University Autonomy: Illusion or Reality?

Author(s): Theodor Berchem

Source: Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 11, No. 3, Higher Education, the State and the
Economy. Papers from an Anglo-German Symposium (1985), pp. 245-254
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Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1985 245

University Autonomy: illusion or reality?

THEODOR BERCHEM

ABSTRACT In Germany the tradition of university autonomygoes back to Humboldt's

reform rather than the privileged corporationsof the middle ages. Humboldt'sconceptof
the university is still fertile as a model and a methodfor today'suniversities.The social
significanceof sciencein the modernworld, increasedexpenditureon highereducation,and
the academisationof a growing numberof professionsseem to underminethe traditional
legitimation of university autonomy. On the other hand good new reasonsfor autonomy
can be derived preciselyfrom scepticismwith regardto a naive belief in the progressof
science and to an all-too-narrow professionalisationof university education. The ever
closerinterconnectionbetween 'academic'and 'public'functions of the universitieshas led
to the replacementof the traditional 'dualisticadministrativestructure'by a 'unified'one
under a rector/president. The dualism of functions has, however, reappearedin the
distinction between 'legal' and 'moreextended'supervisionby ministers.For the future a
moreprecisedistinction betweenglobal regulationslegitimatelyclaimed by the state and
self-governmentwithin the frameworkthus set should be aimed at.

In a survey carried out for the OECD some years ago [1], it was attempted to
calculate 'autonomy indices' for institutions of higher education. Fifty-three univer-
sities in 12 European countries were asked to state which, out of a total of 20, typical
decisions of university management (e.g. the creation of a new teaching post, the
determination of admission quotas, or the purchase of a computer) could be taken
by the university itself and which ones would require the approval of an external
body such as a Minister.
For German universities, or, it could be argued, for German legislators, the result
was not really flattering. Whilst British universities could take all 20 decisions
themselves without external approval, West German institutions ranked last but
one, with only 29% formally autonomous decisions. For a second index, criteria were
set somewhat more generously and such decisions additionally counted as autono-
mous, external approval to which was, although formally required, almost always
granted automatically. According to this index, again, West German universities
ranked last but one with a score of 41 points out of a maximum of 100; only
Austrian universities were rated even worse, with 35 points.
I do not think, however, that the question put to me, i.e. whether university
autonomy in West Germany is an illusion or a reality, could be taken just as
rhetorical one and rapidly answered by the verdict 'illusion'.
First, it is true that a German university cannot take many of the decisions
analysed in the survey against the will of the competent Minister, but it is equally
true that the latter cannot take them against the will of the institution either. I do

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246 OxfordReview of Education
not see, therefore, any real danger to the freedom of research and teaching in our
institutions. The indices cited above might suggest a picture of arbitrary incursion
by the state. A sometimes arduous, but on the whole working, co-operation between
the university and the state, an intersection, rather than a sharp demarcation, of
competences, is, however, far more typical for our system of higher education.
Secondly, decision-making in West Germany is certainly more formalised and
subject to juridification than is the case, for example, in the UK. In many cases, we
would need a formal agreement between the university and the state or, at least,
approval by the supervising authority, while, in the UK, a recommendation would
be given by the University Grants Committee. I understand that, although such
recommendations are not legally binding, their disregard may lead to severe sanc-
tions. As an example, I would cite target numbers for students to be admitted.
Although I have deep respect for, and a strong interest in, the different structures of
British higher education, I am sure that differences in the degree of autonomy are
not as abysmal as the OECD survey could make us believe.
In Germany, the demarcation of competences between the state and the univer-
sities has not developed in a largely unbroken tradition of good practice. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth century the universities founded in the Middle Ages as
privileged corporations were passing through a deep crisis that was bound to be fatal
for some of them. The universities and schools of higher learning which were
founded by absolute sovereigns in that period had as their prime task the training of
specifically qualified future civil servants. It was only through Humboldt's university
reform, in 1810/11, that the idea of university autonomy was introduced again, in
the face of these dependent establishments, into our system of higher education.
Since then it has certainly not always determined the practice of our institutions, but
Humboldt's ideas have given a durable model of what a university should be. We
cannot and should not try to get around this model which is still fertile for the
shaping of the future of the universities.
Humboldt once said that in order to gain "insight into pure science... freedom is
necessary and loneliness helpful" and that "the entire external organisation of the
universities springs from these two points" [2]. Consequently, in Humboldt's
concept the state had lost its former task and right of detailed regulation; it was now
confined to the task of ensuring the material existence of the university. Humboldt
was convinced that in the final analysis the interest of the state, too, would be best
served in this way, by free research and by a kind of teaching not submitted to
detailed prescriptions by the state and/or the employers. In its science policy,
Humboldt said, the state would have to "bear in mind that... its intrusion is always
an impediment and that things would, in principle, work out infinitely better
without it" [3].
A closer analysis shows, however, that Humboldt, too, did not plead a boundless
autonomy of the university and that he did not want to confine the state to the role
of paymaster. In his famous essay, "On the Internal and External Organisation of
the Institutions of Higher Learning in Berlin", he continues: "As to the external
shape of its [the university's] relationship to the state and the activity of the latter in
this context, the state should only see to the wealth [i.e. the strength and the
variety] of intellectual vigour, by choosing the men to be assembled, and guarantee
the freedom of their work... The main thing is the choice of the man to be set to
work... Next to that, a small number of organisational laws, which should be simple
but have a more profound effect than usual, is of prime importance..." [4].

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 UniversityAutonomy 247
Today, we do not have a small number of simple, but a large number of
sometimes extremely complicated organisational laws, none of which has proved
durable enough over the last two decades to stay in force without amendment for as
long as 10 years. As the abundance of legal provisions, in my view, shows, the state is
less confident today of its own capability to ensure, by a small number of organisa-
tional measures that would have a 'more profound effect than usual', that its
legitimate demands on public institutions of higher education be respected and that
the satisfaction of such demands, in detail, can be left to the institutions themselves.
The organisational framework drawn up by Humboldt for the foundation of the
University of Berlin and his demarcation of the responsibilities of state supervisors
and academic self-government are certainly not to be considered an unalterable
dogma. For instance, we would hardly agree to Humboldt's sharp refusal of any
substantial role of the faculties in the appointment of professors. In our modern
understanding the principle of cooptation in the recruitment of teaching staff is a
central element of autonomy. The dualism, in university government, of state-
controlled administration of financial and budgetary matters, on the one hand, and
self-government in 'academic matters' proper, on the other hand, has never been
universally accepted even in Germany. The South-West German universities and the
Technical Universities have always had a 'unified administrative structure' (Ein-
heitsverwaltung)under the Rector. The Higher Education Laws of our day prescribe
such a "unified administrative structure", and their provisions, in so far, have not
been criticised by anyone.
But Humboldt's method of setting some clear guidelines and reference points by
the state instead of claiming a say in every detail, is still worth heeding.
When the new University of Berlin was founded, little more than 5000 students
were in attendance at all the German universities, from Freiburg to Konigsberg; that
is about the size of a smaller newly founded university today. Nowadays we have
about 1.3 million students, including those at Fachhochschulen,and the most recent
projections predict as many as 1.5 million by the end of the decade. It would be easy
to give similar comparisons for the number of university teachers, the volume of
budgets or the equipment of institutes.
These figures do not only show different quantities, they also reflect new qualities.
The boundary conditions under which the state and the university have to define
their relations have fundamentally changed. Autonomy can never be justified, and
its measure determined, by just drawing on tradition, e.g. on Humboldt, in our case.
It must always be justified anew, and, if necessary, fought for.
The Vice-Chancellor of Oxford pointed out at the recent General Assembly of the
Standing Conference of Rectors, Presidents and Vice-Chancellors of the European
Universities (CRE) that there were some examples in history when a far-reaching
autonomy of the universities had not guaranteed the optimal fulfilment of their
tasks, i.e. the enlargement and transmission of human knowledge. There had been
long periods of stagnation in the history of European universities that eventually
jeopardised the very existence of the universities as institutions. The Vice-Chancellor
added, however, and rightly so, that "the historial record-and in this case,
conspicuously, perhaps, the history of our own times-is very far from licensing any
naive assumption that political interference will even be well-intentioned, let alone
actually beneficient" [5].
The model of the university created by Humboldt remained undisputed as long as
it was continuously corroborated by an ascertainableand undeniable performance of

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248 OxfordReview of Education
the universities in both teaching and, even more so, research. The rise of the sciences
in Germany during the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century
appeared to be a result of Humboldt's idea of the university and has contributed
considerably to its spread abroad.
The shocking compliance of large parts of the universities and their graduates to
Nazi barbary could have given rise, perhaps, to doubts. But as the Gleichschaltung
imposed by the Nazi regime radically eliminated university autonomy, its restoration
seemed to be the most obvious thing after the war. The legitimacy of any interfer-
ence by the state in science and the university seemed, henceforth, highly question-
able. It has been said, with some reason, that the strengthening of university
autonomy in the 1950s and 1960s had led to a "curtailment of the responsibilities of
the state never experienced before" [6].
But on the other hand, developments that were bound to question the very
legitimacy of academic self-government in its traditional form, at least, were already
under way. In the meantime [7]:
Science and research have gained an overwhelming impact on our economic,
social, and political life. If applied in a destructive way, the progress of science and
technology could jeopardise the basis of existence for millions and, at worst, the
physical survival of mankind itself. On the other hand, the work and life of
hundreds of millions depend upon the progress of science and technology. It is
true that the environment problems of our day are largely caused by the technical
application of scientific findings. But solutions for such problems will only be
found if new technologies are developed, i.e. if scientific progress is continued
rather than stopped. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to repudiate
claims that 'society' had a right to bring its influence to bear on the 'scientific
enterprise' known as the university.
In the same time the cost of universities has risen incredibly. Their share in
public expenditure, and even in gross national product, is so large today, that the
general public, and much more so finance ministers feel they may legitimately
question what is done with the money and whether it is 'efficiently' used. On the
other hand, the dependence of modern science on ever larger and ever more
expensive equipment has brought about new possibilities, and new dangers, of
outside control over research through the allocation of financial resources.
Finally, the 'academisation' of a growing number of professional activities has
reinforced the interest the general public takes in the sort of 'professionaltraining'
which has always been, at least, part of what has gone on in the universities. It
makes a difference whether small social elites are educated in universities or 20%,
and in the near future, perhaps, over 30% of an age cohort embark on a course of
higher education. In my view, the expansion of participation rates in higher
education, which has taken place not only in the Federal Republic but in almost
every industrialised country over the last 20 years or so, is a development of
secular significance. It has not been caused by gloomy predictions or propaganda,
and the trend can certainly not be reversed by a propaganda of opposite sense.
And I would add: Even if there were a way back I would not be in favour of it.
The trend towards more and better education is good. The question is only
whether the provision we make in our education system is appropriate to a
demand that has changed. There are reasons to doubt that, and the universities
will be subject to pressure for change from outside if they do not prove to be
capable of reflecting on the structure of provision and reforming it themselves.

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 UniversityAutonomy 249
At first sight, all these circumstances would seem to restrict, rather than enlarge, the
realm where universities can legitimately claim autonomy. But, in the same develop-
ments, good new reasons can be found to support the case for autonomy and self-
government, i.e. for the right of each institution to take decisions independently
according to rules set up by itself.
The great, and not always positive, impact of scientific findings on our modern life
has generated widespread criticism with respect to science. Probably for the first
time in modern history, science faces the question of whether there are things we
should better not know and not experiment with. But is it not precisely the fear of
scientific findings being used against man that is at the basis of such scepticism? And
what would justify the optimistic assumption that the direction and limits of
scientific research could more appropriately be determined by the state, or industry,
rather than through the critical dialogue of disinterested scholars and the com-
petition of scientific methods and theories? It is true that the scientific community
has sometimes not been able in the past to ensure that scientific findings are not
used to cause mischief. But the independent determination of the aims and methods
of research by the researchers themselves has at least ensured that criticism of
negative developments has remained possible, and that alternatives have remained
open.
I would certainly not plead a short-sighted submission of science under claims
of 'social relevance', however the latter might be defined precisely. But certainly
the university can neither ignore problems about which society is asking ques?
tions of science nor must it serve all sorts of interest groups with the kind of
'expertise' they happen to desire. If science tries to contribute to the solution of the
most urgent problems mankind faces, and does so in an unequivocal and indepen-
dent manner, it will be able to convince others that self-government is the most
appropriate way to organise science and, therefore, best serve social interest in
scientific results.
Let me add one further comment: the self-determination of science can not only
be jeopardised by the state as we would traditionally be most inclined to suspect. I
am very much in favour of deregulation with respect to the obtaining and use of
external funds for research in the interest of free scientific competition. But I want
to state clearly that external research funding should only be a supplementto the
basic, public, funding of university research. We would otherwise risk the directions
of research being subjected to short-term demand.
During the last decades, the state has derived very far-reaching claims on the
universities from the fact that our institutions are not only places of research and
scholarship but of the professional training of large numbers of young people as
well. The Lander present themselves as the guardians of the interests of these young
people with respect to professional training, e.g. when it comes to an 'exhaustive' use
of available capacities or to the reform of study courses and examination rules. My
own opinion is that we are lagging behind, rather than hurrying ahead, in adapting
the structure of study courses to changed needs. I would warn, however, against any
narrow 'professionalisation' of study courses at universities. It is a sad irony that we
have achieved a stronger 'stream-lining' of study courses for future teachers in terms
of 'practical requirements in schools' precisely when graduates in disciplines which
had traditionally prepared mainly for the teaching profession have hardly any chance
of finding a post in schools. Today unemployed teachers are finding other kinds of
professional activity with more difficulty than in the past because they themselves, as

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250 OxfordReview of Education
well as potential employers, believe-perhaps wrongly so-that they would only be
fit for the teaching profession. On the other hand, lawyers have continued with a
broad, uniform course of study, despite the increasing specialisation of law, and have
therefore-perhaps not always rightly so, but certainly successfully-acquired and
retained a versatile image.
We all have many more doubts now than ten years ago about the possibility of
predicting with a reasonable extent of reliability the quantitative and qualitative
needs for specifically trained manpower over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years.
The unreliability of such provisions is, in my view, an additional reason for a
curriculum to be informed in the first place by the content of the discipline in
question rather than doubtful 'profiles' of future professional requirements. The
time-lag between the discovery of new 'needs' for specific forms of training, and the
entrance of the first graduates of a course of study newly designed in accordance
with such new needs is so long that an increased responsibility of universities in
shaping their curricula could well serve as a buffer against an all too rash compliance
to short-term needs, and indeed fashions.
I do not question the right of the state to set framework conditions within its own,
political, responsibility, e.g. whether a given course should be introduced at all and,
if so, how long it should take. An 'outside' decision on the length of courses would,
among other reasons, seem to be necessary in order to prevent sub-disciplines from
solving their contradictory claims by a boundless addition of course and examination
requirements, which would be the solution most convenient to them, but the most
costly one for both students and society.
The important role universities take in professional training is, by the way, not at
all a recent development. Wilhelm von Humboldt himself derived the differences in
organisation between the university and the Academy of Sciences precisely from this
role of the university:
The university is always in a closer relation to the practical life and the
needs of the state because it fulfils a practical task for the latter, the
education of youth [8].
As the connection between matters of teaching and, more particularly, research
and financial and budgetary matters has become closer and closer, the traditional
dualism of a state-controlled administration of economic matters and self-govern-
ment in academic affairs has become questionable. In the past, the ministry and its
arm within the universities, i.e. the Kanzler or Kurator, were in the position to
influence in an indirect, but efficient, manner even the very core of the realm of
research and teaching, through their jurisdiction of budgetary and equipment
matters. They made use of these possibilities in a more or less subtle fashion, and
their position was further strengthened by the fact that their counterpart at the head
of the academic self-government, the Rector, elected for a one-year term only, was at
times totally inexperienced in administration and thus could not always stand up to
them.
The Framework Act for Higher Education of 1976 has, therefore, prescribed that
universities be governed by a "unified administrative structure" (Einheitsverwalt-
ung) under the Rector or President. The tension between tasks which can be
defined as academic in a strict sense and those which pertain to public administra-
tion has not been superseded by such a change. In the Framework Act for Higher
Education it has only taken the new legal form of a dualism of "legal supervision"

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 UniversityAutonomy 251
(Rechtsaufsicht) and "more extended supervision" (weitergehendeAufsicht). In ques-
tions pertaining to research and teaching proper, the Minister is confined, at least in
theory, to checking only whether the decision of the university has been taken
lawfully, i.e. within the framework of legal provisions governing the institution.
Within the realm of "more extended supervision" the Minister can influence the
contentof a decision at his own discretion. The Framework Act enumerates some of
the fields subject to a "more extended supervision", namely staff affairs, economic
management, budgetary and financial matters-all of which were the classical
responsibilities of the Kanzler or Kurator-as well as health care, and the determin-
ing of teaching capacities and admission quotas.
The last field, in particular, has proved in recent years to be a Trojan Horse of
state influence on the universities. In many countries, and I would imagine, very
much so in the UK, one would certainly rank the decision on how many and which
students were to be admitted to a given course of study among the very core of
university autonomy. In the Federal Republic of Germany universities can decide on
neither of these questions. This is, by the way, anything but a recent development.
But it was not felt to be a problem as long as the numbers of potential applicants
and available places were stable and balanced over a longer period of time and the
aptitude for academic study-certified to secondary school leavers by the Abitur
-was on the whole unquestioned. Both presuppositions are no longer true.
The precipitous expansion of participation rates in education has led to a
considerable disequilibrium between the number of secondary school-leavers for-
mally qualified for academic study and the number of places available. Restrictions
on admissions had to be introduced in some of the more popular courses of study,
above all and most drastically in medical courses. The capacity of individual courses
of study is determined in a complex procedure governed in every detail by a treaty
between the Lander and ministerial decrees. The universities are obliged to admit a
corresponding number of students who are allocated to them by the 'Central Office
for the Allocation of Study Places'. The calculation of available capacity has been
contested so frequently, particularly in medicine, by unsuccessful applicants that the
courts have checked, and, thereby, indirectly fixed, the organisation of research and
teaching in all the universities and departments concerned on several occasions and
in great detail. There is little space for imagination and creativity in designing study
courses as long as a university must at all times be in the position to prove in court
that it has exactly, say, 72 places for beginners in medicine and could, under no
circumstances, admit a seventy-third. As long as students are allocated to individual
institutions in a computerised procedure which does not take any regard of academic
criteria, it would seem difficult for institutions to develop their own unmistakable
profile, at least with respect to teaching and students. Those politicians who call for
more diversity and competition between institutions should grant them the opportu-
nity to develop these laudable qualities. Only a strong profile makes autonomy a
living reality and justifies, by the way, the autonomy of individual institutions.
The Framework Act of Higher Education has introduced a third legal category,
namely co-operation (Zusammenwirken) between the Land and the university in
order to take into account the close interconnection of 'academic' and 'public'
(particularly budgetary) aspects. As fields for such co-operation the Act lists inter
alia "regulations concerning study courses and academic examinations", the "estab-
lishment, alteration and dissolution of departments", "interdisciplinary study units,

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252 OxfordReview of Education
institutes, operational units and joint commissions", "planning", and the "formula-
tion of the institution's proposal" for the election of the Rector or President (?60).
In the field of regulations concerning study courses and examinations the Frame-
work Act has set up complicated machinery for cooperation. Recommendations are
to be prepared by 'study reform commissions' on a federal level, local regulations are
then to be issued by individual institutions and approved by the competent Land
minister, etc. The federal 'study reform commissions' are composed of representa-
tives of the universities, of the Lander, and of 'professional practice', i.e. normally,
officers of employers' organisations or trades unions. As university representation
includes students and junior academic staff, university professors find themselves
very much in a minority position in these commissions.
Experience with this kind of machinery is generally judged so sceptically that it is
probably going to be abolished, at least in part, with an amendment to the
Framework Act now under discussion. An example taken from the present debate
on amendments to the Framework Act may demonstrate how difficult it is to achieve
even minimal adjustments in the distribution of competences in this field. The
Federal Government has proposed in its Bill that regulations for study courses,
which govern the organisation of studies with regard to the requirements of the
regulations for examinations, be only notified to, rather than formally approved by,
the Land. The Framework for the regulation of the course of study would continue
to be set anyway by the regulations for examinations which in any case would
continue to be subject to Land approval. In the Bundesrat,the second chamber of
the Federal Parliament where Ldndergovernments are represented, the Ldnderhave
not even agreed to this minimal change for an increase in the autonomy and
responsibility of the universities.
The model of direct co-operation may be helpful in order to avoid conflicts from
the outset and secure the support of the Minister of Education and Science vis-a-vis
his colleague responsible for finance in good time. But the price to be paid is an
obscuration of competences and responsibilities that will be harmful in the long run.
The universities and the state must endeavour to develop, most urgently in those
fields where the Law prescribes co-operation between them, procedures and, above
all, good practice so that the initiative of each side pertains to different kinds of
subjects. Thus the task of the state would be one of global regulation whereas the
universities would have to fill the framework set by the state in their own,
autonomous, responsibility. Under such circumstances, the government would be
able, and obliged, to take the political responsibility for the framework set by it vis-
a-vis Parliament and the general public. The universities, on the other hand, would
have to be prepared to practise autonomy even when it hurts.
Neither of these assumptions can be taken for granted today. To cite but one
example, the Prime Ministers of the Lander took the political decision in 1977 to
keep access to universities open for the present strong age-cohorts. The universities
are, at least under our system, obliged to accept such a decision. (I do, by the way,
personally agree to it as we have not yet any realistic alternative we could refer
qualified secondary school-leavers to for their professional training).
If politicians want to stick to this decision, they must, however, be prepared to
bear the inevitable financial consequences and give universities the necessary
additional resources to cope with 'student overload'. If they wish, on the contrary, to
revise the fundamental decision to keep access open, they must be prepared to
declare that openly and publicly instead of demanding that the universities either

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 UniversityAutonomy 253
give up necessary academic standards or keep teaching going (somehow) at the
expense of research.
On the other hand, it is part of the game of working autonomy that the
universities be prepared also to take themselves those decisions that are uncomfor-
table to them and not leave them readily to government administrators, only to
complain later about expansive bureaucracy and harassment.
The new procedure for the selection of medical students may be a crucial test in
higher education politics. Under these new regulations, individual universities will
be given the right to allocate a certain number of study places at their own
discretion on the basis of interviews. An attitude that would criticise, and rightly so,
the state-run selection by computer, but would dodge the responsibility to commit
oneself in the selection of students, could not be tolerated.
The same applies when it comes to the redistribution and/or concentration of
resources between institutions because of changes in financial conditions or demand.
If universities, and particularly university professors, cannot affirm credibly that
they themselves would be prepared to bring about such painful interventions it will
be extremely difficult to prevent others from changing our academic landscape
according to their criteria which may be extraneousto science. I know how difficult
that kind of business is. But a kind of autonomy that is only suitable when the sun is
shining would be easily lost.
And perhaps it is even easier to regain a certain degree of autonomy and freedom
of choice for the universities at a time of bad weather. In educational policy, the time
for brilliant projects and, more importantly, rapidly increasing budgets, to be
generously distributed is definitely gone. The politics of education, and, even more
so, higher education are anything but popular. This may induce some politicians to
give the responsibility for certain decisions (which are, frequently, highly unpopular
decisions) back to the universities. I am certainly not prepared to accept that the
universities be made the scapegoat for the decisions of others. But we should take
politicians who talk about greater freedom of decision for the universities, about
more diversity and competition, at their word.
I have tried to explain what university autonomy could mean today and what the
state of affairs is in the Federal Republic of Germany. I have not been able, or
willing, to treat the subject exhaustively. I am still not able to give a plain answer to
the question whether autonomy is an illusion or a reality. Probably, it is neither a
mere illusion nor a plain reality. Certainly, for both the universities and politicians it
is an accepted model we try to orientate our day-to-day activity towards, without
ever fully achieving it.

NOTES

[1] OECD/IMHE, Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Likely Future Trends of

University Management in Europe (1980), cf. CRE, Dossier, 8th General As-
sembly (1984), p. 273 et seq.
[2] W. v. Humboldt, Der Konigsbergerund der LitauischeSchulplan, in: Werke,vol.
IV, Stuttgart 1964, p. 191.
[3] W. v. Humboldt, Uber die innere und dussereOrganisationder hoherenwissen-
schaftlichenAnstalten in Berlin, op. cit., p. 257.
[4] Ibid., p. 259.
[5] G. J. Warnock, 'Autonomy for Innovation', in: CRE, op. cit., p. 208 et seq.

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254 OxfordReview of Education
[6] Dallinger/Bode, Hochschulrahmengesetz, Kommentar,Tiibingen 1978, p. 335.
[7] Cf. for the following: L. Raiser, 'Die Universitat im Staat', in: Vom rechten
Gebrauchder Freiheit, Stuttgart 1982, p. 244 et seq.
[8] W. v. Humboldt, Oberdie innere..., op. cit., p. 269.

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