1.

TAÑADA V. TUVERA
No. L-63915 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Facts:
In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañada, Sarmiento,
and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc(MABINI) seeking
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. There is a need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its binding force and effect:
giving access to legislative records, giving awareness to the public of the law promulgated.
The Official Gazette, however, does not contain publications of administrative and executive
orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by
law, presents all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also,
Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15
days unless it is otherwise (for some do specify the date of effectivity) following the completion
of the publication in the Official Gazette. However, the decree has been misread by many;
for it has no juridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of RA 386.

Issue: Whether or not to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from
the Official Gazette, as it would be essential to the effectivity of the said legislative or
executive act that regulates the acts and conduct of people as citizens.

Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the
Official Gazette, serving as a response to the maxim “ignorance as an excuse
for noncompliance.” The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned,
for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which
appliedthe 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette
2.
HONASAN V PANELS OF PROSECUTORS
GR NO. 159747
13 APRIL 2004

FACTS:
The petitioner, Senator Gringo Honasan and other military personnel were
charged with the crime of coup d’etat before the Department of Justice (DOJ,
for brevity). Subpoena was issued for preliminary investigation. Afterwards,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman, for brevity), not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction
to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the
charge be filed in court, the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that
can legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to
the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and pr a y i n g t h a t t h e
proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Furthermore, Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ,
that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation under
paragraph (1), Section 13,Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers
upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
ISSUE: W h eth er or n ot the Om budsma n a nd not the DOJ h as
j u r i s d i c ti on to con duct th e preliminary investigation
RULING:
The court ru l ed th at the Of f ice of the Om budsma n a nd t h e
D OJ h a ve con cu rren t jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
According to (C) section 2, Rule 112 ofthe Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
states “other officers as may be authorized byl a w ” , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e
Constitution, S ecti on 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989andSection 4 of
the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, which specifically provides that
theOmbudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation over
cases cognizableby the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of power, it may
take over, at any stage, fromany investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its authority over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. In other words,
respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any
stage.
3.
Gatbonton vs. NLRC et al.,
G.R. NO. 146779
January 23, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent

Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Sometime in
November 1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-
complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual
harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation
of the complaint, respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and
Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension effective
January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner’s continued stay
during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as
the students’ learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare
himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of
the community.” Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
suspension, damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the

Regional Trial Court of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was
terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered into a compromise
agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 7877 or the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct
anew an investigation on the charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to
recognize the validity of the published rules and regulations, as well as the
authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case
against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension of petitioner was valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure
for the protection of the company’s property pending investigation of any alleged
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may place
the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of
his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis
to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the
payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension.
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to
“promulgate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by
the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.” Petitioner’s
preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for
the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877.
Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations.
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is
a law of general application.[14] In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required
publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV
(Administrative Provisions), which states that “[T]hese Rules and Regulations to
implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after publication by the Committee.” Thus, at the time of the imposition of
petitioner’s preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were
not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis. There
is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive
suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to
the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive
suspension is not justified. Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-
day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is
in order.

Petition is partially granted.

4. Marcos v. Judge Fernando Vil. Pamintuan
A.M. RTJ-07-2062, Jan 18, 2011

FACTS:
Judge Reyes in an order on May 30, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-
R due to forum shopping and ordered that that the Buddha statuette in the
custody of this Court be immediately released to the children of the late Rogelio
Roxas in trust for the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas. Regional Tria Court denied
the separate motions for reconsideration by the parties. On November 15, 2006:
Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging the Respondent with Gross Ignorance
of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting
Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “Albert D.
Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the
Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al. Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the Respondent be
dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government
service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent was placed under preventive suspension pending resolution of the
administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law

Ruling:
Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3, is
DISMISSED from the service. Respondent should have realized that the trial
court did not rule on that point that the Golden Buddha is fake in its May 30,
1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a
two-fold purpose, to wit:
 1. to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business
2. to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist.
Notably, this is NOT Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative
case. Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for 1 year. Having been
previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now
deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from service

5.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON
G.R. No. 170236 August 31, 2006

FACTS:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape.
On or about May 12, 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had
sexual intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-
mute minor. Rowel recounted that on the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his
father on top of his sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot."
His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena
crying. He could not do anything because he was afraid of their father. Rowel
remained in the room but the following morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita
Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the
police to report what had transpired.

The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of
the Revised Penal Code. The court imposed death penalty against the accused.
The defense argued that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the
accused.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which abolished the
death penalty law.

Ruling: Yes. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June
24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted
on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which
reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant
to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda.
Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.

6.

JARILLIO V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164435, [June 29, 2010]

FACTS:

On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in

lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage
with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999.

On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against

the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against
Alocillo in 2000.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at
the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo
and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action
had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as
1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime
of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten
years of prision mayor.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner
committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared
null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA
also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her
marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of
her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s

1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s
psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the

conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening proof that
her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

Ruling:

No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a
valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even
one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to

be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question.
Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer v. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and Imelda Diaz
G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Allegedly, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him a
loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way
of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note
payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to
petitioner post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above
mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which
property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G.
Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said waiver, petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claimwhich he caused to be annotated at the back of the
TCT.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante
were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still
failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract
against the Diazes and Comandante. At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired
the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00
on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter Comandante.
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner
that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. As affirmativedefense, the
Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604
cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon
which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest
over the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of
the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the
parents are still living valid?

RULING:

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For
the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at
the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either
of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With
respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property
subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she
expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as
shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the
source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second
paragraph of Article 1347 of the CivilCode.