REPUBLIC ACT 8219 “AN ACT AMENDING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1146, AS
AMENDED, EXPANDING AND
INCREASING THE COVERAGE AND
BENEFITS OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
INSTITUTING REFORMS THEREIN AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
 IMPORTANT TERMS:
1. GSIS- The Government Service Insurance
System created by Commonwealth Act 186.1
2. EMPLOYER- The national government, its
political subdivisions, branches, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and
financial institutions with original charters,
the constitutional commissions and the
judiciary.2
3. EMPLOYEE or MEMBER- Any person,
receiving compensation while in the service
of an employer as defined herein, whether by
election or appointment, irrespective of status
of appointment, including barangay and
sanggunian officials.3
COMPULSARY MEMBERSHIP4:
Membership in the GSIS shall be compulsory for
all government employees receiving compensation
who have not reached the compulsory retirement
age, irrespective of employment
status, except members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police and
contractual who have no employer and employee
relationship with their agencies.
COVERAGE5:
GSIS covers all government workers irrespective
of their employment status, except:
 Members of the Judiciary and
Constitutional Commissions who are
covered by separate retirement laws;
1
An Act amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as
Amended, Expanding and Increasing the Coverage and
Benefits of the Government Service Insurance System,
Instituting Reforms therein and for other Purposes,
Republic Act 8219, Sec. 2a.
2
Sec. 2c, Republic Act 8219.
3
Sec. 2d, Republic Act 8219.
4 6
Sec. 3, Republic Act 8219.
5 7
Sec. 3, Republic Act 8219
 Contractual employees who have no
employer-employee relationship with their
agencies;
 Uniformed members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, including the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology and the
Bureau of Fire Protection.
BENEFITS:
1. SEPARATION BENEFITS6- The Separation
benefit is given to employees who have not
reached the retirement age of 60 but have been
separated from the service. The benefit can
either be in the form of cash payment or both
cash payment and pension.
Eligibility and Benefits:
a. If the member has been in the service
for at least 3 years but less than 15
years, and below 60 years of age: Cash
payment equivalent to 100% of the
Average Monthly Compensation(Average
Salary in the last 3 years) for every year of
service payable upon reaching age 60.
b. If the member has been in the service
for at least 15 years and is below 60
years of age: Cash payment equivalent to
18 times the Basic Monthly Pension
(BMP) payable upon separation and
monthly pension for life starting at age 60.
2. RETIREMENT BENEFITS7- Retirement
under RA 8219 may be availed by those who
have rendered at least 15 years of service in
the Gov’t and must be at least 60 years of age
upon retirement. Also, they must not be
permanent total disability pensioners. The last
3 years of service need not be continuous
under RA 8219.
Retirement Packages:
a. Option 1: 5-year Lump sum and old age
pension. Under this option, retirees can get
their five-year pension in advance. The
lump sum is equivalent to 60 months of the
Basic Monthly Pension (BMP) payable at
the time of retirement. After 5 years,
Sec. 11 & 12, Republic Act 8219.
Sec. 13 & 14, Republic Act 8219.
 retirees will start receiving their monthly
pension.
b. Option 2: Cash payment and Basic
Monthly. Under this option, retirees will
receive a cash payment equivalent to 18
times the Basic Monthly Pension (BMP)
payable upon retirement and then a
monthly pension for life, payable
immediately after retirement date.
3. DISABILITY BENEFITS8- There are three
kinds of disability determined by GSIS based
on established medical standards: a)
Permanent Total Disability, b) Permanent
Partial Disability, and c) Temporary Total
Disability.
a. Permanent Total Disability:
Eligibilities: Members who become
permanently and totally disabled are
entitled to PTD benefits when:
1. In the service at the time of disability;
or
2. If separated from the service, have paid
at least 36 months contributions within
the five year period immediately
preceding the disability; or have paid a
total of at least 180 months
contributions prior to the disability;
*Provided, however, that the following
conditions are met:
 Gainfully employed prior to the
commencement of disability resulting
in loss of income;
 Not a registered member of any
social insurance institution; and
 Not receiving any other pension
either from GSIS or another local or
foreign institution or organization
Benefits:
1. Members who become permanently
and totally disabled are entitled to the
monthly income benefits for life
equivalent to the basic monthly
pension (BMP) effective from the date
of disability. In addition to the
monthly income benefits for life, a
cash payment equivalent to 18 times
the basic monthly pension (BMP), will
8
Sec. 16, 17 & 18, Republic Act 8219.
be paid to members who were in the
service at the time of the permanent
total disability and who have paid a
total of 180 monthly contributions.
2. Separated members who have at least
three years of service and become
permanently and totally disabled but
have not paid a total of at least 180
monthly contributions prior to the
disability are entitled only to cash
payment equivalent to 100% of their
average monthly compensation for
each year of service with paid
contributions but not less than twelve
thousand pesos (Php12,000.00).
b. Permanent Partial Disability:
Eligibilities: Members whose disability is
partial are entitled to PPD benefit when:
1. In the service at the time of the
disability; or
2. If separated from the service, have paid
at least 36 months contributions within
the five year period immediately
preceding the disability; or have paid a
total of at least 180 months
contributions prior to the disability
*Provided, however, that the following
conditions are met:
 Gainfully employed prior to
the commencement of disability
resulting in loss of income as
evidenced by any incontrovertible
proof thereof;
 Not a registered member of
any social insurance institution; and
 Not receiving any other
pension either from GSIS or another
local or foreign institution or
organization
Benefits:
1. The period of entitlement to PPD
benefit is determined after due medical
evaluation; but such period of
entitlement to the benefit will not
exceed 12 months for the same
contingency. Only the leave of
absence/s without pay incurred during
the period of entitlement, duly certified
 by the authorized officer of the agency
where members are employed, is
compensable.
2. The amount of PPD benefit
is computed by dividing the BMP by
30 days and multiplying the quotient
by the number of compensable
calendar days of leave of absence
without pay (LWOP).
c. Temporary Total Disability:
Eligibilities: Members are entitled to the
TTD benefit when:
1. In the service at the time of the
disability; or
2. If separated from the service, have paid
at least 36 months contributions within
the five year period immediately
preceding the disability; or have paid a
total of at least 180 months
contributions prior to the disability;
*Provided, however, that the following
conditions will be met:
 Gainfully employed prior to the
commencement of disability resulting
in loss of income;
 Not a registered member of any
social insurance institution; and
 Not receiving any other pension
either from GSIS or another local or
foreign institution or organization.
Benefits:
1. The period of entitlement to TTD
benefit is determined after due medical
evaluation and proof of actual loss of
work resulting in loss of income by
way of the incurred actual number of
days of leave of absence/s without pay
duly certified by the authorized officer
of the agency where members are
employed; but such period of
entitlement to the benefit should not
exceed 120 days in one calendar year.
2. However, if the disability requires
more extensive treatment that lasts
beyond 120 days, the payment of TTD
may be extended by GSIS but not to
exceed a total of 240 days. Only the
leave of absence/s without pay incurred
during the period of entitlement is
compensable.
3. Entitlement, however, starts from the
fourth day of the disability. The
amount of TTD benefit is computed by
multiplying 75% of the daily salary of
members by the number of days of
disability based on the medical
evaluation but not to exceed 240 days
for the same contingency. However,
the computed daily salary shall not be
less than Php70.00 but not to exceed
Php340.00 per day.
4. SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS9
Eligibility Requirements:
1. When a member or pensioner dies, the
primary beneficiaries (surviving legal
spouse and dependent children) or
secondary beneficiaries, as the case
may be, shall be entitled to the
applicable survivorship benefits.
2. The primary beneficiaries shall be the
following:
2.1 The legitimate spouse, until
s/he re-marries, or co-habits/engages in
common-law relationship; and
2.2 The dependent legitimate,
legally adopted or legitimated children,
including illegitimate children, who
have not reached the age of majority,
or, have reached the age of majority
but incapacitated and incapable of self-
support due to a mental or physical
defect acquired prior to age of
majority.
3. The secondary beneficiaries shall be
the dependent parents and, subject to
the restrictions on dependent children,
the legitimate descendants.
The secondary beneficiaries shall only be
entitled to survivorship benefits if there are no
primary beneficiaries.
Benefits(Maximum Amount of Survivorship
Pension):
1. The surviving spouse shall be
entitled to basic survivorship pension which is
fifty percent (50%) of the Basic Monthly Pension
(BMP) but not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the
current Step 8[4] salary of an Undersecretary,
pursuant to the Salary Standardization Law10 and
9
Sec. 20, 21 & 22, Republic Act 8219.
10
Republic Act 6758.
its amendments. For example, if the salary of an
Undersecretary is equal to Php63,380.00 and
Basic Monthly Pension (BMP) of the deceased
member/pensioner is equal to Php70,000.00, the
maximum amount of survivorship pension is
Php31,690.00 (50% of P63,380.00) for the
surviving spouse, not Php35,000.00 (50% of
Php70,000.00).However, the existing survivorship
pensioners (surviving spouse) who are receiving
more than the said limit shall not be subjected to
this policy.
2. The dependent children shall be
entitled to dependent children’s pension for a
maximum of five (5) children, equivalent to 10%
of the BMP for each child but not to exceed fifty
percent (50%) of the BMP, counted from the
youngest and without substitution.
5. FUNERAL BENEFITS11
The law provides P30,000 Funeral Benefit to
the following:
1. An active member;
2. A member who has been separated
from the service but who is entitled to
future separation or retirement benefit;
3. A member who is an old age
pensioner;
4. A retiree who at the time of his
retirement was of pensionable age
under RA 8291 but who opted to retire
under RA 1616; and
5. A member who retired under RA 1616
prior to the effectivity of RA 8291 with
at least 20 years of service, regardless
of age.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8282 “AN ACT
FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM THEREBY
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1161, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE SOCIAL
SECURITY LAW”
 IMPORTANT TERMS:
1. SSS – The Social Security System as created by
this Act.12
11
Sec. 23, Republic Act 8219.
12
An Act Further Strengthening the Social Security System
thereby Amending for this Purpose Republic Act No. 1161,
2.EMPLOYER ‐ Any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries on it the Philippines
any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of
any kind and uses the services of another person who is
under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations
owned or controlled by the Government: Provided,
That a self‐employed person shall be both employee
and employer at the same time. 13
3. Employee ‐ Any person who performs services for
an employer in which either or both mental and
physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services, where there is an
employer‐employee relationship: Provided, That a self‐
employed person shall be both employee and employer
at the same time. 14
4. "(e) Dependents ‐ The dependent shall be the
following: (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to
receive support from the member; (2) The legitimate,
legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not
reached twenty‐one years (21) of age, or if over
twenty‐one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or
while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated
and incapable of self‐ support, physically or mentally;
and (3) The parent who is receiving regular support
from the member. 15
COVERAGE:
1. Compulsory:
 All employees not over sixty (60) years of age
and their employers. 16
 Self-employed persons as may be determined
by the commission. 17 This includes:
o All self-employed professionals
o Partners and single proprietors of
businesses
o Actors, actresses, directors,
scriptwriters and news correspondents
who do not fall within the definition of
employee
o Professional athletes, coaches, trainers
and jockeys
o Individual farmers and fishermen
2. Voluntary:
as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Social Security Law,
Republic Act 8282.
13
Supra Note 12, Sec 8c.
14
Supra Note 12, Sec 8d.
15
Supra Note 12, Sec 8e.
16
Supra Note 12, Sec 9a.
17
Supra Note 12, Sec 9A.
  Spouses who devote full time to
managing the household and family
affairs.18
 Filipinos working by foreign-based
employ ers for employment abroad.19
EFFECT OF SEPARATION FROM
EMPLOYMENT: Obligation of employer and
employee to pay ceases. However, employee may
still continue to pay the total contribution to
maintain his right to full benefit. 20
EFFECT OF INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS
OR PROFESSIONAL INCOME: If the self-
employed member realizes no income, he shall not
be required to pay contributions for that month but
he is allowed to continue paying provided that no
retroactive payment shall be allowed except for
quarterly remittance of monthly contributions.
a. Monthly pension shall be suspended upon
reemployment or resumption of self-employment
of a retired member who is less than 65 years old
and shall again pay monthly contributions. 22
b. Upon death of a member, his beneficiaries
(Primary or if none, Secondary) shall be entitled to
his monthly pension. 23
c. Monthly pension of a member who retires after
reaching the age of 60 shall be the higher of either
his monthly pension computed at the earliest time
he could have retired or the monthly pension
computed at the time he actually retires. 24
2. Death Benefits
A. Sec. 13
 Paid at least 36 monthly contributions
prior to death

- Beneficiaries (Primary or if none, Secondary)

ELEGIBILITY and BENEFITS shall be entitled to whichever is higher among the
lump sum benefit equivalent to 36 times the
1. Retirement Benefits 21
monthly pension or if he has not paid the 36
A. Sec. 12-B (a) monthly contributions, a lump sum benefit
equivalent to monthly pension times the number
 At least 120 monthly contributions prior to of monthly contributions paid to SSS or 12 times
retirement the monthly pension.
 Reached the age of 60
 Already separated from employment or has 3. Permanent Disability Benefits
ceased to be self-employed
A. Sec. 13-A (a)
OR
 Paid at least 36 months prior to
 Reached the age of 65 disability

- Entitled to monthly pension as long as he lives - -Entitled to monthly pension

Has an option to receive the first 18 monthly
 Not paid the required 36 monthly
pensions in lump sum.
contributions
B. Sec. 12-B (b)
-Entitled to the lump sum benefit equal to
 60 years old at retirement but does not whichever is higher among monthly pension times
qualify under Sec. 12-B (a) the number of monthly contributions paid to SSS
 separated from employment or 12 times the monthly pension.
 not continuing payment of contributions on NOTE:
his own
a. A member who has received a lump sum benefit
- Entitled to lump sum benefit equal to the total and is re-employed or has resumed self-
contributions paid employment not earlier than 1 year from disability
NOTES: shall again be subject to compulsory membership
and will be considered a new member.
18
Supra Note 12, Sec 9b.
19 22
Supra Note 12, Sec 9c. Supra Note 12, Sec. 12-B (c)
20 23
Supra Note 12, Sec 11. Supra Note 12, Sec. 12-B (d)
21 24
Supra Note 12, Sec 12-B. Supra Note 12, Sec. 12-B (e)
b. The death of the pensioner would entitle his
beneficiaries to receive the monthly pension. 25
B. Sec. 13-A (d)
Disabilities deemed as permanent total:
 Complete loss of sight of both eyes
 Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or
wrists
 Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs
 Brain injury resulting to incurable
imbecility or insanity
 Such cases as determined and approved by
the SSS
 Unemployed or self-employed members
shall directly notify the SSS under the
same rules as those employed
- 90% of his daily salary credit will be paid by the
employer or the SSS
NOTES:
a. In no case shall sickness benefit be paid longer
than 120 days
b. Unused portion of 120 days of sickness benefit
granter cannot be carried forward
c. Daily sickness benefit shall not be paid for more
than 240 days on account of the same confinement

C. Sec. 13-A (e)

 Disability is permanent partial and such

occurs before 36 monthly contributions
have been paid prior to disability
- Benefit shall be the percentage of lump sum
benefit with due regard to the degree of disability
D. Sec. 13-A (f)
 Disability is permanent partial and such
occurs after 36 monthly contributions have
been paid prior to disability
- Benefit shall be the monthly pension for total
disability payable not longer than the period
designated.
6. Maternity Leave Benefit (Sec. 14-A)
 Paid at least 3 monthly contributions in the
12 month period preceding childbirth or
miscarriage
 Employee notified her employer of her
pregnancy and the probable date of her
childbirth. The same shall be transmitted to
SSS
- Female member shall be paid a daily maternity
benefit equivalent to 100% of her average daily
credit for 60 days (normal delivery) and 78 days
(caesarean delivery)

4. Funeral Benefit (Sec. 13-B) NOTES:

 Funeral grant equivalent to P12,000.00 a. Full payment shall be advanced by the employer
upon death of a member within 30 days from filing of maternity application

5. Sickness Benefit (Sec. 14) b. Availing of this benefit shall be a bar to

recovery of sickness benefits covering the same
 Paid at least 3 monthly contributions in the period
12 month period immediately preceding
the semester of sickness or injury c. Applicable only to first four deliveries or
miscarriage
 Confined for more than 3 days in a hospital
approved by SSS
 Employee shall notify employer of his
sickness or injury within 5 calendar days
after the start of his confinement unless
such confinement is in a hospital or the
employee became sick or injured while
working or within the premises of the
employer.
GSIS CASES
25
Supra Note 12, Sec 13-A (c)
G.R. No. 196102 moment in time but rather over a period of time.
The right to compensation extends to disability
November 26, 2014 due to disease supervening upon and proximately
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE and naturally resulting from a compensable injury.
SYSTEM, Petitioner, Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen
vs. in the course of employment, every natural
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimant’s own negligence or misconduct.
Facts:
Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension
Aurelia Y. Calumpiano was employed as Court
caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due
Stenographer at the Court of First Instance of
to advance to late stageglaucoma, which rendered
Samar from January 5, 1972 to March 30, 2002.
her legally blind.
Before her retirement on March 7, 2002, filed
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is
before the Supreme Court, an application for
well guided by the principles, declared in Bauland
disability retirement on account of her ailments,
De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the
hypertensive cardiovascular disease and acute
test of proof in compensation cases, that the
angle closure glaucoma. To bolster her claim, she
primordial and paramount consideration is the
submitted the medical
employee’s welfare; that the strict rules of
certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr.
evidence need not be observed in claims for
Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of
compensation; that medical findings of the
whom are Ophthalmologists at Eastern Samar
attending physician may be received in evidence
Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together
and used as proof of the facts in dispute, that in
with the results of
any determination of compensability, the nature
her perimetry test, a medical certificate was issued
and characteristics of the job are as important as
by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the
raw medical findings and a claimant’s personal
Supreme Court approved application for disability
and social history; that where the primary injury is
retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New
shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
GSIS Act of 1997). Respondents disability claim
every natural consequence that flows from the
was forwarded to GSIS, but the latter denied her
injury likewise arises out of the employment,
claim for the reason that
unless it is the result of an independent intervening
hypertension and glaucoma, which were her
cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or
illnesses, were not work-related. Her motion for
misconduct, and that the policyis to extend the
reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.
application of the law on employees’
compensation to as many employees who can
Issues:
avail of the benefits thereunder.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
respondents diseases hypertension and glaucoma The Petition is DENIED.
are compensable under the increased risk theory
and;
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov201
the findings of the ECC 4/gr_196102_2014.html

Held:
The fact that the essential hypertension of
respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the G.R. No. 192708
time she was already out of service is October 2, 2017
inconsequential. The main consideration for its
compensability is that her illness was contracted MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS'
during and by reason of her employment, and any ASSOCIATION (MPSTA), TEACHERS'
non-work related factor that contributed to its DIGNITY COALITION (TDC), MELCHOR
aggravation is immaterial. Indeed, an employee’s V. CAYABYAB, EVA V. FERIA, ELCIRA A.
disability may not manifest fully at one precise PONFERRADA, AND NATIVIDAD P.
TALASTAS, IN THEIR BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF ALL GSIS MEMBERS AND
RETIREES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Petitioners
vs.
MR. WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
MANAGER OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
GSIS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AND SEC.
ARMIN LUISTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents
Facts:
On 14 November 1936, a government service
insurance system was created by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186 in order to
promote the efficiency and welfare of the
employees of the government of the Philippines.
On 31 May 1977, then President Marcos approved
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 amending,
expanding, increasing, and integrating the social
security and insurance benefits of government
employees and facilitating the payment thereof
under C.A. No. 186. More than 20 years later,
P.D. 1146 was amended, and Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8291, or the "The GSIS Act of 1997," took
effect.
Under this Act, the employee-member and the
employer-agency are required by law to pay
monthly contributions to the system. One of the
changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the
employer's contribution from 9.5% to 12%.
However, there was no concomitant increase in
the budget appropriation. As a result, DepEd was
unable to pay GSIS the equivalent of the 2.5%
increase in the employer's share. It must be noted
that neither DepEd nor GSIS denies that there is a
problem with the reconciliation of their records,
such that the GSIS database might reflect
nonpayment of the PS despite its automatic
deduction from the employee's salary and its
remittance by DepEd. As for the GS, it is also
possible that the database might reflect
nonpayment despite remittance. In fact, GSIS
itself admitted that it is public knowledge that
previous problems in the Information Technology
infrastructure of GSIS have severely affected the
efficient servicing of members claims.
Assailed resolutions issued by the GSIS were not
published in a newspaper of general circulation
and were enforced before they were even filed
with the Office of the National Administrative
Register. Petitioners seek to nullify the resolutions
for being "intrinsically unconstitutional, illegal,
unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory,
immoral, ultra vires, and unconscionable.
Issue:
Whether said resolutions issued by GSIS are valid
Held:
The policies are invalid due to lack of publication.
In Tenada vs. Tuvera case has already laid down
definitive interpretation of Article 2 of the Civil
Code,
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
This Court held that the requirements of
publication and filing must be strictly complied
with, as these were designed to safeguard against
abuses on the part of lawmakers and to guarantee
the constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern. Even in
cases where the parties participated in the public
consultation and submitted their respective
comments, strict compliance with the requirement
of publication cannot be dispensed with.42
While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions
with the Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of
the retirees and beneficiaries had already been
lodged.43 The resolutions were not published in
either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation in the country.
GSIS maintains that the publication of the
resolutions was unnecessary, because the policies
were "just a mere reiteration of the time honored
principles of insurance law."44 According to
GSIS, the PBP is actually contained in R.A. 8291,
which allegedly contemplates the actual payment
of premiums.
Aside from seeking the nullification of the
Resolutions, petitioners are also praying that this
Court order respondent GSIS to 1) restore the
creditable service of all GSIS members (not just
teachers), reckoned simply from the date of their
respective original appointments or elections; 2)
compute and grant the creditable service, benefits,
and claims of GSIS members based on their
periods of service and regardless of any deficiency
in the GS; 3) account the automatic deduction of
the PS from their salaries as conclusive
compliance with their obligation of premium share
payments, and thus entitle them to their full
benefits and claims, regardless of the remittance
thereof by the agency-employer to the GSIS; and
4) accept as proof of employee premium share
payment and loan repayment the pay slips of the
employees and/or remittance lists or certifications
from the agency-employer, or other proof of
payment as may be provided by the employee
and/or the agency; and to update the employee's
service records using these documents. Petitioners
are also asking us to order the refund to GSIS
members of those amounts that were deducted
from their claims and benefits arising from the
implementation of the PBP, APL, and CLIP, with
interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from
the time of withholding of each of those amounts.
Wherefore the petition is partially granted. GSIS
Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which
respectively embody the Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy,
and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse, are
declared invalid and of no force and effect.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/oct2017
/gr_192708_2017.html
G.R. No. 204738
July 29, 2015
GLENDA RODRIGUEZ-ANGAT, petitioner
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
Facts:
Petitioner Glenda Rodriguez-Angat was a former
employee of the GSIS holding the position of
Acting Senior Social Insurance Specialist detailed
at the Loans Department of the then Social
Insurance Group. Petitioner was assigned a
personal IP address with a Terminal ID to enable
her to perform her functions and access GSIS
databases.6 Respondent GSIS is a government
owned and controlled corporation duly organized
and existing pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended. Respondent charged petitioner
with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
In a Show Cause Memorandum dated February
20, 2007, respondent required petitioner to explain
her participation in the erroneous tagging of the
loan of Sy. Petitioner replied via verified
memorandum dated February 28, 2007 with the
GSIS Investigation Department where she denied
any participation in the erroneous tagging of the
salary loan and claimed that she was never
assigned to the Loans Division which was
responsible for the tagging of the loan accounts as
"fully paid". Petitioner further claimed that even if
the tagging was done using her terminal, such fact
alone does not necessarily prove that it was she
herself who personally committed the erroneous
tagging.
Respondent was not persuaded by petitioner’s
explanation and filed against the latter
Administrative Case No. 07-010 on July 26, 2007
for Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
In the instant case, Rodriguez-Angat was formally
charged with Simple Neglect of Duty and
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations, which under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS) are only less grave and light offenses,
respectively. Hence, applying the abovementioned
pronouncement of the Supreme Court, Rodriguez-
Angat cannot be held guilty of the higher or grave
offense of Grave Misconduct. To do so would
constitute a denial of her right to be informed of
the nature of the offense with which she was
charged.
As regards the issue of whether substantial
evidence exists to find Rodriguez-Angat guilty of
Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, the
Commission likewise rules in the negative.
Records show that the GSIS failed to sufficiently
prove that Rodriguez-Angat did the tagging of the
salary loan account of Mercy M. Sy of the Manila
Health Department as fully paid despite its
outstanding balance or that she allowed others to
use her computer terminal in the performance of
such act. What was merely established is that the
loan account of Sy was tagged as fully paid using
Terminal ID A7C4 which allegedly belonged to
Rodriguez-Angat. The GSIS, however, failed to
present any evidence to prove that, indeed,
Terminal ID A7C4 belongs to Rodriguez-Angat.
At this juncture, it is worth stressing that a party
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
(Dela Cruz vs. Sison, 451 SCRA 754), and that
allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence
– mere allegation is not evidence (Ramoran vs.
Jardine CMG Life Insurance Co., Inc., 326 SCRA
208).
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction
over the appeal/petition of GSIS?
Whether is it lawful to convict her of a higher or
graver offense of Grave Misconduct and impose
upon her the penalty of Dismissal from service
with all its accessory penalties.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the CA did not acquire
appellate jurisdiction due to the belated filing by
respondent of its appeal to the CSC Resolutions.
According to petitioner, records show that
respondent received its copy of the October 6,
2010 CSC Resolution on October 22, 2010 as
evidenced by a Certification issued by the Pasay
City Central Post Office – contrary to the
allegation of respondent that it received the same
only on October 27, 2010. Following this
argument, petitioner reckons the 15-day period to
appeal38 from October 22, 2010 and claims that
respondent had only up to November 8, 2010
within which to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the
CA. Thus, when respondent filed its petition for
review before the appellate court on November 11,
2010 – or three (3) days after the expiration of the
period to appeal – the CSC Resolutions have
already become final and not appealable.
We disagree with petitioner and affirm the
timeliness of the appeal before the appellate court.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the
substantial evidence rule where a finding of guilt
would have tobe sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent committed acts stated in the complaint.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of
substantial evidence ismet when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of,
even if such evidence is not overwhelming oreven
preponderant, and respondent’s participation
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.
In the case at bar, petitioner was formally charged
with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. Simple
neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give
proper attention to a task expected of an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference.
It is censurable under Section 52(B)(1) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service as a less grave offense and is
punishable by suspension from office for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Respondent, however, found petitioner guilty of
Grave Misconduct and imposed upon her the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all the
attendant accessory penalties. To be classified as
grave, one’s misconduct must show the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rules.
To warrant dismissal from the service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrong fullintention and
not a mere error of judgment.
In the case at bar, respondent was not able to
adduce substantial evidence to prove the elements
constitutive of Grave Misconduct. Respondent
failed to discharge its burden to show clear and
convincing evidence that the erroneous full
payment tagging was done due to corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules on the part of
petitioner. Instead, respondent simply ratiocinated
and concluded its finding of Grave Misconduct on
petitioner using her terminal for the erroneous full
payment tagging despite her awareness of its
repercussions as "a clear manifestation of her mal-
intent"
Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Uniform Rules), Simple Misconduct is classified
as a less grave offense with the corresponding
penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months for the first offense,
while violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations is classified as a light offense
imposing the penalty of reprimand for the first
offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 116748 dated May 31, 2012 and December 4,
2012, respectively, are
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Glenda Rodriguez
Angat is found GUILTY of Simple Misconduct
and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations and is ordered SUSPENDED for SIX
(6) MONTHS. She is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar infractions will be
dealt with more severely.
No costs.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jul2015/
gr_204738_2015.html
G.R. No. 192971
January 10, 2018
FLORO MERCENE, Petitioner
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, Respondent
Facts:
Petitioner FloroMercene (Mercene) obtained a
loan from respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of
₱29,500.00 on 19 January 1965. As security, a real
estate mortgage was executed over Mercene's
property in Quezon City, registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 90535. The mortgage was
registered and annotated on the title on 24 March
1965.
Mercene contracted another loan with GSIS for
the amount of ₱14,500.00. The loan was likewise
secured by a real estate mortgage on the same
parcel of land. The following day, the loan was
registered and duly annotated on the title on 14
May 1968.
On 11 June 2004, Mercene opted to file a
complaint for Quieting of Title against GSIS. He
alleged that: since 1968 until the time the
complaint was filed, GSIS never exercised its
rights as a mortgagee; the real estate mortgage
over his property constituted a cloud on the title;
GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed. In its
answer, GSIS assailed that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and that prescription does
not run against it because it is a government entity.
RTC found for petitioner while the CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner had sufficiently
established that the action to foreclose had
prescribed
Held:
In its answer, GSIS raised the affirmative defense,
among others, that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. In turn, the CA ruled that
Mercene's complaint did not state a cause of action
because the maturity date of the loans, or the
demand for the satisfaction of the obligation, was
never alleged.
In order for cause of action to arise, the following
elements must be present: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
In University of Mindanao, Inc. v. BangkoSentral
ng Pilipinas, et al., the Court clarified that
prescription runs in mortgage contract from the
time the cause of action arose and not from the
time of its execution, to wit:
The prescriptive period neither runs from the date
of the execution of a contract nor does the
prescriptive period necessarily run on the date
when the loan becomes due and demandable.
Prescriptive period runs from the date of demand,
subject to certain exceptions.
In other words, ten (10) years may lapse from the
date of the execution of contract, without barring a
cause of action on the mortgage when there is a
gap between the period of execution of the
contract and the due date or between the due date
and the demand date in cases when demand is
necessary.
The mortgage contracts in this case were executed
by SaturninoPetalcorin in 1982. The maturity
dates of FISLAI's loans were repeatedly extended
until the loans became due and demandable only
in 1990. Respondent informed petitioner of its
decision to foreclose its properties and demanded
payment in 1999.
The running of the prescriptive period of
respondent's action on the mortgages did not start
when it executed the mortgage contracts with
SaturninoPetalcorin in 1982.
The prescriptive period for filing an action may
run either (1) from 1990 when the loan became
due, if the obligation was covered by the
exceptions under Article 1169 of the Civil Code;
(2) or from 1999 when respondent demanded
payment, if the obligation was not covered by the
exceptions under Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
Thus, applying the pronouncements of the Court
regarding prescription on the right to foreclose
mortgages, the Court finds that the CA did not err
in concluding that Mercene's complaint failed to
state a cause of action. It is undisputed that his
complaint merely stated the dates when the loan
was contracted and when the mortgages were
annotated on the title of the lot used as a security.
Conspicuously lacking were allegations
concerning: the maturity date of the loan
contracted and whether demand was necessary
under the terms and conditions of the loan.
As such, the RTC erred in ruling that GSIS' right
to foreclose had prescribed because the allegations
in Mercene's complaint were insufficient to
establish prescription against GSIS. The only
information the trial court had were the dates of
the execution of the loan, and the annotation of the
mortgages on the title. As elucidated in the above-
mentioned decisions, prescription of the right to
foreclose mortgages is not reckoned from the date
of execution of the contract. Rather, prescription
commences from the time the cause of action
accrues; in other words, from the time the
obligation becomes due and demandable, or upon
demand by the creditor/mortgagor, as the case
may be.
In addition, there was no judicial admission on the
part of GSIS with regard to prescription because
treating the obligation as prescribed, was merely a
conclusion of law. It would have been different if
Mercene's complaint alleged details necessary to
determine when GSIS' right to foreclose arose,
i.e., date of maturity and whether demand was
necessary.
Wherefore the petition is denied. The 29 April
2010 Decision and 20 July 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV No. 86615
are AFFIRMED in toto.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/jan2018/gr_19
2971_2018.html
G.R. No. 189827
October 16, 2013
GERSIP ASSOCIATION, INC., LETICIA
ALMAZAN, ANGELA NARVAEZ, MARIA B.
PINEDA, LETICIA DE MESA AND
ALFREDO D. PINEDA, Petitioners,
vs.
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE SERVICE
SYSTEM, Respondent.

Facts:
On March 19, 1981, the GSIS Board of
Trustees(GSIS Board) approved the proposed
GSISProvident Fund Plan (Plan) to
providesupplementary benefits to GSIS
employeesupon their retirement, disability or
separationfrom the service, and payment of
definiteamounts to their beneficiaries in the event
ofdeath. It likewise adopted the "ProvidentFund
Rules and Regulations" (PFRR) whichbecame
effective on April 1, 1981.Under the Plan,
employees who aremembers of the Provident Fund
contributethrough salary deduction a sum
equivalentto five percent (5%) of their monthly
salarywhile respondent’s monthly contribution
isfixed at 45% of each member’s monthlysalary. A
Committee of Trustee appointed byrespondent
administers the Fund by investingit "in a prudent
manner to ensure thepreservation of the Fund
capital and theadequacy of its earnings. Out of the
earnings realized by the Fund, twentypercent
(20%) of the proportionate earnings
ofrespondent’s contributions is deducted and
credited to a General Reserve Fund (GRF) and
theremainder is credited to the accounts of the
members in proportion to the amounts standing
totheir credit at the beginning of each quarter.
Upon retirement, members are entitled to
withdrawthe entire amount of their contributions
and proportionate share of the accumulated
earningsthereon, and 100% of respondent’s
contributions with its proportionate earnings.
On March 30, 2001, petitioner
GERSIPAssociation, Inc., composed of retired
GSISemployees and officers, wrote the President
and General Manager of respondent requesting
theliquidation and partition of the GRF. In his
letter-reply dated August 14, 2001, then
Presidentand General Manager Winston F. Garcia
explained that there exists a trustrelation rather
than co-ownership with respectto the Fund,
stressing that the PFRR authorizes a reduction of
20% earnings for the GRF, not a total liquidation
of the fund itself.
In its Answer, respondent asserted thatpetitioners
as retiring members of theFund were entitled only
to the benefitsprovided in Section 1(b), Article V
of thePFRR and that their claim is not coveredby
Section 8(a) to (d), Article IV whichenumerates
the purposes for which theGRF is allocated.
Respondent furthercontended that there is no legal
basis forpetitioners’ theory that they are co-owners
and not just beneficiaries of theFund.
Issues:
Whether or not GSIS Provident fund is not a
"trust" but a co-ownership.
Whether the petitioners, as members of the
Provident Fund, are legally entitled to accounting
and audit of the Fund.
Held:
The GSIS Provident Fund was established through
Resolution No. 201 of the GSIS Board. The GSIS
Board likewise adopted a set of rules and
regulations (PFRR) to govern the membership,
fund contributions and investment, payment of
benefits and the trustees. A Trust Agreement was
executedbetween respondent and the
Committee.Respondent’s contention that it had
thereby
created an express trust was upheld by the GSIS
Board and the CA. The appellate court further
ruled that the rules on co-ownership do not apply
and there is nothing in the PFRR that allows the
distribution of the GRF in proportion to the
members’ share therein. The Court sustains the
rulings of the GSIS Board and CA.
Trust is the legal relationship between one person
having an equitable ownership in property and
another person owning the legal title to such
property, the equitable ownership of the former
entitling him to the performance of certain duties
and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. A
trust fund refers to money or property set aside as
a trust for the benefit of another and held by a
trustee.20 Under the Civil Code, trusts are
classified as either express or implied. An express
trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of
the parties, while an implied trust comes into
being by operation of law.
There is no doubt that respondent intended to
establish a trust fund from the employees’
contributions (5% of monthly salary) and its own
contributions (45% of each member’s monthly
salary and all unremitted Employees Welfare
contributions). We cannot accept petitioners’
submission that respondent could not impose
terms and conditions on the availment of benefits
from the Fund on the ground that members already
own respondent’s contributions from the moment
such was remitted to their account. Petitioners’
assertion that the Plan was a purely contractual
obligation on the part of respondent is likewise
mistaken. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013
Here, petitioners as beneficiaries of the Fund /gr_189827_2013.html
contend that they became co-owners of the entire
Fund including respondent’s contributions and its
accumulated earnings. On this premise, they
demand a proportionate share in the GRF which
was deducted from the earnings on respondents’
contributions.
Under the PFRR, however, the GRF is allocated
for specific purposes and not intended for
distribution to members. Section 8,24 Article IV
thus provides:
Section 8. Earnings. At the beginning of each
quarter, the earnings realized by the Fund in the
previous quarter just ended shall be credited to the
accounts of the members in proportion to, which
deduction shall be credited to a General Reserve
Fund. Whenever circumstances warrant, however,
the Committee may reduce the percentage to be
credited to the General Reserve Fund for any
given quarter; provided that in no case shall such
percentage be lower than five per cent (5%) of the
proportionate earnings of the System’s
contributions for the quarter. When and as long as
the total amount in the General Reserve Fund is
equivalent to at least ten per cent (10%) of the
total assets of the Fund, the Committee may
authorize all the earnings for any given quarter to
be credited to the members.
We find nothing illegal or anomalous in the
creation of the GRF to address certain
contingencies and ensure the Fund’s continuing
viability. Petitioners’ right to receive retirement
benefits under the Plan was subject to well-
defined rules and regulations that were made
known to and accepted by them when they applied
for membership in the Fund.
Petitioners have the right to demand for an
accounting of the Fund including the GRF. Under
Section 5,28 Article VIII of the PFRR, the
Committee is required to prepare an annual report
showing the income and expenses and the
financial condition of the Fund as of the end of
each calendar year. Said report shall be submitted
to the GSIS Board and shall be available to
members. There is, however, no allegation or
evidence that the Committee failed to comply with
the submission of such annual report, or that such
report was not made available to members.
The Petition is denied and the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
SSS CASES
June 21, 2017
G.R. No. 194137
AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC., vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
FACTS:
Sometime in September 2001, the SSS
filed a complaint with the City
Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City
against Ambassador Hotel, Inc.
(Ambassador Hotel) and its officers for
non-remittance of SSS contributions
and penalty liabilities for the period
from June 1999 to March 2001 in the
aggregate amount of ₱769,575.48.
After preliminary investigation, the
City Prosecutor's Office filed an
Information, dated January 28, 2004,
before the RTC charging Ambassador
Hotel, Inc.'s Yolanda Chan (Yolanda),
as President and Chairman of the
Board; and Alvin Louie Rivera, as
Treasurer and Head of the Finance
Department, with violation of Section
22(a), in relation to Section 22(d) and
Section 28(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No.
8282.26 Only Yolanda was arrested.
ISSUE 1:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER.
RULING:
Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282
explicitly provides that “if the act or
omission penalized by this Act be
committed by an association,
partnership, corporation or any other
institution, its managing head,
directors or partners shall be liable to
the penalties provided in this Act for
the offense.” 27 Thus, a corporation
26
Supra Note 12
27
Supra Note 12, Sec 28(f).
cannot invoke its separate judicial
entity to escape its liability for non-
payment of SSS contributions.
To acquire jurisdiction over the
corporation in a criminal case, its head,
directors or partners must be served
with a warrant of arrest. Naturally, a
juridical entity cannot be the subject of
an arrest because it is a mere fiction of
law; thus, an arrest on its
representative is sufficient to acquire
jurisdiction over it. To reiterate, the
law specifically disregards the separate
personality between the corporation
and its officers with respect to
violations of R.A. No. 8282; thus, an
arrest on its officers binds the
corporation.
In this case, Yolanda, as President of
Ambassador Hotel, was arrested and
brought before the RTC. Consequently,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Yolanda and of
Ambassador Hotel as the former was
its representative. No separate service
of summons is required for the hotel
because the law simply requires the
arrest of its agent for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over it in the
criminal action. Likewise, there is no
requirement to implead Ambassador
Hotel as a party to the criminal case
because it is deemed included therein
through its managing head, directors
or partners, as provided by Section 28
(f) of R.A. No. 8282.
ISSUE 2:
WHETHER THE DECISION
RENDERED BY THE LOWER COURT
DECLARING PETITIONER LIABLE
TO RESPONDENT SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM FOR ALLEGED
UNREMITTED SSS CONTRIBUTION
IS VALID.
RULING:
Under Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8282,
an employer is defined as "any person,
natural or juridical, domestic or
foreign, who carries on in the
Philippines any trade, business,
industry, undertaking, or activity of
any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders
as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including
corporations owned or controlled by
the Government.”28
Ambassador Hotel, as a juridical entity,
is still bound by the provisions of R.A.
No. 8282. Section 22 (a) Remittance of
Contributions. “The contributions
imposed in the preceding section shall
be remitted to the SSS within the first
ten (10) days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are
applicable or within such time as the
Commission may prescribe. Every
employer required to deduct and to
remit such contributions shall be liable
for their payment and if any
contribution is not paid to the SSS as
herein prescribed, he shall pay besides
the contribution a penalty thereon of
three percent (3%) per month from the
date the contribution falls due until
paid. If deemed expedient and
advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of
contributions shall be made quarterly
or semiannually in advance, the
contributions payable by the employees
to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon
separation of an employee, any
contribution so paid in advance but not
due shall be credited or refunded to his
employer.”29
During trial, the prosecution
established that the SSS, through De
28
Supra Note 12, Sec 28(c).
29
Supra Note 12, Sec 28(a).
Ocampo, discovered that the last
remittance of SSS contributions by
Ambassador Hotel was made in May
1999. She informed the hotel of its
delinquency on April 17, 2001. She
gave the hotel's representative the
delinquency assessment and the billing
letter. She also requested that the
records of previous SSS payments be
presented, but these could not be
produced. After referring the case to
the Cluster Legal Unit, De Ocampo sent
a final demand letter to Ambassador
Hotel by registered mail and personal
service. Notwithstanding the several
notices of its delinquency, Ambassador
Hotel failed to settle its obligations.
Moreover, though it offered to pay its
delinquency through installment, no
postdated checks were ever submitted.
Cordon, a witness for the hotel, even
admitted that they were informed of
their delinquency and that they
attempted to unearth its SSS records to
defend its obligations, but failed to do
so. The hotel never proved that it had
already paid its contributions or, if not,
who should have been accountable for
its non-payment. Glaringly, even
though Ambassador Hotel was given
sufficient leeway to explain its
obligations, it did not take advantage of
the said opportunity. Consequently, it
had nothing else to blame for its
predicament but itself.
In fine, the Court is of the view that
there is preponderance of evidence that
Ambassador Hotel failed to remit its
SSS contributions from June 1999 to
March 2001 in the amount of
₱584,804.00. It must pay the said
amount to the SSS plus interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum.
G.R. No.178055
July 2, 2014
AMECOS INNOVATIONS, INC.
and ANTONIO F. MATEO vs.
ELIZA R. LOPEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Amecos Innovations, Inc.
(Amecos) is a corporation duly
incorporated under Philippine laws
engaged in the business of selling
assorted products created by its
President and herein co-petitioner,
Antonio F. Mateo (Mateo). On May 30,
2003, Amecos received a Subpoena
from the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City in connection with a
complaint filed by the Social Security
System (SSS) for alleged delinquency
in the remittance of SSS contributions
and penalty liabilities in violation of
Section 22(a) and 22(d) in relation to
Section 28(e) of the SSS law 30 , as
amended.
By way of explanation, Amecos
attributed its failure to remit the SSS
contributions to herein respondent
Eliza R. Lopez (respondent). Amecos
claimed that it hired respondent on
January 15, 2001 as Marketing
Assistant to promote its products; that
upon hiring, respondent refused to
provide Amecos with her SSS Number
and to be deducted her contributions;
that on the basis of the foregoing,
Amecos no longer enrolled respondent
with the SSS and did not deduct her
corresponding contributions up to the
time of her termination in February
2002.
Amecos eventually settled its
obligations with the SSS; consequently,
SSS filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint which was approved by the
Office of the City Prosecutor.
30
Supra Note 12
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE REGULAR CIVIL
COURT AND NOT THE LABOR
ARBITER OR THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION OVER CLAIM[S]
FOR REIMBURSEMENT ARISING
FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS.
WHETHER THE REGULAR CIVIL
COURT AND NOT THE LABOR
ARBITER OR THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION OVER CLAIM[S]
FOR DAMAGES FOR
MISREPRESENTATION ARISING
FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS.
RULING:
This Court holds that as between the
parties, Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor
Code 31 is applicable. Said provision
bestows upon the Labor Arbiter
original and exclusive jurisdiction over
claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations. The
observation that the matter of SSS
contributions necessarily flowed from
the employer-employee relationship
between the parties – shared by the
lower courts and the CA – is correct;
thus, petitioners’ claims should have
been referred to the labor tribunals. In
this connection, it is noteworthy to
state that "the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction to award not only the
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also
damages governed by the Civil Code.”
At the same time, it cannot be assumed
that since the dispute concerns the
payment of SSS premiums, petitioners’
claim should be referred to the Social
Security Commission (SSC) pursuant
to Republic Act No. 1161, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8282.32 As far as
SSS is concerned, there is no longer a
31
32
Supra Note 12
dispute with respect to petitioners’
accountability to the System;
petitioners already settled their
pecuniary obligations to it. Since there
is no longer any dispute regarding
coverage, benefits, contributions and
penalties to speak of, the SSC need not
be unnecessarily dragged into the
picture. Besides, it cannot be made to
act as a collecting agency for
petitioners’ claims against the
respondent; the Social Security Law
should not be so interpreted, lest the
SSC be swamped with cases of this sort.
G.R. No. 209741
April 15, 2015
Social Security Commission vs.
Edna A. Azote
FACTS:
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna
and Edgardo, a member of the SSS,
were married in civil rites. On April 27,
1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to
the SSS with Edna and their three older
children as designated beneficiaries.
Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another
Form E-4 to the SSS designating his
three younger children as additional
beneficiaries.
On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed
away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her
claim for death benefits with the SSS as
the wife of a deceased-member.
However, the SSS records revealed that
Edgardo had earlier submitted another
Form E-4 with a different set of
beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote,
as his spouse; and Elmer Azote as
dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim
was denied. Her children were
adjudged as beneficiaries and she was
considered as the legal guardian of her
minor children.
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a
petition with the SSC to claim the death
benefits, lump sum and monthly
pension of Edgardo. She insisted that
she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo.
In its answer, the SSS averred that
there was a conflicting information in
the forms submitted by the deceased.
Summons was published in a
newspaper of general circulation
directing Rosemarie to file her answer.
Despite the publication, no answer was
filed and Rosemarie was subsequently
declared in default.
The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for
lack of merit and it further wrote that
the National Statistics Office (NSO)
records revealed that the marriage of
Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora
Sino was registered on July 28,
1982. Consequently, it opined that
Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not
valid as there was no showing that his
first marriage had been annulled or
dissolved. The SSC stated that there
must be a judicial determination of
nullity of a previous marriage before a
party could enter into a second
marriage.
ISSUE:
WHETHER EDNA SHOULD BE
ADJUDGED AS THE LEGAL SPOUSE
OF THE DECEASED, THUS
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS.
RULING:
No. The law in force at the time of
Edgardo’s death was RA 8282.
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A.
No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased-member is
qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits33. In this case, there
is a concrete proof that Edgardo
contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by
their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when
he filled out the 1982 Form E-4
designating Rosemarie as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second
marriage of Edgardo with Edna was
celebrated at the time when the Family
Code was already in force. For the
purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must
33
Supra Note 12, Section 8 (e) and (k)
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Using the parameters outlined in
Article 41 of the Family Code34, Edna,
without doubt, failed to establish that
there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at
the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule
that "whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence."35 Edna could not
adduce evidence to prove that the
earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there
was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage
to Edgardo. What is apparent is that
Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to
show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased-member, she would not
qualify under the law to be the
beneficiary of the death benefits of
Edgardo.
The existence of two Form E-4s
designating, on two different dates, two
different women as his spouse is
already an indication that only one of
them can be the legal spouse. As can
be gleaned from the certification issued
by the NSO, there is no doubt that
Edgardo married Rosemarie in
1982. Edna cannot be considered as
the legal spouse of Edgardo as their
marriage took place during the
existence of a previously contracted
marriage. For said reason, the denial
34
35
Signey v. Social Security System, 566 Phil. 617, 627 (2008).
of Edna’s claim by the SSC was correct.
It should be emphasized that the SSC
determined Edna’s eligibility on the
basis of available statistical data and
documents on their database as
expressly permitted by Section 4(b) (7)
of R.A. No. 8282. 36

It is of no moment that the first wife,

Rosemarie, did not participate or
oppose Edna’s claim. Rosemarie’s non-
participation or her subsequent death
on November 11, 2004 did not cure or
legitimize the status of Edna.

36
Supra Note 12, Section 4 (b)(7)