Parties to Civil Actions (Rule 3, Sections 1 to 22)
Furthermore, they claim
7. Newsweek v IAC
In order for there to be a cause of action in a complaint for libel, there
must be an identifiable victim. The libelous article must pinpoint a
specific individual.
Facts: An article entitled An Island of Fear was published in Newsweek
magazine in February 1981. This article is subject of a libel suit filed
against Newsweek by the private respondents, incorporated
association of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental, as a “class suit”
in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the area. The sugarcane planters
alleged that Newsweek committed libel against them by portraying
Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who not only exploit impoverished and underpaid
workers and laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with
impunity.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not contain allegations that state, much less support a cause of
action. Newsweek maintains that the article is not libelous in nature so
there is no cause of action.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the motion to
dismiss saying that there was a cause of action.
Issue: W/N there is a cause of action
Held: No, there is no cause of action
Newsweek correctly argued that there is no cause of action because the
complaint filed by the sugarcane planters
did not contain any allegation that anything written in the article
referred specifically to any one of the private respondents. For a
complaint of libel to prosper, there must be an identifiable victim.
The rule is: when the libel is alleged to be directed at a group or class,
as in the case, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or
all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately.
The action brought by the sugar planters is not really a “class suit” in
behalf of the 8300 sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental. Each of the
private respondents has a separate and distinct reputation in the
community. The
defect that there was no specific victim of libel in the article cannot be
cured by filing a “class suit.”
(Extra: The disputed portion of the article which refers to private
respondent Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out
Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that a sugarcane
worker had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought
into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental. This
is merely a reporting of fact. Nothing libelous here.)
8. Minors Oposa v Factoran
Doctrine of Intergenerational Responsibility
Facts: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et
al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary
of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection
by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.
Issue: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class
suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”
Held: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development,
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
9. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v Melicor
(SKIP REPEATED CASE)
10. De la Cruz v Joaquin
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient
ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove
that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Facts: To secure payment for an obligation, Respondent supposedly
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Petitioners, for a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija. The parties also executed a Kasunduan which Respondent
claimed showed the deed of sale to be actually an equitable mortgage.
Petitioners contend that the document was merely an accommodation
to allow Respondent to repurchase the land, which the latter failed to
exercise.
The RTC declared that the parties had entered into a sale with right to
repurchase. It further held that Respondent had made a valid tender of
payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase.
Hence, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his
payment. The CA sustained the RTC decision and ordered a substitution
by legal representatives, in view of Respondent’s death.
Petitioners now assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of
jurisdiction when Respondent died during the pendency of the case and
that there was no substitution of heirs.
Sustaining the trial court, the CA noted that petitioners had given
respondent the right to repurchase the property within five (5) years
from the date of the sale or until June 29, 1979. Accordingly, the parties
executed the Kasunduan to express the terms and conditions of their
actual agreement.
1
The CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal
representatives, in view of respondents death.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues: Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the
death of Pedro Joaquin
Whether respondent was guilty of forum shopping
Held: 1. No. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules under Sec.16, Rule 3 require a substitution of
the deceased. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to
protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the deceased
party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be
made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to
a day in court is denied. A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary
when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any
claim that the right to due process was violated. Strictly speaking, the
rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of
due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right
of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot
affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute
for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable
violation of due process.
Case records show that Respondent’s heirs voluntarily appeared and
participated in the case after the CA had ordered for legal
representatives to appear and substitute for him. As such, the Motion
for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to
have substituted for the deceased respondent. As there was no
violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a
ground to nullify the trial court’s Decision.
2. As to the matter of forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have
failed to provide this Court with relevant and clear specifications that
would show the presence of an identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action between the present and the earlier suits. They have
also failed to show whether the other case was decided on the merits.
Instead, they have made only bare assertions involving its existence
without reference to its facts. In other words, they have alleged
conclusions of law without stating any factual or legal basis. Mere
mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights
asserted and reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim that respondent
is guilty of forum shopping, or that res judicata exists.
11. Spouses Algura v City of Naga
The rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption
meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand,
when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should
apply the “indigency test” under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption
Facts: The rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for
exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section
19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the
other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both
requirements, then the application should not be denied outright;
instead, the court should apply the “indigency test” under Section 21 of
Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for exemption. On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion
to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees dated March
10, 2000.11 They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP
3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of
the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-
store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence along
Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that
petitioners' second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding
house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In
addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income
from their computer shop patronized by students and from several
boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that
petitioners were not indigent litigants.
Under the Rules of Court (then Sec. 16, Rule 141), a party may be
qualified as a pauper litigant (for those residing outside Metro Manila)
if he submits an affidavit attesting that a.) his gross monthly income
does not exceed P1,500.00 (now not more than double the monthly
minimum wage) and b.) he should not own property with an assessed
value of not more than P18,000.00 (now not more than P300k market
value). The City asserted that the combined income of the Alguras is at
least P13,400 which is way beyond the threshold P1.5k. The City
presented as proof Antonio’s pay slip as a policeman (P10,400) and
Lorencita’s estimated income from her sari-sari store. The claim of the
spouses that they were property-less, as proven by the City Assessors’
Certification, was not disputed by the City.
The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by
the city, they only relied on the income of Antonio which was barely
enough to cover their family’s need like food, shelter, and other basic
necessities for them and their family (they have 6 children).
The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses
were disqualified as pauper-litigants. Subsequently, the case filed by
the spouses against the City was dismissed for the spouses’ failure to
pay the required filing fees.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-
litigants
Held: No, there was no hearing on the matter hence the case was
remanded back to the lower court. In this case, the Supreme Court
reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 (then
Sec. 16, Rule 141).
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent
litigants may not be required to pay the filing fees. On the other hand,
Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must
meet before he can be qualified as an indigent party and thus be
exempt from paying the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly
applied, then the spouses could not qualify because their income
exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec. 21,
Rule 3 is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a
chance in a hearing to satisfy the court that notwithstanding the
evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they have no money
or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic
necessities for their family, and are thus, qualified as indigent litigants
under said Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in
order to let the spouses satisfy the court that indeed the income
they’re having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was not sufficient to
cover food, shelter, and their other basic needs.
12. White v City of Manila
The rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption
meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand,
when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should
apply the “indigency test” under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting
2
Short-Time Admission, Short- Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint- in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships
the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than
twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint- in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships
the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC..
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State.
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted.
At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed
by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
3
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. An
ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The behavior
which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance
can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover,
drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
Venue of Actions
1. Dacoycoy v IAC
Facts: On March 22, 1983, Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta,
Rizal, filedbefore the Rizal RTC, a complaint against private respondent
de Guzmanpraying for the annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a
parcel of riceland inBarrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender
of the produce thereofand damages for private respondent's refusal to
have said deeds of sale setaside upon petitioner's demand. On May
25, 1983, before summons could be served on de Guzman, theRTC
Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner
toconfer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue.
After saidconference, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground of impropervenue. o It found, based on the allegations
of the complaint, that petitioner'saction is a real action as it
sought not only the annulment of theaforestated deeds of
sale but also the recovery of ownership of thesubject parcel of
riceland located in Pangasinan, outside its’ territorialjurisdiction.
Petitioner appealed to the IAC, which affirmed the order of dismissal of
his complaint.
Issue: W/N the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground ofimproper venue?? NO
Held: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by
the RTC on theground of improper venue is plain error,
attributable to its inability todistinguish between jurisdiction and
venue. Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed byRule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the
laying of venue isprocedural rather than substantive. It relates to the
jurisdiction of thecourt over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisionsrelating to venue establish a relation between
the plaintiff and thedefendant and not between the court and the
subject matter. Venuerelates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more
of the convenience of theparties rather than the substance of the case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits;while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may
be had. In Luna vs. Carandang, we emphasized:
1. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title
to,or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the
Philippines,subject to the rules on venue of actions;
2. Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an
actioninvolving real property shall be brought in the Court of First
Instanceof the province where the land lies is a rule on venue of
actions,which may be waived expressly or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of
petitioner isa real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over thecase, it being a regional trial court vested with the
exclusive originaljurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve
the title to, orpossession of, real property, or any interest therein . .
." in accordancewith Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
With respect to theparties, there is no dispute that it acquired
jurisdiction over the plaintiffDacoycoy, the moment he filed his
complaint for annulment anddamages. Respondent trial court could
have acquired jurisdiction overthe defendant either by his
voluntary appearance in court and hissubmission to its authority,
or by the coercive power of legal processexercised over his person.
Although petitioner contends that, he requested the City
Sheriff ofOlongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons on de
Guzman at hisresidence, it does not appear that said service
had been properlyeffected or that private respondent had appeared
voluntarily in court orfiled his answer to the complaint. At this stage,
respondent trial courtshould have required petitioner to exhaust the
various alternative modesof service of summons under Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, i.e.,personal service under Section 7,
substituted service under Section 8,or service by publication under
Section 16 when the address of thedefendant is unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainlynot the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding,particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the CFI
4
(now RTC),may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails tochallenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
provided bySection 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial
to beheld and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in
aspecial action be permitted to challenge belatedly the
wrongvenue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motionto
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperlylaid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,
though technicallywrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules onvenue had been devised. The trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant'sprerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motuproprio dismissing the
case.
2. Diaz v Judge Adiong
From the provision of Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is
at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising
from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the
place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published.
Facts: 1. On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general
circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news article
captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its
Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed
alleged anomalies by key officials in the Regional Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
2. On 22 July 1991, the public officers, private respondents instituted
separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the
City Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City.
3. On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the
criminal case thus holding this decision : "WHEREFORE . . . this
investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds that it has no
jurisdiction to handle this case and that the same be filed or instituted
in Cotabato City where complainant is officially holding office at the
time respondents caused the publication of the complained news item
in the Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is
recommended that this charge be dropped for lack of jurisdiction."
4. On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the
action for damages on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the
complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi
City
5. On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of merit. Diaz thereafter moved for reconsideration of
the order of denial. The motion was also denied in the Order of 27
August 1991, prompting petitioner to seek relief therefrom
6. Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not
be rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private respondents,
who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the
alleged libelous news items published in that city. Consequently, it is
petitioner's view that the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City has no
jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for damages
Issue: W/N The RTC in Marawi City has jurisdiction to entertain the civil
action for damages?
Held: No. The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then
held office in Marawi City
respondent Macumbal was the Regional Director for Region XII of the
DENR and held office in Cotabato City
respondent Indol was the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer of Lanao del Norte and held office in that province
respondent Lanto was a consultant of the Secretary of the DENR and, as
averred in the complaint, was temporarily residing in Quezon City
respondent Abedin was the Chief of the Legal Division of the DENR
Regional Office in Cotabato City
2. Moreover, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and
printed in Cotabato City. Thus, respondents were limited in their choice
of venue for their action for damages only to Cotabato City. Marawi
City is not among those where venue can be laid.
3. third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code:
“The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, that where one of the offended parties is a public officer . . .
(who) does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or
city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous matter is printed and first published . . . . " (emphasis
supplied)”
4. From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is
at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising
from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the
place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published.
5. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such
waiver may occur by laches.
Deposition: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is
LIFTED.
3. Phil Banking Corp v Tensuan
Facts: Phil. Banking Corp filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money at the RTC of Makati. An agreement had fixed the venue of
actions arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
only. Terms of the stipulation provide – “ I/We hereby expressly submit
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which
may arise from this note”
Issue: Stipulation shows that the stipulation does not require the laying
of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily.
Held/Doctrine: Sec 2(b), Rule 4. The parties, by written agreement, may
change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to
another. In the enforcement of the parties’ stipulations concerning
venue, it is the tenor of their agreement, which is of critical relevance.
The relevant task, in other words, in determining the intent of the
parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such
words are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the will of
the contracting parties.
4. Unimasters Conglomeration v CA
Stipulation regarding venue must clearly indicate its restriction
otherwise, the mentioned venue will be construed as an additional
place for the parties to be able to sue and be sued.
Facts: Petitioner Unimasters and respondent Kubota entered into a
“"Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" w/c included the
stipulation “ All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with /
in the proper Courts of Quezon City”. Sometime later, Unimasters filed
an action for damages in Tacloban City against Kubota, a certain Go and
5
Metrobank for breach of contract and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order.
Kubota filed a motion to dismiss on ground of improper venue and
another motion to transfer injunction hearing to a later date due to
their counsel being unavailable as of yet. The Trial Court dismissed the
first and granted the second. During said trial, Kubota’s counsel stated
that their participation in the trial should not construed as a waiver to
their action to dismiss based on improper venue. Later, Kubota filed
with the CA an appeal on the dismissal by the lower court. The CA
decided that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to continue despite being in the improper venue since
the aforementioned stipulation in the contract clearly limited the venue
to that of the courts of Quezon City.
Issue: WON the aforementioned stipulation was limiting the venue to
w/c the parties could file an action.
Held: No, the SC held that absent additional words and expressions
definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention
that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place
selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly
evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation should be
construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one
place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or
Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
The SC also commented on the Kubota’s issue of the RTC not having
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. The
SC said “venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal
actions. This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of
damages in an amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00, is
assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. Assuming that
venue were improperly laid in the Court where the action was
instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a procedural, not a
jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before
that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is
within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by
the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, the RTC would proceed in
perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.”
5. Anita Mangila v CA
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against herein petitioner. On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his
Sheriff’s Return showing that summons was not served on petitioner. A
woman found at petitioner’s house informed the sheriff that petitioner
transferred her residence to Sto. Niño, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff
found out further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioner’s departure from
the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors, private
respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September
26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment6
against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.
The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from
their counterparts in RTC, Pampanga. Thus, on October 28, 1988,
Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on petitioner’s
household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with
the Order, Affidavit and Bond.
Petitioner filed a motion to discharge attachment claiming that the
court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on January
13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. The trial court,
however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity
of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter private respondent applied for an alias summons which was
granted by the court.
Issue: W/N the writ was validly implemented
Held: The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ;
and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences,
the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act
in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.23
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on
September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988. However,
the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three
months after the implementation of the writ of attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on
September 27 since a motion for its issuance can be filed “at the
commencement of the action.” However, on the day the writ was
implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously
with the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the summons
was actually served on petitioner several months after the writ had
been implemented.
Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service
on petitioner after her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true
that private respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of
petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse
under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on
petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the
enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive
process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her
person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or
simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether
by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted
by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons
does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person
because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
6. Hyatt Elevators v Goldstar Elevators
the residence of a corporation is the place where its principal office is
established
Facts: Petitioner and respondent are domestic corporations similarly
engaged in the business of selling, installing and maintaining/servicing
elevators, escalators and parking equipment w/ offices in Makati.
Initially, Hyatt filed a complaint for unfair trade practices and damages
against LGIC and LGISC to w/c the latter asked for dismissal due to
improper venue. The case was filed in Mandaluyong City.
Later on, petitioner decided to amend its complaint to replace LGISC
with LGISC OTIS, a new entity born from a joint venture and also to
include Goldstar who in turn also filed for dismissal due to the same
ground.
6
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
The CA however ruled otherwise and said that the lower court made an
error since the venue of the filing was indeed improper.
It should be noted that Petitioner had relocated its office to
Mandaluyong from Makati.
Issue: WON the venue is improper
Held: Yes. The SC stated that since Makati was the principal place of
business of both respondent and petitioner, as stated in the latters
Articles of Incorporation, that place was controlling for purposes of
determining the proper venue. The fact that petitioner had abandoned
its principal office in Makati years prior to the filing of the original case
did not affect the venue where personal actions could be commenced
and tried. Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendant resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Residence is the permanent home -- the place to which, whenever
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. Residence is
vital when dealing with venue. A corporation, however, has no
residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. This is precisely the reason why the Court in Young Auto Supply
Company v. Court of Appeals ruled that for practical purposes, a
corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation. Even
before this ruling, it has already been established that the residence of
a corporation is the place where its principal office is established.
Inconclusive are the bare allegations of petitioner that it had closed its
Makati office and relocated to Mandaluyong City, and that respondent
was well aware of those circumstances. Assuming arguendo that they
transacted business with each other in the Mandaluyong office of
petitioner, the fact remains that, in law, the latters residence was still
the place indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. Further unacceptable
is its faulty reasoning that the ground for the CAs dismissal of its
Complaint was its failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation so as to
reflect its actual and present principal office.
7. Nocum v Lucio Tan
FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that the venue was improperly laid,
among many others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and
first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus
Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the
amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is
alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of
Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first
published in the City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside
the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or deficiency in
the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended
Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in
the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses
and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and the
other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners.
Petitioners argue that since the original complaint only contained the
office address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the
place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first
published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its
allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE #1 : WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES
HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the
facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case
was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is
vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that it is the RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon.
Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the
place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter
of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes
a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d)
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties;
venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint
that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in
the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer
jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the
same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the
lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid. The term
"jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to
the place where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue." The
amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It
is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction,
except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in
the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural,
not a jurisdictional impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was
proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to
allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where
the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless,
before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended. In
so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE #2: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS
arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of
jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive,
relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It
is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of
trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should
be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to
the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in criminal
actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place
where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have
been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the
7
original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is
a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
8. Spouses Lantin v Lantion
A stipulation about the venue of an action is not enough to preclude
parties from bringing suits in other venues. Such stipulation must
clearly show the intention of exclusivity. In the absence of qualifying
and restrictive words, it will viewed as a mere agreement
Facts: Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from
respondent Planters Dev’t Bank (PDB) and executed several real estate
mortgages and promissory notes to cover said loans. Upon defaulting
on the loans, PDB foreclosed the mortgaged lots and in the public
auction that followed, PDB was the winning bidder. On 11/08/03,
Petitioner spouses filed against PDB and its officers a suit for the
declaration of nullity of the sale and mortgage, reconveyance,
discharge of mortgage, accounting, permanent injunction and damages
in the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that only their
peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had already
been fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged.
They challenged the validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-
payment of their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover those
loans.
PDB filed for dismissal of the suit by petitioners due to improper venue.
According to the mortgages “18.In the event of suit arising out of or in
connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured
by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of
auction exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at
such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for
this purpose any other venue.
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of
this note shall exclusively be at the proper court of Metropolitan
Manila, Philippines or any other venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for
this purpose any other venue provided by the Rules of Court.
Judge Lantion dismissed petitioner’s case.
Issue: WON Judge Lantion committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case.
Held: No, according to Section 4(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where
the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing
on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action,
however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
As can be seen from the aforementioned provisions in the mortgages,
the words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue”
are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements. The
judge’s dismissal was done in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts (Rule 5, Sec 1 & 2) and Kinds of
Pleadings (Rule 6, Sec 1 to 13)
1. Financial Bldg Corp v Forbes Park
Facts: The USSR owned a lot in Forbes Park and it engaged the services
of Financial Building for the construction of a multi-level office and staff
apartment building. Due to the USSR’s representation that it would be
building a residence for its Trade Representative, Forbes Park
authorized its construction and work began shortly thereafter.
However, Financial building submitted to the Makati City Government a
second building plan for the construction of a multi-level apartment
building, which was different from the first plan for the construction of
a residential building submitted to Forbes Park.
Forbes Park discovered the second plan and it enjoined further
construction work. Forbes Park suspended all permits of entry for the
personnel and materials of Financial Building in the said construction
site.
Financial Building filed in the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
Injunction and Damages with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
Forbes Park. Forbes Par, in turn, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that Financial Building had no cause of action because it was
not the real party-in-interest. Forbes Park won in this case thus it
sought to vindicate its rights by filing a complaint for damages against
Financial Building arising from the violation of its regulations. Trial court
rendered a decision in favor or Forbes Park.
Issue:
W/N THE ALLEGED CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION THEREIN ARE
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND/OR ARE DEEMED WAIVED FOR ITS
FAILURE TO INTERPOSE THE SAME AS COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
IN THE EARLIER CASE
Held:
Yes. The instant case is barred due to Forbes Park’s failure to set it up
as a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier case.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party’s claim.[15] If it is within the jurisdiction of the
court and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, such
compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed
by the opposing party.[16]
Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate
action but it should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the
same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have
devised the following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by
the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim? Affirmative answers to the above queries
indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 16540, its
existing compulsory counterclaim at that time is now barred.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.[19] A counterclaim
presupposes the existence of a claim against the party filing the
counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the
counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed,
more so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the
counterclaimant.
2. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA v. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, GR
No. 204528, 2013-02-19
Facts:
on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
8
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M.
De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for
brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist... from
framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing
bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in
relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge
issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
. power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held
allegedly for determining whether a temporary... protection order may
be issued.
ued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s] ince no writ has been issued, return is
not the required pleading but answer".
The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo...
cases.
He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and
thus required an Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7
March 2012.[10] Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the
parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
after that hearing. Since the period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the
memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer.[11]
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance
of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed
for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
The production and inspection orders were in relation... to the
evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear
from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the
alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent
Gatdula.
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012
filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order
to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of
fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Issues:
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could
not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not
the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at
this time.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary
remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty[12] and
security[13] as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.[14] The Rule on the
Writ... of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's
of constitutional rights.[15] It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced... disappearances.[16]
It is initiated through a petition[18] to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,
Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.
The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation[20] of the
facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed".
is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show t
After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of
Amparo[22] or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the
petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's
right to life, liberty or... security is under threat or the acts complained
of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself
sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The
court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show
whether the... grounds for more permanent protection and interim
reliefs are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return[23] after the issuance of
the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive
pleading to the petition.[24] Unlike an Answer, the Return has other
purposes aside... from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents
are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the
"Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the
Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the
service of the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all
concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the assistance of any
military or civilian agency of the government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18.
The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact
that temporary protection, production... and inspection orders were
given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production
and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the
court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities
in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the
Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is
9
contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy... remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated.

Judge Pampilo's basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his

Order dated 2 March 2012:

Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the
said rule.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the

Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.

Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff.

this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is

mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an
RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and... criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or particular fact.[34] It is not a civil nor a criminal action,
hence, the application of the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case
prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return.

Worse, is the trial court's third irregularity: it required a memorandum

in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not
after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of
the party litigants and is a final pleading usually... required before the
case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the

Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012

itself. In the body of its decision, the RTC stated:

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the

actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment
of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. After... examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of
or the threat to the petitioner's... life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be

executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and
grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and... concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

10