Outline important developments that have contributed to the conflict between North Korea and

the United States. Explain why peaceful negotiations to ease tension with North Korea have
proven difficult. Make reference to the role of international organisations in Korea, and third-
party intervention by countries such as China.

At its root, the conflict between North Korea and the USA is caused by irreconcilable ideological
differences. This was brought to the foreground of international attention during the Korean War
(1950-1953), during which the international community witnessed the capitalist USA reinforcing the
military forces of South Korea, and communist Russia backing the DPRK. Edwards (2006) states that
the countries used North Korea as a ‘pawn’ within the larger scale conflict of the Cold War. This implies
that both economically powerful countries – the USA and Russia – were taking an international stand
on an issue of national importance; from Russia’s perspective the promotion of, and in America’s case
the prevention of, the spread of communism. Russia’s alliance with the DPRK during the Korean War
set the precedent for conflict between the DPRK and the USA on an ideological basis. (1987)

Neither North nor South Korea was equipped with the means or finances for large-scale conflict in
1950 due to the recent withdrawal of Japanese troops in 1945***. This meant that both states
required international aid, which came first in the form of representatives nominated by the USA and
Russia to lead the South and North Korean governments. Syngman Rhee, who had been in exile in the
USA for four decades (Breen, 2010), was endorsed by the USA to lead the nascent South Korean
government due to his capitalist ideals that matched the anti-Communist agenda of the USA. The
government of the DPRK, however, had Soviet-supported Kim Il-sung at the figurehead. Kim had
participated in guerrilla warfare within Korea before fleeing to Russia, where he served as a major in
the Soviet Red Army (Lan'kov, 2002). It is possible that this past allegiance to the Russian army
strengthened Kim’s position in his negotiations with Stalin in April 1950.

President Truman, under pressure from General Macarthur, felt obligated to ‘defeat a communist
offensive in Asia and roll back the “Red Menace”’ (Lowe, 2000). Edwards (2006) proposes that the
phrase ‘communist offensive’ was used to present the USA’s decision to enter combat as ‘under the
shadow of a moral crusade’ – a considerably more comforting spin than the widespread circulation
that the Korean war represented the brink of a third world war. All of the conflict is, however, based
in ideological differences, and a desire from all countries not to appear weak on the international
stage.

Another contribution to the continuing conflict into the modern day is the fact that the Korean War
ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

The conflict between North and South Korea is epitomised through the 4km demilitarised zone along
the 38th parallel. This, intended to be an impermanent and arbitrary division, has become a symbol of
North Korea’s isolation. The North Korean media, enforced by the power of the ‘juche’ ideology,
interpret this isolation as a form of protection; the concept of ‘juche’ will be explored in detail later in
the essay.
‘There is no murkier episode in the history of the American occupation than the return of Rhee to
Seoul…General Hodge and his staff participated in a carefully orchestrated conspiracy to bring back
Rhee, despite the refusal of the state department to grant him a passport.’ (Hastings, 1987)

1 – important developments that have contributed to the conflict

 Korean War, in context of the Cold War – USA and Russia using Korea as a ‘pawn’ within
larger scale conflict. (Edwards, 2006)
 Origins of the war; both countries (USA and Russia) taking an international stand on a
national issue (promotion/deterrence of communism).
 Korea’s vulnerability having been battered and left by Japan 1945 meant that both states
needed international assistance, not having the means or finances to resolve the conflict.
 Truman’s stance of anti-communism encouraged by MacArthur (whose real ambition was to
become president; ‘defeating a communist offensive in Asia and rolling back the “Red
menace” in Korea could prove an irresistible appeal in an impressive curriculum vitae’ (Lowe,
2000)
 Armistice not a peace deal – Eisenhower signed it, ‘adamant that the Korean war must be
terminated instead of dragging on interminably’ – Synghman Rhee ‘opposed’ and ‘refused to
sign’ (Lowe p4).
 Formation of the 4km demilitarised zone along the 38th parallel cemented separation
between North and South (even though it was not intended to be permanent); isolates NK,
however NK’s ideology & enforced media presents this isolation as beneficial to NK
population (protected by legacy of great leader, will be explored in detail later in the essay).

2 – third-party intervention

Third-party intervention by other countries played an enormous role in the escalation of the Korean
conflict. Lowe (2006) indicates that Kim Il-sung ‘skilfully played the Soviet Union and China off against
one another’ in an attempt to secure the reunification of Korea with the military support of ‘covert
Soviet air intervention’ and ‘vast’ Chinese armies. McGregor (2016) suggests that Chinese involvement
was motivated by an ‘opportunity for China to challenge the US’. In the early stages of the conflict,
however, China’s resources were significantly depleted from the Chinese civil war between the PRC
and Taiwan (1945-1949). Mao was therefore focused more on the economic recovery of his own
country, and revision of domestic policy, than international affairs for the first few months of the
Korean War. This meant that Kim turned to Stalin for assistance. Kim spent much of April 1950 in
Moscow, and intimated to Stalin that the war ‘would take five days and that Koreans in the south
would rise up to support his effort at unification’ (Edwards p17). Stalin was willing and able to provide
Soviet air support, but wished to mask the extent of his contribution, so did not send in ground forces.
This was the state of play until November 1950, when China had recovered sufficiently to provide an
army of 1,350,000 ground troops (Zhang, 1995) to help the DPRK army recapture territory north of
the 38th parallel. This trifecta of allied communist nations – the DPRK, China and Russia – therefore
exerted a far more powerful force than the DPRK had the means to produce on its own.

-Early stages,

-China obligated to return the favour – NK had supported China with a ‘volunteer army’ ***

-China came in to help after US troops crossed the Yalu river

  Kim Il-sung ‘skilfully played the SU and China off against one another’ Lowe
 Chinese civil war (PRC v Taiwan) meant Mao had limited resources; ‘resented his exclusion
from the Stalin-Kim developments but he could only observe developments.’
 Perhaps more significantly, the intervention of the Soviet Union, Kim visited Moscow April
1950. In communication with Stalin, ‘estimated it would

3 – peaceful negotiations proven difficult

Peaceful negotiations have proven difficult because both North and South Korea sought unification,
but under their own regimes. Intense ideological differences therefore increased the separation
between the states. There is a significantly reduced likelihood of reunification due to the unique
development of North Korea since 1950 under the Kim dynasty, and the mysterious ‘juche’ and cult
of personality that surrounds them.

‘Juche’ is literally translated as ‘self-reliance’, and is the DPRK’s official state ideology. Initially a
political catchphrase from 1955-1966 ***, a propaganda piece from the 1980s develops the concept
in relation to the country’s leader:

‘The Suryong (leader) is an impeccable brain of the living body, the masses can be endowed
with their life in exchange for their loyalty to him, and the Party is the nerve centre of that
living body.’ http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/30/north-korea-nuclear-
threat-kim-jong-uns-leadership/

This constitutional social structure, whereby citizens are automatically subservient to the legacy of
the Supreme Leader Kim Il-sung, makes peaceful negotiations with the DPRK government difficult.
Current leader Kim Jong-il is the third generation product of this ‘juche’ cult, and the mandatory
respect he is shown borders on enforced worship. This goes some way to explain the grandiosity and
self-conviction of the Kim family, having successfully manufactured and enforced this hierarchical
social structure. The centrepiece of the ideology is, memorably, self-reliance; this concept at the heart
of DPRK beliefs explains why the DPRK expresses little or no interest in international affairs and
peaceful negotiations, as they believe themselves to be entirely self-reliant.

 Both states sought unification under their own regime – intensity of ideological differences
led to increased separation with reduced hope of reunification (because of unique
development of nk under kim dynasty). NK insisted it is the true government since end of
war 1953 ***. This grandiosity and self-conviction of the Kim family mean they are difficult
to negotiate peacefully with
 Additionally, NK’s proven willingness to eradicate dissenting thinkers by execution makes for
tough negotiation
 USA’s sense of grandiosity strengthened by utilisation of atomic testing in Nevada as a
tourist attraction – miss atomic bomb – spectators encouraged to appreciate the ‘beauty’ of
bombs going off in the distance, symbol of national strength and patriotism – The
Propaganda Came From Both Sides (and still does)
 Mutual propaganda – juche and the supreme leader (propaganda of protection, presents NK
citizens as childlike, vulnerable) VS threat, fear tactics of the USA (emphasised by
McCarthyism); two angles to American propaganda (whoop yeah atomic bombs!!//omfg
communists, hide) – cultivated distaste in general population from both sides makes
negotiations difficult.
 Refer to BBC documentary whereby student Alessandro Ford specifies the difference
between ‘hating Americans’ and ‘hating American government’??? students said ‘we detest
 the American government. We think they’re vermin, we think they’re evil, imperialist dogs.
Now the people, they told me, they had no problem with…to us, the American people are
merely being misled, and if they don’t hate us, then we don’t hate them’ (Ford, 2015) – NK
propaganda is targeted specifically at the government whereas western propaganda is
vague, ‘ehhh…anti-communist?’
 Re: camps – NK friend said ‘those are not camps like the Japanese used to put us in, those
are re-education camps – those are camps for when someone doesn’t understand the Great
Leader’s political thought, and simply need to be instructed’
 Korea’s development of its nuclear (and non-nuclear) weapons programme, and its secrecy
about all of it, makes peaceful negotiations difficult.

The role of international organisations in Korea was initiated by the US who sought UN support during
the original conflict between 1950 and 1953. The UN condemned the first invasion of South Korea as
a ‘breach of peace’ and demanded cessation of hostilities (resolution 82, 25 June 1950). This demand
was ignored by North Korea, a trend that continues today. More recent sanctions between 2006 and
2013 have addressed nuclear testing and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, and have
included search-and-seize measures advised to surrounding UN member states. In 2013, sanctions
were also implemented on money transfers, effectively freezing the DPRK out of international finances
(***). These sanctions are evidently not effective deterrents, as the DPRK’s actions in continuing
nuclear testing have demonstrated their determined agenda to develop potential nuclear capability
to hit the target of the USA. A globally-visible manifestation of this agenda occurred in 2003 when the
DPRK became the first state to withdraw from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.

Another international organisation that has attempted to regulate the DPRK is the IAEA. A statement
from IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has condemned the DPRK’s ‘clear violation of numerous
UN security council resolutions’, and its ‘complete disregard of the repeated demands of the
international community’ (2016). The sanctions imposed by the IAEA have proved as ineffective as
those from the UN. Deputy Permanent Representative of the DPRK, Kim In Ryong, stated to Associated
Press that the DPRK’s nuclear programme is ‘the product of the United States’ hostile policy towards
DPRK’, hence the DPRK’s refusal to participate in ‘any type of talks which would discuss its nuclear
abandonment’ (***). This demonstrates the DPRK’s immutable hatred of the USA and its ongoing
conviction that the USA is a dangerous adversary. It also highlights the belief that this international
rivalry is more prominent on the DPRK’s agenda than any peaceful negotiations.

4 – international organisations (UN, IAEA and non-proliferation treaty)

 First brought in backing the US at beginning of Korean war – condemned invasion of SK as

‘breach of peace’, demanded cessation of hostilities (resolution 82, 25 June 1950). That went
really well. Set a precedent for NK ignoring the UN
 NPT – NK withdrew 2003
 International atomic energy agency – condemns NK’s actions but, again, ignored: ‘clear
violation of numerous UN security council resolutions, and in complete disregard of the
repeated demands of the international community.’ -IAEA director general Yukiya Amano,
19 Sept 2016
 Kim In Ryong (deputy permanent representative of the DPRK) told Associated Press that
‘DPRK have already declared not to attend any type of talks which would discuss its nuclear
abandonment, nuclear disbandment’ – nuclear programme is ‘the product of the United
 States’ hostile policy towards DPRK’
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/north-korea-nuclear-
attack-us-un-warning-donald-trump-rex-tillerson-japan-south-korea-latest-a7708031.html
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