abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court

G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998.*

must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
considered on its merits.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
Same; Same; Meaning of Abandonment.—In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon”
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute in force
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.—
the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to
As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987,
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the
the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
No. 91.
parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has
remained a requisite for its validity.—It is thus evident that notwithstanding the
Same; Same; Same; Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.—In the instant case, records disclose that
remained a requisite for its validity.
petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
Same; Same; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the
other laws.”—During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by
whims.
the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: “Art. 188. The
written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be
Same; Same; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.—In a
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted
number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
latter’s spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.”
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to
(Italics supplied)
his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother.
Same; Same; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent
has abandoned the child.—As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the
Same; Same; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant
written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
chosen is unfit.”—The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.”
decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the
the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: “.
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient
. . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality
designated by the court.” In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant
with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.”
Same; Same; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction.—The
Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental authority and
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the
responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
minor children.
to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
Same; Same; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront.—In cases where the father
definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
 Same; Divorce; A divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil
Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy.—As regards the
divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v. Escañothat a
divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized
in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American
citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce
has no legal effect.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority
to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record.—As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final
and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast
the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. However, although this Court
is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the
lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court
has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rosello & Fernandez Law Office for petitioner.
De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapiofor private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query,
certainly not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law
and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter
of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all
surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimonypendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Cebu 4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They
further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the
complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot
jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with
any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the
husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent as
the parties are by this agreement legally separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce
decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving
"rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his
children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging
that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers
and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family
business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over
the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract
without the written consent of her husband;
 2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States
and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by
Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while
his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to
the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioner-spouses
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved.
These children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano,
Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this
Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though they
were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed "close filial ties with the Clavano
family, especially their maternal uncle," petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press,
real estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed "Menchu," approved
of the adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the
fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they
would go to church together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos
— Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while
the two younger ones were observed by the court to have "snuggled" close to Ronald
even though their natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on "a very
shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his children" on account of his
being "an improvident father of his family" and an "undisguised Lothario." This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons
and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived
as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of "comparatively recent dates"
were "attempts at verisimilitude" as these were joint deposits the authenticity of
which could not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna
Marie was "dim if not nil" because it was petitioner who "devised, engineered and
executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is now an alien from the
standpoint of Philippine laws" and therefore, how his "new attachments and
loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a
ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514
P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not
only without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag,
141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82
Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert,
170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E.
349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep.
564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) 9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption
was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not
have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption
did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be
adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is
not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question
therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the children. In
adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental
duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or
the withholding of the parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary
affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in fact
even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes from two
judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the
children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A.
Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor
has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has
submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children's names totalling
$2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide
support commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987,
oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other
remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally
in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really
been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
———— —————— ———— ——————
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Virginia, U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name as trustee for Charmaine
Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the
amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors.
The second is an "or" account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a
minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the funds
withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence "the aim
and purpose of providing for a better future and security of his family." 10
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That
he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by
the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife
initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay
claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that
he "is still a father to his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another
woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant
adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the
Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos
who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco
should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for
adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to her
residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly,
petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love
the children much more than he could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court,
alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose care the child may
be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Emphasis supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
 (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling
and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services and
Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-
placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25,
1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive
Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family
Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family
Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting
parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if
living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not
incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living
parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child,
or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or
by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court
treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption
proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts
relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested,
than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption
statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the
natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given
her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex "A".
Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2
of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left
his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox
copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which
our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. 17 This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it
has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that
these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the
control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume
or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents
owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C.
Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been "a long time
since the last time you've heard from me excluding that of the phone conversation we've had."
She discussed petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over
risks that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the "last phone conversation"
she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice
had changed; he had become a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent him
Valentine's cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative "almost dalaga"
who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress
when she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it.
She informed him, however, that she was worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to
extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the
boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton
was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted
having said so much about the children-because they might not have informed petitioner of
"some happenings and spices of life" about themselves. She said that it was "just very exciting to
know how they've grown up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different
characters." She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at the best of health." After
extending her regards "to all," she signed her name after the word "Love." This letter was mailed
on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West
Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of "a note from
Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2,
1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when petitioner "called up last time." She told
him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted
to order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioner's call
because she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap
sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs.
She told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about the children's needs because those were expensive
here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and
that whatever expenses he would incur, she would "replace" these. As a postscript, she told
petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be thought of at X'mas. Thanks
again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to
"Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother "to stay for a little while,
just a few weeks after classes start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be
in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it
and "we'll see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt
and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told
petitioner that they had been going to Labug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go for
them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the
best of health" and that they prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was ended with
"Love Keith."
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the Christmas card
"with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner
the amounts following his father's instructions and promise to send money through the mail. He
asked his father to address his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters.
He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season — that they enjoyed eating,
playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule and that
their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their blankets and pile
up their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine,
who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother was leaving for
the United States on February 5, they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner.
He asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he
would make the sign of the cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and
his insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For
Keith, Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was not always satisfied with her dolls and
things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your son, Keith." The
letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key
chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of her
birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size
10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start
on January 9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again
because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not been remiss
in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila — they went to Malacañang,
Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three
days and Baguio for one week. He informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he
was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his "reward" from petitioner and so
with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told
petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner
and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter. She asked
for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and "something else." She, promised
not to spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton
said "hi!" to petitioner. After ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for
her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing him; that he
would like to have some money but he would save them; that he learned that petitioner had
called them up but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but would be back home
May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the "official
altar boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that he was
saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only one in his group who saved
in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts
sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and
asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he was a member of
the basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call them often
like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they could wait for
it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner would
be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to write because he did not want to commit
any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner,
added that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated October 8, 1984 from Keith,
Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the year '83 written on the
upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when their Mom
"was there" where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00.
Because his mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that
would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with
friends but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence. Keith wanted
a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner would come
and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January 1986. Keith
told his father that they had received the package that the latter sent them. The clothes he sent,
however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith
asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled
shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make her look sexy. He
intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already ashamed to be asking
for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts
for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to
the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts
below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that,
as regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the
courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but
totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his
feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to
conclude that Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for
adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to
their presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of
snuggling close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children,
could not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and
private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to
his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to
her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
 This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother
and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered
by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the
opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with
pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to
make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the
relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the
child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for
him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and
spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day
they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not
so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever
treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare and
best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father,
the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a, result of her
character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the
best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her
small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to
suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering
is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and
other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over
his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly
affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner
maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children
needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person
they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager"
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned
his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to
their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare
of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to
consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally
hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of
convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been
out of the country for two years and came home twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting
the fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad
enough that their father left their children when he went abroad, but when their mother
followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family must have
realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the children, they
decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However,
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private
respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife,
private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. 34 Moreover, private
respondent Ronald claimed that he could "take care of the children while their parents are
away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the
children's surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the
United States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were different
from his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the children the stigma of
being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just
wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for
the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of an almost
fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her
health condition was not that serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An
eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could not have been employed if her health
were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of
parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate
womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would "never be at ease
with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father
to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point.
Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being
Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man,
considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the
Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and
parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a
paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show
that a "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. 42 Petitioner has
demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a
telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately
after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United
States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
to refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how "meager."
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. 52 (Emphasis
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted supplied)
child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall
benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived
perspective. The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to
separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of
approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but
the agreement of the spouses.
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47

While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a

In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the
such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that
basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents' counsel, 48 the
there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the
authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal
legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children
separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the
from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority
Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to
given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal
the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt
properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the children.
charge against them. 54
Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents' apparent reliance on the
decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's consent to the adoption.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in
legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts
by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant
below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
chosen is unfit."

As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the "exercise"
Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is
of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the
not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen,
the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make
the divorce has no legal effect.
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50

Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established

In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving
of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion
that:
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose
of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental
children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties;
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it
no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
 each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of
unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well being of the child. must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.

Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and
care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family
Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on
Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of
Filipino children. 59
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they
shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not
to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best
interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for
adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them.

The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998": questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the
full and harmonious development of his/her personality. 60
SO ORDERED.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth
in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61

(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s). 62

Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates.
Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions:

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention. 63

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a
regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests. 64

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct
contacts with both parents . . . 65

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child. 66

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary
 woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999.*
marriage. Given the undisputed, even accepted, fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased
together as husband and wife, we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in
Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER
this case.
OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
“Balalong,– respondents.
Trial Courts; Finality of Findings of Fact; As a rule, factual findings of the trial court
are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts except when it failed to notice
Evidence; Best and Secondary Evidence; Authentication and Proof of Evidence; Public
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.–As a
and Private Documents; If the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its
appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
contents may be proved by a copy or recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
recollection of witnesses.–“It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente,
or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some
records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court “failed to notice certain
authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.– Upon a showing that the document
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.– Hence, the
was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror,
present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed
secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
in petitions under Rule 45.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of a document may be proven by the parties
Same; Same; Adoption; The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of
person claiming such relationship.–The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the
thereof.– Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The
Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in
the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who Benito P. Fabie and Nelson P. Paraiso for petitioner.
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument Coronado, Osorio & Associates for private respondent.
[has] indeed [been] lost.–
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and
documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.–In the present case, due The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document
execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other
was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as than the marriage contract.
well as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were The Case
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificates; Failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24,
for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.–Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces 1998, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
finds it quite “bizarre– for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their
marriage. On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to
send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. In WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being
the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision
the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer. dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in
toto.2
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage
is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.–This jurisprudential
attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein
Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract" excluded
under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and
non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier
issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the
various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued
by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition
for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in
Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the
legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased
Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased
Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo
was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original,
Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract
issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and
Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;
3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the
loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he
allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who
allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he
was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered
in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of
Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since
he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.
 A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document
Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and
compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant
fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented
the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner
Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of
unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the
standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed
genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty.
Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and
authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his
claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis
in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of
the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as
by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by
secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent
loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due
execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the
marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid
examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge
Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an
unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such
expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of
the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on
account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of
this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus,
upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below
which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that
would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and
documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court. 6
The Issues
In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. 7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not
been sufficiently established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may
be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent
Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab
initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. 9 We cannot
sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the
parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11Clearly then,
the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned
marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may
be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may
be adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded
the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded
the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as
the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been
recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the
marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar
general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages;
and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage.
In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It
is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself
is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is
actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital
of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even
by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. 18 The Court
has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial
and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were
certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to
agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must
emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent
and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to
the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may
be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated
this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage
contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975
in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census
and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three
years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong
premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s
duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell
upon the solemnizing officer.29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis
supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage
was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The
appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for
"the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the
trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The
rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O.
Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the
Court examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions
of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the
questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert
witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court
relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition
was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature
on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof: 39
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A: I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its
context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.40
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he
was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during
the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued
this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I can’t
make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not
his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the
request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. 42 Indeed, we find no
reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge
Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
 Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this
document?

A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my
findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in
the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the
capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought
without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent
Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he
did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that
the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the
questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no
indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was
presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged
adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the
claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it
G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996.*
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his
offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for
Adoption; Evidence; Factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed
adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter
by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive
relief at law.—The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
upon the Supreme Court.—It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together
the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded
cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance
high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingly, we fully uphold
for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally
the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
adoption.
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Same; Names; While the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter
Actions; Joinder of Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; By a joinder
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption, the given or proper name,
of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
registered in the civil register.—Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
declaration.—By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of
the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order
action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
also known as the first or Christianname, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon
the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Joinder of Causes of Action.—While joinder of
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption,
following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
Same; Same; Change of Name; Civil Register; The name of the adoptee as recorded in
Same; Same; Same; While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims
the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.—The name of the adoptee as recorded in the
common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.—The statutory intent behind the provisions on
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court
joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil
to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a
register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized
standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is
name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the
some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many
object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its
separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem
decree recording such change.
presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
Same; Same; Same; Actions; If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be
authorized.
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a
special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.—The official
Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Change of Name; Petitions for adoption and change of
name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
name have no relation to each other, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less
therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
do they present any common question of fact or law—in short, they do not rightly meet the
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules.—
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition
or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that
there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition for change of name is an independent and
character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly
discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules—a fortiori, it
would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding.—A petition for change of name being a
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and
 Same; Same; Same; The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related
and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and
comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding.—It furthermore cannot be
said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all
matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change the name of the adoptee
in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and
substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of
avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of
action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and
dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having
just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Same; Same; Same; Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations
wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that
the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the Rules.—The situation presented in this case does not
warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general,
and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by
respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the
same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Same; Same; Same; Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice—it cannot be
overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice.—Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities
that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the
correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a
judge whose authority they acknowledge. It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules
have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or
whimsicality.
Same; Same; Same; The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the
adjudication of cases are matters of public policy which can in no wise be changed or
regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular
convenience.—The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or
failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of
the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it
necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The
rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of
public policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed
or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular
convenience.
Names; A person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and
identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him—it is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.—It is necessary to reiterate in this
discussion that a person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and
identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the
given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Civil Register; The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register.—By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his
name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil
register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.
Same; Same; Actions; Change of Name; The only way that the name of a person can be
changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the
civil register.—By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For
purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and
correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or
official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of
name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and
failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Grounds Warranting a Change of Name.—Jurisprudence
has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of
name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the
change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptism; A name given to a person in the church records or
elsewhere or by which he is known in the community—when at variance with that entered in
the civil register—is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.—Contrarily, a
petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name,
under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of
baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to
a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name
and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a
change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he
is known in the community—when at variance with that entered in the civil register—is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Parent and Child; While the right of a natural parent
to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right
of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption,
even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably con-sidered.—While the right of a natural parent to name
the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an
adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even
for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the
adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend
to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the
Court.
PETITION for certiorari to review a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br.
158.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
The Law Firm of Pascual Gesmundo and Lim for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure
questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated
September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the
petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer
therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van
Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition 2 to adopt the minor
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule
99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive
parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the
change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name
with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been
called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
private respondents' residence. 3
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3,
1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and
purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van
Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon
as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule
103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the
adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born.
Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its
appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. 5
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner
regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of
the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The records show that the latter have
commendably established their qualifications under the law to be adopters, 6 and have
amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the
findings of the trial court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994
setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994
issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and
submarkings). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. "K"
to "V"); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W").
Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social
Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals.
They are found physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to
adopt Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share
their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously
provide him a happy and secure home life.
"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons.
He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the Munsons during
the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs.
Munson and vice-versa.
"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran
aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when
sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are
binding and conclusive upon this Court. 9 Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that
portion of the order of the court below granting the petition, for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows. (1)
whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2)
whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in
a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related
to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be
entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or
proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to
193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles
364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name,
must correspondingly be complied with. 10
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on
adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. 11 Petitioner
further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a
matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the
adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. 12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of
discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in
the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate
but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive
joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties,
have been met. 13
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in
view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its
citizens and in the orderly administration of justice. 14Private respondents argue otherwise
and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of
the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding. 15
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph
should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of
name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any
third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said
rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has
not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor
petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking
said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may
be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any
possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be
published together with the petition for adoption. 16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be
vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the
adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the
same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the
given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in
one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of
the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
application is made should normally make its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency
of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf
and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of
name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be
made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor
appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the
petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar
as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which taken together cannot but lead
to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of
name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to
employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding
petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and
liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.
Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et
al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and
jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting
of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one
cause of action in a declaration. 23 It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of
which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or
petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join
in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where
allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision,
even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under
applicable joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are
intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of
justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve
these ends, they are liberally construed. 26
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5,
Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned
upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same
parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete
determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one
subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision
should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the
rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be
adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, 27with the end
in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice. 28
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage
joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs,
although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or
in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of
causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. 29 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may
have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the
correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual
unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that
there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly
would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by
particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition
for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and
qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665).
On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected
for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for
neither action is dependent on the other. 33
The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the
actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-
10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not
related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what
is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to adopt,
a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling
grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the
sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot
 be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no
way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be
improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private
respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and
relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets
to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent
to an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the
commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present
action for adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the
case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared
feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the
matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional
parties-defendants for a complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763,
770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally
accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met. 34
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a
complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and
change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was
grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of
the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and
also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and
comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions
whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are
best taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of
causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive
provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of
action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still
that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action although they may
be included in one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option
whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference
may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on
the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the
policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as
proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of
the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at
times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct
observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
dispensation. 36 It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business. 37
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will
to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to
provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and
at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge. 38
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in
the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules
in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and
reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that: 40
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often
been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the
concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute
between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due
process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a
rule of court.
. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of
the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid
application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities
deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are empowered,
even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. 41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by
following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they
seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of
the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such
urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State
that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its
natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious
maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to
comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the
questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary
to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and
procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public
policy. 42They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or
regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular
convenience. 43
In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules
and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:
. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or
misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of
the proper remedy.
Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of
procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change
of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but
unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and
jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of
name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced
for the change of name was the fact of the adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph
and by which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents. 45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of
adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and
designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal
rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim,
merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child
Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have
as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. 46
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in
this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose
than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all
intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by
petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the
minor at birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent
judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination
of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It
is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name
of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name.
The giver or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child
is entitled is fixed by law. 48
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The
official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes
of the law. 49 And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article
376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the
interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. 50
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 51 For purposes of an
application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the
requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure
therein renders the proceedings a nullity. 52
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully
the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are
shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official
name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must
show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such
change. 53
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 54
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by
another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied
inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a
condition sine qua non to a change of name. 56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has
been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which be is known in the community - when at variance with that
entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long
accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name
prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with
the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been
called and known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to live with
private respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties
for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or
established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause
have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil
register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. 60
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that -
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first
name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled
that is fixed by law. . . .
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose
than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the
intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by
petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the
minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo
Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In
the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he
acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to
change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He
adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation
from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a
Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and
social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought.
This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident
in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the
legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a
petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds
therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and
through the legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for
the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a
first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and
changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents
have the right to freely select and give the child's first name for every person, including
juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar,
private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor
adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent.
Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes by
private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as
a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights
and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, 62 should be understood in its proper
context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given
name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the
civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and
even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name.
This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save
when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may
merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and
protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted
child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered.
To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow
that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.
Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without
prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the proper or given name of
their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for
change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all
jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially
known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in
accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B.
CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
Adoption; Actions; Jurisdiction; The court acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
adoption even if the given name of the child to be adopted was published as “Michael”
instead of “Midael,” which is the name appearing in the birth certificate—changing the name
of the child from “Midael” to “Michael” cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both
names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone.—The present case is
different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted.
In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter
“d,” so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read “Michael.” Even the
Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the
child from “Midael C. Mazon” to “Michael C. Mazon” cannot possibly cause any confusion,
because both names “can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone
(tono, tunog, himig).” The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that
those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose
has been served by publication of notice in this case.
Same; Change of Name; Rule 108, Rules of Court; It is error to grant a prayer for
correction of the given name of the child in a petition for adoption if there was no compliance
with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court—the decision, insofar as it orders the correction of name,
is void and without force or effect.—With regard to the second assignment of error in the
petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private
respondents’ prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary
to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and
because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.
Same; Same; Same; Art. 412, Civil Code; Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of the
Supreme Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code covers “those harmless and innocuous
changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled.”—The trial court was clearly
in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the
civil status of persons. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of
the Civil Code—to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of Court of 1964—
covers “those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled.”
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Civil Registrar; The local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.—The local
civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing
of the complaint including the judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; A notice made pursuant to a petition
for adoption, where only the prayer for adoption is stated and no mention is made of the
prayer for correction of name in the civil registry deprives the civil registrar of notice and of
the opportunity to be heard.—While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was
notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only
the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the
correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar
was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Encarnacion, De Guzman & Associates Law Office for private respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite City, granting private respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon
with prayer for the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael."
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon
stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment
be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first
name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by service of
the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the
Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of
the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition
was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto,
Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also presented was
Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who
endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best
interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the
Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons. It cited Rule 108, §1, which provides that any person
interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil
registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to
cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the
same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the
petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and declaring that:
1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by and option of petitioners
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minor's name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original name of Michael
Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is hereby directed to
accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate of said minor; and
4. This judgment shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of the herein petition.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, 2 invoked by the petitioner in
support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was
inapplicable because that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that
to require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name would entail
"additional time and expenses for them as well as for the Government and the Courts."
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to comment. Despite
opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents' petition for adoption. Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication did not
state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v.
Republic.3 There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave
the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of
birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a "substantial defect in the petition
and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was a question of identity involved in that
case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as
common experience would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child
sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the
letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read
"Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot
possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the publication
requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make
their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the
minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court,
correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction
of the name of the child in the civil registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the
correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, §2 plainly states:
§2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule 108
was inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes,
such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."4 Thus, in Yu v. Republic5 it was held
that "to change "Sincio" to "Sencio" which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel
"i" in the first name into the vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error."
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic6 it was held that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a
summary proceeding is appropriate."
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides:
§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 7 As he
was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the
trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of
an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the
filing of the complaint including the judgment.8
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, §4
which reads:
§4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for
adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of
the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in
the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice
and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render
the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and
void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter. 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the local civil registrar
to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In other
respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175080. November 24, 2010.*
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES,
ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F.
MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; In a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law
may be raised.—In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between
him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.
Absent any of the obtaining exceptions to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial
Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court.
Tenancy Relations; Agrarian Reform Law; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines; Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Expiration of Period.—Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo
is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy
relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold
contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides: x x x Moreover,
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise
provides: SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc.—The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Civil Law; Filiation; Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.—It is settled law that
filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his
book “Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He
explained thus: The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article 335) which provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his
heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in
any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171
of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.”
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in
the present articles.
Same; Adoption; Adoption cannot be made subject to a collateral attack.—The same
rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack.
In Reyes v. Sotero, 482 SCRA 520 (2006), this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate. Furthermore,
in Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754 (1970), the Court declared that the legality of the adoption
by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and
cannot be subject to collateral attack.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra for petitioners.
Valeriano B. Mariano for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 August 2006 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July 1998 and Resolution dated 28
September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo,
Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square
meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said
title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and
Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by
virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by
respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and
between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their
peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio
(Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-
in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had
been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through
fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from
the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in
Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada
was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that
Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and
other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from
the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan
and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between
Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.3
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He
clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere
tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she
was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00
from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned
the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the
annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio
also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. 4
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial Adjudicator5 concluded that
Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be
maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Librada
Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff Librada Mauricio
over the subject landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.6
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB, namely: (1) Whether
or not there is tenancy relation between the parties; and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan
dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are
former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia,
Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the
agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB
banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by
Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial
Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.7
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on 28
September 2004.8
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution regarding the status of
Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died during the pendency
of the case.9 On 10 August 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution
of the DARAB. It sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy
relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan. 10
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no tenancy
relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that the Kasunduang Buwisan
sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the
right to occupy and cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having
been entered into without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio further asserts that per
records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered
into by Godofredo and Eugenio with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes
error on the part of the Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed
between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being agricultural. Finally,
Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into between him and Librada
wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered
into and the contents thereof were mutually understood by the parties. 11
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for failure to show
that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its challenged decision and
resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as factual. However, upon filing of a
motion for reconsideration by Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required
respondent Leonida to comment on the petition.12
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the jurisdiction of
this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of facts. 13
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be
raised.14 Absent any of the obtaining exceptions15 to this rule, the findings of facts of the
Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and the
Mauricio’s came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that the Mauricios
are former tenants of the parents of the herein Defendant-Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit
"H" which is the Tax Declaration of the property in controversy proves that upon the death
of the parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra-
judicial partition/settlement and this property was initially under the ownership of the
appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the same property was finally
acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm
the fact that the Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed
the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and to
prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of Respondent-Appeallant
Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The "Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy
relationship began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until
further revised.16
This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of tenancy. Petitioners
swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since 1936 until his
death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and
executed by Godofredo and Susana which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject
land. On the other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another
Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28 September 1994 which effectively
terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate the subject
premises in exchange of monetary considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its disquisition, the
DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
x x x Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the transcript of the
testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board is convinced that indeed the
purpose of the document was to eject her from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio
wanted to return the money she received because the contents of the document was never
explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board is even further
convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies that while the document was
allegedly signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized
in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less
ascertain the veracity of the contents of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to whether or not It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr.
Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This Board Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
further adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation of the testimony Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil
of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
case at bar, had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada
Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances relevant to the execution of the alleged
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
"Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in all contractual,
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
moral dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void."
case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read nor
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.17
view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. 21
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, we defer
to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,22 the Court stated
Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their
that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
demeanor on the witness stand.
proper party, and not through collateral attack.23

Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral
remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be
attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed
extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale,
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate. 25 Furthermore, in
alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act
Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can
No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to
collateral attack.27
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the
voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the
the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close
case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.
of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties,
and the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In
the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on certiorari
former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied) No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) SO ORDERED.
likewise provides:

SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. —
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee
thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)

As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by

Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death
of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.18

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot
collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.19

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.—For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s
name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives
and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper
name and the surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by the parents
for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an
individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper nameand (2) the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of making
a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child; The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed
in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social
and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”
secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother.—Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is
a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the
interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the
New Civil Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.” This
provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence
of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent,
and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted;
that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and
custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal
heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every
Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is
a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted
child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting
Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship
or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be
before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also,
as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married
woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance
with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is
that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and
permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall
be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating
the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed
by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989,
when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales
in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in

the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

SO ORDERED.
 adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.*
biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not unmindful of
petitioner.
the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children,
regrettably, the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It is undisputed
against judicial legislation.—We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being
that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She
humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family,
sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May
as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v.
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
Vergara (270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is
be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The
clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions
law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the
for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
adoption. Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
from each other.
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to
suit petitioner.
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A foreigner
adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for dissolution
Republic Act No. 8552, and the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
of the marriage between the spouses is of no moment—it is not equivalent to a decree of
qualification to adopt cannot be waived.—The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
dissolution of marriage; Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
was married, joint adoption with the husband is mandatory.—Petitioner, in her
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could nolonger
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country
be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living
Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he
of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since,
proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoption is mandatory.
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Br. 22.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Teodoro P. Sales for petitioner.

Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still CARPIO, J.:

considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child.—
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) The Case
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: Jude P. Lim.
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents
were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager
to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle)
and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to
the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in
the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner
did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not
only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of
the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since,
at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they
have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That
the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
 (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was
correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he
must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are
the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over
the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE VEFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for
all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known;
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner
that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide
homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in
a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September

2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10196. September 9, 2014.*
MELODY R. NERY, complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, respondent.
Attorney-Client Relationship; Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.—
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to
the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly states: CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. CANON 16 – A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x. CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Civil Law; Adoption; The alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.—Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt is waived.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.—Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case
overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to
deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the
legal profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal
fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June 2008, she
engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by
an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid
₱200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a
blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter,
Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in installment: (a) ₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b)
₱50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) ₱40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer
asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed
the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that
they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the
hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why
she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no
longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the
hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of
the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the
court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the
reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be
deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were
left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner
Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear
during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position
papers.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,5 Sampana argued that
Nery’s allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted
receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and
adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of
the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being
adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close
relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then,
required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification).
Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged
that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for
the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption
case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of
malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report and recommendation, as follows:
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. 11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of
the status of the petition.1âwphi1He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed
the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He
even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s
funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession. 12

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of
malpractice by his failure to file a petition for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the
petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the dutyof fidelity to the client’s cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. 9 A lawyer also owes it
to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client thatmay come into his
possession.
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana,13 we
already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land.
We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and
warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after
receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious consequence of
disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty
for Sampana’s malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for
THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant
Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00), with 12%
interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17 November
2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. SO ORDERED.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client.
Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the
alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
 G.R. No. 188801. October 15, 2014.*
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
CASTRO, a.k.a. “MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO” and “JAYROSE M. CASTRO,”
petitioners, vs.JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA
GREGORIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; The remedy of annulment
of judgment will only be available if “the ordinary remedies of new trial, ul judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only
be available if “the ordinary remedappeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”—Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.”
Same; Same; Same; Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be
brought four (4) years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before
it is barred by estoppel or laches.—Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there
are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud,
which must be brought four (4) years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be
brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches. Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction
over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is “[that which] prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.”
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
Civil Law; Adoption; The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a
child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children.—It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for
adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings.
The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. Under
Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of
his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption; The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where
a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.—As a general rule, the
husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In
Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the word
“shall” in the above quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions to the
general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
Same; Civil Procedure; Adoption; Service of Summons; Personal Service of Summons;
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.—For the adoption to
be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that
their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in
this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud;
Prescription; An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four
(4) years from discovery.—In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece, 660 SCRA 323
(2011): Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from
fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat. (Emphasis supplied) An action for annulment based on extrinsic
fraud must be brought within four years from discovery. Petitioners alleged that they were
made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is
within the period allowed by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether
the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during
the trial.—When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any
other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the
trial. Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s
acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
Civil Law; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1993 (R.A. No. 8552); Republic Act
(RA) No. 8552 fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption
is found to have been obtained fraudulently.—The law itself provides for penal sanctions for
those who violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:
ARTICLE VII VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.—(a) The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts: (i) obtaining consent for an adoption
through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts; (ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or (iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation. (b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child
under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of
simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prisión mayor in its medium period and a fine
not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied) Unfortunately, Jose’s
death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No.
8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is
found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section
19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the
adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death
annulment of the judgment. in July 1995.17
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o
Raro, Trinidad & Cudia for petitioners.
Victor Dayrit Rodriguez for respondents. opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government which
LEONEN, J.:
was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of
on February 9, 2006.
notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a
and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of
complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 21 In her
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged
CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial
children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.23She also
court that granted respondents' decree of adoption. 3
alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were
his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd)
relationship with Larry.24
and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the
estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his
Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M.
fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it
Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
was often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his
illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their
Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He
marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963,
alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties had to be sold to
but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly
pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. 4
weigh on the case with "justice and equity."27
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28
later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in
Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite
October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29
their separation(.)"
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of
2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh.
Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed
children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his
different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave
erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.
birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another
set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial
alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's
court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
former Governor Mauricio Castro.
the time of their birth.34
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report mentioned that
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children.13 It also
stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. 14 Under "Motivation for
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the
Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:
spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the hearing." 35

The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his
an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of
dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will
his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that
fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
had already attained "finality and immutability."37
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the
different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons
stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment.
The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment. 38
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009, 39 they
filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for
annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and
(2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law
on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment.40 They argue that because of the
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth
certificates presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on
jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not
only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such
consent was never secured from Joanne.
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been
deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by the participation
and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public prosecutor."
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to
them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the
alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but
intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that
petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as
such, the only indispensable party is the state.
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed
of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought,
to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy,
being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the
final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds
for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability
of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision
or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which
annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years
from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by
estoppel or laches.
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action
or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case
to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured."
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption,
as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August
1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on
adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of
wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the
requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained,
Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In
Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee,
if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have
to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over
10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been
committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is
erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from
court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of
the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The
filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the parties.
Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of
Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. 64 Rosario
and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due course
to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of
Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing
lawyer in Laoag City.
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure birth certificates
for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured:
one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, 71 and
another wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all. 72 The birth
certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their
father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth
certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for
adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless,74 to the prejudice of their
daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and
alleged to be fraudulent.
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his
petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or
opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the
basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies"76 presented during the
trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other
party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such
instrument or testimony was presented in court, thus:
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the
case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been
litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not
deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many
means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of
discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use
at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud. 77 (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud
was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's
acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article
VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the
following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material
inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a
person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal
liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of
adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 79 since rescission of
adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other
remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe
that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a father, her
parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited from any
monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a
medical degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now
working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if
the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 192531. November 12, 2014.*
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Appeals; Generally, findings of fact by administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under
their jurisdiction.—Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by
the petitioner — Cornelio’s death certificate. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it
appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3)
years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it
was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away.
Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations must always be in harmony
with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always
be resolved in favor of the basic law.—This Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously declared,
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in
order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend
or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied) Guided by this
doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is
patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the
Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate
parents.”
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.—The term “parents” in the phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted
Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and
cannot be unduly limited to “legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase
“dependent parents” should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; As jurisprudence elucidates, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—As jurisprudence elucidates,
equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. The concept of equal protection, however,
does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class. “Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.”
Legitimate Parents; Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate
parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under
the Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).—Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it
say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the
employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate
parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in 1985,
adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of
the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is
a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
Civil Law; Adoption; Succession; Biological Parents; It is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption.—It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights
of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from
the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation,
so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority,
in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot
leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a better life under the
care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority over the adopted child.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Michael D. Domingo for petitioner.
Mary G. Miranda for respondent SSS.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 3 Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
which led to his untimely death the following day.4
ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
The Issues
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
documents you submitted to us.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11

SO ORDERED.6
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but
legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no
longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his
The Court's Ruling
sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio
Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial
Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained The petition is meritorious.
finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s
primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away.
As the ECC ratiocinated:
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death
benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr.
Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits.
secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit." deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law,
in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of
the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect,
deceased.
if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner –
shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October
26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985,
which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not
duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits
claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve
rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes
arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe
time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that
he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally,
that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated
and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer
the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the
ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively
divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a
secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from
the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative
legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not
contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to
"legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court
in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore
with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope,
inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does
not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and
cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase
"dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to
limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being
repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent
parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not
"legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted
undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents –
legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in
contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits
the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness
since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the
rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On
the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of
work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate
ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC
extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as
insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents"
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP.
Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition,
assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted
Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly
equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary
beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the
ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of
the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is
a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, 21 who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of
custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted
after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall
govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition.
Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We
invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or
is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in
his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than
the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able
to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following
rules:
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur
withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants
and the other half, by the adopters;
that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John
can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in
the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died
in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a
bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s
adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly
reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this
veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of
Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the
SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed
that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his
benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does
not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the
designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626,
John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances
– from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental
authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to
designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to
death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s
intestate succession shall apply.
adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides: benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
Bartolome.
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to No costs.
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue
of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise SO ORDERED.
of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold