been a city employee,
performed paid contract services for the city, the City Council, or any City Council member, any controlling person
of such a consultant, or any of the foregoing’s spouse in the previous three years. AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, §
3(I)(3)(b) (2012).
277 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(I)(6) (2012). The pool of 60 “shall be the most qualified applicants on the basis
of relevant analytical skills, ability to be impartial, residency in various parts of the City, and appreciation for
the City of Austin's diverse demographics and geography.” Id.
279 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(I)(8)-(9) (2012).
280 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(D)(4) (2012).
281 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(F) (2012).
282 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(K)(1), (3) (2012).
283 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(K)(2) (2012).
284 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(K)(7) (2012).
285 Id.
286 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(K) (2012).
287 Id..
288 Id.
289 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 33 n. 143. The website also allowed people to sign-up for emails about
commission activities, made Census data available so that people could draw their own maps, showed all maps
submitted by members of the public (following GIS-conversion by the commission’s mapping expert), showed
commission plans in GIS format with a zoom feature, linked to the commission’s Facebook page. Id. at 35 n. 146.
290 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(G) (2012).
291 AUSTIN, TEX., CHARTER art. II, § 3(G)(2) (2012).
292 AUSTIN CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 10 (2014).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 8-9.
295 AUSTIN CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 3 (2014). Both the open meetings and the public
hearings were video recorded and televised. Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 33-34.
296 Id.
297 Bickerstaff, supra note 120, at 18.
298 City Charter, Art. VII, Sec. 11(“No ordinance shall be passed except by bill.”).
299 City Charter, Art. VII, Sec. 1.

300 Board R. 56 available at https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/aldermen/rules/bills_rules-of-
board-of-aldermen.cfm.
board-of-aldermen.cfm,
board-of-aldermen.cfm. If there is a recommendation for the bill to not pass, the bill will not be considered by the
Board unless two-thirds of the Board vote to consider it. Board R. 62 available at https://www.stlouis-
mo.gov/government/departments/aldermen/rules/bills_rules-of-board-of-aldermen.cfm.
Page 51

306 City Charter, Art. IV, Sec. 16 & 18; Of the Mayor vetoes the bill, the Board can override the veto if
two-thirds of the Board vote yes. City Charter, Art. IV, Sec. 17 & 18.
307 City Charter Art. V, Sec. 1.
309 Election Summary Report, St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, available at https://www.stlouis-
mo.gov/government/departments/board-election-commissioners/documents/election-results/upload/Apr2017-
Final-Official-Summary-2.pdf
312 Id.
313 Id.
Page 52
Appendix I
SAMPLE ORDINANCE
1 BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS AS FOLLOWS:
2 SECTION ONE. This Ordinance shall be known as the “Saint Louis City Independent Citizens
3 Commission Ordinance.” In 2021 and thereafter in each year following the year in which a
4 national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of the decade, an
5 independent citizens commission shall be convened to adjust the boundaries of the 14 wards to
6 comply with the process and standards set forth in this ordinance. The Commission shall be
7 convened no later than [Month, Day], 2021 and no later than [Month, Day] in each year
8 following a national decennial census. The Commission shall not draw ward boundaries at any
9 other time, except if ordered by judicial decision. If the date of the election is changed, the above
10 dates shall be updated accordingly to allow the Commission sufficient time to draw the new
11 ward map.
12 SECTION TWO. The Commission shall consist of [X] commissioners. To be eligible to serve on
13 the Commission, commissioners must meet the following eligibility requirements:
14 (1) Each commissioner, except for the student commissioner, must be a registered voter
15 in the City of Saint Louis for at least three (3) consecutive years immediately preceding
16 the date of appointment.
17 (2) Each commissioner, except for the student commissioner, must have voted in at least
18 three (3) of the last five (5) Saint Louis City general elections held immediately
19 preceding the date of appointment.
20 (3) One commissioner must be a student enrolled in either a community college or
21 university located in Saint Louis City at the time of appointment who resides and is
22 registered to vote in Saint Louis City.
Ordinance Page 1
1 (4) Each commissioner should have general knowledge of the City's neighborhood and
2 population groups.
3 (5) Each commissioner must be free of conflicts of interest. For the purposes of this
4 section, a conflict of interest arises if, in the five years preceding the date of appointment,
5 an applicant, or their first degree relative:
6 (A)(i) Been appointed to, elected to, or have been a candidate for state or City
7 office;
8 (ii) Served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political party or of the
9 campaign committee of a candidate for elective state, county or city office;
10 (iii) Been a registered state or local lobbyist;
11 (iv) Contributed or bundled one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in aggregate to
12 candidates for City of Saint Louis elective office in the last City election.
13 (B) A person who has been, within the three (3) years immediately preceding the
14 date of application: a paid employee of the City of Saint Louis; a person
15 performing paid services under a professional or political contract to the City of
16 Saint Louis, to the Board of Aldermen of the City of Saint Louis, or to any
17 member of the Board of Aldermen of the City of Saint Louis; any Controlling
18 Person of any such consultant; or a spouse of any of the foregoing.
19 (6) Each commissioner shall be ineligible—for a period of 10 years beginning from the
20 date of appointment—to hold elective office in the City of Saint Louis. Each
21 commissioner shall be ineligible, for a period of three (3) years beginning from the date
22 of appointment, to hold appointive public office for the City of St. Louis, to serve as paid
23 staff or as a paid consultant to the City of St. Louis, the Board of Aldermen or any
24 member of the Board, or to receive a non-competitively bid contract with the City of St.
Ordinance Page 2
1 Louis. This three year ban on having a paid consultancy or entering into a non-
2 completely bid contract applies to all commissioners individually and to all entities for
3 which the commission is a controlling person.
4 (7) The term of office of each member of the commission expires upon the appointment
5 of the first member of the succeeding commission in the year following the year in
6 which the national decennial census.
7 SECTION THREE. Recruitment and requests for applications should be made both in the City
8 Journal as well as mediums accessible to a diverse range of City residents. The application
9 period should be held open for no less than thirty (30) days.
10 SECTION FOUR. When the application period is closed, a list of applicants should be sent to the
11 Missouri State Auditor or a third-party auditing firm. This third party will ensure that all
12 applicants meet the above eligibility requirements and will remove all non-conforming
13 applications. The auditors will then draw fifty applications at random from this pool of eligible
14 candidates and present this list to the Board of Aldermen. Each Alderman can strike one
15 candidate from consideration. Aldermen must make their decisions on who should be removed
16 from consideration within 30 days. Depending on the commission size decided upon, the
17 auditors will draw at random roughly half the number of commissioners from the remaining
18 pool. The selected commissioners will then convene and select the remaining commissioners
19 from the auditor’s applicant pool. This selection will not be at random, and will be done with the
20 goal of ensuring and balancing the commission’s diversity across area of residence within the
21 City, age, gender, and race and ethnicity in a manner that reflects St. Louis’ racial and ethnic
22 make-up.
23 SECTION FIVE. The Commission shall establish the boundaries of Saint Louis City wards.
24 These wards shall be comprised as nearly as practicable, of compact and contiguous territory
Ordinance Page 3
1 within straight lines, and contain as nearly as may be the same number of inhabitants.
2 Additionally, the ward map must comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1971
3 et seq.) and all other federal and state requirements.
4 SECTION SIX. The activities of the Commission are subject to all of the following:
5 (1) the commission shall comply with all state and city requirements for open meetings.
6 (2) Subject to limited exceptions, communications between the Commission’s staff
7 members and the Commission, between Commissioners, and between Commissioners
8 and the public should be subject to Missouri Sunshine law (RSMo §610 et seq.)
9 (3) Commissioners and Commission support staff cannot communicate either
10 with members of the Board of Aldermen or its staff regarding redistricting.
11 (4) the Commission shall select one of its members to serve as the chair and one to
12 serve as vice chair. The chair and vice chair shall remain voting members of the
13 Commission.
14 (5) [XX] members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. [XX] or more
15 affirmative votes shall be required for any official action, including approval of a final
16 plan establishing the boundaries of any council district.
17 (6) the Commission shall hire commission staff, legal counsel, and consultants as needed;
18 provided, however, that compensation of such persons shall be limited to the period in
19 which the Commission is active. The Commission shall establish clear criteria for the
20 hiring and removal of these individuals, communication protocols, and a code of
21 conduct.
22 (7) the Commission shall establish and implement an open hearing process for public
23 input and deliberation that shall be subject to public notice and promoted through an
24 extensive outreach program to solicit broad public participation in the redistricting
Ordinance Page 4
1 public review process. The hearing process shall begin with hearings to receive public
2 input before the commission votes and approves a preliminary redistricting plan. At
3 least one public hearing shall be held in each of the City’s police districts.
4 (8) the Board of Aldermen shall appropriate sufficient funds to meet the operational cost
5 of the Commission and the cost of any outreach program to solicit broad public
6 participation in the redistricting process.
7 (9) the Commissioners and Commission staff shall not communicate with the members of
8 the Board of Aldermen or Board staff regarding redistricting.
9 (10) the Commissioners shall not consider any incumbent or potential political candidate’s
10 place of residence in drawing the wards. The Commissioners also shall not draw wards to
11 favor or discriminate against any incumbent, political candidate, or political group.
12 SECTION SEVEN. Before formulating the final map, the Commission shall present a tentative
13 map to the Board of Aldermen. The Board of Aldermen will then have the opportunity to make
14 objections to the map. The Commission can choose to accept or reject any of the
15 recommendations made by the Board of Aldermen. The Commission may choose to respond
16 with its reasons for not following the recommendation.
17 SECTION EIGHT. By December 31, 2021, and thereafter by [Month,Day] in each year after
18 the decennial national census, the Commission shall adopt a final plan for the Saint Louis City
19 which specifically outlines and describes the geographic boundaries for each of the City’s
20 fourteen wards. Upon adoption, the commission shall certify the plan to the Board of
21 Aldermen; the Board of Aldermen may not change this plan. The Commission’s plan, adopted
22 as an ordinance and codified in the Revised Code of the City of Saint Louis, will have the force
23 and effect of law.
Ordinance Page 5
1 (i) When issuing its final plan, the Commission shall issue a report explaining the
2 basis for its decisions to ensure compliance with underlying federal, state, and
3 local laws.
4 SECTION NINE. Should the Commission be unable to produce a final map, the Mayor shall
5 be required to produce a final ward map within thirty days.
6 SECTION TEN. For purposes of this section, the following terms are defined:
7 (1) COMMISSION means the Saint Louis City Independent Citizens Redistricting
8 Commission.
9 (2) CONTROLLING PERSON means an officer, director, manager, principal, or
10 shareholder or member owning at least 10% ownership of a legal entity.
11 (3) DAY means a calendar day, except that if the final day of a period within which an
12 act is to be performed is a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday in which the Saint Louis City
13 offices are closed, the period is extended to the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday,
14 or holiday in which the Saint Louis City’s offices are closed.
15 (4) FIRST DEGREE RELATIVE means one’s parent, spouse, or child.
16 (5) PARENT means one’s natural and adopted parents or someone who acted in lieu of a
17 parent.
18
19 (6) SPOUSE means one's licensed marriage spouse, common law spouse, or recognized
20 domestic partner.
21 (7) CHILD means one’s natural, foster and adopted, and stepchildren.
Ordinance Page 6
Appendix 2
SAMPLE SURVEY
Saint Louis City Redistricting Survey
In 2022, the Board of Aldermen will be reduced from 28 members to 14 members. With this
reduction, St. Louis City will need to redraw its ward boundaries
We would like to hear your thoughts on what you want the St. Louis process to look like. The
following questions will help us get an idea of what is important to you. There is also a section at
the end where you can write any opinions that you have about the redistricting process.
Who should draw the map?
Saint Louis and other cities have used the following models for redistricting:
Independent Citizens Commission: A commission of nonpartisan citizens draws the map.
Politically-Appointed Independent Commission: City officials (for example, the Mayor or the
Board of Alderman) appoint commission members on either a partisan or nonpartisan basis.
The Board of Aldermen: Members of the Board of Aldermen draw the ward boundaries.
1. Which of these models, if any, do you think is best?  
• Independent Citizens Commission
• Politically-Appointed Commission
• Board of Aldermen  
• Other  
2. What problems, if any, do you see with the current system of allowing members of the Board
of Aldermen to draw their own ward boundaries?  
3. Would you support a ballot initiative to create an Independent Citizens Commission?  
4a. Why would you support this initiative?  
4b. Why would you not support this initiative?  
Survey Page 1
5. If you believe that an Independent Citizens Commission should draw the ward boundaries,
how should members of the commission be selected?  
• Selected by the Board of Aldermen  

• The Board of Aldermen selects names from a list that has been approved by an
independent auditor
• The Commissioners are selected at random from a list that has been approved by an
independent auditor  
• The Commissioners are selected at random from a list that has been approved by an
independent auditor and the Board of Alderman
• Other  
6. Would you support a ballot initiative to create a Politically-Appointed Independent

Commission?  
Yes
No
7a. Why would you support this initiative?
7b. Why would you not support this initiative?
8a. If you believe that a Politically-Appointed Independent Commission should draw the ward
boundaries, how should members of that commission be selected and who should select them?
8b. Why?
Who should be able to serve on the commission?
10. If St. Louis implemented an Independent Citizens Commission, how important are the
following eligibility requirements? (Check all that apply)
A person must be a United States Citizen
A person must be a registered voter and have been registered in the city for a specified
number of years
A person must have voted in a specified number of recent City elections
A person must have demonstrated an ability to serve with integrity and impartiality
A person must have a high degree of competency to carry out the commission’s
responsibilities
A person must have a flexible schedule for attending commission meetings A person
Survey Page 2
must have a general knowledge of the City and its neighborhoods
The person is not from the same neighborhood as someone else serving on the
commission
Other
11. Why are these eligibility requirements important to you?
12. What, if any, of the following should bar a person from serving on an Independent Citizens
Commission? (Check all that apply)
Within the last five years:
The person is or has been an elected official or a candidate for any elected office
The person has served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political party or of
the campaign committee of a candidate for Missouri state, or St Louis City office
The person is or has been a state or local registered lobbyist
The person is being paid under a contract with the City or is a controlling person of a firm
that is operating under a contract with the City
The person is or has been appointed to a City office
The person has contributed more than $5,000 to or on behalf of a candidate for City
office
The person’s spouse or immediate family member would be ineligible for one of the
above reasons.
Other
14. If St. Louis implemented a Politically-Appointed Independent Commission, how important

are the following eligibility requirements? (Check all that apply)
A person must be a United States Citizen
A person must be a registered voter and have been registered in the city for a specified
number of years
A person must have voted in a set number of recent City elections
A person must have demonstrated an ability to serve with integrity and impartiality
Survey Page 3
A person must have a flexible schedule for attending commission meetings.
A person must have a high degree of competency to carry out the commission’s
responsibilities
A person must have a general knowledge of the City and its neighborhoods
The person is not from the same neighborhood as someone else serving on the
commission
Other
16. If St. Louis implemented either a Politically-Appointed Independent Commission, how

important are the following eligibility requirements? (Check all that apply)
Within the last five years:
The person is or has been an elected official or a candidate for any elected office
The person has served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political party or of
the campaign committee of a candidate for Missouri state, or St Louis City office
The person is or has been a state or local registered lobbyist
The person is being paid under a contract with the City or is a controlling person of a firm
that is operating under a contract with the City
The person is or has been appointed to a City office
The person has contributed more than $5,000 to or on behalf of a candidate for City
office
The person’s spouse or immediate family member would be ineligible for one of the
above reasons.
Other
Who should choose the map?
18. Under the above models, there are several options for which entity would have the final say
in choosing the map. Which do you think would be best?
The Independent Citizens Commission map is final
Survey Page 4
Politically-Appointed Independent Commission or Independent Citizens Commission
submits preliminary map to Board of Aldermen. Board may make objections to this map.
Commission may incorporate these objections to the extent it sees fit into a final map that
Board may not amend
Board of Aldermen has the power to adopt, amend or reject the Politically-Appointed
Independent Commission or Independent Citizens Commission’s map
Other
19. Why is this the best option?
Transparency and Public Input
20. Do you think that whichever body draws the lines should hold public meeting and/or
hearings?
Yes
No
Other
21a. Why?
21b. Why not?
22. Should the body drawing the lines present possible maps to the public for citizen feedback?
23a. Why?
23b. Why not?
Considerations for Redistricting
Ward redistricting will occur after the 2020 federal census data is released. Each new ward must
contain roughly the same number of people.
26. Besides population, what else is important to consider when drawing new ward boundaries?
(check all that apply)
Constituents’ socio-economic backgrounds
Preserving neighborhood boundaries
Police Districts
Survey Page 5
Creating diverse wards
Business Districts
Maintaining current ward boundaries
27. Why are your selected considerations important?
Additional Thoughts?
28. What, if any, additional thoughts do you have on how the redistricting process should be
changed?
29. What, if any, additional thoughts do you have on how members of a commission should be
chosen?
30. What, if any, additional thoughts do you have on what is most important in drawing ward
boundaries?
About You
31. Are you a resident of Saint Louis City?
Yes
No
Other
31a. Which ward do you currently live in?
31b. How long have you lived in Saint Louis City?
32. How old are you?
33. Are you interested in being contacted about this survey?
Yes
No
34a. If yes, please provide your name and contact information:
Survey Page 6

Redistricting Paper Wash U Law Clinic 2017

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Redistricting Paper Wash U Law Clinic 2017

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LOOKING

Washington University School of Law Urban Revitalization Clinic

Presented at Washington University School of Law on April 21, 2017

This report makes four primary recommendations:

Looking Toward 2022: A Best Practices Study

REDISTRICTING IN THE CITY OF SAINT LOUIS

the City’s voters.15

B. Board Bill No. 31 and Referendum R

of the City’s 128,522 voters approved of the amendment.41

C. Drawing the 2011 Ward Map

CRITERIA FOR REDISTRICTING

communities of interest, and respect for minority representation.45

A. Constitutional, State, and Local Criteria

tracts—should be used as redistricting criteria.54 Communities of interest are “groups of people in a

B. Federal Voting Rights Act

redistricting plans may violate the Voting Rights Act.71

OVERARCHING VALUES TO CONSIDER IN REDISTRICTING

effective and fair representation of citizens.85

example of appropriate process transparency.

contributing to the process.106

to mock up their own district maps.

and decision-making entity will be significantly improved.118

TYPES OF REDISTRICTING ENTITIES AND HOW OTHER CITIES HAVE DRAWN

(1) City Council

maintain or bolster their district’s status.

C ASE S TUDY : C LEVELAND ’ S 2013 C ITY C OUNCIL -R UN P ROCESS

the full Council one week before Council voted on it.130

ward to increase its Hispanic population.133

(2) Advisory Commission

incumbents who appointed the commissioners.

Backup commissions—a variant of advisory commissions—assume redistricting duties if the

automatically adopted unless the city council adopts a different plan.143

Case Study: Dallas’ 2010 Advisory Commission

either adopt the plan, or modify and adopt it.151

requirement.153 According to a Dallas Morning News editorial, the Commission’s chairwoman

process with backroom negotiations.”154 This kind of politicking is characteristic of advisory

(3) Politician Commission

residents are voters, supporters, or rivals.”161

CASE STUDY: LOUISVILLE’S 2011 AD HOC METRO COUNCIL COMMITTEE

particular districts and gather public comment and input.”164

(4) Independent Commission or Person

choosing their voters rather than voters choosing their representatives.175

members, giving legislators no power to select commission members.184 Commission independence is

individuals and those with conflicts of interests.186

In addition to removing political influence, independent commissions often result in more

(a) Non-Citizens Commission

merger, a mayor and 12-member Board of Alderman ran the City.193

plan must be approved “as submitted and without amendment.”196

frighten[ed] that one man [was] drawing the districts.”204

Case Study: Toronto’s 2013-2016 consultant team process

people completing the TWBR’s survey.216 The survey questions included:

repeal the map.222

Case Study: San Francisco’s 2010 Redistricting Task Force

the lines are drawn.226

three appointees meet the following minimum criteria:

website devoted to training on how to do so.235

divisions may be well-served by nonpartisan appointments.241

imposed on appointees in 2011 seemed to lessen this problem to some extent.245

Case Study: New York City’s 2010 Districting Commission

to their population in the city.251

month before such a hearing.253

(b) Independent Citizens Commission

Case Study: Austin’s Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

campaigned for Proposition 3.266 Managed by a retired Democratic political consultant,267AGR’s

referendum question on the ballot.269

on subsequently holding elected or appointive public office, or working as a consultant or receiving a

or party’s when drawing the lines.281