G.R. No.

L-8409 December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS
EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon.
On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the
latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said
court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule
75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties.
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided
at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot
at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house,
soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr.
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained
until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26,
1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure
secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of

1
Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa,
78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of
Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz.
Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether
he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested
his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did
not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son
of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do
so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very
likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor
and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will
never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp.
172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover,
some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that
municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A
España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month
before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and
"B" residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary
public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the
deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on
November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the
herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by
his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have
objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's
failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the
acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent
— has not been offset by the evidence of record.

2
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and
refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from
its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then
held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever
action oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the
oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the
deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's
objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are
now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is
your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I
allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I
will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is
not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent,
because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they
were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves
unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it
drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand,
he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the
decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order
appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to
the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower
court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the
jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-
examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and
the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel:
"Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason
that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the

3
purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand,
which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to
object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a)
their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the
Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower
court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in
connection with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears
that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition
of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late
Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge,
pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953,
on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus,
Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage,
including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of
the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion
was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the
Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not
pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court
first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules
of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It
could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by
law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is
denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially,
said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in
the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of
first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts
— but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court
immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident
decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have
properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

4
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was
filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda.
De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said
court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the
corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it
should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with
costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his
only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one
of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as
one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes.
Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of
liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal
and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6]Private respondent stated
that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-
9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the
decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

5
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene
in the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene
in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to
the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the
fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these
were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them
the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly,
the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather
various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they
prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate
court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they
prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set
the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x
x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.[17]

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.

6
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now
before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of
those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus
to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons
interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right
of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition
for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have
interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition
for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate
of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any
asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule
85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court
to give notice to the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition
or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person
interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied,
then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors
to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as
they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the
other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where
they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

7
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with
guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an
action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned
that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia,
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of
the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case
had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of
the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that
the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to
close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such
action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate

proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it
appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in
fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case
will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case
No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely
makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing
of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the
reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration
proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has
been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against
the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs
desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that
questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but
claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be
rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by
any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]

8
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do
so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also
any person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for
quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered
in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the
extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided
for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under
this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There
is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances
their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission
that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate
court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right
to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose
a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing
a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of
cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with
respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for
mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed
access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them.
Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall
be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court

9
ruled that petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as
the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they
have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact
"interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon
them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access
the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator
and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors
in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any
or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission
by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them
and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot
grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal
of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against

10
the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay
in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all,
the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for
the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we
have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under
the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking
to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita
M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin,
Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of
legal age.1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed
a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.

11
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail
of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in
the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the
Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time
file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal
of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative
defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being
irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September
15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the
petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that
the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO
MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the
deceased father TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased
TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein
petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring
this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses
of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is,
that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the
filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as

13
the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within
he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of
the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names
of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to
be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave
no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO
for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance
in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the
trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative
defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately
seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the
Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition,
the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant
nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the
instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the

14
Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a
ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress
of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an
action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know
that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168799 June 27, 2008

EUHILDA C. TABUADA v. HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding Judge of the Regional

15
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
March 2, 2005 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special
Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution[2] of the trial court denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged order.

The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp.
Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose and Paciencia
Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the case. In light of the said
manifestation, the trial court issued the following Order[3] on December 6, 2004:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective
counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable settlement, finally, on or before
25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for
hearing as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going
to submit a Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement on or before 25
December 2004.

Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are
notified in open court.

Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,[5] Rule 17, of the Rules of Court,
terminated the proceedings on account of the parties failure to submit the amicable settlement and
to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of
even date, likewise denied all the motions filed by the parties.[6]

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the
reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others, that the termination of the case
was premature, there being yet no payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and that they
had already prepared all the necessary papers for the amicable settlement.[7] Despite the said pleas
for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the proceedings; hence,
in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution,[8] it affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles
to this Court via Rule 45.[9]

The petition is granted.

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the

failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority
for the court to jettison the case.[10] Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed
by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-
contentious nature of special proceedings[11] (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a
state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its
dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the
sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties
therein.[12]

16
 The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if
the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court,[13] cannot even be used to justify
the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the
December 6, 2004 Order[14]readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of the
amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they
fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed.[15] Hence, it
cannot be categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an
affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot
be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to
consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find
support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the
law and rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records
of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance,
trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.[16]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005 Resolution of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be
reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same
time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973,
Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the
order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no

17
notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in
the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the
estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment
was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia
G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia
G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia,
he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina
Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply
listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.
Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it
attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions
for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G.
Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special
administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure
cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B.
Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power
of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties
making up the state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia
only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2,
1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation
petition of May 18,1973.

18
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over
the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit
from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with
whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not
been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for
acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of
the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and
improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and
the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of
the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody
and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to
Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to
Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition,
the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the
place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections
thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider
the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the
special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution
of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix
was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that
the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the
assets of the estate.

19
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues
raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other
three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the
statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the
corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G.
Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B.
Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his
residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders
of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before
Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated
the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B.
Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the
same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the
motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

20
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment
of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however,
her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling
the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet
become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until
Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975,
and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their
respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain
Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February
9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied
upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to
be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,

21
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets
in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in
a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this
does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of
numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And
it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 11

22
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the
petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that
as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to
her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death
certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the
last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also
by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained
three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November
12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia;
and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that
Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that
objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the
case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting
on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of
the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is

another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving
spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis
for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his

23
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not
be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this
respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado
G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation
whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of
any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8,
1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention
for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this
Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the
instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as
special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502
and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

24
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R,
promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He
was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr.
and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco,
Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-
R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964;
that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties
in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons,
and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead
of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March
1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing
not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been
served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)
herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.
The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed
in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an

25
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April
1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to
dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the
Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set
aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in
the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10
April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court
to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp.
Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a
principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said
court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at
No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and

motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid
petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the
proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the
New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should
prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should
be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as
proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates
that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City
at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the
petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he
executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first
choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself
selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs.
The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first
choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the
probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of
11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the

26
Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May
1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last
will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due
notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with
the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator
acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had
been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after
receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty.
Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all
indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by
him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the
late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the
testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals
(docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-
7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents

(petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc.
2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction
was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not
leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the
time of his death.

27
 Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the
respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the
Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge
Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition
for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of
the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having
yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state
in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's
jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment
a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the
proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does
not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and
taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent
court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish
in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit,
whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in
pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the
precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on
the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never
questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes
Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been
satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.

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The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ
of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over
"all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of
the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited
Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of

the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the
late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place
of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the
Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an
adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of
the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider
such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court
of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy
Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the

29
 jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction
over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company,
20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 — confers
upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of
the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600,
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place
of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-
ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion
of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestatemay be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion
and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that
court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to
the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal
domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it
would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon
City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

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3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts
analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned
decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even
if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding
shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City
court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that
[therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case,

31
the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venuetherefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely

a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right
to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in
the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal
of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment
of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by
the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late. 16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choiceof residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home
and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule
expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

32
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate
court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of
the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal
resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was
better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja
vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first
filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect
asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a
last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu
or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would
seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the
Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review,
to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already
so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have
not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show:
"(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper
venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's
last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city
court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as
per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte,
supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action
admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in

33
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings
before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives
gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence
of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them
to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught.
As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as
to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent
is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left
a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public
policy and the orderly administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable
rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed
an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the
decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for
letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and
submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the
intestate proceedings be convertedinto a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal
domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of
the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights
under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter
of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since
petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property
and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and
the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly
took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to
continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.

34
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition
and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving
widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the
petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in
the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free
(pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's
will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction
nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964
admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final
and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over
all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu
court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders
and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to
annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before
the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in

35
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of

36
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition
and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion
for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on
June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

37
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and

38
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides
at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,

39
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

40
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

41
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar

42
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration,
as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

43
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to
the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

44
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion
to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-
CHING, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves
behind. For in death, a persons estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the
familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother
of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against
Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated
September 25, 1996 and Resolution[2] dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.[3] The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
99, Quezon City denying petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife,
Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value
of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million,
and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their
two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition[4] for the
settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name,
and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically
to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner
is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas
estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead.[5] Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as
special administratrix.[6]

45
 Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving
spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.[7]
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake
whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.[8]
In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel
Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as
joint regular administrators of the estate.[10] Both were issued letters of administration after taking
their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on
September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period
set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas
estate.[11] Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsory heirs of Miguelita.[12]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion[13] praying, among
others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and
distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the
estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the
properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture.[14] Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-
owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that
it is indeed premature. The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:

On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs, the Court
finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as
indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the
paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the
petitioner in their partnership venture.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7,
1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul
and set aside the intestate courts Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996
which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature,
indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.

46
 The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged
Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:

Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there
is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is
inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for
these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in
exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents
claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
I

RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE
ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW
THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS

ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS
SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND
RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear
and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased
persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.[16]
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may
hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental
and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[17]we held:

x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should

47
or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the
said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing
and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of
the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition[18] dated
September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated
October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted
in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed
on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing
on each.

Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific
properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly
adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas
estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three
(3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge.[19] He could have submitted an
inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The
fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners
inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what
properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to
secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with
respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution[20] dated May 7, 1996, thus:

On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching
Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the
distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need
for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned
that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly
placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material
and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate
court was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to
the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties, then it means that she has amaterial and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she

48
should be given her day in court. The intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving
the propriety of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the
purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that
her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of
the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course
should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person
to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate
or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as
a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then
the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so.[22]

Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over
properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima
facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears
stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with
petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified
or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs.
Alcid[23] relevant, thus:

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the
law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by

Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight,
and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified
in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x

49
 Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration Decree, proscribes
collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing
evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement
of yours which I quote: In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the
distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our
daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking
that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his
marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half
was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the
amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the
estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you,
Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]
She further testified as follows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments,
bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in
IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per
your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or

50
 what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are
agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is
that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-
Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares
of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni
Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito
po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners
inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership.
The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted
that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties.[26] Sensing that such
assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and
declare that she and Miguelita were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her
properties to be used in a joint business venture.[27] Respondent must have realized early on that if
the properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title
and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory
heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.[28]
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive
respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We
reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be
submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.[29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, vs.HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that
she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.

51
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco
were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine
Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and
Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the
possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she
be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and
distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.1

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was
an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30,
1970. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an
administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s
estate because of her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-
heirs have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the
estate.

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto the
Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book
No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos
pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.

Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating
that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s
adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
436 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City,
wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and therefore
grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is
freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents
Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners
Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid
to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove the
jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioner’s opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos
appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered

52
the parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.12

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no
proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner’s
natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was
adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.

Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec.
Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals
dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition
to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by
an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition.

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that reasonable
doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
"badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint
against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification
of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of
petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against
the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the
properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.

On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator22 before
the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true determination and appraisal of the decedent’s
universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
appointed special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the management of
properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of the interested
parties."

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with
falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed
the said finding to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the
task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a
bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir of

53
the decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5,
2001.26

On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the
Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted,
Chichioco filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco
alleged that petitioner converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity
in any of the properties left by the decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take
control and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may
be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC
on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent
Chichioco’s petition for review in the criminal case.30

Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002
resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to
possess and use the decedent’s property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the
latter’s death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit
an inventory of the decedent’s estate.

Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by
the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise
no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent.
Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the
settlement proceedings.

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court.
It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing
his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate
court reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in
cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the
requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore take control and possession of any of
the decedent’s properties.

54
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No.
53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was
also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the
Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities
permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005,34 hence this petition
on the following assigned errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE
VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF
SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457
WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by
any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall,
petitioner submitted a certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree
was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk
of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications
were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are
thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers
perform.37

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document38 required by law to be
entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the
local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are
entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the
Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of
irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate
action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held
in Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of
the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent.
Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed
legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains

55
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for
as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the
decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an
interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement
proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude
first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from
inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the
proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the
instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioner’s adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioner’s
opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and
settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been
submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending
incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter
through their respective pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be
served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of
Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the evidence before it.42 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure
which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the
records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. Vs. vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN

G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant, vs.CRISPIN BORROMEO

56
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether
belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding
or in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the
litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.

Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of
August 13, 1969.

The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They
possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.

One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan
Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the
registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).

The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by
OCT No. P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by
Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and
1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on
Appeal).

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria,
Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who
died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of
Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is
not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the
deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).

Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on
September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and
Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined
areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:

(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or
CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in
accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No.
2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which
should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;

57
 (b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361
hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;

(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as
Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on
Appeal).

(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No.
1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No.
1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the
estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for
each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that
amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition.
They contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6,
1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No.
1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the
partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720
hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the
estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the
ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six
hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded
from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.

On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they
asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be
included in the project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the
project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership
of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the
lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima
Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower
court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order
was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and
3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of

58
July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.

The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of
P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was
appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the
evidence.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965
that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her
estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to
recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo
and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31,
1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed
from those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).

The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the
twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is
how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the
intestate. proceeding.

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality
not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions
justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
its final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs.
Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).

59
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be
forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.

The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the
in the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein
they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the
share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the
said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the
Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer
the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the
ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to
support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the
expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate
court should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a
full-dress hearing should be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of
deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for
the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966
(pp. 26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.

After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan
spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should
be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No.
1112, made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case
No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding
those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares
from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated

60
May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate
to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no
amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within
thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines
already set forth. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24,
2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to
state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the
parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the
case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on
November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation
over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]

61
 On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to
Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate
of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in
Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 [14] was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-
Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by
respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when
she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her
name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling,
among other things, the issues as follows:

a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?

b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?

c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.[16] (Underscoring
supplied)

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account of the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving
the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that
petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.

xxx

62
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures
(sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary
act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a
special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a
right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet,
the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2,
Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v.
Cario,[20] viz:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however,
to the case in this wise:

To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of
contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee
Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two
marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two
marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus,
merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand,
the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title toproperty.
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a

63
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be
the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not,
therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to
such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in
the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the
establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil
action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon
this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts
dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred
when
I.

. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of
action.

II.

. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later
and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . .
.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA
decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements
in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of
which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.

Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a
reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and
that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.

64
 In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners
executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26,
1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent
Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein
individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles.
The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia,
state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss
in this wise:

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).

On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper
recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.
Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance
of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his
petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by
him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia
Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another
marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent.
The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew
Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the
decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the
special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision
in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children
of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was
whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.

65
 This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct
the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein
as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence
presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage
between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in
the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is
improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the
special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents
maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-
sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of
the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia
before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by
Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues,
whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and
recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings
. . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of
orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a
court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas
v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending,
but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings
for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate
court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of
partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father
immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She
subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to
suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to

66
her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said
case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground
that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and
validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she
was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case
for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order
of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case
be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not
been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:

As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil.,
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his
share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for
hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated
to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs
to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship
should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about
the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging
to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals
estate, executed on February 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general
rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the

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competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78
in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses
of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as
heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of
the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision
on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44602 November 28, 1938

MARIA CALMA, vs.ESPERANZA TAÑEDO

The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the
complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable
against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent
per annum. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the
corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria
Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased.

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While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza
Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of
P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this
sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the
property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.

Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks
that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the complaint be annulled and that the
estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. lawphi1.net

The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.

The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act
No. 3176 reading:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation
and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail
themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the
outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and
with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased
persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said
formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor
at the time the liquidation and partition was made.

Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176, this court, in the case of Caragay vs.
Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the
institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse
or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It
should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they
cannot be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic situation would result
if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a
testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property.
Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the
liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should
be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.

Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz vs. De
Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal
power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court
in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. This
doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De Gala (58 Phil., 881).

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From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio Calma for
the payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal
property, the power of Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta
Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable
against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who
had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to be
filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.

Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed
before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by
appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial
administratrix.

On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried
properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it
does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of
the testamentary proceedings.

We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had
with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in
the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by
filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in
execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-2263 May 30, 1951

PAZ Y. OCAMPO, vs.CONRADO POTENCIANO

This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.

From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this appeal, it
appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed
purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way
of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as strong materials
standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for
an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price,
the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period.

70
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Biñan,
Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though
registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal
property.

The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but
several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying part of the principal in addition to
interests. The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937, and the period having
elapsed without the repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the
register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on the strength which the
register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his
wife. This, however, did not close the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with
Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time
at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase
price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both principal
and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the money in court and brought an
action in her own name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to
compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and that
of her husband.

Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging
that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and
void as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share
passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property they,
the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property
held in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth
day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet these allegations,
plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect,
that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with
the rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option
agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the
payment of rental for that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the
loan, was also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender of
payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The Court of First
Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto
Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.

When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and
rendered judgment declaring:

(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado
Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum;

(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1) were
validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding upon the property in
litigation;

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 (c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the
same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;

(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto
legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their father Conrado Potenciano;

(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within
the time she had to do so;

(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the property in question, was in
accordance with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying
anew said purchase price;

(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of

conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in litigation to the heirs of
the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and

(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056
(Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title for said property in
favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by
appellees of the corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the deed of
conveyance mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

This judgment that is now before us for review.

First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de
retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a
loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case,
the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title
in themselves over the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano
in this case was, therefore, null and void.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation,
by the option agreement for the repurchase of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now
contend that this war error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after
the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing
that the surviving spouse had such authority as de factoadministrator of the conjugal estate. As
pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now
obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed
by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in
question was nothing more than mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt,
since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with

72
security, or equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with
right to repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned
the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the
tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229),
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the
debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code; Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)

Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor
Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring them
owners of the property in question, they having inherited one-half of it from their mother and
acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-
owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired
nothing.

Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the
obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to be mere contract of loan with security
or equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel
transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said
property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the
corresponding fees. With costs against the appellants.

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