CHAN KENT vs. MICAREZ , G.R. No.

185758, March 9, 2011

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title against her parents and brother. She alleged
that the subject residential lot was purchased by her but was named under her parents under an implied trust due to the
difficulty in registering a real property in her name being married to an American citizen. However, she learned from her sister
that their parents sold the subject lot to her brother.

After the issues had been joined, the RTC ordered the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC). Conferences were then scheduled.

Based on the Report of Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao, Sr. that respondents’ counsel and representative did not appear on the
conferences, the RTC issued an order allowing petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. It was later been clarified by
Padao that it was petitioner‘s counsel and representative who did not attend the mediation proceedings. With this, the RTC
issued Order dismissing the case. Motion for reconsideration to set aside the order, appealing the relaxation of the rule on non-
appearance in the mediation proceedings, was denied.

Petitioner invoked that the dismissal of the case was not in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence. She claims
that it was unjust because her representative and counsel did not deliberately snub the mediation proceedings for
they have attended twice the mediation conferences and only left when respondent’s counsel had not yet arrived. Her reason for
failing to attend the last scheduled conference was due to some urgent matters caused by the sudden increase in prices of
commodities.

Issue: Whether or not dismissal is the proper sanction for failure to attend the mediation process.

Ruling: Negative.

Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of the case, the Court finds the sanctiontoo severe to be
imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on
mediation proceedings.

A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA provides sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and
such other sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties
absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.

The Court held that a mere censure or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioner’s representative and her counsel so as
to be informed of the court’s intolerance of tardiness and laxity in the observation of its order. By failing to do so and refusing to
resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously deprived petitioner of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly paid for.

Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for non-appearance to provide
substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end.

G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015

BBB,*Petitioner, v. AAA,*Respondent.
RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure to assail the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with modification the issuance against
him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.

Antecedent Facts

The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTC’s issuance of the PPO against
BBB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA]
was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy
named [CCC], with the help of her parents.

During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11,
1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).

To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter,
the birth certificates of the children, including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to
legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and heated
arguments. The two however have contradicting statements as to the cause of their present situation.

[BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent arguments. According to [BBB],
[AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges,
contrary to [AAA’s] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated
fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the brewing animosity between him and his
wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children with
her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family expense
to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.

[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBB’s] incessant
womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].

The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF],
insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did
nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and
lived temporarily at a friend’s house. She however went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE]
after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her friend’s house.

What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and
[EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently
from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB]
would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].

While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the rentals due on the
condominium unit they were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find
work to support the family, after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family.
According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing
her to request for loans from friends.

[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their children. [AAA]
alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within
the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every move,
i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home, etc.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing,
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the
dispositive portion of which orders:

“x x x x
Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or otherwise verbally
abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at
her;

Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may cause mental and emotional
anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and anyone
else for that matter;

Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit environment, specifically
prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress [FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances where he
would be allowed by this Court to see their children;

Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of 12 visits per year) at the
latter’s residence for a maximum period of 2 years [sic] each visit, subject to further orders from this
Court. For this purpose, [BBB’s every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall
coordinate with [AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at the expense of
[BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB]
visited the children;

Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of the motor vehicle more
particularly described as follows:

One (1) Hyundai Starex Van

1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443

Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further orders from this Court;

Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month (not Php 81,650.00 being
prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses, groceries, medicines,
medical bills, and insurance premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the
first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] in receiving
such support;

Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member at
a distance of 100 meters;

Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any specified place
frequented regularly by the offended party and children and any designated family or household member;

Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with the
undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and that in case such violence
is committed[,] he will pay the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;

Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA])
representing both reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.

x x x x.”5

Ruling of the CA

BBB filed before the CA an appeal 6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that
the RTC’s (a) issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their children,
(c) directives for him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive amount of
bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.

On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual findings and
dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper
proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological,
emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public
ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a
professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel
AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in
person or through text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably consider BBB’s claim that he cannot
provide financial support to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC as his income merely
depended on contractual hosting and events management assignments. The CA emphasized that AAA was
in the position to know the sources of BBB’s income. Citing Section 28 8 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article
2139 of the Family Code, the CA, however, ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise
custody over the children, who at that time were already older than seven years of age.

The CA denied BBB’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration 10 by way of the Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010
which is likewise assailed in the instant petition.

Issues

Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S DECISION TO MAKE THE
[TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TPO)] PERMANENT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND COST OF LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO
POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12cralawlawlibrary

IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE THE
UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED BY AAA. 13cralawlawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON
BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE
AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES. 14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the proceedings below
relative to his financial position and AAA’s supposedly baseless accusations and demands from him. In
addition, he posits that the text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence,
doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current whereabouts and
circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and
custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and
AAA barely get in touch with each other except when the latter initiates the same.

In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual issues which are
subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to
be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB still verbally abuses her.
BBB has not posted the P300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorney’s fees
and costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the law,
is also among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in 2010, she left DDD and EEE under the
care of BBB only because the circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then
lapsed from the time she filed an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the PPO
ensued. She could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but to yield
custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA points out
that since their children are all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of choosing for
themselves whom they want to exercise custody over them.

Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render
Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and
AAA had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of
DDD and EEE.17cralawlawlibrary

AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the MOA18 pointing out
that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and guidance. Atty.
Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s illicit relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued
by the RTC.

In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care and full
knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further, BBB’s alleged involvement with FFF is an
issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based on compromise.

Disquisition of the Court

The instant petition is not a proper

subject of a compromise agreement.

The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a
judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.

Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a
TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially
being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend
that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.

It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue
of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x. 22(Emphasis deleted)

AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the Family
Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of
minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an incidental
relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.

The courts a quo committed no

error in issuing a PPO against BBB.

Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in the CA’s ruling that the
RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to
determine who shall exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as
with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the
herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with
dispatch.

The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as regards
the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these
matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAA’s vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the
Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties
are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but the
Court now requires the RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail to put an
end to their bickering.

No grounds exist which compel this

Court to resolve the first three issues
raised by BBB since they are merely
factual in character.

In Padalhin v. Laviña,25 the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.cralawred

x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review
on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review
the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the
existence of clear and substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees in
Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s counterclaims on
the supposed showing that the complaint filed by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears
stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual
and not legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the original and emphasis ours)

In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award of attorney’s fees
and costs of litigation in AAA’s favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the amount of
P300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of
evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a petition filed under Rule 45
recognizes exceptions,27 BBB’s case does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord
with each other as to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding
upon this Court.

The doubt raised by BBB anent the

admissibility of the text messages as
evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.

In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of
text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits
authorship of the subject messages.29cralawlawlibrary

BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by
him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the
pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
The Appellant’s Brief30 filed before the CA stated in part that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is totally
obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an ongoing
verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home despite the entreaties
of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their separation, and up to the
time that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA]. 31 (Emphasis and underscoring in
the original and italics ours)

Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to
an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to
AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as
evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the
text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an
interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had
admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and
he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already apparent.

The deletion from the PPO of the

directive of the RTC and the CA relative
to the award of support is not warranted.
While CCC is not BBB’s biological son,
he was legitimated under the latter’s name.
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the
provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then,
BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.

This Court is not persuaded.

Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated.” Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents.”

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being
the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage.
Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged
CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it
now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be
allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of
the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code,
the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s
support.

Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court
the issue of CCC’s status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this
Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked
collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose.” 34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO
before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court
has no authority to resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for the
RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses
shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued the
PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that
psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim
that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of
the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody.
Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they
want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then
the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children
would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be
modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt
to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support
BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles
201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the children
are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or increased
proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a
mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus,
the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and

violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to be trifled
with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be punishable
with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or
imprisonment of six (6) months.35cralawlawlibrary

Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that “[a] PPO shall be effective until revoked by
a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.”

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a MOA, upon
which basis a judgment by compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out
AAA’s vacillation anent the MOA’s execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or
unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not AAA’s half-
hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court,
however, refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition for the
Court to dispose of revolve around the propriety of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves that principal
query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files
an application for its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and
Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED.
The Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) 36 thereof. The case is
hereby remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with
dispatch the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;
(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and
(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4, 2014, respectively, are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the
RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality
in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal
protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if
not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as
violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated
the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence
is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

[A.M. No. P-01-1518. November 14, 2001]

ANTONIO A. ARROYO, complainant, vs. SANCHO L. ALCANTARA, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan,
Albay, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Sancho L. Alcantara, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan,
Albay, for oppression, misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violations of 5(a) & (d) of R.A. No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)and 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).
The allegations in the complaint[1] are as follows:
On August 4, 1999, respondent issued a subpoena to Joaquin Opiana, Sr., complainants father-in-law and a resident of Barangay
Tandarora, Guinobatan, Albay, requiring him to appear before the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay. Ruben Olayres,
Barangay Captain of Barangay Tandarora, Guinobatan, Albay, served the subpoena on Joaquin Opiana, Sr. It appears that complainant
had an altercation with Olayres as the latter presented the subpoena in an arrogant manner. Joaquin Opiana, Sr. at the time had a serious
illness such that service of the subpoena upon him distressed him, causing him to experience difficulty in breathing.
On August 13, 1999, complainant wrote a letter by registered mail to the office of respondent, requesting him for a copy of the
alleged subpoena and a certification as to the facts surrounding the issuance of the same. Although respondent received the said letter
on August 16, 1999, per Registry Receipt No. 476, [2] he failed to act on it.
On September 14, 1999, complainant wrote to respondent to follow up the request in his first letter. [3] However, respondent twice
refused to receive the follow-up letter.[4] Complainants subsequent request to examine the records of the Municipal Trial Court of
Guinobatan, Albay also proved futile.
Complainant argues that the issuance of a subpoena on Joaquin Opiana, Sr., who was not a party in any case before the Municipal
Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay, hastened the latters death on August 27, 1999. Complainant also alleges that respondent, by issuing
the supposed subpoena, conferred undue benefit in favor of Olayres and caused the latter to file a criminal case for assault against
complainant and his wife. Complainant seeks the preventive suspension of respondent pending investigation of the charges against him.
In his answer,[5] respondent claims that the document mistaken by complainant to be a subpoena was in reality just a letter, typed
on an ordinary bond paper and addressed to Joaquin Opiana, Sr., requesting him to attend a meeting at the office of the Municipal Trial
Court of Guinobatan, Albay. Respondent explains that he made such request in his personal capacity upon the insistence of Ruben
Olayres, who thought that respondents position as a clerk of court could be used to amicably settle the dispute among the heirs of Isaac
Opiana, one whom was Joaquin Opiana, Sr., concerning a certain real property. Respondent attached to his answer the letter of Olayres,
dated August 3, 1999, requesting him to mediate in the dispute. [6] Respondent also contends that the mistake as to the nature of the
document which he prepared could be attributed to the one who thought that what he caused to be served was a subpoena. Respondent
claims that he was aware of the proper procedure regarding the issuance of a subpoena and he could not have allowed the barangay
chairman to serve the same as the latter was not authorized by the rules to do so. According to respondent, complainant could not produce
a copy of the supposed subpoena because there was none, the document involved being a letter written only in one copy intended to be
given to the addressee thereof.
During the pendency of this case, respondent applied for retirement effective June 30, 2000. On December 8, 2000,[7] he wrote a
letter to the Office of the Court Administrator, praying that his retirement benefits, less such amount as would be determined by the
Court Administrator, be released to him considering that he had rendered judicial service for more than 36 years and that he was the
sole breadwinner of his family.
Upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, who found that this case involved factual matters which must
be resolved after hearing, this Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Antonio C. Alfane, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi
City for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Anent the respondents request for partial release of his retirement benefits, the Court adopted the recommendation of the Office of
the Court Administrator to release the same minus the amount of P100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case. [8]
In his report, dated May 29, 2001, Executive Judge Antonio C. Alfane stated that respondent should be held liable for violation of
R.A. No. 6713, 5 (a) and (d) but absolved from the other charges of oppression, misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e) on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. As penalty, Judge Alfane recommended
that respondent be ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary for three months.
We find the recommendations of Executive Judge Alfane to be substantially well taken.
First. To prove his charge against respondent for violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e), complainant presented as his witness Joaquin
Opiana, Jr., who testified that respondent asked P5,000.00 from him during the meeting held at the behest of the latter. Joaquin Opiana,
Jr. said that he was not able to pay the said amount because his family could not afford it. [9] Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that
he merely advised Joaquin Opiana, Jr. to raise the money in order to pay the fees of the geodetic engineer, who would conduct the survey
on the disputed land of the Opianas. Respondent denied that he ever asked for money for himself as his fee for mediating the dispute. [10]
Executive Judge Alfane found that the evidence presented by complainant was insufficient to hold respondent liable for the
charge.[11] We agree. To hold a person liable for violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e), the concurrence of the following must be established:
(1) the respondent is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) the said public officer committed the
prohibited acts in the performance of his official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) he caused undue injury to any
party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence.[12]
In this case, the element of undue injury, which has been consistently interpreted as actual damage,[13] has not been shown as
complainant failed to prove that respondent indeed asked for and received money during the meeting. Complainant likewise failed to
substantiate his charge of alleged unwarranted benefit bestowed upon respondent Olayres through manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence. The mere fact that Olayres filed a case against complainant and his wife for direct assault as a
consequence of the fight that occurred during the service of the alleged subpoena does not prove that respondent indeed accorded
unwarranted benefit in favor of Olayres. Furthermore, the fact that respondent tried to help Olayres reach an amicable settlement with
the Opianas is insufficient basis for concluding that he exhibited manifest partiality and evident bad faith, much less inexcusable
negligence.
 Second. The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6713, for violation of which respondent was charged, read as follows:

SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under
obligation to:

(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on
the request.

....

(d) Act immediately on the publics personal transactions. All public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to
avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.

It appears that respondent violated the abovesaid provisions when he, after receipt of complainants first letter requesting for a copy
of the alleged subpoena, deliberately failed to act on the said request and even refused to receive complainants follow-up letter on the
pretext that the contents of the second letter were the same as that of the first one. The law enjoins public officials, such as respondent,
to extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public, and, at all times, to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order, public policy, public safety, and public interest. [14] In the performance of
this duty, respondent had indeed been remiss.
Third. Executive Judge Alfane recommended that respondent be absolved from the charge of oppression, misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because of reasonable doubt as to whether respondent indeed issued and caused to be served
a subpoena to complainants father-in-law. According to him, complainant failed to produce in evidence the alleged subpoena and to
comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court regarding the proffer of secondary evidence in lieu of the Original document. Further,
Executive Judge Alfane opined that if the document subject of the controversy was really a subpoena issued by respondent without
authority, Joaquin Opiana, Jr. would then not have voluntarily attended on behalf of his father the meeting held the day following the
incident.[15]
We disagree. While it is true that complainant failed to produce the alleged subpoena in court, the evidence on record shows that
respondent issued a document purportedly from the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay. Respondent admitted in his answer
that Barangay Chairman Olayres requested him to mediate among the heirs of the late Isaac Opiana because his position as a clerk of
court might convince the parties to settle their differences regarding the land left by their deceased father. To this request, respondent
acceded, with the alleged intention of helping Olayres.
In the first place, a clerk of court had no authority to mediate among the constituents of Olayres. Respondent even admitted that
he was aware of this fact. Although he claims that his act was done in his personal capacity and not as a clerk of court, this is belied by
the fact that complainant was given the impression that the intended meeting involving his father-in-law was court-related. Complainant
testified that he read the words Municipal Trial Court in the alleged subpoena. [16] Furthermore, the meeting was held at the office of
respondent on August 5, 1999, a Thursday, and during working hours. [17]
It is apparent that respondent had exceeded his authority as a clerk of court. He had, wittingly or unwittingly, allowed his position
to be used to exercise his moral ascendancy over the members of the Opiana family, whom he summoned to his office for mediation. He
gave the impression that such meeting was part of the proceedings of the court, for which reason Joaquin Opiana, Jr. felt compelled to
attend the same to represent his sick father.
Moreover, respondents deliberate setting aside of complainants request for a copy of the supposed subpoena and his refusal to
receive complainants follow-up letter in violation of 5 (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 cannot be viewed in isolation as it appears that he
intentionally violated these rules to cover up his reprehensible act of issuing a document purportedly from the court in excess of his
authority.Respondent refused to give any written explanation concerning the nature of the document he issued to summon Joaquin
Opiana, Sr. Neither did he explain why he was not able to produce in court the supposed letter of invitation he executed after complaint
presented evidence to prove that he has done all within his means to get a copy of the subpoena. It cannot be denied that such document
was well within the control of respondent, who was the one who prepared it, signed it, and caused it to be served on Joaquin Opiana,
Sr. Thus, his failure to present in evidence the purported letter raises the presumption against him that evidence willfully suppressed
will be adverse if produced.[18]
Indeed, respondent failed in his duty to conduct himself at all times with propriety and decorum and, above all else, to be above
reproach.[19] It bears stressing that everyone connected with the dispensation of justice bears a heavy burden of responsibility of so
conducting himself that reflects credit to his office. By acting in excess of his authority, albeit with good intentions, respondent
committed simple misconduct.
By way of penalty, Executive Judge Alfane recommended that respondent be fined in the amount equivalent to his salary for three
months for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, 5 (a) and (d). We hold that the appropriate penalty for this lapse is a reprimand, the
violation being a light offense.[20] In addition, the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent for having committed simple misconduct
should be suspension without pay for a period of one month and one day to six months. [21] However, considering that respondent has
retired from the service, this Court will impose on him, in lieu of suspension, a fine approximately equal to his former salary for three
months. Since at the time of his retirement, respondents monthly salary was P17,069.00, a fine of P50,000.00 would thus be appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sancho L. Alcantara guilty of simple misconduct and violation of R.A. Act No. 6713,
5 (a) and (d) and accordingly imposes on him as penalty a fine in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and a reprimand,
respectively. The Court also orders the release of the balance of the P100,000.00 retained from his monetary benefits after deducting the
fine.With respect to the charge against respondent for violation of 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the same is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.