EN BANC fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as
delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo
Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric
Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation
companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right
of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the
petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to
Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to
construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point
in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of
Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is
granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other
person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to
the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was
ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and
the transportation companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-
General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda
after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power
is attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally
observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government
of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now
made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may
not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are
familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.
Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the
Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a
contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts
of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301;
Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co.
[1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and
award too far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the
doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such
amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract
for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a
statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular
franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true
that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced
would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446,
without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs.
Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state
legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative
authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The
first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court.
Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in
dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of
jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we
would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming
before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as
administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of
duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon
themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another
anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members
of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at
all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and
its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act
speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an
entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in
any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic
Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be
required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers
and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all
strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise
any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of
execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a
court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the
term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative
and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any
operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some
future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its
opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the
court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it
executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will
carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its
character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . .
(Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that
section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed
further in the matter.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers,
Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968
ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, Petitioner,
vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS,
as Executive Secretary, Respondents.
Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary
of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary
pending investigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed,
confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by
Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner
is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those
of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642,
4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following
expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and
privileges of district judge - P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter
requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary
action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval
of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and
apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments
and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the
Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R.
A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that
a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to
the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending
investigation of the above charges."chanrobles virtual law library
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions
advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and
abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents
admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner,
exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that
the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or
executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-
judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land
Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary
Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites
that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of
the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme
Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of
Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at
all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme
Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily
result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom
the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured
officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary
Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of
Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No.
5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the
Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose
functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication
from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution
expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII,
sec. 10[i]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor
General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since
the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the
Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par.
2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the
Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges
of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that
in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of
Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by
Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from
office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First
Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of
Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for
Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in
plain and unequivocal language.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the
Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank
and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by
the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of
that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with
the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401,
160 N. E. 655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge
the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General
Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972, -
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character,
whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into
being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases
and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article.
It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it
exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445)
and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra
(272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S.
274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite
Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411.
(Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S.
469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of
judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes
between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive
officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed
with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land
Registration. - When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard
to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to
him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the
question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds,
stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the
Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the
records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice
to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds:
Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with the
ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a
question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a
Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It
will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land
Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
1 of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has
Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau
director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not
administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should
constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers
and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151,
sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion
of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the
latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes
should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict
2
with the Constitution, We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act
1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include,
the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of
privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently,
the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to
sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of
discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the
petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now
Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty,
violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic
Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58
thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as
such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his
monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed
of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending
decisions for one month, two months to over three months,
together with the title, number, number of hours of court session
held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon.
Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in
violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated
February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
"B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New
Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December,
1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced
by the certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial
Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2 thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance
never performed his official duties or discharged the duties
appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his
salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the
cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached
as Annex "C" and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last
paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit
the certificate of service in flagrant violation of action 5 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:
... District judges, judges of City Courts,
and municipal Judges shall certify on their
application for leave, and upon salary
vouchers presented by them for payment,
or upon the payrolls upon which their
salaries are paid, that all special
proceedings, applications, petitions,
motions, and all civil and criminal cases
which have been under submission for
decision or determination for a period of
ninety days or more have been determined
and decided on or before the date of
making the certificate and ... no salary
shall be paid without such certificate'
(Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from
July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February,
1971 stating therein the number of hours of session that the
Court holds daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a
clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a
District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to
deny his fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the
administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the
Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was
 entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his
reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am
entering upon the performance of the
duties of the office of Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29,
1970.'
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate
falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the
requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and
good moral character appertaining to holding the position of
Judge in the administration of justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging
pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba
on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After
consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the
municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice,
respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba
Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom
and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistance
promised by the Laguna provincial government for the
purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on
the national government for the equipment needed by the court
(Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all
these items must be furnished by the provincial government.
The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the
respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor
of Calamba assured the respondent that the court could be
accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal
building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his
personnel are transferred to another location. When the
projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about
to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors
objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent
to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with
the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder
the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the
second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the
negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to
reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space
selected by respondent was the second floor of the Laguna
Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the
municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner
on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the
municipal government could release the amount necessary for
the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which
was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices
for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial
fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the
provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for
the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court.
Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for
the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the
Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for
the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on
December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment
chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see
enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the
Department of Justice marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could
actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years
he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of
duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits
he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary
of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office,
grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances
mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyer
who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid
himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because
aside from the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he
worked in the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of
Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if
respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other
judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of
dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried
a salary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical
Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole,
positions from which he was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively.
Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent
took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of
Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6,
1952 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually
discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, to
perform their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions
and circular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial
Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring
a judge who has not entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with
them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial
duties certify that 'all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil
and criminal cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination
for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the
date of making the certificate.' And bow could such a judge hold court in his place of
permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the
court as prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10
when his court is not yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58
of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their
respective complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material
facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of
without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be
dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations
for the respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as
complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent
collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since
the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent
has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not
really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking
his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to
earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any
judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good
reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the
Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in
whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a
judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government officials or officers in
duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the
performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on
his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on
the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made
himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his
vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty,
to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered
some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being
unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part. As to
whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary
and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should
observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be
discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory
of dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of
accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges
under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of
Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial
functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate
judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others.
On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for
he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made
himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not
actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making.
The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have been caught
unprepared and have not had enough time to have it read. Conceivably, under the law,
with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another
court pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiative control
of the Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at
the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of
Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept
clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our
government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded
by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public
service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said
three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional
precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the
judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or
even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his
actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to
review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect,
by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case
may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice
is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy
of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER
OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C.
Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with
Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge
of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
(Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor
to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a
Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the
appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached
to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the
Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a
violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of
the second paragraph of Section .7, Article
IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amount to an abandonment
of my present position as Executive Judge
of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said
Committee as part of the primary functions
of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed
abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is
believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal
justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that—
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on
Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice
Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation
of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical
demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application,
it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed
in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however
eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the
rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to
the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the
Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G.
VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO
DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against
the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and
allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled
that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC
Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with
respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel
for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC
was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the
April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of
IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him
to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30,
1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of
Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent
Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10)
IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
1
ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De
Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's
shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that
Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a
Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without appellate
jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as
an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in
the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the
stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979,
resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or
matter where he may be called to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an
administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot
be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of
another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance
could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired
them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of
Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25,
1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the
SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
2 88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero,
but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the
matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal
Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior,
co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our
opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other
capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and
to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case
would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative
body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may
not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to
3 with the hearing of the administrative case.
accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747
falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the
constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder,
or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy
before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not
necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside.
The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications; COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
BOARD; and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Administrative Action Board, DOTC, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its
Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre
supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and
Port Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the
reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed
Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G.
Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees
resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they
were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by the PPA General Manager also
for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications
of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount
of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant
to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and
thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate
action." At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground
that he needed time to study the charges against him. The AAB proceeded to
hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on
February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed
with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the
certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and
proceeded to file before this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R.
No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon. Reinerio 0. Reyes, etc., et al." In
the en banc resolution of March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for "appropriate action." 3 G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in
the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No.
PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging
the following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando
Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against them;
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the
service;
c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are
declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the
government service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals
also rendered a decision 4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court
through an "appeal by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order."
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a
decision and hence, the filing of memoranda has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions
of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions" of this Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals
failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due process; (b) the PPA general
manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the
necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA general
manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to
the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-
AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try
the administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality
of the preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary
and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot
subject him to a preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8,
Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of
the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank
of Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and
not the PPA General Manager is the "proper disciplining authority. 6
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously
equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial measure with "suspension"
as a penalty for administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive
suspension on a government employee charged with an administrative
offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No.
807:
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
the service.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive
suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so
that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons,
from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated. 7 Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative
penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D.
No 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the
investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may
only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final
disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself
and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent
in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers
are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by
Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers
and employees" in the PPA.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted
even if the disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative
case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive
suspension has been exhausted. The employee concerned may then be
reinstated. 8 However, the said ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section
42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any fault, negligence or petition of a
suspended employee may not be considered in the computation of the said
period. Thus, when a suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a
restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in
the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive suspension. 9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the
AAB may initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA Personnel below
the rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of
petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that
Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of
Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the
same decree gave the Council the power "to appoint, discipline and remove,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other
personnel."
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, See.
4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be "attached" to
the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication.
When Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the PPA retained
its "attached" status. 10 Even Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV,
Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the DOTC
"shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective
charters or laws creating them, except when they conflict with this Code."
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative
relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of
1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative
supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship
between the Department or its equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board
of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman
or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is
permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation
or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which
shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall
serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the
discretion or judgment of the executive officer of the
agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and
the head of the board or the attached agency or
corporation strongly disagree on the interpretation and
application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to
resolve the disagreement, he shall bring the matter to the
President for resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached
to a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned
their audited financial statements within sixty (60) days
after the close of the fiscal year; and
(d) Pending submission of the required financial
statements, the corporation shall continue to operate on
the basis of the preceding year's budget until the financial
statements shall have been submitted. Should any
government-owned or controlled corporation incur an
operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it shall be
subject to administrative supervision of the department;
and the corporation's operating and capital budget shall be
subject to the department's examination, review,
modification and approval. (emphasis supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the
"lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The
attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from
Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even
an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from
Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel
actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under
the Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the Administrative Code
explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall
not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. 12
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of
personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental
interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which
provides:
Sec. 8. Management and Staff. — a) The President shall,
upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the
General Manager and the Assistant General Managers.
(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall
be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and
fitness based on a comprehensive and progressive merit
system to be established by the Authority immediately
upon its organization and consistent with Civil Service
rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer,
promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority,
including temporary workers, shall be governed by such
merit system.
(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of
the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number
of personnel of the Authority, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments.
For professional and technical positions, the General
Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that
are comparable to those of similar positions in other
government-owned corporations, the provisions of
existing rules and regulations on wage and position
classification notwithstanding.
(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval
by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism
for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to
remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA
General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after gathering
sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in
accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors. 14
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of
Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department
Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service
Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department Secretary is
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the following
provisions:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission
shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension
for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against
a government official or employee in which case it may
hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be
final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department head.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General
Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have
first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the
imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It
was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the
then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the
case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under
Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and
recommend to him "all cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities,
grafts and acts of corruption in the Department." Composed of a Chairman and
two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 25 issued by the President on May 25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a
quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from
the observance of due process in its proceedings. 16 We are not satisfied that
it did so in this case the respondents protestation that petitioner waived his
right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was
precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it
upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to
preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction
of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-
049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the petitioner.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
case in REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with
dispatch its reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless after a
determination of its duration, it is found that he had served the total of ninety
(90) days in which case he shall be reinstated immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon JJ., concur.
Padilla and Bellosillo, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. &
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive
Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility
and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On
September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank
by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil
Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil
 Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission,
as the central personnel agency of the government, is
mandated to establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy in the civil
service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission
the power, among others, to administer and enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others,
that The Career Service shall be characterized by (1)
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination, or based
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security
of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level
shall cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative
need to consolidate, integrate and unify the
administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle
A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on
the Commission the power and authority to effect
changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution
provides that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Civil Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline
reorganize and effect changes in its organizational
structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties
and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board
shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive
Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner
as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994,
the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued
CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career
Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the
issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including
whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to
abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because
these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the
President has refrained from considering appointments of
career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate
court to settle the legal issues arising from issuance by
the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-
4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-
4359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT
COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED
THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO.
93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions
of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It
posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY
DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS
PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4)
OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID
PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO
QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF
THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT
THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE
COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1),
Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the
1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN
SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY THE
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO.
114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO
QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH
THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which
adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan
provides:
Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a
continuing pool of well-selected and development oriented
career administrators who shall provide competent and
faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in
this Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the
 governing body of the Career Executive Service. The
Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary
and the Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio
members and two other members from the private sector
and/or the academic community who are familiar with the
principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the
organization and operation of the service. (Emphasis
supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of
rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a
legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in
this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what
offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in
the exigencies of government it is necessary to create
and define duties, the legislative department has the
discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be
created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and
become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office
created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if
it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing
the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations
Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation
of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least
one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as
are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the organization as
the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17
must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission
shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an
Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the
programs of the offices of the Commission and render
periodic reports on their operations, and perform such
other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman
with legal advice and assistance; render counselling
services; undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and
application of the Civil Service law, rules and regulations;
prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations;
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall
formulate development plans, programs and projects;
undertake research and studies on the different aspects of
public personnel management; administer management
improvement programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary
services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the
Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other
basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall
formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations pertaining to personnel records maintenance,
security, control and disposal; provide storage and
extension services; and provide and maintain library
services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation
shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules
and regulations relative to the administration of position
classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
shall provide leadership and assistance in developing and
implementing the overall Commission programs relating to
recruitment, execution and placement, and formulate
policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the Commission's examination and
placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall
provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to
performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee
incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall
provide leadership and assistance in the development and
retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil
Service; formulate standards for training and staff
development; administer service-wide scholarship
programs; develop training literature and materials;
coordinate and integrate all training activities and evaluate
training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall
develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct or inspection and audit personnel and
personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory
services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government
agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide
leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and
regulations in the accreditation of employee associations
or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of
employee grievances and management of employee
disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
governing corporate officials and employees in the areas
of recruitment, examination, placement, career
development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects
of personnel management on the basis of comparable
industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be
responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the
regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement
 of government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission
shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices
each to be headed by a Director, and such field offices as
may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at
least the rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its
control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall
be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not
negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination."
This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of
the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its equivalent and
attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be
accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs.
Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the
abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to
state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the cited case was
dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of
action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of
the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City
Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of
any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the
crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An
act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and
delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of
judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle
of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the
assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a
suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court
as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in
its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the
Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date
when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very
comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations
of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the
judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental
Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of
petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of
October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through
counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of
the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was
deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous
study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in
several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda
from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As
far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set
forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged
rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as
members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of
"any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this
excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10
"Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most
what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals.
This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to
parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights
is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-
ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and
public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that
in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of
People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently
now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however,
would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which
is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process
can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the
United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case
of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been
lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest
violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in
informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open
to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This
Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated
September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which
shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide
the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary
which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special
Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a
Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It
began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has
the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what
today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the
judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for
remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from
Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest —
can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to
all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are
affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee
addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point
for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the
Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior
courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that
reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for
more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is
need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be
the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades
of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater
complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in
the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically
underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances
previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its
task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to
the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need
for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is
well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to
be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued
national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on
development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts
are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as
simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in
terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National
Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than
economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of
the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and
change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of
operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and
the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way
the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could
be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures
deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court
on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be
filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas
for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not,
even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of
the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report,
equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well
known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined
efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973
Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth
of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the
judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted
with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang
Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even
worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful,
as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting,
likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it
were to take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The
reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901,
23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth.
There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally
composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en
banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to
transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two
years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing
system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First
Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of
the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The
membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28
Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29
Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in
1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the
same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955,
32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and
Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with
the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges
as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became
the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the
background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to
the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in
accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in
disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures
which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and
upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership,
however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of.
Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate
court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to
increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary
procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments.
In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to
the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17,
1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its
report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial
Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance
with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the
aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some
amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the
public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted
of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had
submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon
the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such
Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the
bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the
present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it
may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings
of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well
as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14,
1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in
factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of
arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within
the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38
reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be
without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here
involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course,
if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to
an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted
with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases
enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the
other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit
of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of
Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a
quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936,
43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the
Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of
such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to
the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him,
the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the
same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity
of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This
Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel
in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard
of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with
due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among
other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely
new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is
valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain
limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of
the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all
the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article
of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation
of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort.
(Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44
justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the
National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is
this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the
one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to
realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily
factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead
and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may
arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of
tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that
kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose
was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the
legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted
purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge.
Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for
reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government
than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct
Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an
express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices
whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the
legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of
Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the
reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the
reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts of first
instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by
new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was
no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that
the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that
the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore
may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts
of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52
municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal
circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the
grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be
differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was
for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question
of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an
unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la
Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta
de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo,
entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar
el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un
juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva al
Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held
applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating
a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el
caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha
cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The
present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that
the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive,
may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all
inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned,
with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such
cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision
reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court
of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to
inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure
provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is
thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution
adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong
executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former
Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto
of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to
govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed
by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with
this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by
Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it
may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers, to
quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
"obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The
president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of
the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly
provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are
once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As
originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as
the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime
Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with the
assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was
established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free
Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does
not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of
the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members
of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the
Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at
least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly
indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the
executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the
Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a
caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to
preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the
executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing
inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent
Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was
a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76
Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far
as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved.
If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the
action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but
only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal
is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between
one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former
is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional
taint must be applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January,
has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could
have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now,
however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring
and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the
Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way
as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the
Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself
for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically
provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree
through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true
there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be
ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to
reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang
Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts
and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the
essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from
acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has
long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that
this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As
Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the
main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments
of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall
another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its
affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for
which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle,
Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is
a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down
'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight
compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually
from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise
expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is
well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers:
"The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities
of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted
the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are
instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing
the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That
we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners
would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the
challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against
raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines
set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of
a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of
non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the
competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the
completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The
undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and
efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free
Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to
laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such
means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is
worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90
He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor
to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion"
"The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party
caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection
based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite
time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical
language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President,
within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing
pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis
of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with
the immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section
is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected
continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the
said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents
of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is
equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the
government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in
the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it
is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive.
There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply
omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle
that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99
Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981,
petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then
and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the
framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not
consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the
product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set
forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could
be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has
had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to
inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be
improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer
of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on
Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the
Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court
Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has
played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has
been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate
reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct
involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of
judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the
people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the
language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a
moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official
certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of
tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any
fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more
likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of
their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is
not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the
most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the
national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence
in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As
emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,
105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given
character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be
guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such
stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to
cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the
judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we
are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to
reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common
Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just
blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it
was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the
judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified
good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the
duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent
and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume
that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except
the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones
will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its
solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any
fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing
power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and
efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly
has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers
assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their
determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes
of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as
well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric
Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost
half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department
or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence
to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act."
110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not
having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54554 March 30, 1981
EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge of the CFI of Rizal,
Branch XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital and the CITY
MAYOR OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for "Certiorari, mandamus and Prohibition", seeking the
dismissal of Civil Case No. C-7770 below, we have, as factual background,
the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the
Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent,, Dr.
Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City
General Hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent,
former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently
appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay,
a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested
Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among
others that, as Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then
Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now
Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September
20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment stating:
... as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was
promoted to Assistant Hospital Administrator from his
previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in
rank to the said higher position by reason of his having
completed all academic requirements for the Certificate in
Hospital Administration ... contrary to the claim of Dr.
Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on
appeal. On December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board
issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's
appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. The pertinent portion of the
aforestated Resolution reads:
A perusal of the records shows that appellant Medalla is
the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General
Hospital; he is a holder of the Degree of Doctor of
Medicine; he has completed the requirements in Hospital
Administration and is recommended for the title of
Certificate in Hospital Administration; he is also a
candidate of a Masters degree in Hospital Administration
He possesses the First Grade eligibility (BA 1080) and
had undergone relevant training in Hospital
Administration. His performance rating is 'Very
Satisfactory'.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
On the other hand, appellee Mackay had been a Resident
Physician, the position he held prior to his promotion to the
contested position. He is a holder of the degree of Doctor
of Medicine and is a First Grade eligible (BA 1080-Medical
Board). He is a graduate student in Hospital Administration
and as completed all academic requirements for a
certificate in Hospital Administration. His performance
rating is "Very Satisfactory".
A perusal of the organizational chart of the Ospital ng
Caloocan approved by the Hospital Administrator would
show that the Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to
the Assistant Hospital Administrator. The Resident
Physician is not a next lower position to the Assistant
Hospital Administrator. Therefore, Medalla and not Mackay
is the person next in rank who may be promoted to the
position involved.
Moreover, even on the basis of competence and
qualifications to perform the duties of the position, the
records show that Dr. Medalla is more competent and
qualified than Dr. Mackay. The qualification relied upon by
the Acting City Mayor in justifying the appointment of Dr.
Mackay which is his having completed the academic
requirements for the Certificate in Hospital Administration
does not give Dr. Mackay the advantage inasmuch as Dr.
Medalla has also completed the academic requirements
for a certificate in Hospital Administration and is
recommended for a title of Certificate in Hospital
Administration apart from being also a candidate for a
Masters degree in Hospital Administration. 1
xxx xxx xxx
Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, pursuant to section
19(6), PD No. 807, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave rendered
a Decision on April 24, 1979 declaring that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as
recommended by Civil Service Commission, the
appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant
Hospital Administrator in the Caloocan City General
Hospital is hereby revoked and the position awarded in
favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla. 2
The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for reconsideration.
On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the
President, the same Acting City Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital
Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco as his Assistant, thereby again
completely bypassing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on May 7, 1979.
On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on Medalla's
protest, and besides calling attention to the penal provision of P.D. No. 807,
disapproved Mackay's appointment as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered and finding the protest of
Dr. Medalla in order, the appointment of Dr. Mackay as
hospital Administrator at P26,388 per annum effective May
7, 1979 is hereby disapproved. it is hereby ordered that Dr.
Medalla be appointed to the position of Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital. 3
On July 20, 1979, Mackay moved for reconsideration asserting 1) denial of due
process of law inasmuch as the contested Resolution/Decisions were issued
ex-parte, and 2) that the Civil Service Commission can not ignore nor overrule
an appointment made by a City Executive.
Without awaiting the resolution of his Motion for Consideration- Mackay filed,
on July 23, 1979, before tile Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City,
presided by respondent, Judge, a Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" civil Case No. C7770)
against Hon. Jacobo Clave, the Civil Service Commission, the Acting City
Mayor, the City Treasurer, and Medalla, praying that said respondents be
restrained from implementing the Decision of Hon. Jacobo Clave of April 24,
1979, the Resolution No. 49 of the Merit Systems Board dated December 29,
1978, and the Decision of the Civil Service Commission of June 27, 1979. The
Court a quo issued the Restraining Order prayed for on July 25, 1979 enjoining
implementation of the aforestated Resolution/Decisions.
On August 2, 1979, Medalla moved to dissolve the Restraining Order and to
dismiss the Petition alleging mainly that Mackay had not exhausted his
administrative remedies and that the latter's right to a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was not only dubious or debatable but was clearly non-existent.
Hon. Jacobo Clave and the Civil Service Commission likewise filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the same ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On August 13, 1979, Mackay moved to suspend proceedings pending final
resolution by the Civil Service Commission of his Motion for the
reconsideration of the Decision of said Commission dated June 27, 1979.
On September 24, 1979, the Trial Court denied both Motions to Dismiss filed
by Medalla, on the one hand, and Hon. Clave and the Civil Service
Commission, on the other, holding that Mackay's failure to await resolution of
his Motions for Reconsideration pending before the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission did not deprive him of a cause of action
besides the fact that according to the respective Manifestations of the said
Offices, the Motions for Reconsideration had already been resolved
adversely against Mackay.
Acting on Medalla's Motion for Reconsideration thereof as well as his Motion
to Lift Restraining Order, the Court a quo, in its Order of July 15, 1980, denied
reconsideration but lifted the Restraining Order "there being no showing that
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. "
Respondent Judge then set the case for hearing.
At this juncture, Medalla instituted this Petition before us praying that the
Court a quo be restrained from proceeding with the hearing and that
judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the Honorable Marcelino
N. Sayo, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII,
Caloocan City, to dismiss respondent
Mackay's petitions, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and/or non-
exhaustion of administrative
remedies resulting to a lack of cause
of action;
2. Declaring the decision of the Office
of the President (Annex "C") and the
Merit Systems Board (Annex "E") as
valid and enforceable. 4
We issued a Restraining Order on August 27, 1980 enjoining respondents
from proceeding with the case below.
On November 7, 1980, we required petitioner Medalla to implead the Mayor
of Caloocan City as party-respondent, and the latter to comment on the
Petition and to state whether he is ready to issue an appointment to Medalla
as Hospital Administrator, Medalla's rights thereto having been upheld by the
Civil Service Merit Systems Board and by the Office of the President.
In his Compliance, Medalla included an additional prayer that the City Mayor
of Caloocan be ordered to immediately appoint him as Hospital Administrator
and to pay him salary differentials.
In his Comment, the City Mayor of Caloocan invoked the privilege of an
appointing authority to determine who can best fulfill the functions of an office
citing the case of Aguilar vs. Nieva, Jr. 5 to that effect. And as to the matter of
his readiness to issue an appointment to Medalla, he manifested his
preference to withhold action pending Mackay's unresolved Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of June 27, 1979 of the Civil Service Merit
Systems Board.
Petitioner Medalla submits that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing
Mackay's Petition before it, there being a clear showing of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and that said Court was devoid of jurisdiction in
reviewing on certiorari decisions of the Office of the President and of the Civil
service Commission rendered in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.
Private respondent Mackay takes the contrary view and prays, instead, that
the contested Decisions/Resolution be declared null and void and respondent
Judge ordered to proceed with the hearing of the case below.
Although Mackay's Motions for Reconsideration were, in fact, still pending
resolution by Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Commission,
respectively, at the time private respondent Mackay filed the Petition below,
dismissal of said Petition can no longer be anchored on the ground of non-
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla prays, considering that
Manifestations dated August 17 and 23, 1979 filed by the said parties before
the Court a quo show that they had resolved the incidents adversely against
Mackay. 6 That issue, therefore, has become moot and academic.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions
and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential
Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the
power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act
arises from a failure to recognize the most important
principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation
of powers into three coequal departments, the executive,
the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own
assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is
challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be
implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject
and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are
under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior
to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief
Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret,
apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by
the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this
light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be
governed by the same principles as govern the judicial
review of all administrative acts of all administrative
officers. 7
The courts may always examine into the exercise of power
by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether
the particular power has been granted to the officer,
whether it is a legal power that could have been granted to
him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner.
This jurisdiction does not depend upon an act of the
legislature authorizing it, but inheres in the courts of
general jurisdiction as an essential function of the judicial
department (State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agri.
Asso. 123 SW 68 1). 8 (emphasis supplied).
For the speedy determination of the controversy, however, and considering
that the position involved is infused with public interest, rather than remand the
case to the Court below for further proceedings, we hold that grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Merit
Systems Board is absent.
To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA No. 5502),
it is clear that the power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices
entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil Service law, rules and
regulations (ibid., section 19). The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of
the city departments provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital
Administrator is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B). The Hospital
Administrator is the head of the City General Hospital empowered to
administer, direct, and coordinate all activities of the hospital to carry out its
objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured (ibid.).
Under section 19 (3) of the Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807, effective on
October 6, 1975), the recruitment or selection of employees for promotions is
drawn from the next-in-rank.
SEC. 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second
level of the Career Service as defined in Section 7, the
employees in the government service who occupy the next
lower positions i the occupational group under which the
vacant position is classified and in other functionally
related occupational groups and who are competent,
qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility
shall be considered for promotion.
Section 19 (6) of the same Decree provides for the administrative procedure by
an aggrieved employee in case of non-observance by the appointing authority
of the next-in-rank rule, thus:
 Sec. 19(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have
the right to appeal initially, to the department head and
finally to the Office of the President an appointment made
... (2. in favor of one who is not next-in-rank, ... if the
employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the
written special reason or reasons given by the appointing
authority for such appointment: ... Before deciding a
contested appointment the Office of the President shall
consult the Civil Service Commission. For purposes of
this Section, .qualified next-in-rank' refers to an employee
appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously
determined to be next-in- rank to the vacancy proposed
to be filled and who meets the requisites for appointment
thereto as previously determined by the appointing
authority and approved by the Commission.
The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla He had
appealed to the department head and from thence, in view of the latter's
unfavorable action, to the Civil Service Commission and thereafter to the
Office of the President. Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service Merit Systems
Board its Decision of June 27, 1979, and the Decision of the presidential
Executive Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla's favor.
The special reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment,
which is, that lie had completed all academic requirements for the Certificate
of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, since Medalla himself was found to
be in possession of the same qualification. But while the qualifications of both
petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear
that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital
Administrator under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently,
at the time of Mackays appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator and
subsequently hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was
only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in rank, Medalla is
entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator.
Respondent Mackay's urging that he was denied due process deserves scant
consideration considering that subsequent developsments in the case
establish that he was heardon his Motions for Reconsideration by both the
Civil Service Commission and the office of the President.
It is true that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should
be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified
and elligible, who in his best estimation are possesses of the requisite
reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgement. 9 However, as
reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board,
upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the
qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay for
the contested position, revealing a careful study of the controversy between
the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation of Mackay's
appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, 1) the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr.
Honorato C. Mackay, as Hospital Administrator is hereby declared null and
void; 2) respondent City Mayor of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to extend
an appointment to petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, as Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital immediately upon notice
of this Decision; 3) petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, shall receive all
compensation and emoluments appertaining to said position thenceforth, but
without entitlement to salary differentials; and 4) respondent Judge is hereby
permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 7770.
This Decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30637 July 16, 1987
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
II of the Court of First, Instance of Agusan, and AGO TIMBER
CORPORATION, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent
judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor
authority to review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and
assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining the correct
boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court
reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or
agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be
disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to
each other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License
Agreement No. 49, is located in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and
Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less,
while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter referred to as respondent
Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is located at Los
Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000
hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one
Narciso Lansang under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-'52.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they
have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the
eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western
boundary. The western boundary of petitioner Lianga is described as "... Corner 5, a
point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-
Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary in a general
northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters to Corner 6,
a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao
Creek ..." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is described as "...
point 4, along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao
boundary in a general southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to
point 5, a point along Los Arcos-Lianga Road; ..." 1
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas,
the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common
boundary of their respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook
the survey and fixed the common boundary as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging
Company at Km. 10.2 instead of Km. 9.7 on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N900E,
21,000 meters; N12 W, 21,150 meters; N40 W, 3,000 meters; N31 W, 2,800 meters;
N50 W, 1,700 meters" which respondent Ago protested claiming that "its eastern
boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as described in
Section 1 of Art. 1693 of the Philippine Commission as indicated in the green pencil in
the attached sketch" of the areas as prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. 2 The Director
of Forestry, after considering the evidence, found:
That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation portrays a line (green line)
far different in alignment with the line (red) as indicated in the original
License Control Map of this Office;
That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation (green line does not conform
to the distance of 6,800 meters from point 3 to point 4 of the original
description of the area of Narciso Lansang but would project said line to a
distance of approximately 13,800 meters;
That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would increase the
area of Narciso Lansang from 9,000 to 12,360 hectares;
That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would reduce the
area of the Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. to 107,046 hectares instead of the
area granted which is 110,406 hectares.
and ruled that "the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions
of this Office is granting the license of Mr. Narciso Lansang; and further, that it also
runs counter to the intentions of this Office in granting the Timber License Agreement
to the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. The intentions of this Office in granting the two
licenses (Lansang and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.) are patently manifest in that
distances and bearings are the controlling factors. If mention was ever made of the
Agusan-Surigao boundary, as the common boundary line of both licensees, this Office
could not have meant the Agusan-Surigao boundary as described under Section 1 of
Act 1693 of the Philippine Commission for were it so it could have been so easy for
this Office to mention the distance from point 3 to point 4 of Narciso Lansang as
approximately 13,800 meters. This cannot be considered a mistake considering that the
percentage of error which is more or less 103% is too high an error to be committed by
an Office manned by competent technical men. The Agusan-Surigao boundary as
mentioned in the technical descriptions of both licensees, is, therefore, patently an
imaginary line based on B.F. License Control Map. Such being the case, it is reiterated
that distance and bearings control the description where an imaginary line exists. 3
The decision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber
Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the
sketch attached to the decision.
In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated
August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled
that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber
Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the
green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed
decision." 4
Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated
June 16, 1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the
ruling of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. 5 On
motion for reconsideration, the Office of the President issued another decision dated
August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit
reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision, dated March
20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. 6
Respondent Ago filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated August 9,
1968 of the Office of the President but after written opposition of petitioner Lianga,
the same was denied in an order dated October 2, 1968, signed by then Assistant
Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. 7
On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago Timber Corporation, as
plaintiff, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, docketed thereat as Civil
Case No. 1253, against Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., Assistant Executive
Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M. Duavit and Director of Forestry, as
defendants, for "Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber Areas
and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same question
raised and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268 and insisting that "a judicial review
of such divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the
correct boundary fine of the licensed areas in question." 8
As prayed for, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order on October 28,
1968, on a bond of P20,000, enjoining the defendants from carrying out the decision
of the Office of the President. The corresponding writ was issued the next day, or on
October 29, 1968. 9
On November 10, 1968, defendant Lianga (herein petitioner) moved for dismissal of
the complaint and for dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds that
the complaint states no cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent public officials and respondent corporation. It also submitted its
opposition to plaintiff's (herein respondent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. 10 A supplemental motion was filed on December 6, 1968. 11
On December 19, 1968, the lower court issued an order denying petitioner Lianga's
motion to dismiss and granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
respondent Ago. 12 Lianga's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied on
May 9, 1969. 13 Hence, this petition praying of the Court (a) to declare that the
Director of Forestry has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the common
boundary of the licensed areas of petitioners and respondents and that the decision of
the Office of the President dated August 9, 1968 is final and executory; (b) to order
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1253 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan; (c) to
declare that respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the
temporary restraining order dated October 28, 1968 and granting the preliminary
injunction per its Order dated December 19, 1968; and (d) to annul the
aforementioned orders.
After respondent's comments on the petition and petitioner's reply thereto, this Court
on June 30, 1969 issued a restraining order enjoining in turn the enforcement of the
preliminary injunction and related orders issued by the respondent court in Civil Case
No. 1253. 14
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent
Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary fine of its licensed
timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of
Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly
belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of
Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and
forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking
of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or in the decision of the
Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, 15 whose decision is in turn
appealable to the Office of the President. 16
In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily
have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative
proceedings, 17 which is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent
court to consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by
said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials
who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority
specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a
well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious
and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. 18
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office
the power to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented,
the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. 19
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction,
is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except
when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 20 As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of
clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions
with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly
disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." 21
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are similar to the earlier case of Pajo,
et al. v. Ago, et al. 22 (where therein respondent Pastor Ago is the president of herein
respondent Ago Timber Corporation). In the said case, therein respondent Pastor Ago,
after an adverse decision of the Director of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and Executive Secretary in connection with his application for
renewal of his expired timber licenses, filed with the Court of First instance of Agusan
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and damages with preliminary injunction alleging
that the rejection of his application for renewal by the Director of Forestry and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and its affirmance by the Executive
Secretary constituted an abuse of discretion and was therefore illegal. The Court held
that "there can be no question that petitioner Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over
the grant or renewal of respondent Ago's timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code);
that petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as department head, is
empowered by law to affirm, modify or reject said grant or renewal of respondent
Ago's timber license by petitioner Director of Forestry (Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code);
and that petitioner Executive Secretary, acting for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm, modify or reverse the orders regarding
the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two aforementioned officials." The
Court went on to say that, "(I)n the case of Espinosa, et al. v. Makalintal, et al. (79 Phil.
134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we held that the powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition of public lands
such as granting of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts or approving, rejecting,
reinstating, or cancelling applications or deciding conflicting applications, are all
executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In
general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to
acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of act. Findings of
fact by an administrative board, agency or official, following a hearing, are binding
upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency or official
has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly
acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And
we have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance
of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67
Phil. 480; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil. 609)"
Respondent Ago contends that the motion filed by petitioner Lianga for
reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the President was denied in an alleged
"decision" dated August 15, 1966, allegedly signed by then Assistant Executive
Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. that, "however, for some mysterious, unknown if not
anomalous reasons and/or illegal considerations, the "decision" allegedly dated August
15, 1966(Annex "D") was never released" and instead a decision was released on
August 9, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit,
which reversed the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in its first
decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Leido.
It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until
the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A
decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation. 23
Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of
Appeals, 24 (where herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that,
"While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be
the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same is being
put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing
and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it is stin subject
to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the
judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding
judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may
not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court."
Respondent alleges "that in view of the hopelessly conflicting decisions of the
administrative bodies and/or offices of the Philippine government, and the important
questions of law and fact involved therein, as well as the well-grounded fear and
suspicion that some anomalous, illicit and unlawful considerations had intervened in
the concealment of the decision of August 15, 1966 (Annex "D") of Assistant
Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit, a judicial review of such divergent
administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line
of the licensed areas in question and restore the faith and confidence of the people in
the actuations of our public officials and in our system of administration of justice."
The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the
Leido "decision" allegedly denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the
substitution thereof by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify
judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption
of regularity and legality of official actions. 25 It is presumed that an official of a
department performs his official duties regularly. 26 It should be noted, furthermore,
that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case history in the Office of the
President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated August 9,
1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant
Executive Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own
first decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by himself).
The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60[New] which approved the transfer to
respondent Ago of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to
Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain conditions, terms and limitations, among which
were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry as to the exact location of its
licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision that may be
rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago
Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change
at the discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to expire at
an earlier date. Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director
of Forestry, upon granting any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms,
conditions, and limitations, not inconsistent with law, as may be deemed by him to be
in the public interest. The license operates as a contract between the government and
respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from questioning the terms and
stipulation thereof.
Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law
explicitly provide that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in
their respective places, 27 if the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an
inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, within their jurisdiction.
28
The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts
by means of the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed
within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces or districts 29 except
where the sole issue is the legality of the decision of the administrative officials. 30
In the leading case of Palanan Lumber Plywood Co., Inc. v. Arranz 31 which
involved a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela against the same respondent public officials as here and where the
administrative proceedings taken were similar to the case at bar, the Court laid down
the rule that: "We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Court acted without
jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the petitioners Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry, who have their official residences in Manila and Quezon City, outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela. Both the
statutory provisions and the settled jurisdiction of this Court unanimously affirm that
the extraordinary writs issued by the Court of First Instance are limited to and
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
operative only within their respective provinces and districts."
A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a
determination of a question of law whether the decision of the respondent
administrative officials was legally correct or not. 32 We thus declared in Director of
Forestry v. Ruiz. 33 "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the
rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to
control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went further and said that when
the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions the legal
correctness of the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the
enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of
injunction when the officials sought to be restrained from enforcing the decision are
not stationed within its territory.1avvphi1
"To recapitulate, insofar as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still
stands that courts of first instance have the power to issue writs limited to and
operative only within their respective provinces or districts. "
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void,
since it appears that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not
licensed to respondent Ago. The forest area referred to and described therein comprises
the whole area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary
Timber License No. 58452. Only a portion of this area was in fact transferred to
respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60[New].
It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction
to decide on the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and
respondent Ago, as determined by respondents public officials against whom no case
of grave abuse of discretion has been made. Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and excess, if not lack, of
jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9,
1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the
President.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The restraining
order heretofore issued by the Court against enforcement of the preliminary injunction
and related orders issued by respondent judge is the case below is made permanent and
the respondent judge or whoever has taken his place is hereby ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 1253.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled
"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and
corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof,
and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to
issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council
of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or
sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made
by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a
company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner
 obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of
raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in
section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn
within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any
basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the
regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall
be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the
manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires the
application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by
proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall
from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued,
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall
declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all
laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect,
but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings
or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings
for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-
General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at
which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging
him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order
No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act
No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive
Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary
to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be
of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in
imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was
approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st
of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919;
and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as
it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It
will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-
General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but
says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any
cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is
also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the
Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue
and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is
or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying
out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the
Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice
should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a
criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General
found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any
higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States
all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary
to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power
to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch
is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any
Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it
delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No.
2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-
General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and
the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not
define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a
law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94
U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the
public interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject
to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by
their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates
of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different
railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and
that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum
freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a
similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and
determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was
attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive
opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry.
Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. —
Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and
warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates
for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is
conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with
the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be
raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The
authority thus given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their
discretion and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a
delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers
and property shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to
investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even
then that law does not make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The
only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held —
 That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now
too well settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the
power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the
facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The
true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring
an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be
just and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at
whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as
to what the law shall be, — which would not be allowable, — but have
merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the
execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely
permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the
law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or
discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law,
and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be
issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its
terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti,
but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States
vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a
forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as
will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and
use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the
provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except
upon stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely
assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land
which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an
exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary
and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person
having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary
control is altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed
conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations,
— not for the government of their departments, but for administering the
laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative
power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had
legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act
under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of
which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the
defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of
the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's
property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty
imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart
as a forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from
depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and
use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules
regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary,
but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating
legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a
railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and
that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and
reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the
legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts
what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such
power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of
fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations
which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the
forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot
delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power
is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and
remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special
permission of the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100, 1 the Supreme Court of that State
says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts
to confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in
executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations
among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate
saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be
delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative
officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it
shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment
of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present
case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide
arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall
close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be
 sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and
regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it
at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price
would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a
crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed
a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no
act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for
the time being as follows:
In Manila —
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall
be the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of
supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be
determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing
provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of
supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost,
from the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place
of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the
Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or
special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative
power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the
exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that
power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the
Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only
purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law,
which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law,
the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands.
There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of
common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are
many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a
wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes
no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon
which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila
"at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all
grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the
law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands.
Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products.
Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the
Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid,
then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by
proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or
any other product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws
should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is
nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the
Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the
proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The
Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does
not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is
charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and
profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an
emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a
particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against,
its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the
life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought
not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question
involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live
under a republican form of government. We make the broad statement that no state or
nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions
specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to
fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a
republican form of government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not
dealing with government property. It was dealing with private property and private
rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon
the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the
Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine
Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or
different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of
the Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times
the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force
and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended
even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United States
Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be
bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the
time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in
doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the wheat
and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government
itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it.
That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the
defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did
not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale,
it was the personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was
passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken on solemn
oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the
changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a
republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under
the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice,
and make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy,
will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act
No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in
the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix
the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in
violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of
the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the
price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that
portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the
constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So
ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and
McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance
of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so
that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in
criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano
Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter
prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the
final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended
party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands
vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein,
Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence
both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the
testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four
years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor,
to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on
March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from
five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months
and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all
other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and
four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17,
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935.
The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for
certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24,
1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file
a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding,
referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the
granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2
of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a
resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera
concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados
no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the
crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but
denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las
circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo
de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma,
una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las
suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de
probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de
una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las
decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones
enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que
demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed
an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file
a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new
trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an
additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was
postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by
thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion
subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus
curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was
circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the
evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature
deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me
(him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial
court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in
said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for
a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied
with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the
legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937,
herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the
court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in
preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon
objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement
of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the
hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have
been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came
to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which
fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing
the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended
upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August
21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the
following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of
the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to
the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states
that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities
like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code
contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence
of a special provision, the term "province" may be
construed to include the City of Manila for the
purpose of giving effect to laws of general
application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a
law of general application because it is made to
apply only to those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards shall have provided for
the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be
a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has provided for the
salary of a probation officer as required by section
11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an
Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of
Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in
section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and
distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in
section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had
jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to
entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to
commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had
promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason
that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation
proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano
Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28,
1937, it became final and executory at the moment
of its rendition.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a
rehearing of said order or to modify or change the
same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano
Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted
by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is
furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the
respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues
to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued
his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for
probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the
petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature
providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years
of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional
because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of
the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial
board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law
operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it
constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the
provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative
power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine
Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the
National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the
provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section
2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to
enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different
provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition
dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in
behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine
Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by
other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221,
and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further
elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve
and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the
exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two
memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not
only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive,
but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On
October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City
Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People
of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining
the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws
and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented.
Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on
the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is
unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the
laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative
power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the
Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of
its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in
probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the
constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well
as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each
and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts
sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ
of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature
because the remedy sought by the petitioners is
the very same remedy prayed for by them before
the trial court and was still pending resolution
before the trial court when the present petition was
filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised
the question as to the execution of judgment before
the trial court, said trial court has acquired
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the
theory that its resolution denying probation is
unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or
not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless
cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of
First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the
same upon motion of herein petitioners
themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein
petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and elevate the
proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated
because it impairs the authority and dignity of the
trial court which court while sitting in the probation
cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great
dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has
jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and
pending resolution by the trial court, the present
action would not lie because the resolution of the
trial court denying probation is appealable; for
although the Probation Law does not specifically
provide that an applicant for probation may appeal
from a resolution of the Court of First Instance
denying probation, still it is a general rule in this
jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision
of an inferior court is appealable to the superior
court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying
probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
being appealable, the same had not become final
and executory for the reason that the said
respondent had filed an alternative motion for
reconsideration and new trial within the requisite
period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court
was able to resolve in view of the restraining order
improvidently and erroneously issued by this
court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by
implication admitted that the resolution of the trial
court denying probation is not final and
unappealable when he presented his answer to the
motion for reconsideration and agreed to the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the
trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is
incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it
appearing that the trial court, although it believed
that the accused was entitled to probation,
nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism
because the accused is a rich man; and that, before
a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration specifying the error committed so
that the trial court could have an opportunity to
correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this
court is not appealable, the trial court retains its
jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or
modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this
power to alter or modify an order or resolution is
inherent in the courts and may be exercise either
motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the
petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion
for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the
trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said
court cannot order execution of the same while it is
on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing
because the doors of probation will be closed from
the moment the accused commences to serve his
sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19
Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents
maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations
of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and
does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional
memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the
view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and
contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in
probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that
both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning
the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first
time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event,
section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last
memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having
been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed
anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of
the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the
petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the
present case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the
application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said
application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the
application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation
implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize
it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or
indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on
the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already
observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could
enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would
be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of
inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy
in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the
nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the
petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and
take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1)
whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised
in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is
constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of
certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding
principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an
act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question
is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568;
6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently
raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary
legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law
even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng
vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It
has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in
habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol.
I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an
application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an
application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the
constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p.
783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed.,
1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875;
113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited).
The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve
years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and
prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the
Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A
point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being
decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up
the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No.
2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court
and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the
question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief
Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section
516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction
in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or
persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when
such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the
validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the
Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario,
26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected
numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to
cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its
discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it
and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209
U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60
Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas.,
1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755;
L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A,
1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer
to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents,
and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad
powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code,
we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule,
although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not
lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior
court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute,
and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in
such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ
of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of
prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree
[1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish
[1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13;
State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields
[1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their
jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the
procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has
become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at
common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of
the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts,
including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is
inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass.,
133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel.
Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58
Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242
U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the
opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to
temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial
power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses
against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the
punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such
subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise
reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert
their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the
contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the
proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion
to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition
urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will
become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that
the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative
and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion,
for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration
which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and
that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and
ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the
executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this
court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the
execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the
judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such
suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct,
therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings
is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered
on application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought
to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901],
130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120;
168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners
but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon.
Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass
upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party
whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The
respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12
C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225
Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court
will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one
who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its
operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio
take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power
to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of
the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case
where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath
decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332),
proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While
therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised
before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised
by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is
advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the
hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in
criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence
the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court.
Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in
question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be
given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede
that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it
does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also,
Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But
we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey
[1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very
sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the
first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.
(12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a
court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910],
136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908],
214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188
Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question
will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S.,
870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question
raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again
and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And
on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation,
represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we
are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in
the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name
the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.
Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General
vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the
State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto
proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining
corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their
right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The
capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of
the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it
has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction
in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute
in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought
to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the
statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the
issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not
follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari
and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will
not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that
the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the
constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95
N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict
of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any
state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.)
Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that
a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case.
(McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W.,
892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W.,
1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.)
And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
(State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court
to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court
in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu
Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not
the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not
now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is
such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No.
4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845),
this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General
vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the
State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto
proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation,
alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of
the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute
was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin,
J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from
questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives;
that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their
government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an
adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied
on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and
lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action
under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the
supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the
people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the
only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was
remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a
party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The
people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers."
(Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action
(mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the
constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether
or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to
bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity
of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the
Legislature is not disregarded, and need not,
as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of
fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas
City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs.
Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law
officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his
bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity
(State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662),
by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley,
82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain
proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City
of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S.
W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155
S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board
of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs.
State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind.,
339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11).
In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district
attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no
right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District
Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222);
State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New
Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co.,
etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A.,
512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that
a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it
is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs.
Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not, merely because he
believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district
attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a
violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially
declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of
constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be
decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex
rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely
that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers
the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is
immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State
ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that
executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should
not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the
state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the state. If, in
the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with
each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment,
one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce
the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the
court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional.
If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from
constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the
general proposition that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They
have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact,
they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is
sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked
by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court,
that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not
authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city.
(Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and
23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past
and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of
Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not
a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others
are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held
void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the
court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable,
it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex
parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also
Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the
determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential
to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs.
Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105
N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.],
458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W.,
605), as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of
which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins.
Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E.,
306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to
probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of
the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its
validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons
accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will
likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four
years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now
resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S.,
500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913],
207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co.
[1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad,
supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected
by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of
want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here
an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our
ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A
more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act
unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to
enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of
section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may
declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution.
And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by
setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial
duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature
that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to
be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The
question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10;
Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs.
Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts
sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature
and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it
must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting
and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution.
The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn
declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6
R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective
Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the
courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear
case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned
argument, called attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had
already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a
foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the
integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the
President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the
National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that
this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality
Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13,
1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of
the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is
sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the
President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the
reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons
are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies
submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express
or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his
broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time
pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him
exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him
under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or
another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any
vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is
that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative
department of our government — independent in the performance of our
functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty
as we see it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds:
(1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)
that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it
denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as
the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise
known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines
"the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and
forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art.
VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution
differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has
been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law,
pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec.
2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to
pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The
framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the
state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised
"after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power
does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally
followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II,
sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be
pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the
impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood
that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109
Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23
am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England,
Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the
whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of
Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment,
perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending
upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office
and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution
also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the
executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the
President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National
Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these
fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the
pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by
the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the
Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in
anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken
away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by
the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of
government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person
properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by
the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning
power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the
grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself
nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise
thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then,
confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason
unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending
sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed.,
129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief
Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the
opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was
limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced
absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the
government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". .
. and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of
penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means
as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be
adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise
discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment,
recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in
the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United
States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation
Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal
probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43
Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to
defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers
chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72
Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice
Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has
begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act
of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which
sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The
court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No.
1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the
district courts exercised a form of probation either, by suspending
sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers
or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242
 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the
district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court
pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were
to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to
enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by
the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the
judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the
House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal
government with reference to its treatment of those convicted of
violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of
the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and
in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile
offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults
[1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by
inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the
questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no
manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President.
This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to
consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special
reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit
(Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation
Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain
and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite
power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually
enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently
sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of
the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to
fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported
by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A,
1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the
Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for
each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910],
87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the
court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad,
and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial
judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed,
as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be
certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108
S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all
crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has
demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts — particularly the trial courts —
large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in
particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this
power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties
which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus,
while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely
because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts
being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5,
Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law
provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may
allow such circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of
such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera
and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the
Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of
each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the
courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law,
considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.)
Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of
age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees
at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed.
Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense",
i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the
courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in
view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible"
crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor
or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive
imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in
certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed
when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon
appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof
are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of
age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final
sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the
execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal
penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue
harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other
enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence
Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No.
4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts
large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as
amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain
classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation
thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act
No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the
original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature
and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National
Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to
"humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular
cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing
and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the
criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has
in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by
the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this
be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with the
power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use
the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of
punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared
by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as
announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of
criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte
Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the
court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the
contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power
lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to
pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the
courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by
law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some
cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to
suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so
would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb
[1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9
Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev.,
150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla.
Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650;
People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St.
Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac.,
291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep.,
175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630;
181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs.
Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F.
[2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United
States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark.,
620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166;
122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex
parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick
[1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60;
168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371;
Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise
[1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534;
35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64
Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs.
Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court
[1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399;
79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909],
75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82
Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151
Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y.,
288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel.
Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs.
Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App.
Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C,
1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233
P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot
[1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B,
1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130
Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S.
W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998;
Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs.
State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24;
Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan
[1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich
[1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to
follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally
authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a
system of probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs.
Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved
particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for
the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the
court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a
parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as
the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a
power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power
in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal
App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are
actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In
People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36
N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of
Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant
reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former
was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but
the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities,
remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte
Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80
U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149;
24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly
familiar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons,
and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with
full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the
constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by
the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte
Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was
understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to
grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree
restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments,
that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so
distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left
separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and
the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a
statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to
suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, — a power
inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when
the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and
which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative
power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense,
upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood
and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in
Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29
Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He
is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire
punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's
case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section
4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have
submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has
complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the
period of probation, remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the
probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-
fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs.
2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete
liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment,
to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the
imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this
reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other
sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The
executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law,
which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above
it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible
unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs.
Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of
the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as
authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the
Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means
of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We
have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred
on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime,
it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and
reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through
Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the
power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions
of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a
"reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve
postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas
a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker,
Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and
cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot
be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant
commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to
change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac.,
525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of
the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections
12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not
impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a
well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted,
and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of
the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in
sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding
from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which
exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United
States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of
guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of
the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex
parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less
penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat.
[Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381;
65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries,
394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker,
Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs.
State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a
statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but the
same objections have been urged against parole statutes which
vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the
power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld
quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the
notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported
in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning
power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving
their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer
and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power
of the executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof
constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative,
the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government
derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly
by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have
originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a
misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was
established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened
principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the
principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The
classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither
must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.)
Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language:
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to
any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has
located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power
to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been
intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people
have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias
[1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle
that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening
mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick
[1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes
[1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government,
that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by
the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities
exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule.
Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to
immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in
cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies
in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the
same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government.
(United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51
L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138;
24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C.
L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442;
Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has
ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and
referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32
Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked
upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the
more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices
[1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland
[1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332;
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative
power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or
export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same
article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is
beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence
of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to
exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever
doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove
mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer
at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
(Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
(6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1),
this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature
void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his
discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the
sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañia
General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34
Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should
take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of
the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative
power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least
indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a
variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that
the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the
rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of
action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute, to aid the delegate in
exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard
is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely
lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L.
ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs.
Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and
cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case
at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply
in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do
not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The
probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission"
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By
section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves
the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain
language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton
County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547);
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs.
Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General
authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case,
this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to
take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held
proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend
or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle,
such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this
advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to
the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the
simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or
administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the
provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be
sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus
Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218;
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as
law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made
effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the
adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the
United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins.
Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the
basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all
branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re
Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A.,
938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the
apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public
Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign
Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in
Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds
restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following language — speaking of declaration of legislative power
to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to
provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances
are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that
at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the
essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words,
the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to
the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public
policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case
require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed."
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.)
In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27
Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of
legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of
the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such
agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker
[1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The
legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other
person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained
by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation
or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is
arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of expendiency
announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or
conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at
all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate
any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest
entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say
when — the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces
will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would
yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of
certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power
of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective
provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be
suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I
of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in
this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article
I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall
never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even
provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the
legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a
law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to
certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for
particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec.,
174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution
of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending
the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised
but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be
exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall
expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of
rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from
the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of
rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II,
tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the
laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the
assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and
suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent
of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights
contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal
authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth
section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that
"No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part
thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and
of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute."
There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to
exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the
theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power,
which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to
the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this
particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the
people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of
the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject,
and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing
laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It
cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general
principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our
constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court
one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient
kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of
civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution
and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses,
damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the
owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for
the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a
provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine
whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the
provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that
the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could
no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to
suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis.,
504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State
vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute
formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any
county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be
enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for
any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative
in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the
roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in
force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the
inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court to
say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the
question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that
tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it
became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the
act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it
effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded
and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court
is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of
the former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to
determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then
to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our
constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in
the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for
the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in
force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that
suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present
indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those
applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle
hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the
constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6
R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in
character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed
under different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing
of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be
differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what
seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced
within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is
nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is
proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local
self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in
the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which
treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation,
discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as
provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the
provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers,
they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law
should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial
boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of
the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until
the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary
funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what
may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature
not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the
elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It
has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible
reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions
which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission
[1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a
limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to
certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill
of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of
the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the
tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power,
like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of
laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.
S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina,
249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what
may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question
not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22
Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating
against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.
(Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666;
17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.)
The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis.,
327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs.
Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917],
242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs.
Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17
Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp.
1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of
the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not
in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of
the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province
while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied
those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for
the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would
be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person
coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of
the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no
province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the
salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we
accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of
Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of
said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation
officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while
inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result.
But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of
the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting
aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of
the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We
see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By
analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550;
Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte
Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881],
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S.,
703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law.
ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S.,
450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may
be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil
Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754;
State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas.,
1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law
it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs.
Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84
Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11
of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have
probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation
goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act,
to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J.
Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666;
17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of
Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that
case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this
court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial
of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis
(Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the
guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should
be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58.
No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the
equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act
No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and
providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first
instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right
to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after
a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against
him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments
and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney —
although not in the form had in the provinces — was considered a reasonable
substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city
as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case
has reference to a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals
to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court,
except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes
a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision
complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution
that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional
and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our
Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons
already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be
avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any
mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only
where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute
otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N.
J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams
vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287,
309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir
([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule
concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
 the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it
by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally
enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86
N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black
Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must
remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117;
63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without
causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner
contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R.,
Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla.,
255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240
Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs.
Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the
invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative
will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A.,
N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759;
Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601,
635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L.,
121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act
applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on
constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may
be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact
that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other
portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is
the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of
that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system
dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial
boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not
lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the
part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of
the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and
visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed
in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of
the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court
upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those
conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious
habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful
character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or
probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times
at his place of abode or elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of
the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall
endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside
within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for
actual damages or losses caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to
time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and
terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the
submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the
court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that
probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged
from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-
compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be
committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to
be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if
revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed.
Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of
every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his
supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to
instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct
and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition,
and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by
court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct
and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said
probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and
condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for
the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to
perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation
officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for
in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for
adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by
the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on
parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe
appointed in the provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to
its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the direction of
a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General
with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary
of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is
hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be
disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to
appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the
probation officer under civil service regulations from among those
who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed
by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of
such probation officers and administrative personnel until such
positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the
foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers required to be
appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula
singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are
to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as
the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the
supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the
probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and
4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2;
sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec.
3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall
truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer"
concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify
"the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3,
last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular
probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the
legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a
probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in
Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him
under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the
conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned
to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation
officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible.
But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on
what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better
otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive
interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not
permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not
for any purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make
the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the
provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have
the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry
out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation
officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may
fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It
was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix
the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include
said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of
P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the
salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would
be left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal
salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the
fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is
seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the
central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer
with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an
impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that
in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without
probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable
system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to
permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal
and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in
order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in
any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened
criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for
reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise
of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law.
ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664,
665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the
individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is
commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside
because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different
aspects presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their
memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases
brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short
time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the
examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved
we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported
better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare.
(Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of
authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases
brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly
or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified
because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State
governments of the United States and the dual character of the
American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the
Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of
Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the United
States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular
Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution
of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the
United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the
Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p.
1317);
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice
Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law.
ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of
times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co.
vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708;
Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142),
fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing
local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of
prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and
avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to
the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the
former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were
allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of
the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied
in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of
the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if
its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act
of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of
the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner
argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be
created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import
of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of
this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic
and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of
Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of
Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed
executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive
order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision,
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division
other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of
such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or
subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several
officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations
of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation
of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing
municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at
the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence
of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of
two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs.
Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February
13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate 2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. 2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of
a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only
the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes
more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act
No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated
therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1
of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the
powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence
of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government
was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned,
even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section
68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil.
726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare"
and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial
pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues
involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no
binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon
national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the
authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates
or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative
functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a
legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79
P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any
case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of
legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine
whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs.
Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan
and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by
the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by
statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the
authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and
bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the
area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac.
405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and
population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the
inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the
inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the
lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether
the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re
Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of
Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation
of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had
been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal
corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs.
Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is
concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is
quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of
Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the
United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more
trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative,"
provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or
oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is
without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or
activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to
particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the
making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3
sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the
scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions
that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or
prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the
code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that
is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative
power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation,
leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in
Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory
grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would
bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution,
which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the
legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed
to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as
to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently
unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he
had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof
or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control
does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau,
or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus
or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving
the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that
which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. 7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim
(a) that "not all the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created
municipalities — "have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition
is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties
do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or
elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on
behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official
investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661,
Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function,
said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national
government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any
of the executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in
connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to
judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders
creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual
operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures
incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General
Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved
in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by
him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner.
Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:.
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law 1 in this proceeding for
certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G.
Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and
set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed
against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the
aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition,
filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his
answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal
questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo
who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation
and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due
process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling.
Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent
Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be
discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as
promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this
proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter
stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order
No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional
infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf
and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged
Act as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due
process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent
Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a
hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on
May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence
was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered
the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of
such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the
meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970
the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The
answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970.
Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an
answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining
why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as
noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal
questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and
secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of
the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July
6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this
petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of
Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the
Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on
July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres
appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear
during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this
Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the
Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers,
and the oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of
the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the
affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to
demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation
does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the
respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity
of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the
due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow
that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail.
Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited
to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts
having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for
determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is
saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally
concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue,
petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action
with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so
before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential
directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we
"have decided to pass upon the question of the validity of the presidential
directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end to a
dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable damage
and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters themselves."
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from
similarly passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in
a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing
question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve
public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding
from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the
matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly,
there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of
showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be
shown too much for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or
disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is
parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such
manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be
visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with
any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." 3 It is
thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the
police power to promote public safety.
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force,
Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out "to all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven
in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number
and unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not
disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly
for disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would
be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a
statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public
safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due
process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute
assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or
caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the
teaching of many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary
source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to
have been cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines
predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American public law,
laissez faire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence
American court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by
Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of
caution which would do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which
statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending
to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due
process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a
basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the
social and economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there
was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not
too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of
Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He did
note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13
What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant
theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these
rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are
increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls."
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state
jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American
rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to
by us even then As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The
doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period
has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due
process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days
before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a
principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme
Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United
States, and only recently the year before, the American Supreme Court in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold
that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it
that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government
the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the
commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live
up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No
constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property
rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded,
unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a
declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire principle was
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-
impairment guarantees would call for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts
there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire.
One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A.
Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he
disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost
unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as
to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted
by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My
answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not
only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are
necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people
because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation
may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to
grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to
be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision
automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who
likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights,
explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the
leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the course
of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place
calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power
to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v.
Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the
Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to
legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of
tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of
tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the
Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable
tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of
labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one
month, 33 and social security scheme. 34
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the
scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during
all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such
a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and
circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would
seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile
undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly
hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity,
duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for
being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on
reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor
vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be
registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory
built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint.
The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to
dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3
inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At
least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to
how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is
the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be
installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle
parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end
of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in,
commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front
part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the
sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-
compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient
cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already
registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of
Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than
ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of
that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue
rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with
its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for
a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto
a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers
that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there
is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A
distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the
laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as
to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a
decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect
that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He
continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L.
Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that,
while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes ... " 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the
pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of
Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue
the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that,
under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to
local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine
what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the
details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable
standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with
the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed
and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank,
which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines,"
and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in
the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are
sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the
character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place
the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative
powers ... " 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment,
leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted,
the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his
order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside.
Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action
as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not
been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner.
Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:.
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law 1 in this proceeding for
certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G.
Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and
set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed
against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the
aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition,
filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his
answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal
questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who
was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and
the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due
process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling.
Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent
Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be
discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as
promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this
proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter
stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order
No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional
infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf
and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged
Act as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due
process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent
Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a
hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on
May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence
was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered
the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of
such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the
meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970
the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The
answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970.
Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an
answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining
why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as
noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal
questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and
secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of
the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July
6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this
petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of
Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the
Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on
July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres
appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear
during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this
Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the
Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers,
and the oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of
the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the
affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to
demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation
does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the
respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity
of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the
due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow
that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail.
Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited
to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts
having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for
determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is
saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally
concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest,
as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue,
petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of
action with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so
before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential
directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there
announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the validity of
the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be
putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused
considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco
planters themselves."
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from
similarly passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in
a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing
question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding
from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the
matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly,
there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of
showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be
shown too much for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or
disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is
parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such
manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be
visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with
any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." 3 It is
thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the
police power to promote public safety.
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force,
Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out "to all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven
in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number
and unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not
disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly
for disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would
be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a
statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public
safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due
process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute
assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or
caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the
teaching of many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary
source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to
have been cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines
predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American public law,
laissez faire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence
American court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by
Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of
caution which would do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which
statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending
to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process
clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic
assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the
social and economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there
was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not
too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of
Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He did
note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13
What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant
theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these
rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are
increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls."
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state
jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American
rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to
by us even then As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The
doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period
has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due
process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days
before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a
principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme
Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United
States, and only recently the year before, the American Supreme Court in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold
that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it
that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government
the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the
commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live
up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No
constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property
rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded,
unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a
declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire principle was
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-
impairment guarantees would call for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts
there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire.
One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A.
Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he
disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost
unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as
to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted
by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My
answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not
only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen
will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are
necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people
because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation
may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom
to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests,
not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who
likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights,
explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the
leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In
the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have
taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its
undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle."
21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the
Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to
legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of
tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of
tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the
Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable
tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of
labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one
month, 33 and social security scheme. 34
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the
scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during
all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such
a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and
circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would
seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile
undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly
hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity,
duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for
being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on
reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor
vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be
registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory
built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint.
The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to
dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3
inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At
least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to
how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is
the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be
installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle
parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end
of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in,
commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front
part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the
sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-
compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient
cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already
registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of
Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than
ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of
that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue
rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with
its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for
a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto
a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers
that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches
of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over
local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the
test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an
undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution
to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection
call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a
decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect
that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He
continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L.
Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that,
while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes ... " 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the
pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of
Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue
the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that,
under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to
local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine
what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the
details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable
standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to
act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with
the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed
and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central
Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the
Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and
real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These
standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated
authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law
and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of
legislative powers ... " 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment,
leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted,
the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his
order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside.
Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action
as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not
been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Villamor, J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister
of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and
HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E.
Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for
motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of
the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite
standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as
issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner
Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading
submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly
persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional
infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police
power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative
power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of
President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas],
statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in
land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor
vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning
device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore,
I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety
on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have
at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors
at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor
vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any
street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner,
user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be
installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle
staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described,
to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the
acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall
closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate
to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it
was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of
Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The
Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to
procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a
reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by
mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also
promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu,
the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were
not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a
pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on
June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension
and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as
amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of
Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring
the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules
and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with
the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2.
In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped
with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of
payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All
Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby
superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle
Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the
assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as
an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended,
"clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For
him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because
it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-
sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners
who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the
rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the
assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19,
1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) —
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss
the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining
order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this
Court.16
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and
granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was
submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they
lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner
owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in
paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the
effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions
Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation
of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary,
confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth
being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the
reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."18
Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional
litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction
was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and
regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was
unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned
Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to
be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are
Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference
was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on
road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory
and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute
in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times
intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous
scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being
clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be
dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents.
It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in
an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of
Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence
in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote
Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers,
I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.'
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-
being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by
the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
"To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought
to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National
Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent
considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was
clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the
American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power.
We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such
rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The
President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information
and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual
foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early
warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular
accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of
petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on
record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on
its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of
petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of
early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could
mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise
result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the
armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to
conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a
pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this
Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus:
"Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking
lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the
Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at
a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any
part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because
he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency
vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go
unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the
questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from
whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor
vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device
so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in
said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning
device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor
confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said
devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so
sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device
requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to
enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous
officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to
an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where,
as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and
implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against
it.32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is
not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of
unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he
entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass
upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed
by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation
and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily
and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then
to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless
of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice
Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire
into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional
power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation
of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there
be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should
be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely
to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The
attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may
be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines.
Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make
such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta
sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law
clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained
as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to
the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not
too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of
non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers
by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is
delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed
is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two
whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards
posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government
under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed
then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal
protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to
substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual
observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate
occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in
Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the
constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially
pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not
a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can
rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but
that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
REGALADO, J.:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the
public utility services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such
services in the Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2,
1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be
charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen
percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being
violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By
virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places
as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it
was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the
following activities and established the following installations:
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth
station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I)
was established. Pinugay I provided direct satellite
communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the
United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea,
Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru
the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A"
antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II provided
links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe,
Middle East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries
operating within the region) thru the Indian Ocean
INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna
(Pinugay III) was established to temporarily assume the
functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were
being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or
reserved antenna for possible contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a
standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field, Pampanga as a
television receive-only earth station which provides the
U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third
standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV) to take over the
links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole
signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement
relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention and the
Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by
petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex,
facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television
standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to
apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering
its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority
to charge rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with
respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and
maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to
charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and
charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then
offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid
for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional
authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6)
months, or up to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September
16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates
through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service
rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the
Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers
Authorization Department of the financial statements of
applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some of
applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the
Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more
reduction should be effected either on the basis of a
provisional authorization or in the final consideration of
the case. 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC
empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide
the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and
constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised in an unconstitutional
manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates
procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order
No. 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-
fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is
guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory
powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue
delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to
mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC,
the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the
constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the
same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained
only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency
concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both
be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard,
the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of
rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of
an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
7 It is also clear from the authorities that where the function
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to
respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which necessarily include the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof,
which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or
components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be
maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of
the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in
the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates
procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to
petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said
order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral
evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side
before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have
been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the
function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence
quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary
and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-
legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative,
notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named
person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. 8
Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question
need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to
respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely
interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's
application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the
only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently
engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,9 we made a
categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative
bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the
power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant
to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is
not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is
more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a
report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that
petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously,
the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said
report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents
thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as
to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-
judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of
the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:
of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is
not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is
said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is
essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and
hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future
action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined according to
the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure,
 sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding
and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general
rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of administrative action where the administrative
body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts
are particular and immediate rather than general and
prospective, the person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. 11
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact
that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is
premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit
in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor
were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It
is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to
rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The
rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of
the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report
on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent
NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since
the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of
the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may
be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such
power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does
not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure
than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter
unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the
applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which
provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice
and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules
and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which
shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by
any public service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to
respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to
the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon
a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion
as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the
rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and
the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may
modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have
other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential,
respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and
not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not
offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity
to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a
specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it
has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order
of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period,
could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are
unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue
during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing,
therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration
of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive
due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its
implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and
eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since
petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a
legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has
is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at
any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein
petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that
the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor
arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise
which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the
common good so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of
said utility is required by the common good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of
public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the
property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management
incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property
remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to
regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the
power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the
interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent,
to regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the
requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission
has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them
arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates
which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound
business judgment based upon the evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling
for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and
independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is
essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities
of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the
fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is
also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a
carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely
and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements
of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other
sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore,
it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the
prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial
statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what
implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said
statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial
statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the
consequent detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent
NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which
petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have
always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the
transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or
refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major
adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by
petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any
in the receiving end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding
change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of
petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in a
deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications.
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing,
rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up
with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances abroad. There projected
undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at
their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may
practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy
of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not
necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of
rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and
should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should
heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's
pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and
in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy,
as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with
reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of
respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of
September 13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of
respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized
services, is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South
Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato),
WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte),
HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental),
ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN
G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second
District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A.
LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN
JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National
Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS,
HON. SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the
President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the
regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the
Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing
for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary
restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on
January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive
Order and statute in question.
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No.
6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling
for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del
Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan,
Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite
held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an
autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of
the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions.
Provided, however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for
the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this
Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will
become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at
present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will
become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will
become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will
become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region
XII, will become part of Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their
petition, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in
South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and
Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick
certain provinces and cities within the existing regions —
some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in
the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the
cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure
them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the
law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point,
that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
 do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from
Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII
to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to
Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This
can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to
reorganize the administrative regions
in Mindanao to guarantee the
effective delivery of field services of
government agencies taking into
consideration the formation of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while
the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge,
the authority to merge does not include the authority to
reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA
6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to
include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will
violate the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order
429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of
administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in
Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment
of congressional representatives, the same is not valid
under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of
R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986
Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the
different legislative districts in provinces and cities.1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New
Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners
brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a
resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the
law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No.
429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is
only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by
E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the
President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as a mere incident of his
power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17,
respectively, of the Constitution.
He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a
grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the
case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan,3 in which the
power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on
the ground that —
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details
with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships,
many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a
more or less rapid change both in development and
centers of population, the proper regulation of which
might require not only prompt action but action of such a
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as
such, to take it efficiently.
The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge
the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734,
to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which
the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it
extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the
autonomous region.
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which
provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the National
Government. In exercising this authority, the President
shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good
government and responsive national government,
including but not limited to the following guidelines for a
more efficient, effective, economical and development-
oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning
implementation, and review functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and
responsiveness in decision-making
process;
(c) Further minimization, if not,
elimination, of duplication or
overlapping of purposes, functions,
activities, and programs;
(d) Further development of as
standardized as possible ministerial,
sub-ministerial and corporate
organizational structures;
(e) Further development of the
regionalization process; and
(f) Further rationalization of the
functions of and administrative
relationships among government
entities.
For purposes of this Decree, the
coverage of the continuing authority of
the President to reorganize shall be
interpreted to encompass all agencies,
entities, instrumentalities, and units of
the National Government, including all
government owned or controlled
corporations as well as the entire
range of the powers, functions,
authorities, administrative
relationships, acid related aspects
pertaining to these agencies, entities,
instrumentalities, and units.
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following
actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate,
merge, or integrate entities, agencies,
instrumentalities, and units of the
National Government, as well as
expand, amend, change, or otherwise
modify their powers, functions and
authorities, including, with respect to
government-owned or controlled
corporations, their corporate life,
capitalization, and other relevant
aspects of their charters.
 g. Take such other related actions as
may be necessary to carry out the
purposes and objectives of this
Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in
character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as
respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions
the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on
the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer
the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis
and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was
passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a
Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations
owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government."4 The Commission on Reorganization
created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization
plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn
required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of
its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan
submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress.5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated
Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative
regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of
the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first
by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao,
Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further
"restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX
into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center
of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions
have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In
conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate
not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.
As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of
the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."7 The power
conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as
"administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The
question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in
any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in
the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed.
It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President
in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit:
"to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the
public business."12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were
established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in
authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the
provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress
was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative
regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in
the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It
is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to
that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the
reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and
cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX,
§13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the
existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673
claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in
fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by
moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions
(provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions.
Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO
No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did
not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite.
The unauthorized action of the President, as effected by
and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the
following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of
Region X and which did not even participate in the
plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2)
the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly
belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in
the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3)
South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General
Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del
Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of
Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the
said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected
their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces
and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the
existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are
to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous
Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces
forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the
President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be
no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they
may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at
present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting
or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political
consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and
to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for
political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces
and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located,
can be "merged" by the President.
To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more
fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without
neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the
petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429
is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of
administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1)
contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication
facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population;
(5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination
of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court
said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays."
There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or
determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742,
773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions
carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of
money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house
regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer
rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the
wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we
will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that
presented by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS
DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention,
as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent[1] and the main
sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of,
the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.[4] For this and the other
reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative
(hereafter, Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for
Peoples Initiative,[6] a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to
institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other
volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of
municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual
signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an
order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the
electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of
general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article
X[9] of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution[10] embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with
the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the
people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of
registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-
037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a)
directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three
(3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
[12] Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to
file their memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There
is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the
petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the
peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national
treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not
to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in
the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public
and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the
admission of a taxpayers and legislators suit.[14] Besides, there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their
Comment[15] on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL
TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO
AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF
THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN
BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY
PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING
LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16,
1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290
CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY
TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT
A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097
PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment[16] which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk
reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not
formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or
Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to
amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC
power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains
as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a
subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an
initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution,
or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners
estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact
figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997
Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the
people.
In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January
1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that
power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative
on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No.
6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latters Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted
the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and
allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d)
set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI),
filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in
Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention
wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibiting political dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to
amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all
other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance,
to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers
in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation
in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term
limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their
elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law
that implements the peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to
state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency
before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the
publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in
the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the
procedure for a peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.[21] He
avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a
sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication
because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What
vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing
of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters.
He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the
authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is
limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call
and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a
Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing
law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed
only by Congress or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for
Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in
Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco
and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and
(d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period
of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a
nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following
pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments
raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed
in the draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision
of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers
in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter
alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco
to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the
allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal
and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House
Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of
the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments
on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The
parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil
action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth
issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to
the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this
special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The
petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by
private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec
from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a
petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing
the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
(People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of
the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and
uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or
authority to entertain the petition.[26] The COMELEC made no ruling thereon
evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at
the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December
1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the
signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to
the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the
required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin
Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari
under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche
of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,
while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise
it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____
Section ____ of the Constitution.[31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee
submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as
Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2
of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are
left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there
are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore,
that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature
does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially
with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature.
The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power
of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the
exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that
within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate
rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to
be carried out - is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature
itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it
fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process of
an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to
vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the
draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a
great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we
have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process
and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now,
to again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the
hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is
limited to proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has
to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied
in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation
of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas
the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire
Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is
reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No.
7, we accept the proposed amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2
clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the
legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of
this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form
for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines
initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment
on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved
is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require
a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the
issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is
required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous
and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law
proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a
requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on
the National Assembly on plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the
final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second
reading on 9 July 1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration,
Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on
Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be
amended by changing percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the
phrase by law in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress[43] shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.[44]
This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of
Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those
who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and
intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for
the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how
[the right] is to be carried out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill
No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two
House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt with the
initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the
Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of
Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505
into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate[50]
and by the House of Representatives.[51] This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to
provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section
reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted
from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and
enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of
initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as
to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of
the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and
character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national
and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and
clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle
on initiative on amendments to the Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are
placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with
the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined
by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the
findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum,
which could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to
both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body
to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing
for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and
local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally,
to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the
initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents
of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of
votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters
for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the
invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have
been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to
the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified
therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.
6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution
in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as
the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to
the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are
fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the
rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there
must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.
6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that
power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C
of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the
power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that
it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735,
a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of
the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its PANGANIBAN,
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
QUISUMBING,
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3)
to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;[65]
and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the YNARES-SANTIAGO,
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.[66]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERRE
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
- versus - CARPIO,
the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution
No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified
by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order CORONA,
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of CARPIO-MORALES,
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to
lift the term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and CALLEJO, SR.,
not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
AZCUNA,
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on TINGA,
amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system. CHICO-NAZARIO, and
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, GARCIA, JJ.
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA;
and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
a) GRANTING the instant petition; REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for Respondents.
subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
x-------------------------x
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN
petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as
against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO- G.R. No. 168207
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved. ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M.
LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL,
SO ORDERED. AND SERGIO R. OSMEA III,

EN BANC Petitioners,

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) G.R. No. 168056 - versus -
OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO,

Petitioners, Present:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
Respondents.
PUNO,

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

x-------------------------x x-------------------------x

ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. G.R. No. 168461 FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT G.R. No. 168463
represented by its President, ROSARIO ANTONIO; CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,
PETRON DEALERS ASSOCIATION represented by its RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-
President, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C.
DEALERS OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN
President, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S.
ANTONIO doing business under the name and style of ANB HATAMAN, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A.
NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATION; LOURDES SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, RUY ELIAS
MARTINEZ doing business under the name and style of C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI and TEODORO A.
SHELL GATE N. DOMINGO; BETHZAIDA TAN doing CASIO,
business under the name and style of ADVANCE SHELL
STATION; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA doing business under
Petitioners,
the name and style of NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE
STATION; EFREN SOTTO doing business under the name
and style of RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATION;
DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President,
DESI TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business
under the name and style of R&R PETRON STATION; - versus -
PETER M. UNGSON doing business under the name and
style of CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE STATION;
MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE doing business under the name
and style of NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE STATION;
JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
name and style of STARCARGA ENTERPRISES; Finance, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
ADORACION MAEBO doing business under the name and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and EDUARDO R.
style of CMA MOTORISTS CENTER; SUSAN M. ENTRATA ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
doing business under the name and style of LEONAS
GASOLINE STATION and SERVICE CENTER;
CARMELITA BALDONADO doing business under the name
and style of FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTER;
MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA doing business under the name
and style of LORPED SERVICE CENTER; RHEAMAR A.
RAMOS doing business under the name and style of RJRAM
PTT GAS STATION; MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO doing
business under the name and style of VIOLAGO-PTT Respondents.
SERVICE CENTER; MOTORISTS HEART
CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for
Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS
HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-
President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA;
x-------------------------x
MOTORISTS HERITAGE CORPORATION represented by
its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F.
FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE STANDARD OIL
CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for
Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO
BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. G.R. No. 168730
MANUEL doing business under the name and style of
ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION; ANTHONY ALBERT
CRUZ III doing business under the name and style of TRUE Petitioner,
SERVICE STATION,

Petitioners,
- versus -

- versus -
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO
BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue; and HON. ALEXANDER
Department of Finance and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
AREVALO, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Bureau of Customs,

Respondents.

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

 House Bill No. 3555[2] was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House

Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No.

1468, which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The

President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January

27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading.
Promulgated:

Respondents. September 1, 2005

House Bill No. 3705[3] on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced

by Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V.

x---------------------------------------------------------- Paras. Its mother bill is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and
-x
Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent

on February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and

DECISION third reading on February 28, 2005.

Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
1950[4] on March 7, 2005, in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873,

taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705. Senator Ralph G. Recto

sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be
borne by everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he
sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan.
ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on
French statesman and economist
second and third reading on April 13, 2005.

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for

On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
education, increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full
Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the
value-added tax benefits these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No.
proposed bills.
9337)[1] was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its

extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases,

however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill

infirmities in its passage. No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, after having met and

discussed in full free and conference, recommended the approval of its report, which

the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments
thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law.

Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.

On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was

transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
came R.A. No. 9337.

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.[5] When said date came, the
3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for
its issuance of the temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me
just tell you a little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005,
the Court issued a TRO at about 5 oclock in the afternoon. But before that, there was
a lot of complaints aired on television and on radio. Some people in a gas station
were complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%. Some people were
complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding in
domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that theyll have to pay would
have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per
our own understanding of the law, thats not true. Its not true that the e-vat law
necessarily increased prices by 10% uniformly isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Its not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that
granted the Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : Thats correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . .
interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be
the elimination of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct
to say that the VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail
price by 10% to cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import
duties, the Net Tax would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going
into exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different industries, different
products, different services are hit differently. So its not correct to say that all prices
must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Youre right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel,
are at present imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Tax was also removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification
to increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that
first day, were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And thats one reason among many
others this Court had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation.
Thats why we added as an issue in this case, even if its tangentially taken up by the
pleadings of the parties, the confusion in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people
were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of 10%,
which you yourself now admit and I think even the Government will admit is incorrect.
In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6% depending on these
mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of each service, of
each company, isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So thats one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending
the clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all
these by means of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this
Court. . . .[6]
The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed
a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10%
VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to
12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
G.R. No. 168207
On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari
likewise assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase
the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12%
contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process
clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair
and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous
because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the
conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the
people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in
the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT
collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based on
fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the
President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the no-
amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
G.R. No. 168461
Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association
of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No.
9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax
on depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition,
excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the
amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or
any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to
deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are
subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of
services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary,
oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory.
Petitioners argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the
amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax
partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited
without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other property or
property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by
limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no
profit or value-added.
Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the
limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or
(2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is
not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with
higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes
out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.
G.R. No. 168463
Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero filed this petition for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the governments
pass on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and
fiscal reform agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core

3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic
117, 119, 121, 125,[7] 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill
No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that environment necessary for economic growth.
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives

ISSUES
G.R. No. 168730

The Court defined the issues, as follows:

On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition on July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
that the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered

establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and

expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these establishments to a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section

28(1) of the Constitution.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108
RESPONDENTS COMMENT
of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents.
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of

constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.

2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of
the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e.,
b. Article III, Section 1
legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and

the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard
RULING OF THE COURT
to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents

contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to

increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise. As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of

value-added tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a

fallacious notion of its nature.

Respondents also refute petitioners argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the

70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase

or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and the 5% final The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange

withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, or lease of goods or properties and services.[8] Being an indirect tax on expenditure,

and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others. the seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer, [9] with

the seller acting merely as a tax collector.[10] The burden of VAT is intended to fall on

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers. Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference

Committee exceeded its authority by:

In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the

transaction or business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else. 1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337;
[11] Examples are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and

residence taxes.[12] 2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate
bills;

In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in 3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be
credited against the output tax; and
existence, albeit in a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax

computed under the cost deduction method and was payable only by the original
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other
sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the cost kinds of taxes in addition to the value-added tax.

deduction method and tax credit method was used to determine the value-added tax

payable.[13] Under the tax credit method, an entity can credit against or subtract
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference
from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs
Committee.
and imports.[14]

It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, [i]f the
273, that the VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0%
power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of
or 10% on all sales using the tax credit method.[15]
the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.[19] Thus,

Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that each House may determine

the rules of its proceedings. Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to

E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,[16] R.A.
promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each
No. 8241 or the Improved VAT Law,[17] R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of
house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
1997,[18] and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by

respondents as the VAT Reform Act.

Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides

as follows:
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.

Sec. 88. Conference Committee. In the event that the House does not agree with the
PROCEDURAL ISSUE Senate on the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled
by the conference committees of both chambers.

I.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: possible, adhere to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so
substantial that they materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to
the House for the latters appropriate action.
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2) Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

A. The Bicameral Conference Committee ...

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the
Report prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference
Committee Report in the same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
final reading.

Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:

Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives
on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after
their composition. The President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in
the conference committee with the approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be
signed by a majority of the members of each House panel, voting separately.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the
Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from
the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners
mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd
Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or
Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the
courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:

A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a But the cases, both here and abroad, in
reconciled version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference varying forms of expression, all deny to
committee shall be attached to the report. the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply
... with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, have declared that the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to
not addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And
themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with
house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or
branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform
its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a
with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a
in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses particular measure.[21] (Emphasis
supplied)
creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the

bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners
houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by
allege irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or
Congress.
deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to the Farias case,[22] the

present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference
In the recent case of Farias vs. The Executive Secretary,[20] the Court En Banc,
committee on matters regarding Congress compliance with its own internal rules. As
unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the enrolled bill doctrine,
stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power
thus, declining therein petitioners plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of
to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the
the bill. Assailed in said case was Congresss creation of two sets of bicameral
best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most
conference committees, the lack of records of said committees proceedings, the
orderly manner. It is also the sole
alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and the

disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference

committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings.

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only 108 of NIRC)

the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the

internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.

With regard to the no pass-on provision

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs.

Secretary of Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that [i]f a

change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it No similar provision Provides that the VAT
imposed on power generation
must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any and on the sale of petroleum
products shall be absorbed by
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. [24] To date, generation companies or
sellers, respectively, and
Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, shall not be passed on to
consumers
therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to
be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
Provides that the VAT
imposed on sales of
electricity by generation
companies and services of
transmission companies
and distribution companies,
as well as those of
franchise grantees of
electric utilities shall not
apply to residential

end-users. VAT shall be

absorbed by generation,
Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the transmission, and
distribution companies.
proceedings of the bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
dwell on the issue. The Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference

committee because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705

on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed Provides that the input No similar provision Provides that the input tax
tax credit for capital credit for capital goods on
disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements were as follows: goods on which a VAT which a VAT has been paid
has been paid shall be shall be equally distributed
equally distributed over 5 over 5 years or the
years or the depreciable depreciable life of such
life of such capital goods; capital goods; the input tax
House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950 the input tax credit for credit for goods and
House Bill No. 3555 goods and services other services other than capital
than capital goods shall goods shall not exceed 90%
not exceed 5% of the of the output VAT.
total amount of such
goods and services; and
for persons engaged in
retail trading of goods,
With regard to Stand-By Authority in favor of President the allowable input tax
credit shall not exceed
11% of the total amount
of goods purchased.

Provides for 12% VAT Provides for 12% VAT in
on every sale of goods or general on sales of goods or
properties (amending properties and reduced rates
Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% for sale of certain locally
VAT on importation of manufactured goods and
goods (amending Sec. petroleum products and raw
107 of NIRC); and 12% materials to be used in the
VAT on sale of services manufacture thereof
and use or lease of (amending Sec. 106 of
properties (amending NIRC); 12% VAT on
Sec. 108 of NIRC) importation of goods and
reduced rates for certain
imported products including
petroleum products
(amending Sec. 107 of
NIRC); and 12% VAT on
sale of services and use or
lease of properties and a
reduced rate for certain
services including power
generation (amending Sec.
Provides for a single rate
of 10% VAT on sale of
goods or properties
(amending Sec. 106 of
NIRC), 10% VAT on sale
of services including sale With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and
of electricity by generation excise taxes
companies, transmission
and distribution
companies, and use or
lease of properties
(amending Sec. 108 of No similar provision No similar provision Provided for amendments
NIRC) to several NIRC provisions
regarding corporate
income, percentage,
franchise and excise taxes

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on

with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT input tax credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus:

imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should

not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT (A) Creditable Input Tax. . . .
imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the ...
VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as Provided, The input tax on goods
purchased or imported in a calendar
proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4) month for use in trade or business for
which deduction for depreciation is
and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise allowed under this Code, shall be spread
evenly over the month of acquisition and
and excise taxes should be amended. the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if
the aggregate acquisition cost for such
goods, excluding the VAT component
thereof, exceeds one million Pesos
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the (P1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however,
that if the estimated useful life of the
House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the capital good is less than five (5) years, as
used for depreciation purposes, then the
rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or input VAT shall be spread over such
shorter period: . . .
disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing
(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. If at the
provisions by making the following changes: end of any taxable quarter the output tax
exceeds the input tax, the excess shall be
paid by the VAT-registered person. If the
input tax exceeds the output tax, the
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters:
from the Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive
of input VAT carried over from the
tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the previous quarter that may be credited in
every quarter shall not exceed seventy
Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the percent (70%) of the output VAT:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any
House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate would be input tax attributable to zero-rated sales
by a VAT-registered person may at his
retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax collection as a option be refunded or credited against
other internal revenue taxes, . . .
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or

National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income

1%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise tax, franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to

the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006. include such amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill

No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.

2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity

generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate

consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences

and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term

be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to settle such settle is synonymous to reconcile and harmonize.[25] To reconcile or harmonize

disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision. disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the

specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither

provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or

not, the Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise

by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the between the disagreeing provisions.

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1


In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee
on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the
disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to
the subject embraced by the original provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10%
VAT wanted by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise
when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a
compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two
houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject
of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings
of the Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto,
Chairman of the Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on
provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were
thinking that no sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any
sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And lets
keep it plain and simple. Lets not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision.
Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have
yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is
basically simple, lets keep the VAT simple.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision
never really enjoyed the support of either House.[27]
With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the
Bicameral Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of
the limitation or cap on such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the
Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of both houses to put
a cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the
House of Representatives, one of the major objectives was to plug a glaring loophole
in the tax policy and administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of
input VAT tax credits . . . and [b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax
credit, we are capping a major leakage that has placed our collection efforts at an
apparent disadvantage.[28]
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As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax
proposed in Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to
it, the conference committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the version
of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
were germane to subjects of the provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral
Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado[29] and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[30] the Court recognized the long-
standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino
case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely
new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no
reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as such amendment is germane to the
subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed
the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article
VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on
the No-Amendment Rule
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is
allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had
passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the no amendment rule (Sec. 26
(2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its
ruling in the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in these cases must
have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there
would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modification of the
compromise bill. . . .
only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No.
3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the
NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which
amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by the

Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed amendments did
for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee
report.[32] (Emphasis supplied) not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section

24 of the Constitution.

The Court reiterates here that the no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure
The argument does not hold water.
to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of

said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its

concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:

proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to

absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the

Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing

In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with
prohibited.
the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate

came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate
Article VI, Section 24 of the provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other
Constitution on Exclusive Origination of
Revenue Bills kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with

the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills,

still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
provisions on corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer

to the following provisions, to wit:

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the

Court held, thus:

Section 27
Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation
28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends . . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
119 Tax on franchises changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point,
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
151 Excise Tax on mineral products legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be
236 Registration requirements the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all
Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can
originate from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the

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Constitution to originate in the House.
...
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be
introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that
had not been touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the
House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by
House Bill No. 3555, stated:
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting
task of solving the countrys serious financial problems. To do this, government
expenditures must be strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be
significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities
are still optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced budget by the year
2009. In fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings have
been identified by the administration. It is supported with a credible package of
revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and
control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax
(VAT). (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared
that:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all
acknowledged that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our
fiscal system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually
achieve a balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of
opportunities which might seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run
prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of our economy. One such
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opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance given our
present conditions.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of
Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax administration
and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As
these house bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures
from the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes
of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure
on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it
entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph
Recto on why the provisions on income tax on corporation were included is worth
quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise P64.3
billion in additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power,
services and petroleum products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only P48.7 billion amount is
from the VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab P10.5 billion- will be
picked by corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the
consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be
only on the burden of the consumer?
The corporate worlds equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from
32 to 35 percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise P10.5 billion a year. After that,
the rate will slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30
percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this
emergency provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house
in order. This fiscal medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the
length of their sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a
light at the end of the tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big
business will be there to share the burden.[35]
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the
amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to
the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the government.
 Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et

al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by
germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the
authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met,
effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were
constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.
subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the

consumer would be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to
The assailed provisions read as follows:
these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT.

Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:

SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise
tax on bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product. SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.

For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for (A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be
a VAT. levied, assessed and collected on every
sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling
destroy the VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially price or gross value in money of the
sensitive products such as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene. goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged, such tax to be paid by the
seller or transferor: provided, that the
... President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%),
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left after any of the following conditions
hand what was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of has been satisfied.
softening the impact of VAT, so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices
they will have to pay as a result of VAT.[36] (i) value-added tax
collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth
which are necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system. percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government

deficit as a percentage of
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half
and purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit, percent (1 %).

among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments. SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods.

(A) In General. There shall be levied,
I. assessed and collected on every
importation of goods a value-added tax
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on
of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: the total value used by the Bureau of
Customs in determining tariff and
customs duties, plus customs duties,
excise taxes, if any, and other charges,
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
such tax to be paid by the importer prior
b. Article VI, Section 28(2) to the release of such goods from customs
custody: Provided, That where the
A. No Undue Delegation of customs duties are determined on the
Legislative Power basis of the quantity or volume of the
goods, the value-added tax shall be based
on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if
any: provided, further, that the

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

 President, upon the recommendation properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included
of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to
rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%) after any of the customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
following conditions has been
satisfied. usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.

(i) value-added tax

collection as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the
(GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that
percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress
deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue
exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 %). that the law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes

SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of
read as follows:
Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.

SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of
Services and Use or Lease of Properties

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be
levied, assessed and collected, a value- or create the conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions
added tax equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of gross receipts derived from the precedent.
sale or exchange of services: provided,
that the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation
to twelve percent (12%), after any of
the following conditions has been that the imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of
satisfied.
Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without
(i) value-added tax
collection as a percentage representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a
of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the previous year favorable recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation. Moreover,
exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to
(ii) national government
deficit as a percentage of how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any
GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
percent (1 %). (Emphasis
supplied) President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the

President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase

the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.
such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the

Constitution, which provides:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of

government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and own constitutionally allocated sphere.[37] A logical
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the government.
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of

powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
means what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.[38] This doctrine is based on the

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and
not through the intervening mind of another.[39]
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides
that the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The powers which
Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has
been described as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and to determine
the expediency of its enactment.[40] Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may
be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power,
it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one
appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power,
and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the
validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the
following recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;[41] and (b)
fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[42] A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.[43] Both tests
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
essentially legislative.[44]
In People vs. Vera,[45] the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded
on the concept and extent of delegation of power in this wise:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any
other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
...
The true distinction, says Judge Ranney, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
...
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it
leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a
particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself
rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of
facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental
process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent
tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on
account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this
modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the
Constitution of the United States in the following language speaking of declaration of
legislative power to administrative agencies: The principle which permits the
legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the
ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is
the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words,
the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy
demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be
done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of
an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress,
but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may
be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then, may provide
that a law shall take effect upon the happening of future specified contingencies
leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified
contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).[46]
In Edu vs. Ericta,[47] the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).[48]
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It
leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive.

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the
discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must
word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.[49] While the
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.[53] Where the law is clear
power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.[54]
power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.[50]

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which
enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary
cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word
to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations
shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear
is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its
directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The
members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the
time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain
complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a
information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing
person or body other than the legislature itself.
such information is proper.[51] The Constitution as a continuously operative charter

of government does not require that Congress find for itself

every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of
legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself
properly to investigate.[52]
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List,
et al. that the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the
Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the
position of petitioners

Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso
phrase upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. Neither does the Court
in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:
find persuasive the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation

by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, former is a mere alter ego of the latter.
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply
(i) Value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the
(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
(ii) National government deficit as a Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
percentage of GDP of the previous year

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary
of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's
bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is subject to
the direction of the President."[55]
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence
of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego
of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the
power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will is to take effect.[56] The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by
which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical
data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out
by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection
of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the
President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary
of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax
collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%). If
either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate
must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue
delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible.[57] Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.[58]
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to
the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism,
the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but
the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the
legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.[59]
The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions
precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The Court
does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at
all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the
Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.
B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not
Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary
Additional Tax Burden
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an
unfair and additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12%
increase, dependent on any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested provisions, is
ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original
10% if the rates are no longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair
and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to
year.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two
conditions set forth therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to
12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10%
rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%,
the VAT collection goes below the 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the
national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does not
exceed 1%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions
or limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a
forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon.[60]
Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in
this case the Court finds none, petitioners argument is, at best, purely speculative.
There is no basis for petitioners fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself
does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in
Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present. The rule is that where the provision of the
law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.[61]
Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an
incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/ of the GDP of
5
the previous year, should be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only
condition. There is another condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:
1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%
The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If
VAT/GDP is less than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of
implementing the VAT or that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax
collection. Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12% because such action will
also be ineffectual.
2. Natl Govt Deficit/GDP >1.5%
The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the
fiscal condition of government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards
the direction of a balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the
VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if
the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need to increase the VAT rate.[62]
That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT
collection does not render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for
which the law was passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact,
fiscal adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue.
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was
originally stated by Adam Smith in his Canons of Taxation (1776), as:
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state.[63]
It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government
expenditures and their variations.[64]
The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial
woe. During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary
Purisima bluntly depicted the countrys gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:
First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in
a position where 90 percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso
of revenue that we currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. Thats interest plus
amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable situation. Thats the first
fact.
The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer
countries that borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt to
GDP is approximately equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a
sustainable situation.
The third thing that Id like to point out is the environment that we are presently
operating in is not as benign as what it used to be the past five years.
What do I mean by that?
In the past five years, weve been lucky because we were operating in a period of
basically global growth and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an
inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of the
world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be
challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is our ability to access the financial
markets.
When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad
as it is now, at least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were
assuming that raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can then convince
them to improve our ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on
us because the interest rates have gone up. In fact, just within this room, we tried to
access the market for a billion dollars because for this year alone, the Philippines will
have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We
issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to access last
week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not accessed and we
might pull back because the conditions are not very good.
So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to
front-end our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the
debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit
you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We
need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt
spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.[65]
The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an
inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the states showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.[68]

economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In the Farias case, the Court refused

to consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a
14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that: limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It

states, in part: [P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over

. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this
Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT:
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-
conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.[66] added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or

local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of

trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax
In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or
due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by any person
the executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of
registered or required to register under the law.
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[67]

II.

Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the
NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input
tax that may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid
cannot now be credited against the output tax.

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1
Petitioners argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the

output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However,

A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such

input tax is still creditable.

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a businesss books of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No.
accounts and remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed
9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and
by Section 110(B), which provides that if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the
confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against
excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. In addition, Section
deprivation of life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied in
112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have

not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in
Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
payment of his other internal revenue taxes.
equal protection of the law.

The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is
proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the
fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent
periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later
on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).
Therefore, petitioners argument must be rejected.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the
operation of the 70% limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the
limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments
to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax
collection and revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the
seller, when he buys goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when
he sells goods. In computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal
to the input taxes that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is
required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for
the excess, which has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);[69] and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to
the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the
taxpayers option.[70]
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax.
Thus, a person can credit his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax.
In laymans term, the value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to
him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to
him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the
person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller
will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
payment of the tax is the seller.[71] What only needs to be done is for the
person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against
his output taxes.
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input
tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or
limited without due process of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of
the due process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax
is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind
for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take
away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away
property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.[72]
Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of
distribution are not recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the
cost, which is deductible from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No.
273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the
input tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and services by VAT-registered
persons against the output tax was introduced.[73] This was adopted by the Expanded
VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),[74] and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8424).[75]
The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by
law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8
of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 110. Tax Credits.
(A) Creditable Input Tax.
Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for
use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this
Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59)
succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT
component thereof, exceeds One million pesos (P1,000,000.00): Provided, however,
That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is less than five (5) years, as used
for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such a shorter
period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services, lease or use of
properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon
payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the
creditable input tax on purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost
of P1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a
delay in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners argument is without basis because
the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of his privilege to credit the input tax.
It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable
input tax in this case amounts to a 4-year interest-free loan to the government.[76] In
the same breath, Congress also justified its move by saying that the provision was
designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.[77] The legislature also dispelled
the fear that the provision will fend off foreign investments, saying that foreign
investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing the case of China,
where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not deterred.
[78] Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this involves
executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot
intervene.
With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the
government for taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended
Section 114 of the NIRC, reads:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each
purchase of goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in
Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final value-added tax at the
rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof: Provided, That the payment
for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject
to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this
Section, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the
withholding agent.
The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10)
days following the end of the month the withholding was made.
Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a
more simplified VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
as a withholding agent with respect to their payments for goods and services.
Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added
taxes to be withheld -- 3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross
payments for services supplied by contractors other than by public works contractors;
8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on
payment for the lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners.
Under the present Section 114(C), these different rates, except for the 10% on lease or
property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is
applied.
The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final,
as opposed to creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): final
value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%).
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act
of 1997), the concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:
SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax. Under the final withholding tax system the amount of
income tax withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment
of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The liability for payment of
the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure
to withhold the tax or in case of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected
from the payor/withholding agent.
(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes
withheld on certain income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the
tax due of the payee on said income. Taxes withheld on income payments covered by
the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and
compensation income (referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable
in nature.
As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the
government are subject to a 5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax
payable on the transaction. This represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The other
5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the
actual input VAT directly or attributable to the taxable transaction.[79]
The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress
intended to treat differently taxable transactions with the government.[80] This is
supported by the fact that under the old provision, the 5% tax withheld by the
government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller or contractor, to nothing.

wit:

Whats more, petitioners contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. value-added. It need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of

exception that a business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It
(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its
political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or cannot be overstressed that a business is created precisely for profit.
controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each
purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by contractors which are
subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct
and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of
payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross receipts for services
rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall be persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
creditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor:
Provided, however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[83]
withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That
the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners
shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For this
purpose, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes
withholding agent.
of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the

The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
days following the end of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)
assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of

validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear
As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable
showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.[84]
exhibits Congresss intention to treat transactions with the government differently.

Since it has not been shown that the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax has
Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a
been unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate the provision.
high ratio of input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with
Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the only ones subjected to the 5% final
the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid
withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the government.
classification.

Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners
The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any
believe. Revenue Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax
classification in the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or
Regulations 2005 issued by the BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed
the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection.
5% of gross payments, the excess may form part of the cost. Equally, should the
Petitioners alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different consequences.
actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is treated as income.[81]
While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results depending on ones

profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has
Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the
laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.
government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
added.
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal

protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
Petitioners stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The
to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments,
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only
particulars.[85]
be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,[82] full of sound and fury, signifying

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

Petitioners brought to the Courts attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038
by Sens. S.R. Osmea III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and
House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to
amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to
petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory.
On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until
Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its
unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.
B. Uniformity and Equitability of
Taxation
in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:[90]
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services
by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding
P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its
application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so
that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence
of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general
public.

It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
margins, and unduly favors those with high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious

to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under Section
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e.,

transactions with gross annual sales and/or receipts not exceeding P1.5 Million. This

acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses that qualify for VAT coverage
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.
class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different

amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the
people at all times.[86]
imposition of the tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum

products[91] and natural gas[92] were reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or
was removed.[93] Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.[94]
12%) on all goods and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending

Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or
Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in
12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services and
order to distribute the burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident
use or lease of properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain
corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous 32%.[95]
sales and transaction.
Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject to 15%

final withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporations domicile was
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will
increased to 20%.[96] The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
bear the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax
(PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore.[97] Even the sale by an artist
paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government.
of his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.
It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the

power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which
particular class.[87]
would otherwise rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that

R.A. No. 9337 is equitable.

R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The

VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with
C. Progressivity of Taxation
gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding P1,500,000.00.[88] Also, basic marine

and agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the tax,[89]

thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible. As was stated Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

regressive. It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will

suffer the consequences.

CONCLUSION

Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayers ability to pay. This
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an
principle was also lifted from Adam Smiths Canons of Taxation, and it states:
enema, a first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither

blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the
state. cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the

person affected.[98]
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and
that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many
wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions.
...
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive.

The principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch
as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services
enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In
other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small.
The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository
of remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has
judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate
compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing
full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing,
each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
[100]

business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of

the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino[101] holds true then, as it still holds true

margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really now. All things considered, there is no raison d'tre for the unconstitutionality of R.A.

the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest No. 9337.

hit.

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in

Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a

progressive system of taxation." The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus: There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation

of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.
the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. The constitutional provision has been interpreted to
mean simply that direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible,
indirect taxes should be minimized. (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF SO ORDERED.
THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not
to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which
perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the EN BANC
proclamation of Art. VIII, 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art.
VI, 28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OFG.R. No. 180046
THE PHILIPPINES,

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is Present:
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the Petitioner,
taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive PUNO, C.J.,
effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. - versus -
No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other
transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4 amending 103 of the NIRC)[99]
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

EDUARDO ERMITA and QUISUMBING, examinees to re-take the Nursing Board Examinations.
COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION represented by its On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents. supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE CARPIO, the Philippines.

PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno
(Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND CORONA, [4]

TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC),CARPIO MORALES, In a letter dated 24 November 2006,[5] the Review Center Association of the
ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the
TINGA, CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving
(ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW
permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia
CHICO-NAZARIO,
SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE), of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review

VELASCO, JR., centers.

Petitioners-Intervenors.
In a letter dated 3 January 2007,[6] Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its
NACHURA,
PIMSAT COLLEGES, President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. Chairman Puno wrote that the
Respondent-Intervenor. IRR was presented to the stakeholders during a consultation process prior to its
BRION, and finalization and publication on 13 November 2006. Chairman Puno also wrote that
petitioners comments and suggestions would be considered in the event of revisions to
PERALTA, JJ.
the IRR.

Promulgated: In view of petitioners continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate the IRR, Chairman
Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007,[7] invited petitioners representatives to a
April 2, 2009
dialogue on 14 March 2007. In accordance with what was agreed upon during the

x--------------------------------------------------x dialogue, petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR. Petitioner
also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman Punos statements during the
DECISION
dialogue, particularly on lowering of the registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and
CARPIO, J.:
the requirement for reviewers to have five years teaching experience instead of five
The Case years administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a categorical answer

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive to their request for the suspension of the IRR. The CHED did not reply to the letter.

Order No. 566 (EO 566)[1] and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed
Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR).[2] before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and

The Antecedent Facts Regulations[8] praying for a ruling:

On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted
the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants
wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were
circulated during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A.
Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. George Cordero, Inress Review
Centers President, was then the incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses
Association. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers
in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing)
and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it
to two Board of Nursing members.[3] On 19 June 2006, the PRC released the results
of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees
set on 22 August 2006.
1. Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of
the CHED;
2. Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be
integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional
associations with recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools;
and
3. Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722)[9]
limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as
well as degree-granting programs in post-secondary educational institutions.
On 8 October 2007, the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-2007[10] referring
petitioners request to exclude independent review centers from CHEDs supervision
and regulation to the Office of the President as the matter requires the amendment of
EO 566. In a letter dated 17 October 2007,[11] then CHED Chairman Romulo L. Neri
(Chairman Neri) wrote petitioner regarding its petition to be excluded from the
coverage of the CHED in the RIRR. Chairman Neri stated:

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the
mandates of CHED under Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8,
the members of the PRCs Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the

ADMIN CASES PAGE 1

2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, issued
Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher Education
to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and similar
entities in the entire country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the
agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all
review centers as provided for under Section 4 of the Executive Order
which provides that No review center or similar entities shall be
established and/or operate review classes without the favorable
expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the
necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x x x
To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the
coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No. 566.
Considering that the requests requires the amendment of Executive Order
No. 566, the Commission, during its 305th Commission Meeting, resolved
that the said request be directly referred to the Office of the President for
appropriate action.
As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an
HEI, as required under the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations,
tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.[12]
(Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before
this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as
invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing
the RIRR.
Dr. Freddie T. Bernal, Director III, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the Director IV of
CHED, sent a letter[13] to the President of Northcap Review Center, Inc., a member
of petitioner, that it had until 27 November 2007 to comply with the RIRR.
On 15 February 2008,[14] PIMSAT Colleges (respondent-intervenor) filed a Motion
For Leave to Intervene and To Admit Comment-in-Intervention and a Comment-in-
Intervention praying for the dismissal of the petition. Respondent-intervenor alleges
that the Office of the President and the CHED did not commit any act of grave abuse
of discretion in issuing EO 566 and the RIRR. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the
requirements of the RIRR are reasonable, doable, and are not designed to deprive
existing review centers of their review business. The Court granted the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Comment-in-Intervention in its 11 March 2008
Resolution.[15]
On 23 April 2008, a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support of the
Petition and a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA Review School of the
Philippines, Inc. (CPAR), Professional Review and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC),
ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA), CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all
independent CPA review centers operating in Manila (collectively, petitioners-
intervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566 and the RIRR
as invalid on the ground that both constitute an unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power. The Court granted the intervention in its 29 April 2008 Resolution.
[16]
On 21 May 2008, the CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of
2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008)[17] extending the deadline for six months from 27 May
2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs
in accordance with the RIRR.
In its 25 November 2008 Resolution, this Court resolved to require the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO
21, s. 2008.
The Assailed Executive Order and the RIRR
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Executive Order No. 566 states in full:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 566
DIRECTING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION
OF REVIEW CENTERS AND SIMILAR ENTITIES
WHEREAS, the State is mandated to protect the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take
appropriate steps to make education accessible to all, pursuant to
Section 1, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the State has the obligation to ensure and promote
quality education through the proper supervision and regulation
of the licensure examinations given through the various Boards
of Examiners under the Professional Regulation Commission;
WHEREAS, the lack of regulatory framework for the
establishment and operation of review centers and similar
entities, as shown in recent events, have adverse consequences
and affect public interest and welfare;
WHEREAS, the overriding necessity to protect the public
against substandard review centers and unethical practices
committed by some review centers demand that a regulatory
framework for the establishment and operation of review centers
and similar entities be immediately instituted;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7722, otherwise known as the
Higher Education Act of 1994, created the Commission on
Higher Education, which is best equipped to carry out the
provisions pertaining to the regulation of the establishment and
operation of review centers and similar entities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a System of Regulation for
Review Centers and Similar Entities. The Commission on
Higher Education (CHED), in consultation with other concerned
government agencies, is hereby directed to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar
entities, including but not limited to the development and
institutionalization of policies, standards, guidelines for the
establishment, operation and accreditation of review centers and
similar entities; maintenance of a mechanism to monitor the
adequacy, transparency and propriety of their operations; and
reporting mechanisms to review performance and ethical
practice.
SEC. 2. Coordination and Support. The Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), Technical Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
various Boards of Examiners under the PRC, as well as other
concerned non-government organizations life professional
societies, and various government agencies, such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and others that
may be tapped later, shall provide the necessary assistance and
technical support to the CHED in the successful
operationalization of the System of Regulation envisioned by
this Executive Order.
SEC. 3. Permanent Office and Staff. To ensure the effective
implementation of the System of Regulation, the CHED shall
organize a permanent office under its supervision to be headed
by an official with the rank of Director and to be composed of
highly competent individuals with expertise in educational
assessment, evaluation and testing; policies and standards
development, monitoring, legal and enforcement; and statistics
as well as curriculum and instructional materials development.
The CHED shall submit the staffing pattern and budgetary
requirements to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) for approval.
SEC. 4. Indorsement Requirement. No review center or similar
entities shall be established and/or operate review classes
without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and
without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to
conduct review classes. After due consultation with the
stakeholders, the concerned review centers and similar entities
shall be given a reasonable period, at the discretion of the
CHED, to comply with the policies and standards, within a
period not exceeding three (3) years, after due publication of this
 Executive Order. The CHED shall see to it that the System of
Regulation including the implementing mechanisms, policies,
guidelines and other necessary procedures and documentation
for the effective implementation of the System, are completed
within sixty days (60) upon effectivity of this Executive Order.
SEC. 5. Funding. The initial amount necessary for the
development and implementation of the System of Regulation
shall be sourced from the CHED Higher Education
Development Fund (HEDF), subject to the usual government
accounting and auditing practices, or from any applicable
funding source identified by the DBM. For the succeeding
fiscal year, such amounts as may be necessary for the
budgetary requirement of implementing the System of
Regulation and the provisions of this Executive Order shall be
provided for in the annual General Appropriations Act in the
budget of the CHED. Whenever necessary, the CHED may tap
its Development Funds as supplemental source of funding for
the effective implementation of the regulatory system. In this
connection, the CHED is hereby authorized to create special
accounts in the HEDF exclusively for the purpose of
implementing the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 6. Review and Reporting. The CHED shall provide for
the periodic review performance of review centers and similar
entities and shall make a report to the Office of the President of
the results of such review, evaluation and monitoring.
SEC. 7. Separability. Any portion or provision of this Executive
Order that may be declared unconstitutional shall not have the
effect of nullifying other provisions hereof, as long as such
remaining provisions can still subsist and be given effect in
their entirely.
SEC. 8. Repeal. All rules and regulations, other issuances or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order,
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 9. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately upon its publication in a national newspaper of
general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 8th day of September, in the
year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Six.
(Sgd.) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
By the President:
(Sgd.) Eduardo R. Ermita
Executive Secretary
The pertinent provisions of the RIRR affecting independent review centers are as
follows:
Rule VII
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate Only CHED
recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs may be authorized to
establish and operate review center/course by the CHED upon
full compliance with the conditions and requirements provided
herein and in other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In
addition, a consortium or consortia of qualified schools and/or
entities may establish and operate review centers or conduct
review classes upon compliance with the provisions of these
Rules.
Rule XIV
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Review centers that are existing upon the approval of
Executive Order No. 566 shall be given a grace period of up to
one (1) year, to tie-up/be integrated with existing HEIs[,]
consortium of HEIs and PRC recognized Professional
Associations with recognized programs under the conditions set
forth in this Order and upon mutually acceptable covenants by
the contracting parties. In the alternative, they may convert as a
school and apply for the course covered by the review subject to
rules and regulations of the CHED and the SEC with respect to
the establishment of schools. In the meantime, no permit shall
be issued if there is non-compliance with these conditions or
non-compliance with the requirements set forth in these rules.
Section 2. Only after full compliance with the requirements
shall a Permit be given by the CHED to review centers
contemplated under this Rule.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
Section 3. Failure of existing review centers to fully comply with
the above shall bar them from existing as review centers and they
shall be deemed as operating illegally as such. In addition,
appropriate administrative and legal proceedings shall be
commence[d] against the erring entities that continue to operate
and appropriate sanctions shall be imposed after due process.
The Issues
The issues raised in this case are the following:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of
legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making
power.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Violation of Judicial Hierarchy
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition.
Among other grounds, the OSG alleges that petitioner violated the rule on judicial
hierarchy in filing the petition directly with this Court.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive but is concurrent with the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.[18] The Court has
explained:
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket.[19]
The Court has further explained:
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two
reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it
would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[20]
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner
alleges that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive
Department usurps the legislative powers of Congress. The issue in this case is not
only the validity of the RIRR. Otherwise, the proper remedy of petitioner and
petitioners-intervenors would have been an ordinary action for the nullification of the
RIRR before the Regional Trial Court.[21] The alleged violation of the Constitution by
the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of
its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside
technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public
and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the
Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[22]
OSGs Technical Objections
The OSG alleges that the petition should be dismissed because the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping were signed only by Fudolig without the express
authority of any board resolution or power of attorney. However, the records show
that Fudolig was authorized under Board Resolution No. 3, series of 2007[23] to file
a petition before this Court on behalf of petitioner and to execute any and all
documents necessary to implement the resolution.
The OSG also alleges that the petition should be dismissed for violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice because Fudolig only presented his community tax
certificate as competent proof of identity before the notary public. The Court would
have required Fudolig to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice except that
Fudolig already presented his Philippine passport before the notary public when
petitioner submitted its reply to the OSGs comment.
EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722
The OSG alleges that Section 3 of RA 7722 should be read in conjunction with
Section 8, enumerating the CHEDs powers and functions. In particular, the OSG
alleges that the CHED has the power under paragraphs (e) and (n) of Section 8 to:
(e) monitor and evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of
higher learning for appropriate incentives as well as the imposition of
sanctions such as, but not limited to, diminution or withdrawal of subsidy,
recommendation on the downgrading or withdrawal of accreditation,
program termination or school closure;
(n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers
and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act[.]
The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term programs x x x of higher
learning is broad enough to include programs offered by review centers.
We do not agree.
Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:
Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of
the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is
hereby created, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of
the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both
public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private. (Emphasis supplied)
Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA
7722)[24] defines an institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning.
Higher education, however, is defined as education beyond the secondary level[25] or
education provided by a college or university.[26] Under the plain meaning or verba
legis rule in statutory construction, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[27]
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute.[28] Hence, the term higher education should be taken in its ordinary sense
and should be read and interpreted together with the phrase degree-granting programs
in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private. Higher education
should be taken to mean tertiary education or that which grants a degree after its
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
completion.
Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide:
Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the
Commission shall be both public and private institutions of
higher education as well as degree granting programs in all
post-secondary educational institutions, public and private.
These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational
institutions offering tertiary degree programs.
The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting
institutions shall be within the responsibility of the
Commission.
Article 7. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over institutions of higher
learning primarily offering tertiary degree programs shall
belong to the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or
post-secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education
Modernization Act of 1997 covers chartered state universities and colleges. State
universities and colleges primarily offer degree courses and programs.
Sections 1 and 8, Rule IV of the RIRR define a review center and similar entities as
follows:
Section 1. REVIEW CENTER. - refers to a center operated and
owned by a duly authorized entity pursuant to these Rules
intending to offer to the public and/or to specialized groups
whether for a fee or for free a program or course of study that is
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge and
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal
school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations
given by the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The
term review center as understood in these rules shall also
embrace the operation or conduct of review classes or courses
provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation
for the licensure examinations given by the Professional
Regulations Commission.
xxx
Section 8. SIMILAR ENTITIES the term refer to other review
centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered
by licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations
Commission including but not limited to college entrance
examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial services in
specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like.
The same Rule defines a review course as follows:
Section 3. REVIEW COURSE refers to the set of non-degree
instructional program of study and/or instructional
materials/module, offered by a school with a recognized
course/program requiring licensure examination, that are
intended merely to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and
private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers
a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school
setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also
covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the
PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It
does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of
the CHED. A review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is not even required to enroll in a
review center or to take a review course prior to taking an examination given by the
PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course is
not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not
required to take or pass an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also
not required to submit any thesis or dissertation. Thus, programs given by review
centers could not be considered programs x x x of higher learning that would put
them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which
include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services
examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify
as programs of higher learning.
Usurpation of Legislative Power
The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The OSG further argues that President
Arroyo was exercising her residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),
[29] particularly Section 20, Title I of Book III, thus:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers
and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated
above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the
President under the law.[30] The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under this
provision requires legislation,[31] as the provision clearly states that the exercise of
the Presidents other powers and functions has to be provided for under the law.
There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the
CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a
prior legislation granting her such power.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions
of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to
alter or repeal them,[32] and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In Ople v. Torres,[33] the Court declared void, as a usurpation of legislative power,
Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the President to create a national
identification system. AO 308 mandates the adoption of a national identification
system even in the absence of an enabling legislation. The Court distinguished
between Legislative and Executive powers, as follows:
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not
indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by
the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern
or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty
of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control
to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
x x x. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation
of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy. x x x.[34]
Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any
enabling law. The Court further stated in Ople:
x x x. As well stated by Fisher: x x x Many regulations however,
bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative
legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws.[35]
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid
exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through
the promulgation of rules and regulations.[36] The CHED may only exercise its rule-
making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers
review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education
nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Exercise of Police Power
Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good
order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that
salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.[37] Police
power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President
and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation.[38] Here, no delegation of
police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations
of non-degree granting review centers.
 Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law
It is argued that the President of the Philippines has adequate powers under the law to
regulate review centers and this could have been done under an existing validly
delegated authority, and that the appropriate law is Republic Act No. 8981[39] (RA
8981). Under Section 5 of RA 8981, the PRC is mandated to establish and maintain a
high standard of admission to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure
and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations. Section 7 of RA 8981
further states that the PRC shall adopt measures to preserve the integrity and
inviolability of licensure examinations.
There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should
properly be interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The enumeration
of PRCs powers under Section 7(e) includes among others, the fixing of dates and
places of the examinations and the appointment of supervisors and watchers. The
power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be
read together with these functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at
all with the regulation of review centers.
The PRC has the power to investigate any of the members of the Professional
Regulatory Boards (PRB) for commission of any irregularities in the licensure
examinations which taint or impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the
said examinations.[40] This is an administrative power which the PRC exercises over
members of the PRB. However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of
review centers. The PRC has the power to bar PRB members from conducting review
classes in review centers. However, to interpret this power to extend to the power
to regulate review centers is clearly an unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981.
The PRC may prohibit the members of the PRB from conducting review classes at
review centers because the PRC has administrative supervision over the members of
the PRB. However, such power does not extend to the regulation of review centers.
Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform such other functions
and duties as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of RA 8981 does not
extend to the regulation of review centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981
that mentions regulation by the PRC of review centers.
The Court cannot likewise interpret the fact that RA 8981 penalizes any person who
manipulates or rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes known
licensure examination questions prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers
with the grades in the professional licensure examinations[41] as a grant of power to
regulate review centers. The provision simply provides for the penalties for
manipulation and other corrupt practices in the conduct of the professional
examinations.
The assailed EO 566 seeks to regulate not only review centers but also similar
entities. The questioned CHED RIRR defines similar entities as referring to other
review centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure
examinations given by the PRC including but not limited to college entrance
examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like
English, Mathematics and the like.[42] The PRC has no mandate to supervise review
centers that give courses or lectures intended to prepare examinees for licensure
examinations given by the PRC. It is like the Court regulating bar review centers just
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
because the Court conducts the bar examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no
mandate to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not even take any
licensure examination given by the PRC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petition-in-intervention. We
DECLARE Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education
Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17821 November 29, 1963
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, defendants-appellants.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for plaintiffs-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch X),
in its Civil Case No. 41639, enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond
owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of
Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No. 15905.
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had
blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking
that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions
to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959,
ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati;
otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent.
After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial
court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of
the present appeal.
The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno, Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and Benjamin Yonzon, investigator, question the jurisdiction of the
trial court, and attribute to it the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in holding in effect, that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional:
2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case;
3. The trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of defendant
Secretary of Public Works and Communications and in reversing the latter's
finding that the stream in question is a navigable river which was illegally
closed by plaintiffs;
4. The trial court erred in holding that the Sapang Bulati is a private stream;
and
5. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first exhaust
administrative remedy before filing the instant petition.
The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No.
2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass
upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam
encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the
law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act 2056 provides:
Section 1. Any provision or provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other
works which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal
waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the
construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared
 as communal fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public
nuisances or a prohibited constructions as herein provided: Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Public Works and Communications may
authorize the construction of any such work when public interest or safety
so requires or when it is absolutely necessary for the protection of private
property.
Section 2. When it is found by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, after due notice and hearing, that any dam, dike or any
other works now existing or may there after be constructed encroaches
into any public navigable waters, or that they are constructed in areas
declared as communal fishing grounds, he shall have the authority to order
the removal of any such works and shall give the party concerned a period
not to exceed thirty days for the removal of the same: Provided, That
fishpond constructions or works on communal fishing grounds introduced
in good faith before the areas we proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be
exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or
works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river,
stream, or would not cause inundations of agricultural areas: Provided,
further, That should the party concerned fail to comply with the order of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications within the period so
stated in the order, such removal shall be effected by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications at the expense of the said party within
ten days following the expiration of the period given the party concerned:
Provided, furthermore, That the investigation and hearing to be conducted
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under this section
shall be terminated and decided by him within a period which shall not
exceed ninety days from the time he shall have been notified in writing or
a written complaint shall have been filed with him by any interested party
apprising him of the existence of a dam, dike or any other works that
encroaches into any other public navigable river, stream, coastal waters or
any other public navigable waters or waterways and in areas declared as
communal fishing grounds: Provided, still furthermore, That the failure on
the part of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications without
justifiable or valid reason to terminate and decide a case or effect the
removal of any such works, as provided for in this section, shall constitute
an offense punishable under section three of this Act: And provided,
finally, That the removal of any such works shall not impair fishponds
completed or about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct any
public navigable river or stream and/or which would not cause inundations
of agricultural areas and which have been constructed in good faith before
the area was declared communal fishing grounds.
The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not
only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but
also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act
(R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway
entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves
the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and
its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are
clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act
No. 2056, section 2.
It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or
administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial
functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive
or administrative powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers
so far as that principle is recognized by the Federal Constitution nor is it in
violation of due process of law. (3 Willoughby on the Const. of the U.S.,
pp. 1654-1655)
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private,
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a
statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence
of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to
commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and
determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
particular laws. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235)
s. 237. Powers to determine cases within Statute. — One important class of
cases in which discretion may properly be vested in administrative officers,
which class is almost an operation of the general rule relating to the
ascertainment of facts, consists of those cases in which a general rule or
prohibition is laid down and power is vested in an executive officer to
determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule or
prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise of
judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature
within the sense prohibited by the Constitution. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
sec. 237, p. 952)
A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases" upholding the constitutionality
of the U.S. River and Harbor Act of March 3, 1899, that empowered (sec. 18) the
Secretary of War to take action, after hearing, for the removal or alteration of bridges
unreasonably obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of power, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Congress thereby declared that whenever the Secretary of War should find
any bridge theretofore or thereafter constructed over any of the navigable
waterways of the United States to be an unreasonable obstruction to the free
navigation of such waters on account of insufficient height, width of span,
or otherwise, it should be the duty of the Secretary, after hearing the parties
concerned, to take action looking to the removal or alteration of the bridge,
so as to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and
unobstructed. As this court repeatedly has held, this is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary.
Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385, 51 L. ed. 523, 533,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S.
177, 192,54 L. ed. 435, 441, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Hannibal Bridge Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 194. 205, 55 L. ed. 699, 703, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603.
The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable
waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War with the duty of
ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether the
particular bridge came within the general rule. Of course, the Secretary's
finding must be based upon the conditions as they exist at the time he acts.
But the law imposing this duty upon him speaks from the time of its
enactment. (Louisville Bridge Co. v. U.S., 61 L. ed. 395). (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great
value can not be done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to
summary abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before
us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to
the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy that
Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public
nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of
appellees clearly are in the latter class.
It may not be amiss to state that the power of the Secretary of Public Works to
investigate and clear public streams free from unauthorized encroachments and
obstructions was granted as far back as Act 3208 of the old Philippine Legislature, and
has been upheld by this Court (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, supra; Meneses vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647). We do not believe that the absence of an express appeal
to the courts under the present Republic Act 2056 is a substantial difference, so far as
the Constitution is concerned, for it is a well-known rule that due process does not
have to be judicial process; and moreover, the judicial review of the Secretary's
decision would always remain, even if not expressly granted, whenever his act violates
the law or the Constitution, or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
The argument that the action of the Secretary amounts to a confiscation of private
property leads us directly to the issue of fact whether a navigable portion of the Bulati
creek had once traversed the registered lot of the appellees Lovina and connected with
Manampil creek that borders said lot on the northwest before it was closed by Jose de
Leon, Lovina's predecessor. The Secretary of Public Works has found from the
evidence before him that, originally, the sapang (creek) Bulati flowed across the
property in question, and connected the Nasi river with sapang Manampil; that in 1926
or thereabouts, the Bulati creek was 2 meters deep at high tide and 1/2 meter deep at
low tide, and the people used it as fishing grounds and as a communication way,
navigating along its length in bancas; that former registered owner, Jose de Jesus,
closed about meters of the course of the sapang Bulati that lay within the lot in
question by constructing dams or dikes at both sides and converting the lot into a
fishpond.
The appellees, on the other hand, rely on the 1916 registration plan of the property
(Exh. C), showing it to be merely bounded by the Bulati creek on the southeast, as well
as on the testimony introduced at the hearing of prohibition case (over the objection
of the Government counsel) that the Bulati creek did not enter the property.
The Court of First Instance found that "according to the location plan, Exhibit "C",
the "Bulati creek, on which dikes and dams in question were constructed was a mere
estero and could not be considered a navigable stream then." It is not explained how
such fact could appear solely from the plan Exhibit "C" (no other proof being referred
to), unless indeed the court below so concluded from the fact that in said plan the
Bulati creek does not appear to run within the registered lot. The conclusion of lower
court is not supported by its premises, because by law, the issuance of a Torrens title
does not confer title navigable streams (which are fluvial highways) within registered
property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such
streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan (Act 496, sec. 39 cf.
Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647), so
that delimitation of their course may be made even after the decree of registration has
become final. In the present case, in truth the very plan of the appellees, Exhibit "C",
shows parallel reentrant lines, around its point 65 and between points 44 and that
indicate the existence of a stream connecting the sapang Bulati on the southeast and
the sapang Manampil on the northwest, and which the surveyor apparently failed
delimit for some undisclosed reason. That the stream was the prolongation of the
sapang Bulati, that formerly flow across the registered lot, is also shown by the fact
that appellees' plan Exhibit "C", the westward continuation the Bulati creek (west of
point 65), which bounds the registered lot, is labelled "Etero Mabao". The plan thus
corroborates the previously summarized testimony laid before investigator Yonzon
and relied upon by the Secretary in his administrative decision. Even more, appellees'
own caretaker, Yambao, showed investigator Yonzon the old course of the Bulati
within the fishpond itself; and this evidence is, likewise, confirmed by the cross-
section profile of the ground near the dams in question (See plan Annex "AA" of
Yonzon's Report), where the old channel of the creek is clearly discernible. To be
sure, appellees contend that they were not shown this plan; but in their evidence
before the court of first instance, they never attempted, or offered, to prove that said
plan is incorrect.
That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed was also testified to by the
government witnesses, whose version is corroborated as we have seen.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in
matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence
of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion (Com. of Customs vs. Valencia, 54
O.G. 3505), none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with
appellant that the court below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary
of Public Works.
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid down
before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to
substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion and
judgment of the court, to whom the statute had entrusted the case. It is immaterial
that the present action should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for
certiorari, in either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to
the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de
novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation
of the constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether
they find reasonable support in the evidence. 1 Here, the proof preponderates in favor
of the Secretary's decision.
Nevertheless, we, agree with appellees that they can not be charged with failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, for the Secretary's decision is that of the President,
in the absence of disapproval (Villena vs. Secretary of the interior, 67 Phil. 451).
Finally, there being a possibility that when they purchased the property in question
the appellees Lovina were not informed of the illegal closure of the Bulati creek, their
action, if any, against their vendor, should be, and is hereby, reserved.
In resume, we rule:
(1) That Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works;
(2) That absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by
Torrens title does not confer title to it nor preclude a subsequent investigation and
determination of its existence;
(3) That the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act No.
2056 should be respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or
imposition, so long as the said, findings are supported by substantial evidence
submitted to him.
(4) That ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by
prescription.
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of injunction
issued therein are annulled and set aside. Costs against appellees Lovina.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30783 August 27, 1929
JUAN B. ALEGRE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondents-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Camus & Delgado and Jose M. Casal for appellee.
STATEMENT
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of
abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the
respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, which was
denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question
without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions
of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and,
in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void.
For answer the defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the
amended petition and denies all other allegations, and as a special defense, alleges:
1. That on November 8, 1927, the petitioner addressed to the respondent a
letter of the following tenor:
The COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
Manila
SIR: I desire to export to England one hundred (100) bales
of abaca which are not supported by any certificate of the
Fiber Standardization Board recently created by law.
I do not desire to submit to the decision of the inspectors
of said Board, and want to ship the abaca referred to
without any certificate of inspection.
I would request you to inform me if I can obtain the
permission of that office for the exportation of the
aforementioned one hundred (100) bales of abaca.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JUAN B. ALEGRE
2. That on the same day the respondent, through the Insular Deputy
Collector of Customs, answered the above letter of the petitioner informing
him that he would not be permitted to export the said one hundred bales of
abaca unless the export entry covering the exportation is accompanied by a
certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board, or a notation is written on the
face of the triplicate of the export entry signed by the fiber inspector who
made the inspection indicating that the abaca covered thereby has complied
with the provisions of the law relative to the shipment of such product.
Copies of the said letter and its enclosure are attached to, and made a part
of, this answer marked as Exhibits A, B, and C.
3. That the provisions of the law relating to the classification, grading, and
inspection of fibers were designed to remedy, and did remedy the
dangerously unsatisfactory conditions of the Philippine fiber industry
obtaining at the time of their enactment.
4. That the petitioner has secured fiber grading permits from the Fiber
Standardization Board has otherwise enjoyed the benefits of the law
providing for the grading and inspection of fibers as amended.
Wherefore, the respondent prays that the amended petition for the writ of
mandamus be denied with costs against the petitioner.
As the result of a trial on such issues judgment was rendered as prayed for in the
petition, form which the defendant appeals and assigns the following errors:
 1. The lower court erred in not holding that the petitioner was estopped
from questioning the constitution of Act No. 3263 amending section 1772
et seq. of the Administrative Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that sections 1722 and 1783 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, are unconstitutional and void.
3. The lower court erred in ordering the respondent to permit the
exportation of petitioner's hemp without the certificate of the Fiber
Standardization Board.
JOHNS, J.:
Act No. 2380 is entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of
abaca (Manila hemp), maguey (cantala), sisal, and other fibers," and was enacted by
the Philippine Legislature, February 28, 1914.
Section 1 specifically defies the meaning of the words "fiber," "abaca," "maguey,"
"sisal," "strand," "string," "tow," "waste," "grading station," and "grading
establishment."
Section 2 is as follows:
(a) The Director of Agriculture is hereby enjoined and directed to
establish, define, and designate standards for the commercial grades of
abaca, maguey, and sisal, which shall become the official standards of
classification throughout the Philippine Islands, calling to his assistance
the agencies of his Bureau, those of any other Bureau or branch of this
Government, or such other agencies as he may deem necessary.
(b) The Director of Agriculture shall prepare in suitable form the official
standard of each grade of the fibers covered by this Act and furnish the
same upon request to all authorized grading establishments, provincial
governments, chambers of commerce, planters' associations, and other
institutions directly interested in the trade, the actual cost of such
specimen to be paid in advance by the party requesting the same.
(c) The designation and mark of each grade of the official standard,
together with the basis upon which each grade is determined, shall be
defined and published by the Director of Agriculture in a Bureau of
Agriculture General Order not less than six months prior to the date when
this Act goes into effect; the Director of Agriculture shall furnish a
sufficient number of copies of this order and of any other or others
hereafter issue on this subject to the foreign markets, municipal presidents,
provincial governors, and to such other persons and corporations as he
may deem advisable, for general information and guidance.
(d) To preserve the official standards as originally prepared, the Director
of Agriculture shall stipulate the manner in which they shall be kept and
shall define the period at the expiration of which they shall be renewed.
(e) Any grading establishment shall have the right to prepare or renew the
set of official standards of grades for its use, providing that such a set shall
be an exact copy of the official set of standards and that it shall have been
approved and certified to by the Director of Agriculture or his authorized
agent.
(f) The Director of Agriculture shall establish one or several standards for
abaca which may have been partially cleaned or prepared in the form of
tow, waste, or strings, at the request of a party concerned, if such
standards are required by the market. He shall also likewise establish a
standard or standards for the fiber of any species of Musa other than
abaca for which there shall be a demand in the market. Such standards, if
established, shall be designated and defined in the general order deferred
to in section two (c) of this Act.
Subsection (b), of section 3, provides:
No person, association, or corporation shall engage in grading abaca,
maguey, or sisal, unless a permit shall have previously been obtained,
which shall be signed by the Director of Agriculture, such permits to be
known as 'grading permits.'
Subsection (e) says:
In grading fiber for export, each grade prepared shall correspond to one of
the official standards, and it shall also bear the same designation and mark
as the latter. The set of official standards shall be placed in a prominent
position in the grading shed for reference.
Section 5 provides:
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
(a) All fibers included in this Act which are intended for export shall be
pressed in bales approximately of the following dimensions and weight:
Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters;
and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net. In any grade of abaca
in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure, the
approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be
determined in a general order by the Director of Agriculture.
(b) The limit of size of diameter of each hank contained in the bale of
abaca, the manner in which these hanks shall be arranged in the bale, and
the manner of labeling and tying of each entire bale shall be designated by
the Director of Agriculture not later than six months prior to the date on
which this Act goes into effect.
(c) Each and all hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in
quality, and each hank shall also be securely tied by a strand to hold the
hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes
the bale.
(d) Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber,
fiber not identical with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous
matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry.
Subsection (g), of section 6, provides:
All fiber of which the official standard shall have been established as
provided in section two hereof shall be graded, baled, inspected and
approved as provided in this Act.
And the last paragraph of subsection (i) says:
The object of such inspection shall be to determine whether or not the grade
inspected conforms with the official standard for the same, whether or not
the private mark (if any) used is correct, and whether the bailing and
labeling is in conformity with the provisions of this Act and the authorized
instructions of the Director of Agriculture.
Subsection (k) provides:
Every shipment of graded and baled abaca, maguey, or sisal, which has
been inspected and approved, shall be accompanied by a certificate or
certificates of inspection attached to the bill of lading and duly signed by
the fiber inspector who made the inspection. All certificates of grading shall
be prepared in quadruplicate, the original and one copy to be given the
owner, one copy to be forwarded to the Director of Agriculture, and one
copy to be filed in the inspector's office.
Section 7 says:
(a) No person shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly or in part, or
cause to be changed, obliterated, or counterfeited, the official or private
mark or brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and
stamped as provided in this Act, nor shall any person use any tag or mark
which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the authorized
orders of the Director of Agriculture; nor shall any person tamper with or
alter the quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been inspected,
graded, and stamped as provided in this Act.
(b) Any person, associations, or corporation violating any of the provisions
of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent
jurisdiction, be defined not more than two hundred and fifty pesos.
(c) Upon conviction of any person, association, or corporation of a violation
of any of the provisions of this Act, the Director of Agriculture may
withdraw and cancel the grading permit theretofore issued to such person,
association, or corporation.
It will thus be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in
detail for the inspection grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers,
and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and
quality of the hemp, so that an intending purchaser from an examination of the
certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for
sale.
The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of,
the Administrative Code, section 1244 of which is as follows:
A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other
fibrous products for which standard grades have been established by the
Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign
port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the
 shipment of such fibers.
Section 1783 of the Administrative Code, which corresponds to section 5 of the
original act, now reads as follows:
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export
shall be pressed in bales approximately of the following dimensions and
weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five
centimeters; and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net.
Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber,
fiber not identical with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous
matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry.
All hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each
hank also be securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which
shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes the bale.
In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by
excessive pressure, the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale
of such fiber shall be determined in a general order by the Director of
Agriculture. He shall in like manner determine the limit of the diameter of
hanks contained in bales, the manner in which these hanks shall be
arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and trying of each entire
bale.
Section 2 of Act No. 3263, which was approved December 7, 1925, among their
things, provides:
The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections seventeen hundred
and seventy-one and seventeen hundred and seventy-two of the same Act:
SEC. 1771-A. Philippine fiber inspection service. — There is hereby
created an office which shall have charge of the classification, baling, and
inspection of Philippine fibers and shall be designated and known as
"Philippines Fiber Inspection Service" and he governed by a
standardization board.
SEC. 1771-B. Standardization Board. — There is hereby created a board
which shall be designated and known as "Fiber Standardization Board"
and shall be vested with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. Said
Board shall consist of seven members, with the Director of Agriculture as
its permanent chairman and executive officer, and the other members shall
be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Senate: Provided, That one member shall represents the fiber exporters;
one member shall represent the dealers or middlemen and two members
shall represent the fiber producers.
Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows:
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for
the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may
hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each
grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the
basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by
the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination
of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign
markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice
shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six
months before the new standards shall go into effect.
Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to reads as follows:
No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the
Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make
one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this
law provided.
Section 2748 of the Administrative Code now reads:
Any person who shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly, or in part,
or cause to be changed, obliterated, or counterfeit, the official of private
mark and brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded,
and stamped as provided in this law, or who shall use any tag or mark
which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the
authorized orders of the Fiber Standardization Board, or who shall tamper
with or alter the quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been so
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
inspected, graded, and stamped or who shall otherwise violate any of the
provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three
hundred pesos; and upon conviction hereunder of any person holding a
grading permit, the Fiber Standardization Board may, with the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, withdraw and cancel
such permit.
The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and
baling of fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is
squarely presented as to whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation
of legislative power.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, a standard authority all over the world, vol. I,
8th ed., pp. 228-232, says:
The maxim that power conferred upon Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to any other authority does not preclude the Legislature from
delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
It may confer an authority in relation to the execution of a law which may
involve discretion, but such authority must be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and
fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an
administrative officer or body may be invested with the power to principles
apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the
laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
sufficiency both in provision and execution.
Boards and commissions now play an important part in the administration
of our laws. The great social and industrial evolution of the past century,
and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing
complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these
administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though
legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out
the purposes of a statute and various governmental power for the more
efficient administration of the laws.
Hence, the question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber
Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent
of the law for its more efficient administration. It must be conceded that the details,
spirit and intent of the law could only be carried into effect through a board of
commission.
The case of Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470, is square in point. The law there
construed is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representation of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after May first,
eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, it shall be unlawful for any person or
persons or corporation to import or bring into the United States any
merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for
consumption to the standards provided in section three of this Act, and the
importation of all such merchandise is hereby prohibited.
SEC. 2. That immediately after the passage of this Act, and or before February
fifteenth of each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a board, to
consist of seven members, each of whom shall be an expert in teas, and who shall
prepare and submit to him standard samples of tea; . . .
SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Treasurer, upon the recommendation of the said
board, shall fix and establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for
consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States, and shall procure and
deposit in the customhouses of the ports of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and
such other ports as he may determine, duplicate samples of such standards; that said
Secretary shall procure a sufficient number of other duplicate samples of such
standards to supply the importers and dealers in tea at all ports desiring the same, at
costs. All teas, or merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness
for consumption to such standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the first
section hereof . . . .
Construing which that court said:
We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the legislation
considered in Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, that it does not, in any real
sense, invest administrative officials with the power of legislation. Congress
legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the
necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty
of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of
Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring
 that the penalty power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce
could not be efficaciously exerted.
And
The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the
Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what teas may be imported,
and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative power, is without
merit. We are of opinion that the statute, when properly construed, as said
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but express the purpose to exclude the
lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for
consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality. This, in
effect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon the
Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the
legislative policy declared in the statute.
The St. Louis vs. Taylor (210 U. S., 281), construed the validity of an Act of
Congress, which is as follows:
Within ninety days from the passage of this Act the American Railway
Association is authorized hereby to designate to the Interstate Commerce
Commission the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured
perpendicular from the level of the tops of the trials to the centers of the
drawbars, for each of the several gauges of railroads in use in the United
States, and shall fix a maximum variation from such standard height to be
allowed between the drawers of empty and located cars. Upon their
determination being certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
said Commission shall at once give notice of the standard fixed upon to
all common carriers, owners. . . . And after July first, eighteen hundred
and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in
interstate traffic which do comply with the standard above provided for.
And in its opinion said:
"It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to the railway association and to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is
clearly a Federal question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted that after a date named
only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be fixed by the association and
declared by the Commission. Nothing need be said upon this question except that it
was settled adversely o the contention of the plaintiff in error in Buttfield vs.
Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470; 48 Law. ed., 525; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349, a case which, in
principle, is completely in point. And see Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.
S., 364; 51 Law. ed., 523; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 367, where the cases were reviewed." (28
Sup. Ct. Rep., 617.)
It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides:
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for
the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may
hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each
grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the
basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by
the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination
of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign
markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
ADMIN CASES PAGE 1
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice
shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six
months before the new standard shall go into effect.
That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of "official
standards for commercial grades of fibers," and that "the Fiber Standardization Board
shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine
fibers," and that:
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall
be pressed in uniform bales. The approximate volume and net weight of
each bale, together with the manner of binding, marking, wrapping, and
stamping of the same, shall be defined in a general order by the Fiber
Standardization Board.
And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality
greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled,
inspected, and certified as in this law provided. That is to say, the law provides in
detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power
and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the
Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it
must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and
vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o
legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the
Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things,
the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the
power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission.
The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection,
grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot
be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced?
The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not
an argument against its constitutionality.
The appellee has cited authorities of similar laws, which have been enacted by
different States of the United States, that have been declared unconstitutional in
violation of section 8 of article 1 of the United States Constitution which confers upon
Congress the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
It must be conceded that within the meaning of the Constitution, the Philippine Islands
is not a State of the United States, that it is not a Tribe of Indians, and that it is not a
foreign nation.
We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and
are clearly of the opinion that the act in question, is not a delegation of legislative
power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are
for an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed, without costs
to either party. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.