G.R. No.

110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on
the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the
Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other
entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and
other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite. The City Government went to the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease
and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint,
invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of cease and desist orders of that
nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC. RTC denied LLDA’s motion to
dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the
cease and desist order during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order.
RULING: Yes. The issuance of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power
and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order
issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in
the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon
the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4
(d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program
within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers
in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the
government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is
concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or
orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting
in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be
sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region
and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell
further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an
administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
 G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR.,

PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed
PEREZ, respondents.

FACTS: Six plaintiffs who are the petitioners at bar all alleged that they are share tenants
of the defendants; that the defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots
which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and
prejudice: and that they were told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective
areas for they could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed that
they be declared as leasehold tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's
fees and different kinds of damages.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants
appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral
and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the
IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former
believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in
peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
RULING: The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of
the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the
defendants.
Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful
and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that the petitioners
were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their
landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and caused prejudiced to the
latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the
award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same Code which
provides, Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of
the petitioners and therefore, they are liable for the compensation to the latter.
 G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.
FACTS: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors
duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper
motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it
is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause
of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of
the Court.
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
RULING:
1. Yes. The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr.
precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the
judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint
is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence
of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision
Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners can file a class suit
 because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in
its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

2. The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and conclusions based on unverified data. The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.
 G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ET. Al, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public
nuisance with damages against defendant alleging in the motion that the continued
operation of the cement batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the
neighborhood, both in point of health and property." The defendant is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was issued
by the Quezon City government a business permit (Exhibit B) for the manufacture of
road and building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates, with cement batching
plant. Plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three parcels of residential
lots adjacent to the Daytona compound which has been over-run by effluence from the
cement batching plant of the defendant. The sediment settled on the lots and all forms of
vegetation have died as a result, and the land tremendously diminished in value. Dr. Raul
I. del Rosario, a neighboring physician, testified that he had treated several patients who
traced their sickness to the pollution caused by defendant Daytona batching plant. He said
that cement dust produces broncho-pulmonary obstructive diseases, and the people living
in the neighborhood of the batching plant are the most susceptible to these diseases.
SACHA del Rosario testified that her house has to close its windows most of the time
because of the dust pollution and her precious plants have been destroyed by the cement
powder coming from the constant traffic of trucks and other vehicles carrying the product
of the batching plant passing through her area.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daytona is liable for damages.
RULING: Yes. There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to
issue the order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was
a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's (Daytona
Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great menace to the
neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:

From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly

any question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant of the
defendant corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other
residents in the area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor
generated by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing
them serious discomfort and untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates
certain rights of the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance
and its abatement justified. (Decision, p. 5; p. 90, Rollo)
 G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and

export of charcoal briquette, received a letter from private respondent acting mayor Pablo
N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant, until further
order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with
him to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c)
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of
other document.

At the requested conference, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to

comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents. In
compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although
among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a
"Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National
Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau). Petitioner's
attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. On April 6, 1989,
without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered
the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acting Mayor has legal grounds for ordering the stoppage of
the operation of Technology Developers Inc.

RULING: YES. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not
prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must
be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same
unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant
goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been
installed.
 G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, ET. Al., petitioners

vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

FACTS: NAPOCOR began the construction of steel poles or towers in connection with
its Power Transmission Project. Petitioners in search of the adverse effects, got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to
electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia. Petitioners aired
this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them.
NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who in his
Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with which
Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project.
Negotiations being unsuccessful, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against NAPOCOR. The lower court then issued an order temporarily
restrained the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above order by
the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from
Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure
and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the
Government," particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and installing
high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes and from energizing
and transmitting high voltage electric current through said cables while the case is pending
final adjudication

The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court’s order hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the steel poles or towers
by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.

RULING: AFFIRMATIVE. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued prohibiting judges
from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the
decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction
in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the
importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this
particular law.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development
and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when
Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court
declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside
this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to conduct prior consultation

with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the
Local Government Code which provides: "no project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally protected

right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local
Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected communities are
veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and
subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from
the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act
complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of
NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the
issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction. Moreover, the Local
Government Code, requires conference with the affected communities of a government
project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the
act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules
require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant.
Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish
absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
 G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern
is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

HELD: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for
the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for
said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.