001. US v.

PABLO
G.R. No. L-11676 | October 17, 1916 | En Banc | Appeal from Judgment of the CFI of Bataan
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
TORRES, J.

Short Version:
Pablo made a false testimony in order to protect some gambling lords. He was convicted of perjury under
Act. 1697 which was repealed by the Administrative Code, which in turn does not provide for any penalty.
The Court resolved the matter by ruling that Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the articles of the Penal
Code relating to false testimony. Since the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not
explicitly provide that the provisions of the Penal Code are also repealed, the Penal Code provisions are
deemed to be in force.

Facts:
- 1915, Andres Pablo:
o A policeman of the municipality of Balanga,
o Ordered by his chief (together with companion Tomas De Leon) to raid a jueteng game.
o When he arrived at the reported gambling den, the players had already run away.
! He only found therein Francisco Dato (whom he arrested), a low table, a tambiolo,
and 37 bolas.
! While he saw two men leave the lot: Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo,
nonetheless, since he had seen no material proof that the game was being played, he
refrained from arresting them.
o These facts were reported in a Memorandum to the Chief:
“I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo
Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape."
- Chief of Police:
o Complaint in the Court of Justice of the Peace
o Charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of
municipal ordinance No. 5.

- Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato

o Subsequently arrested.
o But were afterwards admitted to bail.
o Dato pleaded guilty; Malicsi and Rodrigo pleaded not guilty.

- The Memorandum submitted by Pablo was used as evidence against them.

- However, during trial, Pablo averred that he and his companion did not see the accused Malicsi and
Rodrigo run away; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter were the cabecillas or
ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him by an unknown person
- Thus, Rodrigo and Malicsi were acquitted; Dato was sentenced.

- Apparently, before trial, Pablo was paid P15 not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, prior the trial
in the justice of the peace court (in the house of Valentin Sioson)

- Provincial Fiscal
o Charged Pablo was later on charged with perjury, under the provisions of Act 1697 Sec 3.
o Filed Information in CFI Bataan.

- CFI Bataan
 o He was convicted thereof. He comes to this court on appeal.
- Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under Act
No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that
are already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions in the penal code (art 318-324)
pertaining to false testimony.
- However, Act No. 1697 has already been repealed by the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657)
and the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not say under what other
penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury, shall be
punished.

Issue:
Given that the Administrative Code does not provide for any penalty against the crime of perjury, should it
go unpunished? NO

Dispositive:
Judgment appealed from reversed. Pablo sentenced to penalty of two years four months and one day of
prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas

Reasoning:
- Notwithstanding that Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the articles of the penal code relating to
false testimony, and said final article in the the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No.
1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the
will of the legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete or partial
repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code, and, furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish
those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false testimony, and it cannot be conceived that
these crimes should go unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must
be conceded that there must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or
false testimony.

- There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2,
third Partida.

- Since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punished under the said
articles of the said Code, which have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but
since its enactment, have not been applied, yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the
Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324
should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act
relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise
been repealed.

- This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false testimony
or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima
Recopilacion which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the
excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in
numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even though they were repealed, it is
seen that they have been revived by the decree which I issued in conformity with them although they were not
expressly designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take account of the importance of the
matter.
- It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to
crimes of false testimony.
 - The Court thus convicted Pablo of false testimony with the aggravating circumstance of bribery,
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one;
o Therefore, he has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.

Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result .
002. People v. Santiago

G.R. No. 17584/ March 8, 1922/En Banc/ Appeal to SC

Gregorio Santiago – petitioner

People of the Philippines – respondent

SHORT VERSION: Gregorio Santiago, who was driving a car, ran over a 7-year old child, Porfirio
Parondo, causing his death. Gregorio was charged with the crime of "homicide by reckless negligence" and
was sentenced to one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial. He now comes to
this SC, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2886 which amended Military Order No. 58 (that stated
that all public prosecution shall be in the name of the U.S.).

Facts:

Petitioner Gregorio Santiago

Driving an automobile at 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meters wide.

Notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space, he overtook a stationary wagon
standing on one side and, without slowing down, mowed into two kids playing on a heap of stones
on the other side, killing one of the kids (7 yr-old boy) instantly.

Petitioner Gregorio

Was charged with the crime of "homicide by reckless negligence" , under Act 2886

P did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and

P did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent
man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur

Was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
 ***Note: The complaint was filed under Act no 2886 (i.e., instead of U.S. vs Gregorio Santiago, it
became People of the Philippines vs. Gregorio Santiago).

Act No. 2886 was promulgated on 24 February 1920 and the criminal complaint was filed on
10 may 1920.

Petitioner Gregorio

Act 2886 was unconstitutional since the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend
or introduce amendments in General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 of the latter,
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.

Section 2 “All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses.”

Act 2886 amending Gen Orders No. 58: “All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People
of the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."

ISSUE/HELD:

a) WON Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional?
YES.

b) WON the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of the state? NO, procedure in
criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of the states, but it is left in the hand of the legislature,
so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.

RATIO:

1) The procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the
hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.

a) Reason being is for practicality.

b) A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great powers will
admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity
of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public.

2) Thus, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has the authority, under
its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure,
 a) As part of police power, each State has a large measure of discretion in creating and defining
criminal offenses

b) A statue relating to criminal procedure shall be void as a denial of equal protection, if it prescribes
a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation

3) The SC also held that the power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its
territories such as the Philippines.

a) By act of the US Congress their power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to
define and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.).

4) Also, the US military government, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish
new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58.

a) Preamble reads: In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of these Islands, the
criminal code of procedure now in force therein is hereby amended in certain of its important provisions, as indicated in
the following enumerated sections.

b) The main purpose of GO 58 is limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its
provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. Since the provisions of this General Order have the
character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the
question is considered only on principle.

i) As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58.

ii) Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, is acting within the bounds and
scope of its power as the legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.

5) No question, the present Legislature had, and had, the power to enact and amend laws; and is very evident
from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law.

a) Further, the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty.

6) There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name to be used
as party plaintiff in criminal cases---which must not be understood as depriving the Government of the
Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public crimes.

a) The government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous!
(ie Porto Rico and Hawaii (note: at that time, Hawaii is not yet part of the US).

b) Prevailing jurisprudence acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of the

Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name
 unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to give that
government the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within its territory
the penal laws in force therein.

The silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory (even laws prior to Act no. 2886) of the said
General Order must be considered as an act of approval. Furthermore the SC ratiocinated that, supposing for
the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the
information constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected
to in the court below.

DISPOSITIVE: Affirms the Lower Court.

a) Section 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as
the provisions of a constitution;

b) That the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions; and that the court
a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.

c) The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, Santiago being furthermore sentenced to the accessory
penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances.

003. LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 | April 24, 1985 | En Banc | Petition for Mandamus
Escolin, J.

Short Version:
In this petition for mandamus, Petitioners want the respondent public officials to publish several presidential
issuances. The respondents argue that based on Art. 2 of the CC , publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. The Court held that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons
or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned

Facts:
- Petitioners
o Seek a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent public officials to publish in the Official
Gazette several presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
- Respondent public officials
 o Argue that based on Art. 2 of the CC1, publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates.
o Since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
2. WON publication in the Official Gazette is a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

Reasoning:
1. YES
- In Severino v. Governor General, the Court held that while the general rule is that a writ of
mandamus should be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private
interest to be subserved independent of that which he holds with the public at large, and that it is for
the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved, when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws

2. YES
- Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
- The Court cited Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 (An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication
and Distribution of the Official Gazette)2 , stating that its clear object is to give the general public
adequate notice of the laws governing them.
o It is a requirement of due process.
o Otherwise the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat” would have no basis.
- Publication is all the more important in the case of issuances made by the President since his
activities are not as widely covered by mass media as the legislature. Publication is thus the only way
to inform the people of presidential issuances.
- The wording of Sec. 1 of CA 638 uses the word “shall” which indicates that it imposes upon the
respondent public officials an imperative duty.
- Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect.

1
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
2
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
 - Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned
- Question: What about acts enforcing PDs prior to their publication and prior to the court’s
declaration of their invalidity on ground of non-publication?
o It depends on whether rights have already been vested before the law was declared
unconstitutional by the court.
- In this case, none of the PDs in dispute have been implemented or enforced by the government

Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
1. Fernando, C.J., concurring with qualification
- He doesn’t agree that publication of legislative and presidential issuances should always be published
in the Official Gazette in order to be effective.
- First, he reasons that while publication is essential, there is no such requirement in the Constitution
that legislative and presidential issuances be published in the Official Gazette.
- Second, declaring matters enforced under the subject unpublished presidential issuances would set
open matters already deemed settled.
- Third, Art. 2, CC expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." The CC is only a legislative enactment. It does not and cannot have
the force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and
effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

2. Plana, J., concurring with qualification

- The Constitution does not require the publication of laws in the Official Gazette as a prerequisite to
their effectivity.
- He makes two observations about Art. 2, CC:
o Such provision does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
o Clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
- Also with regard to C.A. 638, it only provides for a uniform publication and distribution of the
Official Gazette. It does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws.
o Said law enumerates what should be published in the Official Gazettem among them
‘important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress” and “all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability.”
- An earlier law of general application cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute
that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only the Constitution can do
so.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

3. Melencio-Herrera, concurring
- He adds that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective
only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can
 have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

4. Teehankee, J., concurring

- His point is that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in order to comply with the
constitutional requirements of due process.
- He says that the respondents’ position would nullify and render nugatory Art. 2, CC.

Pesigan v. Angeles

Limitations of Crimes

Aquino

April 30, 1984

Short Version:

Can’t confiscate carabaos being transported because the law providing such forfeiture wasn’t published in the
Official Gazette yet.

Facts:

Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan are carabao dealers.

They transported 26 carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Cam Sur to Padre Garcia, Batangas.

They had with them the ff.

• A health certificate from the provincial vet of Cam Sur

• A permit to transport large cattle under the authority of the provincial commander
• 3 certificates of inspection from the Constabulary

Despite these, the carabaos were confiscated at Basud, Camarines Norte, by Lt. Zenarosa, the police station
commander, and by Dr. Miranda, the provincial vet.

This was based on EO 626-A, providing that “no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another xxx (otherwise, these)
shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture xxx”

The Pesigans filed a case against Zenarosa and Miranda for recovery of the carabaos as well as damages.
RTC ruled against the Pesigans.

CA affirmed.

Issue and Dispositive:

Are the Pesigans bound by EO 626-A? No, it was not yet published during the time they transported the
carabaos.

Ratio:

The confiscation happened on April 2, 1982.

EO 626-A was published in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982, 2 months after the commission of the act.

NCC 2 provides that laws become only effective, 15 days after publication.

• Laws here include circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties

• Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations, and make the said
penalties binding on persons affected

This rule applies in a case of a violation of EO 626-A because it provides for confiscation and forfeiture,
which makes it a penal sanction.

• The public must first be informed of that provision, through the publication in the Gazette, before
violators of the EO may be bound
• Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette
o "Every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect."

005. US v. SWEET
1 Phil. 18 | September 20, 1901 | Ladd | APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
LADD, J.

Short Version:
Philip K. Sweet, an employee of the US military, assaulted a prisoner-of-war. Sweet claims that the military
tribunals, NOT the CFI, have jurisdiction over the case. The Court ruled that under Act 136, the general
principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals (CFI) is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial will prevail absent legislation to the contrary.

Facts:
1. Philip K. Sweet
o Charged with committing an offense punishable under the Spanish Penal Code (Art 418)
against a prisoner-of-war.
! The penalty for such an offense is arresto mayor and a fine of 325 to 3250 pesetas
! Therefore, by virtue of Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission,
section 56 (6),
• Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases
in which a penalty of more than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed."
o Unless,
! The appellant (Sweet) was at the time of its alleged
commission an employee of the United States military
authorities in the Philippine Islands; and
! The further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to
have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody
of such authorities (US military authorities), are sufficient
to deprive it of jurisdiction.
Then CFI will be deprived of jurisdiction

2. Philip K. Sweet comes to the court, arguing:

o That the CFI has no jurisdiction:
! An assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is
not an offense under the Penal Code
! If it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character sustained by
the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts him
from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
o He was acting in the line of duty, but with no evidence to prove such fact.

Issue #1:
WoN an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is an offense under the
Penal Code

SC #1: Yes
1) It is true, generally
a) that an assault (of the character charged in the complaint) committed in time of war by a military
person upon a prisoner of war, is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military
Justice; and
b) that under the provisions of the same Code the Military Tribunals have exclusive cognizance of all
offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by military persons.

However,
a) the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense under the
Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the Article (418)of the
Spanish Penal Code above cited.

There is nothing in the language of that Article (418) to indicate that it does not apply to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction of the law.
2) Further, under articles 4 and 5 of the Spanish Code of Military Justice,
a) a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner
of war, but only to military tribunal, which has jurisdiction for the criminal responsibility

However,
a) the criminal responsibility, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same
acts, viewed in another aspect, might have also, if committed in time of war, constituted an infraction
of the military code.

3) The Spanish Military Code is no longer in force here in PH and which indeed never had any application to
the Army of the United States

Issue #2:
WoN courts are deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the offense was committed by an employee of the
US military authorities

SC #2: No

1) No provision in any legislations by Congress, and and in local legislation, which has the effect of limiting
the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance, with regard to employees of the United
States military authorities

2) General principle should apply

a) that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of
the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and
America

3) Further, Sweet’s claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him in the
execution of the orders of his military superiors maybe available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial
in the court,
a) but can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.

Reasoning:
1.
2.
3.
4. In Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6),
a. Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a
penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may
be imposed.
5. No law has been cited limiting the general jurisdiction conferred upon the CFI by Act No. 136, with
respect to US military employees, nor is the SC aware of any such law or provision.
6. Therefore, the case is therefore open to the application of the General Principle that the jurisdiction
of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought
before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and America and which
 must, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the
contrary.
7. Sweet’s claim that he was acting under orders of his military superiors may be available by way of
defense, but does not affect the right of the CFI to take jurisdiction of the case.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur Moreland, J., concurs in the result .

Cooper concurring:
Concurs with the result of the decision but believes that an offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience to an order of his superior in good faith, unless the illegality of the
order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the Civil Government.

006. Liang v. People

G.R. No. 125865/26 March 2001/First Division/Motion for Reconsideration on SC Decision
Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) – petitioner
People of the Philippines – respondent
Decision by J. Ynares-Santiago, Digest by Pip (Gagamitin mo na nga na sample yung digest at format ko Chua, kay Anne
Curtis mo pa icre-credit? For shame!)

Short Version: Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. He argued that he was covered by the absolute
immunity of the ADB, where he worked. The Court ruled that his immunity did not cover the alleged acts of
oral defamation, since such could not be considered to be acts performed in his official capacity.

Facts:
Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng)
Chinese national employed as an economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Two informations for grave oral defamation were filed against him alleging that on separate
occasions (the 28th and 31st of January of 1994) he uttered defamatory words to Joyce v. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB, for the imputation of theft.

MeTC Mandaluyong
Issued warrant, but Liang was released to the custody of the ADB Security Officer

Acting pursuant to advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, by virtue
of an Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government, dismissed the informations
against him.

People of the Philippines

On petition for certiorari and mandamus

RTC Pasig
Annulled and set aside the MeTC’s order.

Liang
Petition for review, Supreme Court.

SC
January 2000, denied the petition for review.
 a) Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity.
i) DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.

ii) MeTC erred in receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing
the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution,
a) the latters right to due process was violated.

iii) mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping
of the charges

b) Under Section 45 of the Agreement- the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity."
i) It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the
DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.

c) Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty
i) The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.

ii) Well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

d) Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming that
Liang indeed is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
i) As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.

e) That there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
i) Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law

ii) Rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in

cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

iii) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction
nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.

Motion for Reconsideration:

Liang
MR, argued
 That the DFA’s determination of immunity is a political question to be made by the
executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts.

Furthermore, the immunity of international organizations is absolute and extends to all its
staff.

Issue:
Were the statements allegedly made by Liang uttered while in the performance of his official functions? NO.

SC:

1) First, the Court emphasized that its earlier decision did not deny diplomatic immunity at all. Rather, the
Court merely ruled as to whether Liang’s alleged words fell squarely under the provisions of Section 45(a) of
the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippines, where officers and staff for the bank (including experts
and consultants performing missions for the bank) enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity.

Again, the Court ruled that the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as
falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.

Slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity.

The issue of whether Liang’s utterances in fact constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine.

Voting: C.J. Davide, Jr., concurring in J. Puno’s concurring opinion.

Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

J. Puno’s concurring opinion: He basically argued that international officials are entitled to immunity only
with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy
absolute immunity. (This in apparent response to Liang’s insistence that ADB’s absolute immunity extended
to him.)

(US vs. Ah Sing) PDF

008. MIQUIBAS VS. COMMANDING GENERAL

JESUS MIQUIABAS VS COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND,

UNITED STATES ARMY

G.R. No. L-1988

February 24, 1948

Moran, C.J.

Short Version:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines. Therefore
the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense
allegedly committed by him

Facts:

1. Petitioner
a. Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
b. He has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the
United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States.
2. Petitioner
a. Was arrested for that reason
3. A General Court-Martial appointed by respondent
a. Tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
4. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
5. Thus, Petitioner
a. a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed against the Commanding General Philippine-
Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody
and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an
offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense
allegedly committed by the petitioner? (NO)

Ruling:

It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any criminal
action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Ratio:

1. The offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within a base that would bring the case within the jurisdiction of the
general court-martial.

• It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all
offenses committed within its territory.
o But it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign
nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of
said territory.
• On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases.
• Under paragraph 1 (a) thereof, the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal
case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base.
o Paragraph 2, of Article XXI of the agreement, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation,
which will be available for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary
 quarters and installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until
such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement
of the two Governments."
! There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing the Port
of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
o Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary
quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be
considered as offenses within the bases
o Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a base,
since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases
mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located
within the present limits of the City of Manila.

2. The offender is not a member of the armed forces of the United States

• Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-
Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed forces
of the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the United States.
• Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
• Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of
civilian employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a
conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.

Digested by Lor Saguinsin

009. Gumabon v. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-30026 / January 30, 1971 / En Banc / Petition for Habeas Corpus
Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares – Petitioners
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons – Respondent
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jason Jimenez

Short Version: Petitioners sought release from imprisonment through this petition for habeas corpus. They
were meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes. They invoked
the doctrine in People v. Hernandez which negated the existence of such an offense, a ruling that was not
handed down until after their convictions had become final. Their petition was granted. Since judicial
decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines, the conclusion is that the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the RPC as to penal laws having such
character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving
the same."

Facts:
Petitioner Gumabon
Pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua

For the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
 Other petitioners (Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua) pleaded guilty, and
were similarly made to suffer the same penalty.

Each of them has served more than 13 years.

Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, SC ruled that the information against the accused (very same rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery) was not warranted under Article 134 of the RPC, there being no
such complex offense.

SC reaffirmed the ruling of People v. Hernandez in People v. Lava.

Petitioners
Asserted the deprivation of the constitutional right of equal protection.

That they were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
Geronimo, and others were convicted.

That the law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter
were convicted.

It had not and has not been changed.

For the same crime, committed under the same law, petitioners were allowed to suffer life
imprisonment, while others suffered only prision mayor.

Petitioners
Relied on Article 22 of the RPC which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect.

That he has served more than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is
thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.

Petitioner
Hence, this petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:
1. Should the Hernandez ruling be given retroactive effect? YES
2. Is the habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? YES

Ruling: Petition granted

Ratio:
1. The Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of
the RPC (Article 22) as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a
final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." The Hernandez case negated
the existence of the complex offense for which the petitioners were convicted.

2. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence
is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight
of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in
case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ
 of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." The only means of
giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus."

Voting: Dizon, Zaldivar, Concepcion, concur. Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Bernardo vs. People, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

FACTS:

Isidro Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa’s Riceland in Plaridel Bulacan from Oct. ’72 to Aug. ‘74.

His son Cayetano Bernardo(co-Petitioner) stayed with him in the house built on that land, and helped him in
tilling the land.

Isidro left the landholding, and transferred to San Nicolas Bulacan, without knowledge of the landowner Sta.
Rosa.

However, before leaving, the tenancy rights of the house were left with the son.

Eventually, Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole rice field, through her overseer Dr. Cruz.

Sta Rosa

Forcible entry against the Bernardos (Cayetano and Isidro), MTC Bulacan

Bernardos

Lost in their cases before the MTC, and also in the CFI

Also lost their petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA

Sta. Rosa

Sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate their house and land
Bernardos

Refused

Sta. Rosa

Criminal complaint was charged against Bernardos for violation of PD 772. CFI Bulacan

“That on or about the 22nd day of April 1974, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Isidro Bernardo and
Cayetano Bernardo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without the knowledge and
taking advantage of the tolerance of the owner Ledda Sta. Rosa y Cruz, succeed and/or continue in
possessing and squatting on a parcel of land of the said owner, by erecting thereon their residential house and
failing to remove the said residential house despite demand to do so made by the said owner.

Bernardos

Pleaded not guilty

Bernardos

During pendency of case, Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiciton of court to entertain a case for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772.

PD 772 applies to squatters in urban communities only and not to agricultural lands

PD 772s preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban

communities or more particularly to illegal construction in squatter areas made by well-
to-do individuals."

CFI

Denied MTD

Cbonvicted Bernardos of crime chargesd and were sentence to pay fine

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of presidential
decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation of said
law

RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted.

Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions.

As per OSGs comment, it said that no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is
not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
statute

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents| 1 April 1998|J. Martinez

Facts

1983

Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law)

RTC Manila

Around 7 years later (1990),

Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case.

When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver (special edition by ARMSCOR,
PHILS.) and 6 rounds of live ammunition were found in his possession.

Consequently, Tujan

Charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD
1866

RTC Makati
RTC Makati

Recommended no bail.

Also directed the continued detention of Tujan at MIG of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.

Tujan

Motion invoking his right to a Preliminary Investigation pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112, ROC

Prayed his arraignment be held in abeyance until the PI is terminated.

However, Tujan's counsel, during the hearing of the motion for PI, withdrew the said motion saying he
would file a Motion to Quash the information, for which he requested 20 days to do so.

RTC

The request was granted.

Tjuan

Motion to Quash, on the ground

That Tujan "has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged" in
the criminal case for subversion with RTC Manila, based on Sec. 3(h) and 7, Rule 117, 1985
Rules on Crim Pro.

In support of the motion, Tujan contends that "common crimes such as illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in
subversion,". He avers that "the present case is the twin prosecution" of "the earlier
subversion case" and, therefore, he "is entitled to invoke the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy."

Petitioner

Opposed the MQ, arguing

1) That Tujan was not in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because:

(a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case, and
 (b) the offense charged against him is for Subversion, punishable under RA 1700; while the
present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion, punishable under a different law (PD 1866).

2) That "absorption rule" does not apply in the present case because Illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion; nor is Subversion a
necessary means of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition."

RTC Makati

Granted the MQ, stating that the illegal possession was a continuing offense of the subversion, thus,
Tujano was in double jeopardy.

Cited Sec. 1, Rule 117, ROC on MQ, which states that MQ may be filed at any time before entering
the plea of the accused, thus, arraignment was not neccessary in filing the MQ.

Issue:

Is the accused charged with the same offense in both case which would justify the dismissal of the
second charge on the ground of double jeopardy?

No double jeopardy

Held:

Sec. 1, PD 1866:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or posses any firearms, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
 If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs.

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor.

Under the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition
is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.

The third paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition "in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion" a circumstance to increase the penalty to death.

Thus, the allegation in the Information in the case of illegal firearms, that the unlicensed firearm
found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, "a member of the communist party of the Philippines and
its front organization," was used "in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion"

Does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same
Information,

But simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 was committed so as to qualify the penalty to death.

Thus, there is only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion.

There is nothing in PD 1866 which decrees that crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are
the very acts that are being penalized.
 On the other hand, the previous subversion charge before RTC Manila was based on a different law
(RA 1700) Section 3 thereof penalizes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt act affiliates
with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization . . ." Section 4 of said
law further penalizes "such member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor
or of any subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the Government."

Therefore, Tujan could be charged either under PD 1866 or RA 1700.

NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Rule
117, ROC)

Tujan's MQ did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy because it had not arisen yet since Tujan has
not even been arraigned in the subversion charge. Further, the two criminal charges are not of the same
offense as required under Sec. 21.

SC recognizes that RA 1700 and PD 1866 can co-exist.

However, the subsequent enactment of RA 7636 totally repealing RA 1700, substantially

changed the present case wherein the repealing law, being favorable to Tujan, who is not a
habitual delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.

Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act with was penalized by a prior law
ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this
jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has
no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this
charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed,
subversion is no longer a crime.

Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is now bailable under RA 8294
which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. 8294 has amended PD 1866, as amended, by eliminating the
provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in furtherance of subversion, the penalty of death
shall he imposed. Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of
firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). 33 The reduced penalty of imprisonment — which is four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years — entitles the accused-private respondent to bail. Considering,
however, that the accused-private respondent has been detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the
present (as far as our record has shown), or more than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order.
This is so because even if he were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the length of
his detention while his case is pending has already exceeded the penalty prescribed by the new law.

PEOPLE vs. BON

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Bon

October 30, 2006

Tinga, J.

Short version: (Sorry, long case but I tried my best summarizing it here.) Bon was convicted on 6 counts of
qualified rape and 2 counts of attempted rape. He was thus imposed 6 death penalties and for the attempted
rape, 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
However, RA 9346 was enacted, removing the death penalty. A problem arose because of 2 possible
interpretation of the effects of RA 9346.

1. Whether RA 9346 only applies when the penalty is death (i.e. a person convicted of death will only
get reclusion perpetua, but a person convicted and imposed reclusion perpetua will still get reclusion
perpetua as RA 9346 will not apply)
2. Whether RA 9346 had the effect of downgrading the penalties prescribed for felonies (i.e. if before,
the penalty for a consummated felony is death, and for the frustrated felony, reclusion perpetua, and
for the attempted felony, reclusion temporal, and so on, RA 9346 will downgrade all these penalties
accordingly. Thus, if consummated felony will now have the penalty of reclusion perpetua, frustrated
will get reclusion temporal and so on.)

Court favoured the second interpretation. The first one will result in many absurdities (principal and
accomplice will have the same penalty if principal is convicted of death; person guilty of consummated crime
will have the same penalty as person guilty of frustrated crime.) A statute should be so construed not only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of jurisprudence.
Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. If the
language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would
if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.

FACTS

Eight (8) informations

Filed against Alfredo Bon, by the Asst. Prov. Prosecutor of Gumaca Quezon

Charging him with the rape of his nieces, AAA and BBB, the minor daughters of his older
brother.

The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of 6 years.

Several instances at the house of their grandmother, at any time of the day.

AAA and BBB shared this to their mother, who, upon knowing, reported to the
authorities and let her children be examined in the Gumaca District Hospital

Appellant

Denial and alibi as his defense.

That the only reason the case was filed against him was that AAA and BBB mother
had harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father (AAA and BBB grand father)

RTC

Convicted of 8 counts of rape, with qualifying circumstance of minority of the victims, and the
relationship of the victim and Bon, the latter being the former’s relative by consanguinity within the
third degree.

Bon was imposed the penalty of 8 death sentences.

*CA (by virtue the pronouncement in People v. Matero; automatic review was done by SC in the past)

Affirmed 6 of the convictions but downgraded the convictions in 2 cases to attempted rape.

Accordingly, CA reduced the penalties attached to the 2 counts of rape from death for consummated
qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and
4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.

HOW WAS THIS PENALTY DETERMINED?

Penalty for an attempted felony is lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony.

Prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen
years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code.

Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the CA for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty
comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.

At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum
penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower, or prision mayor.

*RA 9346 (Act prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines) was enacted and thus, the
sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA can no longer be imposed. Section 2 of the
law mandates that, in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

The enactment of RA 9346 has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Bon was
sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death.
With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that he should now be sentenced to a penalty
two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep.
Act No. 9346?
ISSUE: What should be the appropriate penalty for the 2 counts of attempted rape in view of RA 9346?

REASONING

If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had
been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such
downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to
those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor, among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue
of RA 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly."

While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in
actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees
insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with RA
9346.

Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar
as they impose the death penalty."

2 schools of thought:

1. It can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among
many examples) does not “impose the death penalty,” since none of the convicts concerned would
face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory
 provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by
death, are not amended by RA 9346.
2. The operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls
for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe
"impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep.
Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call
for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the
proper graduated penalty.

If the true intent of RA 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual
executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity.

For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would
have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would
have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific
a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of
RA 9346 to actual executions only.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Let us test the premise that the legislative intent of RA 9346 was to limit the prohibition law to the
physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death.
Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in
the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim,
even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X
and Y were convicted by final judgment.

Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua.

Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal.

Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of RA 9346, the graduation of penalties remains
unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into
account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale
of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously
punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal
law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a
step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature
truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in
the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates
the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals
and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others.

Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple
kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty.
Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the
penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal,
while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.

Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are
justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a
lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought.

Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would
receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the
accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than
the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so.

Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies
which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death
would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion
perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both
the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize
that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated stage,
unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death," such as murder, which may be frustrated.

Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their
attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus
consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for
attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty.

If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then
those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though
the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would now
be prision mayor.

It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty
for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime would,
again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established thought in
criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees
fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies
resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering
that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from
deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.

The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In
contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred
the application of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In
particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated
penalties.

Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect
of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated
and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws.

Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now
bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would
bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death."

Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an
anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated.

Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the
crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the
reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty
two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.

There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive"
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent
with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of jurisprudence. "Interpreting and harmonizing
laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a
complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative
and quasi-legislative acts."

There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later
statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the
graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the
application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.

It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the
state and liberally in favor of the accused. If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting
substantial justice. The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. It is this philosophy of caution
before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles
in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Others

Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also effectively
classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification
under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death
penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.The categorization of
certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than
others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of
these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found
guilty of heinous crimes.

It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep.
Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of
crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still,
what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special
category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil
indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.

Conclusion / Summary

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth,
"death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the
graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted
rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court
of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of
"death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as
often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the
latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier
observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is
to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would have
warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep.
Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to
those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its
enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their
reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not make operative the release of
such convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There
are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices
such as the Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees
possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by
reason of this ruling.
DISPOSITIVE

By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, Bon is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts
consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of
the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages
andP10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape. Separately, the Court applies
prevailing jurisprudence in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.

013. Pascual v. Board of Examiners

28 SCRA 344 (1969)/May 26, 1969/(Division not stated)/Appeal
Arsenio Pascual, Jr. – petitioner-appellee
Board of Medical Examiners – respondent-appellant
Salvador and Enriqueta Gatbonton – intervenors-appellants
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jadd Dealino

Short Version: The Spouses Gatbonton filed an administrative complaint for immorality against Arsenio
Pascual. The Board of Medical Examiners compelled Pascual to take the witness stand for the complainants.
The CFI – Manila granted preliminary injunction, and later prohibited the Board from compelling Pascual to
take the witness stand. The Supreme Court sustained Pascual and upheld the CFI’s decision, based on the
right against self-incrimination in relation to the right to privacy.

Facts:
Spouses Gatbonton
Filed an administrative complaint with the Board of Medical Examiners against Arsenio Pascual,
charging him with immorality

The Gatbontons’ counsel announced that they would present Arsenio Pascual himself (the respondent
in said administrative complaint) as their first witness.

Pascual objected based on his constitutional right against self-incrimination (from being a witness
against himself.)

The Board noted his objection but effectively stated that he would take the witness stand anyway
unless he could secure a restraining order, from a competent authority.

This injunction was granted by the CFI – Manila.

Pascual
Alleged that in ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at
 the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a
privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.

CFI
Granted Pascual’s demand perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to
testify as witness

Board
Answered

Argues that the right against self-incrimination is only available only when a question resulting in a
self-incriminating answer is asked.

Spouses Gatbontons
Intervened in the petition, additionally arguing that the right against self-incrimination cannot be
asserted in an administrative hearing.

CFI
Eventually prohibited the Board from compelling Pascual to take the witness stand for the
complainants.

Issue:
Whether Pascual may be compelled to be a witness for the complainants in an administrative case against
himself. NO.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

Ratio:
1. The Court emphasized its ruling in Cabal v. Kapunan (1968), to the effect that in criminal cases, an
accused may refuse to take the witness stand, in addition to refusing to answer incriminatory
questions.
a. This principle also applies in administrative cases where a criminal or penal aspect is present.
i. Pascual would be similarly disadvantaged, as when the proceeding is criminal.
ii. In this case, Pascual stands to lose his license to practice medicine.

b. The American case of Spevack v. Klein (1967) is also cited, where it was stated that the Right
Against Self-Incrimination in their 5th Amendment has been absorbed by the 14th
Amendment (Equal Protection and Due Process), such that the Right Against Self-
Incrimination should not be “watered down” by making the deprivation of livelihood (in this
case, the practice of medicine) the price of asserting the right.

2. The Court views the Board and the Spouses’ interpretation of the right (that it can only be claimed
once on the witness stand) as a diluted, specific aspect of the right. This right also includes the Right
to Silence.
a. The Court declared in the 1905 case of US v. Luzon that an accused has the right to remain
silent, and this silence is not a presumption of guilt.
b. Taking the witness stand should be done out of the defendant’s own free will.

3. The rationale for these principles (Right Against Self-Incrimination vis-à-vis the Right to Privacy,
Rights of the Accused) is that even though crimes should not go unpunished and that the truth
should be revealed, these must not be achieved at the expense of the respect accorded to the
 human personality. [Probably the rationale for the strict construction of penal laws against the
State]
a. Governments should respect the dignity and integrity of its citizens. (citing Chief Justice
Warren in Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).

4. At the time this decision was written, the current trend was to relate the Right Against Self-
Incrimination with the Right to Privacy.

Voting: Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., official leave.

14. Manuel v. People

476 SCRA 461/29 November 2005
Decision by J. Callejo, Digest by Roe Anuncio

Short Version: Eduardo Manuel was charged and convicted of bigamy. He brought the case to the Supreme
Court, contending that he should be acquitted because he believed in good faith that his first wife was already
dead when he contracted the second marriage, thereby negating any intent on his part. The Court ruled that
intent is presumed and he was not able to discharge the burden of proving otherwise.

Facts:

Eduardo Manuel was charged with bigamy.

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the
first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

Private Complainant
Tina Gandalera-Manuel (wife of second marriage)
Then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.

Alleged that Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.

Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single.

In their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.

4 years passed, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support.

Made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo
had been previously married. She was able to secure an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.

Eduardo’ Defense

Tina was a GRO.

 He fell in love with her and married her.

He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry
him.

Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite
on her neck.

He then abandoned her.

Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage

His first wife was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned; and never heard of her for
20 yrs

Trial court
Found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
Sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant
Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00

Declared :
(1) that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s
20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.

(i) And that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously
married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo
Appealed, CA

That he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent.

That he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.

He insisted that as per Art 3 RPC, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a
felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only
out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage.

He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code

CA
Affirmed RTC

Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.

Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent spouse.
Issue: Was there intent on the part of Eduardo? YES.

Ruling: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Ratio:
“Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.”

Elements of bigamy: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.

The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.

Another view, however, by Viada, considers a third element: fraudulent intent to consummate the second
marriage.

Fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) is an essential element of a felony by dolo.

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the
principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime.

There is no willfulness if the subject believes that the former marriage has been dissolved;
and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be
deemed not to constitute a crime.

Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief
that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any
news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of
the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential
elements of the crime.

Now, as gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit).

Art. 3, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides : there is deceit (dolo) when the act is performed with deliberate
intent.

A felony cannot exist without intent.

Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.

Although the words “With Malice” do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
such phrase is included in the word voluntary.

“Malice” is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.

When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by
the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.
In CAB, the petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant.

General Rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution
for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.

However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, but this
he was unable to discharge.

He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the

presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.

Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith,
and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ,

appellant.
Automatic review to the SC bec of the death penalty
May 9, 2003
Digest by: Ces
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Short version: Delos Santos was charged and convicted for the murder of Rod Flores. He was sentenced to
the death penalty. On automatic review to the SC, he claimed that there was no proof of his motive because
he did not have any previous argument or altercation with Flores. The SC held that Proof of motive is not
indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his
participation is adequately established.

Facts:

Danny delos Santos was charged with murder, before RTC Bulacan

The Information alleged that “the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to
kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
kitchen knife said Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his death.”

Appellant

Danny pleaded not guilty.

Prosecution:
 The Prosecution presented witnesses (De Leon and Tablante) who claimed they saw Delos Santos
emerge from behind Flores then he stabbed stab Flores twice.

a) Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw Rod
Flores drinking gin with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the Jayvee’s
house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

As Marcelino was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, Marcelino approached
them and borrowed Flores cart.

While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and
conversing with the group

Suddenly, Delos Santos emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a
knife, making an upward and downward thrust.

Flores ran but delos Santos ran after him and stabbed him repeatedly.

Delos Santos only ceased stabbing after he saw Flores dead.

b) Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leons testimony.

On cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help Flores by separating

him from the Delos Santos who ran away. He also testified that the Delos Santos
joined his group at about 11:00 a.m. and kept on coming back and forth.

c) Dr. Benito Caballero also testified that Flores suffered 21 stab wounds, 11 of which were
fatal.

Defense

Delos Santos denied the accusation and claimed that he was at his auntie’s house at the time of the
crime and that he was around 40 meters away from the scene of the crime.

e claimed that he and Flores met but did not greet each other and that there was no altercation
between them.

RTC

Found Delos Santos guilty of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

The court took into account the brutality in the manner by which the life of the victim was taken.

He was sentenced to death by legal injection.

The case was brought to the SC by automatic review.

Defense:
 Claims that there was no evidence that he had a motive to kill Flores, considering that they had not
previous heated argument or altercation.

Issue (relevant to topic): Whether the lack of motive is relevant

Ratio:

No it is not.

1) Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.

In People vs. Galano, the SC ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense.

It becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is
some doubt on whether the accused had committed it.

In CAB, however, the prosecution witnesses (De Leon and Tablate) positively identified the accused.

2) The fact that the statements of the witnesses were taken 2 months after the incident is immaterial.

It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the
crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator.

The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case is of common
knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a valid
reason exists for such hesitance.

3) The court disregarded his defense of alibi.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the
physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.

In CAB, the required impossibility does not exist.

Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law.

Delos Santos did not present any evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses, in testifying
against him, have improper motive.

The prosecution was able to establish that appellant’s attack on Flores was from behind without any
slightest provocation on his part and that it was sudden and unexpected.

Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to
resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous.
GUIYAB v. PEOPLE

October 20, 2005

Quisumbing, J.

Short version: Joey Guiyab was convicted of homicide by the TC and CA based on the testimony of witness
Joseph Madriaga. Madriaga testified that Guiyab and a Juan Sanchez attacked him and his companion Rafael
Bacani, the victim, with a knife. SC believed Madriaga’s positive identification of Guiyab.

FACTS

Prosecution Evidence:

Testimony of witness Madriaga

On December 12, 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., victim Rafael Bacani and witness
Joseph Madriaga were in front of the Community Center in Tumauini. A certain
Juan Sanchez approached and kicked them.

They posed for a fight but Joey Guiyab said “Pureban nu ta inanna nu”, or “You try
and you will see” while brandishing a knife.

Joseph hit Sanchez with a stone, and so Guiyab chased him. According to Joseph,
Guiyab failed to catch him so Guiyab instead attacked Rafael who was following
them behind, stabbing him once on the right chest. Rafael was brought to the
hospital and died a day after.

Testimony of Dr Cruz, resident physician Isabela Provincial Hospital

Victim Rafael died of cardiorespiratory arrest, the antecedent cause of which is

hypovolemic shock and the underlying cause is the stab wound at the anterior chest.

Testimony of Visitacion Matias, mother of Rafael

On danages

Testimony of Domingo Gumaru, accused’s neighbor

Charge
 Petitioner Joey Guiyab was charged with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabagan.

Defense

SP04 Romeo Tumolava, kumpadre of accused’s parents

That he saw Guiyab near the Community Center at the night of the incident.

RTC/CA

Found Guiyab guilty.

Defense:

That the real identity of the assailant was not fully established by the prosecution since the lone
eyewitness (Joseph Madriaga) learned the name of the petitioner only after it was fed to him by
Police Officer Armando Lugo.

Thus the identification of the accused was tainted with conjecture and speculation.

Issue: WON the the accused was adequately identified - YES (or, the identification of the petitioner was
tainted with conjecture and speculation – NO)

Held: The SC found Madriaga’s identification of Joey Guiyab credible.

Even if he did not know the name of Guiyab prior to the incident, Madriaga was able to identify him in open
court when he was asked to point out the person responsible for the stabbing.

Besides, Madriaga maintained that although he did not know Guiyab by name, he knew him by his face as
part of the community.

There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive
identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former
personally.

The witness need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face.
 Knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name.

Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name
was supplied to the eyewitness.

The weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused
commit the crime, and not because he knew his name.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2001 and
the Resolution dated February 26, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23703, which sustained
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner JOEY GUIYAB guilty of Homicide and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum or
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and to PAY the heirs of
Rafael Bacani P50,000.00 as death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 for actual damages and P18,000.00 for funeral
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, are AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

017. People vs. Temblor

G.R. No. L-66884/ May 28, 1988

Defendant-appellant: Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald”

Decision by Grino-Aquino; Digest by: Luisa Mauricio

SHORT VERSION: While Cagampang and wife Victoria were manning a store adjacent to their house,
Temblor came and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of
cigarettes, Temblor shot Cagampang. Temblor and another man demanded from Victoria to bring out
Cagampang’s firearm which she did. Temblor took Cagampang’s .38 caliber revolver and fled. Temblor was
charged with murder. CFI and SC found him guilty. One of Temblor’s contentions was that he lacked
motive for killing Cagampang. But the court held that he had enough motive (he was NPA and NPA had an
agaw-armas campaign) and that, moreover, proof of motive is not essential in this case because Victoria
positively identified Temblor as the person who shot her husband.

FACTS:

1) At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang (Cagampang), his wife
Victoria and their two children were in the store adjacent to their house in Brgy. Talo-ao, Agusan del
Norte.
 Accused Vicente Temblor (alias Ronald) arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes.

While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and
Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head.

Wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul"!

Two persons barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that Victoria
brings out her husband’s firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they
shouted.

The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim.

Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the maleta where her husband's firearm was hidden.

She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's
.38 caliber revolver, and fled.

2) Some months after the incident, 1981, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station
by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and identified the accused as the man who
killed her husband.

CHARGE:

Criminal charge for the crime of murder, RTC Agusan del Norte and Butuan City

With the use of firearms

DEFENSE: plea of not guilty

1) Alibi.

That at 4pm of that day, Temblor and father had been in house of a certain Silverio Perol,
drinking.
 Further, Temblor and his companions, who admitted members of the NPA (New People’s
Army), were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong.

Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of
dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public
market on November 26, 1981.

2) That the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name

This circumstance renders the Identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her
husband's killing, insufficient.

CFI: found him guilty of Murder, reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties under Article 41 and 42 RPC
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

ISSUE: WON TEMBLOR IS GUILTY OF MURDER – YES

RULING: Judgment appealed affirmed in all respects, Temblor guilty.

RATIO

Identity of the accused

Temblor: Victorina did not know him by name. hence, the identity of the accused was not established

Court: untenable.

Temblor was positively identified by Victorina who recognized him because she was less than a
meter away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and
by an incandescent lamp outside.

Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal
— who was a long-time acquaintance of Temblor and who knew him as "Ronald." He saw Temblor
in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the
gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away.
 The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the
appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its
findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be
disturbed on appeal

Temblor’s alibi

Temblor: from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house
of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over
dog as pulutan until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.

Court: alibi does not lie

The prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel Officer and
the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol, showing that Perol was not at home drinking with
Temblor and his father but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50pm up to 7am the next
day.

Temblor’s self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.

Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that
the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond
doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted
that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep
or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes.

Lack of motive

Temblor: he did not have a motive for killing Cagampang.

Court: untenable.

Temblor’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings
perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and
ammunition for their group are prevalent. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign.
Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified.
018. PEOPLE v. HASSAN

L-68969/ January 22, 1988 / Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Zamboanga Vr XIII/
Defendant-apellant- Usman Hassan
Decision by: Sarmiento, J.
Digest by: Sai Bautista

Short Version: Hassan was convicted of murder on the bases of the testimony of a lone witness for the
prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator of the Zamboanga
City Police Station. The Supreme Court found that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. As a
general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must
stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role
towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when 'the
identification is extremely tenuous

Facts:

Usman Hassan
Accused of murder for stabbing to death one Ramon Pichel, Jr.

Ramon Pichel
A Manager of the sand and gravel business of his father
Usman Hassan
An illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador, a member of the Samal Tribe

Jose Samson, 24-years-old (lone witness for the Prosecution)

Testified, through investigation conducted by Police Investigator Rogelio Carpio

That he was with the victim Ramon at about 7:00 pm of July 23, 1981

That he was a backrider in the motorcycle of victim Ramon

That they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City

That while he was selecting mangoes, he saw accused stab the victim Ramon, who was seated at his
red Honda motorcycle which was parked about 2-3 meters from the fruit stand;

That he saw the accused stab Ramon from behind "only once" and that after the stabbing, the
accused ran towards the PNB Building.

That he testified to know Usman by face, but not by name.

That he was able to see the accused because it was very bright; That victim Ramon was
facing the light of a petromax lamp

Described the accused

Wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants; but Samson did not see if the
aggressor was wearing shoes

Stabbed Ramon with a knife but "Samson did not exactly see what kind of knife it was, and
he did not see how long the knife was
Note: Samson’s statement taken 2 days after the stabbing; then sworn to, 2 days after it was taken,
was never presented nor mentioned by the Prosecution at all

RTC of Zamboanga
Convicted Hassan, based on this testimony and testimony of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio
regarding the investigation conducted by the police.

Issue: WON accused should be found guilty for the crime of murder- NO!

Ruling: Evidence for the Prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof- beyond
reasonable doubt- required to convict an accused person.

Ratio: (Relevant part: MOTIVE)

In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and
alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption
of innocence.

1) In CAB, testimony of the lone eye witness and evidence introduced by the police are weak and
unconvincing

~The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, that he saw the assailant stab the deceased
"from behind on his chest" only once contradicted the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer
of the NBI officer who identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest and third
rib, and another located at the left arm posterior aspect. The medical expert also concluded from the
nature and location of the chest wound that it was inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused
was in front of him."

2) Further, the investigation procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation between Jose
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for
confrontation in the funeral parlor.

However, on cross-examination he stated that the accused was identified by Samson in a "police line-up”.

Court considered this confrontation arranged by the police investigator between eyewitness and the
accused as violation to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the identification of the accused.

~Also, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were
done haphazardly. Statement of Hassan was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of
Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken. The fruit vendor—from whom Samson
and the deceased were buying mangoes was not investigated. Nor was the arresting officer, companion of
Corporal Carpio presented. The knife and its scabbard, which were confiscated by Carpio from Hassan at the
time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood
which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased. Court also emphasized the fact
that accused was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion after the incident. If he were the assailant,
he would have fled.

~ A day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of
the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious
and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. There was no attempt on the
part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with
the killing of Pichel, Jr which could have produced the link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence.

Court found that there was total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete
stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction,
because, after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with
the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack
of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true
where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit as when 'the Identification is extremely
tenuous," as in this case.

Accused AQUITTED.

Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

019. US VS. AH CHONG

March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao

SUMMARY: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and the deceased Pascual Gualberto was employed as a
house boy at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province. It is a detached house located
some 40 meters from the nearest building. One evening, after having gone to bed, Ah Chong was awakened
by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, ―Who is there,ǁ but received no answer. Fearing
that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, ―If you enter the room I will kill
you.ǁ But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door (as support
to the lock)& believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and struck the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate Pscual. He asked for help immediately after seeing Pascual wounded. Pascual
died the day after. He admitted having stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was a ladron (burglar). They had an agreement that when either returned at night he should
knowck and acquaint the other of his identity. Trial Court found Ah Chong guilty of the crime of
assassination. SC reversed the conviction and acquitted Ah Chong because of the mistake of fact and absence
of negligence on his part given the circumstances of the case. There is no criminal intent which is a requite of
the crime committed

FACTS:
1) The defendant, Ah Chong,
a. was employed as a cook
2) The deceased Pascual Gualberto
a. was employed as a house boy or muchacho at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province.
3) Officiers Quarters is a detached house located some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August 1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club.
a. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building..
i. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
ii. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside
 of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
iii. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind
in the room.
4) On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, Ah Chong, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room.
a. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
b. He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
c. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and
Ah Chong, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out.
"If you enter the room, I will kill you."
d. At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been
placed against the door.
e. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
f. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded
condition, followed by Ah Chong, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight.
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house,
No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
g. Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound
on the following day.

Arguments of Ah Chiong:
5) There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
Ah Chong alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
6) Ah Chong also claims that they had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should
knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.

Prosecution
7) Ah Chong was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio
mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
TC
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act?

RULING: No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake
of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except
in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from
criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be.

No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to
desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that
in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

Spanish jurist Pacheco: A voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the
word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use
in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."

The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors.

Legal maxims.:
• Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were
so”;
• Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"

Moral science and moral sentiment: no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil.
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract
justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"),

However Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse").

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part;

The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door
of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent,
in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instance de oficio.
020. PEOPLE v. OANIS
G.R. No. L-47722 | July 27, 1943 | En Banc | Appeal from a decision of the CFI
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES-- plaintiff-appellee,
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
MORAN, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua

Short Version:
Oanis was a police officer while Galanta was a corporal of the Constabulary who were ordered to capture the
fugitive Balagtas. In the process, they shot a man in the room of Balagtas’ rumored paramour. The man was
sleeping with his back towards the door. They claim that they acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties. Court ruled that The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake
of fact does not apply in this case as it applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. It is also required that the defendant had no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him. In this case, no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
The person in the room being then asleep, the appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves.

Facts:

Cabanatuan chief of police Oanis and corporal Galanta were found guilty by the lower court of homicide
through reckless imprudence.
Trial court’s version of facts:
December 24, 1938 – Telegram was received by the police stating that escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas is with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan and to get him dead or alive.

Corporal Galanta, and privates Oralo, Serna and Fernandez were instructed to arrest Balagtas and if
overpowered, to follow the order in the telegram.

Chief of police Oanis volunteered to go with the four.

The search party split into 2 groups.

Oanis, Galanta, and Fernandez arrived at Irene's house.

Oanis asked Brigida where Irene's room was.

Brigida indicated the place and also told him that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Oanis and Galanta then went to Irene’s room and after seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him.

It turned out that the person killed was not the criminal Balagtas but Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour.

Galanta’s version:

After opening the curtain covering the door, Oanis said, "if you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson and
Irene woke up and as Tecson was about to sit up in bed, Oanis fired at him.

The wounded Tecson leaned towards the door, and Galanta fired at Tecson after Oanis shouted,
"that is Balagtas."

Oanis’ version:

After Oanis said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson while he was still
lying on bed, and continued firing until using up his bullets.

Oanis then entered the door and upon seeing Tecson who was apparently picking up something
from the floor, fired at him.

Issue:
WON Oanis and Galanta should be absolved from liability for killing Tecson on the ground of mistake of
fact. NO.

Dispositive:
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
costs.

Reasoning:
 - The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact applies only when the mistake
is committed without fault or carelessness.
- The Court compared the present case with US v. Ah Chong, and gave another example:
o In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again.,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair
which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
room-mate.
o A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as
a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life
and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
! In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault
or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a
further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified
his act of killing.
o In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person
in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain
his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.

Other stuff:
- The Court also ruled that the appellants committed criminal negligence, as the killing was intentional.
Since Tecson was killed in his sleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of fulfilling a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office.
o There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
! (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right; and
! (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
- In the instance case, only the first requisite is present. The second requisite is wanting for the crime
by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty
was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered.
- The appellants have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as
to his identity.
- According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions:
1) PARAS, J., dissenting:
- His point was that the appellants undoubtedly followed the order to get Balagtas dead or alive.
 - As Balagtas was a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that made him
extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his
arrest, whether dead or alive.
- Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to
take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence.

2) HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

- The doctrine laid down by US v. Ah Chong should be applied in this case.
- Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea,
supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there
asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But
the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the
fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress.
- In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants to employ force and to
make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to their
belief, was Balagtas
- In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed without any
fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had
no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.