JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015; Bersamin, J.

SUMMARY:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in
an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the
Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced
age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he
is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

Court ruled that he be allowed bail. The Court said there is this national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of
his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen
as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of
Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

DOCTRINE:
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and
the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. The general rule is,
therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995),
“such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore,
that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.