West Tower Condominium vs.

FPIC – Leonen dissenting

The purpose of our environmental laws is to maintain or create conditions that' are conducive to a
harmonious relationship between man and nature. Environmental laws protect nature and the environment
from degradation while taking into account people's needs and general welfare. Sections 1 and 2 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1151, otherwise known as the Philippine Environmental Policy, embody the
purpose of our environmental laws:

SECTION 1. Policy.- It is hereby declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being.

SEC. 2. Goal.-In pursuing this policy, it shall be the responsibility of the Government, in cooperation with
concerned private organizations and entities, to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy, in promoting the general welfare to the end that the Nation may (a)
recognize, discharge and fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations, (b) assure the people of a safe, decent, healthful, productive and
aesthetic environment, (c) encourage the widest exploitation of the environment without degrading it, or
endangering human life, health and safety or creating conditions adverse to agriculture, commerce and
industry, ( d) preserve important historic and cultural aspects of the Philippine heritage, (e) attain a rational
and orderly balance between population and resource use, and (f) improve the utilization of renewable and
non-renewable resources. (Emphasis supplied)

This policy .espouses the need for a balance between resource exploitation and environmental protection
to promote the general welfare of the people. Environmental protection is a necessary means to increase
the chances of the human species to subsist.

The ponencia recognized the need to achieve a balance between human necessities and environmental
protection, thus:

The Court is fully. cognizant of the WOPL's value in commerce and the adverse effects of a prolonged
closure thereof. Nevertheless, there is a need to balance the necessity of the immediate reopening of the
WOPL with the more important need to ensure that it is sound for continued operation, since the
substances it carries pose a significant hazard to the surrounding population and to the
environment.56 (Citation omitted)

This need for. "balance"57 and the incidence of oil pipeline tragedies58 prompted the majority to further
delay the lifting of the temporary environmental protection order despite findings that support the
pipeline's integrity/safety. The majority also ruled that the procedures already conducted ~n the presence
of the Department of Energy should be repeated59 in light of the uncertainty and fear caused by the cited
oil pipeline disasters.60 In trying to achieve "balance," therefore, and in adopting the Court of Appeals'
findings,61 the majority adopted a strict application of the precautionary principle. This may result to
situations inconsistent with environmental protection.
Under the Rules, the precautionary principle shall be applied in resolving environmental cases when the
causal link between human activity and an environmental effect cannot be established with
certainty.62 Based on this. principle, an uncertain scientific plausibility of serious and irreversible damage
to the environment justifies actions to avoid the threat of damage. 63 Avoidance of threat or damage, as in
this case, usually comes in the form of inhibition of action or activity.

Strict application of the precautionary principle means that the mere presence of uncertainty renders the
degree of scientific plausibility for environmental damage irrelevant. Speculations may be sufficient causes
for the grant of either a temporary environmental protection order or a permanent environmental
protection order, regardless of the extent of losses and risks resulting from it.

This interpretation may be inconsistent with the purpose of avoiding threat or damage to the environment
and to the people's general welfare.64 It was argued that:

If [the precautionary principle] is taken for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The reason is
that risks of one kind or another are on all sides of regulatory choices, and it is therefore impossible, in
most real-world cases, to avoid running afoul of the principle. Frequently, risk regulation creates a
(speculative) risk from substitute risks or from foregone risk-reduction opportunities. And because of the
(speculative) mortality and morbidity effects of costly regulation, any regulation-if it is costly-threatens to
run afoul of the Precautionary Principle.65

Inhibiting an activity, especially one recognized for its role in commerce, has drawbacks. Although it may
ensure that no risk of harm to the environment will directly result from the activity, it can also unjustifiably
deprive the public of its benefits.66 Inhibiting pipeline activities, for example, may deprive the public of the
benefits of an oil transport system that can deliver more products at a given time and to a wider area,
compared to other modes of distributing oil such as through roads or rails. This will slow down oil
distribution along the production and distribution chains. Therefore, it will have a significant negative
impact on commerce.

Inhibiting an activity may also unduly create other. risks that are not immediately apparent. 67 Inhibition of
oil pipeline activities may prevent pipeline leaks from happening again. However, it will also force suppliers
to resort to other modes of oil distribution to maintain a supply to address national demands. These other
modes may include the use of trucks and trains, which has negative environmental impact as well.

Trucks have relatively limited capacity to distribute oil compared to pipelines. Thus, to keep up with national
demands, trucks must be dispatched in greater number and with more frequency. As a result, our highways
may have to be constantly lined with trucks. This will cause road congestion and-more certainly than the
existence of leaks on the White Oil Pipeline-worsened air pollution. According to the World Health
Organization, about seven million deaths in 2012 were linked to air pollution.68 Air pollution is related to
"cardiovascular diseases, such as strokes and ischaemic heart disease, ... [and] respiratory diseases ... [such
as] acute respiratory infections and chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases."69 It is .also reported to
increase the risk of cancer among humans.70

Lastly, the delay in lifting the temporary environmental protection order despite evidence that prove that
the pipeline is free from leaks, as well as the order to repeat respondent First Philippine Industrial
Corporation's procedures, will unnecessarily force not only respondent but also the concerned agencies to
spend much needed resources that may be used for other public purposes. In effect, other equally
important tasks or projects are deprived of the agencies' resources and attention. This may likewise cause
unintended drawbacks that we may not yet realize.

In the end, the inhibition of pipeline activities may in itself be a plausible and equally harmful threat to the
general welfare compared to the threat posed by the pipeline. Permitting the increase of air pollution and
unnecessary use of public resources may be inconsistent with the precautionary principle that the majority
tried to apply in resolving the case.

Thus, dealing with environmental issues is not as simple' as applying the precautionary principle in its strict
sense when faced with uncertainty. We must recognize the interconnectedness of variables and issues so
that we can address them more effectively and truly in accordance with our policy of taking care of the
people's general welfare through environmental protection.

The Department of Energy has already issued its Certification stating its conclusion that the White Oil
Pipeline is already safe for commercial operations. Its conclusion is consistent with expert findings. When
conclusions support the project's operation, and when there is no showing that an error was committed in
arriving at such conclusions, the fear of disaster without basis is not a sufficient reason to deny the lifting
of an issued temporary environmental protection order. Respondent First Philippine Industrial Corporation,
the Department of Energy, and other administrative agencies need not spend more resources only to
repeat a procedure that has already been and is still being done

Benguet Corporation vs. Leviste

Facts:

Helen Dizon-Reyes (private-respondent), "Helen" for brevity, filed a case before RTC-Quezon City docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-30171 alleging ownership over 11 mining claims and seeking the cancellation of the
Operations Agreement entered into by Dizon Mines and Benguet Corporation.

The antecedent of the facts are as follows:

1. Helen appointed her father Celestino as her lawful representative to transfer, assign and dispose
her 11 mining claims.
2. Celestino, entered into an Agreement with Dizon Mine granting them the power to explore,
develop, exploit and operate 57 mining claims, which includes the 11 mining claims of Helen.
3. Helen and other claim-owners executed a Deed of Ratification of Assignment thereby confirming,
transferring, conveying and assigning Dizon Mines the mining claims.
4. Helen thereafter revoked the SPA.
5. Despite this revocation, Dizon Mines and Benguet Corp. entered into an Operation Agreement
transferring to Benguet Corp. the possession of the 57 mining claims.
6. Helen now claims that the Operation Agreement lacks legal basis due to her revocation of the SPA.
7. Benguet Corp. moved for the Dismissal of the case based on different grounds, the cardinal ground
which is the focus of this case is that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature
of the action and the venue was improperly laid.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cancellation of mining contracts.

Ruling:
No, Section 7 of PD 1281 provides:

Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnership or persons
engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to refusal of the claim-owner/operator to abide
the terms and conditions thereof.

The current trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases an administrative matter

The court ruled that the subject agreement of this case is a mining contract and Helen is seeking for its
nullity, does not wish to abide the terms and condition of the said contract, thereby the said case is within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines by virtue of Section 7 of PD 1281.

Apex Mining v. Garcia

Facts:

1. The case involves Apex Mining Co., Inc (Apex for brevity) and Marcopper Mining Corp. (Marcopper
for brevity), regarding their conflicting mining claims in a forest reservation (timberland), Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest reserve.
2. Marcopper initially registered its mining claim in the said area and came to know that the area was
an existing forest reservation established by Proclamation No. 369 by the former Governor
General.
3. Because of this, Marcopper eventually abandoned their mining claim in the said forest reservation
and thereafter applied for a Prospecting Permit before the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
(BMGS for brevity).
4. It was however discovered based on the records of BMGS, that the said area was also covered by
several mining claims of Apex and other Small Scale Miners.
5. Because of this, Marcopper sought the cancellation of Apex’s mining claims.

Issue:
Whether or not the disputed area is within a forest reservation.

Ruling:

Yes, Proclamation No. 369 made the said area as a forest reserve as declared by the former Governor
General.
The former Public Land Act (Act. 2874) empowers the Governor-General to declare lands of public domain
to be disposable and also to suspend their concession or disposition. The issuance of the Governor-General
of Proclamation No. 369 made the said area a forest reserve (public dominion) and therefore is not
disposable.

Furthermore, Section 8 and 13 of PD 463 as amended by PD 1385 provides:

Section 8. Prospecting, exploration and exploitation of minerals in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the proper Government agencies. In the event of said agencies cannot
undertake the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of mineral in reserved lands, qualified persons may
be permitted to undertake such prospecting, exploration and exploitation in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary. xxxxx
xxxxxx
Section 13. No prospecting and exploration shall be allowed:

1. In military, or other Government reservations except when authorized by the proper Government
agency concerned.

xxxxx

Pursuant to PD 643, one can acquire mining rights over forest reserves by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently a permit to explore with the BGMS

The court found out that Marcopper complied with the procedural requisite (the Prospecting Permit) for
their mining claims while the other Small-Scale Miners and Apex did not comply and therefore they did not
acquire valid mining rights.

Atlast Mining vs. CA

1. Cuenco-Velez leased mining claims to Atlas for copper mines in Toledo, cebu
2. Atlas also leased respective mining claims from Biga partners
3. It turned out that the two sets of mining claims overlapped, thus leading to confusion as to who
Atlas mining should pay royalties for the use of the mining claims
4. Atlas filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
5. A motion to dismiss was filed by respondents on the ground that by virtue of the promulgation of
P.D. 1281, the RTC is divested of jurisdiction from deciding cases regarding agreements over mining
claims

Issue:

WON it was divested of jurisdiction by the passage of P.D. 1281

Held:

1. YES.
 PD 1281 issued on January 16, 1978, effectively gave more teeth to the Bureau of Mines (Sec. 3) giving it
'original and exclusive even over 'cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts,

Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or take away rights that are
already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already in existence.
It does not come within the legal purview of a prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively
independent of the general rule against the retrospective application of statutes. 38 Being procedural in
nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment except only with respect to those
cases which had already attained the character of a final and executory judgment. 39 Were it not so, the
purpose of the Decree, which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by granting
jurisdiction to a body or agency more adept to the technical complexities of mining operations, would be
thwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants in a mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a
forum of convenience. Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings.

Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a special law and under a well-accepted principle in statutory
construction, the special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application. 40 Jurisdiction having
been conferred by a special statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a general law. 41

Finally, as aptly observed by the respondent appellate court, it is a rule oft repeated by this Court that the
construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of enforcing the same deserves great and
considerable weight. Unless the same would result in legal absurdity, the same should be respected. 42

From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the operative act which divested the trial court of
jurisdiction to decide the declaratory action is not respondents' act of filing an administrative suit for the
cancellation of their operating agreement with ATLAS. With or without such administrative action, the trial
court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction to proceed with the declaratory action immediately upon the
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1281 on January 16, 1978.

Industrial Enterprises vs. CA

Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:

· 1. Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar.

2. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
 3. IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights
and interests to MMIC.
4. IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of
Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the
coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation
be granted back.
5. Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of
MMIC. It was dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held:

No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived
from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the
determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks
to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective
of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the
rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that
in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued
efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's
application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the
BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This
is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over
said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand
aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction
of an administrative agency.

LAGUA VS CUSI
April 15, 1988

DOCTRINE: It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the
unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure.
Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development

FACTS:
1. In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others: In Paragraph 5(a):a) On 1 January
1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the
Chief Security Guard of Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff
Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling
logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed.
2. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the
use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while
the vehicles and trucks.
3. Petitioners then filed an action for damages
4. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction,
and (2) lack of cause of action. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by
the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development
Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads,
therefore, the re olution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest
Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also
argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as
an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

ISSUE: w/n the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial court.

HELD: Yes. The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the
same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry
Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages
can be instituted. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal
and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover,
the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the
logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the
petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed
out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based
on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development. Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's
ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own
behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the real parties in interest. However,
the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest,
Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the
names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the
dismissal of the complaint

Sunville Timber Products vs. Abad

FACTS:

1. The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and
utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga
del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.‘
2. in 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA
on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations.
3. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner.
4. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies;
and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
then elevated the matter to the CA, which sustained the trial court .The CA held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case
before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper
administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in
connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural
resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the
courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
2. Whether the RTC is correct when it declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605.

RULING:

1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine
results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a
waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with
the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in
a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less
important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could
also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their
heavily loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the
doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.

Among these exceptional cases are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;

5) when the claim involved is small;

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved;

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and

10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry
laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question
they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and
public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative
remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent
laws vesting in the DENR the power and function “to regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to exercise exclusive jurisdiction” in the “management
and disposition of all lands of the public domain,” and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the
Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations
here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that
the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express
powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private
respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before
the RTC, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.

The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is
best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of
review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the
national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat
against the petitioner’s uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the
TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

2.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the
unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA
and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of
this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application
of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent
for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare
the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be
avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground, as we have done in the case
before us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable
requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an
event, it will be time for the Court “to make the hammer fall, and heavily,” in the words of Justice Laurel,
if such action is warranted.

Paat vs CA

Facts:
1. On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in
the truck.
2. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of confiscation and asked the
owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within fifteen days.
3. Private respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. de Guzman filed a letter of
reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
4. The letter was forwarded to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s wishes.
5. `During the pendency of the resolution, however, the respondent filed a suit for replevin. The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by the RTC. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied and the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.
Held:
. The provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section
1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never be clearer.

Mari vs. Sec. of Agriculture

1. In 1946, Mari applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of land

2. The application was initially approved by the DOL but there was subsequent opposition from herein
respondents Duran who were occupying the land
3. DOL ruled over the oppositions and adjudged the land to Mari
4. An appeal was made to the Sec. of Agri but such was denied on the ground that the signature
thumbmark was a forgery
5. The respondents that the forgery was the fault of their atty., who they filed a criminal case against
6. The appeal was thus reinstated

Relief from judgment??

Republic vs. Tan properties

1. Case for original registration filed by T.A.N. properties

2. Opposed by State through DOL
3. TAN presented 3 witnesses to prove that the land was initially peacefully possessed by Dimayuga
OCENPO since 1942 and transferred to his predecessors and later sold to TAN

RTC: adjudicated the lot to TAN

CA: affirmed

Issue: WON TAN proved OCENPO since 1945

WON the land was A&D, thus allowing the original registration by TAN

Held:

All lands are presumed to belong to the State

In this case, TAN submitted two certifications:

1. CENRO cert. (590,000 sq.)

 2. Regional Tech. Director of Forest Management Services

FIRSTLY, Under D.A. 20 the CENRO issues certs. of land classification for area below 50 has. While PENRO
issues for over 50 has.

In this case, the land being applied for is over 50 has (500,000sq.m). Thus, it is beyond the CENROS
capability to issue a cert. of a&d. Furthermore, Regional tech. direc. Has no authority to issue land
classification.

SECONDLY, a PENRO or CENRO cert. is insufficient as there is still req. that DENR Sec. approved the land
classification and released the land as A&D within the survey by the PENRO or CENRO

Universal Robina Corp. vs. LLDA

1. URC is engaged in manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in Pasig

2. After lab testing, of URC’s corn oil refinery plant’s wastewater, LLDA found that URC was not
complying certain DENR orders
3. LLDA sent an order to explain why URC should not be closed for discharging polluting effluents in
the Pasig river
4. In 2003, URC informed LLDA of its intention to build a wastewater treatment facility which would
be complete by 2007
5. After resampling in 2007, URC finally passed the standards
6. URC was initially assessed a total penalty of 1.2 mil but they sought reconsideration to 560,000
because of an alleged error in the computation.
7. LLDA failed to reconsider.
8. URC filed for certiorari with the CA contending GAD

CA: affirmed. Also stated that “appeal from orders of the LLDA should be to the DENR Sec. or Office of the
Pres.” – exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Was appeal to the CA proper?

HELD: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence .[ 10] The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed

Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary
arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely
adopts the LLDA’s findings is merely presumptuous
Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA
GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994

FACTS:

1. A complaint was filed with LLDA seeking to stop the operation of a 8.6 HA open garbage dumpsite
in Tala Estate, Caloocan due to its harmful effects on the residents and the possibility of polluting
the waters in the surrounding area

1. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan
was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Tala Estate
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from
the EnvironmentalManagement Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natu
ral Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act No. 4850.
2. Because of this LLDA issued an ex-parte CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government
of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.
3. Caloocan countered with a prayer for injunction at the RTC

ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Calooca
n?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions.
The authority shall have the following powers and
functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished

• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting
and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Riza
l and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wa
stes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex
press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE:
HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry
services.
2. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the
inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
3. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater
generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco
Del Monte River.
4. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA
clearance and Discharge Permit from LLDA.
5. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent.
6. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards
7. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted its application
for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary
measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed.
8. It was reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction.
Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed.
9. A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA.
 10. Petitioner requested another test. This time, it showed compliance.
11. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its corresponding
daily penalty be set aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual
hearing and not on 5 September 2001.
12. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no
legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to
abate the water pollution.

This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984
prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine
not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues.
The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in
PD No. 984.

CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines.

ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.

HELD: YES.

Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal
sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed
by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192).

SC disagree. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the
Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board
under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect
to adjudication of pollution cases.

Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to
effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement.

Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions
as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v.
Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if
such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its
express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner,
we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.