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ARTICLE III- THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1

Due Process of Law

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

Facts: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose
was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation
of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process;
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title;
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations; and
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession

Issue: Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

Held: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. Noting that the retail
trade was at the time controlled by aliens, it ruled that the State was entitled to take adequate
steps to relax the foreign stranglehold on a vital artery of the national economy. Justice Labrador
declared: “The disputed law is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective—to free the national economy from alien control and dominance. xxx Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination
of others, especially if not of their own race and country.”

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres [G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994]

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees.

However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought
to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical
and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers
and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding
of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS
appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal.

PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant
petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was
under.

Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a
hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted
to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity
to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

Facts: Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is
assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao
(regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos,
these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit.
Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were
confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC
granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the
confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on
the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner
asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its
penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A is unconstitutional for violating of the due process clause.

Held: Yes. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end,
the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be
heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported
is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government.
Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with,
such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the
instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated
property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers
mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in
making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see
fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No.131652, March 9, 1998]

Facts: Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The case was brought before the
Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue
due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit
of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial Court
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte
and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness
of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new
life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he
did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape
and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on
the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has
not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Aniag vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104691, October 7, 1994]

FACTS: In preparation for the scheduled synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a Gun
Ban resolution. Ceding to the request of the House of Representatives Sergeant-at-Arms to return
the firearms issued to him, petitioner instructed his driver to pick up the firearms from his house
and to bring the same to Congress. The driver was then apprehended at a checkpoint after the
policemen found the firearms in a bag in the truck of the car.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner’s driver acquiesced to the warrantless search.

RULING: NO. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver
Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength
and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such
scenario, the “implied acquiescence,” if there was any, could not be more than a
mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and “consent” given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.

Philippine Communications Satellite Corp vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989]

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940]
Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993]

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council [G.R. No.
178552 05 October 2010]

FACTS: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness
and overbreadh doctrines?

RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech
of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, 24 February
2015

FACTS: Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia who was supposed to be the salutatorian of his batch,
receive the Philippines Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy. Cadel 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of
the PMA, the country’s premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio
City. He belonged to the “A” Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL cadets had a lesson
examination
(LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the
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PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4 period
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class in OR432 was from 1:30- 3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5 period class in ENG412
was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H). Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof.
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Berong) of the 5 period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia
because he was “[l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.” Cadets 1CL

Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five
minutes. On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL cadets
had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C.
Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room.

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Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4 period class in OR432
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was from 1:30- 3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5 period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-
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4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H). Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5
period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia because he was “[l]ate
for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.” Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas,
Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia reasoned out that: “I
came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir.” December
19, 2013, Major Hindang gave Cudia a penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. He was
punished because of the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who said that she never
dismissed her class late.

Cudia wrote an appeal to seek reconsideration of the punishment. He addressed his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin Leander, Senior Tactical Officer and
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asserted: “I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4 period class
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ended 1500H and our 5 period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after
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4 period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.”

Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1CL Cudia
and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based
on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander
sustained the penalty
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang
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reported him to the HC for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated: Lying that is
giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended
at 1500H that made him late in the succeeding class.

The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted
until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of the charge against
him, as to which he pleaded “Not Guilty.” Among those who testified were Cadet 1CL
Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the
hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia again appeared and was called to
the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under
oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members followed.
After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes through secret
balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton John G.
Lagura (Cadet 1CL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order of HC
Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a
chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went
out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who
already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding
him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal. 
 


On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the


Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral
Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet 1CL
Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b
of the CCAFPR S-2008). 


On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA
Headquarters placing Cadet 1CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFP-
GHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting
him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA. 


Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to


dismiss Cadet 1CL Cudia. 


Cudia filed an appeal. But the Headquarters resolved to deny Cudia’s appeal
for lack of merit. 
ISSUES: 1. 


On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets
1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members. Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that
the case be formalized. Cudia filed an appeal. Respondents contend that the HC denied the
appeal the same day, January 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the
arguments and evidence presented.

Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the
academy in utter disregard of his right to due process. [NO]

APPLICATION

Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet
from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation
(CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which
merits a recommendation for a cadet’s dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is
likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. 


Cadet 1CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not
accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a
huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as
an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured 


Whether the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia lied, thereby violating
the Honor Code. [NO]

Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted by the CHR is of such
great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may honor, uphold, and respect. [NO]

Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act")

o Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the
power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC
as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the
PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In
the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC’s finding of guilt
in terminating his military service.

Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating
that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government”

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended by
E.O. No. 1005),

AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military
professionalism, and, in general, military culture. Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides
that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."

As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30, Article
III of C.A. No.

1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, the PMA is
an institution

that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the
investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable
errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest.

With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and
reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.

themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that
only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the
PMA.

As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military “to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics.” Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet
1CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA

Respondents contend that the CHR’s allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and
that he failed to

discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he “paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudia’s]
sham trial by the

Honor Committee” is an unfounded accusation.

As to the CHR’s finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise “in bad faith and determined to
destroy [Cadet 1CL]

Cudia, for reasons of his own” because the former previously reported the latter for an honor
violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless
as there is failure to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he
cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing
less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected
from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first
class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia believed that there was bias against him, he
should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor
Code Handbook.

Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to
prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything
from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates
against PMA’s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL


LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE


DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH
THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
from the Philippine. Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
EQUAL PROTECTION

People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]

Facts: Private respondent (Mariano Cu-Unjieng) was convicted of a criminal charge by trial court
of Manila. He filed several motions for reconsideration or new trial but was denied. On 1936, the
SC remanded the case to the original court of origin for the execution of judgment. While waiting
for the new trial, he appealed to Insular Probation Office (IPO) for probation but was denied.
However, Judge Vera, upon another request by petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for
hearing for probation. Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for the latter has no power to
place the petitioner under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 which
provides that:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. xxx

Petitioners contended that Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 because nowhere it states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila. Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal
protection clause for being an invalid classification because its applicability is not uniform
throughout the country for each provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to provide
a probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each
provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc.

Issue: Whether or not the said Act No. 4221 denies the equal protection of the laws

Held: YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power. Each provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to
provide a probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of
each provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc. What if the other province decides not
to adopt probation system, or it decides not to have salary for the probation officer?

It is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

Facts: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose
was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation
of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:
reasons:
5. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process;
6. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title;
7. the Act violates international and treaty obligations; and
8. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession

Issue: Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

Held: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. Noting that the retail
trade was at the time controlled by aliens, it ruled that the State was entitled to take adequate
steps to relax the foreign stranglehold on a vital artery of the national economy. Justice Labrador
declared: “The disputed law is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective—to free the national economy from alien control and dominance. xxx Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination
of others, especially if not of their own race and country.”
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978]

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed
in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same
null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit
from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

The Supreme Court annulled a city ordinance requiring aliens to obtain a work permit from the
mayor as a pre-condition for employment, holding that “while it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.”

Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]

Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”.

Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”, that
it is violative of the right to travel.
Issue: Whether or not Department Order No. 1 violates equal protection on the ground of sexual
discrimination.

Held: No. It was held that Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves
distinguishable from other Filipino female workers, and more so from Filipino overseas contract
workers in general, because of the special risks to which their class was exposed owing to the
nature and conditions of their employment. Official reports showed that a number of them had
been abused and maltreated by their foreign employers and they had found themselves without
recourse. A ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Court finds the
impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not
apply to “all Filipina workers” is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. Not all of them are
similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting
in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing [G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000]

Facts: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution


established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its
standard of instruction, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-
of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether there is indeed a discrimination thus a violation of Equal Protection Clause.

HELD: Yes. Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. The Constitution directs the State
to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.” Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.”

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work
with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character”
notwithstanding. In this case, employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That
is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions
of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

Garcia v. Drilon [G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013]

Facts: In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be
a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection clause.

Issue: Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.

Held: No. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
“person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships.

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true equality.”
Himagan vs. People [G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994]

Quinto vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010]

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter
moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any
person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that:

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start
of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.

Held: The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of Sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and
reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective
officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]

Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [G.R. No. 148208.
December 15, 2004]

FACTS: The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents
from further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took
effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and
wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of
the Bank Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under RA No
6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the
rates prescribed under RA No 6758.
7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government
Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) –
SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No
8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul
of the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”
HELD: The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional. With the
passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were
substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c),
Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-
file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must
also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests
on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support
the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot
justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who
are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,
directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not
identical are analogous.

Almonte vs. Vazquez [G.R No. 95367, May 23, 1995]

FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988
and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued
in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces
tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING: Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of
a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for
privilege resting on other considerations.

Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968]

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one (1%) percent
per export sale to the US and other foreign countries.

In lieu, Ormoc Sugar filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal protection
clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc.
was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the constitutional provision on equal protection.

Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only
sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the present company,
from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be
levied upon.

Equal Protection Clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where:
1. it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
2. these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3. the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; and
4. the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. [G.R. No. 167614, 24 March 2009]

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on
the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 1998, $413.90 for March 1998, and
$1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his
salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus
$45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however,
no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees.
This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality
of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed
the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue
raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

Issue: Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Held: Yes. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the law.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.

Corpuz v. People [G.R. No. 180016, 24 April 2014]

FACTS:
 Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation
to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after
the expiration of 30 days.
 The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
 When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
 Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
 Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the
date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES:
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

HELD: Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said
receipt.
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient
of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime,
as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was
committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

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