TITLE: ELCANO VS.

HILL
CITATION: G.R. NO. L-24803, AUGUST 23, 2012

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal
case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.”
Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in
the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180

RULING:

Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate
civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the
minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of
the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor
to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article
2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision,
Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Lucita Suyom, et. al

G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002

FACTS:
A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned to death under the engine of the tractor
were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledans daughter,
Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself, Respondent Marissa Enano, and two
sons of Respondent Lucita Suyom.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and multiple physical injuries in MTC of Manila.
Having failed to recover anything in the criminal case and upon verification with the Land
Transportation Office, respondents were furnished a copy of Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration showing that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. Respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation
(Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages in the RTC of
Manila.
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issued an Order dropping Raul Tutor,
Ecatine and Edwin Lim from the Complaint, because they could not be located and served with
summonses. On the other hand, in its Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the
vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in possession and
control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of
Equitable, but of Ecatine.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual
and moral damages and attorneys fees to respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between
petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the
legal owner was still Equitable. Thus, petitioner was liable to respondents. The CA affirmed the
RTC's decision.

In its appeal to the SC, Equitable contends that it should not be held liable for the
damages sustained by respondents and that arose from the negligence of the driver of the Fuso
Road Tractor, which it had already sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not having
employed Raul Tutor, the driver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or supervised him.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Equitable is correct?

RULING:
NO.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
for civil liability ex quasi delicto.

These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to
the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or
under both causes. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other,
the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other.

In the instant case, respondents -- having failed to recover anything in the criminal case
-- elected to file a separate civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents
and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso tractor.

TITLE: LILY LIM vs. KOU CO PING

CITATION: G.R. NO. 175256 - August 23, 2012

FACTS:

In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement

manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers
and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of
bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority
contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by
FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja),
sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15
million or P63.00 per bag. Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of
P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million.
(FRCC: 50,000 bags of cement @ P63/bag or P3.15M CO)
(CO: 50,000 bags of cement @ P64/bag or P3.2M LIM )
Lim withdrew cement of bags cement of bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. However, he
was not allowed to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags. Lim clarified the matter with Co and
Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the
goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim
objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to
price fluctuations. Lim filed for a case against CO for ESTAFA in the RTC of Pasig praying for
the return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00 (37,200 x P64), foregone profits, and legal
interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

RTC acquitted CO for insufficiency of evidence. (kay wala dawn a prove ang 1st and 2nd
element of ESTAFA; Art. 315, RPC). He was also subsequently relieved from the Civil liability
arising from the crime of ESTAFA. Lim filed an appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Lim also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the defendant
and the FRCC, Tigerbilt, etc. CO filed a Motion to Dismiss in both cases on the ground of forum
shopping. RULING OF THE CA(civil aspect of the ESTAFA CASE): Dismiss on the ground of
forum shopping. RULING OF THE RTC (Specific performance and damages): dismissed the
Motion to Dismiss filed by CO stating among others that there is no forum shopping since they
do not share the same cause of action .

ISSUE: Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal
case for estafa?

RULING:

No.

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code
(such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be based on an act or omission that
may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries.

In the case at bar, the 1st action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with the criminal action. While the 2nd action is a civil action arising
from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).
Therefore, the 2nd action involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal (1st case) in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising
from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to
their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code.
AMADO PICART, plaintiff and appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, Jr., defendant and appellee.
No. 12219. March 15, 1918

FACTS:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction
in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge,
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says
that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the
other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then
no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Picart filed an action against Smith to recover the sum of P 31, 100 as damages alleged
to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. However, the judgment of the
CFI of La Union results in absolving Smith from liability. Hence, Picart appealed the current
case.
ISSUES:Whether or not the lower court is correct in absolving Smith from his liability?

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court are in the opinion was guilty of negligence such as to give rise to a
civil obligation to repair the damage done. The court promulgated a test that will determined
whether a person is negligence or not, stated as follows:

“The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.”

The court also qualifies the test by stating that, “Where both parties are guilty of
negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of
time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.”
 In the case at bar, the plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, seeing an automobile ahead
he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few
feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being
frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car.

Hence, although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the
bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the
collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created
by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff
could by no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.

CORLISS VS. MANILA RAILROAD

GAID VS. PEOPLE

TITLE: ALFREDO and CLEOPATRA PACIS VS. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES

CITATION: GR No. 171636

DOCTRINE:

a) Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages
based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code.

b) A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous
weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being
done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk,
a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of
care.

FACTS:

Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against Jerome Jovanne
Morales. Spouses Pacis are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, 17 years old and a first year
student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation who died due to a gunshot wound in the head which
he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store located at Upper
Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne
Morales.

With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason
Herbolario. They were sales agents of the defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers
of the gun store.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the
gun store for repair. The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum was left by defendant
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the
regular caretaker of the gun store, was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales agents
Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant Morales were away.
Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store which
included the key to the drawer where the fatal gun was kept.
 Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top
of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to
Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag . However, he was acquitted of the
charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that respondent is civilly liable
for the death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial
court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partly due to the
negligence of respondent’s employee Aristedes Matibag.

Respondent appealed to the CA. It reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA ruled that there is no
negligence on the part of the respondent and the death of Alfred Pacis was an accident.

ISSUE: Was the death of Alfred Pacis an accident?

RULING:

NO.

The SC ruled that it was caused by the negligence of the respondents. This case for
damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil
Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil
action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages
in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action
for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based
their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP
Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person
who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain
basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate
Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under
his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty
to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary
affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous
weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety

and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk
of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are
not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the
firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the
store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an
accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when
he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was
not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded
to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from
another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the
weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent
himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a
License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original
composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good
father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

TITLE: CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

ERNEST E. SIMKE, respondents.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988
FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in
the Philippines.
He went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was
landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While
walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh
bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for
damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity
in charge of the airport.
The CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on
the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other
purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace."
But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor
condition. And under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning, designing,
constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CAA was negligent.

HELD:
Yes.
Under Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place." Also, under Article 2176. “Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done.”
In this case, the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims,
was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper
drainage of the open. Its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing
hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon
CAA.
The obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public,
requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where
the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of
the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or
elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence (ako ra gibutang because about negligence pud siya)
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part
of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own
damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the
following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of
much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct
by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence, they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man,
in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued'
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith,
supra, p. 813]

The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have
reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual
circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step-in
question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.

TITLE: Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs Harper

CITATION: G.R. No. 189998, August 29, 2012

DOCTRINE: The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings
to their guest.

FACTS:
November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to check out on November 6,
1999. In the early morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors.

It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued at
P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit card
issued in the name of Harper. But the customer's difficulty in answering the queries phoned in
by a credit card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba
(Lumba), who asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative
to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left
the store, and left the three credit cards and the passport behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room to inform
him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any response from the
room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to
check on Harper's room. Alarcon and security personnel went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and
were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the bed. It was found that the muderer, a
caucasian male, was able to trespass into the hotel room of the victim and was then able to
murder and rob the victim.

Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner
pertinently alleging that the murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel's private
rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross negligence in
providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or
omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed.

Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper's own negligence in
allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels
were not insurers of the safety of their guests.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner had committed negligence and corollarily, whether its negligence was
the immediate cause of the death of Christian Harper.

RULING:
YES

Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code). Therefore, hotel
owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom strangers murder inside
his hotel room.

The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to the death of the victim
was to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the hotel, which
is inadequate because the hotel is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That
there was a recommendation to increase security to one guard per floor but this was not followed.
This omission is critical. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are
bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and
belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.

Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its guests, otherwise the
hotelkeepers would just stand idly by while strangers have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms
on the pretense of being visitors of the guests which is absurd.

The decision of the CA was reproduced in the decision to which the SC concurred. The CA
discussed the test of negligence as:
 “The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with
a perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test,
as applied to the extant case, is whether or not [Shangri-La Hotel], under the attendant
circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would
have used in the same situation.”

Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel. The "reasonable care" that it must exercise
for the safety and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with the grade and quality of
the accommodation it offers. If there is such a thing as "five-star hotel security", the guests at
Makati Shangri-La surely deserves just that.

It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that its conclusion of negligence on the part
of defendant-appellant is grounded mainly on the latter's inadequate hotel security, more
particularly on the failure to deploy sufficient security personnel or roving guards at the time the
ghastly incident happened.

TITLE: DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. VS. CHING

REFERENCE: 543 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008
TOPIC: III. Negligence - A. Concept
FACTS
Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner, along the National Highway in Butuan
City, going to Surigao City to deiver commercial ice. A passenger bus was cruising on the opposite
lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned
by private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., which suffered a tire blowout the night before.
Limbaga, the driver, parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the
national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. The prime mover was not equipped with
triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under Letter of
Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and
the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. He likewise placed kerosene
lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right,
onto the lane of the approaching Van. Ortiz pumped his break slowly as he saw the approaching
passenger bus, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Van, however, became inoperable as a
result of the incident.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the prime mover owner and driver with the
RTC. The passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC held that the proximate cause of the
three-way vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway
and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle.
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC decision, the CA held that the proximate
cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right
of way of the passenger bus. The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have
an early warning device. The appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that
Limbaga placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, may act as substitute early warning device.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan van?
RULING
YES, the prime mover is liable.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.
(a) Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway; he
failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
The Supreme Court stated the test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith as
follows: The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that
of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is
whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.
Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the
national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of
the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the
national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked
prime mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest,
Inc., that the prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed
because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to
simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to
oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside
the vehicle.
Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver,
like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly
specialized driving skills and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.
ADDITIONAL RULING NA NI: in case e recit
(b) The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable; Limbaga did not
put lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover.
The CA reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 22 as authority for the
proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is
misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the prime mover or
within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves were placed on the prime
mover.
 Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified24 that only banana leaves were
placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see any lighted tin cans in the
immediate vicinity of the collision.
Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime
mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation to this effect was
made by private respondents in their Answer to the complaint for damages.
(c) The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
The RTC is correct in its ruling that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and
probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer.

Title: ASSOCIATED BANK vs.TAN

Citation: G.R. No. 156940 December 14, 2004

FACTS:
Respondent, Vicente Henry Tan is a businessman and a regular depositor-creditor of the
petitioner, Associated Bank. Sometime in September 1990, he deposited a postdated check with
the petitioner in the amount of P101,000 issued to him by a certain Willy Cheng from Tarlac.
The check was duly entered in his bank record.

Allegedly, upon advice and instruction of petitioner that the P101,000 check was already
cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, respondent, on the same date, withdrew the sum of
P240,000 from his account leaving a balance of P57,793.45.

A day after, Tan deposited the amount of P50,000 making his existing balance in the
amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his business partners.
However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him alleging that the checks bounced
for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner to take positive steps
regarding the matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject
checks. Nonetheless, petitioner did not bother nor offer any apology regarding the incident.

Tan filed a Complaint for Damages on December 19, 1990, with the RTC against
petitioner. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to
pay damages and attorney’s fees. Appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision. CA ruled
that the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of the value of the deposited check
prior to its clearing. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to debit the amount of the dishonored check from the
account of respondent on the ground that the check was withdrawn by respondent prior to its
clearing

RULING:
No, for the Petition has no merit.

The real issue here is not so much the right of petitioner to debit respondent’s account but,
rather, the manner in which it exercised such right. Banks are granted by law the right to debit
the value of a dishonored check from a depositor’s account but they must do so with the highest
degree of care, so as not to prejudice the depositor unduly.
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned.

It is undisputed, even admitted, that purportedly as an act of accommodation to a valued client,

the petitioner allowed the withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing.
That act certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the banking system. Such a practice
is unusual, because a check is not legal tender or money; and its value can properly be
transferred to depositor’s account only after the check has been cleared by the drawee bank.
In this case, petitioner did not treat respondent’s account with the highest degree of care.
Respondent withdrew his money upon the advice of petitioner that his money was already
cleared. It is petitioner’s premature authorization of the withdrawal that caused the respondent’s
account balance to fall to insufficient levels, and the subsequent dishonor of his own checks for
lack of fund

FRANCISCO V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS

G.R. No. 193577, September 7, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers Inc. (CBCI) filed a case against Petitioner Francisco
for damages based on Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code. CBCI alleged that its diesel
fuels were delivered and sold to Francisco by a certain Gregorio Bacsa who represent himself as
an employee of CBCI. However, Bacsa was not authorized by CBCI and that Bacsa only stole the
diesel fuels. CBCI wanted to recover the diesel fuels from Francisco but this cannot longer be
done because Francisco had already sold it to third persons. Hence, CBCI filed this case for
damages against Francisco.
In his defense, the heirs of Francisco, who substituted Francisco in the case, argued that
he cannot be held liable for damages because he is a purchaser in good faith. The heirs of
Francisco argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable to CBCI
because he failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family when he bought the diesel
fuel. They argue that since Francisco was blind, the standard of conduct that was required of
him was that of a reasonable person under like disability. Moreover, they insist that Francisco
exercised due care in purchasing the diesel fuel by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his
son to check the identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery from Petron, the supplier
of CBCI; (3) Francisco required that he be named as the consignee in the invoice; and (4)
Francisco required separate receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual payment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Francisco is liable for damages for failing to exercise the required diligence
under the circumstances in purchasing the diesel fuels of CBCI which was just stolen by Bacsa.

RULING:
Francisco is liable for damages. Francisco should pay the actual value of the diesel fuels
which can no longer be recovered. He failed to exercise the required diligence under the
circumstances. One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a
reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps
and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under
which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes
that of a reasonable person who is blind.

We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex
station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business until this time. In
this instance, however, we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected
of a reasonable person who is blind.
 First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was
authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel,
fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa
to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were
typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he
should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as
indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to
Francisco.

Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable

person who is blind. Since CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property, it may recover from
Francisco, even if Francisco pleads good faith.

TITLE: PHIL HAWK CORP V. VIVIAN TAN LEE

CITATION: GR 166869 FEBRUARY 16, 2010

FACTS:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed a case for Damages based on Quasi Delict arising
from vehicular accident between a motorcycle and bus of Phil Hawk. The accident
resulted in the death of respondent’s husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical
injuries. Before the answer, respondent filed an amended complaint, adding additional damages and reliefs. The
trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline
and correct behavior on the road. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court with modification in the award of damages.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioner’s driver, and whether negligence
on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and
causing physical injuries to respondent;
(2) Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
(3) Whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.

HELD:
(1)In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary
precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep
parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane,
causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly

arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

(2)The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to
respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him
discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner’s tests were concentrated on the ability to
drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in
sideswiping incidents. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by
Article 2206of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings,
but for loss of capacity to earn money. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when:

(1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or

(2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.

In this case, the records show that respondent’s husband was leasing and operating a Caltex
gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual
income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income
Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that respondent’s husband earned a gross
income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondent’s testimony
as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before respondent’s
husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income
derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot
be considered. In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not
gross earnings, hereto be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary
for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In
the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease
and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses
at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).

(3) In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of the respondent’s
husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by
respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her
Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.

TITLE: VIRGINES CALVO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME ND STYLE OF

TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES INC. VS UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE
CITATION: G.R. NO. 148496

FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services Inc. (TCTSI), a sole
proprietorship customs broker. Petitioner entered into a contract with San Miguel Corp (SMC)
for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from
the Port Area in Manila to SMCs warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita,
Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

The shipment in question, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board M/V
Hayakawa Maru and, after 24 hours, were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre
operator, Manila Port Services, Inc.

Petitioner, pursuant to their contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre
operatorr and delivered it to SMC warehouse where it was expected by Marine Cargo Surveyors
who found out that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were stained or torn and the 3
reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn which resulted to a P93,112.00 damage.
 SMC collected the said amount from UCPB under its insurance contract.

In turn, respondent brought a suit against petitioner in the RTC of Makati which the
court rendered judgment finding petitioner liable to respondent for the damage for the shipment.
The court ruled that ´´Generally speaking under Article 1735 of the Civil Code, if the goods are
proved to have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed the extraordinary
diligence required by law. The burden of the plaintiff, therefore, is to prove merely that the goods
he transported have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated¨ The said decision was also affirmed by
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Calvo can be exempted from liability under Art. 1734 (4).

RULING:
NO.
Art. 1734 (4) provides ¨Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration
of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
....
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.
....
For this provision to apply, the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the
defect/s in the container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary
observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding
such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom.
In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects
in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised
extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability,
the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds.

Murag mao an cguro nis iya relation sa negligence churvi: ana sya nga “Whenever the thing is
lost (or damaged) in the possession of the debtor (or obligor), it shall be presumed that the loss
(or damage) was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary. No proof was proffered to
rebut this legal presumption and the presumption of negligence attached to a common carrier in
case of loss or damage to the goods”.

TITLE: RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORPORATION vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA ELECTRIC CO., HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, Branch 104-
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
CITATION: G.R. No. 126074 February 24, 1998

FACTS:
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO
demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing
unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and
for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground
that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in
the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them
that their electricity be disconnected. Alarmed by this development, petitioners, instead of
settling the amount, a case before the RTC of Quezon City for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order to forestall any planned disconnection by
MERALCO.

After due trial, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case in favor of the plaintiff(s)
and against the defendants:
1. Making the Injunction permanent, enjoining the defendants in both cases, and all
their subordinates, legal representatives, electric meter readers and technicians
from committing acts of dispossession/disruption of electric power on the subject
premises located at the compound of Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corporation and
Ridjo Paper Corporation located at 64 and 68 Judge Juan Luna St., San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City.
2. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim on (the) two cases are (sic) denied for lack of merit.
MERALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 22, 1996, reversed the
trial court's finding, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED; and appellees Ridjo Tape
and Chemical Corporation and Ridjo Paper Corporation are hereby ordered to pay subject
differential billings of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58, respectively. Costs against the
appellees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MERALCO is negligence?

RULING:
YES.

The failure of MERALCO to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus
and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction and the due diligence to discover and
repair the defects therein constitutes negligence.-

Corollarily, it must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a
reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not
malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such
duties constitutes negligence.

The presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time
will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof; As a public utility, MERALCO has the
obligation to discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.-

It has been held that notice of a defect need not be direct and express; it is enough that
the same had existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been
detected, and the presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length
of time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. Hence, MERALCO’s failure to
discover the defect, if any, considering the length of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence.
Furthermore, we need not belabor the point that as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation
to discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.

The rationale behind this ruling is that public utilities should be put on notice, as a
deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in
serviceable condition, they run the risk of forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts
originally due from their customers. Certainly, we cannot sanction a situation wherein the
defects in the electric meter are allowed to continue indefinitely until suddenly the public utilities
concerned demand payment for the unrecorded electricity utilized when, in the first place, they
should have remedied the situation immediately. If we turn a blind eye on MERALCO’s omission,
it may encourage negligence on the part of public utilities, to the detriment of the consuming
public.
 Being a public utility vested with vital public interest, MERALCO is impressed with
certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part to perform such duties
would be prejudicial to its interest.-

To summarize, it is worth emphasizing that it is not our intention to impede or diminish

the business viability of MERALCO, or any public utility company for that matter. On the
contrary, we would like to stress that, being a public utility vested with vital public interest,
MERALCO is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its
part to perform such duties would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the
bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall
be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.

HEIRS OF RENDERO COMPLETO & ELPIDO ABIAD VS. SGT. ALBAYDA,JR.

Parties:
COMPLETO- taxicab driver
ALBAYDA- one riding the bicycle, member of Phil Air Force
ABIAD- employer of Completo

Facts:
Completo, who was driving a taxicab, bumped and side swept the bike rode by Albayda,
who was going to work. Albayda suffered a fracture on the left knee, and was hospitalized from
August 27, 1997 until February 11, 1998, and again confined from February 23, 1998 until
March 22, 1998 (a total of roughly 7months).
Conciliation between parties failed. Hence, a case for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed by Albayda against Completo. Albayda manifested before the court of his
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad.

Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the incident. On
the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefuly driving the taxicab when he heard a
strange sound for the rear right side of the taxicab. He found Albayda lying on the road, holding
his left leg, thus he brought him to the hospital.

After taking of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Albayda and
ordered Completo and Abiad to pay Albayda actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.
When appealed, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with modification.

Issues:

1. WON Completo was the one who caused the collision

2. WON Abiad, as employer, is solidarily liable with Completo

Rulings:

1. Yes.
It is the rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the
motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff,
and that such negligence was the proximate cuase of the injury suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict.

It was proven by preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable

diligence driving the taxicab because he was over speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden
by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries
sustained by Albayda, by not slowing down when he approached in the intersection, when
Albayda had a right of way sinse he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.

The bicycle occupies a legal position of at least equal to that of other vehicle, and that
motorists are usually required to have more duty of care than that of a bicycle because of physical
advantage. A motor vehicle poses greater danger of harm, hence, due to the inherent differences
between the 2 vehicles, more care is required from the motorist.

2. Yes.

Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the obligation imposed in 2176 is demandable
not just for one's own acts or omissions but also for those persons whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees, and sahll cease only upon
proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.

There is legal presumption that the employer is also negligent by its employee's
negligence. It will only be rebutted upon clear showing on the part of employer that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.

The collision gives rise to the liability on the part of Completo as driver and Abiad, his
employer, and the liability of two or more persons of quasi-delict is solidary. That civil liability
of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his
own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee and attaches even if employer is not
inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.

TITLE: HIDALGO ENTERPRISES VS SPOUSES BALANDAN

CITATION: G.R. NO. L-3422

FACTS:
Hidalgo Enterprises owns an ice-plant factory in San Pablo City, Laguna wherein installed
in its premises are two tanks full of water which are nine feet deep for the cooling purposes of its
engine. Although the factory is surrounded with fence, the tanks weren’t nor are they covered.
Moreover, the edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.

At about noon of April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, the son of the defendant spouses
together with his friends entered the factory to take a bath in one of the tanks. While bathing,
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank only to be fished out later as a cadaver who died of asphyxia
secondary to drowning.

The CFI of Laguna and CA held the petitioner liable of attractive nuisance (the tanks) and
neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering his premises.

The doctrine of attractive nuisance provides that one who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto,
is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. The condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them
to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

ISSUE:
Whether Hidalgo Enterprises is guilty of negligence

RULING:
No.

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial
as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location. The court in citing Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co. provided:

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their
waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger, children are early instructed so
that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without
adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."

Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question
whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. that the parents
of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila
on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual.

TITTLE: HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET AL., vs GO CHONG BING

CITATION: 102 PHIL. 556 (1957)

FACTS:
On or before June 2, 1952, defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador
or driver's helper by the name of Francisco Rosomera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952,
defendant ordered Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven by
his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then flooded, should it be
unable to cross the river because of the flood. Romera at that time was not a licensed driver. He
only had a student's permit, issued to him on March 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started
from the town of Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some persons
boarded the truck and among them was one policeman by the name of Venancio Orfanel. While
the truck was on the way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, while
the latter stayed on the driver's left, reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck. As to the
circumstances under which Orfanel was able to take hold of and drive the truck, there is some
dispute and this matter will be taken up later in the decision.

While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it driven by defendant's
driver it so happened that they came to a truck that was trying to park on the left side of the
road. Romera suggested to Orfanel that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they
approached the parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the truck
towards the right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were on the right side of the
road, As the truck had swerved to the right and was proceeding to hit the said pedestrians,
Romera told Orfanel to apply the brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the
gasoline and the truck did not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by
the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow and
his children and of the accident, Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence.
He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced accordingly. Court of First Instance: absolved
defendant from liability for the accidental death of Quirico Gregorio
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Go Chong Bing is liable.

HELD:
The Supreme Court is on the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the wheel to the
policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. The testimony of witness Dayo is not corroborated by any other testimony. As he
testified that he was two meters behind Romera, he could not have noticed with exactness the
circumstances under which the policeman was able to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck
and his testimony in that respect cannot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion
that the defendant's cargador, or Francisco Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for
the latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that the latter had both the
ability and the authority to drive the truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit
and not a driver's license.

The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or accident was caused by
an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related to the defendant, and as such act
or omission was punishable by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished
therefor, no civil liability should be imposed upon the defendant. Against this decision the
plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, contending that when defendant permitted his cargador,
who was not provided with a driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negligence
per se. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for the sake of
argument that the defendant had so violated the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting
the truck to one who is not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared
liable for the accident because his negligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof.

The leading case in this jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Company, 16 Phil. 8. Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and
in American cases was carefully considered and it was held:

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order
to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.


(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. (Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra. p.15)

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a person may be
held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on
the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by the
said act or omission.

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, which are two: An Act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the
liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or
the omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and directly
from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; necessarily presupposing, a legal ground for
imputability. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 28.).

It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs' intestate
was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from
defendant's cargador, in spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant
therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already received indemnification
for the accident, but because there is no direct and proximate causal connection between the
negligence or violation of the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.

BATACLAN VS. VILLANUEVA

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
CITATION:
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957

FACTS:
After midnight on September 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of Medina Transportation operated by
owner defendant Mariano Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City,
driven by Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers and Bataclan was one of the
passengers of the said bus who was seated beside of the driver.

At 2:00am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into the canal on the right side of
the road and the bus turned turtle. Four passengers including Bataclan were trapped inside the
bus and could not get out.

After an hour, ten men came carrying lighted torch made of bamboo fueled with
petroleum. These men approached the bus and a fierce fire started, burning and all but
consuming the bus, including the four passengers.

By reason of the death of Bataclan, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P 87, 150.

The RTC of Cavite awarded Php 1000 to the plaintiffs plus Php 600 as attorney’s fee, plus
Php 100, value of the goods carried by Bataclan for sale in Pasay City. This is for the reason that
the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus including the four passengers. That Bataclan, though he must have
suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive and so the damages were awarded not
for his death but for the physical inquiries suffered by him.

Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to CA but the latter endorsed the
appeal to SC because of the value involved in the claim of the complaint.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus. (this is what is relevant to the topic)
2. Whether or not the carrier is liable.

HELD:
1. No.

Proximate cause as defined in American Jurisprudence is… “that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.” And more comprehensively, “the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result there from.”

In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, the SC held that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help.

The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, especially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

2. Yes. The case involves breach of contract of a common carrier. There was negligence on
the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon.

There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony
of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst
up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus,
but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it
over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

Also when the bus has already overturned, driver should and must have known that in
the position of the bus, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over
a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
 Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

FERNANDO VS. CA
TITLE: Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and City of Davao
CITATION: 208 SCRA 714
TOPIC: Negligence as Proximate Cause

FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of
the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa,
Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26,
1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date,
specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the
septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken
out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City
Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the
septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did
the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and, in his
reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of
oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst,
swelled in hemorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case,
was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.

On August 28, 1984, the trial court dismissed the case. Petitioner appealed to the CA
which reversed and set aside the appealed judgment and ordered the defendant to pay for
compensatory and moral damages and attorney’s fees. But after finding merit in the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant-appellee Davao City, the CA reversed and set aside the prior
decision made hereby dismissing the case. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Davao City is guilty of negligence?
2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims
hereof?

RULING:

No.

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission causes
damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176,
New Civil Code).

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a

claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.

In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage
from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the
case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public
respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job.
His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was
the proximate cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors
Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do. The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence.

URBANO VS. IAC

G.R NO. 72964, 7 JANUARY 1988

FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano (Urbano) was on his way to his ricefield
when he discovered that the place where he stored palay was flooded with water coming from an
irrigation canal. When he investigated the area, he saw Marcelino Javier (Javier) and Emilio Efre
(Efre). Javier admitted that he opened the irrigation canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano started
to hack Javier with a bolo. Javier was wounded at the right palm of his hand.

Upon intervention, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano agreed to
shoulder all the expenses for the medication of the wound of Javier, as well as to pay also
whatever loss of income Javier may have suffered. Javier, on the other hand, signed a
statement of his forgiveness towards Urbano and on that condition, he withdrew the complaint
that he filed against Urbano.

After several weeks of treatments and medication, the doctor pronounced that the
wound of Javier was already healed. However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to
the hospital when he had sudden lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition
to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected from the healing wound in his right palm of his
hand. The following day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died.

The heirs of Javier filed a case of homicide against Urbano. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
 Urbano then filed a motion for a new trial based on the affidavit sworn by the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied by the respondent court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier may be considered as the
proximate cause of the latter’s death.

RULING:

No, the wound inflicted by Urbano cannot be considered as the proximate cause of Javier’s
death.

The Court defined proximate cause as “that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.” In this case, the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused c a u s e d the victim’€ ™s death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court ruled that Urbano is not liable for the death of Javier. Urbano is only liable
for the physical injuries inflicted to Javier through the wound on the right palm of his hand.
The Court took into account the average incubation period of tetanus toxin, and medical
evidence indicated that patients affected with tetanus experience its symptoms within 14
days. If, indeed, Javier had incurred tetanus poisoning out of the wound inflicted by Urbano,
he would not have experienced the symptoms on the 23rd day after the hacking incident.

The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to
the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. However,
the act of Javier working in his farm where the soil is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient
supervening cause which relieves Urbano of any liability for the death of Javier. There is a
likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which t h e petitioner had nothing to do.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.

It must be stressed that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited
to the criminal’s aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.

TITLE: MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION VS. SEBASTIAN BAKING

CITATION: G.R. NO. 156037 MAY 28, 2007

Principle:
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a...
combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Facts:

Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.
Subsequently, after several tests, Dr. Sy found that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride
were above normal levels and prescribed two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood
Sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.

Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron for Dormicrum – a
potent sleeping tablet.

Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for three consecutive days. On the third day,
he figured in a vehicular accident. His car collided with another car driven by one Josie Peralta.
It turned out that Respondent fell asleep while driving and has no idea regarding the accident.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have caused the accident, he returned to Dr. Sy and the
latter was shocked because of the wrong medicine sold to his patient.

Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) complaint for damages
against petitioner.

The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision of which was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. Hence this present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was negligent, if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause
of respondent’s accident?

Ruling:
YES.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no re-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict”.

The Court also enumerated the three (3) elements of Quasi-delict, to wit:

1.Damage suffered by the plaintiff; 2. Fault or negligence of the defendant; 3. Connection

of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred
by the plaintiff

The Court stressed that there is no dispute that respondent suffered damages. It is
generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and
safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if the drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence.

That petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspondent with the
superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence
in driving his car.

The Court disagreed.

 Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.5

Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been
careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet,
it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the
latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.6 Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.

Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate cause of the accident was the petitioner’s
employee’s negligence. The vehicular accident could have not occurred had the employee been
careful to his job.

TITLE: UMALI VS. BACANI

CITATION: G.R. No. L-40570. January 30, 1976
FACTS:

During a storm in Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan, some banana plants standing on

an elevated ground near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and
fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left
hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.

On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric
wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He
also saw Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right
then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain
that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3
years and 8 months old whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place
where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of the child that the broken wire was fixed
on the same morning by the lineman of the electric plant.

Petitioner, owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant, claims that he could not be
liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort because the proximate cause of the boy’s death
electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event -
the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line. He also pointed out the
absence of negligence on the part of his employee Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired
and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house
during that time.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of negligence for the death of the child.

RULING:

Yes.
A series of negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in the Alcala Electric Plant
resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant,
there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground
and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees
of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did
not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life
and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they
could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third,
employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already
made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a
danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
anybody from approaching the live wire.

The defendants argued that the proximate cause of the victim’s death could be attributed
to the parents’ negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone. However,
there’s negligence on the part of defendants’ employees resulting in a live wire lying on the
premises without any visible warning of its lethal character. Anybody, even a responsible grown
up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim.
Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents’
negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire, he accidentally
touched. Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the parents of the
victim in this case was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants’ lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt
him from liability. Petitioner’s liability for injury caused by his employees’ negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states that: “The owner and manager
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their
functions.” The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer
because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This
liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact, the proper defense for the employer to
raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father
of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately
supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial
Court.

TITLE: S.D. MARTINEZ VS BUSKIRK

CITATION: GR NO. L-5691 DECEMBER 27, 1910

Facts:
Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in
Ermita, Manila. When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for the transportation of fodder
and to which two horses are attached, was coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff
was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut
upon the plaintiff’s head and injuring the carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that
purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the
purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.

However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The
employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. From the stated facts, the court ruled
that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil
Code: Finally, masters of directors or arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (ofhorses) and a trusty and capable
driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

Held:
It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by
the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive
and which are approved by the society, are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One
could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair
therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. The court holds that it is a universal
practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been
practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries. The judgment is therefore
reversed.

BPI VS. SUAREZ

IMMEDIATE CAUSE; INTERVENING CLAUSE

TITLE: ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA
TABUGO vs. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA
CITATION: G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
FACTS:

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s premises,
the class to which Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the
subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is Estefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was
the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking
into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates
who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test
tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the
bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still
had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070 for her fares and had
to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that
[Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC. On November 17, 1994, before the science experiment was
conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written
procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had
cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of
understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the
heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment and as
repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and
looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle
hitting one of [Jayson’s] eyes.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to
St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter
cried and apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube
until the compound had cooled off.

After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed
that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges
due to the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, requested SJC to
advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing [Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive
from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter
demanding that it should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred
and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment.
RTC ruled in favor of Jayson. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the petitioner is the proximate cause of the injury’s
incurred by the defendant?
RULING:
YES.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows
special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its
students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles,
to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the classfifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the
heated compound.

In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which
happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers.
This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the
utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately,
was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, "for
petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident."