TANADA VS ANGARA

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations,

petitioners,

vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to
the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and
as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:

Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section
19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.

Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in
the Final Act.
Discussions:

1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies,
which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent
seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations
with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of
practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of
a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.

The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate,
after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.”

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and
in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”

The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was
well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994.
After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcos, 806 Fd. 344, US Court of Appeals

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines sought preliminary injunction barring the Marcoses, several real estate holding
companies and their alleged principal and managers as record holders of certain properties in New York from
transferring or encumbering properties, which were alleged to have been purchase using ill-gotten wealth from the
Philippines. A temporary restraining order given and the real estate holding companies and alleged principals and
managers were ordered to vacate the said estates. The US Southern District Court of NY granted preliminary
injunction, but the defendants appealed the case with the Court of Appeals. It was held that, among other rulings
regarding the case, the act of state doctrine did not prohibit adjudication in federal court of legality of acts of
former President Marcos and his wife in that action purely private acts by the president. This doctrine will also not
apply even to public acts because the Marcos government was no longer in power and danger of interference with
executive’s conduct of foreign policy.

Issue:
WON the acts of the Marcoses are insulated because they were acts of state, thereby, not reviewable by US courts

Held:
The classification of certain acts as acts of state with the consequence that their validity will be treated as beyond
judicial review is a pragmatic device, not required by the nature of sovereign authority and inconsistently applied in
international law. The purpose of the device is to keep the judiciary from embroiling the courts and the country in
the affairs of the foreign nation whose acts are challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from
making pronouncements on matters over which it has no power; maximally interpreted, the classification prevents
the embarrassment of a court offending a foreign government that is "extant at the time of suit."

The continuing vitality of the doctrine depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign relations. A court
that passes on the validity of an act of state intrudes into the domain of the political branches.
BAER vs. TIZON

FACTS:

This is a petition seeking to nullify seeking to nullify the orders of respondent Judge denying his
motion to dismiss a complaint filed against him by the private respondent, Edgardo Gener, on
the ground of sovereign immunity of a foreign power, his contention being that it was in effect a
suit against the United States, which had not given its consent.

Private respondent Edgardo Gener is engaged in logging operations and his operations were
stopped by the American Naval Base authorities. Hence, he filed a petition for preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner, Baer, from interfering with his logging operations. The
restraining order was granted by the lower court.

Counsel for petitioner, contested the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, on the ground that the
suit was against a foreign sovereign without its consent. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
reiterating such ground. It was pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or
instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being
official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in
directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base,
petitioner was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the
security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most
important duty of the Commander of the Base.

Gener opposed on motion to dismiss, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title
and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the
same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government." That was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Baer, acting in its official function is immune from suit.

RULING:

The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a
suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious
the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof.

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. He cannot be prevented from
performing his official function which is to protect and maintain the security of the base.
Continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would
not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base.

Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. Vs Lazaro

FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating contractors
engaged in stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling
services in Manila South Harbor to insure efficiency and economy in cargo-handling operation and
provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the government as
well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by PPA
resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered into
with local and foreign clients or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive stevedoring contract in
favor of respondent OTSI.

HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of the port
including stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and interest of
the general welfare. In addition, the contract clause cannot override the police power enacting public
regulations intended for the general welfare.

Petition Denied.
People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered
that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion –
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here,
Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes
those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in
the case at bar

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted
to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the
change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to
be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered
no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons (1951)

G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951

Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights, constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law,

Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights

FACTS:

Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret
operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. (The petitioner's entry into
the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto
government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)

He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. and
later there was an order for his release.

But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the
Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to
Russia.

He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October, 1948.

He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not
found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although it
should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or
country would take the petitioner.

This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus

ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a reasonable
time

HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their
agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be
available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000
with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by
section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are "stateless,"
which the petitioner claims to be.

The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents,
except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is
a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All
human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.

petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only
purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable

Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in

this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a
discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants
stand convicted.

If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal
application.

As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of
bringing any against him are slim and remote.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in
the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two
other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana

petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question”
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a
private entity

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off
the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that
they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See
the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter
ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court
said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled
“An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City
of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a
day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed
a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance
will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right
to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,

When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the
power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy
and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.

CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held
that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a
lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of
the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could
be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in
the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as
to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law
that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they
also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
– those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.

The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders. Q

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Lim vs Exec. Sec

Facts:
Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.”
They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance
the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American
counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s
objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to
reaffirm.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Issue: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling:

To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to
engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel
must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any
political activity.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation
must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers
to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the
aforesaid context.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .’activities” arose from
accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this
manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As
conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to
protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement