TOPIC: ALSO READ CIRCULAR POSTED BY ESTELLE IN FB
1. People v ROMY LIM (2018)
FACTS: On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the
September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court {RTC), Branch
25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-
1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of
violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act o/2002.
Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing that
the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Issue: W/N Lim is correct?
RULING: The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and
Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No.
9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving
clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control o f the
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of
the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in
instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers
and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened
by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action o f those
who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault. The
present case is not one of those.
Here, Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the
plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. Carin also
turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in
the house, Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Orellan testified
that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of
the two sachets of shabu. To ensure that .they were not interchanged,
he separately marked the item sold by Lim to Carin and the one that he
recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10
and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his
initial/signature.
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and
representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures
do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
It must be alleged and proved that the -presence of the three
witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal
drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as: (1) their
attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused
or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official
themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile
through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of
the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses
must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does
not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a
justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of
RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that
the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in
contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a
sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere
statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact
the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers
are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they
have received the information about the activities of the accused until
the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing
full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure
prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are
compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but
must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest
efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.
In this case, IOI Orellan testified that no members of the media and
barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at
night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's
house. Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the
PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were
no available media representative and barangay officials despite their
effort to contact them He admitted that there are times when they do
not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might
leak the confidential information. We are of the view that these
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply with the law.
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the
presence of a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
While the arresting officer, 101 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they
only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried
to contact a DOJ representative.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the
details of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of
the required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust
team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's house,
considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members,
and the two accused were the only persons in the house.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory
requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its
IRR may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies not just on
arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but
also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national
penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international
package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a consented search, stop and
frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or application of
plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or
seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
In order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket
any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following
should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
2. In case o f non-observance o f the provision, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation
therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
3.I f there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the
sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer
the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the
(non) existence ofprobable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the
court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment
order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of
probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
2. TOPIC: RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
 the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of
vs.
 Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo. The testimony of Sgt. Mariano
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y
CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS
MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla,
Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside
her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City. Her
bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked.
The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some personal
garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness
saw the commission of the crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of
the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to
the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with
the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence
implicating him in the crime.
Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim.
In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of
jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina
Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City
police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial
confession. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay
City. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in
the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez,
"Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went
near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret
Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and
Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami"
and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for
Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay
City against those named.
Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre
entered a plea of not guilty. The only evidence, therefore, presented by
Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was
investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre,
Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the
commission of the crime.
Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three
persons do?
A. They just stared at him and said nothing
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent
(they) should have protested vigorously and not merely kept their
silence."
Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner, declared that the three (3)
appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and
homicide committed in the residence of the deceased,
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the
Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police.
ISSUE 1: Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in 1)
utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now
deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from
the alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt;
1) The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis
of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio
Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro
Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent
evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value
against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the
other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to
this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do
not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence,
therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported
tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime
made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to
Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the silence of appellants while under police
custody, in the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them
as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be considered
as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.
2) The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken
as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an
incriminating question. It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
The silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny
statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such
accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or
accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his
participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement
would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against
self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self-
incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege
against self- incrimination is an important development in man's
struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most
noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those'
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained
by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life."
... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures
to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental
to our scheme of justice ...
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and
against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as
resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free,
genuine will.
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the
operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused person are
not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees,
all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights
of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under
investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have
counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to
force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or
torture in the course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any
confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution
protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty for such silence.
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy,
this Court, in Pascual explained that the privilege against
self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from
appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of the
incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that
the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold,
further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the
remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of
Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain
the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that
herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation
in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in
a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion
they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the
police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and
appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan and
Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with
which they are charged.
TOPIC: CONFESSION TO MEDIA ADMISSABLE; NOT UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
CORROBORATED BY CORPUS DELICTI
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FACTS: On October 17, 1996, at around 4 o'clock, when the body of
six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo
grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's body bore several
stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time. The
investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant
Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim's grandfather, as the lone
suspect in the gruesome crime.
A criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996, Dr.
Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an
autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his
examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that the child's hymen
had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding,
SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint against accused-
appellant to rape with homicide.
The prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel
who testified that, on separate occasions, accused-appellant had
confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay. SPO1 Espinoza
testified that before he commenced his questioning, he apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later
translated into Pangasinense. According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-
appellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator even in the
absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant
also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing the victim.
On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the
course of his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel.
Neither was accused-appellant's confession reduced in writing.
Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection
of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station
DWPR, an AM station. He covers the third district of Pangasinan,
including Malasiqui. Sometime in October 1996, an uncle of the victim
came to Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer
Domantay's case. On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to
interview accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal
jail. He described what transpired during the interview thus:
Q: What are those matters which you brought out in that interview with
the accused Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot"?
A: I asked him what was his purpose for human interest's sake as a
reporter, why did he commit that alleged crime. And I asked also if he
committed the crime and he answered "yes." That's it.
Q: More or less what have you asked him on that particular matter?
A: I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung pinagsisisihan
mo ba ang iyong ginawa?" "Opo" sabi niya, "Ibig mo bang sabihin Jun,
ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?", "Ako nga po". The [l]ast part of my
interview, "Kung nakikinig ang mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang
gusto mong iparating?", "kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay
tatanggapin ko". That is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot,
what was his purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary dispute,
and he used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was
conducted in the jail, about two to three meters away from the police
station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the nearest policemen
present were about two to three meters from him, including those who
were in the radio room. There was no lawyer present. Before
interviewing accused-appellant, Manuel said he talked to the chief of
police and asked permission to interview accused-appellant. On
questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had
been called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted
ISSUE: THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
Art. III, §12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
. . ..
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is,
"when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect." R.A. No.
7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which
an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
"invited" for questioning.
an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was
already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer
Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and
the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution applied to
him. But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was
neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1
Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant
should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet
inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous
tree."
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's
confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People
v. Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the
crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession
admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without
the assistance of counsel, this Court said:
[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail
when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar
to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. We are not
persuaded.
Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The
interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was
an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely and
spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to
accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers
around because about two to three meters from the jail were the police
station and the radio room. We do not think the presence of the police
officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant
and coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for
the police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit
some incriminating information from the accused." This is pure
conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates
before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat
reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in
conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit
incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the
media are known to take an opposite stance against the government by
exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the
police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where
it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of fear.
As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6
days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer
Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the
other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his
confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed
by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near the bamboo grove
where the child's body was found.
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. 3⁄4 An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-
appellant's guilt with respect to the killing of the child. It is clear that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant is guilty of homicide. Second. There is, however, no sufficient
evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping Jennifer Domantay.
Consequently, standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of
the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when
this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that
rape may be deemed to have been established.
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal
tear may be caused by objects other than the male sex organ or may
arise from other causes. Dr. Bandonill himself admitted this. in the case
at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that
accused-appellant sexually abused the victim. The only circumstance
from which such inference might be made is that accused-appellant
was seen with the victim walking toward the place where the girl's body
was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he
simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the
lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance from
which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he
was zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girl's
vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the
finding of rape. THUS ACCUSED IS CONVICTED OF accused-
appellant guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength
TOPIC: IMPOVIDENT PLEA; ACCUSED STILL GUILTY DUE TO
OTHER EVIDENCES
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE,
VS.
RAFAEL PRINCIPE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge of
rape slaying a six year old girl, Arlene, Ipurong, the trial court ordered
the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant and the precise degree of his culpability.
ISSUE: Accused-appellant contends that the trial court failed to
ascertain whether accused-appellant was fully apprised of the legal
consequences of his plea, considering that he finished only up to the
sixth grade of the elementary school.
RULING: Accused-appellant is correct. When an accused enters a plea
of guilt to a capital offense, Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that it is the duty of the trial court to
observe the following rules: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) it must asks the accused if he desires to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This is because a plea of
guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the inquiry
must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension
of the consequences of the plea.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply fully with the requirement to
conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant’s
plea was voluntary and done with full comprehension of the
consequences thereof. In determining whether accused-appellant was
aware of the full consequences of his plea of guilt, the trial court simply
asked him whether he knew that he “may” be sentenced to death,
implying that it was possible that the death penalty might not be
imposed on him. But Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides for
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed against a child below seven years old. Even if the victim is
not a child below seven years of age but homicide is committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the rape, the imposable penalty is
death. Indeed, as noted in People vs. Nadera, a mere warning that the
accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. More often
than not, an accused pleads guilty because he hopes for a lenient
treatment or a lighter penalty. Thus, in the case at bar, when the trial
court again asked accused-appellant his final plea, accused-appellant
answered:
COURT: Mr. Principe, for the last time, the court would like to ask you
your final plea before the case is submitted for resolution.
ACCUSED PRINCIPE: As narrated. I have admitted my guilt, sir, in
connection with this case. My only plea is, if possible, kindly give me
the minimum penalty that the Court can impose.
COURT: In other words, you admit your guilt because you did it. Only,
what you want is leniency from the Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q I want to tell you that what you stated in open court are recorded and
it is finally for the Supreme Court to give you leniency.
A: Yes, sir.”
Although accused-appellant said he was admitting guilt “because [he]
did it,” there is doubt whether that was his only reason for pleading
guilty because he also said he “wanted leniency from the court.” This
makes it doubtful whether his plea was voluntary.
While accused-appellant’s improvident plea should be
disregarded, nevertheless his conviction cannot be set aside as
there is, in addition to his plea, other sufficient and credible
evidence on which the judgment of the trial court rests. This
evidence consists of accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession,
his testimony in open court, and the testimony of the other
witnesses.
There are four fundamental requirements for the admissibility of
extrajudicial confessions in general, to wit: (a) the confession must be
voluntary; (b) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) it
must be in writing. In this case, after accused-appellant was read his
rights in Tagalog, he signified his intention to confess his participation in
the rape and killing of Arlene. He did this in the presence of his father
and with the assistance of Atty. Cesar Villar, who had been chosen by
his father for him. In his confession, he stated categorically that he took
Arlene to an abandoned house near Best-Line Eatery, where he struck
her on the head with a rock, raped her, and afterwards dumped her
body into the toilet bowl in order to hide it. Accused-appellant’s
confession was placed in writing and it was signed by him, his counsel,
and the administering officer.
Accused-appellant acknowledged his extrajudicial confession in court.
The court asked him if he executed the extrajudicial confession
voluntarily and in the presence of counsel, and he answered in the
affirmative. Accused-appellant testified with some relatives present in
the courtroom, including his grandmother. In addition, he was assisted
by his counsel deoficio, Atty. Victor Galang.
Finally, the testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution confirm
accused- appellant’s testimony that he committed the crime. One of his
drinking companions, Frederick Agrigado, testified that accused-
appellant left them at about 4 p.m. to buy “pulutan” from the Best-Line
Eatery. Another witness, Alfredo Apan, said he saw accused-appellant
with the victim Arlene on his back walking towards the highway at about
the same time. After the disappearance of the victim, Alfredo Apan
confronted accused-appellant, telling him that he was the last person
seen with the child. Accused-appellant’s vehement denial aroused
Apan’s suspicions as he was the one who saw accused-appellant with
Arlene. At the restaurant, accused-appellant was served by Lerma
Morales, who noticed that he was with a 6-year old child, whom
accused-appellant introduced as his niece. After accused-appellant was
given his order, he took the child’s hand and led her to the abandoned
house. When he returned to his drinking companions, they noted it was
already about 5:30 p.m. and that he had been gone for one and a half
hours. Arlene’s body was found missing at past 5 p.m. of that same
day. All the above witnesses placed accused-appellant at the scene of
the crime at the time it took place.
The conviction of an accused may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, while there is
no eyewitness account as to who raped and killed Arlene, the above
circumstances strongly point to no other person than accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. This conclusion becomes all the more
certain and inevitable when the circumstantial evidence is considered
together with accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession and his own
testimony in open court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Cabanatuan City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Arlene Ipurong,
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as temperate damages,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRANAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL
BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY
TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", July 21, 2005
Facts: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a
young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. The woman was
identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia
surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the
abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel
Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-
perpetrators in the crime. The claims of Rusia were supported by other
witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a state
witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court
found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua.
Issues and RULING:
1. WON there was a violation of the appellants right to due
process?
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as having been
trampled. upon by the trial court are their: (a) right to be assisted by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence
on their behalf, and (d) right to an impartial trial.
a. Right to be assisted by counsel - appellants fault the trial
court: first, for appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be
assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to
suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.
There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counselde oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de
parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system. An examination of its
provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the "preference in
the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person
under investigation rather than an accused, in a criminal prosecution.
And even if we are to extend the "application of the concept of
"preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would
enable him to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others
equally capable.
If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available
to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter."
An application for a continuance in order to secure the services of
counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the
denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accused's right to
counsel.79 The right of the accused to select his own counsel must
be exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does
not mean that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to
secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his
trial. The court may deny accused's application to discharge his
counsel where it appears that such application is not made in
good faith but is made for purposes of delay.
b. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine the Prosecution
Witnesses
All of appellants' counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling
Rusia concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and
Jacqueline. That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of
time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be
labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. The court
has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to
consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice. Where
several accused are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in
which counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine the
state's witnesses may be regulated by the court. If some of the
prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination, it was
not because appellants were not given the opportunity to do so.
The fact remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross
examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and
cross examine. the witnesses" against them.
c. Right to Impartial Trial
The intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the
hearing was not only appropriate but was necessary. Remarks which
merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to the real
point in issue. and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke
of counsel. Judge Ocampo's comments were just honest observations
intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to
caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may
rebuke a witness for levity
or for other improper conduct. This is because he is called upon to
ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and
impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the
defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases.
d. Right to Produce Evidence
The trial court exclude the testimonies of 4 airline personnel, intending
to prove that Larranaga did not travel from Cebu to Manila, and vice
versa, on July 16, 1997. The exclusion was justified. To prove that he
was not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines on
July 15 and 16, 1997 would not prove 'the legal requirement of
"physical impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from
Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997. The trial court
did not also allow the presentation of additional witnesses to prove
Larranaga’s enrollment at Center for Culinary Arts, located in QC. To
prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a certain period of time does
not negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City sometime in
July 1997 and stayed there for a while. Due process of law is not
denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent
evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness.105 It is not error
to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is
not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for
offering it.
2. WON prosecution witness Rusia is qualified to be a state
witness under paragraphs (d) and (e), section 17 of the revised
rules of criminal procedure?
Rusia's admission that he raped Jacqueline does not make him the
"most guilty" of the crimes charged. He had no inkling then of
appellants' plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The extent of
Rusia's participation in the crimes charged does not make him the
"most guilty." The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary
in Minessotta does not render his testimony inadmissible. Even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications
enumerated, his testimony will not, for that 'reason alone, be
discarded or disregarded. What makes Rusias testimony worthy of
belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical
evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. Reinforcing his
testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw
incidents of what he narrated. Even assuming that his testimony
standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his
character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence
presented by the prosecution. The fact that not all the requisites for
his discharge are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order.
3. WON there was insufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution?
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was
in another place at such a period of time that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission. These requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. Rusia positively identified the
appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused
by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi,
the much abused sanctuary of felons.124 Rusia's testimony was
corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the
appellants
Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form
part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the
accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
2. Larranaga v CA – Resolution (NOT PART OF RECIT
COVERAGE) CAN BE SKIPPED.
Facts: Petitioner Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Petitioner, represented by his mother,
Margarita G. Larranaga. Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right
to preliminary investigation and sought to annul the informations as well
as the warrant of arrest issued. The SC we issued a resolution holding
that petitioner was deprived of his right to preliminary investigation
when the City Prosecutor of Cebu insisted that he was only entitled to
an inquest investigation and the petitioner was ordered release pending
the preliminary investigation. However, Judge Ocampo, Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, issued an order deferring the
resolution of petitioners motion. It stated that it would be premature to
act on the motion since the trial court has not yet received an official
copy of our October 27 resolution and that said resolution has not yet
attained finality. He further stated that petitioner has been arraigned on
October 14, 1997 and waived his right to preliminary investigation.
When petitioners filed with the SC an urgent motion for immediate
release, Judge Ocampo alleged that petitioners’ counsel deliberately
withheld from this Court the omnibus order, supplemental order and
order of arraignment and misled the Court in its October 27 resolution.
Issues and RULING:
1. WON petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation?
Yes. The prosecutors argue that petitioner is entitled only to an inquest
investigation under Section 7 of Rule 112 since he was lawfully
arrested without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Section 7 of Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully
arrested without a warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place,
not arrested either by a peace officer or a private person. An arrest
signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. The foregoing
facts show no restraint upon the person of petitioner. Neither do they
show that petitioner was deprived of his own will and liberty. Hence,
Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply to petitioner. If petitioner were
arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest would still be illegal
because of the absence of a warrant. It does not fall under a lawful
warrantless arrest.
We reject the prosecutors' argument that petitioner was actually
committing a crime at the time of the arrest since kidnapping with
serious illegal detention is a continuing crime. There is no showing that
at the time of the arrest on September 15, 1997, Jacqueline Chiong
was being detained by petitioner who was then residing in Quezon City.
Hence, petitioner may not be considered as continually committing the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention at the time of the
arrest.
absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify petitioners release
because such defect did not nullify the information and the warrant of
arrest against him.
If there were no preliminary investigations, the court, instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

2. WON there was a waiver as to the preliminary investigation?
Judge Ocampo held that petitioner waived his right to preliminary
investigation when he failed to appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor (they assert that failure to
appear constitute a waiver). A waiver, whether express or implied, must
be made in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner
and his counsel to appear cannot be construed as a waiver of his right
to preliminary investigation.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was
charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding
his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts
of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary
investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived
unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.
As regards petitioners motion to change the venue and the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, we are
constrained to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a
preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department and
not of the Judiciary. Petitioner should therefore address their plea to the
Department of Justice that has control and supervision over the
conduct of preliminary investigations. Even if the Court had jurisdiction
over the issue, petitioners motion should still be denied because it
failed to allege and prove that the City Prosecutor of Cebu has been
actually affected by the publicity. To warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

3. WON petitioner should be released from detention pending the

investigation?

No. Two informations were filed against petitioner. As held in Sanchez

v. Demetriou, filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention
or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect.
Petitioners detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center is legal
in view of the information and the warrant of arrest against him. The