Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 13

G.R. No.

182356 December 4, 2013 The operation released the impingement of the nerve,
but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner, profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11
vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from
and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent. Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca
refused to pay.12
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions:
questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for
are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
what supporting facts the legal questions require; the (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm
court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed
adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of
deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only the complaint) and an average monthly income of
draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for
evidentiary support. actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees.13
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela
Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review on In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had
certorari1challenging the February 11, 2008 no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation
Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163. Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s
illness became manifest one month and one week from
The Factual Antecedents the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she
demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit.14
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela
Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an
Avenue, Quezon City.4 ordinary witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her
passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her
backseat.5 claim, she identified and authenticated a medical
certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla.
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana
Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her
after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and clinical history and physical examinations.17
sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car
end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. because the truck’s brakes got stuck.18
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart
from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear
to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.6 In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was
physically fit and strong when they met several days after
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she
identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7 selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that
she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral
character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed
Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and that she only hired Primero after he successfully passed
style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a
and sand business.8 licensed driver-mechanic.19

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he
feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He
shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the
by. Her injury became more severe. Her health vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of the
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move vehicular accident was a damaged compressor.
her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. According to him, the absence of air inside the tank
Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to damaged the compressor.20
examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered
from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the RTC Ruling
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy
to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that
not improve despite three months of extensive physical the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury
therapy.9 to be Joel’s reckless driving.21

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the
Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed
a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant
that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the that the truck was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel
compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. should have driven at a slower pace because road
Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his
and the C6 vertebrae.10 horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and
Page 1 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to
off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably determine the causation between Joel’s reckless driving
sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact
driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day. The RTC that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
further declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence The Respondent’s Position
of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable
because she was the employer and she personally chose In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela
him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of
ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three Rules of Court. She maintains that the CA’s findings of
elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that
present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are not substantial to merit
employer, personally or through another; (2) that the this Court’s consideration.
services were to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer had the authority to give at all times;
and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the The Issue
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of The sole issue for our consideration in this case is
₱570,000.00 as actual damages, ₱250,000.00 as moral whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of
damages, and the cost of the suit.22 Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.

CA Ruling Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.

In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a
the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to petition for review on certiorari when the findings of fact
establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular by the lower courts are conflicting
accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of
evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule The issue before us involves a question of fact and this
in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA’s
evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will
the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the not review them on appeal. It is not the function of this
date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a
began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Rules of Court. We can only review the presented
Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists
caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that in findings of the RTC and the CA.27
courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana We see this exceptional situation here and thus
did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented
sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, before the trial court.
her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her
claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate.
The medical certificate did not explain how and why the Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by
vehicular accident caused the injury.24 preponderance of evidence

The Petition Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-
stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to
1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions governing establish a quasi-delict case are:
hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no
evidence in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous animal
feeds were sold to the respondents in that case. As (1) damages to the plaintiff;
opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana
asserts that she has established by preponderance of (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by
evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the proximate some person for whose acts the defendant must
cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her respond, was guilty; and
damaged car show that the collision was strong. She
posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these
pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the negligence and the damages.28
medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from
whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular These elements show that the source of obligation in a
accident caused the injury is credible because she was quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual
a surgeon. duties that civilized society imposes upon its members,
or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate members of society to others.29
has probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that
an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first
uncontroverted.25 establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the liability as Joel’s employer.
opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge.
Page 2 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these
reckless driving and her whiplash injury. pictures show the causation grossly belies common
logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of
Only after she has laid this foundation can the the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and pictures.
supervision of Joel - arise.30
B.
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate
causation are established, this Court can then proceed The medical certificate cannot be
with the application and the interpretation of the fifth considered because it was
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31 not admitted in evidence

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit
fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving this
an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence
the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or by the RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.38
omission committed by his employee."32
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule
that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra- validly considered by the courts in arriving at their
contractual obligations.33 judgments.

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden However, even if we consider the medical certificate in
of proving it. the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
credible evidence.34 of the witness but on the knowledge of another person
who is not on the witness stand.39
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. given credence40 except in very unusual circumstance
that is not found in the present case. Furthermore,
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35 admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced
her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury
would not have occurred.36 During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on "Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was
three pieces of evidence: the reason why you were feeling that pain in your left
arm?
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate,
she stated that my condition was due to a compression
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician,
pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the Dra.?
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a
Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty. Yusingco: You
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued
probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum a medical certificate. What relation does this medical
probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that
fully discussed below.37 certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?
A. Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla
made out for me.
The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as
impact of the collision Exhibit H.
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the
damaged car show that the massive impact of the
collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not
Page 3 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling, that person.43
pain that you felt in your left arm?
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical be received in evidence on a matter requiring special
therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown
months indicated that I needed surgery. to possess.44

Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery? However, courts do not immediately accord probative
value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special
neck, on my spine. knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an
expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the
expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical that the expert witness may afford the courts by
operation? demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his
opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his
conclusions is founded.45
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the
compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by the
extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion
underwent for more than three months."42(emphasis cannot be given probative value for the reason that she
ours) was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary
witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature,
and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during
of the contents of the medical trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation
certificate.1âwphi1 However, she was not presented to on the nature as well as the cause and effects of
testify in court and was not even able to identify and whiplash injury in her testimony.
affirm the contents of the medical certificate.
Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity The Supreme Court cannot take
of her findings. We also point out in this respect that the judicial notice that vehicular
medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain accidents cause whiplash injuries.
of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by
state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela
accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that Llana did not present any testimonial or
it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was documentary evidence that directly shows the
suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical causal relation between the vehicular accident and
certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s
accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the negligence causes her whiplash injury was not
medical certificate only chronicled her medical history established because of the deficiency of the presented
and physical examinations. evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that
courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents
C. cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the
Joel’s negligence caused her field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to
whiplash injury has no probative value apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’
pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense arguments.
that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict
case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her
Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness cause by preponderance of evidence. While we
before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently
in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to
whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim,
physician and even assuming that she is an expert in unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a
neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without
violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court,
there is a substantial difference between an ordinary WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed
witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated
ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding: March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate SO ORDERED.
knowledge;
[G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998]
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT
sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
witness may also testify on his impressions of the COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA
FISHING CORPORATION, respondents

Page 4 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only 2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an
for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly investigation of this marine accident and on 21
proved.[1] Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable Coast Guard, the Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro,
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or be the reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount Doruelo navigated the LSCO Petroparcel and declared
thereof.[2] The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific the latter vessel at fault.
facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory damages are borne.[3] A court cannot 3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring
merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in favor of PNOC
as to the fact and amount of damages[4] as well as Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer
hearsay[5] or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping
suspect.[6] Such are the jurisprudential precepts that the stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.
Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic),
The records disclose that in the early morning of defendant PNOC STC again entered into an Agreement
September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the
by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing business properties and other assets appertaining to the
Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune tanker and bulk oil departments including the motor
Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were
Metro Manila when it collided with the sold to PNOC STC.
vessel Petroparcelwhich at the time was owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). 5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among
others, that PNOC-STC assumes, without qualifications,
After investigation was conducted by the Board of all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it
Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant obtained over the LSCO `Petroparcel.
Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding
the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the 6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between
Board and after unsuccessful demands on defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC was executed
petitioner,[7] private respondent sued the LSC and wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving
the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the the sea accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically
then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, paying identified and assumed by the latter.
thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-
two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two 7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of
pesos (P2.00).[8] In particular, private respondent prayed Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry of National
for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt.
value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes Edgardo Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of
of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate LSCO `Petroparcel.
plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees. Meanwhile, during
the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place
of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of 8. LSCO `Petroparcel is presently owned and
the Petroparcel.[9] operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt. Edgardo
Doruelo is still in their employ.
For its part, private respondent later sought the
amendment of its complaint on the ground that the 9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia
original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the caused by the reckless and imprudent manner in which
lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo,
XV.[10] Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing
respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went
actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the down with the ship when it sank the replacement value
insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of which should be left to the sound discretion of this
of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The Honorable Court.
amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting
from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected After trial, the lower court[15] rendered on
the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case
equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be No. C-9457 as follows:
a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on
account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing,
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
opportunities that would thereafter be proven.[11] against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended
to include petitioner as a defendant[12] which the lower a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing
court granted in its order of September 16, 1985.[13] After the value of the fishing boat with interest
petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended from the date of the filing of the complaint
complaint, on February 5, 1987, the lower court issued a at the rate of 6% per annum;
pre-trial order[14] containing, among other things, a
stipulations of facts, to wit:
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat attorneys fees; and
`M/V MARIA EFIGENIA owned by plaintiff was
navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, c. The costs of suit.
Batangas, on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said
fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker Petroparcel The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED
causing the former to sink. for lack of merit. Likewise, the case
against defendant Edgardo Doruelo is

Page 5 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
hereby DISMISSED, for lack of (h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear
jurisdiction. Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing
the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts.
SO ORDERED. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and banera (tub)
cited the evidence presented by private respondent at P65.00 per piece or a total of P414,065.00
consisting of the testimony of its general manager and
sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private respondents The lower court held that the prevailing
witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat
by private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of and all its equipment would regularly increase at 30%
ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing every year from the date the quotations were given.
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat
constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross On the other hand, the lower court noted that
tonnage.According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
was then carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of assorted fish estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation,
the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer any
the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro
radar, pathometer and compass. He further added that testified that the price quotations submitted by private
with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of respondent were excessive and that as an expert
fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in
services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle the making his estimates. However, he failed to present such
case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying that he
commencing suit for damages in the lower court. could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his
estimates as it was a sort of secret scheme. For this
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual reason, the lower court concluded:
damages, the lower court took into account the following
pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the
proffered during trial: plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the fishing
boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence
of ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV; of the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter
with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their
(b) Exhibit B a document titled Marine Protest sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said
executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 witness bare claim that the amount afore-said is
stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V Maria excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to
Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side that caused it present any documentary evidence to substantiate such
to sink with its cargo of 1,050 baeras valued claim. Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed
at P170,000.00; from the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co.,
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
95-footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A.
Magalong Engineering and Construction on January 26, Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the
1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such reconsideration of the lower courts decision contending
trawler would cost P2,250,000.00; that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for
damages; that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee;
(2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87- lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than
NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, that prayed for in the second amended complaint; and
Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the
showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine issues it had raised in its memorandum.[16] Petitioner
model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
cost P1,160,000.00; expounding on whether the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan therein plaintiffs failure to pay the prescribed docket
Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing fee.[17]
that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-
604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined
Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would reconsideration for lack of merit.[18] Apparently not having
cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would received the order denying its motion for reconsideration,
cost P145,000.00; petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a reply to
private respondents opposition to said motion.[19] Hence,
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear on February 12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion
Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance
that two (2) rolls of nylon rope (5 cir. X 300fl.) would of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had
cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3 cir. X become moot and academic.[20]
240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x
50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6), P4,000.00 and 50 Unsatisfied with the lower courts decision,
pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197, 150.00; petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del 14, 1992.[21]On petitioners assertion that the award
Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by
stipulating an acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per competent and admissible evidence, the Court of
appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del
contingent fee of 20% of the total amount recovered and Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of
that attorneys fee to be awarded by the court should be the lost vessel, it was well within his knowledge and
given to Del Rosario; and competency to identify and determine the equipment
Page 6 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
installed and the cargoes loaded on the value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977
vessel. Considering the documentary evidence collision of the vessels.[23]
presented as in the nature of market reports or
quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
the Court of Appeals held, thus: compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
Court categorically rules on the admissibility or and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done,
inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a
these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as penalty.[24]In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial actual damages include all the natural and probable
court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with consequences of the act or omission complained
evidence which appears to be of doubtful admissibility, of.[25] There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather damages: one is the loss of what a person already
than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure
124 [1899], p. 43, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained
Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. to him (lucro cesante).[26] Thus:
18). Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of
through constant use and practice and are very useful the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
and effective aids in the search for truth and for the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money
effective administration of justice. But in connection with which he would have to pay in the market for identical or
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages
or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to for the loss of use during the period before
be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of
court. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending
can easily be remedied by completely discarding or engagements.x x x.
ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No.
4142, May 31, 1950; cited in Francisco, x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the
Supra). [Underscoring supplied]. fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value in
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro
documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other
by appellants own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual
Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically future engagements and only in the light of its profit-
situated itself in an inconsistent posture by the fact that earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to
its own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a
on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) charter or other engagement which it was unable to
appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
evidence. Hence, it concluded: `capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning
machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual
x x x. The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly circumstances, without, of course, taking into account
established at the trial on the basis of appellees considerations which were too remote at the time of the
documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood loss.[27] [Underscoring supplied].
uncontroverted, and which already included the amount
by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party
complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is
amend the second amended complaint in so far as to the required to prove the actual amount of loss with
claim for damages is concerned to conform with the reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
evidence presented at the trial. The amount competent proof and on the best evidence
of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief available.[28] The burden of proof is on the party who
prayed for in appellees second amended complaint. would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on
either side. He must establish his case by a
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent preponderance of evidence which means that the
court held that following the ruling in Sun Insurance Ltd. evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to
v. Asuncion,[22] the additional docket fee that may later that of the other.[29] In other words, damages cannot be
on be declared as still owing the court may be enforced presumed and courts, in making an award must point out
as a lien on the judgment. specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.[30]
Hence, the instant recourse.
In this case, actual damages were proven through
In assailing the Court of Appeals decision, the sole testimony of private respondents general
petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 manager and certain pieces of documentary
as actual damages should have been in light of these evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the
considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September
such award on the actual value of the vessel and its 1977 value when the collision happened, the pieces of
equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no documentary evidence proffered by private respondent
evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an with respect to items and equipment lost show similar
adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel, items and equipment with corresponding prices in early
equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the
the prices quoted in respondents documentary evidence collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the
only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondents exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost
failure to adduce evidence to support its claim for goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of
unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly
private respondents failure to prove the extent and actual authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not
have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings
Page 7 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
and neither was he an expert on the subjects that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
thereof.[31] Clearly ignoring petitioners objections to the them there.
exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of
evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a
award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages. document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement
of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list,
course of Del Rosarios testimony. Private respondent did register, periodical or other published compilation; (3)
not present any other witnesses especially those whose said compilation is published for the use of persons
signatures appear in the price quotations that became engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used
the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
quotations are ordinary private writings which under the
Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered Based on the above requisites, it is our considered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H[39] are not
Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the commercial lists for these do not belong to the category
contents of the writings even though he was the of other published compilations under Section 45
seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem
the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, generis, (w)here general words follow an enumeration of
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
his personal knowledge. their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those
For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private specifically mentioned.[40] The exhibits mentioned are
respondent incurred losses in the total amount mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario
of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme who requested for them from dealers of equipment
caution considering that, because it was a bare similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
assertion, it should be supported by independent vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject
private respondent corporation[32] whatever testimony he matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations
would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its within the purview of commercial lists as these are not
equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work
Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed of the occupation.[41] These are simply letters responding
and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for example
credence[33]considering his familiarity thereto. However, Exhibit D which reads:
we do not subscribe to the conclusion that
his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel January 20, 1987
itself should be accepted as gospel truth.[34] We must,
therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
to support Del Rosarios claim as regards the amount of
losses.
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
The price quotations presented as exhibits
partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering Navotas, Metro Manila
that the persons who issued them were not presented as
witnesses.[35] Any evidence, whether oral or Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on Gentlemen:
the knowledge of another person who is not on the
witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can In accordance to your request, we are pleased to
show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the quote our Cummins Marine Engine, to wit.
hearsay evidence rule.[36] On this point, we believe that
the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model
provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.[37] N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-
line, 4-stroke cycle, natural aspirated, 5 in. x 6 in.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay bore and stroke, 855 cu. In. displacement, keel-
rule pertains to commercial lists and the like under cooled, electric starting coupled with Twin-Disc
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Marine gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction
Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals ratio, includes oil cooler, companion flange,
considered private respondents exhibits as commercial manual and standard accessories as per
lists. It added, however, that these exhibits should be attached sheet.
admitted in evidence until such time as the Supreme
Court categorically rules on the admissibility or Price FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
inadmissibility of this class of evidence because the - P 580,000.00/unit
reception of these documentary exhibits (price
quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of
the trial court.[38] Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, Total FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
however, would show that the conclusion of the Court of - P 1,160,000.00
Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule
states: vvvvvvvvv
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of T E R M S : CASH
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in
an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.

Page 8 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not
defect. be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.[48]

Very truly yours, Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits


does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent
of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because
POWER SYSTEMS, INC. (Sgd.) in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of
Appeals,[49] the Court said:
E. D. Daclan
In the absence of competent proof on the actual
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
in evidence but these are, however, subject to the nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated
general principles of evidence and to various rules in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
relating to documentary evidence.[42] Hence, in one case, violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new plaintiff for any loss suffered. [Underscoring supplied].
automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a
price current or commercial list within the statute which Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
made such items presumptive evidence of the value of arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
the article specified therein. The letter was not omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every
admissible in evidence as a commercial list even though case where property right has been invaded.[50] Under
the clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the Article 2223 of the Civil Code, (t)he adjudication of
letter in due course of business upon instructions of the nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the
dealer.[43] right involved and all accessory questions, as between
the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals assigns.
correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters or
communications when it held that unless plainly Actually, nominal damages are damages in name
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, evidence should only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are
better be admitted rather than rejected on doubtful or not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but
technical grounds,[44] the same pieces of evidence, simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
however, should not have been given probative injury.[51] However, the amount to be awarded as nominal
weight. This is a distinction we wish to point damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the
out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of injury sustained by private respondent considering the
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to concept and purpose of such damages.[52] The amount
considered at all.[45] On the other hand, the probative of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on
value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not certain special reasons extant in the case.[53]
it proves an issue.[46] Thus, a letter may be offered in
evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight Applying now such principles to the instant case,
depends upon the observance of the rules on we have on record the fact that petitioners
evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private
presented as witness to provide the other party to the respondents complaint claiming the amount
litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat
of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria
present the author of the letter renders its contents Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private
suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value
objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus: of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the
amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of
hearsay evidence admitted without objection. Some hold insurance payments should diminish the total value of the
that when hearsay has been admitted without objection, vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint
the same may be considered as any other properly considering that such payment is causally related to the
admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court
no more consideration than if it had been excluded. believes that such allegations in the original and
amended complaints can be the basis for determination
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a
one. Our Supreme Court held that although the question complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the
of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first plaintiff's cause of action.[54] Private respondent should
time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
probative value and should be disregarded whether
objected to or not. `If no objection is made quoting Jones With respect to petitioners contention that the
on Evidence - `it (hearsay) becomes evidence by reason lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended
of the want of such objection even though its admission complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed
does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when
its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to
mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the
evidence, the latter always prevails. docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for
damages under the amended complaint should not be
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the considered as having curtailed the lower courts
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance
evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[55] the unpaid docket
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even
same does not give such evidence any probative though private respondent specified the amount
value. But admissibility of evidence should not be of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence complaint.
whether objected to or not has no probative value.[47]
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question
at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground of
Page 9 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of
amended complaint and the second amended ₱265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the
complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration subject property. During the negotiations, DBP officials
of the decision of the lower court after it had received an allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and
adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name,
Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[56] participation in all including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2)
stages of the case before the trial court, that included to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.14
invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of ₱1,060,800,
the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its as evidenced by O.R. No. 344045115 dated December
answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 10, 2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager
1985,[57] petitioner did not question the lower courts Jorge B. Albarillo, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,16 in
jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989[58]when it petitioner's favor.
filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts
decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower
courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary stamp
tax (DST) in the amount of ₱99,450. DBP acknowledged
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537.17
Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G. R. CV
No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking
Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to the
as it awarded actual damages to private respondent petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount issued a Manager's Check (MC) No. 000095647518 in
ofP6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases the amount of ₱99,450.19
therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1)
technically petitioner sustained injury but which,
unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, In a Letter20 dated February 21, 2006, petitioner through
and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, its counsel demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal
we believe that an award of Two Million undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent
(P2,000,000.00)[59] in favor of private respondent as and documents affecting the sale of the subject property to
for nominal damages is in order. DBP.
No pronouncement as to costs. DBP, through its Letter21 dated April 22, 2006,
SO ORDERED. disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and
reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject
the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot
November 22, 2017 in petitioner's name.
G.R. No. 204289 Meanwhile, Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter22 dated May 15,
2006 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) requesting
FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with
vs. penalties and surcharges thereof affecting the sale of the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, subject property. The BIR, through its Letter23 dated May
Respondent 24, 2006 came out with a detailed computation in the
total of ₱160,700.88.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the
Decision2 dated February 22, 2012 and In a Letter24 dated June 2, 2006, petitioner proposed to
Resolution3 dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the CGT and
Appeals (CA), Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. DST but DBP should shoulder the penalties and
03030, affirming the Orders dated June 13, surcharges. The proposal, however, was turned down.
2008,4 November 4, 20085 and April 17, 20096 of the As of March 7, 2007, the total amount to be paid which is
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Branch 31 necessary for the transfer of the title in petitioner's name
in Civil Case No. 923. ballooned to ₱183,553.61 and counting.25

Factual Antecedents On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint26 for


damages for breach of contract against DBP before the
RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP
Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines be found to have breached its obligation with petitioner;
(DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale that DBP be held liable to pay the aggregate amount of
on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a ₱160,700.88 and surcharges which may be imposed by
residential lot with a two-storey building (subject the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP be ordered to
property) covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro pay damages and attorney's fees; and that DBP be
Street, Calbayog City, and with Tax Declaration (TD) ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for
Nos. 9901006009317 and 9901006004798 with a ₱99,450.
purchase price of ₱l,326,000.9
In its Answer with Counter-Claim,27 DBP alleged that the
In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) terms of the
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)10 appointing
his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to
represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will
subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. work on the document of transfer and to eject the
signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase11 and occupants thereon.28 Assuming that DBP's officials
Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of made such a promise, DBP alleged that the same would
Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis.12 DBP then not be possible since the petitioner did not give any
issued an Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 344001813 dated money to DBP for other expenses in going to and from
October 13, 2004, in the name of Fernando R. Mancol, Calbayog City. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the
Page 10 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
bank's policy to work for the registration of the instrument November 4, 2008. The RTC affirmed with modification
of sale of properties.29DBP further claimed that its June 13, 2008 Order, to read thus:
petitioner's unilateral act in issuing a check to DBP does
not constitute as evidence to prove that DBP assumed WHEREFORE, this court finds no reason to disturb its
the responsibility of registering the instrument of sale. By order dated June 13, 2008, subject only to a modification
way of counterclaim, DBP averred that petitioner grossly that [DBP] is directed to return to the [petitioner], the total
violated the terms and conditions of the agreement of amount of ₱99,450.00 deposited to it for the payment of
sale.30 Petitioner failed to pay, reimburse or assume the the [CGT] and [DST], with interest of six percent (6%) per
financial obligation consequent to the initiation and filing annum from December 21, 2004 until its return to the
of the writ of possession by DBP against the occupants. [petitioner].
Petitioner's failure was contrary to his promise and
assurance that he will pay. Petitioner did not comply with
the clear and express provisions of the Deed of Absolute SO ORDERED.45
Sale and of the rules and procedures of sale on
negotiation. DBP, thus, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that petitioner be DBP sought reconsideration46 of the RTC Order dated
ordered to assume the burden of initiating the ejectment November 4, 2008, which however, was denied by the
suit and to pay DBP damages, attorney's fees and cost RTC in its Order47 dated April 17, 2009. The RTC ruled
of suit amounting to ₱200,000. that DBP has waived its right to question the return of
₱99,450 to the petitioner since DBP failed to refute such
an issue in the RTC Decision dated April 14, 2008.
On February 20, 2007, the RTC issued an
Order31 declaring DBP in default by reason of its
counsel's failure to appear during the pre-trial and to file Both petitioner48 and DBP49 appealed the RTC Order
its pre-trial brief. dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008,
respectively, with the CA.
Trial ensued.
On February 22, 2012, the CA in its Decision,50 denied
both appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified32 that he was
the one commissioned or ordered by a certain Atty. Mar
De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
and to bring the following documents: a check worth appeals filed in this case are hereby DENIED. The
PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, assailed Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008
and the deed of sale.33 and April 17, 2009 of the [RTC], Branch 31 of Calbayog
City in Civil Case No. 923 are AFFIRMED. Costs to be
shouldered equally by both parties.
Mancol, Sr. testified34 that he signed the Negotiated
Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First SO ORDERED.51
Served Basis on behalf of his son, by virtue of the
SPA.35 He stated that after the execution and delivery of Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to Reconsideration,52 while DBP filed a Motion for
facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, Reconsideration,53seeking the reversal of the CA
and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the house Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions,
and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal agreement however, were denied in the CA Resolution54 dated
contradicted the negotiated rules and agreement.36 He September 27, 2012.
stated that DBP undertook to get rid of the occupants,
when its lawyer filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
a Writ of Possession37 dated January 11, 2005, which is Henceforth, only the petitioner filed the instant appeal
pending in the RTC.38 anchored on the following arguments:

On April 14, 2008, the R TC Decision39 ruled in favor of I. THE TESTIMONIES OF [PETITIONER'S]
the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to petitioner the WITNESSES, [VILLANUEVA] AND [MANCOL, SR.]
amount of ₱99,450 deposited to it for payment of the ARE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NOT
CGT and DST; to pay the surcharges and/or interests on HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AND THAT THEY
the CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from SUFFICIENTI.JY ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE
June 12, 2005 up to the date of payment; and to pay the AND VALIDITY OF A SUBSEQUENT ORAL
petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of ₱l5,000. The AGREEMENT BETWEEN [PETITIONER] AND DBP TO
RTC likewise dismissed DBP's counterclaim.40 (1) ARRANGE AND EFFECT THE TRANSFER OF THE
TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF [PETITIONER],
INCLUDING PAYMENT OF [CGT] AND [DSTs], AND (2)
Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration41 of the TO GET RID OF THE OCCUPANTS IN THE SUBJECT
RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others, that the PROPERTY[;]
testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay
because their statements were based on facts relayed to
them by other people and not based on their personal II. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
knowledge. EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE SUBSEQUENT
ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANCOL, JR. AND
On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order42 granted DBP's DBP, AND THAT TO IGNORE THEM IS TO SANCTION
motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint. VIOLATION OF MANCOL. JR.'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS[; AND]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration43 of the June
13, 2008 Order. For the first time, petitioner alleged that III. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF'
through his father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S
contemporaneous verbal agreement with DBP. He FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.55
argued that since his father was his attorney-in-fact, then
his father had personal knowledge of all transactions
involving the sale of the subject property. The motion, The petition/ails.
however, was denied in the RTC Order44 dated
Page 11 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
The above assignment of errors make it evident that the at all, while probative value refers to the question of
only issue involved in this appeal is one of fact: whether whether the admitted evidence proves an
or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, issue."64 "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be given probative admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
agreement in the sale contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself evidence."65
to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in
petitioner's name; and, get rid of the occupants of the It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only
subject property. on the facts that he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own
We answer in the negative. perception.66 A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such
"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by received as proof of the truth of what he has learned,
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that read or heard.67 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard
the purport of the written contract."56 from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements.68
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 957 of the establishes the truth of a disputed fact.69 A witness bereft
Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the called upon for that purpose because his testimony
agreement. "Moreover, as with all possible objections to derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as a
the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then competency of the extrajudicial source of his
be entertained.58 information.70
In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls
CA,59 the Court held that: within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary to
petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement between
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the agreement. As admitted by the petitioner, the alleged
objection must be made when the objectionable question verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and
is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SP A. Villanueva has no
features become apparent only by reason of such personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related
answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such only to the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to go to
evidence will form part of the records of the case as BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents: a
competent and complete evidence and all parties are check worth ₱99,450, the amount for the CGT, title, TD,
thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's acts would
resulting from the evidence.60 (Citations omitted) suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew about
the verbal agreement.
Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly
made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth exception As correctly pointed out by the CA:
under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in- [Villanueva] did not personally witness the perfection of
interest after the execution of the written agreement, by the alleged contemporaneous agreement between
offering the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. Mancol, Jr. and DBP. Furthermore, he had no personal
knowledge of its existence. His testimony merely
The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection touched on the alleged denial by the Revenue Office of
against the said testimonies during the trial since DBP the payment of the [CGT] on the subject property and the
was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection subsequent execution of a new deed of conveyance by
of the parol evidence rule. the DBP. It is clear then that his testimony did not bolster
[petitioner's] allegation to any degree.71
This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of
the testimonial evidence as an exception to the parol The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s
evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has testimony. Although the records show that by virtue of an
weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be SP A executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the
confounded with its probative value. Negotiated Offer to Purchase, including the Negotiated
Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a
First-Come First Served Basis, and that he made the
"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to
and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains prove that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal
to evidence already admitted and its tendency to agreement with DBP. Upon being asked what transpired
convince and persuade."61 The admissibility of a after the delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mancol,
particular item of evidence has to do with whether it Sr. simply answered that DBP agreed to undertake the
meets various tests by which its reliability is to be transfer of title of the lot, and to oust the occupants.
determined, so as to be considered with other evidence There was no mention as to who actually and personally
admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the appeared before DBP or any of its officials in order to
truth.62 The weight of evidence is not determined forge the alleged verbal agreement. Thus:
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the
witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its
practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge (DIRECT EXAMINATION by Atty. Elino Chin, counsel
trying the case.63 "Admissibility refers to the question of for
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
Page 12 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019
Witness: [Mancol, Sr.]) fact, for me, in my name, place and to do and perform
the following:
xxxx
1. To represent and negotiate before the DBP Catarman
ATTY. CHIN Branch regarding the INVITATION TO BID FOR
NEGOTIATED SALE scheduled on October 13, 2004 at
the Mezzanine Floor, the subject Residential Lot with two
Q After the delivery of this Exh. "H'', what transpired? storey building (TCT No. 2041) located at Navarro Street,
Calbayog City; and
A The bank agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title and
the payment of the [CGT] to get rid of the present 2. To sign, or execute and receive any paper or
occupants of the house and lot. document necessary for the above purpose.

Q You said that the bank agreed, is that in writing? x x x x.74

A Only verbal. There is nothing in the language of the SP A from which


We could deduce the intention of petitioner to authorize
Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP.
Q That does not contradict the negotiated rules and Indeed, it has been held that "[w]here powers and duties
agreement? are specified and defined in an instrument, all such
powers and duties are limited and are confined to those
A Yes, but there was a verbal undertaking for them to which are specified and defined, and all other powers
do what was agreed upon. and duties are excluded."75 Clearly, the power to enter
into a verbal agreement with DBP is conspicuously
inexistent in the SPA.
x x x x.72
To adopt the intent theory advanced by petitioner, in the
Additionally, the RTC aptly observed that: absence of clear and convincing evidence to that effect,
would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA. It would
[N]owhere in the records would also reveal that the likewise be contrary to "the rule that a power of attorney
agreement to arrange and effect the transfer of title over must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument
the subject lot was entered into between [DBP] and will be held to grant only those powers which are
[Mancol, Sr.], for and on behalf of the [petitioner]. specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond
nor deviate from the power of attorney."76
x x x The [SPA] authorizes [Mancol, Sr.] to represent the
[petitioner] and negotiate before the DBP, Catarman It is axiomatic that this Court will not review, much less
Branch on the invitation to bid on he sale of the lot reverse, the factual findings of the CA, especially where,
covered by TCT No. 2041 scheduled on October 13, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the
2004, as well as to sign or execute and receive any paper trial court, since this Court is not a trier of facts.
or document necessary for said purposes. This explains
why it was Mancol, Sr. who signed the Negotiated Offer All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to
to Purchase and the Negotiated Sale Rules and grant the petition.
Procedure, and who paid to DBP the initial payment of
the purchase price on October 13, 2004 in [petitioner's]
behalf. It was not established however whether the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
subsequent payments and other transactions, including dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated
the act of entering into an oral agreement with [DBP] that September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas
it will effect the transfer of the subject title, were also Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030 are AFFIRMED.
carried out by Fernando Mancol, Sr. in behalf of
[petitioner]. SO ORDERED.
The [petitioner] fails [sic] to show with whom the [DBP]
agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of the title in his
name.1âwphi1 Thus, as there is no showing that it was
[Mancol, Sr.] who entered into such agreement with
[DBP] or that he was personally present during the
perfection of the agreement and witnessed the same,
any statement from the latter as to the circumstances
relative to the perfection of such oral agreement would
indeed be hearsay.73

Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf


of petitioner, entered into a verbal agreement with DBP,
such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite
petitioner's insistence, the act of entering into a verbal
agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority
given to Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing and
negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid on
the sale of the subject lot, which is specifically worded as
follows:

I, FERNANDO R. MANCOL, JR., xxx by these presents


do hereby name, constitute and appoint my father
Fernando M. Manco, Sr., as true and lawful attorney-in-

Page 13 of 13 evidence.wlcnotes.nts2019

Вам также может понравиться