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2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
CHAPTER VII – EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES
Jabonete vs Monteverde
When Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question, he had
knowledge that an easement of right of way existed. Plaintiffs
proceeded to the lot in question and opened in the fence erected by
Antonio a sufficient opening for the passage of men and vehicles.
The parties entered into an amicable agreement limiting the right
of way to the plaintiffs and their "family, friends, drivers, servants
and jeeps.” Later, the plaintiffs transferred to another place
because they were unable to continue with their repair shop located
in that area. So, Antonio reconstructed his fence and closed the
opening made by the plaintiffs pursuant to the decision.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ lot was foreclosed by DBP, and later
conveyed to Mrs. Arcilla under a conditional deed of sale. She then
demanded the re-opening of the fence of Antonio since she will
construct her house in the said lot. Antonio refused.
WON Antonio can be compelled to extend the right of way to Mrs.
Arcilla? NO
The easement awarded or secured to the plaintiffs was strictly a
personal one. The servitude established was clearly for the benefit
alone of the plaintiffs and the persons enumerated and it is clear
that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said
order, did not intend the same to pass on the plaintiffs' successors-
in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original
plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil
Code, and not a pre-dial servitude that inures to the benefit of
whoever owns the dominant estate. Another evidence that the
servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that
the same was granted to the latter without any compensation to the
respondent-appellant.
Alcantara vs Reta Jr.
Alcantara et al claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land
owned by Reta. Reta allowed Roble to use 62 coconut trees for
P186 from where he gathered tuba. Roble was also allowed to
construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. The land later on has been converted into a
commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject them. They
claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land,
they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in
accordance with the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed
that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo
Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative
of such Act. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land in
question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not
proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ).
WON the petitioners have the right of first refusal under PD 1517?
NO
Where a person is allowed to construct his house on the land of
another to facilitate gathering of fruits, this would be in the nature
of a personal easement pursuant to Article 614.
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Requisites to avail of PD 1517: 1) a legitimate tenant of the land
for 10 yrs or more; 2) must have built his home on the land by
contract; 3) has resided continuously for the last 10 years.
Alcantara failed to present proof of a lease agreement between him
and Reta. Moreover, the use of Roble of the coconut trees from
where he gathered tuba is a usufructuary arrangement, and not
lease. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under
Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement
between Roble and Reta is valid or not, the conclusion would still
be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of
lease. Hence, Roble is not a legitimate tenant under PD 1517.
Moreover, there was never an intention on the part of Reta to sell
the property, hence the right of first refusal has no basis since it
presupposes that the property is to be sold to a third person.
North Negros Sugar Co. Inc. vs. Hidalgo
NNSC is the owner of a sugar central (known as “mill site”) and
also its adjoining plantation Hacienda “Begona”. It constructed a
road adjoining the “mill site” and the provincial highway. It allows
vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for each one;
pedestrians are allowed free passage. Hidalgo owns the adjoining
“Hacienda Sangay” wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba
saloon. The road of the NNSC is the only means of access to get
to Hacienda Sangay. At one point, it stopped Hidalgo from using
the said road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his
Hacienda Sangay, Hidalgo passed through Hacienda Begona in a
passageway used by the carabaos. NNSC applied for injunction to
restrain Hidalgo from entering/passing through his properties.
WON injunction should be granted? NO
The road was constructed by the plaintiff on his own land and it
made this road accessible to the public, regardless of class/group
of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement constituted in
favor of the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at
its pleasure as no period has been fixed when the easement was
constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not
capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the road
devoted to the public in general, the road is charged with public
interest and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish
discriminatory exceptions against any private person. He may
withdraw his grant by discontinuing its use; but so long as he
maintains it, he must submit to the control. Furthermore, there
exists a forcible right of way in favor of the defendant because
those living in Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial
road except through the road in question.
Valisno vs Adriano
Felipe and Honorata, Adriano siblings, previously owned 2 parcels
of land. On the land of Honorata was an existing irrigation which
passes through the land of Felipe, whose property adjoins the river.
When Valisno bought the property, he cultivated therein different
fruits and crops. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements"
appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to him, the water
right was the primary consideration for his purchase of the
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Felipe, however, enclosed the irrigation providing water to the
land of Valisno, causing the latter prejudice.
WON Valiano has water rights over the irrigation canal? YES
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the
passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land
prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff
was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code. Water rights,
such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third person. As an easement of waters
in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it
free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such
as the Felipe’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him
of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Concurring opinion of Justice J.B. L. Reyes in the case of
Ronquillo, et al vs Roco
The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the
power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient
tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a
servitude, it is a limitation on the servient owner's rights of
ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from his
property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner
actually crosses or passes over the servient estate; because when
he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and
undisturbed. Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and
uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at
intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or
discontinuous nature.
Tanedo vs Hon. Bernad et al
Cardenas was the owner of 2 lots. Lot A was sold to Tanedo and
the other (Lot B) was mortgaged. The mortgaged lot had a 4-storey
apartment and house constructed thereon with a septic tank. The
other lot had on it a house. Thereafter, Lot B was sold to spouses
Sim who blocked the sewage pipe.
WON the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the
subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners?
NO
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different
persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law as provided in Art 624 since no statement
abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Tañedo. Nor did
Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the
occupants of the lot before he sold it to Tañedo. Hence, the use of
the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the
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spouses Sim, the new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Valderama vs North Negros Sugar Central
Several hacienda owners entered into a milling contract with
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central for the
milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the
hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central with all the
cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the
execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests
were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. 2 years after,
Valderrama et. al made other milling contracts identical to the first
one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners,
however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling
as required by its capacity, so the North Negros made other milling
contracts with the various hacienda owners. The contract entered
into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted
the North Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period
of 50 years upon their properties for the construction of a railroad.
The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the
transportation of sugar cane which they did not produce, and is
contrary to their intent.
WON the easement of way established was restricted to
transporting only sugar cane from the hacienda owners’ lands?
NO
In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar
company for the construction of a railroad for the transportation of
sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the
nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the
servient estates can be transported on said railroad, because it is a
well-settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by easement. That an easement being
established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of the
servient estates cannot limit its use to the transportation of their
cane, there being no express stipulation to that effect. An easement
of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons
carrying goods pertaining to persons who aren’t owners of the
servient estates and at all time the person entitled to the easement
may please, for in such case the easement continues to be the same.
Solid Manila Corp vs Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. and CA
Solid Manila Corp owns a parcel of land which lies in the vicinity
of another parcel of land belonging to Bio Hong Trading Co. In
the deed of sale conveying the land of Bio Hong to them is an
annotation which states the reservation of an easement of way. In
the annotation, it was stated that the alley shall remain open at all
times, no obstructions shall be placed thereon and that the owner
shall allow the public to use the same. Solid Manila Corp and other
residents of the neighboring estates has been using the alley ever
since and they contributed to its maintenance. However, in 1983,
Bio Hong Trading Co. constructed steel gates that hampered
others from using said alley. Respondent alleges that the easement
has been extinguished by virtue of a merger in the same person of
the dominant and servient estates, the petitioner has another
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adequate outlet and that the petitioner has not shown that the right
of way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
WON an easement exists on the property? YES
The construction of the steel gates by respondent is a violation of
the deed of sale and the servitude of way. Even if it owns the
property, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or put up
obstructions to prevent the public from using such. Respondent’s
contention regarding the merger does not apply in the case here
since the servitude spoken of here is a personal servitude. In a
personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant
tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons
without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger,
as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant
owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the
easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in
favor of the public if that is possible, no genuine merger can take
place that would terminate a personal easement.
Pilar Development Corp vs Ramon Dumadag
Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages
against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without
its knowledge and consent, in its property. It claims that said parcel
of land was designated as an open space of Pilar Village
Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and
amenities for subdivision residents. Respondents asserted that it is
the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and
authority over them; that they have a better right to possess the
occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement
purposes and that only the local government of Las Piñas City
could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
Petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject property
occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for
public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip
does not form part of the public dominion
WON petitioner owns the portion occupied by respondents
reserved for public easement? NO
Article 635 is specific in saying that "[a]ll matters concerning
easements established for public or communal use shall be
governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto." In
the case at bar, DENR A.O. No. 99-21, dated June 1999 is
applicable. Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like in
this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the
open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. Said law is explicit:
open spaces are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men and that areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-
buildable. Thus, the above proves that petitioner's right of
ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to
the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek.
Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it
precisely because it is public land.
Villanueva vs Velasco
When Villanueva bought the parcel of land, there was a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied 1 meter of the 2-
meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted
to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents,
in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner,
even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, as
successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the
contract of easement.
WON easement on the property binds the property? YES
The subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily
constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas.
But the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by
grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or
a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. The small house
occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the
entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. One
meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice
obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents'
estate. Even if the easement was not annotated in the title of the
land and the notice of lis pendens was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, in legal easement, the servient estate is bound
to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the
public highway. Even with the argument that the petitioner was
not made a party to the case between the Gabriels and respondents,
a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to
the said case and those who are their successors-in-interest by title
after said case has been commenced or filed in court.
Ramos, Sr. vs Gatchalian Realty, Inc., et al
Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Parañaque. Asprecs own
Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Gatchalian
Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot
4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision.
Ramos contends that since Gatchalian Realty constructed the
concrete wall, blocking his ingress and egress via the Gatchalian
Avenue, the "nearest, most convenient and adequate road" to and
from a public highway, he has been constrained to use as his
"temporary" way the adjoining lots belonging to different persons.
Said way is allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially during
rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib'
grasses thereon." Moreover, according to the petitioner, the road
right of way which the private respondents referred to as the
petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing road
but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision
plan of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.
WON the petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites
necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his
favor are present? NO
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Petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet
to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne
out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided
by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot
4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The
fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to
the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not
bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite.
Costabella Corp vs CA, Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their
beach hotel. Before such construction, the private respondent, in
going to and from their respective properties and the provincial
road, passed through a passageway which traversed the
petitioner’s property. As a result of the construction, this
passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same
complaint, the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner
had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter’s property
without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the
residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on
the beach. The private respondents also claim that they have
acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for
the re-opening of the “ancient road right of way” (what they called
the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interest’s
act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were
just tolerating the use of the private respondents.
WON the private respondents had acquired an easement of right
of way, in the form of a passageway, on the petitioner's property?
NO
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law.
For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary,
there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the
main road. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal
right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even
if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the
need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to
justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, there must
be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.
Quimen vs CA
Oliveros bought the lot belonging to his uncle Quimen, a land
without access to the road public, with an inducement by her Aunt
Anastacia that she will give her a right of way on her adjoining
property for P200 per square meter. When Yolanda offered
Anastacia the payment, the latter refused to accept denying the
promise of right of way to her once she bought the property.
Yolanda filed an action with a prayer of right of way through
Anastacia’s property.
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WON Oliveros has a right of way through Quimen’s property?
YES
The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which
petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe,
has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity
constituted by law. IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that
easement where the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice
shall be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be
used even if not the shortest route. This is so because least
prejudice prevails over shortest distance. This means that the court
is not bound to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when
there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a
roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner,
such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a
dangerous decline.
Floro vs Llenado
Floro owned a piece of land known as “Floro Park Subdivision”.
It has its own egress and ingress to and from the McArthur
Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing.
Llenado, on the other hand, was the registered owner of 2 parcels
of land known as the “Llenado Homes”. Bounded on the South by
Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park subdivision,
and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos
and Guevarra, the Llenado Homes does not have existing road or
passage to McArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road
traversing the idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically
provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes (before
Llenado Homes). Llenados were permitted by Floros to use Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as a passage to and from McArthur
Highway. However, Floro later barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile
of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, preventing its use by
Llenado. Llenado filed a complaint for easement of Right of Way.
WON there is an easement of right of way? NO
WON they are entitled to compulsory servitude of right of way?
NO
The use of Road Lot 4 and 5 by Llenados was by mere tolerance
of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the
right of way. Although such use was in anticipation of a voluntary
easement of right of way, no such contract as validly entered into
by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms and
conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot claim entitlement to a right of
way through Floro Park on the basis of voluntary easement.
(Take note of the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of
NCC). First precondition is not met since there is an existing right
of way over the Ipapo Property. Payment of proper indemnity was
also not proven since there the complaint by Llenado did not
contain fixing of amount that he must pay to Floro in the event the
easement of right of way be constituted. Also, third requisite has
not been met. Moreover, in order to justify the imposition of the
servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not what is required by law the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
This easement can also be established foe the benefit of tenement
with an inadequate outlet, but not when outlet is merely
inconvenient.
Valdez vs Tabisula
Spouses Valdez purchased from spouses Tabisula a parcel of land.
Contained in the deed of sale is a stipulation that the Sps. Valdez
‘shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale’. Sps.
Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property. Feeling
betrayed by said act of Sps. Tabisula based on the deed of sale’s
intended road right of way, Sps. Valdez reported the matter the
brgy. Lupon but it was in vain which constrained Sps. Valdez to
file a case for specific performance against the Tabisulas with the
RTC. The Sps. Tabisula contended that: 1) Sps. Valdez and family
also are the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
property, which adjoining properties have access to two public
roads ; and 2) they could not have agreed to providing petitioners
an easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-
storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is
to be located, which was erected long before the subject property
was sold to the Valdez’s; thus, the easement should be taken from
the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs.
WON the Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided
for in the deed of sale? NO
It is clear that what the Sps Valdez seek to enforce is an alleged
grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: “they
shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.”
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing. The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they “shall
be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not a
disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of
right of way is “not included in this sale” could only mean that the
parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement
for the purpose. The use of the word “shall,” which is imperative
or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit
or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be
recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third
parties.
Sps Valdez are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement
of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the
preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must
be established. Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of
way under Article 649, the following requisites must be complied
with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has
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no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must
be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of
proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of
the dominant estate, herein Sps. Valdez. Since the Sps. Valdez
then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they
have no right to demand the grant by the Sps. Tabisula of an
easement on the “western side of the Tabisula’s lot.”; it appearing
that the Sps. Valdez and their family are also the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two
public roads or highways.
National Power Corp vs Suarez etc
In order to implement its 350 KV Leyte Luzon HDVC Power
Transmission Project which aims to transmit the excess electrical
generating capacity from the Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and
various load centers, petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation
of a parcel of land in Brgy. Bibincahan, Sorsogon, registered in the
names of respondents. In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the PNB, representing the
provisional value of the property, alleged to cover an area of
24,350 square meters. On September 23, 1996, it served a Notice
to Take Possession of the property to respondents. Respondents
filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that the property
covers an area of 34,950, not 24,350 square meters, and that
petitioner had already constructed 2 transmission towers in the
middle of the property, cut down more or less 737 trees of different
varieties and an estimated 562.86 board feet of hardwood trees and
706.80 board feet of softwood trees. They thus moved for the
determination of just compensation.
WON NPC, in its acquisition of an easement of right of way
(aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the
land, must be paid? NO
Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s
property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot
sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee and not the
full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This
conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme
Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. x x x
True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the
property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not
gratis. Considering the nature and the effect of the installation of
power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property.
For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land.
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Encarnacion vs The Hon CA and the Intestate Estate of the Late
Eusebio De Sagun and the Heirs of the Late Aniceta Magsino
Viuda De Sagun
1/2 meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and
the other 1/2 meter portion was taken from another lot owned by
Mamerto Magsino. It was also about that time that petitioner
started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his
abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for
his family and for his customers.
WON Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of an already existing
easement of right-of-way? YES
While the Supreme Court recognized “that an additional 1 1⁄2
meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate
to only about 342.5 square meters”, it noted that petitioner has
expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his
land to compensate private respondents for their loss (thus,
addressing the requirement of least prejudice)
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his
family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants
to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need
for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual
hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become
extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner
to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and
to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the
improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the
servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the
people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
Talisay-Silay Milling Co vs CFI of Negros Occidental
The Central has been operating in the Talisay-Silay mill district in
Negros Occidental as early at 1920-1921 sugar crop year. The
Central also entered into identical milling contracts wherein it was
granted the right to construct and maintain railroad lines traversing
the planters' properties for the hauling of sugarcane from the
various plantations in the mill district to the mill site. The identical
milling contracts, as with the contractual railway easements, were
for a period of 50 years to expire at the end of the 1969-1970 sugar
crop year. The respondents refused to extend the 50-year
contractual right of way granted to the Central's railway complex
in the Talisay-Silay mill district and outlying areas. Petitioner’s
filed for the conversion of their contractual easement of the right
of way into a legal easement. It contended that there is no other
way by which the locomotives of the plaintiff can pass in order to
reach the plantations of planters growing sugar canes except thru
the railroad lines traversing the parcels of land which lines
altogether form a continuous system of railroad transportation as
petitioner’s mill is surrounded by other immovables, and there is
no outlet to a public highway to which it can haul the canes of said
planters. It argued that before the expiration of contract, it has
offered to lease the area at an annual lease rental of P0.20 a sq
meter.
WON Plaintiff satisfied all the preconditions for grant of legal
easement? NO
After the central's right to maintain and use the railroad tracks over
the properties of the landowners incontrovertibly expired with the
milling contracts, the central has to rely strictly on its supposed
entitlement to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the
Civil Code, but it cannot claim any such servitude without first
establishing the preconditions for its grant, namely, (a) that it is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) after payment of proper indemnity; (c) that the
isolation is not the result of the central's own acts; and (d) that the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
As regards the requisite that the Central's mill must be shown to
be surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway, the complaint clearly shows that the Central,
even as it assumes the role of a dominant estate, wants a railway
access to the fields of its planters to be able to haul the latter's
sugarcane to the milling site. It does not seek access to a public
highway.
The Central's offer to lease the affected portions of the respondent
landowners' properties for P0.20 per square meter per annum is
not the "prepayment" referred since “prepayment means the
delivery of the proper indemnity required by law for the damage
that might be incurred by the servient estate in the event the legal
easement is constituted. The fact that a voluntary agreement upon
the extent of compensation to be paid cannot be reached by the
parties involved, is not an impediment to the establishment of such
easement. Precisely, the action of the dominant estate against the
servient estate should include a prayer for the fixing of the amount
which may be due from the former to the latter. Notably, the action
filed by the Central did not opt for this since this case is not one
for legal or compulsory easement.
Domingo Lao and Albina De Los Santos vs the Heirs of Lorenza
Alburo
This involved a conflict in the inclusion of stone wall in the
application for registration of a parcel of land. It was contended by
the oppositor that “.... a stone wall shown in that plan to be
northeast of the said parcel had been improperly included; that this
wall had belonged to the said Lorenza Alburo, for it had existed
since March 8, 1881; that the principal timbers of the building that
had belonged to the said deceased had rested on it for more than
35 years, and the latter's successors had been and were now in the
quiet, peaceable, and uninterrupted possession of the said wall.”
WON the stone wall belongs to applicants Domingo Lao and
Albina de los Santos? YES
The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing
wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
applicants, much higher than the adjoining building of the
objectors; that along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which
catches the rain water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants'
building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron
pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the said
wall is covered by the roof of the applicants' building; that the
supports of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants'
land and that none of the buttresses are on the side of the objectors'
lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the
rear enclosing wall of the applicants' property in such wise that the
two walls that inclose the lot form but a single construction, the
exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party
wall, but that it forms a part of the applicants' building and belongs
to them.
Gargantos vs Yanon and CA
This involves a sale of a house, a land with improvements by one
owner, Sanz, which he subdivided into 3 and sold to 3 different
individuals. 1 of those sold already had existing windows and
doors at the time of sale which served as passages for light and
view. The deed of sale did not provide that the easement of light
and view would not be established.
WON the property has an easement of light and view against the
other buyer-owner? YES
It is obvious that Article 621, NCC and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo
case are not applicable herein. Instead, it is covered by Article 624,
NCC which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of
both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so
that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at
the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is
made to disappear before the instrument is executed. ...”
Cortes vs Yu-Tibo
The wife of Cortes has certain window that is receiving light and
air which is opening on the adjacent house which was existing
since 1843 and that Yu-Tibo had commenced certain works with
the view of raising the roof of the house in a manner that 1/2 of the
window has been covered thus depriving the building of a large
part of the air and light formerly received through the window. As
argued by Cortes, there is a constant and uninterrupted use of the
window for 59 years; hence it acquired prescription as easement
of light in favor of his house and as a servitude on the house of
Yu-Tibo and therefore had acquired the right to restrain the
making of any improvements in the latter house which might in
any manner prejudicial to the enjoyment of said easement. Yu-
Tibo on the other hand argued that the easement is negative and
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin from
the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have
prohibited by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which would be lawful for the existence of the
easement.
WON windows opened in a wall positive? NO
5 | P a g e KDAlianza
WON a window can be opened in a party wall without consent of
the other? NO
The opening made was just a plain exercise of the right of
ownership. NO EASEMENT WAS CREATED AT THIS POINT
even if this is tolerated by the neighboring owner because the
property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not
as the exercise of an easement. The easement really consists in
prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything
which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light. The easement of
lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is of a
negative character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription under Art 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting
the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of
the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful
from him to do were it not for the easement.
No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a
party wall a window or opening of any kind, as provided by article
580 of the Civil Code. The very fact of making such openings in
such a wall might, therefore, be the basis for the acquisition of a
prescriptive title without the necessity of any active opposition,
because it always presupposes the express or implied consent of
the other part owner of the wall, which consent, in turn, implies
the voluntary waiver of the right of such part owner to oppose the
making of such openings or windows in such a wall.
Castro vs Monsod
Respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 65
sq.m. of the property of petitioner, merely asserting the existing
legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion
of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his
property is located at an elevated plateau of 15 feet above the level
of petitioner’s property. Prior to the filing of the case, petitioner
noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her house to be
slippery, she hired construction workers to see where the leak was
coming from. The workers had already started digging when
police officers sent by respondent came and stopped the workers
from finishing their job.
WON the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the
subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the same may
be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate? YES
An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners.
There are therefore no judicial easements. Article 684 of the Civil
Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his
surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land
or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two
adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have
his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if
either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral
support of his neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state,
by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its
position, the one so excavating is liable. In the instant case, an
easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of
respondent.
An annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support
is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or
registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the
same already binds the property and the owner of the same,
including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining
landowner would come to court or have the easement of subjacent
and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and
respected.
Ngo Sin Sing vs Li Seng Giap and Sons
Sps Ngo Sin Sing decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building
on their lot, and for this project, they contracted the services of
Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation
(Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a
semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG
Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. During the
construction of the NSS Building, the respondent received
complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There
were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and
concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart. An inspection of
the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on
petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing the
foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill to their
neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs
would be undertaken by their contractor. Apparently, the LSG
Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it
was no longer safe to occupy the building. Respondents as owner
of LSG Building demanded that petitioner should handle the cost
of rebuilding the said building. the latter refused hence a case was
filed.
WON the liability of petitioner be mitigated due to the contributory
negligence of respondent? YES
The foundation of the LSG building is the same as the foundation
of the previous building when it was bought. It was only renovated
and added additional 2 floors. Clearly then, the foundation that is
too old cannot hold a 4 storey building, more so when the adjacent
lot was excavated by petitioners. Thus, considering that
respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the
sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is
warranted. The respondent should likewise share in the cost of the
restructuring of its building. The ruling is justified by the Doctrine
of "Supervening Negligence" which states that where both parties
are negligent but the negligence of one is appreciably later in time
than of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence
of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of or bar a defense against the liability
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could
have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
In the case at bench, the negligence of Contech caused the
damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its
duty of excavating eight (8) inches away from the boundary line
from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and subjacent
support.
Chan Jr. vs INC
Chan owned the Aringay Shell Gas Station. It is bounded on the
south by INC’s chapel. The gas station was supposedly needed
additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of
this, the services Yoro was allegedly a construction contractor in
the locality. They entered into a MOA which stipulated that any
damage within or outside the property of Chan incurred during the
digging shall be borne by Yoro. Further, the MOA discusses
division of wealth in case hidden treasure is found during the
digging. After some time, Chan was informed by the members of
the INC that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the
land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was
affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and
prejudice of the respondent.
WON the MOA has the effect of making Yoro solely responsible
for damages? NO
ART. 2176. — Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are
the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act
was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent
because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may
have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on
respondent's premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro
on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage
caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they
are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The MOA
cannot steer Chan clear of any liability. As a general rule, joint
tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
6 | P a g e KDAlianza
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station. Some of the
for their benefit. residents petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) for the closure
or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was
referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal
CHAPTER VIII – NUISANCE Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation.
Upon their advice, the SB recommended to the Mayor the closure
or transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc vs Guillermo Balandan et al
Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is
Balandan and his wife is claiming damages for the death of their
a blatant violation and disregard of existing law for being near to
son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in
a school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and
their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was
church, with distances less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were
fenced but ingress and egress was easily made because the gates
called as witnesses when actual measurements were done). It is
were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate.
also located in a thickly populated area with
Also, the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when
commercial/residential buildings, houses closed to each other
Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the
which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of
factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing,
fire. The residents also complain of the irritating smell of gasoline
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose
already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to
residents to illness. Lastly, it hampers the flow of traffic.
drowning.’
WON the closure/transfer of the gasoline filling station was an
WON the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?
invalid exercise of police power? YES
NO
The resolution must be struck down as invalid as it authorizes the
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
closure or transfer of location of a gasoline station upon authority
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against
of its Official Zoning Code. According to the Court, the business
this danger, children are early instructed so that they are
of a gasoline station could not be considered a nuisance per se
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of
which the municipality could summarily abate in the guise of
private property creates an artificial pool on his own property,
exercising its police power.
merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
danger, he is not liable because of having created an attractive
Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc vs Jac Liner, Inc
nuisance.
2 ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said
Estate of Gregoria Francisco et al vs CA
to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney
The Philippine Ports Authority issued to Tan Gin San, a permit to
terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to
occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of 1 year. The
the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance,
permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra.
establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal
Respondent Mayor notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or
facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other
relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of
hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena
the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure;
the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand
and stressing the "clear-up campaign on illegal squatters and
Central Terminal, Inc.
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Since the
WON the ordinance is valid? NO
notifications remained unheeded, Respondent Mayor ordered for
An ordinance prohibiting the operation of all bus and jeepney
its demolition.
terminals within Lucena, including those already existing and
WON Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial
allowing the operation of only one common terminal is invalid.
process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building? NO
Bus and jeepney terminals are not nuisances per se. They cannot
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
be abated via an ordinance without judicial proceedings.
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
Perez, both in his personal and official capacity as Chief,
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
Marikina Demolition Office vs Sps Madrona and Pante
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The
storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. Sps Madrona and Pante built their house on their registered land
and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. They received
By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property,
of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per the following letter from Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition
Office stating that the structure that they built encroached on the
accidens, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. sidewalk and that is in violation of PD 1096 of the National
Building Code and RA 917 on illegally occupied/constructed
improvements within the road right-of-way.
Parayno vs Jovellanos
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
WON the respondents’ structure is a nuisance per se that presents
immediate danger to the community’s welfare and can be removed
without need of judicial intervention since the clearing of the
sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the Marikina City
Government and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in
PD 1818? NO
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached
on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily
after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead,
he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations
in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is
a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention. Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its
nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as
correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If
petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on
the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per
accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is
unwarranted.
Aquino vs Municipality of Malay, Aklan
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. was
already operating a resort in the area when it sought the issuance
of a building permit covering the construction of a 3-storey hotel.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s
application on the ground that the proposed construction site was
within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance
2000-131 (Ordinance). The building was demolished.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be
abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred
million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the
Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court
order before proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no
court order because the municipal mayor has the express power
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of
illegally constructed buildings.
WON judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can
order the closure and demolition of the property in question? NO
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a
nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as
an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times
and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel's particular incident — its
location — and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no
build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary
permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel
is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per
accidens.
7 | P a g e KDAlianza
One piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function
as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals
and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
permits.
CHAPTER IX – REGISTRY OF PROPERTY & MODES
OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila et al vs CA
Sps de Castro, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in
favor of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel
of land which provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the
property within 100 years from the execution of the deed of
donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render
ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property
would revert to the estate of the donors. While still within the
prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner executed a
deed of absolute sale of the subject property in favor of Sps Ignao.
Thus, the heirs filed a complaint for nullification of deed of
donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property
with damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the action to file for rescission has prescribed.
WON the condition is valid? NO
Won the Action for rescission has already prescribed? NO
Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of
donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. “In the case at bar, we
hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the
alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible
condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil
Code.”
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an
action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within 4
years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein,
hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should
apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code.
Laureta vs Mata
S. Laureta donated to P. Mata. Exhibit A:
"a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token
of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in
my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my
estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa' to said youth all the
properties described as follows." In the second paragraph it said:
"Therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition
is the subject of this donation." In the third it recites: "I also declare
that I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct
of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, etc." In the fourth —
"I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee
cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death
of the donor, etc."
At the time of Laureta’s death, Mata and Magno, entered upon and
took possession of the lands. Paulo Laureta, administrator of the
estate, made a demand upon them for possession of the lands
which was refused, resulting in this action.
WON the rules for testamentary succession should govern despite
the donation made during the lifetime of the donor? NO
From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property
and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists,
perfectly and irrevocably. Until the day arrives or until the
condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made,
cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective
upon a certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes
of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the
donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. He
who makes a donation effective after his death, makes a donation,
not a legacy. The mere name of the act, when a different intention
does not clearly appear, is enough in order to make applicable
thereto the rules of law referring to donations. However, if the ill-
named donor not only postpones the date of the execution of the
donation until his death but also reserves the right to revoke said
act at his pleasure, then this act is not valid as a form of contract;
this is in truth a disposition of property mortis causa which
requires the same solemnities as required in making a will.
Concepcion vs Concepcion
A deed of donation was executed by the donor Manuela
Concepcion and accepted by Emilia Concepcion. But about 3
years after the donation, the donor died. Plaintiffs-appellees who
are 6 nephews and nieces of the donor, all surnamed Concepcion
instituted special proceedings for the summary settlement of the
estate of their aunt. The donee Concepcion filed opposition to the
petition for summary settlement claiming that the 6 parcels subject
of the donation belonged to her. The plaintiffs contended that the
deed was void because the donation was mortis causa which shall
be governed by the rules established for testamentary succession;
and according to the law governing the execution of wills, a will
should be attested by 3 witnesses, and there should be an
attestation clause as opposed to donation inter vivos which only
requires 2 witnesses without attestation clause.
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
WON the donation was inter vivos? YES
It is the body of the document of donation and the statements
contained therein, and not the title, that should be considered in
ascertaining the intention of the donor. Even when the donor calls
the donation mortis causa instead of inter vivos, even if he says it
is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the
instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main
consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but
rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for
the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos,
and when duly accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee,
and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the
death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated
should take place only after donor's death.
Austria-Magat vs Hon CA
Deed of Donation provides:
Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa
naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang
aking lupang residensyal o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik
doon xxx. (emphasis supplied)
This is a clear expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance.
The irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation
inter vivos. By the words “hindi mababawi”, the donor expressly
renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in
question. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential to
full ownership. Hence, ownership of the house and lot was already
with the donees even during the donor’s lifetime.
Maglasang et al vs Heirs of Cabatingan et al
Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, a "Deed of
Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering
½ portion of the former's house and lot. 4 other deeds of donation
were subsequently executed, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas,
Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for 2 parcels of
land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these
presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all
improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event
that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect."
WON the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa?
YES
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It
conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
8 | P a g e KDAlianza
of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That
the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is
confirmed by the phrase “that in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.” This
only shows that the transfer would be void if the transferor
survives the transferee. If it intended to be a donation inter vivos,
the property would be of the heirs, without reverting the ownership
to the donor. That the donations were made "in consideration of
the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations
as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for
the same reason.
Gestopa vs CA
3 deeds of donation mortis causa over several parcels of
unregistered land were executed in favor of Pilapil by Sps Danlag.
Sps executed a deed of donation inter vivos over said parcels of
land again in favor of Pilapil. This contained the condition that the
spouses Danlag shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during
their lifetime. Likewise, it imposed a limitation on Pilapil’s right
to sell the land during the lifetime of the spouses without their
consent and approval. However, years later, spouses Danlag sold
several parcels of the land so donated to spouses Gestopa.
WON the second donation is donation inter vivos? YES
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis
causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of
the deed. In the case at bar, the granting clause shows that Diego
donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This
is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of
lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties for what was the need for
such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners
of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties
for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society,
indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of
land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. The Danlag spouses
were aware of the difference between the 2 donations. If they did
not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the
four lots already donated mortis causa. An acceptance clause is a
mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement
for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during
the donors' lifetime. Furthermore, a limitation on the right to sell
during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to
the donees and donation was already effective during the donors'
lifetime. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable,
except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of
revocation.
Sambaan vs Villanueva
Spanish…..
L
Guzman vs Ibea
Yangco donated to Abella 9 parcels of land to which Abella
accepted. However, Yangco revoked this donation because the
donee's husband, Ibea, had been speaking ill and discourteously of
her. On the very date of the revocation, Yangco donated the same
property to her nephew de Guzman.
WON Modesta Yangco, after having donated the property, could
still revoke this donation? NO
A donation mortis causa is that which becomes effective upon the
death of the donor. The clause quoted in the decision clearly shows
that the donation became effective immediately, independently of
the donor's death. The properties were turned over to the donee for
her administration and possessions always and as owners. As to
the naked ownership, the donation is pure, actual. It does not
impose any condition, it does not fix any period for its
transmission, it does not in any manner condition its effects upon
death. The provision in the deed that the income of the lands be
delivered to the donor for her enjoyment until she dies, does not
affect the character of the donation, because the law precisely
requires (art. 634 of the Civil Code) for the validity of a donation,
that there be reserved to the donor, in full ownership or in usufruct,
an amount sufficient to support her in a manner appropriate to her
station. The donation being, by its terms, inter vivos in accordance
with law, this character is not altered by the fact that the donee
styles it mortis causa. Being inter vivos, the donation may not be
revoked except for the causes provided by law (art. 648 of the Civil
Code), among which is not included the fact that the husband of
the donee has spoken ill of the donor, especially as this is not the
act of the donee herself. The revocation of the donation in favor of
J. A. being null and void, the second donation of the same lands in
favor of the plaintiff I. G. is likewise null and void.
Zapanta vs Posadas
Father Braulio Pineda died in January 1925 without any
ascendants or descendants leaving a will in which he instituted his
sister Irene Pineda as his sole heiress. During his lifetime Father
Braulio donated some of his property by the instruments to the six
plaintifffs, severally, with the condition that some of them would
pay him a certain amount of rice, and others of money every year,
and with the express provision that failure to fulfill this condition
would revoke the donations ipso facto. These six plaintiff-donees
are relatives, and some of them brothers of Father Braulio Pineda.
The donations contained another clause that they would take effect
upon acceptance. They were accepted during Father Braulio's
lifetime by every one of the donees. Every one of the six plaintiffs
filed a separate action against the Collector of Internal Revenue
and his deputy for the sums of which each of them paid, under
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
protest, as inheritance tax on the property donated to them.
According to the plaintiffs, the donation was inter vivos and
therefore not subject to inheritance tax since it is upon donation
mortis causa that the Administrative Code imposes the tax.
WON the donation was inter vivos? YES
The principal characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which
distinguish it essentially from a donation inter vivos, are that in the
former it is the donor's death that determines the acquisition of the
property, and that it is revocable at the will of the donor. In the
donations in question, the acquisition of the property was
produced while the donor was still alive, for according to their
expressed terms they were to have this effect upon acceptance, and
this took place during the donor's lifetime. That the donation was
subject to a condition is of no matter since the condition was a
resolutory one and would therefore presuppose that the acquisition
of the property came first. Therefore, the property donated passed
to the ownership of the donees from the acceptance of the
donations, and these could not be revoked except upon the
nonfulfillment of the condition imposed, or for other causes
prescribed by the law, but not by mere will of the donor.
Sicad vs CA
Montinola executed a deed entitled “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” in favor of her 3 grandchildren Valderramas. The deed
however provided that that the donation shall be effective only 10
years after her death. In 1980, the original title of the parcel of land
subject of the donation was cancelled and a new title was given to
the Valderramas. Montinola however retained the original title and
she continued to perform acts of ownership over the parcel of land.
Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude
committed against her by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas
defamed her; that she overheard the Valderramas plotting against
her life. She petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her
grandchildren’s title be cancelled. She said that the donation is
actually a donation mortis causa and that the same is void because
the formalities of a will were not complied with. In the same year,
she sold her property to spouses Sicad.
WON the “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” is actually a donation
mortis causa? YES
Montinola not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the
property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,
specially provided that without the knowledge and consent of the
Montinola, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute
of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. A donation
which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee
the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa
“the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the
donor is still alive. The donation is therefore void because the
formalities of a will, which is essentially a donation mortis causa,
were not complied with.
Del Rosario vs Ferrer
9 | P a g e KDAlianza
Spouses Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis
Causa” in favor of their 2 children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and
their granddaughter, Jarabini del Rosario covering the spouses’ lot
and the house on it in equal shares. Few months after the death of
Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of
assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their
daughter Asuncion. When he died, Jarabini filed a petition for the
probate of the deed of donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed
the petition, invoking his father’s assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to her.
WON the spouses’ donation was a donation mortis causa? NO
WON the assignment of Leopoldo’s rights and interest is valid?
NO
The fact that the document in question was denominated as a
donation mortis causa is not controlling if a donation by its terms
is inter vivos. “Irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible
with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability”
is precisely the essence of the act. In the present case, the donors
plainly said that it is “our will that this Donation Mortis Causa
shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Thus, given that the donation was
indeed inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to Asuncion is void.
Lagazo vs CA
Petitioner’s grandmother was awarded a 60.10 sq.m.lot which is a
portion of the Monserrat Estate. Shortly before she left for
Canada, Jacob executed as SPA in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo
Español authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for
the final adjudication of her claims as awardee of the lot. Jacob
revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada.
Simultaneously, Jacob executed another SPA in petitioner’s favor.
Thereafter, Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over Lot
8W in petitioner’s favor. The petitioner then checked with the
register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the
delinquent list so he paid the remaining balance and declared the
lot in Jacob’s name. Subsequently, petitioner sent a demand letter
to private respondent asking him to vacate Lot8W which the latter
refused to do.
WON the donation is a simple or onerous donation? SIMPLE
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no
strings attached), while onerous donation is one which is subject
to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value
than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code,
donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple
donation are not applicable. In the case at bar, even conceding that
petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have
been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by
the donor as a condition for the donation. The payments made by
petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. Like any other contract,
an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation following
the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected
only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee. Furthermore, if the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments." Acceptance of
the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
makes the donation null and void. In this case, the deed of donation
does not show any indication that petitioner-donee accepted the
gift.
Osorio vs Osorio
Antonio Osorio was the owner of 1/3 of the Steamship Company’s
capital amounting to 160k. Upon his death, the administratrix,
with the consent of the heirs, presented a project of partition where
94k of said share would belong to Petrona Reyes, the wife of the
deceased. Petrona executed a deed of donation of 1/2 of her share
of the estate in favor of his son, Leonardo, which the latter
accepted by signing in the same document. However, by that time,
the estate was not yet distributed among the heirs. So Petrona, to
correct the error in said document, executed another document
maintaining in effect the donation that she ceded and donated all
interest or participation on the said shipping company which was
adjudicated to her in the division of the estate. Subsequently, the
steamship company bought a new vessel. Leonardo contended that
the share of Petrona to said vessel also belongs to him by virtue of
the donation. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that
such share was not included in the donation, thus it does not belong
solely to the petitioner. They further contended that the subject in
the donation was a future inheritance, thus, void.
WON the subject of the donation was a future inheritance? NO
Donation of future properties is prohibited. Future properties are
those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the object of
the disposal by the donor. But the properties of an existing
inheritance as those of the case at bar, cannot be considered as
another's property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction
of law continue the personality of the owner. Nor do they have the
character of future property because the heirs acquired a right to
succeed him from the moment of his death, because of the
principle announced in article 657 and applied by article 661 of
the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased
by the mere fact of his death.
The acceptance is necessary because nobody is obliged to receive
a benefit against his will. And all this was complied with in the
first document. The wills of the donor and of the donee having
concurred, the donation becomes perfect. As to the second
document, the donor only tried to correct what she believed to be
an error in the first. She did not make a new donation. She just
executed a personal act which did not require the concurrence of
the donee.
Pajarillo et al vs IAC
Perfecta died intestate and leaving a tract of land with buildings
and improvements. Her siblings Juana and Felipe executed a
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
public instrument entitled “Extra-judicial settlement of the estate
of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it, they disposed
that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration of love
and affection, the said property be donated to Salud, Perfecta’s
niece, who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to PNB. In the
same document, the donee accepted the donation in a public
instrument. The instrument was never registered nor the title
transferred to Salud’s name although she immediately took
possession of the land. Salud transferred the possession of the land
to her mother Juana, who was then staying with her brother
Claudio and his family. During the period they were occupying the
land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. Juana executed a deed of
absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Years later, Claudio
had the land registered in his name. When he and his mother died,
Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of
the property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of
Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name was null and
void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and
that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her
brother and the defendants.
Other impt facts:
Donation involved is that from a mother to a daughter. Donation
was accepted by Salud Suterio in a separate public instrument, but
the acceptance WAS NOT NOTED in both instruments, meaning,
the extra-judicial partition [where the donation was made] and in
the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
WON the extra-judicial settlement was a donation? YES
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the
acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In
the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of
the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that
the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud.
Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience
declare the donation ineffective for the mere reason that there is
no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form
over substance.
Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and
the owners of the property in question. As such, they were free to
give the land to whomever they pleased and for whatever reason
they saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfecta’s wishes and
carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was
no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no question that
Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sister’s
sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The
fact that they did not do this speaks well of their integrity and their
loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial settlement also
reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid
consideration for their own act of liberality.
Dolar vs Brgy Lublub
10 | P a g e KDAlianza
Petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to Brgy. Lublub,
accepted by the barangay captain Militar. Dolar filed against Brgy.
Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession with Damages involving the property he had earlier
donated. He claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be
effective since the donee barangay failed to comply with the
conditions of the donation such as the establishment within 5 years
a public plaza, sports complex and like structures. The said deed
also contains an automatic reversion clause that should the use of
the area be converted to uses other than those stipulated, then the
deed of donation shall be deemed revoked and the ownership shall
revert back to the donors without the need of judicial intervention.
WON the deed of donation in question is no longer effective by
reason of the automatic reversion clause therein? NO
If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for
automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the
condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with
the condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to
the donor. Such provision is in the nature of an agreement granting
a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without
need of going to court and that upon the happening of the
resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the
contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a
judicial declaration to that effect. However, only the final award
of the court can conclusively settle whether the
resolution/rescission is proper or not. In this case, respondent
barangay had already substantially satisfied the terms and
conditions of the donation through the establishment of telephone
service, a water service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom,
all for the benefits of the barangay residents.
Arcaba vs Tabancura et al
Arcaba who was then 34-year-old widow started working for
Francisco who was 75-year-old widower. The latter did not pay
him any wages as househelper though her family was provided
with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became
bedridden. Few months before Francisco died, he executed a
“Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of the
lot, together with his house to Arcaba who accepted the same. The
larger portion was left under his name. This was made in
consideration of the 10 years of faithful services of Arcaba. The
decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession questioned the donation on the ground that Arcaba was
the common-law wife of Francisco.
WON the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in
Cirila’s favor was valid? NO
Donation between common law spouses is not valid. Arcaba
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and
they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public
conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her
wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver
employee. Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer
be interested in sex at the very least. Hence, the deed of donation
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code which provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage.
Quilala vs Alcantara
The donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation. However, the second
page of the deed of donation, on which the acknowledgment
appears, only contains the name of the donor. It appears that he
was the only one who appeared before the Notary Public. There
was no mention of the donee. But in the Deed of Donation itself,
there appears a stipulation that the “donee hereby receives and
accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the donor....”
WON the donation made by Catalina to Violeta valid? YES
The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary
public does not render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact
that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance
that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act.
Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs Tamayo
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his
5 children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as
surviving heirs. Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an
action for compulsory judicial partition of real properties
registered in the name of Agustin Dizon because Natividad
refuse to agree on the partition among his heirs. Respondent's
refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of
land where she presently resides, claiming that her father donated
orally it to her sometime in 1936 with the conformity of the other
heirs. The subject property is also declared for taxation purposes
in his name.
WON Natividad acquire exclusive ownership of the subject
property?NO
Article 749 provides that a transfer of real property from one
person to another cannot take effect as a donation unless
embodied in a public document. While it is true that a void
donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse
and under a claim of title. In this case, respondent was never in
adverse and continuous possession of the property. It is
SY 2017-2018 PROPERTY DIGEST
undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the
deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the latter and
possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other
co-owners absent of unequivocal acts of repudiation. The fact
that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the
name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax
Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax
declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence
of ownership.
Calicdan vs Cendana
The donation involved a parcel of land executed by Fermina
Calicdan (in 1947) in favor of Silverio Cendana. Silverio Cendana,
immediately entered into possession of the land, and built a fence
around it and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon
sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.
However, the donation was later found to be the exclusive property
of Fermina’s husband, Sixto, being an inheritance from the latter’s
parents.
WON the donation inter vivos is valid? NO
WON petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription? YES
The donation was void because Fermina was not the owner
thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents.
Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses.
Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina,
only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which
the latter could convey.
However, prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and
other real rights over immovable property. The possession should
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. The deed of donation inter vivos, although void for
having been executed by one who was not the owner of the
property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and
adverse character of respondent's possession. In this case, the
respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years counted from
the time of the donation in 1947. Such possession was public,
adverse and in the concept of an owner. Therefore, respondent is
the rightful owner of the subject property, not on the basis of the
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby declared void, but
on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
De Luna vs Hon Abrigo et al
Prudencio de Luna donated a lot to Luzonian Colleges, Inc subject
to automatic reversion. When the Foundation failed to comply,
Prudencio revived the donation, with the condition that the donee
build on the land a chapel with an altar of granoletic marble, a
nursery, and a kindergarten to be named after St. Veronica, using
plans provided by O.R. Quinto & Associates. 70% of the
construction must be finished within 3 years, while the entire
project must be accomplished within 5 years. It also provided for
automatic reversion. After Prudencio died, his heirs filed for
cancellation of the donation due to non-compliance with the
conditions.
11 | P a g e KDAlianza
WON revocation had prescribed? NO death before they filed this case. Thus, to avoid injustice, they must
It is true that Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the be estopped from bringing this case.
revocation of a donation must be brought within 4 years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is
Our opinion that the said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on
contracts. Under the rules on contracts, a contract providing for
automatically revocation does not need of a judicial declaration to
take effect. However, where one of the parties contests the
rescission, only a court of competent jurisdiction may settle the
issue. Enforcement must be brought within 10 years
Eloy Imperial vs CA et al
For Php1.00, Leoncio transferred his lot in Albay to his
illegitimate son, Eloy. While it was designated as a sale, it was in
fact a donation. Leoncio later filed for annulment of the sale,
claiming that Eloy deceived him. They executed a compromise
agreement, wherein Eloy agreed to sell a portion of the land and
give the proceeds to Leoncio. Pending execution, Leoncio died.
His adopted son Victor moved for execution of the compromise
agreement. 15 years later, Victor died, survived only by his natural
father Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo was a lessee of the disputed land.
4 years later, Ricardo died, leaving behind his children Cesar and
Teresa. 5 years later, they filed for annulment of the donation,
claiming that it impaired Victor’s legitime. Eloy argued that the
case was barred by res judicata, that Victor repudiated his
inheritance when he did not question the officiousness of the
donation, that the cause of action had prescribed, and that
respondents are barred by estoppel and laches.
WON the cause of action had prescribed? YES
WON respondents are estopped? YES
Reduction of donations which impair legitime are not explicitly
controlled by a particular prescriptive period. Thus, resort must be
found in the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the
Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs. The reckoning period begins upon the death of
the donor-decedent, because it is only then that the net estate may
be ascertained. In this case, it took petitioners 24 years since the
death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action had already
prescribed.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a
presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to
assert it. As a lawyer, Victor should have been aware of his rights
and could have questioned the officiousness of the donation.
Neither did his natural father Ricardo question despite being a
lessee. Finally, Cesar and Teresa waited 5 years after their father’s