G.R. No.

L-23614 February 27, 1970

PEDRO M. BERMEJO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23615 February 27, 1970

JOVITA CARMORIN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Pedro M. Bermejo for himself and accused Jovita Carmorin as petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Augusta M. Amores for respondents-appellees.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together.

These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, rendered on June
3, 1964, dismissing two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction: one filed by
petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo against City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela of Roxas
City, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2721; and the other filed by petitioner Jovita Carmorin
against the same respondents, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2723.

In G.R. No. L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" (her identity at the time was
unknown) were charged in the city court of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of
falsification of public or official document in an information filed by the city fiscal. It was alleged in the
information that on or about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being
private individuals, conspired and confederated together and mutually helped each other, and
willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a document consisting of an amended petition for
habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales
and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents", which petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe"
placed her thumbmark over the name "Jovita Carmorin", which petition was subscribed and sworn to
by the two accused before the Clerk of Court, and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669, thus the two accused stated and made it appear in the
amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of the
petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it
was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia Carmorin.

Relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by
him and that he had examined the witnesses under oath before filing the information, the City Judge,
Hon. Isidro O. Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963, an order for the arrest of accused Bermejo. To
prevent his incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance: (1) that the
information did not charge an offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus (in Special
Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz), allegedly falsified, is not a document
contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that in a previous
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus proceedings it was declared
that the thumbmark in the amended petition was that of Jovita Carmorin; and (2) that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued for his arrest was illegal, Judge
Barrios having issued the same without first examining the witnesses under oath and in the form of
searching questions and answers as required under Republic Act 3828.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash, contending that the petition for habeas
corpus is a public document; that the provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to
municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle of res judicata, or conclusiveness of
judgment, cannot be invoked by the accused. After Bermejo had filed a supplement to his motion to
quash and a reply to the city fiscal's opposition, respondent City Judge, on October 5, 1963, issued
an order denying the motion to quash.

On October 14, 1963, Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack
of merit. Thereupon he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, naming as respondents City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal
Quirico Abela, contending that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion in filing an
information against him without conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and that the City
Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash, raising practically the
same issues that he raised in the motion to quash before the city court, and praying that respondent
City Judge be enjoined from hearing the criminal case against him during the pendency of the
special civil action in the Court of First Instance.

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela with
perjury, on August 23, 1963, in the same city court of Roxas City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for
allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit ... that she was really the one who signed with
her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin ... the amended petition for habeas corpus ... when in truth and in
fact, as she very well knew, she had not done such act of signing with her thumbmark said petition
and it was another person, who signed with a thumbmark said petition as Jovita Carmorin ... ." The
city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in accordance with law
before filing the information.

On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had conducted the proper preliminary
investigation, respondent City Judge Barrios issued an order for the arrest of accused Carmorin.
After posting a bond, said accused, thru her counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo (the same person
accused in the falsification case), filed a motion to quash the information, alleging substantially, that
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person because the warrant of arrest issued for her
arrest was improvidently issued, the respondent City Judge having issued the same without
examining the witnesses personally in the form of searching questions and answers in violation of
"Republic Act 3828, and that no offense was committed by the accused because it had already been
declared by the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No.
V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the petition for habeas corpus was the true thumbmark of
accused Carmorin.

After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to quash, and the accused, her reply, on
October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios issued an order denying the motion to quash. Carmorin's
motion for reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, also naming as
respondents City Judge Barrios and City Fiscal Abella, imputing abuse of discretion on the part of
City Fiscal Abella in filing an information against her without conducting the proper preliminary
investigation, and on the part of respondent Judge Barrios in denying her motion to quash, raising
the same questions raised by her in her motion to quash before the city court and also praying that
respondent City Judge be enjoined from hearing the case pending decision of the special civil action.

On November 22, 1963, respondent city fiscal filed answers to the two petitions, admitting some of
the allegations in the petitions, and denying others; and setting up the affirmative defense that the
orders of respondent City Judge in the criminal cases against the two petitioners cannot be the
subject of the petitions for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Capiz
because the city court of Roxas City issued said orders in the exercise oaf its concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, so that the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before it, pursuant to Section 87, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act 296, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 3828.

Herein petitioners filed their replies to respondents' answers, asserting that the Court of First
Instance of Capiz has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two cases for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction. After the parties had filed their memoranda in support of their respective
contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the court, the Court of First Instance of Capiz issued an
order, on January 6, 1964, declaring that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the court set the hearing of the
two cases for January 24, 1964.

During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly, Atty. Bermejo appeared and testified in
his behalf and in behalf of his co-accused Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abella testified for the
prosecution. Thereafter, the parties filed their memoranda. On June 3, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Capiz rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions, without pronouncement as to
costs. Their joint motion for reconsideration having been denied, herein petitioners brought the
present appeals to this Court.

Before resolving the questions posed in these appeals, We consider it necessary to rule on the
matter regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of First instance of Capiz to take cognizance of the two
petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction — a question that was properly raised by the respondents in the court below, although this
question is not now raised in the appeals. We hold that the Court of First Instance of Capiz erred in
taking cognizance of the two petitions. Section 6 of Republic Act 3828, amending Section 87,
paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act. of 1948, provides in part, as follows:

Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of
municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties
charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not
more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the
absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the
Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.

All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with justices of the peace of
capitals and municipal court judges shall be tried and decided on the merits by the
respective justices of the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be
recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, as the case may be.1

The crime of falsification of a public or official document by a private individual, of which petitioner
Bermejo is charged in the city court of Roxas City in Criminal Case No. 4451, is punishable with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while the crime of perjury of which petitioner Carmorin
is charged in Criminal Case No. 4452 before the city court of Roxas City is punishable with arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.2 Undoubtedly, these two cases fall
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court of Roxas City and the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
This Court, interpreting the aforequoted provision of Republic Act 3828, ruled that "[w]here the municipal
court (city court of Manila) has taken cognizance of a criminal case in its concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance, appeal must be taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; and
where the Court of First Instance has taken cognizance of such appeal in its appellate jurisdiction and
refused to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without
jurisdiction.3 And this rule applies even if the order is not a judgment on the merits because in cases of
this nature the Court of First Instance exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over the city court, and having
concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with "like jurisdiction" as the Court of First Instance. 4 It is Our
view, therefore, that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721
and 2723, now appealed to this Court, is null and void because said court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the City Judge and the City Fiscal of
Roxas City should have been filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of the latter's appellate jurisdiction over
direct appeals from the decision or order of the city court. We note, however, that the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz is correct insofar as it had dismissed the two petitions in question.

Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the petitioners in filing their petitions for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz and the
error of the latter court in taking cognizance of those petitions should not deter Us from ruling on the
questions raised in the present appeals. The record shows that these proceedings have been
pending for more than six years, and were We to remand these cases to the courts below so the
petitions for certiorari should be brought up to the Court of Appeals, our action would only cause
further delay.

We shall, therefore, decide whether herein petitioners are right in assailing the correctness or legality
of the proceedings in the city court of Roxas City in connection with the two criminal cases filed
against them, as they now contend in the present appeals.

While petitioners maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal of Roxas City has no power to
initiate the investigation of cases without a previous complaint by an offended party, they now admit
in their brief that under the existing laws he can commence such preliminary inquiry.5 Nevertheless,
petitioner Bermejo contends that before the city fiscal can conduct such preliminary investigation, there
must be a violation of the law, and in the instant case he avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of
his argument is that the petition for habeas corpus not being a document as contemplated in Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code, the city fiscal is precluded from conducting the preliminary investigation,
much less from filing the information, because Bermejo could not be prosecuted for falsification of the
alleged public or official document.

The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U.S. v. Orera,6 a "document" is defined as a
deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In
U.S. v. Asensi,7 this Court held that any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public
official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules
of Court,8 enumerates the following as public writings:

(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies
and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and papers, which
were involved in civil actions and which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk of superior
court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and were within scope of subject matter
of statute making alteration of court records an offense."9 Considering that the petition for habeas
corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one
Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court
Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the
court records in said proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document
as contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore,
cannot say that he committed no crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived
or conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying said petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin
placed her thumbmark therein when in fact she did not do so.

Petitioner Bermejo likewise complains that notwithstanding his request to be present at the
preliminary investigation, the same was conducted in his absence or behind his back thus denying
him his day in court. We find however, in the record — and the court a quo so found too — that on
March 11, 1963, a subpoena was issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requiring him to appear at the
office of the city fiscal of Roxas City on March 14, 1963 in an investigation. This subpoena was
received by Bermejo on March 12, 1963, and on the same day he sent a letter to the city fiscal,
which was received by the latter in the afternoon of the same day, requesting that the investigation
be postponed to March 19, 1963 because he Bermejo had to attend to another case which was
scheduled to be heard on the same date. The city fiscal acceded to his request, but because the
fiscal's office failed to notify him of the hearing on March 19, 1963, Bermejo was not present when
the investigation was conducted on that day. The preliminary investigation was conducted on the
very day requested by Bermejo, and after finding that there was a prima facie case the city fiscal
filed the information against him on August 22, 1963.

It appears, therefore, that while the city fiscal failed to notify petitioner Bermejo that his request for
postponement was granted, which should have been done, it can also be said that Bermejo was not
entirely blameless if the preliminary investigation was conducted in his absence. It was he himself
who set the date of the investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not bother to come
on the date he fixed. Neither did he try to find out what action the city fiscal had taken on his request
for postponement, on any day before the date of the hearing set by him, although he is living in
Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his office. Moreover, the information was filed five months
later, and this petitioner never inquired, at least as to the status of his case. This behavior of
petitioner cannot merit Our approval. It is obvious that he failed to employ the standard of care or
reasonable diligence that is expected of him. His unwarranted absence on the day of the hearing
which he himself requested, coupled with his seeming indifference or unconcern about his case, is a
clear indication that he was guilty of gross negligence in the protection of his rights. If he did not
have his day in court, it was because of his own negligence. If he was really interested to attend the
investigation, as he now pretends, he should have taken pains to communicate with the city fiscal.
This Court had ruled that in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard. 10 Since petitioner
Bermejo was afforded the opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation but did not take
advantage of it, he has no one to blame but himself. Anyway, said petitioner's rights can still be amply
protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city court where he can cross examine the
witnesses and present his evidence. 11

Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the
preliminary investigations ex parte, their rights to due process could not have been violated for they
are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous authorities 12 supporting this
view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new
Rules of Court invoked by them has no application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court
took effect on January 1, 1964 while the preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were
conducted in 1963. 13 The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot be given retroactive
effect. 14

Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not abuse his discretion in conducting
the preliminary investigations and that he filed the informations against herein petitioners in
accordance with law, there is, therefore, no merit in the assertion of petitioners that the warrants of
arrest issued for their arrest were illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that the orders of arrest were
tainted with irregularity, still the posting by petitioners of their bail bonds amounted to a waiver of the
effect of said defects.

There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued.
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act 3828 requires that the
Municipal Judge issuing the same, personally, examine under oath the witnesses,
and by searching questions and answers which are to be reduced to writing. Here,
instead of searching questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of
respondent and her one witness. Moreover, said affidavits were sworn to before
Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.

However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a waiver of the irregularity
attending her arrest. Besides, by her other personal appearances before the
municipal court and the court a quo, petitioner voluntarily submitted herself to the
court's jurisdiction. Hence, the absence of preliminary examination becomes moot
already, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and could
therefore proceed with the preliminary investigation proper." (Doce v. Branch II, Court
of First Instance of Quezon, et al., supra; Luna v. Plaza, L-27511, November 29,
1968).

The other point raised by petitioners in their contention that the respondent City Judge abused his
discretion in denying their motion to quash is that there was a judicial declaration in the habeas
corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the petition was the
genuine thumbmark of Jovita Carmorin, and that pronouncement is now conclusive so that they
cannot be prosecuted for falsification or perjury, as the case may be. This particular question should
rather be submitted and threshed out in the city court during the trial. The record of the habeas
corpus proceeding is not before Us, and We have no means of knowing what actually transpired in
that proceeding. The proper determination of this question will involve not only the introduction and
consideration of evidence, but also calls for a detailed inquiry on the principle of estoppel by, or
conclusiveness of, judgment.

Also devoid of merit is the other error pointed to by petitioners with respect to the alleged admission
by respondents that they acted illegally, capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction. A cursory
examination of their answers would reveal that what was admitted by respondent was the fact of the
filing by petitioners of their pleadings, but not the allegations contained therein, for, as shown in the
record, respondents have staunchly defended their acts and insisted that their actuations are legal or
in accordance with law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil
Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is set aside for having been rendered by the court without jurisdiction,
and the instant appeals are dismissed. We declare that the warrants of arrests issued, and the
informations filed, in Criminal Cases Nos. 4451 and 4452 of the City Court of Roxas City, are in
accordance with law, and these cases should be remanded to the City Court of Roxas City for trial
on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
 [G.R. No. L-1768. October 20, 1948.]

EMILIO ESPIRITU ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, v. VALERIANO FUGOSO ET AL., Respondents-

Appellees.

Lastrilla & Alidio for Petitioners-Appellants.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscals Julio Villamor and Cornelio S. Ruperto for
Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF POLICE OFFICER; RETRACTION BY LETTER, INSUFFICIENT. — Undoubtedly,

the letter of E. alone cannot nullify the affidavit that he and P. have subscribed and sworn before a notary
public on January 10, 1948. E’s allegation that he signed the affidavit very reluctantly and that he did not
sign it under oath cannot be taken seriously, not being supported by his oath nor corroborated by P., his co-
signer of the affidavit, aside from the consideration that a police officer, such as E, trained to face all kinds
of dangers in the performance of his official duties, cannot be believed to have succumbed to an alleged fear
of future consequences so as to sign an affidavit against his will.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COURTS, POWER TO DECLARE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — There is nothing in

section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution from which it can be concluded that the power to declare a law
unconstitutional belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. The section provides only for the procedure that
the Supreme Court should follow when such a question is presented before it.

3. ID.; QUESTION HAS BECOME MOOT UPON REPEAL OF THE LAW. — Appellants adduced strong arguments
against the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 698, but now the question has become moot,
because of the enactment on June 15, 1948 of Republic Act No. 271, expressly repealing Commonwealth Act
No. 698.

DECISION

PERFECTO, J.:

Appellants instituted this quo warranto proceedings to seek reinstatement in the positions of police officers
they were occupying in the Manila Police Department at the time the Pacific War broke out.

At the time this case was decided in the lower court on September 30, 1947, with the exception of Blas Pineda
and Wenceslao Ealdama, appellants had already been reinstated in the service and appointed to the respective
offices they were occupying prior to the outbreak of the war. According to the lower court, Pineda and Ealdama
were denied reinstatement for they had been removed from the service for cause.

This case was heard on January 10, 1948, on which date the city fiscal and assistant fiscals appearing for
appellees filed a petition for the dismissal of the case upon the fact that all petitioners have been reinstated
and are now occupying the respective positions they had at the outbreak of the war, including Blas Pineda and
Wenceslao Ealdama, as certified in the accompanying sworn statement of Florencio Catindig, Major and
administrative officer of the Manila Police Department, and supported by the joint affidavit of Pineda and
Ealdama, where both asserted that they had been reinstated, except that their salaries have not been adjusted
because of lack of appropriation and that, on account of the willingness of the administration to restore them
to their previously held ranks, obstructed only by the absence of the corresponding appropriations, they are
no longer interested in this quo warranto proceedings.

Appellants’ lawyers filed on January 19, 1948, manifestation to the effect that, according to a letter they
received from Ealdama, Pineda and Ealdama did not sign voluntarily their affidavit of January 10, 1943.

Undoubtedly, the letter of Ealdama alone cannot nullify the affidavit that he and Pineda have subscribed and
sworn before a notary public on January 10, 1948. Ealdama’s allegation that he signed the affidavit very
reluctantly and that he did not sign it under oath cannot be taken seriously, not being supported by his oath
nor corroborated by Pineda, his co-signer of the affidavit, aside from the consideration that a police officer,
such as Ealdama, trained to face all kinds of dangers in the performance of his official duties, cannot be
believed to have succumbed to an alleged fear of future consequences so as to sign an affidavit against his
will.

Furthermore, appellants have not disputed appellee’s allegation that Pineda and Ealdama have also been
reinstated.

The reinstatement of all of the appellants has made this proceeding academic.

Appellants’ alleged that the lower court erred in not declaring unconstitutional Commonwealth Act No. 698.

The lower court, invoking the provision of section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution, expressed the opinion
that the Constitution has lodged the power to declare law unconstitutional exclusively upon the Supreme
Court, and consequently, refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 698.
There is nothing in section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution from which it can be concluded that the power
to declare a law unconstitutional belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. The section provides only for the
procedure that the Supreme Court should follow when such a question is presented before it.

Appellants adduced strong arguments against the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 698, but now
the question has become moot, because of the enactment on June 15,1948 of Republic Act No. 271, expressly
repealing Commonwealth Act No. 698. The case is dismissed without costs.

EDGARDO PINGA, G.R. No. 170354

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

THE HEIRS OF GERMAN TINGA, and

SANTIAGO represented by VELASCO, JR. JJ.,

FERNANDO SANTIAGO,

Respondents.
 Promulgated:

June 30, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure1
necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the
amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff,
such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action.2 The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well
of the compulsory counterclaim.3
 In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule can no
longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The relevant facts are simple enough. Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two
defendants in a complaint for injunction4 filed with Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5
of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by
Fernando Santiago. The Complaint6 dated 28 May 1998 alleged in essence that petitioner and co-
defendant Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting
wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees therein. Respondents prayed that
petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined from committing acts of depredation on their properties, and
ordered to pay damages.

In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim,7 petitioner and his co-defendant disputed
respondents ownership of the properties in question, asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo
Pinga, from whom defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession
thereof since the 1930s.8 They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already been
ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of
Edmundo Pinga. It was further claimed that respondents application for free patent over the
properties was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971. Defendants in turn prayed that
owing to respondents forcible re-entry in the properties and the irresponsible and reckless filing of
the case, they be awarded various types of damages instead in amounts totaling P2,100,000 plus
costs of suit.9

By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. Moreover, respondents,
as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence. It appears that on 25 October 2004, the RTC
already ordered the dismissal of the complaint after respondents counsel had sought the
postponement of the hearing scheduled then.10 However, the order of dismissal was subsequently
reconsidered by the RTC in an Order dated 9 June 2005, which took into account the assurance of
respondents counsel that he would give priority to that case.11

At the hearing of 27 July 2005, plaintiffs counsel on record failed to appear, sending in his
stead a representative who sought the postponement of the hearing. Counsel for defendants (who
include herein petitioner) opposed the move for postponement and moved instead for the dismissal
of the case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents had failed to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented their evidence yet. On that ground,
the complaint was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants to present their
evidence ex-parte.12

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the order issued in open court on 27
July 2005, opting however not to seek that their complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that
the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte.
Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte
was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v.
Ruymann14 and Domingo v. Santos,15 which noted those instances in which a counterclaim could
not remain pending for independent adjudication.

On 9 August 2005, the RTC promulgated an order granting respondents Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissing the counterclaim, citing as the only ground therefor that there is
no opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of the [respondents].16 Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 10 October 2005.17
Notably, respondents filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
wherein they argued that the prevailing jurisprudential rule18 is that compulsory counterclaims
cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action, and a conversu, the dismissal of
the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims.19

The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a Petition for Review under Rule
45 on a pure question of law, the most relevant being whether the dismissal of the complaint
necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.

We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal
of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice
to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

On a prefatory note, the RTC, in dismissing the counterclaim, did not expressly adopt
respondents argument that the dismissal of their complaint extended as well to the counterclaim.
Instead, the RTC justified the dismissal of the counterclaim on the ground that there is no
opposition to [plaintiffs] Motion for Reconsideration [seeking the dismissal of the
counterclaim].20 This explanation is hollow, considering that there is no mandatory rule requiring
that an opposition be filed to a motion for reconsideration without need for a court order to that
effect; and, as posited by petitioner, the failure to file an opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration is definitely not one among the established grounds for dismissal [of the
counterclaim].21 Still, the dismissal of the counterclaim by the RTC betrays at very least a tacit
recognition of respondents argument that the counterclaim did not survive the dismissal of the
complaint. At most, the dismissal of the counterclaim over the objection of the defendant (herein
petitioner) on grounds other than the merits of the counterclaim, despite the provisions under Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutes a debatable question of law, presently meriting
justiciability through the instant action. Indeed, in reviewing the assailed orders of the RTC, it is
inevitable that the Court consider whether the dismissal of the complaint, upon motion of the
defendant, on the ground of the failure to prosecute on plaintiffs part precipitates or carries with it
the dismissal of the pending counterclaims.

Our core discussion begins with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the

plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.

The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the
plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in marked
contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which were superseded by the
1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due to failure to prosecute were governed by
Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the

trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to prosecute
on the pending counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority on remedial law
characterized as the nagging question of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries with
it the dismissal of the counterclaim.22 Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was hardly
silent on the matter.

In their arguments before the RTC on the dismissal of the counterclaim, respondents cited
in support City of Manila v.
Ruymann,23 Domingo v. Santos,24 Belleza v. Huntington,25 and Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
Co.,26 all of which were decided more than five decades ago. Notably though, none of the
complaints in these four cases were dismissed either due to the fault of the plaintiff or upon the
instance of the defendant.27

The distinction is relevant, for under the previous and current incarnations of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is Section 3, Rule 17 that governs the dismissals due to the failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute the complaint, as had happened in the case at bar. Otherwise, it is Section 2, Rule 17,
which then, and still is now, covered dismissals ordered by the trial court upon the instance of the
plaintiff.28 Yet, as will be seen in the foregoing discussion, a discussion of Section 2 cannot be
avoided as the postulate behind that provision was eventually extended as well in cases that should
have properly been governed by Section 3.
 Even though the cases cited by respondents involved different factual antecedents, there
exists more appropriate precedents which they could have cited in support of their claim that the
counterclaim should have been dismissed even if the dismissal of the complaint was upon the
defendants motion and was predicated on the plaintiffs fault. BA Finance Corp. v. Co29
particularly stands out in that regard, although that ruling is itself grounded on other precedents as
well. Elucidation of these cases is in order.

On the general effect of the dismissal of a complaint, regardless of cause, on the pending
counterclaims, previous jurisprudence laid emphasis on whether the counterclaim was compulsory
or permissive in character. The necessity of such distinction was provided in the 1964 Rules itself,
particularly Section 2, Rule 17, which stated that in instances wherein the plaintiff seeks the
dismissal of the complaint, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
the court.30 The
vaunted commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, remarking on Section 2, Rule 17, noted that [t]here
are instances in which a counterclaim cannot remain pending for independent adjudication, as,
where it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim.31

This view expressed in Morans Commentaries was adopted by the Court in cases where
the application of Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court was called for, such as in Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete,32 and Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog City.33 The latter case warrants brief
elaboration. Therein, the plaintiff in a civil case for damages moved for the withdrawal of her own
case on the ground that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay council as required by
law. Over the objection of the defendant, who feared that her own counterclaim would be
prejudiced by the dismissal, plaintiffs motion was granted, the complaint and the counterclaim
accordingly dismissed by the trial court. The Court refused to reinstate the counterclaim, opining
without elaboration, [i]f the civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein.34 The
broad nature of that statement gave rise to the notion that the mandatory
dismissal of the counterclaim upon dismissal of the complaint applied regardless of the cause of
the complaints dismissal.35

Notably, the qualification concerning compulsory counterclaims was provided in Section

2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules, the provision governing dismissals by order of the court, and not
Section 3, Rule 17. As stated earlier, Section 3, which covered dismissals for failure to prosecute
upon motion of the defendant or upon motu proprio action of the trial court, was silent on the effect
on the counterclaim of dismissals of such nature.

Spouses Sta. Maria, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,36 decided in 1972, ostensibly supplied the
gap on the effect on the counterclaim of complaints dismissed under Section 3. The defendants
therein successfully moved before the trial court for the dismissal of the complaint without
prejudice and their declaration in default on the counterclaim after plaintiffs therein failed to attend
the pre-trial. After favorable judgment was rendered on the counterclaim, plaintiffs interposed an
appeal, citing among other grounds, that the counterclaim could no longer have been heard after
the dismissal of the complaint. While the Court noted that the adjudication of the counterclaim in
question does not depend upon the adjudication of the claims made in the complaint since they
were virtually abandoned by the non-appearance of the plaintiffs themselves, it was also added
that [t]he doctrine invoked is not available to plaintiffs like the petitioners, who prevent or delay
the hearing of their own claims and allegations.37 The Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, noted:
 The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the
counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not available to, and was
not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the
prosecution of his own complaint. Otherwise, the trial of counterclaims would be
made to depend upon the maneuvers of the plaintiff, and the rule would offer a
premium to vexing or delaying tactics to the prejudice of the counterclaimants. It
is in the same spirit that we have ruled that a complaint may not be withdrawn over
the opposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is one that arises from, or
is necessarily connected with, the plaintiffs action and cannot remain pending for
independent adjudication.38

There is no doubt that under the 1964 Rules, the dismissal of a complaint due to the failure
of the plaintiff to appear during pre-trial, as what had happened in Sta. Maria, fell within the
coverage of Section 3, Rule 17. On the other hand, Section 2 was clearly limited in scope to those
dismissals sustained at the instance of the plaintiff.39 Nonetheless, by the early 1990s,
jurisprudence was settling on a rule that compulsory counterclaims were necessarily terminated
upon the dismissal of the complaint not only if such dismissal was upon motion of the plaintiff,
but at the instance of the defendant as well. Two decisions from that period stand out in this regard,
Metals Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals40 and International Container Terminal
Services v. Court of Appeals.41
 In Metals, the complaint was expunged from the record after the defendant had filed a
motion for reconsideration of a trial court order allowing the filing of an amended complaint that
corrected a jurisdictional error in the original complaint pertaining to the specification of the
amount of damages sought. When the defendant was nonetheless allowed to present evidence on
the counterclaim, the plaintiff assailed such allowance on the ground that the counterclaim was
compulsory and could no longer remain pending for independent adjudication. The Court, in
finding for the plaintiff, noted that the counterclaim was indeed compulsory in nature, and as such,
was auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derived its jurisdictional support
therefrom.42 It was further explained that the doctrine was in consonance with the primary
objective of a counterclaim, which was to avoid and prevent circuitry of action by allowing the
entire controversy between the parties to be litigated and finally determined in one action, and to
discourage multiplicity of suits.43 Also, the Court noted that since the complaint was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, it was as if no claim was filed against the defendant, and there was thus no
more leg for the complaint to stand on.44

In International Container, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by
the trial court. The defendants counterclaim was dismissed as well. The Court summarized the key
question as what is the effect of the dismissal of a complaint ordered at the instance of the
defendant upon a compulsory counterclaim duly raised in its answer.45 Then it ruled that the
counterclaim did not survive such dismissal. After classifying the counterclaim therein as
compulsory, the Court noted that [i]t is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it
could not remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, without adjudication by the court
of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based.46

Then in 1993, a divided Court ruled in BA Finance that the dismissal of the complaint for
nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of the defendants, carried with it the
dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim.47 The Court reiterated the rule that a compulsory
counterclaim cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court as it is auxiliary to
the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.48
Express reliance was made on Metals, International Container, and even Dalman in support of the
majoritys thesis. BA Finance likewise advised that the proper remedy for defendants desirous that
their counterclaims not be dismissed along with the main complaint was for them to move to
declare the plaintiffs to be non-suited on their complaint and as in default on their compulsory
counterclaim, instead of moving for the dismissal of the complaint.49

Justice Regalado, joined by Chief Justice Narvasa, registered a strong objection to the
theory of the majority. They agreed that the trial court could no longer hear the counterclaim, but
only on the ground that defendants motion to be allowed to present evidence on the counterclaim
was filed after the order dismissing the complaint had already become final. They disagreed
however that the compulsory counterclaim was necessarily dismissed along with the main
complaint, pointing out that a situation wherein the dismissal of the complaint was occasioned by
plaintiffs failure to appear during pre-trial was governed under Section 3, Rule 17, and not Section
2 of the same rule. Justice Regalado, who ironically penned the decision in Metals cited by the
majority, explained:

Turning back to Rule 17, it is readily apparent that Sections 2 and 3

thereof envisage different factual and adjective situations. The dismissal of the
complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of plaintiff, for whatever reason
he is minded to move for such dismissal, and, as a matter of procedure, is
without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the order of the court or, for that
matter, in plaintiff's motion to dismiss his own complaint. By reason thereof, to
curb any dubious or frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his benefit or to obviate
possible prejudice to defendant, the former may not dismiss his complaint over the
defendant's objection if the latter has a compulsory counterclaim since said
counterclaim would necessarily be divested of juridical basis and defendant would
be deprived of possible recovery thereon in that same judicial proceeding.

Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by

plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present
case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also
covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered
upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of
whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is
not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is
evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action
outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an
adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise
such absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same
arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated
for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant
but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a
meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication. Thus
understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless
be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and
proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his
conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal
of his counterclaim.50
 Justice Regalado also adverted to Sta. Maria and noted that the objections raised and
rejected by the Court therein were the same as those now relied upon by the plaintiff. He pointed
out that Dalman and International Container, both relied upon by the majority, involved the
application of Section 2, Rule 17 and not Section 3, which he insisted as the applicable provision
in the case at bar.51

The partial dissent of Justice Regalado in BA Finance proved opportune, as he happened

then to be a member of the Rules of Court Revision Committee tasked with the revision of the
1964 Rules of Court. Just a few months after BA Finance was decided, Justice Regalado proposed
before the Committee an amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 that would explicitly provide that the
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff shall be without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. The amendment,
which was approved by the Committee, is reflected in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee
held on 12 October 1993:

[Justice Regalado] then proposed that after the words upon the courts own
motion in the 6th line of the draft in Sec. 3 of Rule 17, the following provision be
inserted: without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. The Committee agreed with
the proposed amendment of Justice Regalado.

Justice Herrera observed that under Secs. 1 to 3 of Rule 17, it is not the
action that is dismissed but the complaint. He asked whether there is any distinction
between complaint and action. Justice Regalado opined that the action of the
plaintiff is initiated by his complaint.
 Justice Feria then suggested that the dismissal be limited to the
complaint[.] Thus, in the 1st line of Sec. 1, the words An action will be changed
to a complaint; in the 2nd line of Sec. 2, the words an action will be changed to
a complaint and in Sec. 3, the word action on the 5th line of the draft will be
changed to complaint. The Committee agreed with Justice Ferias suggested
amendments.

CA Pao believed that there is a need to clarify the counterclaim that the
defendant will prosecute, whether it is permissive or compulsory or all kinds
of counterclaims.

Justice Regalado opined that there is no need of making a clarification

because it is already understood that it covers both counterclaims.52

It is apparent from these minutes that the survival of the counterclaim despite the dismissal
of the complaint under Section 3 stood irrespective of whether the counterclaim was permissive or
compulsory. Moreover, when the Court itself approved the revisions now contained in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, not only did Justice Regalados amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 remain
intact, but the final version likewise eliminated the qualification formerly offered under Section 2
on counterclaims that can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.53 At present,
even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the
defendant to prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the
dismissal of the complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of the
counterclaim.
 In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Regalado expounds on
the effects of the amendments to Section 2 and 3 of Rule 17:

2. Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal
of his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall
be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have
the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the
court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been
dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from
notice to him of plaintiffs motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the
defendant are available to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive. A similar alternative procedure, with the same
underlying reason therefor, is adopted in Sec. 6, Rule 16 and Sec. 3 of this Rule,
wherein the complaint is dismissed on the motion of the defendant or, in the latter
instance, also by the court motu proprio.

xxxx

2. The second substantial amendment to [Section 3] is with respect to the

disposition of the defendants counterclaim in the event the plaintiffs complaint is
dismissed. As already observed, he is here granted the choice to prosecute that
counterclaim in either the same or a separate action. x x x x

3. With the aforestated amendments in Secs. 2 and 3 laying down

specific rules on the disposition of counterclaims involved in the dismissal
actions, the controversial doctrine in BA Finance Corporation vs. Co, et al.,
(G.R. No. 105751, June 30, 1993) has been abandoned, together with the
apparent confusion on the proper application of said Secs. 2 and 3. Said
sections were distinguished and discussed in the authors separate opinion in that
case, even before they were clarified by the present amendments x x x.54
 Similarly, Justice Feria notes that the present rule reaffirms the right of the defendant to
move for the dismissal of the complaint and to prosecute his counterclaim, as stated in the separate
opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA Finance.]55 Retired Court of Appeals Justice Herrera
pronounces that the amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 settles that nagging question whether the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, and opines that by
reason of the amendments, the rulings in Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA
Finance may be deemed abandoned.56 On the effect of amendment to Section 3, Rule 17, the
commentators are in general agreement,57 although there is less unanimity of views insofar as
Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned.58

To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, including
the amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent with the new rules
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents
arising after the effectivity of the new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even the
doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along with the complaint, clearly
conflicts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine
extends as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil Procedure. If, since
then, such abandonment has not been affirmed in jurisprudence, it is only because no proper case
has arisen that would warrant express confirmation of the new rule. That opportunity is here and
now, and we thus rule that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever nature
in the same or separate action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court
that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since
Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to
dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is
in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the counterclaim.

It would be perfectly satisfactory for the Court to leave this matter at that. Still, an
explanation of the reason behind the new rule is called for, considering that the rationale behind
the previous rule was frequently elaborated upon.

Under Act No. 190, or the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions promulgated in 1901, it was
recognized in Section 127(1) that the plaintiff had the right to seek the dismissal of the complaint
at any time before trial, provided a counterclaim has not been made, or affirmative relief sought
by the cross-complaint or answer of the defendant.59 Note that no qualification was made then as
to the nature of the counterclaim, whether it be compulsory or permissive. The protection of the
defendants right to prosecute the counterclaim was indeed unqualified. In City of Manila, decided
in 1918, the Court explained:
 By paragraph 1 [of Section 127], it will be seen that, where the defendant
has interposed a counterclaim, or is seeking affirmative relief by a cross-complaint,
that then, and in that case, the plaintiff cannot dismiss the action so as to affect the
right of the defendant in his counterclaim or prayer for affirmative relief. The reason
for that exception is clear. When the answer sets up an independent action
against the plaintiff, it then becomes an action by the defendant against the
plaintiff, and, of course, the plaintiff has no right to ask for a dismissal of the
defendants action.60

Nonetheless, a new rule was introduced when Act No. 190 was replaced by the 1940 Rules
of Court. Section 2, Rule 30 of the 1940 Rules specified that if a counterclaim is pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. This qualification remained intact when the 1964 Rules of Court was
introduced.61 The rule referred only to compulsory counterclaims, or counterclaims which arise
out of or are necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the plaintiffs claim, since the rights of the parties arising out of the same transaction should be
settled at the same time.62 As was evident in Metals, International Container and BA Finance, the
rule was eventually extended to instances wherein it was the defendant with the pending
counterclaim, and not the plaintiff, that moved for the dismissal of the complaint.

We should not ignore the theoretical bases of the rule distinguishing compulsory
counterclaims from permissive counterclaims insofar as the dismissal of the action is concerned.
There is a particular school of thought that informs the broad proposition in Dalman that if the civil
case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein,63 or the more nuanced discussions
offered in Metals, International Container, and BA Finance. The most potent statement of the
theory may be found in Metals,64 which proceeds from the following fundamental premisesa
compulsory counterclaim must be set up in the same proceeding or would otherwise be abated or
barred in a separate or subsequent litigation on the ground of auter action pendant, litis pendentia
or res judicata; a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the main suit and derives its jurisdictional
support therefrom as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the complaint;65 and that if the court dismisses the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the compulsory counterclaim must also be dismissed as it is merely
ancilliary to the main action and no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the
counterclaim.

The first point is derived from Section 4, Rule 9, of the 1964 Rules of Court, while the two
latter points are sourced from American jurisprudence. There is no disputing the theoretical
viability of these three points. In fact, the requirement that the compulsory counterclaim must be
set up in the same proceeding remains extant under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.66 At the
same time, other considerations rooted in actual practice provide a counterbalance to the above-
cited rationales.
 Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a
complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim
is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the
complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.

It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates
the cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case,
especially as a general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form the counterclaim
are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other than the plaintiffs very act of filing the
complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to
have occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only apparent exception to this
circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in filing
the complaint precisely causes the violation of the defendants rights. Yet even in such an
instance, it remains debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is
sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff.67

These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is permissive or

compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as to
the amount involved and the nature of the claim.68 The fact that the culpable acts on which the
counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is
insufficient causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint. The dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the boundaries of time to undo the act or omission
of the plaintiff against the defendant, or vice versa. While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes
the pursuit of litigation
by the plaintiff, either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous to similarly
encumber the defendant who maintained no such initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly
moves for the dismissal of the counterclaim or neglects to timely pursue such action, let the
dismissal of the counterclaim be premised on those grounds imputable to the defendant, and not on
the actuations of the plaintiff.

The other considerations supplied in Metals are anchored on the premise that the
jurisdictional foundation of the counterclaim is the complaint itself. The theory is correct, but there
are other facets to this subject that should be taken into account as well. On the established premise
that a counterclaim involves separate causes of action than the complaint even if derived from the
same transaction or series of transactions, the counterclaim could have very well been lodged as a
complaint had the defendant filed the action ahead of the complainant.69 The terms ancillary or
auxiliary may mislead in signifying that a complaint innately possesses more credence than a
counterclaim, yet there are many instances wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is
meritorious. In truth, the notion that a counterclaim is, or better still, appears to be merely ancillary
or auxiliary is chiefly the offshoot of an accident of chronology, more than anything else.

The formalistic distinction between a complaint and a counterclaim does not detract from
the fact that both of them embody causes of action that have in their end the vindication of rights.
While the distinction is necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules of procedure,
it should be remembered that the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the means
for the vindication of rights. A party with a valid cause of action against another party cannot be
denied the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the good fortune of filing the case
first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the previous procedural rule and
correspondent doctrine, which under their final permutation, prescribed the automatic dismissal of
the compulsory counterclaim upon the dismissal of the complaint, whether upon the initiative of
the plaintiff or of the defendant.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable
disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is
palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint,
the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the
judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if
the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from
peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 9 August 2005 and 10
October 2005 of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur in Civil Case
No. 98-012 are SET ASIDE. Petitioners counterclaim as defendant in Civil Case. No. 98-012 is
REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to hear and decide the counterclaim with
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001]

MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO,
LEON, VICTORINA, TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA,
respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately
on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the
counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The
absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot
acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February
17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 42971. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, without anymore touching on the merit of the judgment, we hereby SET ASIDE
the default Order of June 18, 1992 which the lower court had improvidently issued as well as the
ensuing judgment which suffers from the same fatal infirmity. Let the case be remanded to the
lower court, which is directed to promptly set the case for pre-trial conference in accordance with
the present Rules, and for further proceedings.[2]

Also assailed is the September 11, 1998 CA Resolution[3] which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts

The appellate court summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:

The record shows that on October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia,
Tomasa De Guia and Irene Manuel filed with the court below a complaint for partition against
defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia. They alleged x x x that the real
properties therein described were inherited by plaintiffs and defendants from their predecessors-
in-interest, and that the latter unjustly refused to have the properties subdivided among them.
Shortly after defendants filed their traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower
court, in which plaintiff Tomasa De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason
that she had become an unwilling co-plaintiff.

It is further shown in the record that on June 11, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice
setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were
sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned out that both defendants and counsel
failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared
as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

It appears that on July 6, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the June 16,
1992 Order which declared them as in default. They explained therein that they received the
Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of June 18, 1992, giving them no chance to appear for
such proceeding in the morning of that day. The Motion was opposed by plaintiffs who pointed
out that per Postal Delivery Receipt, defendants counsel actually received his copy of the Notice
on June 17, 1992 or one day before the date of pre-trial. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, plaintiffs further urged that counsels receipt of the said notice on June 17, 1992 was
sufficient to bind defendants who received said notice on the next day. Finally, they faulted
defendants for failing to support their Motion for Reconsideration with an affidavit of merit
showing among others that they had a meritorious defense.

In an Order dated August 19, 1992, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied and on June
11, 1993, judgment was rendered ordering the partition of the controverted parcels of land.[4]
The CA Ruling

The CA sustained respondents claim that the trial court had improperly declared them in
default. It held that the Notice of pretrial received by their counsel a day before the hearing did not
bind the clients, because the Rules of Court in effect at the time mandated separate service of such
Notice upon the parties and their counsel. Said the appellate court:

In fine, we hold that the lower court committed a reversible error in declaring appellants as in
default for their failure to attend the pre-trial conference [of] which they were not properly
served x x x notice and in subsequently rendering the herein appealed judgment. And while we
commend the lower court for its apparent interest in disposing of the case with dispatch, the
imperatives of procedural due process constrain us to set aside the default order and the appealed
judgment, both of which were entered in violation of appellants right to notice of pre-trial as
required by the Rules.[5]

Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues

Petitioners impute the following alleged errors to the CA:

I

The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not finding private
respondents as in default despite the existence of fraud, for being contrary to law, and for being
contrary to the findings of the trial court.

II

The Respondent Court, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in reversing the trial courts Decision
notwithstanding private respondents violations of Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 and Revised Circular No. 28-91.

III

The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not affirming the
compromise agreement which has the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially
approved.
 IV

The Respondent Court gravely erred in not applying Rule 135, Section 8 as warranted by the
facts, admission and the evidence of the parties.[7]

In the main, petitioners raise the following core issues: (1) the propriety of the trial courts
order declaring respondents in default; and (2) petitioners allegation of procedural prejudice.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue: The Propriety of the Default Order

When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule 20 of the pre-
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:

SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court
shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider:

x x x x x x x x x.
This provision mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the parties and their
lawyers.[8] In Taroma v. Sayo,[9] the Court explained:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, therefore, the Court in reaffirming the ruling that notice of
pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record, restates that while
service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts
uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at counsels address with the
express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and
place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver
counsel a written authority to represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the
warning that a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. (emphasis
supplied)

Hence, before being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel
must be shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial conference.[10] Moreover, if served
only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date,
the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the
proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.[11]
In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or after the
pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sent to their
counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the pretrial
conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby notified that the above-entitled case will be
heard before this court on the 18 day of June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial.[12]
th

Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a
lack of notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying them the
opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.
 Of course, this situation would not have arisen under Section 3,[13] Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It specifically provides that notice of pretrial shall be served on counsel, who
is charged with the duty of notifying the client. Considering the milieu of the present case,
however, such amended proviso is not applicable.
Second Issue: Allegation of Procedural Bias

Petitioners allege that, to their detriment, the appellate court disregarded established
procedural precepts in resolving the case, and that it did so for three reasons. First, respondents
Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default, filed with the trial court, was merely pro
forma because the former lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Second, it also lacked an affidavit
of merit. Third, respondents Appeal Brief did not contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Granting that respondents Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default was pro
forma, this issue has become moot, not only because the trial court had denied such Motion, but
also because what was appealed was the judgment rendered by the lower court. For the same
reason, we must also reject petitioners insistence that an affidavit of merit was absent. In any case,
there was no need to attach an affidavit of merit to the Motion, as the defenses of respondents had
been set out in their Answer.
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice
behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the
shortcomings of respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim.
Indeed, it has been held that [i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules
in a particular case in order to do justice.[14]
One last point. Petitioners fault the CA for remanding the case to the trial court, arguing that
the appellate court should have resolved the case on its merit.
We understand petitioners apprehension at the prospect of re-hearing the case; after all, it has
been nine years since the filing of the Complaint. However, their claim and the evidence supporting
it -- and respondents as well -- can be best threshed out and justly resolved in the lower court. In
this regard, we cannot pass upon the validity of the Agreement of Partition between Mariano de
Guia and Ciriaco de Guia, for such action would amount to a prejudgment of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.

Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.

RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:

Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's
so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion
to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the
issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of
an early resolution hereof.

The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:

1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698
was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed
at P15,000.00. 1

3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for
and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:

xxx xxx xxx

3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which
required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or
gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further,
she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain.
....

4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended
bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she
is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she
be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court
and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.

Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her
arrest be immediately recalled.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution3 authorizing petitioner to post a
cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at
the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said
court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the
other legal fees.4

5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of
the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty.
Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying
for about fifteen minutes. 5

6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991,
setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of
May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said
court on or before June 5, 1991.6

7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining
under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would
like to prove as baseless.7

8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos.
12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court,
in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment,
originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.

9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner
until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to
cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel.8

10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and
lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated
September 10, 1992.

11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner which reads as follows:

Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to
leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering
the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on
January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration
from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that
 she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24,
1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused
unless authorized from (sic) this Court.10

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States
to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the
United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.

In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:

1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave

abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and

due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order
despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.

3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but
also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.

4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.

5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes.11

I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the
fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We
reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.12
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting
of bail bond.

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting
the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise
that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional
release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even
attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the
fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the
court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which
ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before
respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that
in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who
requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.

II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of
this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to
prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more
reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering
with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order
previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case
pending before it.

It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for
reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court
continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.

Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal,14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where
an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend
the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on
the dismissal of the action.15

It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective,
even though it is not final.16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a
restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the
restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect
such dissolution.18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power.20

The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:

. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that
an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force.
The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge
Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so
insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on
notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever
had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction
impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . .
Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity
practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it
by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . .21

This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in
point and of more recent vintage:

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of
UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioners
then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in
SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of
a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22

On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the
Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner.
At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992.

Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari
divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated by
misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason
for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.

The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation
for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of
divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is
elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no
writ of injunction restraining it.23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or
restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is
nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case
pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless
continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.

III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.

First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is
made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure
order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction;25 or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to the due administration of justice;27 or are
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;28 and include
the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within
the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction.30 Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper
coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the
opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What
ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances. 31

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of
such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure
order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order
is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further
studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and
that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete
despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances
and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in
Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in
Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):

. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold

the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right
to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
 The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga
v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as

delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by

preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes.33

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of
petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending
cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in
the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been
issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing
of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157866 February 14, 2007

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and
AVELINO BANAAG, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy filed by
petitioners Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14 February
2003 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying their Motion to
Suspend Execution in Civil Case No. C-19097.

The instant controversy arose from a verified complaint for Ejectment filed by private respondent
Avelino Banaag on 31 January 1997 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 49, Caloocan
City, against petitioners. Private respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed
property identified as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Private respondent averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property without his knowledge
and consent and that several demands were made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners
refused to vacate the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the matter to the Lupon
Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse proved futile since the parties were not able to settle
amicably. Private respondent then filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC.

On 23 April 1997, petitioners filed their answer denying having unlawfully deprived private respondent
possession of the contested property. Petitioners claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with
the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO’s president
in their favor.

On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend Proceedings on the ground
that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil
Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the
MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants
of the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in
Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.
In an order dated 7 August 1997, the MeTC denied said manifestation and motion. It ratiocinated that
1awphi1.net

the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial boundaries
of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the injunction it
issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

For failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise agreement during the preliminary conference, they
were required to submit their respective position papers containing their positions on the following
issues: (a) whether or not the torrens title of private respondent is a valid basis of his right to eject
petitioners, (b) whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and (c) whether either
the private respondent or petitioners are entitled to their respective claims for damages.

In their position paper, petitioners insisted that they are entitled to the possession of the land because
they have been occupants thereof as early as 1978, long before the property was acquired by private
respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case as ejectment suit applies only to instances where possession of the land lasted for a
period of not more than one year. In addition, they claimed that private respondent has not proffered
any evidence that he has prior physical possession over the property. Petitioners reiterated their
posture in the motion to suspend proceedings wherein they urged the MeTC to respect the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. They also alleged that private respondent’s
certificate of title originated from a fictitious title.

In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private respondent. It opined that TCT No.
196025 in private respondent’s name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his
inherent right to possess the same. This title entitled private respondent better right to possess the
subject property over petitioners’ Certificate of Occupancy executed in their favor by PIADECO. It held
that it has jurisdiction over the controversy since private respondent filed the case within one year from
the time the demand to vacate was given to petitioners. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendants Augusto Mangahas,
Victor Solis, Elisa M. Dionila, Joselito Mangahas and Rogelio Verdejo and all persons claiming right
under them as follows:

1) To vacate the lot in question by removing their houses erected thereat and restore
possession of the lot to the plaintiff;

2) To pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for their use of the premises for the period
from August, 1996 until the property is vacated at the rate of two thousand (₱2,000.00)
pesos per month;

3) To reimburse to plaintiff the sum of ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos as and for attorney’s
fees; [and]

4) To pay the costs of this suit.2

On 2 December 1999, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-19097. In a Decision dated 16 November 2000, the trial court affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. It
ruled that the MeTC was correct in denying petitioners’ motion to suspend proceedings anchored on
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC reasoning that the writ of the latter
court is limited only to its territorial area, thus, the same has no binding effect on the MeTC of Caloocan
City. It sustained the MeTC’s ruling that the latter court has jurisdiction over the case as the same has
been filed within the reglementary period from the date of demand to vacate. Furthermore, the RTC
stated that the validity of private respondent’s title cannot be assailed collaterally in the instant case.
On 18 December 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in a
resolution dated 1 June 2001.

Unfazed, petitioners appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on 6 June 2001 which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65076.

In a Decision3 dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a Resolution dated 20 November 2002.

The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on 13 December 2002.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 2000, private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for execution
pending appeal which was opposed by petitioners. In an order dated 12 September 2001, the RTC
granted the motion.

To implement and enforce its decision, the same court on 27 September 2001 issued a Writ of
Execution. On 28 September 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Reconsider Order dated 12 September
2001 which was denied in an order dated 5 February 2002.

On 17 January 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC. Said motion
was denied in an order dated 14 February 2003. On 05 March 2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho implemented
and enforced the writ of execution.

Hence, the instant recourse.

At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court via petition for
Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard of
the hierarchy of courts and should have been dismissed outright. This Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not
exclusive.4 It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.5 Such
concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.6
A direct recourse of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.7

In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or compelling reason not to observe
the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Equally noteworthy is petitioners’ resort to this Court through petition for declaratory relief. This action
is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.8 Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court which deals with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e.,
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of statute or ordinance.
Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners’ action to declare the RTC order denying their
motion to suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated, should warrant the outright
dismissal of this case.9

At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already been elevated, this Court deems it
wise to resolve the controversy on the merits.
Petitioners assail the Order dated 14 February 2003 of the RTC Caloocan City and its Decision dated
16 November 2000 on the sole ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order and
Decision by virtue of the Writ of Injunction issued on 10 November 1997 by the Quezon City RTC.

It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the injunction order originating from the
Quezon City RTC had already been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65076 affirmed the Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had
become final and executory per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002.10 The relevant portion of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision reads:

The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated November 10, 1997 which
emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should have prompted the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then pending before it. It was the petitioners’
contention that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch
[as] both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is
basically regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it may
be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995).

Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court shall define
the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory
thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"

Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City could
not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners’ Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the Regional
Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate presides.11

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC
became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue.12 Stated
otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in a case that
declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal.13 The reason lies in the fact that public policy
dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should
not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.14

Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the Quezon City
RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed upon
with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there would be no end to litigation.
As elucidated in Hufana v. Genato15 :

It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between
the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts
of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer
be relitigated anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest in that
aforementioned case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by the principle of res judicata, but
at least by conclusiveness of judgment.

Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners’ motion to
suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must
be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the presiding
judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent events would render
execution of judgment unjust.16 Petitioners did not allege nor proffer any evidence that this case falls
within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan
City, denying petitioners’ Motion to Supend Execution dated 14 February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-
19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141407. September 9, 2002]

LAPULAPU DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs. GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Having the same power and prerogatives, courts of coequal and coordinate
jurisdiction cannot interfere with each others orders and judgments. The ultimate test to
determine the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and the
litigants by the repeated invocation of substantially the same facts, issues and reliefs,
thereby unnecessarily clogging court dockets and creating the possibility of conflicting
rulings and decisions.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, seeking the annulment
of the April 30, 1999 Decision and the December 29, 1999 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA).i The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition being partly meritorious, the Court hereby resolves as
follows:
 1. To AFFIRM the Orders of May 28, 1998 and August 4, 1998, in
Civil Case No. 2203-L insofar as they set aside the order holding respondent
Register of Deeds guilty of indirect contempt of court and to NULLIFY said
orders insofar as they set aside the directives contained in paragraphs (a), (b),
and (c) of the order dated November 28, 1997;
2. To DECLARE without FORCE and EFFECT insofar as petitioner
Group Management Corporation is concerned, the decision in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429 as well as the orders and writs issued for its execution and
enforcement; and
3. To ENJOIN respondent Lapulapu Development and Housing
Corporation, along with its agents and representatives and/or persons/public
officials/employees acting in its interest, specifically respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 38, and respondent Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City,
from obstructing, interfering with or in any manner delaying the
implementation/execution/enforcement by the Lapulapu City RTC of its order
and writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
4. For lack of sufficient basis, the charge of contempt of court against
respondent Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation and the public
respondents is hereby DISMISSED.ii
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration.iii

The Facts

The procedural and factual antecedents of this case are summarized by the CA in
this wise:
LLDHC, formerly known as the B. Sunga Corporation, was the registered owner of
seventy-eight (78) lots, with an aggregate area of 423,117 square meters, located at
Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-lapu City.
On February 4, 1974, LLDHC entered into a Project and Loan Agreement with GSIS,
whereby the latter undertook to extend a loan of P25 million to be used by LLDHC in
developing, subdividing and selling to GSIS members, its property at Marigondon, Lapu-
lapu City. To implement the Agreement, GSIS extended to LLDHC an ad interim medium
term loan of P2,500,000.00 of which P710,400.00 was released. To secure payment of
the loan, LLDHC executed a real estate mortgage over its 78 lots at Marigondon,
Lapulapu City in favor of GSIS.
LLDHC having failed to develop the property and defaulted in the payment of its
loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. And, being the lone bidder in the public auction
sale, GSIS acquired the mortgaged lots. After the lapse of the redemption period, GSIS
consolidated its ownership over the mortgaged lots and the corresponding transfer
certificates of title were issued in its name.
On February 26, 1980, GSIS, as new owner, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale
covering its Marigondon lots in favor of GMC.
On April 23, 1980, LLDHC filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ
of Mandatory Injunction against GSIS. Originally docketed as Civil Case No. 131332 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the complaint (re-docketed as Civil Case No. R-82-
3429) was assigned to Branch 38 thereof.
On November 3, 1989, GMC filed a complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against GSIS, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-L of the Regional Trial Court
of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint seeks to compel GSIS to execute a Final Deed of Sale
in favor of GMC covering the Marigondon lots, the purchase price thereof having been
paid in full by GMC to GSIS.
Allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 2203-L, LLDHC filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for specific performance. Said motion having been denied by the Lapu-Lapu
City RTC, LLDHC filed its Answer in Intervention and thereafter participated in the
proceedings as intervenor.
On February 24, 1992, after a full-blown trial, a decision was rendered in Civil Case
No. 2203-L, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to:
1. Execute the final deed of absolute sale and deliver the seventy-
eight (78) certificates of title covering said seventy-eight (78) parcels of land to
the plaintiff:
2. Pay plaintiff actual damages, plus attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, in the amount of P285,638.88 and P100,000.00 exemplary damages;
3. dismissing in toto intervenors complaint-in-intervention for lack of
evidence of legal standing and legal interest in the suit, as well as failure to
substantiate any cause of action against either plaintiff or defendant.
SO ORDERED.
LLDHC, as intervenor, and GSIS as defendant, filed their respective Notices of
Appeals on March 11, 1992 and March 20, 1992. However, on December 6, 1993, their
appeals were dismissed by the Lapu-Lapu City RTC.
On May 10, 1994, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 of the
Manila RTC, Branch 38, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ANNULLING the foreclosure by the defendant GSIS of the
mortgage over the seventy-eight (78) parcels of land here involved:
2. CANCELLING the consolidated certificates of titles issued in the
name of GSIS and directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue
new certificates of titles over those seventy-eight (78) parcels of land in the
name of the plaintiff, in exactly the same condition as they were before the
foreclosure;
3. ORDERING the plaintiff to pay the GSIS the amount of
P9,200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per
annum commencing from October 12, 1989 until fully paid; and
4. ORDERING defendant GSIS to execute a properly registrable
release of discharge of mortgage over the parcels of land here involved after
 full payment of such amount by the plaintiff.
All claims and counterclaims by the parties as against each other are
hereby dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On July 27, 1994, LLDHC filed a Complaint with this Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 34696, seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
In a decision dated December 29, 1994, this Court dismissed the complaint for
annulment of judgment, on the following ground:
In fine, there being no showing from the allegations of the petition that the
respondent court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties
in Civil Case No. 2309 [2203-L], petitioner has no cause of action for the
annulment of judgment. The complaint must allege ultimate facts for the
annulment of the decision (Avendana v. Bautista, 142 SCRA 39). We find none
in this case.
On January 28, 1995, no appeal having been taken by LLHDC, the decision of this
Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696 became final and executory, and entry of judgment was
made on August 18, 1995.
On February 2, 1995, LLDHC filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 118633. Like the complaint in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696, the petition
also seeks the annulment of the February 24, 1992 decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
In its Resolution, dated September 6, 1996, the Supreme Court dismissed LLDHCs
petition, in G.R. No. 118633, stating inter alia, thus:
In a last ditch attempt to annul the February 24, 1992 Decision of the
respondent court, this petition was brought before us on February 2, 1995.
Dismissal of this petition is inevitable.
The instant petition which is captioned, For: Certiorari With Preliminary
Injunction, is actually another Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the
February 24, 1992 Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
lapu City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2203-L. A close perusal of this petition
as well as the Petition for Annulment of Judgment brought by the petitioner
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 34696 reveals that the instant
petition is a mere reproduction of the petition/complaint filed before the
appellate tribunal for annulment of judgment. Paragraphs two (2) to eighteen
(18) of this petition were copied verbatim from the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment earlier filed in the court a quo, except for the designation of the parties
thereto, i.e., plaintiff was changed to petitioner, defendant to respondent. In fact,
even the prayer in this petition is the same prayer in the Petition for Annulment
of Judgment dismissed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. That Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue
commanding the Respondent to cease and desist from enforcing the
judgment of Respondent Judge Teodoro K. Risos in Civil Case No.
2203-L dated February 24, 1992 and all orders and processes
 pertaining to his decision in the said case.
2. Annulling the decision of defendant Judge Teodoro K. Risos
of RTC of Cebu, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
3. Granting Petitioner such other relief as law and justice may
warrant in this case.
Under Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, it is the Court of Appeals (then the
Intermediate Appellate Court), and not this Court, which has jurisdiction to annul
judgments of Regional Trial Courts, viz:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction -- The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, this Court apparently has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition which
is evidently another petition to annul the February 24, 1992 Decision of the
respondent Branch 27, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, it appearing that
jurisdiction thereto properly pertains to the Court of Appeals. Such a petition
was brought before the appellate court, but due to petitioners failure to nullify
Judge Risos Decision in said forum, LLDHC, apparently at a loss as to what
legal remedy to take, brought the instant petition under the guise of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking once again to annul the judgment of Branch
27.
Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is essentially
another Petition to Annul Judgment, petitioner LLDHC should have filed a timely
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated December 29, 1994, dismissing the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the court a quo.
But, this is all academic now. The appellate courts decision had become final
and executory on January 28, 1995.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention that this petition, which is truly for
annulment of judgment, cannot prosper on its merits. [I]t has been settled that
a judgment can be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has been
obtained by fraud.
Neither of these grounds obtain in the case at bench. x x x.
It cannot likewise be successfully argued that there was lack of due process
in the proceedings before Branch 27 of the RTC of Lapulapu. Petitioner had
ample participation in Civil Case No. 2203-L as intervenor, as it in fact filed a
Motion to Dismiss said case on December 7, 1989 which was, however, denied
by respondent Judge. Thereafter, a full-blown trial was held which culminated
in the subject decision sought to be annulled by the petitioner.
 In the same manner, the February 24, 1992 decision of respondent court
cannot be assailed on the ground of fraud. In order for fraud to serve as a basis
for the annulment of judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character,
otherwise there would be no end to litigations. Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party [petitioner herein] has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent. This type of fraud is decidedly absent in the case at bench.
Petitioner has not pointed to any act of the prevailing party (Group Management
Corporation) preventing it (petitioner) from fully ventilating its case as intervenor
in Civil Case No. 2203-L. If ever the petitioners complaint-in-intervention did not
prosper in said case, it was because the lower court after due hearing, did not
find the intervenors case meritorious, and not because petitioner was unduly
deprived of its day in court. Thus, having been unable to prove that extrinsic
fraud vitiated the orders in question, there lies no cause of action for annulment
of said orders.
LLDHC sought a reconsideration of the above resolution but its motion was denied
with finality by the Supreme Court on November 18, 1996.
Consequently, on November 28, 1996, the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, through Presiding
Judge Teodoro K. Risos, issued an order directing the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 2203-L, pursuant to which the corresponding writ of execution was issued on
December 17, 1996.
LLDHC and GSIS filed their respective motions to stay execution, dated December
12, 1996 and January 9, 1997, both of which were denied by Judge Risos in his Order
dated February 19, 1997.
On July 21, 1997, on motion of GMC, Judge Risos issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the defendant GSIS having refused to implement the Order
of this Court dated December 17, 1996 the Court in accordance with Rule 39.
Sec. 10-a of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, hereby directs the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-lapu City to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Titles of the properties
involved in this case and to issue new ones in the name of the plaintiff and to
deliver the same to the latter within ten (10) days after this Order shall have
become final.
SO ORDERED.
On August 1, 1997, respondent Judge Barias issued a writ of execution in Civil Case
No. R-82-3429. Parenthetically, the judgment in said case was affirmed with modification
by this Court in its Decision of December 27, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 49117.
On August 7, 1997, Sheriff-Incharge Regio B. Ruefa, RTC-Manila, sent a letter to
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, ordering him to cancel the consolidated
certificate of title issued in the name of GSIS and to issue new certificates of title over
subject lots in the name of LLDHC.
On August 21, 1997, a writ of possession was issued commanding Sheriff Ruefa to
cause GSIS and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the lots in question and to
place LLDHC in peaceful possession thereof. The corresponding Sheriffs Notice to
Vacate, addressed to GSIS, was served on August 22, 1997.
 On October 23, 1997, Judge Risos, acting on various incidents relative to the
execution of the judgments in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 and Civil Case No. 2203-L,
issued an Order reiterating the order and writ of execution dated November 28, 1996,
and December 21, 1996, as well as the order dated July 21, 1997, directing the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to effect the transfer of the titles to subject lots in favor of
GMC, declaring any and all acts done by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City null
and void starting with surreptitious issuance of new titles in the name of LLDHC, and, in
the interim, enjoining the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City from recording and/or
registering any transfer, disposition, or transaction regarding said lots, which may be
executed by LLDHC and/or GSIS.
Judge Risos held in abeyance all contempt proceedings against the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to allow him to forge (sic) himself of the contemptuous act
charged by the plaintiff.
On November 13, 1997, respondent Judge Barias issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Group Management Corporation (GMC) is hereby
given ten (10) days from notice hereof within which to remove all its structures
erected therein, equipment, machineries and other materials from the plantiffs
properties while Jeselito (Rene) Cenabre, Gualberto Dao, Gines Lamparaga,
all security guards of the 537 Security Agency assigned therein and persons
associated with them are hereby directed to vacate the premises in controversy
also within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Failure to do so as directed, an Order of Demolition shall be issued to be
implemented by the Deputy Sheriff of this Court authorizing him to break open
any closure with the assistance of police or military authorities if necessary.
Let this Order be served personally by the Deputy Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City and the latter to submit the corresponding Sheriffs
Return therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on GMCs Omnibus Motion dated October 29, 1997, and the
Manifestation/Explanation, dated October 30, 1997, of respondent Register of Deeds,
Judge Risos issued an Order dated November 28, 1997, the decretal portion of which
reads:
a) Intervenor Lapu-lapu Development and Housing Corporation
(LLDHC) is hereby ordered to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof why it should not be declared in contempt of this Court:
b) Let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue to restrain
immediately all persons acting on orders or by authority of intervenor LLDHC
from carrying out any and all acts in defiance of this Courts final and executory
judgment, orders and writ of execution aforesaid, specifically acts such as, but
not limited to, the demolition of structures erected by plaintiff upon the properties
subject matter of this litigation and the removal of plaintiffs machinery,
equipment and supplies thereon, as well as the ouster therefrom of plaintiffs
duly authorized representatives, personnel and security guards;
c) Further, let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction immediately
 issue to direct the ouster of intervenor LLDHC; its agents, representatives and
all persons acting on order or by authority of intervenor, as well as the
demolition of structures erected by intervenor upon the properties subject
matter of this litigation;
d) Finally, the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby
declared in contempt of this Court, and his immediate detention and
confinement at the City Jail of Lapu-lapu City is directed as long as he persists
in his interference, disobedience and obstruction of justice by not complying
with the directives of this Court dated October 23, 1997 specifically directing the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City to effect the transfer of the titles of the
properties subject of this case in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring any and all acts
done by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City NULL AND VOID star[t]ing
with the surreptitious issuance of the new certificates of title in the name of
Lapu-lapu Development and Housing Corporation, contrary to the Decision of
this Court dated February 24, 1992, its Order and Writ of Execution as well as
its Order dated July 21, 1997, and if respondent Register of Deeds refuses to
comply with the order of this Court transferring the titles of the land in question
to the plaintiff after ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
e) The Office of the City Sheriff is hereby directed to implement
compliance with paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) above, particularly the detention
and confinement of Atty. Dioscoro Y. Sanchez, Jr., Register of Deeds, Lapu-
lapu City, if he continues to refuse to transfer the titles of the land in dispute
after ten (10) days from receipt of this order, authorizing him for these purposes
to secure the assistance of the Office of the Chief of Police of Lapu-lapu City,
who is likewise directed to provide a sufficient number of his men in the service
to fully and faithfully carry out these orders, including the detention and
confinement aforesaid, until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Accordingly, on December 4, 1997, the corresponding writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction was issued.
Meanwhile, LLDHC came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44052), praying that respondents (GMC and
Judge Risos) cease and desist from proceeding with the execution of the decision in Civil
Case No. 2203-L dated February 24, 1992, on the theory that the decision of the RTC of
NCJR in Civil Case No. 31323 (renumbered R-82-3429) entitled LLDHC, plaintiff, versus
GSIS, defendant, for Annulment of Foreclosure and Mandatory Injunction, is a
supervening event which makes it mandatory for Respondent Judge Risos to stop
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L entitled GMC, plaintiff, versus GSIS,
defendant, for Specific Performance. In denying due course to said petition, this Court
ratiocinated, thus:
The validity of the decision of the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 2303-
L has thus been brought both before this Court and to the Supreme Court by
the petitioner. In both instances the respondent judge has been upheld. The
instant petition is petitioners latest attempt to resist the implementation or
execution of that decision using as a shield a decision of a Regional Trial Court
in the National Capital Region. We are not prepared to allow it. The applicable
rule and jurisprudence are clear. The prevailing party is entitled as a matter of
 right to a writ of execution, and the issuance thereof is a ministerial duty
compellable by mandamus. We do not believe that there exists in this instance
a supervening event which would justify a deviation from this rule.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 2203-L, respondent Register of Deeds and
intervenor LLDHC, through separate motions, sought a reconsideration of
Judge Risos orders dated November 28, 1997 and December 22, 1997.
On May 27, 1998, respondent Judge Fernandez, who succeeded Judge
Risos as Presiding Judge of the Lapu-Lapu City RTC (Branch 27), issued an
Order the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the two instant motions of the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City Atty. Sanchez, Jr. and the
intervenor LLDHC are hereby granted and the order of this Court dated
November 28, 1997 is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the order dated
December 22, 1997 is likewise recalled.
GMC sought a reconsideration of said order. Its motion for reconsideration was,
however, denied by respondent Judge Fernandez in his Order of August 4, 1998.iv

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapulapu City in
Civil Case No. 2203-L freeing the Register of Deeds from indirect contempt of court. It
also declared without force and effect the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. R-82-3429, as well as the Orders and Writs issued for the
execution and enforcement of that Decision. The CA enjoined petitioner, its agents and
representatives, the RTC of Manila and the Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City from
obstructing or interfering with the implementation of the Order issued by the Lapu-lapu
RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
Hence, this Petition.v

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner urges the Court to resolve the following questions:
1. Whether the final and fully implemented decision of the Manila RTC could be declared
and rendered ineffectual and nugatory by the judgment of the Lapu-Lapu City RTC.
2. Whether the herein petitioner and/or the private respondent are guilty of forum
shopping.
3. Whether the refusal of Justices Verzola and Tuquero to voluntarily inhibit or disqualify
them from acting on the present case is proper and justifiable.vi

The Courts Ruling

 The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Valid and Binding Decision

In its Memorandum, petitioner argues that the Decision of the Manila RTC is superior
to that of the Lapulapu RTC and must therefore prevail. It alleges that the former was
executed and fully implemented as early as September 15, 1997, but that the latter is yet
to attain finality.
We do not agree. The records of the case clearly show that the Lapulapu Decision
has become final and executory and is thus valid and binding upon the parties. Obviously,
petitioner is again trying another backdoor attempt to annul the final and executory
Decision of the Lapulapu RTC.
First, it was petitioner that filed on March 11, 1992 a Notice of Appeal contesting the
Lapulapu RTC Judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L rendered on February 24, 1992. The
Notice was however rejected by the said RTC for being frivolous and dilatory. Since
petitioner had done nothing thereafter, the Decision clearly became final and executory.
However, upon receipt of the Manila RTC Decision, petitioner found a new tool to
evade the already final Lapulapu Decision by seeking the annulment of the latter in a
Petition with the CA. However, the appellate court dismissed the action, because
petitioner had been unable to prove any of the grounds for annulment; namely lack of
jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Because no appeal had been taken by petitioner, the ruling
of the CA also became final and executory.
Second, the Supreme Court likewise recognized the finality of the CA Decision when
it threw out LLDHCs Petition for Certiorari in GR No. 118633. This Court ruled thus:
Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is essentially another
Petition to Annul Judgment, petitioner LLDHC should have filed a timely Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 29, 1994, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the court a quo. But this is all academic now. The
appellate courts decision had become final and executory on January 28, 1995.vii
(Emphasis ours)
Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it
becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors in interest.viii Such
decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
have been.ix Petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders
the judgment final and executory. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable. x Therefore,
since the Lapulapu Decision has become final and executory, its execution has become
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the judge.
The CA correctly ruled that the Lapulapu Judgment is binding upon petitioner which,
by its own motion, participated as an intervenor. In fact, the latter filed an Answer in
Intervention and thereafter actively took part in the trial. Thus, having had an opportunity
to be heard and to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling it complained of, it cannot
claim that it was denied due process of law. What the law prohibits is the absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard. Jurisprudence teaches that a party cannot feign
denial of due process if it has been afforded the opportunity to present its side.xi
Petitioner likewise claims that Private Respondent GMC cannot escape the adverse
effects of the final and executory judgment of the Manila RTC.
Again, we do not agree. A trial court has no power to stop an act that has been
authorized by another trial court of equal rank. As correctly stated by the CA, the Decision
rendered by the Manila RTC -- while final and executory -- cannot bind herein private
respondent, which was not a party to the case before the said RTC. A personal judgment
is binding only upon the parties, their agents, representatives and successors in interest.
Third, petitioner grievously errs in insisting that the judgment of the Manila RTC
nullified that of the Lapulapu RTC. As already adverted to earlier, courts of coequal and
coordinate jurisdiction may not interfere with or pass upon each others orders or
processes, since they have the same power and jurisdiction.xii Except in extreme
situations authorized by law, they are proscribed from doing so.xiii

Second Issue:
Forum Shopping

Petitioner contends that its Complaint for the annulment of the mortgage foreclosure
had been filed in the Manila RTC almost ten years prior to GMCs Complaint for specific
performance and damages in the Lapulapu RTC. Thus, petitioner asserts that it cannot
be liable for forum shopping.
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) from another.xiv In
Gatmaytan v. CA,xv the petitioner therein repeatedly availed itself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively. All those remedies were
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances; and all raised substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by, some other court. This Court held that therein petitioner was trying
to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision by filing multiple suits in several
courts. Hence, he was found guilty of forum shopping.
In the present case, after the Lapulapu RTC had rendered its Decision in favor of
private respondent, petitioner filed several petitions before this Court and the CA
essentially seeking the annulment thereof. True, petitioner had filed its Complaint in the
Manila RTC before private respondent filed its own suit in the Lapulapu RTC. Records,
however, show that private respondent learned of the Manila case only when petitioner
filed its Motion for Intervention in the Lapulapu RTC. When GMC filed its own Motion to
Intervene in the Manila RTC, it was promptly rebuffed by the judge therein. On the other
hand, petitioner was able to present its side and to participate fully in the proceedings
before the Lapulapu RTC.
On July 27, 1994, almost two years after the dismissal of its appeal by the Lapulapu
RTC, petitioner filed in the CA a suit for the annulment of that RTC judgment. On
December 29, 1994, this suit was rejected by the CA in a Decision which became final
and executory on January 28, 1995, after no appeal was taken by petitioner. However,
this action did not stop petitioner. On February 2, 1995, it filed with this Court another
Petition deceptively cloaked as certiorari, but which in reality sought the annulment of the
Lapulapu Decision. This Court dismissed the Petition on September 6, 1996. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on November 18, 1996.
On November 28, 1996, Judge Risos of the Lapulapu RTC directed the execution of
the judgment in the case filed before it. The Motion to Stay Execution filed by petitioner
was denied on February 19, 1997. Undaunted, it filed in this Court another Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. On September 21, 1998, we referred the Petition
to the CA for appropriate action. This new Petition again essentially sought to annul the
final and executory Decision rendered by the Lapulapu RTC. Needless to say, the new
suit was unsuccessful. Still, this rejection did not stop petitioner. It brought before this
Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging the same facts and
circumstances and raising the same issues already decided by this Court in GR No.
118633.xvi
First Philippine International Bank v. CAxvii stresses that what is truly important to
consider in determining whether forum shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts
and the parties-litigants by one who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related facts and causes and/or to grant the same or substantially
the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting rulings and decisions.
Petitioner in the present case sued twice before the CA and thrice before this Court,
alleging substantially the same facts and circumstances, raising essentially the same
issues, and praying for almost identical reliefs for the annulment of the Decision rendered
by the Lapulapu RTC. This insidious practice of repeatedly bringing essentially the same
action -- albeit disguised in various nomenclatures -- before different courts at different
times is forum shopping no less. Because of petitioners actions, the execution of the
Lapulapu Decision has been needlessly delayed and several courts vexed.

Third Issue:
Voluntary Inhibition

Petitioner claims that Justices Artemio G. Tuquero and Eubolo G. Verzola gravely
abused their discretion in refusing to voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
acting on the case at bar while it was pending in the CA. They allegedly participated in
the Judgment rejecting its Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 44052,
assailing the February 24, 1992 Execution Order issued by the Lapulapu RTC.
Again, petitioner is clutching at straws. As a general rule, judges are mandated to
hear and decide cases, unless legally disqualified.xviii However, they may voluntarily
recuse themselves on the ground of bias or prejudice,xix expression of opinions that may
show partiality,xx personal knowledge of the case,xxi or distant affinity or former association
with one of the parties or the latters counsel.xxii
Justices Tuquero and Verzola acted within the bounds of duty when they took part in
the deliberation of the assailed Decision. By alleging that the appellate magistrates should
disqualify themselves because of their past participation in CA-GR No. 44052, petitioner
merely calls attention to the repetitive nature of its pleadings and petitions. If indeed the
assailed Decision involves a totally different matter from that disposed of in CA-GR No.
44052, then petitioner should have no reason to worry about the impartiality of the said
justices.
Without the written consent of all parties in interest, the law bars justices from
reviewing rulings or decisions rendered by them as lower court judges. xxiii This situation
does not exist in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND TOURIST INN,
and TEODORICO ADARNA, respondents.

Breva & Breva Law Offices for petitioner.

Goc-Ong & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Subject of the appellate proceedings at bar is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp. No.
1967 entitled "Queensland Hotel, Inc., etc. and Adarna v. Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.," promulgated
on May 4, 1990. 1 That decision nullified and set aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City 2 in Civil Case No. 19513-89 on application of the plaintiff (Davao
Light & Power Co.), before the service of summons on the defendants (herein respondents
Queensland Co., Inc. and Adarna).

Following is the chronology of the undisputed material facts culled from the Appellate Tribunal's
judgment of May 4, 1990.

1. On May 2, 1989 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light) filed a verified
complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico
Adarna (docketed as Civil Case No. 19513-89). The complaint contained an ex parte application for a
writ of preliminary attachment.

2. On May 3, 1989 Judge Nartatez, to whose branch the case was assigned by raffle, issued an Order
granting the ex parte application and fixing the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37.

3. On May 11, 1989 the attachment bond having been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment
issued.

4. On May 12, 1989, the summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and
a copy of the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to
the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.

5. On September 6, 1989, defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the
attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was
promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.

6. On September 14, 1989, Davao Light filed an opposition to the motion to discharge attachment.

7. On September 19, 1989, the Trial Court issued an Order denying the motion to discharge.

This Order of September 19, 1989 was successfully challenged by Queensland and Adarna in a
special civil action of certiorari instituted by them in the Court of Appeals. The Order was, as
aforestated, annulled by the Court of Appeals in its Decision of May 4, 1990. The Appellate Court's
decision closed with the following disposition:

. . . the Orders dated May 3, 1989 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,
dated September 19, 1989 denying the motion to discharge attachment; dated November 7,
1989 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; as well as all other orders emanating
therefrom, specially the Writ of Attachment dated May 11, 1989 and Notice of Levy on
Preliminary Attachment dated May 11, 1989, are hereby declared null and void and the
attachment hereby ordered DISCHARGED.

The Appellate Tribunal declared that —

. . . While it is true that a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment may be
included m the complaint, as is usually done, it is likewise true that the Court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant until he is duly summoned or voluntarily
appears, and adding the phrase that it be issued "ex parte" does not confer said jurisdiction
before actual summons had been made, nor retroact jurisdiction upon summons being
made. . . .
It went on to say, citing Sievert v. Court of Appeals, 3 that "in a proceedings in attachment," the "critical
time which must be identified is . . . when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively
against the defendant or his property . . .;" and that "the critical time is the of the vesting of jurisdiction
in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case."

Reversal of this Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 4, 1990 is what Davao Light seeks in the
present appellate proceedings.

The question is whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary
submission to the Court's authority.

The Court rules that the question must be answered in the affirmative and that consequently, the
petition for review will have to be granted.

It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the validity
of acts done during this period should be defendant on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention
of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object hereof.

An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. 4 By that
act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity; 5 and it is thus that
the court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature of the action. 6 And it is by that self-
same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other appropriate pleading) — by which
he signifies his submission to the court's power and authority — that jurisdiction is acquired by the
court over his person. 7 On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained,
as above stated, by the service of summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary
submission to the authority of the court. 8
The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff, and finally, service of the summons is
effected on the defendant in any of the ways authorized by the Rules of Court. There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant.

the grant of
During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are unquestionable validity and propriety. Among these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, 9
authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment of the complaint 10

by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court, 11 authorization by the Court of service of
summons by publication, 12 the dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice. 13

They may be validly and properly applied

This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or replevin. 14

for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional
remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. 15 It is a remedy which is purely statutory
in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. 16 Withal no
principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter." 17 The phase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the
filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the commencement of
the action;" 18 and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or
even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly
commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees
— the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the
pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after
service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice
sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for
attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party
claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds
the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.

In Toledo v. Burgos, 19 this Court ruled that a hearing on a motion or application for preliminary
attachment is not generally necessary unless otherwise directed by the Trial Court in its discretion. 20
And in Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, 21 the Court declared that "(n)othing in the Rules of
Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ of
attachment." The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon consideration of "the affidavit
of the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of
action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . . (Rule 57), that there is no
other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to
the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as
much as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims." 22 If
the court be so satisfied, the "order of attachment shall be granted," 23 and the writ shall issue upon
the applicant's posting of "a bond executed to the adverse party in an amount to be fixed by the
judge, not exceeding the plaintiffs claim, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may
be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto." 24

In
this Court had occasion to emphasize the
Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, decided on April 18, 1989, 25
postulate that no hearing is required on an application for preliminary attachment, with notice to the
defendant, for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of the remedy . . . (since the) time
which such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property before a writ of attachment issues." As observed by a former member of this Court, 26
such a procedure would warn absconding debtors-defendants of the commencement of the suit
against them and the probable seizure of their properties, and thus give them the advantage of time
to hide their assets, leaving the creditor-plaintiff holding the proverbial empty bag; it would place the
creditor-applicant in danger of losing any security for a favorable judgment and thus give him only an
illusory victory.

Withal, ample modes of recourse against a preliminary attachment are secured by law to the
defendant. The relative ease with which a preliminary attachment may be obtained is matched and
paralleled by the relative facility with which the attachment may legitimately be prevented or
frustrated. These modes of recourse against preliminary attachments granted by Rule 57 were
discussed at some length by the separate opinion in Mindanao Savings & Loans Asso. Inc. v. CA.,
supra.

That separate opinion stressed that there are two (2) ways of discharging an attachment: first, by the
posting of a counterbond; and second, by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.
1.0. The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious mode of lifting an attachment already
enforced against property, or even of preventing its enforcement altogether.

1.1. When property has already been seized under attachment, the attachment may be discharged
upon counterbond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57.

Sec. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an order of
attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached or the person
appearing in his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who
granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given . . . in an amount equal to
the value of the property attached as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. . . .

1.2. But even before actual levy on property, seizure under attachment may be prevented also upon
counterbond. The defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking the discharge
of the attachment by a counterbond. This is made possible by Section 5 of Rule 57.

Sec. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing the order shall without delay
attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against
whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with
the clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed
to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an
amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment
to the applicant of any judgment which he may recover in the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

2.0. Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary attachment may also be lifted or discharged
on the ground that it has been irregularly or improperly issued, in accordance with Section 13 of Rule
57. Like the first, this second mode of lifting an attachment may be resorted to even before any
property has been levied on. Indeed, it may be availed of after property has been released from a
levy on attachment, as is made clear by said Section 13, viz.:

Sec. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. — The party whose
property has been attached may also, at any time either BEFORE or AFTER the release of
the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon
reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to
the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment
on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on
affidavits on the part of the party whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the
attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to
that on which the attachment was made. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

This is so because "(a)s pointed out in Calderon v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 531 (1987), The attachment
debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply
availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the
filing of a counterbond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by
the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which, in most instances . . . would require
presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial on the merits, and cannot easily be settled in a pending
incident of the case." 27

It may not be amiss to here reiterate other related principles dealt with in
Mindanao Savings & Loans Asso. Inc. v. C.A., supra., 28 to wit:
 (a) When an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper
issuance:

. . . (W)hen the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or
an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by
any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty." (Sec. 1 [b], Rule 57),
or "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud m contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action is brought" (Sec. 1 [d], Rule 57), the defendant is not
allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to
show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which
the writ was based — and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or
irregularly issued (SEE Benitez v. I.A.C., 154 SCRA 41) — the reason being that the hearing
on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a
motion, instead of at the regular trial. Therefore, when the writ of attachment is of this nature,
the only way it can be dissolved is by a counterbond (G.B. Inc. v. Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886).

(b) Effect of the dissolution of a preliminary attachment on the plaintiffs attachment bond:

. . . The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given, or a showing of its
irregular or improper issuance, does not of course operate to discharge the sureties on
plaintiff's own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That bond is "executed to the adverse
party, . . . conditioned that the . . . (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to
the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto" (SEC. 4, Rule 57).
Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the attachment,
his bond must stand and cannot be with-drawn.

With respect to the other provisional remedies, i.e., preliminary injunction (Rule 58), receivership
(Rule 59), replevin or delivery of personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also
issue ex parte. 29
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as above indicated — issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment (and/or

ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court 30 — and
appointments of guardian

however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by
service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit
and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5 of Rule 57,
but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for
appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicity directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court. Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant
of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds
therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of
a counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (or
Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the
grounds set forth in Rule 16, or demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.
It was on account of the failure to comply with this fundamental requirement of service of summons
and the other documents above indicated that writs of attachment issued by the Trial Court ex parte
were struck down by this Court's Third Division in two (2) cases, namely: Sievert v. Court of Appeals,
31
and BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. 32 In contrast to the case
at bar — where the summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the order and writ of
attachment and the attachment bond were served on the defendant — in Sievert, levy on attachment
was attempted notwithstanding that only the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment was served on the defendant, without any prior or accompanying summons and copy of
the complaint; and in BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation, neither the summons nor the order
granting the preliminary attachment or the writ of attachment itself was served on the defendant
"before or at the time the levy was made."

For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of
attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant
requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior
hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ
thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian
ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from
the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's attachment bond.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED, and the order and writ of attachment issued by Hon. Milagros C. Nartatez, Presiding
Judge of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 19513-89 against
Queensland Hotel or Motel or Queensland Tourist Inn and Teodorico Adarna are hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

CHESTER DE JOYA, G.R. No. 162416

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ,

in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

Branch 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE Promulgated:

OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT January 31, 2006

OF JUSTICE,

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside
the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952
for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable
cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
 may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or
a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.

x x xiii

This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 the following
documents to support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest:

1. The report of the National Bureau of Investigation to Chief State

Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo as regards their investigation on the complaint
filed by private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten against Mina Tan Hao @
Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa. The report
shows that Hao induced Dy to invest more than a hundred million pesos in
State Resources Development Management Corporation, but when the
latters investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as
payment for his investments were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds or that the account was closed.iii

2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.iii

3. Copies of the checks issued by private complainant in favor of State

Resources Corporation.iii
 4. Copies of the checks issued to private complainant representing the
supposed return of his investments in State Resources.iii

5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to Ma. Gracia Tan Hao.iii

6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the incorporators

and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development
Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the
crime of syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester
De Joya.iii

7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the other accused, Ma. Gracia

Hao and Danny S. Hao.

Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao
finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa,iii and a
copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources Development Management Corporation
naming petitioner as incorporator and director of said corporation.

This Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause
as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause
to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested. It bears remembering that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance.iii Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the
evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient
ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him.

The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to
show that therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State
Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to
P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to
private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were
later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being
incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions.
These are all that need to be shown to establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant
of arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter
should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence.iii In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the Rules allow the
judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable that
the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for his
findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.

The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court,
which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only
in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial
judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the
strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this
case do not warrant the application of the exception.
 In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this
Court nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:

x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires
such jurisdiction:

a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the

filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the
plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired

by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to
the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and,

unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the
voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and

conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in
a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure
of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided
in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the
subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by
the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment
or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to
deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the
Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
 Justice Regalado continues to explain:

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the
plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In
such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is
merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the
Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or
proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.iii

Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from
the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit
to the courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent
judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to
hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and
frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts
jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157783 September 23, 2005

NILO PALOMA, Petitioners,

vs.
DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO, MAXIMA SALVINO, BRYN BONGBONG and
VALENTINO SEVILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner NILO PALOMA is in quest of the reversal of
the Decision1 and the Resolution,2 dated 15 November 2002 and 01 April 2003, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42553, affirming in toto the Orders dated 12 March
1996 and 28 June 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, in Civil
Case No. PN-0016, dismissing his complaint for mandamus for being prematurely filed.

The undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and as unraveled from the records,
follow:

Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District
by its Board of Directors in 1993. His services were subsequently terminated by virtue of
Resolution No. 8-953 dated 29 December 1995, which was passed by respondents as Chairman
and members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District, namely: Danilo Mora, Hilario
Festejo, Bryn Bongbong and Maxima Salvino, respectively. The Board, in the same Resolution,
designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as Officer-in-Charge.4

Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus5 with prayer for preliminary
injunction with damages before the RTC on 11 January 1996 to contest his dismissal with the
prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager.6

Petitioner obdurately argued in his petition that the passage of Resolution No. 8-95 resulting in
his dismissal was a "capricious and arbitrary act on the part of the Board of Directors,
constituting a travesty of justice and a fatal denial of his constitutional right to due process for
the grounds relied upon therein to terminate him were never made a subject of a complaint nor
was he notified and made to explain the acts he was said to be guilty of." "Fundamental is the
rule and also provided for in the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that no officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be suspended, separated or dismissed except for cause and after due
process," so stressed petitioner.7

On 25 January 1996, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
and want of cause of action.8

On 12 March 1996, the trial court issued the assailed order dismissing the petition, with the fallo:

WHEREFORE, all foregoing considered, the complaint thus filed for mandamus with a Prayer
for a Writ for Preliminary Injunction with Damages is hereby DISMISSED for being a premature
cause of action. Without pronouncement as to costs.9

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration likewise failed to sway the trial court by Order dated 28
June 1996.10

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Complaint on 29 March 1996 with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) against same respondents herein, for alleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules
and for Illegal Dismissal.11

On 06 November 1996, the CSC issued its decision12 exonerating respondents from the charge of
violating the Civil Service Law when they voted for the termination of petitioner’s services as
General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Thus, the CSC dismissed13 the
complaint filed by petitioner before it, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, the instant complaint of Mr. Nilo Paloma former General Manager of
Palompon Water District against Messrs. Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn Bongbong and Ms.
Maxima Salvino for Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and Illegal Dismissal is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of prima facie case.14

In its Decision15 dated 15 November 2002, the Court of Appeals yielded to the decision of the
trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated 12 March 1996 and 28 June 1996 in Civil Case
No. PN-0016, are AFFIRMED in toto.16

Equally unavailing was petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court
of Appeals on 01 April 2003.

Affronted by the ruling, petitioner elevated the matter to us via the instant petition, contending
that:

the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of the regional trial court of
palompon, leyte, branch 17.17
The central inquiry raised in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its challenged decision. Concretely, we are tasked to resolve: (1) whether or
not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to
reinstate the General Manager thereof, and (2) whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction
over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner.

Petitioner, in his brief, is emphatic that the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that mandamus
may lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty in case of non-observance of due
process. He enthuses that the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that as an aggrieved party, he
need not exhaust administrative remedies and may resort to court action for relief as due process
was clearly violated.18

Espousing a contrary view, respondents posit that petitioner breached the rule against forum
shopping as he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal against them with the CSC after
obtaining an unfavorable ruling in his Petition for Mandamus filed before the RTC.19 Not only is
petitioner guilty of forum shopping; he, too, is guilty of submitting a false certificate against
forum shopping as the certification he appended with the present petition omitted the fact that he
had previously filed a similar case with the CSC, so respondents say.20 Respondents theorize, as
well, that the instant case has already been rendered moot by the dissolution of the Palompon,
Leyte Water District and its subsequent absorption by the municipal government of Palompon
effective 1 June 1999.21 Finally, it is respondents’ resolute stance that it was fitting for the Court
of Appeals to affirm the trial court’s ruling dismissing the petition filed by petitioner inasmuch
as Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 128 indeed clearly states that the General
Manager shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.22

We are not won over by petitioner’s avowals. The petition ought to be denied.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides-

Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty.23 Mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the
right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act.
It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.24
In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198,25 otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL WATER
UTILITIES ACT OF 1973, which was promulgated on 25 May 1973, categorically provides
that the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors, viz:

Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an
attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation. Said officers shall serve at the
pleasure of the board.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on 15 August 1975 to read:

SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his
duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board. (Emphasis
supplied)

Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District
to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.

The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.26 delineated the nature
of an appointment held "at the pleasure of the appointing power" in this wise:

An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary in nature.
It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to
replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an expiration of term and in an
expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due hearing or sufficient grounds before the
incumbent can be separated from office. The protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of
By-Laws on Removal Of Officers and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.27
(Emphasis supplied)

In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide
arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is
the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the
petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the former’s services obviously ceased to be
"pleasurable" to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of
the General Manager thereof the moment the latter’s services cease to be convivial to the former.
Put another way, he is at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be
terminated at any time for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or
due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence, petitioner is treading on
shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that he was removed sans cause and due process.

Yes, as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, which we held in Feliciano v. Commission On
Audit 28 to be the special enabling charter of Local Water Districts, categorically provides that the
General Manager shall serve "at the pleasure of the board."

Correlatively, the nature of appointment of General Managers of Water Districts under Section
23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose
entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing
authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the
duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.

The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:

(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds
for the same;

(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure
of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;

(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee,
in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon
expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court has previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil servants who serve at the
pleasure of the appointing power and whose appointments are covered by Section 14 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 as cited above. Thus, in
Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,29 petitioner was hired as Project Manager IV by the
Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program-BOT Center. In upholding the
termination of his employment prior to the expiration of his contract, we held that petitioner
serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. This Court ruled in Orcullo –

A perusal of petitioner’s employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is
qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment is co-
terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the
appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree with the
appellate court’s interpretation of the phrase "unless terminated sooner" to mean "that his
contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end
anytime before January 30, 2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP.
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither is it the Court’s business to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.30

Moreover, laws change depending on the evolving needs of society. In a related development,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo inked into law Republic Act No. 9286, which amended
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 providing that thereafter, the General Manager of Water Districts
shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. Rep. Act No. 9286
reads:

Republic Act No. 9286

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 198, OTHERWISE

KNOWN AS "THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS AMENDED

Approved: April 2, 2004

...

Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 23. The General Manager. – At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his
duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause
and after due process. (Emphasis supplied.)

...

Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.31

Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to
pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of prospective application. The general rule is
that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect.32
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested,33 the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.34

First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it should retroact to the date of
effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act
No. 9286 that it or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Third, Rep. Act No. 9286 is a
substantive amendment of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has changed the grounds for termination
of the General Manager of Water Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198,
"shall serve at the pleasure of the Board." Under the new law, however, said General Manager
shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. To apply Rep. Act No.
9286 retroactively to pending cases, such as the case at bar, will rob the respondents as members
of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D. No. 198
to terminate petitioner at their pleasure or discretion. Stated otherwise, the new law can not be
applied to make respondents accountable for actions which were valid under the law prevailing
at the time the questioned act was committed.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was terminated by the Board of
Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act
No. 9286.

Petitioner, next, heaves censure on the Court of Appeals for subscribing to the trial court’s view
that the petition for mandamus was prematurely filed. We recall in Tanjay Water District v.
Gabaton35 that water districts are government instrumentalities and that their employees belong
to the civil service. Thus, "[t]he hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and
Regulations." Tanjay was clear-cut on this matter:

. . . Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water
District, and respondent Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the country, they come
under the coverage of the civil service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact.36 In Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,37 we revisited the import of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, to wit:

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question
involved is also judicial in character. . .

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez [240
SCRA 502], the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the best position to evaluate and to
decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible with its development plan. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-
equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil
Service since it is within the field of their expertise.38 This is consistent with the powers and
functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,39 including, in this case, P.D.
No. 198.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and the
Resolution dated 15 November 2002 and 01 April

2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42553, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003]

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon.

GIOVANNI M. NAPARI, petitioner, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L.
MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City
(Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor,
Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary

disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, it follows that
regional trial courts have the power and the authority to hear and determine such
controversy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorarivii under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul the October 29, 1999 Ordervii issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 3722-O. The decretal portion of the assailed Order
reads as follows:
For the foregoing considerations, this Court is not inclined to approve and grant the
motion to dismiss[,] although the municipality has all the right to bring the matter or issue
to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari purely on question of law.vii
 The Facts

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of
Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga on October 31, 1997.

No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session
issued Resolution No. 97-01, which in part reads:
x x x IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED x x x to pass a resolution certifying that both the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte
have failed to settle amicably their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the
same to the proper court for settlement by any of the interested party (sic).vii
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim;
(2) That there is no cause of action; and
(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied
with[.]vii

Ruling of the Trial Court

In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held that it had
jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section
118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both
parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both
agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that
Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under
Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of Kananga filed this
Petition.vii

Issue

In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of whether
respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.
 The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear and
determine a cause.vii It is a question of law.vii As consistently ruled by this Court, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is vested by law.vii Because it is a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court.vii
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC),vii which provides:
Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall
be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty
(60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city
or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between
two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act
No. 542.vii By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as
such.
However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city
created under Republic Act No. 179.vii Section 89 thereof reads:
Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the
Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled
to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board
of the Province of Leyte.
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.
Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact,
it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643,vii which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code,vii
which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a
declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is
highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc
was an independent chartered city.vii
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.
Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement was
reached. A resolution to that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of both local
government units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication. The
question now is: Does the regional trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the claim?
We rule in the affirmative.
As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived
by the parties.vii It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent
of the parties or by estoppel.vii It should not be confused with venue.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the
general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is
found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,vii otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.vii Section 19(6) of this law provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate
all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. vii They have
the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the
first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the
power is not only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,vii we held that boundary disputes should
be resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as follows:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond
these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries
of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. x x x.
Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes have sown costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers and prejudiced the peoples welfare. Precisely because of these
disputes, the Philippine National Oil Company has withheld the share in the proceeds
from the development and the utilization of natural wealth, as provided for in Section 289
of the LGC.vii
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.