ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R.

99327; 27 MAY 1993]

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law
SchoolCatalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required tofile their
written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges
against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view
of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are
currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This
was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo
Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by
passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is
whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such
as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND NATIONAL
WORKERS BROTHE RHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such
far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989) G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989

Fact: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner
for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further
reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. Petitioner was exempt from
the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC,
including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity
covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor. petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967,
and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for
a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities,
provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. petitioner was granted a
provisional authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3 times, but the last
extension directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent
(15%) on the present authorized rates. Hence this petition.adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issue: whether the Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the Petitioner?adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Held: Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due process. if the authorities that where the function of
the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law, Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of
the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial
or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.