Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49187 December 18, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellant.

Gonzales and Fernandez for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FERIA, J.:

The petitioner in this case was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of the
crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from 5 years 4 months and 21
days of presidio correccional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court. The petitioner filed on June 14, 1944, a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, and the petition was denied on July 5, 1944. A motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner on July 17, 1944, and also
denied.

From the records it appears that a copy of a resolution of this Court denying the motion for
reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner's attorney at his address 307 Palma, Quiapo,
Manila, on July 17, 1944. But the attorney for the petitioner alleges now, in his petition, that
he did not receive the notice because then "he was already hiding in the mountains of
Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings guerrilla," and "prays this Court that the reading
of the sentence of the accused be suspended and that said accused be permitted or allow to
file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the
protection of the rights of the accused." And the petition is based on the resolution of this
Court of October 1, 1945, which suspends, until further notice, section 8 of Rule 53, and
provides that judgment shall be entered, not upon the expiration of the fifteen days after the
promulgation thereof, but upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice of such judgment to
the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.

It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedures of
the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the
resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases
pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the
present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective.
In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17,
1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the
expiration of the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of the order or judgment
deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (section 1, Rule
54); for said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1,
1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or
motion in the present case.

As to the suspension of the reading of the sentence of the Court of Appeals affirming that the
Court of First Instance, prayed for in the petition, we have noted that, after receiving the
record of the case remanded by the clerk of the appellate court for the execution of the
latter's decision in accordance with section 9, Rule 53, made applicable to criminal cases by
section 17 of Rule 120, it is generally the practice followed by the clerks of Court of First
Instance to require the accused to appear, or his bondsmen to produce the body of the
defendant to the court, for the reading of the sentence. Such a practice is not in accordance
with law. The judgment or sentence which, according to section 6, Rule 116, must be
promulgated in the presence of the defendant, is the sentence rendered by the Court of First
Instance after the trial of the case by this court; and a right of a defendant to be present at
the promulgation of the judgment granted by section 1, Rule 111, refers also to said
sentence or judgment of the Court of First Instance.

The certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower
court under section 9 of Rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the
defendant, but for execution of the judgment against him. It is necessary to promulgate or
read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that the accused or his attorney had
already been notified thereof in accordance with section 7 and 8, as amended, of the same
Rule 53.

If the accused desires to have the execution of the judgment in this case temporarily
suspended for some justifiable reason, the petition must be filed with the proper Court of
First Instance.

Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Guillermo Sumilang was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Lagunato imprisonment,
ranging from more than 5 years to more than 10 years, for the crime of arson allegedly
committed in Pila, Laguna, on May 23, 1941.

On October 8, 1943, the Court of Appeals, with the strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Jose P. Melencio, affirmed the lower court's decision.

Sumilang filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on April 20, 1944,
impugning the decision of the Court of Appeals. On June 14, 1944, the Supreme Court,
without stating any reason, summarily denied the petition for review on certiorari. On July 5,
1944, the attorney for appellant filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the said
order of denial. On July 17, 1944, the Supreme Court, also without alleging any reason,
denied the motion.
On July 21, 1944, the clerk of Supreme Court issued notice of the order of July 17,
addressed to Jose F. Fernandez, attorney of Sumilang, at 307 Palma, Quiapo, Manila. The
notice was never received by said attorney who, at the time, was already hiding in the
mountains of Laguna as an officer of the Marking Guerrillas.

On August 2, 1946, more than two years later, the bondsmen of the accused received an
order to produce the person of the same in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on August
16, 1946, for the reading of the sentence. On August 12, Sumilang filed a petition before us,
praying that the reading of the sentence be suspended and accused permitted to file
whatever pleadings necessary for the proper protection of his rights and that he granted such
other relief, just and equitable, in the premises, invoking at the same time the resolution of
this Court dated October 1, 1945.

Sumilang did not specify what pleadings he intends to file or what just and equitable relief he
seeks to obtain from this Court in case his petition is favorably acted upon; but it evident that
he may (a) ask permission to file a second motion for reconsideration and, if granted, to file
thereafter said motion; or (b) attack the validity, not only of the order of denial of his petition
for a writ of certiorari, but also the decision of the Court of Appeals, because they were
issued and rendered by tribunals set up by the enemy during Japanese occupation. lawphil.net

The first question we are called upon to consider concerns the effect of the second order of
denial, the one issued on July 17, 1944, of which neither Sumilang nor his attorney was ever
notified. In our opinion, unless and until notified of said order of denial, the same, for all legal
purposes, must be consider as nonexistent as regards accused Sumilang and, therefore, he
is entitled to enjoy the legal benefits resulting from the nonexistence of said order of denial.

At this stage, we are constrained to analyses and refute the majority position regarding the
interpretation of the word "promulgation" as used in section 8 of Rule 53, which reads as
follows:

Sec. 8. Entry of judgment. — The judgment shall be entered upon the expiration of
fifteen days after promulgation thereof. The entry shall be in the same for as provided
in section 2 of Rule 35.

Promulgation means publication, official announcement, to make known to the public. That is
the etymological meaning of the word, which came from the Latin promulgate, which in turn
came from the word provulgare, composed of the words pro (forth) and vulgus (the
people). Promulgate means "1. To make known by open declaration, as a law, decree, or
esp., a dogma; to proclaim; to publish abroad. 2. Law (a) To make known or public the terms
of (a proposed law). (b) To issue or give out (a law) by way of putting it into execution."
(Webter's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2d Ed., 1938.)

Promulgate. To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or

obligatory. (50 C.J., 720.)

The word "promulgate" is defined as to make known; to publish; to announce

officially; to make public as important or obligatory. Brown vs. Democratic Parish
Committee of St. Bernard Parish, 165 So., 167, 168; 183 La., 967. (34 W. & P.,
Perm., 329.)

In regard to the necessity of a railway company formulating and promulgated rules,

"promulgate" means to make known; that the rules should be brought to the attention
 of the service affected thereby, or that it be given such publicity as that the servant,
in the proper discharge of his duties, is bound to take notice of it Wooden vs.
Western New York & P.R. Co., 18 N. Y. S., 768, 769. (34 W.&P., Perm., 329.).

Since Acts 1915, p. 338, creating a distinct or area for the eradication of the cattle
ticks, etc., prescribes no particular form for the promulgation of regulations by the
board of control of the Agricultural Experiment Station, any public act of the board
promulgating or declaring, in a manner calculated to convey information to the public
generally, the existence of its regulations, constitutes promulgation thereof. Cazort
vs. State, 198 S.W., 103, 104; 130 Ark., 453. (34 W. & P., Perm., 329.)

In Act Cong. March 3, 1905, c. 1496, sec. 3, 33 Stat. 1265, 21 U.S. C.A. sec. 125,
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to "make" and "promulgate" rules governing the
inspection, delivery, and shipment of cattle from a quarantined state into any other
state, and section 1 requiring publication of notice of quaratine and the giving of
notice to the proper officers of carriers doing business in any quarantined state, the
word "make" and "promulgate" are not synonymous, and the duty to "make" rules
was sufficiently accomplished by writing them and signing them officially, but to
"promulgate" them required the giving notice thereof to the officers of carries, etc.,
and their publication in the selected newspapers within the affected district. United
States vs. Louisville & N. R. Co., 165 F. 936, 939. (34 W. & P., Perm., 329.)

The majority maintain that when the resolution of October 1, 1945, was adopted, the decision
of the Court of Appeals, sought by the accused to be revoked, had already become final, this
conclusion being premised on the assumption that the order of July 17, 1944, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, notwithstanding that it was never notified to
the accused or to her attorney, produced its legal effects againts the accused in the same
manner as if the latter had been duly notified of said order on the day of its issuance, July 17,
1944, upon the erroneous and absurd theory that its entry by the clerk constituted its
promulgated in accordance with section 8 of Rule 53, above quoted, which refers to section
2 of Rule 35, providing that —

SEC. 2. When and how judgments and orders entered. — If no appeal or motion for
new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be
entered by the clerk. The notation of the judgment or order in the book of entries or
judgment shall constitute its entry. The notation shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such
judgment or order has become final and executory."

The theory that by the entry made by the clerk, that is, by the notation of the order in the
book of entries of judgments made by the clerk, the order was promulgated, as maintained
by the majority, is premised on a completely mistaken concept of the idea of promulgation,
which is appulse of logic.

Before proceeding further, the majority must be reminded, in the first place, that section 8 of
Rule 53 does not and can not apply to the order of denial of July 17, 1944, because said
order is not a "judgment," the word used in said section, which does not, for any purposes,
mention the word "order". Any law student knows that there is a world of difference between
"judgment" and "order".

But, even if we do violence to the rule meaning of the two word and, byadroit logodaedaly,
should accept both as reciprocally interchangeable, it does not attenuate or minimize the
error in giving to the word "promulgation" a definition which, etymologically and
philosophically, is repugnant to reason and common sense, besides leading to repellent
iniquity.

What principle of justice this Court in giving a party litigant, an accused, a person who is
fighting for his honor, property, liberty, or life, time within which he may ask relief by asking
for reconsideration, or otherwise, of an order or judgment which will jeopardize his
fundamental rights, but at the same time deprives him of the opportunity of availing himself of
that time, because the promulgation of the judgment or order is made, not by notice to him,
but by an official routine undertaken at his back, without his knowledge, the entry made by
the clerk? Conscience revolts againts such a mockery in legal procedure, such farcical,
pharisaical, hypocritical gesture within the administration of justice.

The rules of court, fortunately, do not any ground of such a farfetched and absurd
interpretation. Section 7 of Rule 53, which must be taken into consideration jointly with
section 8 thereof, provides:

SEC. 7. Filing and notice of judgment. — After the judgment and dissenting opinions,
if any, are signed by the justices taking part, they shall be delivered for filing to the
clerk who shall cause true copies thereof to be served upon the parties or their
counsel.

The above provision determines the true procedure of how promulgation is to be

accomplished. The judgment not only shall be delivered for filing to the clerk, but must be
notified to the parties or their counsel, who will be served by the clerk with true copies
thereof. A judicial promulgation accomplished without actual notice to the litigants or their
attorneys is mere twaddle which necessarily will strobilate and proliferate into unending
judicial errors, absurdities and injustices.

In the case at bar, no true copies of the order of denial of July 17, 1944, having been served
by the clerk upon accused Sumilang and his attorney, no promulgation has been legally
accomplished and, therefore, Sumilang is entitled to take all the legal steps to protect his
rights under and within the legal situation resulting from the fact that with respect to him said
order, for all legal purposes, is nonexistent.

Coming to a different order of ideas, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8,
1943, having been rendered by a tribunal created and organized by the enemy during
Japanese occupation, whose judicial processes have been declared null and void and
without effect by proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, as we have explained in our
dissenting opinion in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), Sumilang
is entitled to all the legal remedies available to one who is convicted by a decision which is
null and void ab initio.

For all the foregoing, we dissent from the resolution denying Sumilang's petition dated
August 12, 1946.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the above dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto for the reasons stated in its penultimate
paragraph and those expressed in my own dissents in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon, supra, as well from the main majority decision as from the majority resolution on
the motion for reconsideration.
BRIONES, M., disidente:

No estoy conforme con la resolucion de la mayoria; creoque el apelante, Guillermo

Sumilang, todavia tiene suapelacion pendiente ante esta Corte Suprema y, por tanto, puede
valerse de cualesquier recursos que por ley todaviale asistan como tal apelante.

Consta en autos, sin valida y eficaz contradiccion que laresolucion de esta Corte de fecha
17 de Julio, 1944, ya nose pudo notificar a Jose F. Fernandez, abogado del apelante, en su
domicilio en 307 calle de Palma, Quiapo, Manila, porque entonces dicho abogado ya estaba
remontado en lases pesuras de la provincia de Laguna como oficial de guerrilleros bajo el
mando del famoso jefe guerrillero Marking. Sostengo que desde aquel momento la causa
del apelante, sin culpa suya, quedo desplazada del llamado gobierno de facto y todo plazo
legal contra el quedo suspendido hastades pues de la liberacion. A este efecto, estimo
oportunore producir y reafirmar a continuacion las apreciaciones y conclusiones de mi
disidencia en el asunto basico de Co Kim Cham contra Valdez Tan Keh y Dizon, a saber:

Al interpretar la proclama del General MacArthur de 23 deOctubre de 1944 que

anula todas las actuaciones del gobierno establecidoen estas islas bajo la ocupacion
militar japonesa, creo quela inteleccion mas apropiada es que, como regla general,
esa proclamaanula todo, incluso las actuaciones judiciales (judicial processes),
sobre todo aquellas cuya entidad y cuyos efectos rebasan el periodode la esclavitud
forzosa y trascienden y repercuten en la postliberacion. En otras palabras, la
nulidad, la ineficacia debe ser la reglageneral; y la validez, la eficacia, la excepcion,
la salvedad.

La razon de esto es sencilla. El gobierno de ocupacion representabaen nuestra vida

un parentesis anomalo, de obligada ilegitimidad, y es nada mas que natural que el
gobierno legitimo, dejure, al restaurarse, no transigiese con los actos y procesos de
aquelgobierno, excepto en lo que fuera absolutamente necesario e
irremediable.Caerian, por ejemplo, bajo esta excepcion solamente aquellosactos y
procesos resultantes del hecho de que formabamos una comunidadcivilizada con
necesidades e intereses individuales y sociales complejos; y de que por instinto de
conservacion y para vivir concierto orden y relativa tranquilidad y no precipitarnos en
la anarquiay en el caos habiamos meneser la egida de un gobierno, sinimportar que
este no fuese hechura de nuestra voluntad y que inclusivenos fuera repulsivo. Mas
alla del minimum de esta forzosidad, no puede haber transaccion con las actos y
procesos de aquel regimen.

Como corolario de esta inteleccion es obvio que por mucho quenos tienten y
atraigan ciertas doctrinas y principios conocidos dederecho internacional sobre
gobiernos de facto, no es conveniente y eshasta peligroso sentar reglas absolutas
que a lo mejor no cuadran conlas circunstancias peculiares de cada caso. Lo mas
seguro es enjuiciarpor sus propios meritos cada acto o proceso que se plantee.

En la determinacion judicial de esta clase de asuntos nunca sedeben perder de

vista, entre otras, las siguientes circunstancias: (1) que la invasion japonesa, aun en
el apogeo de su fuerza, jamaspudo quebrantar la lealtad fundamental del pueblo
filipino a su gobiernoy al gobierno de los Estados Unidos de America; (2) que encasi
todas partes de Filipinas esta lealtad hizo posible la articulaciony organizacion
soterranea de fuerzas de resistencia contra el enemigo; (3) que si bien el control
japones era por lo general efectivoen las ciudades y grandes poblaciones, era, sin
embargo, precario enmuchos pueblos y barrios, sobre todo en aquellos que no
 tenianvalor estrategico o eran poco propicios a la confiscacion y rapiña,dominando
practicamente en dichos sitios las guerrillas; (4) que enalgunas regiones el gobierno
del Commonwealth seguia funcionando,trasladandose de un sitio a otro para burlas
la persecucion de enemigoo acuartelandose en zonas a donde no alcanzaba la
accion delas guarniciones japonesas; (5) que muchos habitantes de los llanos
ypoblados se sustrajeron a la jurisdiccion del gobierno de fuerza predominante
(paramount force), refugiandose en las montanas y lugaresdominados por las
guerrillas y colocandose bajo la proteccion ysalvaguardia de estas, o bien en sitios
donde no habia ni japonesesni guerrillas; (6) y por ultimo, que despues del
desembarco del General MacArthur y de sus fuerzas libertadoras en Leyte el 20 de
Octubre de 1944, la lealtad filipina y el espiritu de resistencia llegarona su maxima
tension y la ocupacion japonesa se fue desmoronandorapidamente a pedazos hasta
sufrir finalmente un colapso total. (75 Phil., 403, 404.)

Se arguye que bajo las reglas a la sazon vigentes la citadaresolucion de 17 de Julio, 1944,
quedo firme, sinnecesidad de notificacion a las partes, 15 dias despues de supromulgacion,
entendiendose por tal em simple hechos de suexpedicion y registro en los autos. Creo que
esto es unerror. Esa regla ya era discutible, aun bajo circunstancias normales; pero se podia
tolerar en virtud de la presuncionde que en 15 dias cabia notificar a las partes bajo
unsistema postal eficiente y con servicios de transporte y comunicaciones en normal,
ordenado y expedito funcionamiento. ¿Como pretender, sin embargo, que esa reglarigiera
en una situacion de guerra, cuando todos los serviciosestaban tremendamente
desorganizados y la tranquilidad, la seguridad, la libertad, a lo mejor la vida mismapendia de
un hilo? Y, sobre todo ¿como ponerla en vigorcontra partes litigantes y abogados que, sin
prueba validaen contra, se sumaron patrioticamente al movimiento deresistencia contra el
enemigo?

Por lo expuesto, juzgo que el apelante tiene derecho aque se conceda su mocion. Por de
pronto, tiene derecho apresentar una segunda mocion de reconsideracion, desdeluego con
nuestra venia, que creo debe serle concedida enjusticia y equidad.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996]

FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S

Delta Village, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE.
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO
PALMIANO, respondents.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the
non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase
agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree? This is the major question raised in the
instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent Executive
Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order
of the respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from
petitioner and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E &
S Delta Village inQuezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos.
2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners Association, Inc., the
National Housing Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter
alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in
said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent
filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-
589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in
view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations,
but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose
favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged
that he suspended his payments because of petitioners failure to develop the
village. Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo
spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him.
 On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of
petitioner to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private
respondents complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and,
applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development
and to reinstate private respondents purchase contract over one lot, and as to
the other, it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been
issued to x x x spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo x x x, the management of
E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-
appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid.
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the
HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
and for having been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or
final orders of the x x x Office of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of
Appeals x x x. However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was
deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to
make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary
erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E &
S DeltaVillage justified private respondents non-payment of his amortizations.
Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered
into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern
the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary
did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so
as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can
be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this
point, a leading authority on statutory construction stressed:

The intent of a statute is the law x x x. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary
rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act x x
x. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to
adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent
policy and objects of the legislature.1 (italics supplied.)
 It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must
favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot
buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in
view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey
to the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers, and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in
its preamble, pertinent portions of which read as follows:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human
settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent
sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value; 2 (italics supplied.)

From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that

the legislative intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having
P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the
time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the statute will
effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise its
regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated
under or in connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to
have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very
subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable
that the legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain and
continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are
certain of its provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very
terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and
transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957s enactment:

Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting
facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the
issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be
fixed by the Authority.

Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior
to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or
condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding
section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless
an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions
shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or

condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to
the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (italics supplied)

On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the

application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in question will be consistent with
paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves, which expressly provides:

(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the entire area
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of this contract is
a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the
First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the
subdivision and development of lots for residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter
be required by laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of
Lands, the General Registration Office and other government agencies. (italics supplied)

Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it

follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent
when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioners
failure to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete development
of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory
obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the
findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive
Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive
Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters: although private
respondent started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975, so
that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive
arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation
option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in
timely fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to
cancel the contracts. But by that time the land purchase agreements had already
been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In
any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor
General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private respondent
had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latters
tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent Secretary
exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondents payments
on Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting documents
submitted substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on
said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioners motion for reconsideration of the (Executive
Secretarys) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from
receipt thereof, said decision had become final and executory, pursuant to
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which
provides that (d)ecisions/ resolutions! orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x , unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.