A REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF VIGILANTE GROUPS IN COMMUNITY

POLICING IN NIGERIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction

Vigilante groups appear in Nigeria as a measure to supplement social

security services of the State Police Force. Their emergence as community

volunteer guards demonstrates a genuine driving spirit to checkmate activities of

hoodlums and armed banditry. However, in so many communities, what are often

termed vigilante groups are actually militia groups, especially when viewed against

the backdrop of their activities. In such communities, they are accepted as vital

instruments against what their community members, who support them, regard as

“very serious social threats,” more seriously than armed banditry, such as threats to

territorial integrity by their neighboring communities and somehow, very

specifically, in protecting the economic resources of their land from undue

exploitation. (Tell, 2001). The activities of the Niger Delta militias provide a good

background to distinguish between vigilantes and militias. From the

conceptualization of the terms vigilante, militia and community policing, and

evaluation of the activities of these groups, it is included that the Oodua people’s

congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys (BB) and Hisbah, though have been politicized and

show evidence of protecting a segment of the Nigeria society and threatening the

other, were originally vigilante groups. The Movement for the Actualization of a

1
Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB) exhibits the characteristics of a pressure

group.

There is another category of vigilante groups, which operate under its

umbrella body known as Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), whose activities are

accepted as aiding the police in combating crime in society. The approach adopted

in this discourse is to evaluate the activities of the groups, be they vigilantes or

militias. The aim is to explain their emergence, their nature and character, and the

changes that have taken place in their services over the years. It is also to proffer

suggestions to address the problem.

The emergence of the vigilante groups, it is argued, indicates that the State

security apparatus have failed to adequately protect the lives and properties of the

Nigerian citizenry. Though, there has not been any time in the history of Nigeria

that government was not faced with security challenges, the exit of the military and

the institutionalization of a liberal democratic government witnessed dramatic

increase in security problems and the proliferation of the vigilante groups could be

regarded as an outcome of the situation. Pratten (2008) admits that during this

time, the number of vigilante groups and militias rose steadily. This position is also

shared by Ero (2000) when he observes that the creation of vigilante groups is in

response to the security vacuum created as a result of lapses in the protection of

2
life and property by government. The failure necessitates the provision of security

from outside the formal security structures of the State.

The central issue of this paper is to examine the role of the vigilante groups

in the provision of security or otherwise in their communities of existence over

time. In doing this, the paper reviews the operations of vigilante groups in Nigeria

between 1990 and 2010. It also examines emerging arguments about their role in

providing social security and concludes with several suggestions on how to

streamline the vigilante groups as supplementary community policing organization

in Nigeria.

Clarification of Concepts

Vigilante Group

The term vigilante is derived from the Latin word vigilans, which means to

be watchful (2010). However, the meaning of this concept, which has an old social

history depended on the peculiarities of the situation where it existed. Between the

1830s and 1850s, vigilance committees were formed to help fugitive black slaves

and ensure their obedience and of the abolitionists to the pro-slavery majority in

America (Gilje, 1996). In the 19th century, vigilante groups were set up in frontier

towns and rural communities of United States to keep order and put down illegal

activities by criminals (Slotkin, 1985). In such places, they supplemented the

duties of legal authorities by holding formal trials before administering usually

3
capital punishment. Generally, vigilante groups in the US operated in protecting

the breakdown of law and order; however, in some cases their actions were

dishonorable as they merely dispensed their own version of the law (Stock, 1996).

The initiative of citizens of respective societies the world over, towards

maintaining order outside the formal way persists up to the present day, but it

incorporates perspectives inconsistent with those of the 19 th century such as,

attacking political opponents of their financiers and punishing real and perceived

wrongdoings. Yet these actions of vigilante groups are commended especially by

people who feel dissatisfied with government. The intricate situation in discussing

vigilantism in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world is that vigilante groups try to

justify their existence by accusing the law and its agents of being too slow in

dispensing justice but reversely, the law accuses the vigilante groups of its

violation. However, according to Harris (2001), persons seen “as escaping from the

law” or “above the law” are sometimes the target of vigilantism and anyone who

defies the law to further justice is a vigilante. Following Harris argument, it is

contended that a vigilante is seen as enforcing law, which is justice itself, therefore,

it cannot be enforcing law and as well defying it. Vigilante and law should be

compatible to be able to control crime in society.

4
A Review of the Operations of Vigilante Groups in Nigeria, 1990-2010

It cannot be stated exactly when Nigeria communities began to form private

“security groups” to protect them and their environment. However, the first

category of these groups: Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys (BB),

Niger Delta Militias, Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of

Biafra (MOSSOB) and Hisbah, came about beginning from the 1990s to resolve

peculiar security problems of their communities. These groups have gradually had

their security services influenced by political interests and the masses question if

they are still vigilante groups or militias. The second category comprised of the

groups that operate in both urban and rural areas under the auspices of the

Vigilante Groups of Nigeria (VGN), in partnership with the police.

Firstly, the Oodua People’s Congress emerged in 1994 as a group opposing

the policies of the then military government, but became split in 1999: one group

transformed into a Pan- Yoruba socio-cultural organization, after the exit of the

military (Newswatch, 1998). It is said that the OPC groups pursue two objectives

as flushing criminals out of Yoruba land and protecting Yoruba interests in Nigeria

and outside (Tell, 2000). Since the split, one group appeared tilted to militarism

and the other to vigilantism. For instance, when dock workers elected some Ijaw as

their trade union leaders, an OPC commando stormed the Apapa port with war

against its rival group to install a Yoruba leader (Adekson, 2004). Lagos city

5
witnesses more of the threats of the violent OPC group led by Ganiyu Adams

because the group feels that the Igbo and Hausa traders who are visitors are

exploiting the economic and political opportunities in Lagos to their advantage.

After clashing with the militias of the Ijaw community in Lagos, their next target

was a radio station broadcasting BBC news in Hausa, the lingua franca of the

North. The OPC accused the management of Raypower of cultural imperialism,

which undermines the Yoruba culture (Adekson, 2004). However, the other less

violent OPC group patrols the South-Western Nigeria communities with machetes,

petrol and tyres, which they use in inflicting capital punishment on criminals,

especially armed robbers. It got to a point when the Hausa concluded that the

Yoruba president of Nigeria permitted ethnic cleansing of the Hausa in Yoruba land

by the Gani Adams’ led OPC group and government intervened by declaring the

OPC illegal organization and ordered the shooting of any of its members who

resisted arrest. A military detachment and anti-riot police squad were deployed to

the area and many of the OPC members were killed and several others including its

leader, Gani Adams were arrested and detained. Even the less brutal group has

been accused of politicization, which is to say it is being used by politicians to

settle scores with each other.

The Bakassi Boys emerged in South-Eastern Nigeria to curtail criminal

activities in the area. The nature and rate of crime wave in the area was a great

6
worry not only to the South Easterners but the entire Nigerian citizenry. It got deep

rooted, very difficult to uproot and the man behind was Eddy Okeke, a reputation

medicine man believed to possess super-natural spiritual powers (Akwani, 2010).

He became the source of power for criminals who terrorized the people. When

government apparatus failed to eradicate the menace of Eddy Okeke and his men,

the people decided to act themselves (Meagher, 2007). They conducted

surveillance of the South-East both during the day and night with machetes, which

they used in executing justice against criminals. The trial of suspected criminals

was not based on law, but charms that they claimed were more powerful than the

ones administered by Eddy Okeke on criminals and could cause them confess their

atrocities. The activities of the Bakassi Boys from the early period of emergence

received various forms of recommendations from the public as the traders operated

without fear of armed robbery and people slept relaxed in their rooms. This was

because the traders who organized the vigilantes defined their exact duties, which

were to protect the markets and the communities from the activities of armed

robbers. After one and a half years of their existence, Anambra state was declared

by a commission of journalists as “the most crime-free state in Nigeria”

(Newswatch, 2001). However, between April 2000 and January 2002, it was

reported that the Bakassi Boys killed not less than 2000 people in Anambra state

alone (Amnesty International, 2002), but Kate Meagher who was in Aba during the

7
formative stage of the vigilante notes, “I came across no report of unjustified

killings during the first fifteen months of Bakassi’s operations (Meagher, 2007).

However, like the OPC, the Bakassi Boys became split into rival groups and

have also been politicized. For instance, the Governor of Anambra state finances

the group and claims he is the “commander-in-chief” (Tell, 2001). When Muslims

slaughtered hundreds of Igbo in the North, the Governor of Abia state declared that

“if they kill an Igbo man, we will retaliate immediately” (The News, 2000).

Consequently, armed gangs led by Bakassi Boys mounted roadblocks and killed

over three hundred Northerners who had been living in various Igbo towns

(Meagher, 2007). This however was the first unruly behavior of the Bakassi Boys

as the Igbo are not known for retaliation since their experience during the Biafran

war between 1967 and 1970 and that they are found almost everywhere in Nigeria,

more than any other ethnic group.

The Niger Delta militias came on board to settle internal problems of

competition for oil wealth between the Niger Delta communities on one hand and

between the foreign oil companies and the delta communities on the other. The

Ogoni and Ijaw communities, for instance in the 1990s, began to compete for the

enormous wealth from the resources of their land and also felt that they were being

exploited by the foreign firms. Consequently, the Niger Delta militias fought wars

for their communities on one hand and occasionally kidnapped the white workers

8
on the other. This situation has made the entire region unsafe and is worsened by

victims’ fear to seek justice against those who commit crimes because of the

growing “impurity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human

rights abuses, which has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and

violence.” (Okonta and Douglas, 2001). Thus, the 1990s witnessed increased

number and severity of inter-ethnic militia clashes, especially between those of the

Ijaw and Itsekiei ethnic groups, and between 2003 and 2004, infiltration of arms in

the region led to its heavy militarization. The regions become polarized into two

rival militia groups namely; Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by

Dokubo Asari and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) manned by Ateke Tom. These

militia groups receive both moral and financial support from highly placed

individuals and government. It also appeared that government security team took

side with NDV against NDPVF, and in deep annoyance of government policy of

divide and rule, the NDPVF became so brutal and unleashed terror on civilians, as

they spray bullets indiscriminately, thereby destroying lives and properties. This

situation persisted and it became the concern of the international community

(HRW, 2005) that something has to be done to amicably resolve the problem in the

Niger delta region of Nigeria. The granting of amnesty by the President Umaru

Musa Yar Adua’s administration in 2009 among other palliatives softened the

trouble spots as there is minimal peace in the area. But this is not to say that peace

9
has permanently been restored in the region as nobody is sure that all arms have

been submitted and the issues that created trouble in the region have been settled.

In northern Nigeria, the Hisbah groups enforce compliance of the Sharia

law, which according to International Religious Freedom report (2001) is as a

result of the ‘lax’ attitude of the police (Peters and Barends, 2001). The Hisbah

groups are found operating in 12 States of northern Nigeria. In the northern state of

Zamfara, a group of the Hisbah known as Joint Islamic Aid Group (JIAG)

popularly called Yanagji, monitors public and private behavior, enforces adherence

to Sharia, prosecute alleged offenders and take punishment into their hands (CRF,

2004). In Kano state, the deputy governor allegedly led a raid by Hisbah groups on

shops trading in alcoholic drinks in the city. The situation in Jigawa and Katsina

states is the same as the Jigawa state governor instituted a state-wide Sharia

enforcement vigilante group with powers to arrest and detain visitors of Sharia. In

Katsina state, the Hisbah group known as Runduman Adalci arrest people found to

be playing music (CRF, 2002).

The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

(MOSSOB) is a very unique group in the context of the others under discussion. Its

emergence is traced to the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, whom the

Igbo accused of not giving them a fair share of political appointments in his

government even though they massively supported him (The News, 2000). At the

10
early stage, Ralph Uwazuruike, its founder was not taken seriously as his

tribesmen who had not forgotten the horrors of the Biafran war never gave him

their support. However, he promised that Biafra would be achieved this time

without blood being spilled. The killing of hundreds of Igbo during the Sharia in

the North in 2000 and the handover of presidential power to Umaru Yar Adua, a

Hausa in 2007 by president Obasanjo infuriated the Igbo who concluded that they

would not rule Nigeria in the next fifty years. Consequently, MOSSOB

membership became increased and got the support of Igbo leadership. Its mode of

operation hinged on the Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of non violence. MOSSOB

members dressed in the former Biafran army uniform, supplied the old Biafran

currency for use in the area, broadcast news in the voice of Biafra, hoisted the old

separatist flag and toured the area without arms. In this way, their activities

constituted no threat to the people. Yet, the Federal Government of Nigeria

deployed anti-riot police squad and the army who killed hundreds of its members.

Thus, MOSSOB’s non violence strategy did not result to anything positive and the

Igbo began to look unto the international community for answer to their problem of

marginalization in Nigeria, but this angle too has at this point in time, failed to

work out useful results. The Igbo are not fortunate as the Niger Deltans who can

hold Nigeria to ramsome by vandalizing oil pipelines, kidnapping White workers

and blowing off the oil refineries.

11
 The Vigilante Groups of Nigeria (VGN) according to their Commander-

General, Alhaji Usman Jahum Mohammed, have a nation-wide membership of

about 4.5 million people and their aim was/is to protect government infrastructure

and of the private sector. It is also to protect younger people, women and the aged

who are vulnerable and subject to attack from hoodlums (Adeoye, 2009). In regard

of their mode of operation, these groups have no uniform operational mode

throughout Nigeria. It varies from place to place depending on the circumstances

that prevail in their areas of operation. In some places, their attention is directed to

road surveillance by day and night like the police, but generally, they keep night

surveillance of their communities, halting suspicious movements and making

arrests. During the day, they retire to their offices, which are their constructions,

where they continue to receive cases, conduct trials and administer punishment on

convicts. Cases that defy solution or require detention are sent to the police for

appropriate actions. In other to keep the police abreast of their activities and

progress, the VGN submit monthly progress reports to the police unit nearest to

them, who evaluates the extent of the VGN’s supplementary security services and

makes its observation available to the State Police Headquarters. Indeed, the

National Chairman of the Vigilante Groups of Nigeria (VGN), Usman Mohammed

says his groups of vigilantes have no relationship with groups like OPC, Bakassi

Boys and other such similar groups (Adeoye, 2009).

12
 In terms of remuneration, the VGN have no standing allowances, but in

appreciation of their contributions to the maintenance of community security,

members of their communities and other philanthropists make financial and

material rewards to them. Also, the local government chairmen sometimes extend

financial assistance to the groups in their local government area.

Vigilante Groups and Community Policing in Nigeria: Emerging Arguments

There are two opinions about the role of the vigilante groups as instrument

of community policing in Nigeria. The opinions examined in this paper are

grouped into the optimists and pessimists.

The optimist scholars hold the opinion that vigilante groups complement the

police force in maintaining community security. In recognition of the role of the

vigilante groups, some State governments have enacted laws legitimizing their

functions. For example, the Anambra state government enacts the Vigilante Service

Act (2000) to provide for the registration of vigilante groups in Anambra State

(ICHRP, 2002). The aim is to limit their size, structure and regulate their activities.

Also in this vein, the Benue State government declares through the Community

Volunteer Guards Law (2000) that there is need to legalize and regulate the

activities of the vigilante in the state as they have been found to be helpful and

complementary to the police in keeping peace and security”.

13
 Apart from the attempts made by some state governments to provide the

activities of vigilante groups under law, scholars like Abrahams (2007) admits that

some members of the OPC are involved in vigilante activities, patrolling the streets

and chasing down criminals. His statement reflects the split of the OPC, which

later had a vigilante and a militia group. Members of the OPC militia group have

busied themselves with issues that foment crisis than those that offer security.

The position of the Tiv Area Traditional Council about the Tiv vigilante

groups, especially as it affects their role in community security is that of

commendation. To the members,

The vigilante groups across Tiv land should be

encouraged and facilitated by the local government

council chairmen and other well meaning persons to

effectively carry out their duties (Abomtse, 2004)

Baker (2002) confirms that it is the vigilante groups that protect government’s

facilities like water, electricity, etc, from illegal public use. The Hisbah groups in

Northern Nigeria are seen as helping in the preservation of the Islamic culture. It is

in recognition of their services that the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria

(SCSN) requested the federal government not to see the Hisbah groups as Security

rivals but as supplementing the services of the police (Osigbe, 2001).

14
 However, the views of the optimists are completely unacceptable to the

pessimists who opine that it is the members of vigilante groups who become used

as militias to execute conflicts in Nigeria. This observation is reinforced by the

position of the National War College that:

Militia gangs are found, albeit with varying levels of

sophistication and equipment, in virtually all the

regions of Nigeria. In many of these regions, militias

are assembled from erstwhile vigilante groups and large

army of unemployed youths. What is more, they

sometime engage the official law enforcement agencies

in battles.

The statement adds that in many of the regions, they are distinguished by name and

as private security organizations of individuals and groups. The link provided by

the National War College between vigilante and militia makes the outcome of the

survey conducted by Sesay (2003) very relevant. According to it, ethnic militia will

not develop harmonious relationships with each other to pursue common

development policies for their communities and so their increase number will

certainly undermine democracy. The point is that if the existence of militia

undermines social peace and the vigilantes are potential sources of recruitment, it

15
follows therefore that the vigilante groups, if not for any other wrongdoing are a

threat to peace.

The vigilantes, which emerged in their communities to protect the lives and

properties of the people, have become private organizations of the very important

personalities in Nigeria who finance and influence their activities. For example, the

Bakassi Boys in South-Eastern Nigeria have been accused of operating under the

orbit of the South-Eastern State Governors and also of defying the law and killing

real and perceived criminals (Smith, 2004). It is estimated that in mid 2005, at least

50, 000 people have been killed in various incidence of ethnic, religious and

communal violence since the return to democracy (Economist, 2005).

Having considered both the positive and negative arguments about the role

of vigilante groups in community policing, it is posited that though the vigilantes

have suffered series of setbacks, their activities in maintaining law and order

cannot be ignored easily.

Streamlining Vigilante groups

The vigilante groups in Nigeria assume different structures and patterns of

operation and these are determined by the nature of their societies and the purpose

for which they exist. Many of them that can be classified as militias represent

interests along the plural Nigeria societies and religions. Yet there are other groups

16
under the umbrella of VGN that do not represent any political, economic and

religious interest, but only tackles crimes in Nigerian communities.

The existence of government is a product of social contract; to protect the

citizenry from all forms of social abuses, and by means of the constitution

government oversees the military and the paramilitary. Thus, government has the

capacity to mainstream the vigilante groups by settling problems that give birth to

the emergence of militia groups such as political, economic and religious interests.

Equally, government should harmonize operations of the vigilante groups by

establishing a national body that will register and regulate their operations.

The issues that result to crisis in Nigeria, which these groups under

discussion emerge to execute include among others; political, economic and

religious interests, so there is need for representatives of the multi-ethnic groups to

meet in a conference to discuss the future of the Nigeria Federal State. Such a

conference will provide opportunity for the share of the divergent opinions of

members. Perhaps, this explains why Douglas and Ola (2003) point that the

solution to the problem of Nigeria in this regard can only emerge when

government begins to accept the fact that Nigeria is a federation of diverse ethnic

nationalities and act in recognition of that. Once the problem is recognized, the

militias that exist as opposition to the Federal System would naturally

metamorphose into security purposeful vigilantes to work in partnership with the

17
police. As this suggestion is being made, it is also realized that any time the issue

of national conference is mentioned, the opinion expressed by some Nigerians is

that the National Assembly is enough representation of the Nigerian peoples.

However, it should be noted that these issues relate to ethnic grievances and cannot

be effectively resolved on the floor of the National Assembly where contributions

and decisions are subject to extreme party regimentation.

There is need for a national law to be enacted to unify the structure and

functions of vigilante groups throughout the country to ensure uniformity. Between

the Nigerian communities, there is disagreement as to who is qualified to engage in

community policing as a member vigilante group. For instance, in Southern

Nigeria, the acceptable opinion is that community policing is the exclusive

prerogative of the indigenes (Agenda, 2005). However, this model is unacceptable

in the Muslim dominated Northern states of Nigeria. Here, what is supreme is

Islamic religion, which portrays that only Muslims have the right to police the

society as exemplified in the case of Zamfara, Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, etc.

Therefore it is only a national law that can clearly spell out the functions of

voluntary security groups in the country.

Though members of vigilante groups are volunteers, the issue of incentive

has to be taken very seriously. The incentive should be in form of monetary

reward, which will stimulate greater positive results.

18