Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to
an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will
shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of
31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino
Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the
permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition
despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1)
the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only
one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is
even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to
propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to
the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The
framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state
the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of peopleï ¿ ½s initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is
signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be
to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the
petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the
full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative
petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence
on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that
the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.
The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same.
We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of Verified Signatures:
Legislative District: Barangay:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHERï ¿ ½"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Name
Birthdate
PrecinctNumber Last Name, First Address Signature Verification
MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
___________________ __________________
___________________
Witness Witness
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
(Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet.Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the
initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months
earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August
2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union
of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of
the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF
LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS
A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. 23 (Underscoring
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006
amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic)
Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of
the Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to
the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only
Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the
30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino
Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of
Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present
petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not
also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo.
State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had
pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged
that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated
during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed
by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets.
The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court
in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more
than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft
petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this
Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino
initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25This admission binds the Lambino Group
and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of
the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each
of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3
million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets,
or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance
with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their
own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section
merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the
phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to
schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House
of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular
members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid
fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and
his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the
interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitutionconsistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far
from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus,
in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on -
the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes
it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence,
stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage,
and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative
operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of
the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the
interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets
do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need
for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed
changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for
the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even
if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of
the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members
of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so
vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people
even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a
constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction
was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon
petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California
ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of "laws and amendments to the Constitution" and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear
that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed "the measure")
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought
by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the "Commission for Constitutional Revision" authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is
subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall
be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances." 39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change
in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because
of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect
several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative
clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many
other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in
existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize
a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically
change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the
physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
x x x x
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at
its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or
if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this
State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even
touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral
to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based
on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical
changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The
Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when
it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks
of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common
people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation,
profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time
on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the
words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino
Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII,
section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes
far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will
refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x,
the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but
it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of
the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is
located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in
Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI
are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system
of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also
applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule
of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the
requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later
provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to - the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government - the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that
they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void
and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments
to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation
or reversal ofSantiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the
case can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people
must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as
counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended
petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since
the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even
if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can
trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid
down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant
political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A
revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority- 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53 - approved our Constitution in a national
plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign
will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot
and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then,
the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an
"unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations
of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will,
is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration
and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
SO ORDERED.
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte
that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A
and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A
areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called
"Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement
- the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internalwaters," defined as
extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond
the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and
that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the
latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on
the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing
activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities
with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of
the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or
protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural
gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries
the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources. 48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and
proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation
is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact.
This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the
MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship
between the Central Government and the BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on
the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking,
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall
be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace
Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the
representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature
page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
"ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy
for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP
and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August
5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under
Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.
A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between
opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as
constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied
with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or
feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are
no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated
steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely
imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible
legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the
list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework
agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the
Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
xxxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's
policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the
policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that
New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials.74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive
order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for
carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local
government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by
itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the
MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again,
these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently
arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to
allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. 87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in
the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of
procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City
of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their
territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for
their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers
for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a
former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their
invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the
conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their
allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their
personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by
respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo
tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest
in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers,
allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for
the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not
sign the MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades
courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b)
the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant
or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power
to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against
the possible recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above
in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v.
Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot
notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not
moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature,
the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of
these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to
the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the
terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions
have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the
wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case
or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone
government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles
on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions
and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The
MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the
implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the
Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the
Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only
way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral
Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he
stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of
Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications
and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a
number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del
Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same
problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008,
provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished,
or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to
the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby
GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et.al, petitioners, VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA et.al, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 [1] (RA 9522) adjusting the
country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)[2] demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State.[3] This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),[4] codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to
fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained
unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to
make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),[5] which the Philippines ratified
on 27 February 1984.[6] Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like
the Philippines[7] and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.[8] Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"[9] as the case
may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[10] embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris[11] and ancillary treaties,[12] and (2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.[13]
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.[14] To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included - its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition's compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners' alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country's security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines' claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners' assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under
the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the watersfound within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily -
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.[18]
Respondents' submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however,
we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, [19] and
indeed, of acts of other branches of government.[20] Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained
to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute
sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"[21] because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines
sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United
States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. [22]
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.[23]UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans
and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. - The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."[24]
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,[25] not
by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.[26]
RA 9522's Use of the Framework Of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Shoal, not Inconsistent with the
Philippines 'Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area.[27] Petitioners add that the KIG's (and Scarborough Shoal's)
exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing
the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.[28] A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent
of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-Ã -vis the
Philippines' obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046,
save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners'
argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines' claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this
purpose.
Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines' total maritime space (covering its internal
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: [29]
Extent of maritime area using RA Extent of maritime area using RA 9522,
3046, as amended, taking into account taking into account UNCLOS III (in
the Treaty of Paris' delimitation (in square nautical miles)
square nautical miles)
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by
the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent
States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. [30]
Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG
is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as
"Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG [32] and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,[33] such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic
baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating
baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are
still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan
Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama
itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.[34](Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to
optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x
x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This
will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. [35]
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "`Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" [36] of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category
of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. [37]
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitution's Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of the Constitution.[38]
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution[39] or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article
49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. -
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government,
in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.[40] Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.[41]
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and conditions for their exercise.[42] Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law,[43] thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. [44] No modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage[45] does not
place them in lesser footing vis-Ã -vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the
right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States'
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.[46] Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States' territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.[47]
Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) [48] must also fail. Our
present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."[49] Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran[50] treated the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 [51]) and subsistence
fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7[52]), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generismaritime space - the exclusive economic
zone - in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within
this zone up to 200 nautical miles.[53] UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this
zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations is one of
constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the
general welfare. More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges
governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to the right
answer.1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept.
For as noted in an earlier decision, the welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2 It is much more so under
the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. 3 There is manifest, to recall Laski,
"a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members."4 It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the
labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come
within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.5 We cannot then grant the reversal sought. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged
their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid
to them and the amount allegedly due them.6 There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the
allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. 7 The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set
for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence.8 After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T.
Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to
the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.9 There was a
motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on
the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11 While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is to be given
credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the
additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.
1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs
governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth
thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry
will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its
manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production
plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing
and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable
prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of
Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." 13The amendatory
statute, Republic Act No. 4155, 14 renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy
reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia
tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and
economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending
imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To
attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural
Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order
that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured
cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of
imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the
leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision 17 and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones
of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation 18 if futile.
The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note,
speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described
as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and
those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State
as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government." 19Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose
their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, 21 based on
the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle.
That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, 22 the first
edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to
emphasize that what was categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest
[concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the very bonds of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.
It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative position which at one time it held in the
United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board 24 could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of government activity." 25 The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted
in Edu v. Ericta:26 "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It
entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over
economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu
stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the
Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of
governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing
business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this
constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will
find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the Filipino people because
we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to
grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes." 28
It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision about which the observation was
earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is even more in consonance with the expanded role of government
accorded recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were not heeded. That path this Court
is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no
constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of
Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be
minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the
interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a
compassionate society" be attained. 31
2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary functions cannot militate
against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this
Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the Government to protect the people against excessive or
unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be
deemed governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric
Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia, 34 decided four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which
specified the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass upon that
particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as administrative and executive
pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing governmental functions did not suffice to confer competence on the then respondent
Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages, which as pointed out by the labor union, was connected with an
unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May
19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside, and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn Corporation's
seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case involving petitioner itself, Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration, 37 where the point in dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed
of competence in a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be thought of as
pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of Industrial
Relations." 38 Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent Court the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies
by government-owned or controlled corporations lends to support to such an approach. 39 Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that
proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a view was not previously bereft of
plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it
has, to use a Wilsonian phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.
3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration. There is an air
of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a
full page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection
more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act,
but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ...
." 42 Nor are private respondents included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v.
Philippine National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.44 Certainly, the activities to which the two above public corporations
devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts
2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result
of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private
respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a
cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat,
respondent Court must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying a motion for
reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them [private
respondents] is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized representative, is hereby directed to
make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to
submit his report of his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is
referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of
those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a
central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough
investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866,
and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was
published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments,
the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated
February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the
sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12,
April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of
others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to
bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official
Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest
from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so
given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these Islands,
within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by
the former government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present
the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as
regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these
Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is
unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government
against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by the late
Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of
eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal
interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government in what manner
the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might
be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, which reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the
funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum
of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit
of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your
Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the
treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the
public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said
treasury by order of your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been
held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de
Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there
be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to
wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the failure of
His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de
Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board
of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand
pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money
at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present
crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take part
in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that
the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account remaining will
scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance
of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the
funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said
board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose
it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be
compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report
upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much
greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has submitted for the
determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription
referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of
the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those
wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it
liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and that the
great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted,
since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present juncture it
would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the late
calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question are
sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general
Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de
Hacienda, resolves as follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained
from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may require,
in installments of $20,000.
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary
papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of
having to suspend its operations may be averted.
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total
sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on
April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations
assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall
identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have
been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds
deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your
general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to
relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly
understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal
order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in
reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044 of
December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year 1863
shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules specified in
the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to money.
These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands,
were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and
another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the
fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is, for
compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the
sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia
believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000
pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte
de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On
this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the Royal
Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it
formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M.
Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos
loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it has been using this large
sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount
of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit
funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former
had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated
demands refused to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order
the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the
fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received
from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia,
erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year
1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the
80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised for a
specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there
being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by
the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in
support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of
December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse
within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the
said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after
demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the
general deposit funds.
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish
Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14,
1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the
subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was
carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter
account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account
at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these
two account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to
the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the
following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for what
purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in
connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is called
upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted for the
purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos,
which they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said
year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand
pesos. — (Signed) Emilio Moreta.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.
Manila, November 19, 1913
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine
Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its
petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000
held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held
under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not
be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The
Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus,
should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and "considering
that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the
understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was
used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid
Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did
not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform
the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of
the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in
the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so
intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of
the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to
the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it
was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore,
the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without
interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not
as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See
and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his
kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his
deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter,
as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now
represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable
purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent
of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not in all
cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the
Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though Christian, was not
Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete
separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which apparently
expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American Government
in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The
same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the American
Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply
religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government
like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard;
and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became
impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the
contract has been cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the
sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the donations for the earthquake
sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the
defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose — the
relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that
purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including
the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had
nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of
the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-
General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not
in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act
would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state
which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the
Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is one of
trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not
being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never
has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even
could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have
accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It
follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the
fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine
Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not
prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with
reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the
royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine
Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to
the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of
June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public
charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that
Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus
collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to
its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other
charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the specific
purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change
the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted
only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the
funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's
Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the
Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out
the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan,
was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason.
This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de
Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the
United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to
the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to
the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with
law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the
right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as
the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty,
but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his
cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In
Vilas vs.Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their
force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law that the great
body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became
inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense
of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of
charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general
supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In
Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts
the same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made
known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508,
note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is
deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and
persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities,
who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae.
They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but
that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and
right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no
power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the
rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these
contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and
approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the
public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the
public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such
as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are
the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The
earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original
sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have
died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object
for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the
action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the
specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public
resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's
right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity
and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that
we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the
Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth
section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the
owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which
transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the
Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor
of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its
liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when
ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on
May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that
the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the
right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the
Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as
at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the
Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon
the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the
"Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a
reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is
seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the
reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it
still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3,
1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations,
unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14
Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the King,
and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he
was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is
applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests
and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights
must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of
such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State
has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.
In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:
In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or
government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the state
must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks
to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its
sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.
The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of
Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee,
either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where
lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on
the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39
U. C. Q. B., 397].)
These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the
Philippine Government.
Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question
the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the
late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.