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1. PAL, Inc. vs.

G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990
alias writ of execution

- Respondent Amelia Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced a complaint for damages before
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
- After trial, the CFI-Manila, Branch 13 ruled in favor of private respondent Tan.
-So, the petitioner filed its appeal with the CA which affirmed and modify CFI's ruling.
- Subsequent thereto, a motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent Amelia Tan, duly opposed by petitioner PAL
but was denied for lack of merit.
- No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the judgment became final and executory
- The case was remanded to the trial court for execution. Respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion praying for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the CA; issued its order of execution with the corresponding writ in
favor of the respondent. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Reyes CFI- Br. 13 for enforcement.
- Four months later, respondent Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment
remained unsatisfied.
- the petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff through
the deputy sheriff of the respondent court, Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said
Emilio Z. Reyes.
- the CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature, ordering the executing sheriff Reyes to appear with his
return and explain the reason for his failure to surrender the amounts paid to him by petitioner PAL.
- However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff Reyes who had absconded or disappeared.
- Now, a motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was filed by respondent Amelia Tan.
- But then a motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution" with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of
Execution which was granted
- the petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution; he then filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ
of execution stating that no return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes and that the
judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by the petitioner as evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and receipted
by the server of the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes.
- Respondent del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust
Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila, through its manager and garnished the petitioner's deposit in the said bank
in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978.
- Hence, this petition to review on certiorari.

Issue: Can an alias writ of execution be issued without a prior return of the original writ by the implementing officer?

Ruling: Yes.
The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the circumstances here obtaining is justified because even
with the absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable fact remains that such a return is incapable of
being obtained because the officer who is to make the said return has absconded and cannot be brought to the Court
despite the earlier order of the court for him to appear for this purpose.

A judgment ought not to be illusory it ought to have its proper effect.

Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and end of
the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8 SCRA 59 [1963];
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment cannot be rendered
nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended to rest on the
requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform the court and the parties, of any and all actions taken
under the writ of execution. Where such information can be established in some other manner, the absence of an
executing officer's return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as discharged or being executed through an
alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the case at bar. Where the return cannot be expected to be
forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel the enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on an
impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is
entitled to other writs of execution (Government of the Philippines v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318). It is a well known
legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect, sues his case vainly.

2. Aquino vs. Aure, non-recourse to brgy. Is not a jurisdictional requirement to warrant dismissal of case

G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008



 The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area of
449 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).
 Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before
the MeTC.
o They alleged that they acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses
Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on 4 June 1996.
o Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the subject
property, they refused to vacate the same.
 On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17450 in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process,
among other grounds.
o The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing
that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
o The MeTC further observed that Aure Lending was improperly included as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
17450 for it did not stand to be injured or benefited by the suit.
o Finally, the MeTC ruled that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the action was converted
from a mere detainer suit to one incapable of pecuniary estimation which properly rests within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
 On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground that the dispute was not
brought before the Barangay Council for conciliation before it was filed in court.
 Aures Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order[14] dated 27 February 2001.
 Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision with the Court of Appeals arguing that the lower court
erred in dismissing his Complaint for lack of cause of action.
 On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and
remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the
o The appellate court declared that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is
not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aures Complaint since Aquino failed to
seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.
 In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by
Aquino for it was merely a rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which were already
considered and passed upon by the appellate court in its assailed Decision.
 No. Barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional requirement.
 It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of
 the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies—the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of prematurity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
 The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
 Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant.
 In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over
Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto.
 We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack
of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction.
 By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already
acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto.
 Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure
Lending’s failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so.
 The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the
issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
 The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading or motion to raise
all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or multiple objections may be
 It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses and
objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory
construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction
or interpretation.
 As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion
for interpretation; there is only room for application.
 Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by
the omnibus motion rule.
ISSUE: WON a court can motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with barangay conciliation?
 No, it is clear that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the
trial court of a case on its own initiative.
 Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio.
 The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the
claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
or (3) where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of limitations.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

3. Cabangtang Store vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, G.R. No. 2002612, April 15, 2017, estate as party condition precedent
not necessary

 Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her
husband Levi Lahaylahay have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.
 In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy over the subject property and the
improvements thereon to which Rafael bound himself to pay the amount of P 3,000/mo with provision for a 10%
every year thereafter.
 On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever, Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the
estate of Vipa. In 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate of Vipa filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against Rafael. Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the complaint,
unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.
 MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises and to pay the amount of unpaid rents with
12% interest per annum.
 On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer. According to the
RTC, Grace was the plaintiff not the estate and it had failed to the bring the dispute to the barangay conciliation;
that the property is part of conjugal property and after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership was terminated. Levi
sold his property to Rafael, thus making him co-owner of the property.
 Estate filed a petition for review to CA and reinstated the decision of MTCC.


WON there is a need to refer the case to barangay conciliation


 NO
 There was no need torefer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for conciliation pursuant to
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
 It bears stressing that only individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants
or respondents.
 Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or
acted upon by the barangay for conciliation.
 The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate
and distinct from that of Grace Joy.
 Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for
unlawful detainer with the MTCC.

4. Sebastian vs Ng (modes of satisfying brgy settlement)


 Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng
(Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija.
 She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that
Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to
buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of
P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael’s relationship has ended, Michael
allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay
 Parties entered into an amicable settlement “Kasunduan”, wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of
P250,000 on specific dates
 Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within 10 days from the settlement, in accordance with
the Katarungang Pambaragay Law
 When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the
Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.
 After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita
filed with the MCTC of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.
 Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of
Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 MCTC ruled in favor of Annabel
 Michael filed an appeal with the RTC that MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding the
case. He also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the petitioner to establish the genuineness and due
execution of the kasunduan.
 RTC upheld MCTC decision
o Michael failed to assail the validity of the kasunduan
 Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that:
o (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months from
date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or
Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and
o (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject
matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.
 RTC granted motion, dismissed Angelita’s motion for execution, and set aside the MCTC Decision
 She filed a petition for review with the CA
 CA granted petition, and reversed RTC’s decision
o Declared that the “appropriate local trial court” stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of
RA No 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts
o Ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan rendered the kasunduan final

 In the present petition, Michael alleges that the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of final judgment
because it did not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
o He also points out some irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution
o Kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document
o Since the amount of P250,000 is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of P200,000, the kasunduan is
beyond its jurisdiction

Issue: What are the two modes of enforcing barangay settlements?


 Section 417 of the Local Gov’t code discloses two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement.
 Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period of 10
days from the settlement may be enforced by:
o first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or
o second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the
date of settlement has already elapsed.
 Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere motion of
the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay. The proceedings in this case are summary in nature and
are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay IRR
 The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through
the institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. The proceedings shall
be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court.

 Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for execution,
which was docketed as Special Proceedings No 45-99.
 It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned “motion for execution,” rather than a
petition/complaint for execution. A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the
material requirements of an initiatory action.
o the motion is sufficient in form and substance.
o Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original
action that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court that the
complaint should allege the plaintiff’s cause of action and the names and residences of the plaintiff and
the defendant.
o Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as a motion/special
proceeding. For this reason, Annabel has filed the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the
Local Government Code.
 Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its execution,
unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the
proper city or municipal court.
 In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed
by the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment that is
ripe for execution.
 The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the “appropriate city or municipal court” as the forum for the
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority
over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue