The Republic and American Imperialism

The Roots of the Filipino Nation by Onofre D.
Corpuz
CHAPTER 19
THE REPUBLIC AND AMERICAN
IMPERIALISM, 18981899
The eyes of all the Great Powers are now directed

toward the Pacific Ocean – the nations of Europe
would like to be the only guests at the banquet but
the United States desires a share and wants to
occupy places in the Sandwich Islands, the
Marianas, the Carolines and the Philippines for the
benefit of her commerce. - AguinaIdo (1898)
We come not to make war upon the people of the

Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among
them, but to protect them in their homes, in their
employments, and in their personal and religious
rights. -- McKinley (19 May 1898)
There were three wars in the Philippines in 1898. The first was the
resumption of the Revolution, a triumphant campaign that joined the people
of Luzon and the Visayas into one government; even the Spanish presidio in
Zamboanga fell to a revolutionary group in September 1899.
The United States, too, had a war to fight. Commodore George Dewey
destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in May 1898.
But the United States Asiatic squadron proved to be a probe of

imperialism. On 19 May the American president McKinley ordered the
military occupation of the archipelago. It was the purest and meanest
imperialism. There was no shred of law to justify it, and he did not have a
single soldier in the Philippines to implement it. But he was bent on taking
the country, and he issued a second order in December calling for
The Republic and American Imperialism, 18981899. 1
The Roots of the Filipino Nation by Onofre D. Corpuz
subjugation, if necessary, because he had bought the archipelago, after

forcing Spain to sell it for $20,000,000. These orders of May and December
demanded that the Filipinos, who had won their war of liberation from Spain,
submit to United States rule.
And so the Filipinos had to fight a second war for liberty, not against their
old rulers, but against the new aggressors. The American imperialists called
the war a “Tagalo insurrection” as they called our war of independence from
Spain. Since McKinley had ordered the military occupation of Filipinas in
May 1898, the imperialists misrepresented the FilipinoAmerican War as an
“insurrection.” They called our patriots and heroes murderers, a Mafia,
bandits, outlaws, and ladrones (robbers).
Otis, the American commanding general, had advanced only forty miles
north of Manila by August 1899. It was a mess because he is reported to have
been saying the “the situation is well in hand,” and that “the war will be over
in ten days.” It ended in 1906.
The war was America's first Vietnam. Like the Vietnamese in the mid
1960s, the Filipinos were simply elements in the complex of American
ambitions. Neither had the resources to attack the United States. Much of
the truth about the war, including the barbarity into which it deteriorated,
was hidden from the American people by censorship. There were two
differences from the Vietnam war. The Filipinos had no superpower ally; they
fought alone. And the Americans came not only for war, but to take Filipinas.
This is a story of the beginnings, the web of deceit, and the alliance of
force and piety behind this third war.1
Jingoism
The war between the Americans and the Filipinos could not be foreseen in
1897. On November 3d this year, indeed, Aguinaldo's government proposed
an offensivedefensive alliance with the Americans against Spain. Through
the first half of 1898 Aguinaldo and his comrades continued to hope that the
United States government, which by now was fully aware of their struggle for
freedom through the reports of its consuls, the Hongkong and Singapore
press, and through its generals in Manila, would not hinder or frustrate their
efforts. It is true that, on the 4th of May in Hongkong, they were wary of the
United States as the possible “new oppressor.” On the other hand they
thought they needed a protector, or even an ally, because they were aware of
the danger of being divided among the known imperialist powers, and they
placed their trust in the principles of republicanism and liberty in the
constitution of which the Americans were so proud.
The Filipinos were probably right in the beginning to see no danger from
the United States. On 7 December 1896 the American president Grover
Cleveland reviewed American policy before the Congress in the context of the
“inevitable entanglements” of the United States in the rebellion in nearby
Cuba. It was being urged upon the United States government, among other
options, to end the strife in Cuba through intervention. But Cleveland said:
The United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as
a nation, which plainly dictates that right and not might should be
the rule of its conduct. Further, ... its own ample and diversified
domains satisfy all possible longings for territory, preclude all
dreams of conquest, and prevent any casting of covetous eyes upon
neighboring regions, however attractive.
Cleveland was a responsible man and could not foreclose the options of his
government. He could foresee that a situation and time might arise when
obligations to national interest would have to be recognized and acted upon.
He would wait for proof that Spain's sovereignty was “extinct in Cuba for all
purposes of its rightful existence.” And when this led to “useless loss of life
and utter destruction,” he said, “a situation will be presented in which our
obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher
obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.” But,
Cleveland continued, the United States must not itself create those
situations. He was not a weak man, and he was not opportunistic.
Cleveland's party lost in the 1896 presidential elections. The new

president, William McKinley, explained the Cuba problem for the Congress in
December 1897; he said that the United States had four options, each of
which he discussed. There was a fifth which he said he would not consider:
I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of.
That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.
Like Cleveland, McKinley could not bind his government to a policy of
inaction in Cuba. So he assured the Congress that when the time came for
forcible intervention the United States would undertake it “without
misgiving or hesitancy,” in a manner that would command “the support and
approval of the civilized world.”
But the times were dangerous for the Filipinos, even if they were more
than an ocean away from Cuba. Spanish colonialism might be ending for
them, but United States imperialism had begun. It was still the age of Big
Powers; the new leadership in Washington wanted to get the country into the
Big Boys' club. Four months after he forswore forcible annexation in Cuba,
McKinley ordered military occupation of the Philippines. His December 1899
message to the Congress explained his war against the Filipinos. McKinley
had adopted the law of the jungle, not civilized morality, as the new rule for
United States foreign policy during his presidency:
In this age of keen rivalry among nations for mastery in

commerce, the doctrine of evolution and the rule of the survival of
the fittest must be as inexorable in their operation as they are
positive in the results they bring about.
McKinley was reformulating Charles Darwin, who derived his theories

from scientific studies of the evolution of subhuman species. McKinley now
made these theories the paramount doctrine governing America's policy and
behavior in international affairs. His reference to commerce will seem
innocuous, but its potential mischief will become clear when we consider its
underlying ideas in fuller dress and when we realize that these ideas then
held sway over the minds of the leaders of the United States government.
Among such men, for instance, was Henry Cabot Lodge; he was a key
senator, a ranking member of McKinley's party. Cabot Lodge has a
perspective of American history and of the events of 1898:
For thirty years the people of the United States had been
absorbed in the development of their great heritage. They had been
finishing the conquest of their continent, and binding all parts of it
together with the tracks and highways of commerce. Once this work
was complete, it was certain that the virile, ambitious, enterprising
race which had done it would look abroad beyond their boundaries
and seek to guard and extend their interests in other parts of the
world....
Then the war note rang through the land, and with dazzled eyes
at first, and then with ever clearer and steadier gaze, they saw that
in the years of isolation and selfabsorption they had built up a
great world power, that they must return to the ocean which they
had temporarily abandoned, and have their share in the trade of
every country and the commerce of every sea.
Suddenly came the awakening to the great fact that they had
founded an empire on their Western coasts, that they held one side
of the Pacific, and could no longer be indifferent to the fate of the
other side in the remote East. Now they read with instructed vision
the prophecy of Seward, which foretold that the future course of
trade and empire would lie in the Pacific. They knew at last that
the stream of Eastern trade, which for centuries had flowed to the
West, building up great cities and enriching nations as it passed
from Byzantium to Venice, from Venice to Portugal, and from
Portugal to Holland and to London, was not to be divided, and in
part, at least, to pour eastward over the Pacific.
Now men saw that the long connection, ever growing closer,
with the Hawaiian Islands had not been chance; that the
culmination of the annexation movement in the very year of the
Spanish War was not accident, but that it all came from the instinct
of the race, which paused in California only to learn that its course
was still westward, and that Americans, and no one else, must be
masters of the cross roads of the Pacific....
The work of one May morning carried them on to the Philippines
and made them an Eastern power. Whatever the final disposition of
the islands, whether we hold them and govern much or little, our
flag is there, our footing has been made, and in the East we shall
remain, because we are entitled to, and will surely have, our share
of the great commerce with the millions of China, from whom we
shall refuse to be shut out.
Cabot Lodge's hodgepodge vision was a chauvinistic view of American

expansion – unstoppable, dictated by destiny, historic. He looked at the
Englishspeaking people on the one hand, and the FrenchandSpanish–
speaking people on the other, as locked in a historic struggle for the New
World. The American advance from the eastern seaboard down to the Gulf of
Mexico and westward to California and the Pacific Ocean was inexorable:
The two inevitable antagonists were nearing each other at last,
for they were face to face now all along the western and southern
borders of the United States. The time had come for one to stop, or
for the other to give way. But there was no stopping possible for the
Americans.... All the lands of North America ... had passed from the
hands of the men who could not use them into those of the men who
could.
The expulsion of Spain from the Antilles is merely the last and
final step of the inexorable movement in which the United States
has been engaged for nearly a century.
Such notions and visions in the minds of the United States leaders had to
produce war. If it had not been 1898 it would have been another year; if it
had not been the Filipinos it would have been another people on the Pacific or
Far East that would be the victim; and then on to the Asian mainland, and
beyond, until the American people changed their leaders or until their nation
would have been ruined. The imperialist vision was a mark of the age, so that
imperfect men would impose their rule on others. But the aggression on the
Philippines was doubly wrong because McKinley's actions were accompanied
by deceit.2
We will have a better perspective of America's war against the Filipinos
after we understand America's war against the Spaniards in Manila.
Turkey Shoot In the Bay, Sham Battle for Manila
The SpanishAmerican War in the Philippines was hardly a war at all. It
consisted of a naval action in May followed by three and a half months
without fighting and a sham battle in August.
The first engagement was a gross mismatch, with the American George
Dewey's modern warships displacing 19,098 tons and mounted with superior
guns against the Spanish admiral Patricio Montojo's antiques, displacing
11,689 tons. Indeed Montojo's second largest ship, the CASTILLA, weighing
3,260 tons, was a wooden cruiser; it was leaky; it was given a patchup job on
26 April, but then its engines conked out, beyond repair; the cripple had to be
towed on 29 April to the battle site. In three days this would become the
graveyard of the Spanish squadron. Montojo then sacrificed every chance of
victory; he took his ships to the small bay of Cañacao where the two horns of
the hook of the Cavite peninsula seemed to shelter him; but he only locked
himself in, awaiting the enemy in the shallow eight meters of water without
any room for maneuver.
The naval battle of Manila Bay, fought on 1 May 1898, was an
unprecedented victory for Dewey. It was diminished only by the quality of the
enemy. The battle lasted from 5:41 o'clock A.M. when Dewey opened fire,
until half past noon when all firing ceased, although this covers the interval
from 7:35 A.M. when all hands in the Dewey squadron took time for a
leisurely breakfast, until 11:16 A.M. when they resumed what had by then
amounted to a turkey shoot. The entire Spanish fleet was either destroyed or
sunk by the Americans, or scuttled by the Spaniards themselves, without the
latter managing to take even a single American life.
The second engagement was not even a mismatch. It was a sham. And it
was unnecessary. This was the American taking of the city of Manila on 13
August. (During the American regime 13 August was celebrated as
Occupation Day in the Philippines; all schools were closed for the great
holiday, for the children to hear speeches extolling the great American
“victory” over the Spaniards.)
The battle was unnecessary since the Spanish governorgeneral had been
ordered by Madrid on 8 and 29 June to capitulate, when it became
unavoidable, to the Americans but not to the Filipinos. On 22 July 1898
Spain officially sued for peace. On 10 August a draft protocol to end
hostilities was transmitted by the American Secretary of State to the
Spaniards, to be signed by him and by the French ambassador to

Washington, the latter in representation of Spain's interests. This protocol
was duly signed in Washington in the presence of the American president in
the afternoon of 12 August. At 5:00 P.M. that same afternoon notice of the
ending of hostilities was dispatched to the American commanders in Manila.
But Dewey had cut the submarine telegraph cable linking Manila to
Hongkong; the Washington notice arrived in Manila only on the 16th August.
So the arrangements for the mock bombardment and then the surrender of
the city, negotiated through the British consul RawsonWalker, and with his
death continued by the Belgian consul André, proceeded.
The afternoon of 12 August in Washington was the morning of 13 August
in Manila. This morning came after a spell of monsoon rains in the night; the
morning began humid, with temperatures of 27 degrees Celsius and above.
But the sky cleared; then a cooling breeze arose, and it was a good day for a
mock bombardment of the city. Dewey's guns lobbed a few shells over the
rooftops of the walled city for the sake of Spanish honor, and the recently
arrived army troops waded through the water. The Spaniards raised the
white flag. The American commanding general had instructions to his
command which included: “It is intended that these results shall be
accomplished without loss of life...” The American army troops (470 officers
and 10,437 men had arrived in four expeditions from the United States over 1
to 31 July) took the city.
If the Americans had wanted a real battle for the city, it would have been
just as much a picnic. The Filipinos had made it easy. Dewey in his
Autobiography records that the Filipinos “had not only advanced their lines
along the beach almost to the fortifications [i.e., the walls of Manila], but had
invested the city on the inland side as well.” An American war correspondent,
an eyewitness of these events, wrote of the American and Filipino lines: “Our
pickets were having a rather dull time of it, for they did not have the
excitement of watching the enemy, as the insurgents [that is, the Filipinos]
were attending to that duty a few hundred yards to the front.”
But the Americans were determined to make their takeover of Manila a
genuine sham battle. This meant that the Filipinos had to be excluded from
the action; they could not be relied upon to play games.
Whatever, it was a nice and short and cheap war for the Americans; Spain
sued for peace in July; the thing was over by 12 August in Washington. The
Paris treaty was signed on 10 December. The American jingoists earned full
membership for their country in the exclusive Imperialist Club. Spain saved
face by not having to surrender to the Filipinos. She even got $20,000,000; it
was better than nothing.
The United States seemed to have gotten the Great American Bargain.
But the imperialists in Washington were in for a bigger surprise. McKinley
paid $20,000,000 to buy the Filipinos' country, and bought a $300,000,000
war.3
Three American Consuls and the Revolution:
November 1897August 1898
The American consul in Manila, Oscar Williams, reported to his superiors
in Washington in February 1898 that a republic had been established by the
Filipinos. The republic was the BiaknaBato Republic. Throughout March he
kept his government posted on the Spanish regime's inability to suppress the
Revolution, the arms captured by the Filipinos, desertions from the regime's
forces, the barbarous methods used by the Spaniards, the Filipinos' siege of
Manila. In May after the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay,
Williams recorded the continuing progress of the Revolution. His dispatch on
the 12th reported that members of the revolutionary government had called
on him and given “assurances that all would swear allegiance to and
cheerfully follow our flag. They are brave, submissive and cheaply provided
for.” He closed this report by foreseeing that the result of Dewey's naval
victory would be “the acquisition of these islands, many times more
extensive, more populous, and more valuable than Cuba.”
In mid June, after a string of Aguinaldo successes, Williams reported on
the 12 June ceremonies in Cavite. He said that he had been invited to attend
the independence proclamation ceremonies but had declined. He explained
that:
For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with

General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces
when treating for their return here.... General Aguinaldo told me
today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held
as a colony of United States of America.
It has been my effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in
order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we reorganize
government.
Williams had repeatedly reported in March about rumors that the

Filipinos would take and burn Manila but that they did not do so because the
majority of the population was in support of the Revolution. In June he
thought that by 4 July Manila would be in American hands.
Williams had another dispatch on 4 August, when negotiations between
the Spaniards and Americans for the surrender of Manila had been underway
for some time. Williams' report this day opened with:
It has been my study [sic] to keep on pleasant terms with

General Aguinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided
certain troubles and aided our forces.
Williams received a qualified pat of approval the same day. He was told
that the State Department had furnished the Navy and War departments
with copies of his 16 June report, and that:
Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the

insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of
their socalled provisional government, is approved.
And now for the second American consul, Rounseville Wildman in
Hongkong. He was visited a number of times during the latter part of 1897 by
Felipe Agoncillo, who was vested with full powers as diplomatic agent of the
BiaknaBato republic. The officials of this republic, headed by Aguinaldo,
were named on 2 November.
Wildman sent a report to the State Department on Agoncillo's last visit on
3 November. He explicitly referred to the “republic of the Philippines” not
just once, but twice. Agoncillo, he said, bore two proposals. The first was an
offensivedefensive alliance with the United States against Spain; on this
matter, according to Wildman, it was Agoncillo's judgment that the United
States would declare war against Spain “very soon.” The second proposal was
for the United States to supply 20,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of
ammunition to the Filipinos, payment for which would be made when the
United States recognized the Filipino government.
Wildman's superiors in the State Department did not welcome his official
transmittal of the proposals, and he was instructed in December not to
encourage “any advances” of Agoncillo, as well as not to communicate with
the Department relative to Agoncillo's “alleged mission.”
But it seems that Wildman was sympathetic to the cause of the Filipinos.
His 19 May 1898 dispatch described the revolutionists as “allies.” His July
report stressed the “utter impossibility of Spain, even with the aid of the
United States,” reestablishing her sovereignty over the Philippines. He
advanced an opinion that the Filipinos were superior to the Malays and
Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and Sandico he identified as men who were
good enough to be leaders of government departments “in any country.” He
told the State Department that there was a systematic smear campaign
against Aguinaldo and his cabinet; this was presumably inspired by the
Spaniards. Wildman advised that the Filipinos “cannot be dealt with as
though they were North American Indians,” shunted from reservation to
reservation “at the whim of their masters.”
He reported that on 27 April Williams was with him in Hongkong after
leaving Manila when war was declared and that Williams had joined the
Dewey squadron. Aguinaldo was en route from Singapore, which he had also
left the previous day after his meetings with the United States consul there.
Now, on 27 April, just before the Dewey squadron steamed for Manila Bay,
Wildman and Williams were visited by a delegation of the Hongkong Junta
composed of Jose Ma. Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Teodoro Sandico, Miguel
Malvar, Mariano Llanera, Andres E. de Garchitorena, Lorenzo L. Zialcita,
and Salvador Estrella. The consuls arranged with Dewey for two men of the
Junta (Jose Alejandrino and Garchitorena) to be with Dewey when the
squadron left for Manila Bay. Wildman also arranged for Aguinaldo's passage
on the American ship McCulloch, arriving in Cavite on 19 May. Wildman
closed his report with the view that Aguinaldo's establishment of the
dictatorial government in late May was “an absolutely necessary step if he
hoped to maintain control over the natives.” From that time on, Wildman
reported, Aguinaldo “has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and
dignified and just as the head of his government.”
Wildman was sure he was backing a winner; he was also helping

Aguinaldo buy arms in Hongkong. His encouragement was clear; in his 28
June letter he wrote:
“I suppose you have taken Manila by this time; I hope so.”
On 25 July Wildman was behaving beyond his status as consul, giving

advice and assurances and indeed committing the support of the United
States to Aguinaldo. This day he wrote:
The latest Telegraphic Dispatches assert that all the great power[s] of
Europe (except Great Britain) have arrived at an agreement th[u]s the
Philippines cannot become a part of the United States, but will be
divided up among themselves as has been the case with China. Should
this prove to be true, you will have a greater battle on your hands than
you have already had, and it will require all the power of the United
States and Great Britain to keep your Islands intact and to hold you, as
the first man in them. I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness
of purpose to the President of the United States and to our people, and
they are ready to extend their hand to you as a Brother, and aid you in
every laudable ambition. There are greater prizes in the world than
being the Chie[f] of a Revolution. I look to you to bear me out in all my
promises, and I give you my assurances that you can always call upon
me to act as your champion should any try to slander your name.
Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the purpose
of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were
suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. They are
actua[t]ed by precisely the same feelings towards the Philippinos [sic].
Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be, you
can trust the United States that justice and honor will control all their
dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yok[e]. Do
not let any thing interfere with that. I believe in you, do not disappoint
me.
But then Wildman was curtly rebuked by the State Department. The
Hongkong correspondent of the London Daily Mail had reported part of his
correspondence with Aguinaldo. He was sharply told by Washington on 6
August: “If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent of
Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make
pledges or discuss policy.” (Emphasis supplied)
Wildman, his career at stake, now resorted to dishonesty. He denied

having made pledges or discussed policy with Aguinaldo. His report of 18
July to the State Department stated a changed view of the Filipino leaders'
goals. What they wanted, “in spite of all statements to the contrary,” was
“annexation to the United States first, and ... independence secondly, if the
United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the islands.”
And in a long explanation to the State Department on the 9th August,
Wildman now said that he and Williams saw Aguinaldo as “a necessary evil.”
He said that Aguinaldo would be a useful instrument for Dewey and the
American army commander, General Merritt. He was sure that Aguinaldo
wanted to be the president of a Filipino republic; on the other hand, he said,
“the great majority of his followers, and all the wealthy educated Filipinos
have but one desire to become citizens of the Unites States of America.”
Wildman further insured his career by now describing Aguinaldo's letters as
“childish”; Aguinaldo was “a man of petty moods.”
Williams' and Wildman's conduct toward Aguinaldo was roundly

condemned by Howard W. Bray (infra) in a January 1899 letter to Aguinaldo:
“... Wildman, Williams and Co. have been the worst enemies you have had.
False and bastard. What I regret is that you placed so much confidence in
them.”4
The third American consul was E. Spencer Pratt in Singapore, who had
clandestine conversations with Aguinaldo. Our account of their meetings is
based on Pratt's reports of 28 and 30 April and on the detailed account in the
Singapore Free Press of 4 May. The view in Singapore saw Aguinaldo as “the
supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines.” Because
the Spaniards had reneged on the promise of reforms in the pact of Biakna
Bato, according to the newspaper, Aguinaldo went to Saigon and Singapore;
he wished to consult with friendly contacts on the chances of war breaking
out between Spain and the United States “and whether, in such an event, the
United States would eventually recognize the independence of the
Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in the
conquest of the country.”
In Singapore Aguinaldo especially wished to meet Howard W. Bray, an
Englishman who had lived in the Philippines for fifteen years. Aguinaldo was
the house guest of Dr. Marcelino Santos, an emigré who was then head of the
Filipino colony there. Bray then approached Pratt, who asked to meet
Aguinaldo, and Bray arranged the meeting. Pratt records that he knew of the
“great prestige” of Aguinaldo, and that “I determined at once to see him...”
The first of two meetings was held on Sunday, the 24th April, at The
Mansion on River Valley Road. There were also present, aside from Pratt and
Aguinaldo: Bray, Aguinaldo's private secretary Jose Leyba, his aide Col. Del
Pilar, and Dr. Santos. The interview was held through interpreters. The
Singapore Free Press reports that Aguinaldo reviewed the progress of the
Revolution for Pratt, and then detailed the cooperation he could give, should
the American forces land and take Manila.
Aguinaldo also stated that he could and would organize a liberal

government, “and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country
as the United States intend giving to Cuba.” Pratt records at this point that
he made clear that he had no authority to speak for his government.
However, both sides agreed on cooperation. Pratt sent a wire to Dewey.
Dewey replied, according to Pratt: "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible."
Dewey confirms this in his Autobiography with: “I requested him to come.”
The second meeting was held the next day at the American consular
residence in the Raffles Hotel. Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong the day
after, Tuesday, at noon. He sailed as agreed for Manila three weeks later.
Pratt's impression of Aguinaldo at this time suggests that there was at
least a concurrence of views, and very possibly an agreement. According to
Pratt, Aguinaldo was: “a man of intelligence, ability and courage, and worthy
the confidence that had been placed “facilitated the work of occupying and
administering the Philippines.” The Singapore Free Press report ended by
summarizing Aguinaldo's political goals as “embracing the independence of
the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European
and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily,
on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba.”
In his 9 June report Pratt wrote the State Department that he had been
serenaded by the Filipinos of Singapore. They were led by Dr. Santos, who
eulogized Pratt and the United States with a warm address in French. Pratt
sent copies of the Singapore Free Press and of the Straits Times, both dated 9
June. The accounts of the serenade in the two papers were almost identical;
in both, Pratt is reported to have reciprocated the sentiments of the Filipinos
by addressing them as follows:
Today we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your
own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating
on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be
proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General
Aguinaldo and your fellowcountrymen under his command. When,
six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived
incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's
interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, and
having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged
for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.
The day after the serenade Pratt wrote “To His Excellency, General
EMILIO AGUINALDO”:
All is coming to pass as I had hoped and predicted and it is now
being shown that I was right in arranging for your cooperation with
Admiral Dewey, and equally right in asking that you are given the
support and entrusted with the confidence of the American
Government.
I trust that I shall next have the pleasure of congratulating you
upon the capture of Manila and when that occurs let me ask that
you will send me some historic memento of the place and the
incident, such as the flag or keys of the Ciudad or principal
[fortress,] in souvenir of our Meeting at Singapore and of the
important results which have ensued.
Whether or not there was an agreement with Pratt cannot yet be
established. It is very likely that there was one, and this is supported by the
fact that Dewey accommodated Aguinaldo on one of his ships on the latter's
going to Manila; by Pratt's record of his high esteem for Aguinaldo; and by
the appreciative serenade for Pratt by the Singapore Filipinos. There is also
direct testimony indicating the existence of an agreement. While in Singapore
Aguinaldo gave no other interviews except to the Singapore Free Press editor,
W.G. St. Clair, who was thereby able to report on Aguinaldo's political goals.
In January 1899, after reading Aguinaldo's 5 January proclamation, Bray
wrote him from Hongkong:
Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation in Singapore
was the Independence of the Philippines under an American
protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which
Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up the “price” of the
telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it
and to swear to it when the proper time comes.
There are five of us against one in the event of Consul Pratt
receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows
what happened and I am certain that he also would testify. St.
Clair still has the rough draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is
a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble servant.
And then, after his 9 June report, the boom was lowered on Pratt. The
State Department sent him a peremptory telegram on the 17th June:
Two hundred twelve [the number of Pratt's 28 April dispatch]
received and answered. Avoid unauthorized negotiations with

Philippine insurgents.
The answer referred to was a letterreply dated the same day. It was
signed by the Secretary of State, and read in part:
The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo
that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in
the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed
that you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance
with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional
personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to
Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes
which it might not be practicable to gratify.
This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as
discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted
with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a
matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received
from this Government any recognition. The United States, in
entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of
its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of
the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the
inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the
Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due
from them. (Emphasis supplied)
If in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you
acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate
with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in
accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to
recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your
action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.
The disconsolate Pratt now had a great deal of explaining to do, which he
did in his dispatches in June and July. He denied having committed his
government to the goals of the Filipinos. But he was skating on thin ice. He
had referred to Aguinaldo, in public, as the Filipinos' “distinguished leader.”
He had written Aguinaldo that he had asked for his government's support
and confidence in his behalf. And he closed his address to the Filipinos during
the serenade by expressing the hope that “the eventual outcome will be all
that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos.”
Pratt, at least, was an honorable man. He was unlike Wildman who

belittled Aguinaldo after he had been rebuked. Pratt would not take back the
good words and high esteem he had said about the Filipino leader. On 21
June he wrote to his superiors:
I beg further to state that it was not only on account of the

material aid I was confident he could lend us that I regarded the
cooperation of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because,
as the recognized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the
one best able to direct and influence them, and therefore the one
most important for our commander to have under immediate
control, both as concerned the present and future policy of our
Government in the Philippines, whatever that policy might be.
(Emphasis supplied)
The underscored words in the above excerpt from Pratt's reply supply the
key to Pratt's problem: Washington was quick to tell the consuls what they
could not do, but Washington would not tell them what American policy in
the Philippines was. It certainly seemed as if what the United States
government wanted in the Philippines was a deep and dark secret, which it
did not wish its consular officials to know. Williams and Wildman were
simply bureaucrats they would do what their instructions ordered them,
without knowing what for. Pratt at least thought that he would do what his
government wanted done. But he was guilty nevertheless. He was guilty of
presuming to define what his government's goals were; he should have known
that only his superiors could do that. He promised in his dispatch of 21 June
that he would have “no further dealings” with the Filipinos.
But that was not enough. He had also said, as early as 28 April, that he
had made it easier for the Unites States to occupy and administer the
Philippines. And he was absolutely right. The Secretary of State's 16 June
letter to him said that the United States was “entering upon the occupation
of the islands.” But he was wrong again, because he had guessed right; in
other words, he had “let the cat out of the bag.” Pratt was punished shortly.
He was recalled from his post as consulgeneral, “in consequence of the part
he took in sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines.”5
An American President's Piety and Imperialism:
May 1898January 1899
Aguinaldo interpreted the words and acts of the consuls as at least

evidence of a de facto alliance. The consul's authority did not authorize them
to enter into political commitments in behalf of their governments in any
way, and their superiors kept them in the dark about the United States
government's definite plans in the archipelago. They were not to enter into
agreements with Filipino leaders. But they had personally dealt with
Aguinaldo and made assurances in terms that indicated at least cooperation
with mutual benefit. Aguinaldo certainly thought so, and he was right. The
Singapore Free Press, which had been keeping a close watch on the progress
of the Revolution, and now on the war between the United States and Spain,
believed so. Its 4 May 1898 issue reported on a “secret political arrangement”
that brought Aguinaldo “into direct relations with Admiral Dewey”; it also
reported that Pratt “coincided with the general views” during his second
interview with Aguinaldo. The Spaniards assumed that there was an
alliance, and said so to the American panel during the treaty negotiations in
Paris, on 1 October 1898.
For its part, the American government consistently avoided an alliance
and denied the existence of any commitments based on a formal agreement
with Aguinaldo. It, too, was right, although it could not deny the benefit that
the United States derived from Aguinaldo as a result of a de facto alliance.
During the Paris negotiations the American Commissioners admitted the
assistance to the American military operations owed to the Filipinos,
particularly in connection with the taking of Manila. (Both panels studiously
suppressed any suggestion that their forces had staged a sham battle.) The
American panel's memorandum dated 9 November said on this matter:
The city was closely besieged on the land side by the insurgents.
It was in extremity for provisions and the insurgents controlled the
water supply. The Spanish forces had been unable to raise the
siege, and therefore could not escape from the city on the land side.
In another memorandum, submitted to the 21 November session of the
peace conference, the American commissioners took note of the Spanish
observation of the Americans' alliance with the Filipinos, but stated that such
a relation was not intentional on the part of the United States. This
memorandum said:
The Spanish commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier

stage of these negotiations, spoken of the Filipinos as our allies.
This is not a relation which the Government of the United States
intended to establish; but it must at least be admitted that the
insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with the
consent of our military and naval commanders... (Emphasis
supplied)
This was the view from Washington. There was an alliance but it was

“unintended.” So it could not be acknowledged. The reason lay in the
Secretary of State's letter of rebuke to Pratt on the 16th June: here the
Secretary had revealed that the United States was “entering upon the
occupation of the islands.” This was due to McKinley's orders of 19 May we
will deal with these shortly.
And so, in the 12 August protocol in Washington ending the hostilities in
the SpanishAmerican war, the Americans discarded Aguinaldo and
disregarded as well the informal alliance born of the acts of its officials for
cooperation with the Filipinos.
Of the causes and later character of this new war, Richard Brinsley
Sheridan, an English barrister who witnessed the events in Manila and
Malolos from just after the battle of Manila Bay until after the start of
hostilities in February, wrote:6
[The American people] are ignorant of many important facts in
connection with this war in the East, and they do not realize the
situation in respect to the broken pledges given by American
representatives to the Filipino leaders. There has been a systematic
deception, possibly for political reasons....
Had the people of America known the real conditions of the Filipinos, and
the methods which were adopted to subjugate and to deceive them, it is
probable that they would have withdrawn their support and sympathy from a
war which, although commenced with the highest and noblest motives, has
been carried on by so continuous an exercise of cruelty and injustice, that it
has involved the violation of all the rules of public faith and civilized warfare.
Let us now consider the peace treaty negotiations in Paris and the
testimony presented to the American panel. The negotiating panels met for
their first session on the 1st October. The issues over Cuba, Porto Rico, and
Guam were easy and virtually disposed of before the month was over. When
the panels met on 27 October to take up the Philippine question, however,
the Americans asked for a postponement; the next session was reset to 31
October. It was in this session that the American panel demanded the cession
of the entire Philippine archipelago.
The Spaniards were shattered by this demand; they asked for

adjournment until 4 November. Then the Americans, in turn, asked for
adjournment until 8 November, which was further reset for the next day. On
9 November the panels agreed on an adjournment until the 12th; this was
reset to the 16th, and again to the 21st. Each adjournment was accompanied
by the submission of lengthy papers by one or the other panel. On 21
November the Americans persisted in their demand for cession, but
sweetened it with a proposal for the United States to pay $20,000,000 to
Spain, should the latter agree to the cession.
The Spanish panel snapped up the offer on 28 November. The diplomatic
language of the Spanish acceptance had the following:
[Spain] resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the
law of the victor, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks
material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having
recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers
her for the concluding of the treaty of peace.
The Spanish acceptance broke the deadlock. The rest of the negotiations
were relatively easy from here on, and the panels signed the treaty on 10
December 1898.
It was in fact way back in May that the American demand for cession
became inevitable. On the 19th McKinley issued orders to his secretaries of
War, Navy and the Treasury, calling for the military occupation of the
archipelago. Indeed he had only a navy squadron in Manila Bay and no army
to occupy the Philippines. But that did not matter; he wanted to occupy the
islands and he was going to send an army. He had declared that “forcible
annexation” was “criminal aggression,” just the previous December, but now
in May it no longer meant anything to him.
The orders began with almost identical opening sentences, to the effect
that the Spanish fleet had been destroyed and the Cavite naval station
occupied. In consequence, McKinley said, an army of occupation was needed
to complete the destruction of the Spanish forces and to provide order and
security “to the islands while in the possession of the United States”.
(Emphasis supplied). The Secretary of War ought to have been dumbfounded.
If there was any occupying to be done, the only territory then under
American control was the few square meters of the naval station, taken by
Dewey early in the month. The Americans had not taken Manila, and their
first land soldiers would not arrive until the 1st July. But McKinley had
already decided on the occupation by force of the entire archipelago.
Military occupation of course meant military government and

administration of the islands. The Treasury secretary was ordered to make
recommendations on the collection of duties and taxes in the islands. The
commanding general for the expeditionary forces was named (General
Merritt); he was vested with sweeping powers as the military governor; he
could replace or dismiss native officials, set up law courts, and so on.
The orders to the War secretary were the most detailed; they dealt with
the establishment of a new regime covering the entire archipelago and all its
inhabitants. The text is clear and needs no elaboration:
The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's

territory is the severance of the former political relations of the
inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under
this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they
perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and
property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire
that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the
purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its
obligations in this regard.
It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition,
immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a
proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the
people of the Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among
them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments,
and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either
by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the United
States in its efforts to give effect too this beneficent purpose will
receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation
should be as free from severity as possible.
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and
supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of
the inhabitants.... (Emphasis supplied)
On 26 May Dewey received instructions from Washington “not to have

political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would
incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.”
General Merritt arrived in Cavite on 25 July. He avoided any

communication with Aguinaldo “until I should be in possession of the city of
Manila.” He had clear orders:
My instructions from the President fully contemplated the

occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and state
that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme
and immediately operate upon the political condition of the
inhabitants....'
The premeditation in McKinley's aggression on the land of the Filipinos
that began with his orders of 19 May undercut his blasphemous lie to a group
of Protestant clergymen in Washington in November 1899. “The truth,” he
said, was that he did not want the Philippines, but they “came to us, as a gift
from the gods.”
On 13 August the Navy Department cabled Dewey that:
The President desires to receive from you any important

information you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the
several islands; the character of their population; coal and other
mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages, and in a
naval and commercial sense which would be the most
advantageous....
Dewey was advised that he might be called to Washington if he had other
information of value.
About the lull between 1 May and 13 August Dewey writes in his
Autobiography that: “Among the situations with which I had to deal promptly
as they arose, when I could not delay to consult Washington, the most
complicated was that of the Filipino insurgents.” This required instructions.
Merritt testified that after his arrival he cabled Washington about “the
possible trouble that might arise with the insurgents, and asked for
instructions as to whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them
accordingly in such case.” McKinley obviously would not answer such a
question, and Merritt records that he received no reply.
On 14 August, after the pusillanimous surrender of Manila by the

Spaniards, Merritt finally issued the proclamation called for in McKinley's
orders of 19 May. He announced that the American army had established “a
government of military occupation.” The new proclamation was issued in
English, Spanish, and Tagalog. It was addressed “To the People of the
Philippines.”
It repeated McKinley's dishonest words to the Filipinos that the

Americans had “not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any party or
faction among them, but to protect them....” The final paragraph gave the
Filipinos ugly options: they would be left alone if they “preserve the peace,
and perform their duties” toward the United States; but they would be
disturbed if it were “found necessary for the good of the service of the United
States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.”
Every doubt that the Filipinos had about the intentions of the United
States on their country dissolved with this proclamation. They had not
known of McKinley's earlier 19 May orders. But they had wondered about the
arrival of thousands of American troops in July. Troop ship after troop ship.
The Filipinos had planned to take Manila with or without Dewey. They had
enough men; and all they needed from Dewey was his guns. But McKinley
had sent expedition after expedition. Now, after they had been excluded from
the taking of Manila, and after Merritt's proclamation, the Filipinos saw
McKinley's designs beyond dissembling or denial. The American troops had
not been sent to fight the Spaniards. They were sent to take Filipinas and to
fight the Filipinos.
McKinley's treachery could not be implemented for some time. Merritt

could extend his military government beyond Manila only by occupying
territory under the Revolutionary Government. This he could do by force, but
it was clear that it would not be taken well back home. This was because the
American people knew that their war with the Spaniards was over, and that
a treaty of peace would soon be negotiated: why, then, should American
troops be making war against the Filipinos?
On the 17th August Merritt issued his General Orders No. 6 to the troops.
He congratulated them for “their brilliant success in the capture, by assault;”
of Manila. He praised his troops for their fortitude. This was crazy; the worst
tribulation suffered by Merritt's men was seasickness on the voyage to
Manila.
On the same day Merritt had to report that the Filipinos were demanding
joint occupation of Manila. He asked Washington:
Inform me how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience of the
insurgents on this matter and others that may arise. Is the
government willing to use all means and ... the natives to submit to
authority of United States? [The elision is in the original text of our
source, and probably indicates deletion of material from Merritt's
cable.]
In view of the fact that Merritt's authority under the order of 19 May was
absolute and supreme, the matter was clearly within his authority to resolve.
But he was on the spot; it could mean war, and he had to protect himself by
ensuring that he had direct instructions. He received his instructions;
McKinley's reply was prompt; it left Washington on 17 August; the telegraph
cable had been restored:
The President directs that there must be no joint occupation

with the insurgents.... The insurgents and all others must recognize
the military occupation and authority of the United States and the
cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever
means in your judgment are necessary to this end.
After Spain sued for peace on 22 July and after the taking of Manila in
August the scene shifts to Paris. The American panel was supplied with
statements about the archipelago obtained from a variety of sources; it also
received oral testimony from some officers, including Merritt, who had been
called from Manila and who had brought many of the statements to Paris.
One of the first questions was the relationship between the American
forces and Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo had a correspondence with Gen. Anderson,
commander of the army expedition that was the first to arrive in Cavite (on
the 1st July). On 4 July Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, and we excerpt the
following:
Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon
GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United

States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command
in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire
sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the
Philippine Islands.
For these reasons, I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in
military operations against the Spanish forces....
Aguinaldo replied as follows:
Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Commanding the United States Volunteers
GENERAL: Interpreting the sentiments of the Filipino people, I
have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound
gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the
natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation
and your excellency.
I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly
relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and
kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and
special satisfaction whenever occasion presents....
Merritt found Anderson's cordial sentiments awkward, and he testified to
the American panel: “I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it
was not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents
or act in any way with them.”
Merritt was asked for his opinion of what would happen if the United
States and Spain made peace by treaty and the former left the islands
completely, except perhaps that it might retain a coaling station – in other
words, Spanish sovereignty would be restored. The record reads:
General MERRITT. I think in the island of Luzon they would
fight to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them,
intelligent men, who said their lives were nothing as compared with
the freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government.
Mr. DAVIS. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them?
General MERRITT. No, sir.
Dewey's instructions going into Manila Bay in May had been limited to
the undertaking of offensive operations. He adhered to his instructions to the
letter. After his victory he waited for further orders. There was not a single
American land soldier in the Philippines. As late as July Dewey believed that
“neither the army nor the navy was ready for an engagement.” He had
informed Washington, if the American government's decision was to occupy
Manila, that “5,000 wellequipped troops” would be enough against the
Spaniards, provided that the Americans did not have to fight the Filipinos.
Dewey's estimate of 5,000 troops was only for a specific and limited action,
a fight to take the walled city. The Spaniards were bottled up, food supplies
running out, and without hope of escape or outside help. He also had the
guns of his warships. But it was now October, and Merritt was testifying in
Paris, and the situation was different. McKinley had ordered Merritt to
occupy the archipelago. And so we read the following:
Mr. DAVIS. How many troops, in your opinion, will be necessary
to administer the government of this island to secure the
administration of our Government there?
General MERRITT. From 20,000 to 25,000 would be necessary
at first..
The six statements that Merritt brought from Manila were prepared by
American military officers, except the last, by the Belgian consul. Some are
lengthy, but they say much the same on the issue of FilipinoAmerican
relations and on what the United States should do in the Philippines. The
first, dated 27 August, was by Maj. Gen. Francis V. Greene, USV. It began
with a rather broader perspective than the others, and we quote from it:
If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil
war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The
insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy
prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the
insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed
upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and
Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain
would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. ...
On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without
the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge this
themselves, and say their desire is for independence under
American protection; but they have only vague ideas as to what our
relative positions would be what part we should take in collecting
and expending the revenue and administering the government.
(Emphasis supplied)
The principal paper in another set of statements was a very long one,
again by Gen. Greene; it was dated 30 August. We cite that portion of it
which states a view that became a major theme in the American government
thinking on the Revolution; it is very likely that it helped to bring about the
war:
Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo

insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines,
each speaking a different dialect.... It is claimed by Aguinaldo's
partisans that the Visayans are in sympathy with his insurrection
and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact
that the Visayans have taken no active part in the present
insurrection, nor in that of 18%; that the Spanish Government is
still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo and in the Visayas' islands,
and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The
Visayas number nearly 2,000,000, or about as many as the
population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo claims to
have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support
his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account of
racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes, they will oppose
him. (Emphasis supplied)
Greene was either deceiving or humoring McKinley with his “Tagalo

insurrection” assessment. Maybe he was ignorant about the Visayas, where
all the main islands, from Cebu, Bohol, Panay, Negros, to Samar and Leyte,
were either under the control of, or had adhered to, the Revolution after
August.
Another lengthy and interesting paper was prepared by Cmdr. R.B.

Bradford, USN, who was also interviewed by the American panel on 14
October. He had extensive knowledge, for the time, of Philippine harbors and
anchorages, coal deposits, the different islands, and the strategy implications
of occupation of islands or island groups in the archipelago. He also had
strong ideas on American naval strategic goals and their application to China
and the Pacific islands. The crucial issue in the oral examination of Bradford
related to whether the United States might take one or more of the islands,
as against taking or leaving the archipelago altogether. We cite the following
excerpts:
Q. From your point of view as a naval expert, what is the

objection to the division you have indicated there, taking in Luzon,
Mindoro, Palawan, and the islands between Mindoro and Palawan?
A. I think it a fairly good division, if a division must be made. This
division is much more valuable than Luzon alone. I do not advocate
taking a part, however.
Q. What is your objection to taking that part? A. The
difficulties of defense, which I have already alluded to, and the fact
that a whole loaf is better than half a loaf....
Q. You answer that it would take less to defend the coasts of the
United States, plus the Philippine Islands? A. Yes, sir; and I
would like to give my reasons. For the purpose of illustration, let us
suppose that war is declared and that the theater is in the
neighborhood of the China Sea. Suppose we have on the Pacific
coast 100 ships and no naval supply stations between that coast
and China. Now, the point I make is, that we would be better off
and more powerful with a chain of navalsupply stations stretching
from the Pacific coast to China and 50 ships, or onehalf the force
under the conditions first mentioned. Few realize the great changes
that have taken place since the days of sails and muzzleloading
guns. With the rapidfiring guns of today the entire supply of
ammunition may be expended in a few hours. Ships are helpless
without coal. We must be able to follow the enemy with our ships
the world over, as Nelson did.
Bradford was expressing an 1898 version of United States military

strategic thinking during the 1980s: the concept of “projection of force” visa
vis Soviet Russia in the Far East, which assigned a key role to the American
military bases in the Philippines.
Another notable statement before the American panel was that of Brig.
Gen. Charles A. Whittier, USV, summoned from Manila. He was also
questioned in person. Whittier had good things to say about the military
ability of the Revolution's leadership. After Aguinaldo's return from
Hongkong, Whittier said:
From that time the military operations and the conduct of the
insurgents have been most creditable Positions taken and the
movements of troops show great ability on the part of some leader –
I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the

directions.
Whittier was asked whether the Revolution had been of material

assistance to the American operations. His answer was brief: “Very great.”
He elaborated that if the peace protocol of 12 August had not been in effect,
and if the Spaniards and the Filipinos had had to fight each other, the former
would have made a good contest of it because they would be fighting from a
strong position, the walled city. “But,” Whittier went on, “every place had
been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and
occupation of the country in an able manner.”
On the issue of treatment of prisoners, Whittier's statement was by no
means a minority opinion, and it went against the many allegations of the
Spaniards against the Filipinos:
Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of
the praise of all the world. With ... every justification to a savage
mind for the most brutal revenge, I have heard no instance of
torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country.
Whittier's primary testimony related to the options the United States

might take. He was for a “take all or nothing” decision:
And now comes the vital question, What is to be done with these
islands, and, if we hold them, what form of government is to
prevail? Whatever grave doubts one may have as to colonial
extension on the part of America, we have gone too far, either by
design or chance, to recede. It cannot be denied that we owe it as a
duty to the natives and to humanity that the islands should not be
restored to Spain (even if they were they could not be held for a
year). Any division of them is absolutely impracticable. This would
induce constant friction, the ruin of Manila as the great commercial
center; the important products would be shipped direct from the
southern islands and goods sent directly there in exchange One
owner must hold the whole country and prescribe uniform duties
and government.
This was somewhat similar to Greene's 27 August statement. Whittier
then recounted a conversation with Aguinaldo on the 25th October. Whittier
had gone by train from Manila to Malolos for the prearranged interview. He
first met Buencamino (Whittier has "Buen Camino"), who was “a wiselooking
counselor.” He was taken to Aguinaldo. After Buencamino left them Whittier
told Aguinaldo that he was leaving in a few days to appear before the
American panel in Paris. He avowed that he had friendly feelings for the
Filipinos and admiration for “many of their good qualities” and that he
wished to present their views and demands properly, especially “what
relation they expected to hold the United States to in case we decided to keep
the islands.”
Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided
into two parties – those in favor of absolute independence and those
of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that
he is waiting to see who will have the majority ... [and at that time]
to take his position. I pointed out to him that it would probably be
useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to
any change of opinion, but they must consider that they are without
any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the
development of the country; that the Philippine government alone
did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of
the islands without the assistance of other governments. They
would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen powers striving to take
either a part or the whole of the islands, and they must consider
that their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession
of power under American auspices.
Aguinaldo countered that the civilized nations would ensure that the
Filipinos would not lose their territory, and Whittier noted that the “civilized
nations” were controlling and holding Chinese territory. On the role of the
United States as protector:
[Aguinaldo] said: “To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held
all the country and administered civil offices with its own people.”
“And what then would America get from this,” said I. “That would
be a detail," he said, "which would be settled hereafter.”
I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands.

“Almost entirely” he said. That the different bands, little by little,
were expressing their desire to join him. The Igorrotos [sic] had sent
in some of their leaders the day before and were acting with him.
That he had three representatives from Iloilo within a few days on
the same mission.
After a while Buencamino rejoined them. Buencamino was twenty years
Aguinaldo's senior and had been a key adviser of the latter since June, which
explains Buencamino's assured tone in the following:
Buen Camino said I could be certain that if a protectorate were
granted that they would do their best to have it accepted by their
people on the same lines that I have stated, agreeing with me fully
that to hold one island and giving the others to other powers would
be most unfortunate, and not to be considered.
Whittier recorded that he had notes made of the interview immediately
afterwards, and he concluded with the following impression: “a great desire
for our protection, for the improvement of their people materially and
8
intellectually, the wish to send their young people to America for education.”
The American panel also received various statements on the resources and
commercial potential of the archipelago, as well as others on comparative
colonial administration. By the last week of October the chairman of the
panel, the former Secretary of State, had doubts over the wisdom of taking
the archipelago, but would accept occupying Luzon for commercial and naval
station purposes. Another member, Senator George Gray, flatly opposed
taking any part of the islands. The three other members were for taking the
whole loaf, the entire archipelago.
On 25 October the chairman informed McKinley by cable about the

divided opinion of the panel. The American peace commission was made up of
former Secretary of State W.R. Day as chairman and members Senator Gray,
C.K. Davis, W.P. Frye, and Whitelaw Reid. They were appointed in the
second week of September. McKinley's instructions to the panel said:
“Without any original thought of complete and even partial acquisition, the
presence and success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which
we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action.”
McKinley then instructed the panel to negotiate for the cession of Luzon and
for commercial privileges in the other islands.
McKinley was certainly not honest with his own commissioners and did
not respect the peace treaty conference. He had already ordered, the previous
19 May, the occupation of the archipelago and the establishment of a new
political regime in the islands “while in the possession of the United States.”
But he could not order military operations against the Filipinos. This was
because he was going to demand cession in the Paris conference, and this
would call for a treaty, which would need Senate concurrence, and things
could be awkward if the United States were fighting a war with the Filipinos
for their archipelago and buying the same archipelago from Spain all at the
same time!
Anyway, McKinley cabled to Paris on 26 October in answer to Day's

request for instructions. He directed the panel to ask for outright cession of
the archipelago, believing, he said, that “this course will entail less trouble
than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people
involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility.” The American
panel thus demanded the cession on the 31st October, and offered the
sweetened terms on 21 November.
With the Spanish acceptance of the demand for cession, signing of a treaty
became only a matter of time. Dewey and Otis (the new American military
commander in Manila) were ordered on 4 December to inform McKinley on
the forces needed in the Philippines. Now McKinley could repeat his 19 May
orders.
On 21 December he issued a proclamation that Dewey's victory and “the
reduction” of Manila (again!) had “practically effected the conquest of the
Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.” This
was both incorrect and tricky. The peace protocol of 12 August had fixed the
occupation by the United States as covering only the “city, bay, and harbor of
Manila.” In December the rest of Luzon and the principal islands of the
Visayas were under Filipino occupation and administration. McKinley's
statement that the sovereignty of Spain had only been “suspended” was
simply a legal fiction. This was because Spain's sovereignty had been
irrevocably extinguished by the surrender, in writing, of the various Spanish
garrisons to the Revolution. Using McKinley's logic, Spain's sovereignty
would also have been “suspended” in those parts of the archipelago that had
been taken or “reduced” by the Filipinos. And why, or how, would a state
demand cession of territory by treaty with another state, and pay
$20,000,000 for that territory when the latter's sovereignty over it was
suspended and under control of a successful revolutionary government?
McKinley's inconsistencies were catching up with him and he fabricated
some hazy notion of Spanish sovereignty, even if only in a suspended state.
Did McKinley realize that chaos would reign in international relations if his
theory of suspended sovereignty were part of the law of nations? He needed
the fiction because Spain could not be made to cede the Philippines unless it
was pretended that it had some sort of sovereignty over it. McKinley went
along with that kind of sovereignty. But he employed brute force against the
Filipinos' rights that were based on actual and physical possession and
control of their native land.
The 21 December proclamation continued by stating that as a result of the
cession, the:
actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the

Philippine Islands become immediately necessary, and the military
government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city,
harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible
dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory....
It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to
announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come,
not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends....
Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military
administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the
inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible
way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the
heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of
the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the
mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.
This 21 December proclamation is sometimes called the “benevolent

assimilation proclamation.” But its nice name did not mask McKinley's
deadly decision: to extend the area occupied by the United States, until then
limited to the harbor, bay and city of Manila, over and into territory held by
the Filipinos. It may be said that McKinley had loaded the gun, primed the
charge, had a finger on the trigger, and waited only for the moment to fire.
He irrevocably declared war on the Filipinos with this proclamation.
There appear two more orders of McKinley that we must note. The
headquarters of the Spanish commanding general in the Visayas was Iloilo.
The general, Diego de los Rios, entered into a truce with the Revolution in
early December. On the 21st, General Otis was ordered to send troops to
Iloilo. Meanwhile the Spaniards evacuated Iloilo completely and then
delivered it to the Federal Council of the Visayas; this government recognized
subordination to the Revolutionary Government in Luzon. Otis' instructions
included the following: “It is most important that there should be no conflict
with the insurgents.”
The Iloilo situation was tense, and on 1 January 1899 Otis received the
following further instructions: “The President considers it of first importance
that a conflict brought on by you be avoided at this time, if possible.” The
peaceful tone of the two orders to Otis was deceiving. McKinley had to hold
his horses, he had to order Otis to avoid conflict because he had to nurse the
Paris treaty in the Senate.9
We have already seen how dismayed and appalled the Spanish panel was
when the Americans demanded cession of the Philippines. The United States
Senate published the complete protocols of the Paris peace negotiations in
1899. The American panel memorandum of 21 November reads: “... the
American commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession
should be agreed to, the sum of twenty million dollars....” (Emphasis
supplied) The Spaniards consistently opposed cession since 28 October, and
agreed to it only because Spain was materially prostrate, and had to resign
herself to the “harsh law of the victor.”
On this matter McKinley officially misrepresented the facts again, on 5
December 1899, this time to the American people themselves through their
elected representatives in the Congress:
In this manner the Philippines came to the United States. The
islands were ceded by the Government of Spain, which had been in
undisputed possession of them for centuries. They were accepted
not merely by our authorized commissioners in Paris, under the
direction of the Executive, but by the constitutional and well
considered action of the representatives of the people of the United
States in both Houses of Congress.
This was an untruth, and McKinley certainly knew it. Spain did not offer
any cession, and the American treaty commissioners had not accepted any
cession; it was the other way around. But he had said it, and he compounded
the lie with another totally unfounded statement:
I had every reason to believe, and I still believe that this
transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and
the aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people.
McKinley told the Congress that in January 1899 he had decided to send a
commission to the Philippines (the Schurman Commission) on "a mission of
good will and liberation." But, he said, "the sinister ambition of a few leaders
of the Filipinos had created a situation full of embarrassment for us and most
grievous in its consequences to themselves" before the commission got to
Manila. McKinley could not bring himself to say that his decision had
brought on war. Then he told still another enormous lie to the Congress. The
following was his version of how the war began – we will tell the facts shortly:
The aggressions of the Filipinos continually increased until

finally, just before the time set by the Senate of the United states
for a vote upon the treaty, an attack, evidently prepared in advance,
was made all along the American lines, which resulted in a terribly
destructive and sanguinary repulse of the insurgents.
McKinley continued remorselessly:10
Everything indicates that with the speedy suppression of the
Tagalo rebellion life in the archipelago will soon resume in its

ordinary course under the protection of our sovereignty, and the
people of those favored islands will enjoy a prosperity and a
freedom which they have never before known.
The truest kindness to them will be a swift and effective defeat
of their present leader. The hour of victory will be the hour of
clemency and reconstruction.
McKinley had been a schoolteacher and a postal clerk in his youth. He had
also attended seminary in some small town in his native Ohio. This might
explain his pious imperialism, and particularly his famous tall tale about how
he had decided to buy the Philippines as a possession of the United States.
The fabulous tale came at the end of a call by a group of Protestant
clergymen in Washington in November 1899. It is not proper to pass on
another person's religious thinking, so that we will forego comment on his
story, except to mark how very easily something like it could have been said
by the Spanish friars who came to convert the Filipinos in the sixteenth
century. McKinley detained his callers as they prepared to leave, and said to
them:
Before you go I would like to say just a word about the

Philippine business. I have been criticized a good deal about the
Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is, I didn't want the
Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did
not know what to do with them. When the Spanish War broke out,
Dewey was at Hong Kong, and I ordered him to go to Manila, and
he had to; because, if defeated, he had no place to refit on that side
of the globe, and if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross
the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts. And so he
had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and did it! But that was as far as I
thought then. When next I realized that the Philippines had
dropped into our lap, I confess I did not know what to do with them.
I sought counsel from all sides Democrats as well as Republicans
but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then
Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the
White House night after night until midnight; and I am not
ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and
prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.
And one night late it came to me this way I don't know how it
was but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain
that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) That we could not
turn them over to France or Germany our commercial rivals in the
Orient that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) That we
could not leave them to themselves they were unfit for self
government and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over
there worse than Spain's was; and (4) That there was nothing left
for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and
uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and, by God's grace, do
the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ
also died.
And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly,
and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War
Department (our mapmaker), and told him to put the Philippines
on the map of the United States [pointing to a large map on the
wall of his office]; and there they are, and there they will stay while
I am President!
McKinley knew how to talk to clergymen (the Philippines were “a gift of
the gods” and had “dropped into our lap”) and soldiers (“The powers of the
military occupant are absolute and supreme”; and “There must be no joint
occupation with the insurgents). Indeed he was a product of his times: he was
the seventh in a line of elected American presidents of whom he was the third
to be murdered in office, which shows the violence of his America.
He had decided to make war on the Filipinos on 19 May 1898. His

announced decision to occupy the Philippines corrupted weaker generals like
Greene who reported only part of the reality in the field, the part that would
humor him (and further their careers). Greene misreported the Revolution by
saying that it was nothing but “a Tagalo insurrection.” Greene was rather
like those Vietnam generals of the 1960s and 1970s; they thought they would
fight the war by guessing their commanderinchief's wishes and then tell
him each year that “the boys would be home by Christmas.” McKinley came
to think that he was sending his troops to Manila to squash a tribe of
American Indians. His decisions ultimately infected not just his military
commanders. His civilian officials in Manila, reporting in 1900, deceived their
superiors in America by humoring them; they called the war an insurrection;
for good measure they reassured the righteous McKinley by attributing to the
Filipinos' struggle for independence the nature of a criminal society well
established in the United States: “It is a Mafia on a very large scale.”
McKinley released his own hidden longings when he told the American
people of the “sinister ambition of a few leaders of the Filipinos.” It was a
poor and mean way of defending his record to the representatives of his own
people, slandering the leaders of the Filipinos only because he wanted to take
their country. These leaders were all, in the language of the time, sons of
Filipinas: Ilocanos and Pangasinans and Pampangos and Tagalogs and
Bicolanos and Cebuanos and Ilonggos as well as Spanish mestizos and even
some Spaniards. Many of them had been educated in Europe; their patriotism
enabled them to accept the tested generalship of Aguinaldo. It must be
conceded that they were vastly more cosmopolitan than the former seminary
student and postal clerk from Ohio; they had come home to help fight for
their country's freedom, not to fight a “Tagalo rebellion.”
McKinley cannot have been expected to have read the literature of the

Propaganda; it was in Spanish, and it drew from the ideas and aspirations of
European liberalism. He must be adjudged the intellectual inferior of
Filipinos like Marcelo H. del Pilar and Apolinario Mabini; and it may be said,
without malice, that he was an intellectual pygmy compared to Jose Rizal.
McKinley ignored the opinions of Dewey the New Englander, the only
United States commander who had fought and won a real battle in the
Philippines before 1899. Dewey had advised Washington on 23 June 1898
that: “I have given him (Aguinaldo] to understand that I consider insurgents
as friends, being opposed to a common enemy:” Dewey ended his dispatch by
expressing his assessment of the Filipinos:
In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence
and more capable of selfgovernment than the natives of Cuba, and
I am familiar with both races.
Dewey repeated this in his statement to the United States panel in Paris
on 28 August, saying that “Further intercourse with them has confirmed me
in this opinion.” Of the Paris treaty and the $20,000,000 purchase Dewey had
these to say:11
At the time the delegates to the Peace Conference scarcely

comprehended that a rebellion was included with the purchase. We
were far from being in possession of the property which we had
bought.... Now, after paying twenty millions for the islands, we
must establish our authority by force against the very people whom
we sought to benefit.
Challenges to Aguinaldo: July 1898January 1899
It is clear that the decisions and pronouncements that were being made in
Washington and Paris from May 1898 to December 1899 concealed or
distorted the facts and the reality. The latter were reflected in the events that
took place in Manila, and later on in the provinces and other islands.
Aguinaldo was paid a call by General Anderson and Dewey upon

Anderson's arrival in Cavite on 1 July. Aguinaldo asked Anderson whether
the United States had recognized (or would recognize) the Filipino
Government. Anderson records that he was embarrassed, that he was
constrained to say that he was without authority to recognize the Filipino
Government, and finally that Aguinaldo was “bitterly disappointed.”
Throughout July more and more American troops kept arriving from San
Francisco. Since Dewey's victory the Americans had been in control only of
Manila Bay. McKinley was rather more avid than the Spaniards of the
sixteenth century who would venture into a bay or land on some coast, and on
that basis alone claim title to an entire island and the islands neighboring to
it; he claimed the whole archipelago and would go to war for it.
The newly arrived troops were landed on the bay side of the coastal pueblo
of Paranaque. This was at the southern end of the line of Spanish
blockhouses, starting from the north in Caloocan, that formed the outer
defense of Manila. But the Filipino forces had already besieged the city all
around, so that the American lines would be behind the Filipino lines. The
American encampment was a sprawl of tents, growing with the arrival of
each new expedition. It was called Camp Dewey. July was turning into
August. The men suffered from the monsoon rains that made the ground on
which they slept sodden, muddy, and often flooded.
The American war correspondent Frank D. Millet has a number of items
on the Filipinos during the time that he billeted with his countrymen in
Camp Dewey. The camp was near the Camino Real, the main coastal road
from Manila to Cavite, and the road filled up with improvised stalls and
booths selling fruit and food and souvenir items to the Americans. The latter
paid what was asked, not being used to the native practice of haggling. The
Filipinos went in and out of the American camp, although not as troops in
military formation. Men who were peddlers in the morning could be seen as
soldiers in the afternoon. Young boys who could carry a rifle were members of
the Filipino forces. Millet writes of the dress of the Filipino troops:
They had no distinctive uniform, the only badge of service being
a red and blue cockade with a white triangle bearing the Malay
symbol of the sun and three stars and sometimes a red and blue
band pinned diagonally across the lower part of the left sleeve. The
plundered arsenal at Cavite provided thousands of them with
Spanish uniforms made of finely striped blue linen and these were
much affected among them, particularly the officers. A revolver
with a cord to go around the neck was the most prominent badge of
rank and much more esteemed than the sword, although most of
the officers proudly wore both.
There was more evidence of military ceremony in Bacoor, seat of the

Filipino Government until September 1898. Here, recruits and volunteers
were drilled into shape:
The troops certainly made an excellent appearance. Many of

them, to be sure, had belonged to the native volunteer force (the
Spanish militia, that had defected to the Revolution) and had
acquired a certain amount of training in that way. The recruits
were soon hammered into shape by the veterans of the rank and file
and by the officers who did not waste many soft words on them, at
least until they had sufficiently impressed them with the extent of
the official authority.... I was often told by the under officers, many
of whom were men of a certain education having studied with the
priests, that their men were perfectly obedient to orders and that it
was only necessary to make them appreciate the fact that the
officers had supreme power over them and they made the most
devoted soldiers.
The supplies of the Filipino forces were few and basic, but were adequate
in quantity at this time. The Revolution controlled the railroad from Caloocan
to the north, and in Manila and the Laguna de Bai region all the steam
launches and cascos or river boats, except for one or two, and so they had a
“mosquito fleet.” Sleds and carts drawn by carabaos, and carromatas and
calesas by ponies, moved the supplies. Troop movements were not
cumbersome:
No luggage or supply trains were ever seen. When a detachment
was moved from one point of the country to another it would be
followed, perhaps by a buffalo sledge or a carromata or two with a
few extra rifles and possibly the officers' kit, and that was all. Some
of the men had bundles but the majority carried rifle and cartridge
boxes only. They needed no tents for they pitched no camp but
scattered through the bamboo and occupied the native huts which
are everywhere as thick as toadstools and they got their rations
where they happened to be. This method of life is possible, of
course, for the native alone, for no white man could exist on the food
they flourish on or long resist the many diseases which prey on all
foreigners....
The Americans often had an unconcealed cavalierly disregard for the

Filipinos – we discount the racism that was inevitable in those times. Millet,
even though he was right in thinking that the Filipinos' efforts against the
Spaniards should not have been ignored, suggested anyhow that the Filipinos
could have been used “in the same way as Indian scouts were employed in the
Western campaigns.”12
A very persistent view of the Filipinos that became official opinion in
Washington was that they were out to plunder and sack Manila:
The insurgents ... resented the presence of our troops because
they were keen enough to understand that there was danger of
their being foiled in their long cherished scheme of plundering the
rich town of Manila. The common idea held by the insurgent army
may or may not have reflected the sentiments of the leaders, but ...
it is certain that one great stimulus offered to the native soldiers
was the promise of loot.... There is very little doubt that, if they had
succeeded in taking the town before our army arrived and they
made a herculean effort to do this they would have committed
untold atrocities.
This was also the opinion of General Merritt, who was the American army
commanding general from his arrival in late July to the end of August:
We purposely gave the insurgents no notice of the attack on

Manila, because we did not need their cooperation We were moved
by the fear that they might loot, plunder, and possibly murder.
Merritt's words deserve no credence. First of all, he was lying in referring
to the “attack” on Manila. Nor is it true that the Filipinos' cooperation was
not needed. Merritt denied their cooperation because they had already
bottled up the Spaniards in the city. On the matter of plunder and possible
murder, it was an American invention in conjunction with the Spaniards. The
latter were scared witless, and the former had concealed motives.
Before the Americans had begun to think of occupying the archipelago,
Dewey delivered the Spanish prisoners he took in the battle of Manila Bay to
Aguinaldo. Dewey had no men nor resources to hold the prisoners; and he
never, then or later, lodged any complaint against the Filipinos' treatment of
prisoners.
Felipe Agoncillo, the diplomatic agent of the Revolutionary Government,
called Merritt's insinuations “simply baseless,” and points to the record of the
revolutionary forces even after they had captured the Spanish garrisons in
the rest of Luzon and the Visayas:
Although they now have in their possession fourteen thousand
prisoners, they never loot, plunder, or murder any one; but, on the
contrary, they have always strictly observed the rules of war, in
accordance with the principles of modern civilization, and never
failed to do everything in accordance with humanitarian principles.
General Merritt's honesty should debar him from attributing to
General Aguinaldo, the loyal ally of America, a claim on the part of
the Filipinos for a share of the booty. His reference to the Filipinos
as children is a simple echo of the Spanish saying, and he, like the
Spaniards, may discover his error too late.
Indeed, from his first pronouncements upon the resumption of the

Revolution in late May, Aguinaldo always strictly enjoined that the war be
conducted in a civilized manner, and the military was always under orders to
refrain from abuse and cruel treatment of prisoners.
Wildman presumed to advise Aguinaldo on this matter, but it is certain
that the latter did not follow his counsel. Aguinaldo had wished that his
Spanish prisoners be taken off his hands and he thought of sending them to
Hongkong. Wildman advised that the prominent prisoners be held as
hostages. Then: “Never mind about feeding them meals every day. Rice and
water will be a good diet. They have been living too high for the last few
years.”
As an independent witness, Sheridan documents the kind and correct

behavior of the Filipinos toward the British, both in Manila and in the
provinces. A specific instance was:
Mr. Higgins, the general manager of the railway in Luzon, who
resided within the rebel lines all through the trouble, praises in the
most unqualified terms the forbearance and generosity of the
Filipinos who, when they needed private property in the cause they
were prosecuting, paid for all they acquired, and treated the
English with the greatest kindness and respect, whilst the
Spaniards both seized and destroyed private property without
offering payment of any sort.
We must acknowledge that the American rankandfile soldiers were not
playing Washington's political game. Many of them were volunteers. They
knew only that they had come to fight the Dons, the Spaniards. When they
got the latter whipped, they expected to be shipped home. So, when they were
told to stay although there was no longer any enemy, they were bound to ask
questions, and it dawned on many that the politicians back home were
thinking of having them fight the Filipinos for the latter's land.
For the Filipinos it was much more than a guessing game, more than an
unexpected extension of enlistment. They were fighting for the highest
stakes, and they had to conclude that the foreign troops in their country were
a threat to their goal of liberty.
As time passed and their position as successful antagonists of
the Spaniards was not recognized, they began to grow aggressive
and to comport themselves with an obtrusive arrogance of manner.
Of individual acts proving their real feeling there are a thousand
instances to be cited and while their profession of friendship became
more and more effusive and verbose it ceased to carry any
assurance of sincerity.
The negotiations in Paris would take until 10 December, and then the
consent of the United States Senate would be required. Meantime, McKinley
had to keep the American people in the dark about his adventure in the
Philippines, and so he had to keep a tight lid on events in faraway Manila.
This meant that, until the treaty was ratified, McKinley would not stir things
up.13
The Hongkong junta's suspicion of the United States as “the new

oppressor,” corroborated by Aguinaldo's frustrations with the American
generals, now pushed him away from the United States. He could not have
failed to take note of the “slicing of the Chinese melon” in the course of the
imperialist powers' scramble for spheres of influence and interest in nearby
China. He certainly was aware of the Big Powers' contest for possession of
islands in the Pacific. The Singapore Free Press had stated on 7 June 1898:
We think the Americans will keep the Philippines.... To retain
them is, of course, to give up their traditional policy of
noninterference in the politics of the world; but we confess we have
not much faith in selfdenying politics of that kind.
Aguinaldo had once regarded the United States in a special light,

untainted by imperialism, the defender of liberty. But now he began to see
the United States in stark reality. This was even before the betrayal played
on him by the principals in the sham battle for Manila. A document from
Aguinaldo at this time is partly entitled “General Outline Of Means For
Providing Against Yankee Deceit.” It began with the following paragraph:
The International policy of the Great Powers is decided only by
the demands of their selfish interests. Right, Duty, Law, Religion,
Morality, etc., are only to cover ambition forming a garment of
diplomacy to cover exploitation and conquest.
Aguinaldo had lost his faith in the politics of the powers and lumped the
United States along with the imperialist European states. However, his
views on how to secure Filipino independence amidst the latter's scramble for
aggrandizement were simplistic and even wrong. For instance, he proposed:
II. To offer aid to the United States in their present ambitions
in the Pacific, to assist them in taking other Malayan islands if we
can gain COMPLETE independence.
IV. The nation which in accordance with the treaty of peace
remains in possession of the Philippines will also have to assume
the obligation of the speedy pacification of the country to save the
interests which the Great Powers have scattered through the
Archipelago, so it is to the advantage of the sons of the land to
prolong the war so that the transaction cannot be completed by
Europe.
We quote the following item and closing lines of the Outline in order to
show that Aguinaldo had planned to take Manila before the Spaniards
delivered it to the Americans; and also to provide additional examples of his
views:14
VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must
occupy all Manila including the Walled City with the object and
purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines according to the
decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an understanding
with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood.
Avoid all robbing, sacking, abuses, acts of barbarians and
savages.
Watch closely to prevent the landing of German and French
troops (they are eager to do it) on the pretext of public disorder and
the need of protecting foreign interests.
In order that we may reasonably appreciate the situation of Aguinaldo at
this time, we must consider that the young leader was confronted by
enormous tasks and complicated challenges.
First, the immediate job after the surrender of Manila was how to deal
with the American generals: how to gain joint occupation with them; how to
prepare for a contingency that might offer an opportunity to take the city, by
force if necessary; and all the while restraining the hotheads among his
commanders who could not accept having been left out in the taking of the
city. There was not much that Aguinaldo could do on this matter. The
American occupation of the city was secure. More than this, the Filipinos
could attempt to take the city only at the risk of its complete destruction; this
was because of Dewey's naval guns, against which they had no defense.
Aguinaldo was forced, throughout, into a diplomatic and tactful posture.,
Second, Aguinaldo's priority had to resume the recovery of the territory of
his people. Moreover, news of a peace conference in Paris had reached Manila
after the surrender and it was essential to have de facto occupation of as
much territory as possible in the hope that it would affect the treaty terms in
the Filipinos' favor.
On the winning of territory the Revolution was impressively successful. A
very interesting document of the war was the report of a United States navy
paymaster and a naval cadet on their tour from Manila to the northern
Luzon provinces from 8 October to 20 November 1898; this document is often
called the “WilcoxSargent Report.” The railroad ran through territory that
was wholly under the control of the Revolution. The two men got off the train
from Manila at Pangasinan. From here they traveled by light carromata,
heavy cart, pony, and on foot east and north to Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya,
Isabela, Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, and La Union. They observed and talked to the
people in the plains and highlands, hinterland and coasts. The entire area
was nonTagalog country; it supported and was governed by the Revolution.
Wilcox and Sargent observed not only military conditions but also native
society, and took note of the socioeconomic division between the rich and
poor classes, the influence of the Catholic Church, the “little or no friction
between the civil and military classes.” They recorded the “intelligent
appearance and conversation” of the Filipino leaders, military and civil, with
“very few exceptions.”
Wilcox and Sargent had observations on two noteworthy items: the

people's feelings on independence, and their attitudes to the United States.
Their notes on these topics are as follows:
Popular Sentiment Regarding Independence
57. Of the larger number of officers, civil and military, and of
leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has expressed
in our presence his sentiment on this question. It is universally the
same. They all declare they will accept nothing short of
independence. They desire the protection of the United States at
sea, but fear any interference on land. The question of the
remuneration of our Government for the expense of establishing a
protectorate is never touched upon. On the subject of independence
there is, again, a marked difference between four provinces first
visited and those of Ilocos Sur and Union. In the former there is
more enthusiasm the sentiment is more of the people; in the latter
it is more of the higher class and of the army. In these provinces we
have seen signs of actual discontent with the existing state of
things.
Attitude Toward The United States
58. There is much variety of feeling among the Philippines with
regard to the debt of gratitude they owe to the United States. In
every town we found men said that our nation had saved them from
slavery, and others who claimed that without our interference their
independence would have been recognized before this time. On one
point they are united, however, viz., that whatever our Government
may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex
them....
With regard to our policy toward a subject people, they have
received remarkable information on two points that we have
mercilessly slain and finally exterminated the race of Indians that
were native to our soil, and that we went to war in 1861 to suppress
an insurrection of negro slaves, whom we also ended by
exterminating. Intelligent and wellinformed men have believed
these charges.
They are rehearsed to us in many towns in different provinces,
beginning at Malolos....
The report was endorsed by Dewey to Washington in December,

describing it as “the most complete and reliable information” on northern
Luzon.15
This report on conditions in the nonTagalog areas of Luzon negates

McKinley's beloved notion that the Filipino struggle was a Tagalog rebellion.
It also explains why, after McKinley began his war in February, 1899, the
Filipinos fought heroically against disheartening odds: they did not wish
their people exterminated, as the Indians had been in their native land. But
the report and all other data and opinion on the conditions and aspirations of
the Filipinos would have no effect on the American government. McKinley
had other plans.
Third, Aguinaldo had to create a regular army. The Revolution had

achieved wonders with the Katipunan. But even in the course of the fighting
Aguinaldo had to think of an army not just for the Revolution, but also for an
independent republic. He did not have enough time; in October 1898 he
issued a decree calling for the establishment of a military academy, but by
February his people had been plunged into war with the Americans.
Fourth, Aguinaldo had to lead in the development of the revolutionary

government into a constitutional republic. The idea of a constitutional
government, decent, just, liberal, responsible, had never been absent from the
minds of the educated Filipinos. Aguinaldo faithfully undertook this
important task, during a time of crisis, with unfailing statesmanship.
Fifth, Aguinaldo had to wage a campaign for recognition of his cause and,
later, of the Filipino Republic. On the 6th August he addressed a manifesto
asking for recognition of belligerency and independence from foreign
governments. He sent instructions to Felipe Agoncillo in Hongkong directing
him to have the manifesto published in the newspapers and to take the
original to the United States. Agoncillo's instructions when he would be in
America, where he would also take a letter to McKinley, were:
Make them understand that whatever may be their intentions
towards us, that it is not possible for them to overrule the
sentiments of the people represented by the government, and they
must first recognize it if we are to come to an agreement. Still do
not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection
or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain
independence. This is what we shall endeavor to secure[;]
meanwhile if it should be possible to do so, still give them to
understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself but that
once we are independent we will be able to make arrangements
with them.
On 24 August Aguinaldo created committees of the Revolution composed
of Filipino residents abroad, to work on relations with foreign governments.
Agoncillo was to write Pedro Roxas and Juan Luna to represent the Filipino
Government in Paris and Antonio Regidor and Sixto Lopez to do the same in
London. The representatives in Japan were Mariano Ponce and Faustino
Lichauco, while Heriverto Zarcal was to serve that role in Australia.
No man in the Revolution earned the title of “diplomat” as much as Felipe
Agoncillo; he was a Batangueno and had been with the Hongkong junta
during Aguinaldo's selfexile. He enjoyed the complete trust of Aguinaldo.
They corresponded in cipher, calling each other “brother”; Agoncillo was
“Respe” while in Hongkong and “Kitapalad” when he was in Washington;
Aguinaldo's alias was “Mr. Rost”. On 26 August Aguinaldo again instructed
Agoncillo to go to Washington; he was to assist the United States panel that
would shortly be appointed. But he was reminded that he must not commit
himself to the American commissioners position:
You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to
obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we should know by
the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think
of protection or annexation.
On 30 August, when it was known that Merritt was to appear before the
American panel, Agoncillo received final orders to go to the United States as
soon as possible. Aguinaldo wrote:
If perchance we should go back to Spanish control [as a result of
the treaty], ask them [the Americans] to help us as the French

helped them during their own revolution and ask also the terms.
Agoncillo sailed to San Francisco with General Greene, and from there

proceeded to Washington.
Of course the Filipino diplomatic campaign was doomed from the start.
Aguinaldo's hopes in the socalled “civilized powers” were misplaced; the
latter were themselves the imperialist powers. The Singapore Free Press, in
its issue of 7 June 1898 in an article entitled "The Fate of the Philippines,"
said it all. If the United States did not keep the Philippines, it asked, where
would the islands go? And then it went to the heart of the question by
pointing out that the possession of the Philipines might disturb the Balance
of Power in the Far East:
England, it is said, must not have them, because she has already too much;
Germany, because her designs upon China would thereby be facilitated;
Russia, because she would be too near Australia; and France, because she
may choose in the next war to act as Russia's obedient ally. Japan,
as a pagan power, is out of the question...; and it is very doubtful
whether Holland would undertake the laborious task of reducing
the Philippines to order.... These arguments and many like them
will be urged on the Americans by the chancelleries of Europe,
which are already twittering with excitement and putting out little
feelers, and looking at Manila like children at a cake which they
want badly but think it decorous not to ask for more.
It was only June then, but the newspaper already foresaw that the United
States would hold on to the Philippines as “newly acquired property.”16
Aguinaldo's biggest and riskiest task was how to deal with an enemy, a
stranger that had come uninvited and entered his home while pretending to
be a savior. The Americans had come in with a great deal of force and a
poverty of understanding. In Washington they demanded occupation of the
city, bay, and harbor of Manila. The Spaniards acceded on 12 August. The
Spaniards did not explain what that covered. The Filipinos knew it. The
Americans did not, because it was not simple. The “city” meant the
Intramuros, the walled city, and no more. There was also, in the Spanish
administrative system, the “Plaza de Manila,” or the walled city and its
defense area, covering some adjacent pueblos. And then there was the
municipal district of Manila; this covered the Intramuros as well as the
suburbs of Tondo, Binondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel,
Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco.
The Filipinos, who were not bound by the Washington agreement of 12
August, invested Malate and Ermita next to the south walls of the
Intramuros, Paco and, north of the Pasig, Sampaloc and Tondo. Because of
the money and men and guns back of him, and with Merritt's proclamation of
military occupation, Otis resorted to bully's ways to get Aguinaldo to
evacuate the pueblos occupied by the Filipino forces, including the area in the
port of Cavite where the capital of the Revolutionary Government was
located in Bacoor. Aguinaldo yielded and moved his capital to Malolos, but
kept his forces in a part of Paco. In time, on 15 September, even Paco was
evacuated.
One of the reasons for Aguinaldo's yielding to the American demand was
that he wished to avoid contact between his forces and the Americans. He
had received advice on 26 August from Agoncillo in Hongkong, recommending
that he endeavor not to break friendly relations with the Americans during
the Paris treaty negotiations which would define the status of Filipinas. The
same advice was sent by Bray in a letter written the same day. Aguinaldo
accepted these counsels and waited, hoping for favorable terms in Paris. On 5
January he wrote:
I hope that once the Paris conference was at an end my people
would obtain the independence promised them by the consul
general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly
assured and proclaimed in manifestos and speeches would be
established by the American generals who have reached these
shores.
The Paris treaty proved Aguinaldo wrong. (We cannot deal with the
following report in detail: the Catholic Church exerted “Titanic efforts to
retain its control and discredit the Philippines”; the Vatican and the special
papal legate to the United States tried to press McKinley to recognize the
friars' claims in Filipinas. Germany supported Spain's desperate efforts to

retain its sovereignty. Anyway, the Filipinos' diplomatic campaign was a
lonely fight.) Having secured his cession, McKinley felt that he had stronger
grounds for ordering Otis, on the 21st December, to proclaim the occupation
and conquest of the Philippines. Otis was directed to announce that:
we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect
the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their
personal and religious rights.
McKinley promised that all Filipinos who submitted and cooperated with
the new regime would be rewarded by protection. However, all others “would
be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed.”
McKinley then disguised his military adventure by stating that the

purpose of the United States was “benevolent assimilation.” But even Otis
decided that he could not issue it in its original form. He recorded: “I
concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as
'sovereignty,''right of cession,' and those which directed immediate
occupation, ... etc.” that would only anger the Filipinos. So he edited it, at
least as much as he dared, and delayed issuing his version until 4 January
1899.
Copies of the proclamation were posted in public buildings in Manila. We
have a note on how the Filipinos reacted to it, to the effect that “as a pacific
measure it was absolutely valueless”:
The natives tore the proclamation from the walls and trampled
upon it. Many of the wealthy Filipinos transferred their properties
to Spanish attorneys, and thousands of natives left the city to join
the Insurgents. The Escolta the main thoroughfare of Manila, was
rife with rumors that attempts would be made to burn the city and
that an uprising of the natives might be expected at any moment.
Even the Filipino women declared, in a paper drawn up and signed
by a large number, that they would resist the Americans, side by
side with their husbands and sons, and would shed every drop of
blood in their veins for the independence of their country.
And Otis blundered. While editing the proclamation, he allowed a copy of
the original furnished to the expedition that he had sent to occupy Iloilo on 26
December; it was published there on the 3rd January, and copies of this
original version inevitably got to Aguinaldo in Malolos. Aguinaldo was bitter
about the Iloilo expedition. The American justification for it was that a group
of European and Spanish businessmen of Iloilo had gone to Otis and
petitioned him to provide security. With this pretext, Otis felt that he could
now implement the 21 December proclamation. He sent an expedition of two
infantry regiments and one light battery on two warships to establish the
United States government in Iloilo. With the expedition were four men,
described by Otis as “representative men of Iloilo,” whose help he had asked
for to arrange for a peaceful landing and occupation of the town. We now
know how Otis was misled by his own designs: three of the men were officials
of the Revolution in Iloilo; the other was an agent of Aguinaldo. When the
expedition reached Iloilo the Spaniards had already delivered the town to the
Revolution; the people refused the request of the expedition commander to
land. He furnished them a copy of the benevolent assimilation proclamation,
asking them to submit to the authority of the United States. He was told by
Roque Lopez, President of the Federal Council of the Visayas:
Let the American commander sincerely tell us which authority
we should prefer: That of the United States, arising under the
treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, with which we are not
acquainted because we have not been legally notified thereof, or the
legitimate authority of the revolutionary government of Malolos,
based upon acts of conquests, prior to the said treaty of peace, and
on natural bonds created by the policy and constitution established
since the first moment of the revolution, on August 11 [sic], 1896?
In view of all the foregoing, we insist upon not consenting to the
landing of your forces without express orders from our central
government in Malolos.
The expedition did not land.
Otis' doctored proclamation was nevertheless tantamount to a declaration
of war. It opened with the statement that he had been instructed by
McKinley to assume the government or administration of affairs of the
Philippines. But Otis had to retain the portion which said that “the strong
arm of authority” must be “sedulously maintained” in order “to repress
disturbance and to overcome all obstacles.” Otis signed as “Military Governor
of the Philippine Islands.”
Aguinaldo discovered that duplicity was afoot; he could see the

discrepancies between the two American proclamations. He and his people
were being required, bluntly, to submit to the rule of the United States. He
reacted. On 5 January he issued two proclamations from Malolos. The first
was widely circulated in Manila; his men pasted it over the Otis proclamation
where the latter was posted on the walls. The Americans pretended to be
surprised, and called it a declaration of war. Aguinaldo protested Otis' styling
himself as “Military Governor of the Philippine Islands”:
I solemnly proclaim that I have never had, either in Singapore
or in Hongkong, or here in the Philippines, any undertaking or
agreement, either by word or by writing, to recognize the
sovereignty of America, in this my beloved country. On the
contrary, I say that I returned to these islands on board an
American warship on the 19th of May of last year, with the decided
and manifest preposition to carry on the war with the Spaniards, to
reconquer our liberty and our independence. I stated this in my
official proclamation on the 24th of the said month of May, and it
was published in a manifesto to the Filipino people on the 12th of
last June, when in my native town of Cavite, I exhibited, for the
first time, our holy national banner as a sacred emblem of that
supreme aspiration for independence....
In the proclamation of General Otis, he alludes to instructions
written for him by his Excellency, the President of the United
States, referring to the administration of affairs in the Philippine
Islands. I solemnly protest, in the name of God, the root and
foundation of all justice and of all right, and who has given to me
the power to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our
regeneration, – against this intrusion of the government of the
United States in the sovereignty of these islands.
The second proclamation was more strongly worded. Aguinaldo announced
a “rupture” with the Americans. It began:
The government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to
set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of
its amicable relations with the army of the United States of
America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach
the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to
avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.
Aguinaldo briefly summarized the early American support for the

Revolution, the Filipinos' successes, the benefits derived by the Americans,
the latter's unreasonableness and duplicity, the Filipinos' accommodations
due to their hopes in the Paris treaty negotiations, and then the American
attempt to take Iloilo, “with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title
of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my
government.” The next to last paragraph was as follows:17
My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a

violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a
nation which has arrogated to itself the title, "champion of
oppressed nations." Thus it is that my government is ready to open
hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession
of the Visayan Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in
order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible
verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the
tormentors of human kind.
Now it was all out in the open. Otis had been ordered to occupy the
archipelago; Aguinaldo had declared his readiness to fight. The American
forces were at a strength of 20,851 officers and men at this time. But they
had not yet fought a single real battle on land; for his part, Aguinaldo
doubtless wished for a little more time to prepare. Both he and Otis, of
course, had the coming United States Senate vote on the peace treaty,
scheduled for 6 February, very much on their minds.
When Otis sought instructions from Washington about sending the force
to Iloilo, McKinley approved, but told him that “there should be no conflict
with insurgents.” McKinley had to think of the coming ratification contest in
the Senate. The twothirds vote needed to obtain Senate consent was neither
certain nor easy. There was also a strong AntiImperialist League movement
in the United States at this time; it was essentially a New England

movement, based in Boston; its leaders tended to be Democrats but its motley
adherents were united by the view that McKinley's Philippine policy was
inconsistent with the American constitution and that it was not fair dealing
with the Filipinos. The United States had gone to war with a commitment to
the independence of the Cubans, who had been far from winning their war,
but now it proposed to colonize the Filipinos, who had already won their war
of independence and established a republic.
In the Philippines, indeed, some of the American troops did not see things
McKinley's way. James H. Blount, an infantry lieutenant with the American
forces who was subsequently appointed to a judgeship in the Philippines,
reports that: “The overwhelming sentiment of the Eighth Army Corps when
we took the Philippines was against taking them.”
The irony of it was that when the war did break out in the evening of 4
February 1899, images of American blood being shed won the Senate
ratification in an outburst of populist fervor and patriotism. McKinley was
wrong in his caution, but he got what he wanted. Aguinaldo was also wrong
in waiting for the Senate vote. At least he did not gain anything.
So, Aguinaldo and Otis, both on a collision course, waited things out. They
created a joint commission. Aguinaldo's team was composed of Florentino
Torres (who had been in Spain during the Propaganda), Ambrosio Flores, and
Manuel Arguelles. The two panels met in Manila. Their first session began at
7:30 P.M. on 9 January, the sixth meeting at 4 P.M. on the 29th. The
Filipinos were faithful to Aguinaldo's instructions, and the Americans were
equally bound to McKinley's. The Filipinos were asked during the first
meeting for their views on whether the relations between them and the
“army of occupation” had been strained. They replied that there was tension,
and they detailed the wrongs they had suffered since the day of the Spanish
American sham battle for Manila.
They were then asked what the Filipino people wished and aspired to.

They answered that this could all be summed up in the words “absolute
independence.” Predictably, the Americans fell back on their standard
response: that they had no authority to recognize a Filipino or any other

government, except that which was claimed by McKinley. The discussions
were, for all practical purposes, bogged down at this point, but the Americans
wanted to know the Filipinos' views on protectorateship. To the latter the
matter meant independence first; the details of any protectorate arrangement
could always be ironed out in subsequent talks. They recognized that the
Filipinos were weak compared to the American nation; for this reason the
Filipinos' terms on any protectorate status would be “reasonable.” But they
insisted on independence first. The rest of the meetings would not settle
anything. The Americans had no authority to make any commitments on
political questions; they were very much like modern “exchange scholars”
who “pick the brains” of Third World academics. In the third week of January
the Filipino panel asked Otis to cable the following to Washington:
Undersigned commissioners commander in chief of

revolutionary army of these islands state to commissioners of
General Otis that aspiration Filipino people is independence, with
restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree
with Americans when latter agree to officially recognize the former.
No reply came from Washington. On the 29th the two panels issued a joint
statement: after six meetings they had not come to any agreement. Nothing
more could be done in Manila, with Otis, McKinley's faithful tool,
stonewalling every demand to reveal, in clear terms, what America's
intentions in the islands were.
In Washington, in the course of the debate in the Senate on the

ratification of the Paris treaty, the antiMcKinley and antiimperialist
elements filed resolutions to oppose ratification. The justifications were
varied: they were against colonization; taking the Philippines was against the
American constitution; annexation would bring the inferior Filipinos into the
American polity, and so on.
A very important resolution was that of Senator Augustus O. Bacon,

introduced on 11 January. It essentially declared in its conclusion that:
the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands except
for the pacification thereof....
In other words, the United States would proceed with annexation but its
dominion would be only temporary until a satisfactory Filipino government
should have been established.
These efforts would have produced the first declaration of United States
policy in the Philippines; it was recognized then that only the Congress could
lay down an official policy that was permanent and binding on the United
States. Heretofore, McKinley had been making policy on his own as
commanderinchief of the armed forces. McKinley intended to keep it that
way, and used his party resources to defeat all the legislative efforts.
Meantime, the Constitution was promulgated and the Republic

proclaimed. On the 23d January Aguinaldo issued a circular to the consuls of
Germany, Britain, France, the United States, AustriaHungary, Switzerland,
Belgium, Sweden and Norway, Holland, Italy, Russia, Denmark, Portugal,
Japan, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Liberia, and separately to Otis. The
circular informed the addressees of the constitution and the Republic. On the
26th a similar circular was sent to the editors of the newspapers La
Independencia, La República Filipina, El Kaibigan ng Bayan, and El
Heraldo de la Revolución. These were Filipino papers published in Manila,
and Aguinaldo appealed to their patriotism.18
Black Saturday, 4 February 1899
On the 21st of January the American command moved the First Nebraska
Regiment from Manila to the high grounds of Santa Mesa, east of the walled
city. This placed the regiment in the Third Military Zone of the Filipino forces
in the Manila region. The move was a provocation: it brought the Nebraskans
in proximity to the troops of Col. Luciano San Miguel, commanding the sector
of San Juan del Monte. The Filipinos had occupied all the Spanish
blockhouses after the surrender of Manila in August, all, that is, but
Blockhouse No. 15 or Fort San Antonio Abad; this was the massive stone fort
in MalatePasay that was occupied by the Americans. The Filipinos at
Blockhouse No. 7 were near the picket or outpost of the Nebraskans at
Santol.
According to the American sources, San Miguel's men would exert

repeated pressure on the regiment by crossing their line and entering into
the American zone – after all, the foreigners were newly encamped in Filipino
territory. The regiment belonged to the Second Division of Eighth Army
Corps under the command of Gen. Arthur MacArthur. On the 2nd February,
still according to the American sources, a Filipino patrol penetrated 100
yards into the zone claimed by the Americans. MacArthur complained to San
Miguel, and the latter assured him that the penetration was not ordered by
him. This was Thursday. On this same day Otis wrote to Dewey; he noted
“underlying excitement” in Manila. Otis as commanding general was billeted
in Malacañang. He complained that seven of the palace servants had left the
previous day to join the Filipino forces.
According to the records of an inquiry ordered by Aguinaldo to ascertain
the origin and cause of the outbreak of hostilities, Filipino firemen,
machinists, and sailors employed on American vessels were discharged on
Thursday and Friday. There was also testimony that the Nebraskans' tents
in Santa Mesa had been well lit the previous nights but were dark on
Saturday, 4 February.
In December 1899, in his first message to the United States Congress

after the outbreak of the war, McKinley declared that the Filipinos started
the war by a prepared attack against the American lines on 4 February. It
had been ten months since the war began and McKinley could have asked his
generals to comment on the news in the Manila newspapers after 4 February
1899 to the effect that the first shots had started with the Americans.
It was unlikely that the Filipinos started the hostilities. In the afternoon
of Saturday, the 4th, Antonio Luna, Director of War and in charge of all
military operations, asked for and received twentyfour hours' leave from
Malolos to go to San Fernando in Pampanga to be with his family. That same
night the commander of the First Military Zone, Gen. Mariano Noriel, was in
Parañaque, preparing for his marriage the following day.
Earlier that Saturday morning, Gen. Artemio Ricarte and Col. San Miguel
were called to Malolos by President Aguinaldo. Ricarte was commander of the
Second Military Zone and, by virtue of his experience, chief of operations in
the pueblos around Manila. The two officers arrived in the morning but were
detained there until the afternoon and missed the last train for Manila.
Ricarte was the house guest of Tomas Guison that night.
The diary of Dr. Santiago Barcelona, a close Aguinaldo aide, carried the
entry: “It was a beautiful day, Saturday, February 4, 1899.” In fact many of
the ranking civilian and military officials had to be in the capital this day.
The session of the Congress in the afternoon was scheduled to receive the
report of Aguinaldo's peace commissioners on their meetings with the Otis
commission. The report was duly presented by Gracio Gonzaga; it was
disappointing. According to Barcelona's diary, “the envoys of the Imperialist
Party were not invested with the powers needed to pass any resolutions.” The
generals and officials understandably looked forward to Sunday, and Luna
later proceeded to Pampanga.
But the evening continued fine. Barcelona poetically wrote in his diary
that there was a silver moon. And the presence of so many dignitaries called
for a ball; our diarist noted Ricarte and San Miguel “paying homage to
Terpsichore.”
There was a foreign visitor who had notes of his stay in Malolos that
Saturday. This was the British barrister Sheridan. He spent some hours
interviewing Aguinaldo. The President “had a cabinet and council meeting
with his generals.” Sheridan departed for Manila at 6:00 P.M., leaving “all
Aguinaldo's principal generals and official supporters. This I can state
absolutely, because most of them we saw shortly before our return.”
The absence of the generals from Manila this day is affirmed by
Aguinaldo:
The fatal day of February 4th arrived, on the night of which the
American forces suddenly attacked all our lines, which, in truth,
were nearly helpless, because, as it was on a Saturday, on the eve of
a holiday, our generals and some of our noted commanders had
requested leave to go to the side of their respective families.
McKinley did not understand, and perhaps his commanders in Manila

understood too well, that Saturday was “the eve of the day of recreation for
every Filipino who believes that he should do nothing on the following day,
Sunday.”19
Meanwhile in Manila, still Saturday, in the evening, Sheridan and his
wife and three other British couples left dinner at 8:45 P.M. to watch a
performance of Warren's Combined Shows, a circus troupe. The circus
performed under a huge tent (presumably in Santa Ana). In the audience
were a number of American soldiers occupying the cheaper gallery seats.
Sheridan records that there were reports that the American troops had been
under arms that afternoon, but: “This we could not understand, as we knew
the Filipinos contemplated no action, and therefore we concluded the report
was without foundation.” The show was interrupted at 9:30 P.M. by an
American soldier rushing in, shouting “Prepare, the rebels are upon us!”
Sheridan also noted, obviously later:
It was well known to the residents of Manila, and admitted by
the Americans, that the first shot was fired by them, with the result
that large numbers of men, women, and children were killed.... The
semiofficial and other papers of Manila of the 14th instant have
since admitted that the aggression came from the American side.
Sheridan's note is corroborated by a French journalist who was in the

Philippines in 1899. Henri Turot wrote for Tour du Monde. He described the
United States policy as “deceitful first, then audaciously brutal.” He was
equally assertive on the issue of the outbreak of hostilities:
Of course the Americans claimed that the signal started from
the lines of Aguinaldo. It had to be admitted later that it was an
American sentry who fired the first shot: premeditation was
moreover certain since all the Americans were ready at their battle
stations while the startled Filipinos were hardly able to defend
themselves.
There is also circumstantial, but telling, evidence in a side story involving
a mission from Iloilo. Ramon Avanceña and Adriano Hernandez of the

Federal Council of the Visayas completed their consultations in Malolos on 3
February. They were delegated to go there to look for a solution to the
problem of their having a federal system whereas the Malolos Constitution
provided for a unitary government. They boarded the ship URANUS on
Saturday for the trip home. With them was Aguinaldo's emissary Jose Ner,
with instructions for his discussions on the constitutional question with the
Council. The outbreak of the war found them that evening on board ship, the
URANUS not being allowed to leave port. But if Aguinaldo had planned to
start the war on this day, would he have exposed such important men, on
such a delicate mission, to the unknown but certain dangers of that evening?
So much for McKinley's deceitful charge that the Filipinos began the war
with a “prepared advance.” After hostilities began, Dewey was saddened by
the consequences of his May victory:20
I was weary and in poor health, which I could not help, being
deeply affected by the necessity of the loss of life and the misery
which the pacification of the islands imposed.
Our story of the beginning of hostilities starts with five telegrams, all
dated in the evening of 4 February. The first was as follows:
Captain Adjutant Grey to War Department, San Juan del

Monte, February 4th, 1899, 9:53 p. m. At exactly nine o' clock
tonight, American camp opened fire. Reply was made by our troops.
All hold their positions without fear. I await orders.
Fernando E. Grey y Formentos was adjutant to San Miguel. He therefore
sent, at the same time, a second telegram to San Miguel in Malolos. Then he
sent a third message to Gen. Pantaleon Garcia in Caloocan.
Gen. Noriel, commanding in Parañaque, also wired Ricarte to ask about
the shooting; this was addressed to the latter's Santa Ana headquarters.
Ricarte being in Malolos, Noriel's telegram was received by Capt. Zialcita,
Ricarte's aide. Zialcita forwarded the telegram to Malolos and sent another to
Grey at 9:55 P.M., saying that Ricarte was not in Santa Ana and that he
would ask for instructions.
Grey testified on 6 March before the investigating committee that it was
reported to him by the officer of Blockhouse No. 7 that two soldiers from this
station had gone on the usual patrol, walking in the direction of Blockhouse
No. 6; they were to meet the patrol from the latter station. Before the two
patrols met, a shot was fired at them by the American picket; they headed
back for Blockhouse No. 7 to make a report, and more shots were fired at
them before they could reach the outpost. At the same time, they heard shots
of the same sound from the direction of Tulay ng balsahan (literally, “raft
bridge” or raft ferry) in San Juan del Monte.
A graphic personal account of the first “kills” that fateful Saturday night
is told by Pvt. Grayson of the Nebraska Regiment, one of the two American
soldiers who fired the war's first shots:
I challenged with another “Halt.” Then he immediately shouted
"Halto" to me. Well I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him.
He dropped. Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about 15
feet from us. I called “Halt” and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw
that another was left. Well I think I got my second Filipino that
time. We retreated to where six other fellows were and I said “Line
up fellows; the niggers are in here all through these yards.”
Dewey's sailors and the American army troopers had been idle since the
phoney battle of Manila. The enemy was beaten. Hostilities were over. They
were idle. They complained of the tropical weather, the rain, the heat, the
humidity, and the insects. The months dragged from September into
February. They were irritated by the illarmed Filipino soldiers who could not
understand what was keeping the Americans in their country, and who
taunted the Yankees as their suspicions steadily gave way to hostility. By
February the American troops were itching, hoping for something to break
the tension under the heavy pall of boredom.
Thus the war began in Manila. It was the morning of Saturday, the 4th
February, in Washington. There the treaty of Paris was scheduled for the
ratification vote in the Senate on Monday the 6th. Before the voting started
every senator had heard the news of the rifle shots of Saturday in Manila,
followed at 4:00 A.M. Sunday morning by the booming guns of the American
warships in the bay. According to Mabini, it was a coup d'etat by McKinley.
In Washington the news was that the Filipinos, whom McKinley wished to
liberate and Christianize and whose rights he pledged to guarantee under a
regime of military occupation, had fired at American boys. There were 84
votes counted in the Senate Monday, including “paired votes,” of which 57
were in favor of the treaty and 27 against. McKinley got one vote more than
the twothirds he needed.21
The treaty was ratified. The Filipinos were now “rebelling” against the

United States. McKinley had his war.
NOTES
Chapter 19
THE REPUBLIC AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM; THE ORIGINS OF
THE FILIPINO-AMERICAN WAR: 1898-1899
The quotations at the beginning are from Taylor, III, Exh. 181; and U.S. Congress, Joint Committee
on Printing, James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents
(n.d.), XV, 6569, respectively. Our subsequent citations to the latter source will simply be to
"Messages."
A note on the material from Taylor is useful at this point. The Americans captured some 400,000
items of documents of the Filipino Republic and its instrumentalities and officers. These were taken
to Washington and constituted into the collection "Philippine Insurgent Records." Maj. J.R.M.
Taylor was assigned to work on the material. He selected 1,430 documents and compiled them in
five volumes. Vol. I is his discussion of the background of the Revolution against Spain and its first
phase; it includes documentary material, presented as "Exhibits." Its bias against the Filipinos as a
race and as individuals shows at the start and is sustained throughout Vol. II, which is entirely
devoted to his account of the second phase of the Revolution and the military history of the
"insurrection." The Filipino documents, nevertheless, starting with the exhibits in Vol. I and
constituting the entirety of Vols. IIIV, speak eloquently for the Filipinos, even though one finds
here and there the inevitable nitpicking and carping note by Taylor.
The Philippine Commission reported that Taylor's compilation of selected documents was in
complete translation in 1905, and ready for the printer in 1906. The material was submitted to the
war secretary (Taft, who had been civil governor in Manila) who, for reasons of his own,
disapproved publication. The compilation has only recently been published, in the Philippines.
Discounting Taylor's biases, it is a rich source; the student who knows the period will be able to
assess the material, applying caution to some of the translations. See Philippine Commission, 1905,
34; ibid., 1906, 19; "The Ford Report on the Situation in the Philippines," Historical Bulletin
(JanuaryDecember 1973), XVII, 428; and Teodoro A. Agoncillo, "Notes on the Philippine Insurgent
Records," ibid., (December 1957), II, 4150.
1 Re Otis statement about the situation being well in hand: Robinson, 73, 79. Re censorship: The
correspondents of some American publications covering the war rebelled against Otis' censorship. Robinson
devotes his Chap. 6 to the censorship system. Although the publications were proadministration as a rule,
Otis threatened their correspondents with expulsion from the islands or courtmartial. They jointly signed a
roundrobin dispatch and sent it out via courier to Hongkong; its text is in Robinson, 9182; and partly in
Blount, 220.
2 Re Cleveland message: Messages, XIV, 6151, 6154. Re McKinley and options: ibid., 62586261. Re fifth
option: ibid., 6258. Re "civilized" forcible intervention: ibid., 6263. Re McKinley's social Darwinism: ibid.,
6368.
The passages from Henry Cabot Lodge are from his The War With Spain (1899), 234235, 3, 4. This era was
marked by a large body of "expansionist," "annexationist;" which is to say imperialist, literature, even by
nonpolitical Americans. Just one example of these is Josiah Strong, whose Expansion Under New World
Conditions (1900) is a peculiar admixture of Protestant and trade expansionism.
3 Re the mismatch in Manila Bay: Dewey's account of the action is in his Autobiography, Chaps. 1415;
Appendix B presents his official report. Montojo's story of his force's weakness and other woes, as well as of
his squadron's movements, is in ibid., Appendix C. Montojo later asked Dewey to certify that he had acted
and decided properly. Dewey obliged, ibid., 233, and also Appendix C. However, Dewey recorded
elsewhere that Montojo attended a reception tendered by his wife in Manila on the night before the battle,
rushing to the action in the morning. ibid., 232.
Another account of the battle, using testimony of Dewey's officers, is in Murat Halstead, Full Official History
of the War With Spain (1899), Chap. 11.
Re Spain suing for peace, the truce, and notice to Manila: the documents on the negotiations leading to and
including the 12 August peace protocol are in Senate Document No. 62, 272284.
Re cutting of the cable: Halstead, 284, 309310. Re notice from Washington: Dewey, 281282. See also:
Taylor, II, 85; and Millet, 177.
Re Manila negotiations and mock bombardment: Dewey, 269, 272273. Re André: Millet, 111112.
Re weather: Dewey, 276277; but Millet, 136137, says that the weather was bad and wet.
Re Filipinos' advanced lines, their siege of Manila: Dewey, 269. Dewey's account of the Manila affair is in
ibid., Chap. 18. The terms of the capitulation are in Appendix H.
Re bored American troops: Millet, 42. Re $300,000,000 war: Blount, 599600, counting money cost alone; he
cites reports utilizing data from the Congressional Record (25 February 1908) and the New York Evening
Post (6 March 1907).
4 Re Williams' 22 February dispatch: Senate Document No. 62, 320. Re his March dispatches: ibid., 320323.
Re his meeting with Filipino leaders, assessment of them, view that the islands were more valuable than
Cuba: ibid., 327328. Re his report on 12 June ceremonies, etc., his forecast that Manila would be in U.S.
hands by 4 July: his report on 16 June, in ibid., 329330. Re 4 August dispatch: ibid., 331332. Re
Washington's qualified approval: ibid., 330.
Re Wildman's 3 November report: ibid., 333. Re State Department admonition to Wildman: ibid., 333334.
Re Wildman view of Filipinos as allies, etc., and unlike Indians: ibid., 336338. Re call by Hongkong Junta
members on Wildman and Williams, etc.: Wildman's long 18 July report is in ibid., 336338. Re 28 June
letter to Aguinaldo: Taylor, IV, Exh. 739. Re his 25 July letter: ibid. Re rebuke: Senate Document No. 62,
338. Wildman's 9 August letter is in ibid., 338340.
Re Bray's condemnation of Williams and Wildman: Taylor, V, Exh. 533.
5 Re Pratt's reports of 28 and 30 April, and the Singapore Free Press article: Senate Document No. 62, 343
345.
Re Dewey request for Aguinaldo to come: Dewey, 245, 246.
Pratt's 9 June report and the newspaper accounts are in: Senate Document No. 62, 350353.
Re Pratt letter to Aguinaldo: Taylor, IV, Exh. 739. Re Bray letter to Aguinaldo: ibid., V, Exh. 533. Robinson,
4046, says of the PrattAguinaldo talks that the latter and the Hongkong Junta claimed that an agreement of
fifteen clauses was the result, embodying terms for Filipino independence, a federal republic, with a
temporary role for European and American administrative commissions, an American protectorateship much
like that fixed for Cuba, but all subject to ratification by Dewey and McKinley. Pratt denied this. Robinson
was the New York Evening Post correspondent in Manila from July 1899 to February 1900.
Re State Department telegram to Pratt: Senate Document No. 62, 353. Re State Department's letter: ibid., 354.
Pratt's June and July dispatches, with his 21 June letter, are in ibid., 355356, 358. Re Pratt punished:
Sheridan, 40, 45, 46.
6 Re Spanish panel's belief that a FilipinoAmerican alliance existed: Senate Document No. 62, 14, 15.
Re U.S. panel on "unintended alliance". ibid., 146. Dewey highly valued the Filipino actions in "isolating our
marine force at Cavite from Spanish attack and in preparing a foothold for our troops when they shall arrive."
Dewey, 248.
Re memorandum of 21 November: Senate Document No. 62, 210.
Re the American people ignorant of the cause and nature of the FilipinoAmerican war: Sheridan, 24, 25.
7 The protocols of the treaty conference are in Senate Document No. 62, 12ff. Re U.S. demand for cession:
ibid., 96, 98. Re adjournments: ibid., 109, 110, 128, 129, 151, 196. Re U.S. offer of $20,000,000: ibid., 210.
Re Spaniards' acceptance: ibid., 213. The protocols and annexes end ibid., 271, and the treaty is on pp. 263
271 as well as on pp. 311.
Re Mckinley's orders of 19 May: Messages, XV, 65696573.
Re 26 May instructions to Dewey: Halstead, 324; these came through the navy secretary. Re Merritt on his
orders: Taylor, II, 81. Re navy department 13 August cable to Dewey: the text is in Halstead, 324.
Re Dewey's problem over Filipinos: Dewey, 245. Re Merritt on possible trouble, request for instructions, but
no reply: Senate Document No. 62, 367.
Re Merritt proclamation pursuant to 19 May order: Sheridan, 7275; and Millet, 173175. Portions of the
proclamation repeat the language of the 19 May orders.
Merritt's Gen. Orders. No. 6 appears in ibid., 175176. Re Merritt's request for instructions from Washington:
Halstead, 326. Re restoration of cable: Millet, 186. Re Washington's reply: Messages, XV, 6579.
8 Re Merritt going to Paris with statements: Merritt's testimony and the accompanying statements are in
Senate Document No. 62, 362403.
The Anderson letter and Aguinaldo reply are in ibid., 390. Re Merritt suppressing the correspondence: ibid.,
367. More letters between Anderson and Aguinaldo are in ibid., 390399; and in Taylor, IV, Exh. 739. Re
Merritt view that the Filipinos would fight to the end: Senate Document No. 62, 369. Re Dewey estimate of
number of troops needed: Dewey, 240. Re Merritt estimate: Senate Document No. 62, 370.
Re Greene statements 27 August: ibid., 374; and 30 August: ibid., 424425. Re Bradford statement: ibid.,
477, 486, 487.
Re Whittier and Filipino taking of territory: ibid., 501. On Filipinos' treatment of prisoners: ibid., 500.
International law does not allow taking clergy and civil officials as prisoners of war, and the Filipino leaders
knew this. But the case in Filipinas was special: here the Spanish clergy and civil officials were closely
integrated with the Spanish military. see Taylor, V, Exh. 585, 586.
Re Whittier's "all or nothing" view: Senate Document No. 62, 503. The rest of Whittier's statement, as
submitted to the Senate, is in ibid., 503505. Aguinaldo's own account of the Whittier interview agrees with
the Whittier testimony in important respects. see Taylor, III, Exh. 275.
9 The other statements received by the US treaty panel are in: Senate Document No. 62, 513677.
Re division among the US treaty commissioners: John Foster, American Diplomacy In the Orient (1903),
404. Re composition of U.S. panel and their instructions: ibid., 403.
Re McKinley instructions to negotiate for cession of Luzon, etc.: ibid., 403. Re McKinley's 26 October
instructions: ibid., 404405. Re Mckinley orders that Dewey and Otis inform him on troops needed in the
Philippines: Messages, XV, 6581.
Re McKinley's 21 December proclamation: ibid., 65816582. The responsibility for bringing about the war
falls squarely on McKinley. An extended discussion would involve the broad climate of jingoist and Manifest
Destiny and expansionist fever of the time, as well as persons who are said to have pressed or exercised in
fluence upon McKinley. On the crucial naval expansionism issue, Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of
Sea Power Upon History, 16601783 (1894) is the leading material. On individuals influencing McKinley
see, e.g., Oscar M. Alfonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines, 18971909 (1970). Chap. 2 of this work
identifies key persons of this class, especially Roosevelt and Cabot Lodge. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of
1898 (1936), discusses the general climate. Lawrence H. Battistini, The Rise of American Influence in Asia
and the Pacific (1960), is a history of events. Alfonso, 2526, has Roosevelt writing to Cabot Lodge on 12
June 1898: "You must get Manila and Hawaii; you must prevent any talk of peace until we get Porto Rico
and the Philippines as well as secure the independence of Cuba." This and similar evidence (including the
familiar Roosevelt order to Dewey on 25 February 1898 to prepare for "offensive operations" against the
Spanish naval squadron in Manila Dewey, 179) merely reinforced McKinley's imperialist inclinations, for
which he repeatedly claimed Divine counsel and, even more telling, that he resorted to opportunism, deceit,
and misrepresentation constantly from 1898 onwards.
Re instructions to Otis to avoid conflict: Messages, XV, 6583, 6584.
10 Re deceitful claim that the United States "accepted" cession of the Philippines: ibid., XN, 63916392. Re
equally deceitful statement that the cession was in accordance with the Filipinos' wishes: ibid.
Re the slur about the "sinister ambition" of the Filipino leaders, and the lie about how the war began: ibid.,
6393.
Re McKinley's lie or misinformed statement to Congress that the Filipino resistance against United States
occupation of their country was a "Tagalo rebellion" and that it would be the "truest kindness" to the Filipinos
to defeat Aguinaldo "swiftly and effectively.": ibid., XIV, 63976399.
11 Re McKinley a schoolteacher, etc.: ibid., XN, 6234. Re his tall tale to Protestant clergymen: Homer C.
Stuntz, The Philippines and the Far East (1904), 143144.
Re the Filipino struggle for freedom a Mafia: Philippine Commission, 19001903, I, 33. Taylor says of the
Filipino Republic that it was "a strange government" and, moreover, that the Filipinos "knew it for a Mafia."
Taylor, II, 315. Taylor had his facts wrong. The Mafia was an American criminal society; the Filipinos did
not know of its existence. The 74,094 troops fighting the Filipinos by December 1900 could have been better
employed elsewhere.
Re Dewey's assessment of the Filipinos: Halstead, 314; and Senate Document No. 62, 383. His opinion on the
Paris treaty and purchase: Dewey, 284285.
12 Re Anderson call on Aguinaldo: Taylor II, 61.
Re Millet notes on Filipinos, troops, soldiers' dress, Bacoor drills, supply practices: Millet, 54, 6265, 71. Re
the idea that the Filipinos could be used as Indian scouts: ibid, 61. Millet, 268, writes that from the American
point of view the Filipinos were "almost as far removed from the condition of civilized man as are the
anthropoid apes."
13 Re view that the Filipinos were out to plunder Manila: ibid., 60. Re Merritt's similar view: Sheridan, 81.
Re Agoncillo's refutation of Merritt: ibid., 84. Re Wildman counsel on prisoners: Taylor, IV, Exh. 739. Re
Filipinos' good relations with British: Sheridan, 7071.
Re antiAmerican hostility building up among Filipinos: Millet, 6162.
14 Re Singapore Free Press on the U.S. keeping the Philippines: Senate Document No. 62, 348349.
Re Aguinaldo and "Yankee Deceit": Taylor, III, Exh. 181
15 The Wilcox and Sargent report is reprinted in Historical Bulletin (JanuaryDecember 1969), XIII, 357384.
16 Re Aguinaldo 6 August manifesto to foreign governments: Taylor, III, Exh. 87.
Re Aguinaldo instructions to Agoncillo: ibid., Exh. 89. Re overseas committees: ibid., Exh. 210. Re names of
overseas representatives: 'ibid., Exh. 98. Re Aguinaldo's 26 August instructions to Agoncillo: ibid., Exh. 212.
Re 30 August instructions: ibid., Exh. 217. Agoncillo did not go to the U.S. upon receipt of his first
instructions because he needed written credentials from Aguinaldo to present in Washington. see Taylor, V,
Exh. 514. Re Agoncillo sailing to the U.S. with Greene. Sheridan, 82. Esteban A. de Ocampo, First Filipino
Diplomat (1977), is a biography of Agoncillo.
The Singapore Free Press on the mutual suspicions among the Powers: Senate Document No. 62, 348.
17 Re "Plaza" or military defense area of Manila: Taylor, V. Exh. 572; see also Exh. 584. Re Filipinos
investing suburbs: Taylor, III, Exhs. 100103, 105120, are telegraph messages from Generals Noriel
(Paranaque), Garcia (Caloocan), Ricarte (Pasay), Pio del Pilar (Makati), and other officers, indicating the
tensions of 1213 August 1898. See also Millet, 182.
Re Otis bullying the Filipinos to evacuate, etc., and the evacuation of Paco: Taylor, III, Exhs. 243245, 248
249. See also ibid., V, Exh. 579, 583, 584.
Re Agoncillo's advice not to break the peace during the treaty negotiations in Paris: ibid., Exh. 514. Re advice
by Bray: ibid., Exh. 515, 522.
Re Aguinaldo's error in relying on the Americans, admitted in his 5 January letter: ibid., III, 361.
Re Catholic Church, Vatican, Germany, etc.: ibid., V, Exh. 522.
Re 21 December orders to Otis: Messages, XV, 65816583. Re Otis, the "benevolent assimilation"
proclamation, his editing it: Blount, 164; Taylor, II, 150; Edwin Wildman, Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino
Ambitions (1901), 180181. Re Filipino reaction to Otis version: ibid., 182183.
Re Aguinaldo bitter about the Iloilo expedition: ibid., III, Exh. 361. Re Otis, Iloilo "businessmen," ibid., II,
150. Re the Ilonggos being with the Revolution: ibid.; III, Exhs. 382383; V, Exhs. 1205, 1207. Re Roque
Lopez reply to expedition commander: ibid., 1[, 388. The text of the Otis proclamation (edited) is in
Sheridan, 109113.
The text of Aguinaldo's first proclamation on 5 January is in ibid., 116118. The text of the second is in
Taylor, Ill, Exh. 361; and in Sheridan, 120125. These two texts differ in style in rendering the original
Spanish. Sheridan's version is free, and Taylor's somewhat literal and rigid.
18 Re U.S. forces strength: Taylor, II, 151.
Re McKinley's instructions to avoid conflict: Messages, XV, 6583; and Taylor, II, 381.
Re Blount on Eighth Army Corps sentiment: Blount, 198.
Re the meetings of the joint commission: Taylor, V, 594; see also ibid., II, 163. Re Filipinos' message to
Washington: ibid. Re 29 January nonagreement: ibid., IV, Exh. 739.
Re resolutions in the United States Congress: Kalaw, The Philippine Revolution, 168171; Moorfield Storey
and Marcial P. Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States (1926), 7784; Stuart
Creighton Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation," the American Conquest of the Philippines (1982), 2627. Re
the Bacon resolution: Blount, 175176, and Note, 176. Storey and Lichauco, 8586, has a slightly different
wording of the concluding portion of the resolution.
Re Aguinaldo circular to consuls: ibid., III, Exh. 413. Re circular to editors: ibid., Exh. 417.
19 Re move of Nebraska Regiment to Santa Mesa: ibid., II, 167168. Re Col. San Miguel, commanding, San
Juan del Monte: ibid., 168.
Re Filipino troops crossing lines, Gen. MacArthur, etc.: ibid; Wildman, 194195. Re Otis letter, complaint
about servants: Taylor, II, 158. Re discharge of Filipino workers, lights and Nebraskans' tents: ibid., IV, Exh.
818.
Re Luna, Noriel: ibid., Exh. 819. Re Luna having gone to Pampanga, see also Exh. 815. Re Ricarte and San
Miguel being in Malolos, etc.: ibid., Exhs. 818, 819, 820; see also Exh. 815, and V, Exh. 983.
Re Barcelona diary entries: Simeon Villa and Santiago Barcelona, Aguinaldo's Odyssey, As Told In the
Diaries of Col. Simeon Villa and Dr. Santiago Barcelona, trans. from the Spanish (1963), 105106. A
translation of the Villa diary is in Taylor, V, Exh. 991, as "The Flight and Wanderings of Emilio Aguinaldo,
from His Abandonment of Bayambang Until His Capture in Palanan," trans. J.C. Hixon. Our citations are to
the 1963 edition of the two diaries.
Re cabinet meeting in Malolos, presence of generals, etc.: Sheridan, 154. Re absence of generals: Mabini, II,
314; Aguinaldo, RcseRa, in Taylor, 11, Exh. 2 (p. 22); and in Historical Bulletin (JanuaryDecember 1969).
XIII, 308309.
Re Filipinos taking Sunday off: Taylor, IV, Exh. 983.
20 Re the circus and news of outbreak of war: Sheridan, 155156.
Re aggression by Americans known and admitted in Manila: ibid., 168169, 171. The corroborating quotation
is in Gaston Rouvier and Henri Turot, The War In the Philippines (1985), 46. In this slim volume the
Philippine National Historical Institute combines two separate articles of the two French journalists. The
passage is from Turot's piece, written in March 1900 after his stint in Manila. A slightly different phrasing of
the same passage is in Henri Turot, Aguinaldo et les Philippins (1900), trans. Pacifico A. Castro under the
title Emilio Aguinaldo: First Filipino President, 18981901 (1981), 157158. Turot admired Aguinaldo, the
other Filipino leaders, and their resistance to the American aggression.
Re crucial negotiations by Ilonggos in Malolos: Taylor, V, Exh. 1229. Otis stuck to the lie until the end. In
October 1899 he was still insisting that the Filipinos fired the first shot in the war. see ibid., IV, Exh. 988.
Re Dewey saddened by it all: Dewey, 287.
21 Re first telegram: Taylor, IV, Exh. 818. The Zialcita wire and Grey's message to San Miguel are in ibid., III,
Exh. 501.
Re Grey testimony: ibid., Exh. 818. This long document is the record of the investigation under Gen. Mariano
Trias, commanding the Southern Luzon Region. This command's northern boundary was the Pasig River,
north of it being the Northern Luzon Region (it seems this latter command was never created and the Central
Luzon command was set up instead). Additional material related to the issue is in Exhs. 819 and 820. See
also. Exh. 813, a telegram from the commander of the powder house of San Juan del Monte, to Ricarte. Exh.
817 is about the defeated San Juan forces being in Mariquina, 5 February, Sunday.
Re the first American "kills": Wildman, 195196.
Re the U.S. Senate vote: Mabini, II, 312. Mabini says that the war began with a coup "staged" by McKinley.
See also Blount, 198. The Senate factions, the difficulty of getting the twothirds majority needed, and the
lastminute switches in favor of the treaty by two wavering senators, and a third "pairing" his vote, are
summarized in Cabot Lodge, 230232. On the effect of the outbreak of hostilities on the treaty vote, see:
Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States As A World Power (1912), 155.

The Republic and American Imperialism

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

The Republic and American Imperialism

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

The Roots of the Filipino Nation by Onofre D.

The eyes of all the Great Powers are now directed

We come not to make war upon the people of the

But the United States Asiatic squadron proved to be a probe of

subjugation, if necessary, because he had bought the archipelago, after

Cleveland's party lost in the 1896 presidential elections. The new

In this age of keen rivalry among nations for mastery in

McKinley was reformulating Charles Darwin, who derived his theories

Cabot Lodge's hodge­podge vision was a chauvinistic view of American

Spaniards, to be signed by him and by the French ambassador to

For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with

Williams had repeatedly reported in March about rumors that the

It has been my study [sic] to keep on pleasant terms with

Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the

Wildman was sure he was backing a winner; he was also helping

On 25 July Wildman was behaving beyond his status as consul, giving

Wildman, his career at stake, now resorted to dishonesty. He denied

Williams' and Wildman's conduct toward Aguinaldo was roundly

Aguinaldo also stated that he could and would organize a liberal

received and answered. Avoid unauthorized negotiations with

Pratt, at least, was an honorable man. He was unlike Wildman who

I beg further to state that it was not only on account of the

Aguinaldo interpreted the words and acts of the consuls as at least

The Spanish commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier

This was the view from Washington. There was an alliance but it was

The Spaniards were shattered by this demand; they asked for

Military occupation of course meant military government and

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's

On 26 May Dewey received instructions from Washington “not to have

General Merritt arrived in Cavite on 25 July. He avoided any

My instructions from the President fully contemplated the

The President desires to receive from you any important

On 14 August, after the pusillanimous surrender of Manila by the

It repeated McKinley's dishonest words to the Filipinos that the

McKinley's treachery could not be implemented for some time. Merritt

The President directs that there must be no joint occupation

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo

Greene was either deceiving or humoring McKinley with his “Tagalo

Another lengthy and interesting paper was prepared by Cmdr. R.B.

Q. From your point of view as a naval expert, what is the

Bradford was expressing an 1898 version of United States military

I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the

Whittier was asked whether the Revolution had been of material

Whittier's primary testimony related to the options the United States

This was somewhat similar to Greene's 27 August statement. Whittier

I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands.

On 25 October the chairman informed McKinley by cable about the

Anyway, McKinley cabled to Paris on 26 October in answer to Day's

actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the

This 21 December proclamation is sometimes called the “benevolent

The aggressions of the Filipinos continually increased until

Everything indicates that with the speedy suppression of the

Tagalo rebellion life in the archipelago will soon resume in its

Before you go I would like to say just a word about the

He had decided to make war on the Filipinos on 19 May 1898. His

McKinley cannot have been expected to have read the literature of the

At the time the delegates to the Peace Conference scarcely

Aguinaldo was paid a call by General Anderson and Dewey upon

There was more evidence of military ceremony in Bacoor, seat of the

The troops certainly made an excellent appearance. Many of

The Americans often had an unconcealed cavalierly disregard for the

We purposely gave the insurgents no notice of the attack on

Cabot Lodge's hodgepodge vision was a chauvinistic view of American

This report on conditions in the nonTagalog areas of Luzon negates