SECOND DIVISION

GOLDCREST REALTY G.R. No. 171072

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

CYPRESS GARDENS Promulgated:

CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, April 7, 2009
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated September 29, 2005 and
the Resolution[2] dated January 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 79924.

The antecedent facts in this case are as follows:

Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer

of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions[3]which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated
respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the
condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on
which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level
penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise
controlled the management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.

Following the turnover of the administration and management of the

Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that
certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached
upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against
Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to
compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to
remove the structures it built thereon.Cypress sought to remove the door erected by
Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built
in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire fence on
the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its
occupation of the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.

For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the
roof decks limited common area by Section 4(c)[4]of the condominiums Master
Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and
security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are
unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.

Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular

inspections[5] were conducted on the condominium project.During the first
inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area
fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise
discovered that Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which encroached
68.01 square meters of the roof decks common area.[6]

During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an
alteration approval for the said permanent structure.

In his Decision[7] dated December 2, 1999, Arbiter San Vicente ruled in

favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest, among other things, to: (1) remove the
questioned structures, including all other structures which inhibit the free ingress to
and egress from the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2)
vacate the roof decks common areas and to pay actual damages for occupying the
same; and (3) pay an administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse and
for making an unauthorized alteration of the condominium plan.

On review, the HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter

San Vicente. It deleted the award for actual damages after finding that the
encroached areas were not actually measured and that there was no evidentiary
basis for the rate of compensation fixed by Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held
that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the use of the roof decks limited
common area because only Goldcrest has the right to use the same. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the office [is]
modified as follows:

1. Directing respondent to immediately remove any or all structures

which obstruct the use of the stairway from the eighth to tenth floor, the passage
and use of the lobbies at the ninth and tenth floors of the Cypress Gardens
Condominium; and to remove any or all structures that impede the use of the
unlimited common areas.

2. Ordering the respondent to pay an administrative fine of P10,000.00

for its addition of a second penthouse and/or unauthorized alteration of the
condominium plan.

All other claims are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It questioned the

deletion of the award for actual damages and argued that the HLURB Special
Division in effect ruled that Goldcrest could erect structures on the roof decks
limited common area and lease the same to third persons.

The Office of the President dismissed the appeal. It ruled that the deletion of
the award for actual damages was proper because the exact area encroached by
Goldcrest was not determined. It likewise held that, contrary to the submissions
of Cypress, the assailed decision did not favor the building of structures on either
the condominiums limited or unlimited common areas. The Office of the President
stressed that the decision did not only order Goldcrest to remove the structures
impeding the use of the unlimited common areas, but also fined it for making
unauthorized alteration and construction of structures on the condominiums roof
deck.[9]The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of Cypress Gardens
Corporation is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Board aquo dated May 11, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which partly
granted its appeal. The appellate court noted that the right of Goldcrest under
Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for the exclusive use of the easement covering the
portion of the roof deck appurtenant to the penthouse did not include the
unrestricted right to build structures thereon or to lease such area to third
persons. Thus the appellate court ordered the removal of the permanent structures
constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Office of the President dated June 2, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. Respondent Goldcrest Realty Corporation is further directed to
remove the permanent structures constructed on the limited common area of the
roof deck.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The parties separately moved for partial reconsideration but both motions
were denied.

Hence this petition, raising the following issues:

I.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
GOLDCREST BUILT AN OFFICE STRUCTURE ON A SUPPOSED
ENCROACHED AREA IN THE OPEN SPACE OF THE ROOF DECK.

II.
 [WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE
ROOF DECK DESIGNATED AS A LIMITED COMMON AREA.[12]

Anent the first issue, Goldcrest contends that since the areas it allegedly
encroached upon were not actually measured during the previous ocular
inspections, the finding of the Court of Appeals that it built an office structure on
the roof decks limited common area is erroneous and that its directive to remove
the permanent structures[13] constructed on the limited common area of the roof
deck is impossible to implement.

On the other hand, Cypress counters that the Court of Appeals finding is
correct. It also argues that the absence of such measurement does not make the
assailed directive impossible to implement because the roof decks limited common
area is specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed, which reads:
Section. 4. The Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the common
areas are to be set aside and reserved for the exclusive use of certain units and
each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use of such
limited areas:

xxxx

(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet
10 of Annex B) by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck.[14]

xxxx

We rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings, the failure to

measure the supposed encroached areas is no longer relevant because the award for
actual damages is no longer in issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that
the finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure on the
roof decks limited common area is supported by substantial evidence and
established facts, to wit: (1) the ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB
Inspector Edwin D. Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular inspection of the
roof deck was intended to measure the actual area encroached upon by
Goldcrest;[15](3) the fact that Goldcrest had been fined for building a structure on
the limited common area;[16] and (4) the fact that Goldcrest neither denied the
structures existence nor its encroachment on the roof decks limited common area.
 Likewise, there is no merit in Goldcrests submission that the failure to
conduct an actual measurement on the roof decks encroached areas makes the
assailed directive of the Court of Appeals impossible to implement. As aptly
pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is specifically
identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.

Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof
decks common limited area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and
leasing the same to third persons do not impair the subject easement.

For its part, Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject easement because
the same are already beyond the contemplation of the easement granted to
Goldcrest.

The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one

of fact, considering that its resolution requires us to determine the acts propriety in
relation to the character and purpose of the subject easement.[17] In this case, we find
no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office
structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We
note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the
condominium plan, in violation of Section 22[18] of Presidential Decree No. 957.[19]

The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following
prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only
exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;[20] (2) it cannot use the
easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated;[21] (3) it
cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;[22] (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the
use and preservation of the easement;[23] (5) it cannot alter or make the easement
more burdensome;[24] (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to
make necessary works on the servient estate;[25] and (7) it should choose the most
convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience
to the owner of the servient estate.[26] Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
 Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number
of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the
lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of
the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the
strain on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited
area, making the easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to
all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office
structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally
altered the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4 [27] of the
condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed

Decision dated September 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No.
79924 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 32-43. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes,
Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurring.
[2]
Id. at 45-46.
[3]
Id. at 47-61.
[4]
Id. at 49-50.
Section 4. The Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the
exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use of
such limited areas:
xxxx
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex B) by the Penthouse unit on
the roof deck.
[5]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 152 and 173-174.
[6]
No distinction, however, was made between the roof decks limited and unlimited common areas.
[7]
CA rollo, pp. 86-99.
[8]
Id. at 107.
[9]
Id. at 108-119.
[10]
Id. at 119.
[11]
Id. at 341.
[12]
Rollo, p. 21.
[13]
Referring to the office structure.
[14]
CA rollo, pp. 37-38.
[15]
Id. at 173-174.
[16]
Rollo, p. 316.
[17]
See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., No. 23737, 109 Nev. 842, 858 P.2d 1258 (1993) and Bijou Irr. Dist. v.
Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,461 (Colo. 1991), both cited in 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and
Licenses 71.
[18]
SEC. 22. Alteration of Plans. No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures,
facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision
plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written
conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by the
majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
[19]
THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS PROTECTIVE DECREE, done on July 12, 1976.
[20]
CIVIL CODE,
Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary for its use are considered granted.
[21]
Id.,
Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally contemplated. Neither can he exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id.,
Art. 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his own expense, on the servient estate any works
necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but without altering it or rendering it more burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate, and shall choose the most convenient time and
manner so as to cause the least inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Section. 4. Maintenance, Repairs and Alterations.−
xxxx
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the owner, tenant or occupant of a unit may not undertake any structural
repairs or alterations, or any other work which would jeopardize the safety of the Building, or another unit, or
impair any easement, without the prior written approval of the Condominium Corporation and of the owners of
the units directly affected by such work.
xxxx
[28]
Rollo, pp. 51-58.
CITY OF MANILA V. GERARDO GARCIA
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

FACTS
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area in Malate, Manila, and covered by
Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

Few years thereafter, defendants were given written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific
areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal
rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this
school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was
followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the
occupancy and to vacate.

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

RULING
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. The defendants were wrong
in insisting that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They entered the land, built houses of second-class
materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city pemits,
thus, illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued when the effects of the war had simmered down
and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet,
usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property. Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their
constructions are as illegal, without permits.

The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder and impair the use of that
property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the
elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have
to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount.
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DIVISION

[ GR No. L-33213, Jun 29, 1979 ]

ARTEMIO C. REYES v. ANDRES STA. MARIA +

DECISION
180 Phil. 141

TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside the lower court's Order which dismissed petitioners-
plaintiffs' complaint filed before it for recovery of the property in the
possession of respondents-defendants and for declaration of ownership
thereof as against said respondents' contrary claim of ownership on the
ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction. Such action was clearly an accion
publiciana for the recovery of the right to possess (possession de jure) (if
not an accion reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction
and not a mere action for detainer to recover physical possession
(possession de facto) which would fall within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court (if filed within one year after unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession) as erroneously held by the lower court in its
dismissal order.
Petitioners as plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had filed
on April 1, 1968 an action which they termed as one to quiet title to a
certain residential lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an
area of 368.5 square meters and to recover the possession thereof from
respondents as defendants,[1] wherein they made the following averments:
"2. That plaintiffs are owners pro-indiviso of a certain residential lot
situated in the Barrio of San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and more
particularly bounded and described as follows:
(Description omitted)
"3. That through the tolerance and goodwill of plaintiffs, thru the
intervention and entreaty of one Maximo Santos, father of the defendants,
the latter used and occupied said land free of charge, under the following
conditions, to wit: (a) that instead of paying rentals on the premises
defendants undertook to pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the
land; and (b) that said defendants will leave and vacate the premises
anytime the plaintiffs so demand;
"4. That sometime in February, 1968, plaintiffs verbally notified
defendants that said plaintiffs were in need of the land, hence, said
defendants should vacate and leave the same, but said defendants
unreasonably refused at the same time claiming ownership of the property,
and alleging further that they bought the same from a certain Pablo
Aguinaldo;
"5. That in order to quiet the title of ownership over this land, the plaintiffs
have been compelled to institute the present action and, as a consequence,
she suffered damages in the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
"6. That the defendants thru their acts stated above have therefore
maliciously and unlawfully detained the land of plaintiffs since February,
1968; and
"7. That for the unlawful occupation of the land, an estimate of Fifty
(P50.00) Pesos monthly rental is hereby claimed as reasonable damages
suffered by plaintiffs since February, 1968."[2]
Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for judgment (a)
"declaring [them] to be the owners of the property described….."; (b)
"ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and return the possession
of the same to plaintiffs"; (c) "ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the sum of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), Philippine Currency,
rental or damages every month effective the first day of February, 1968,
until the possession of the premises is finally restored in favor of plaintiffs";
and further ordering defendants to pay them (d) P1,000.00 attorney's fees
and (e) costs of suit.
Upon respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit" and that the
action embodied in petitioners' complaint "is actually one for ejectment or
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the case falls within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the inferior court or municipal court" as against petitioners'
opposition that "plaintiffs' complaint is principally one to quiet title to
property, the question of possession being merely reduced to an incidental
issue," the lower court issued its appealed order of August 15, 1968, finding
the motion to dismiss to be "well founded" and dismissing the case "for lack
of jurisdiction." The lower court reasoned that:
"A perusal of the actual averments of facts in the complaint do not reveal
any allegation of ultimate facts which could sufficiently support an action to
quiet title. Upon the other hand, it is plain that the allegations of facts are
only constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer. The allegation in para-
graph 5 of said complaint 'that in order to quiet the title of ownership over
this land, the plaintiffs have been compelled to institute the present action
x x x' is not sufficient by itself to consider this case as an action for quieting
title under Article 476 of the New Civil Code. Neither does the prayer of
said complaint asking that the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the
property in question constitute a cause of action."
Hence, the present petition for review and setting aside of the dismissal
order, which the Court finds to be meritorious. The lower court was clearly
in error in issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken notion "that the
allegations of facts are only constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer"
since the complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver
the possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership
of the same property and their counter-allegation that they had bought the
same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action
was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property
(possession de jure), as well as to be declared the owners thereof as against
the contrary claim of respondents.
As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the
summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion
interdictalunder the former law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil),
which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within
one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana, which is
for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de
reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course
includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi), also brought in the Court of
First Instance."[3]
It has been said that "(T)he only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is
the physical possession of real property - possession de facto and not
possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself, he
may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatever may
be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of
time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria."[4] Petitioners' action was not merely
for recovery of possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion
publiciana for recovery of posession de jure, if not one of accion
reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the land.
As reaffirmed by the Court in the analogous case of Aguilon vs.
Bohol,[5] petitioners' action is at least "an accion publiciana, which action
'corresponde al que tiene derecho a la posesion, contra el que posee sin
derecho ó con titulo menos firme, para que se ponga la cosa en poder del
actor con todas las accesiones, frutos, etc.' (I Enciclopedia Juridica
Española 450)," and such accion publiciana or the plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess
(independently of title) clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Courts of
First Instance and not of the Municipal Courts. The Court further
underscored therein "that an action for recovery of possession is an urgent
matter which must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace,
violence or even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act swiftly and
expeditiously in cases of that nature."
Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana before the
lower court as against respondents' claim that they should instead have
filed a summary action for detainer in the municipal court. Having been
fully apprised of respondents' refusal to surrender possession and their
contrary claim of ownership of the same property, petitioners properly filed
their accion publiciana with the Court of First Instance to avoid getting
enmeshed in what would certainly have been another jurisdictional dispute,
since they could reasonably foresee that if indeed they had filed a summary
action for illegal detainer instead in the municipal court, respondents
would then have contended, contrary to their present claim, that the
municipal court is without jurisdiction over the detainer case by virtue of
their contrary claim of ownership of the property.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the lower
court's dismissal order of August 15, 1968 and the case is remanded to
respondent Court of First Instance with instructions to expedite the
proceedings and trial and determination thereof on the merits. With costs
against respondents. This decision is immediately executory.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Civil Case No. 3648-M, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled

[1]

"Artemio C. Reyes and Hilarion C. Reyes, Plaintiffs, vs. Hilaria Santos Vda.
de Lopez and Pilar Santos, Defendants."
[2] Note in parenthesis and emphasis supplied.
[3] Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 298.
[4] Idem, at pp. 303-304.
[5] 79 SCRA 482 (1977).
It is to be noted, however, that in R.A. 5967 enacted on June 21, 1969,
[6]

enlarging the jurisdiction of city courts, said city courts have now been
granted the concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance "in
 ejectment cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the
pleadings, the issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction
with the issue of possession." (Sec. 3 [c]).

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JUN

18
 Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. v. Meralco, G.R. No. L-15334
(January 31, 1964) Case Digest
Article 415 of the Civil Code: Real Property

Facts:

Meralco constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, which carry electric transmission wires
attached to insulators from its hydro-electric plant located in the province of Laguna to the City of
Manila.

The City Assessor of Quezon City declared Meralco's steel towers for real property tax.

Issue:

Whether or not Meralco's steel towers are considered real properties so that they can be subject to
real property tax.

Held:

No, Meralco's steel towers are not considered real properties that can be subject to real property tax.

Article 415 of the Civil Code states the following are immovable properties:

(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works, which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which tends directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

The steel towers do not come within the objects mentioned in above paragraphs.

They are not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. They are removable and
merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be
dismantled and moved from place to place.

They are also not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.

They are not machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended for industry or works on
the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel towers are
constructed.
 The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, which ordered the cancellation of the tax declarations,
were affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Posted 18th June 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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1.
JUL
 17

Other Actions for Recovery of Possession: Injunction

Injunction

 A judicial process whereby a person is required to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.
 To be granted, (1) there must exist a clear and positive right over the property in question which
should be judicially protected through the writ; (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right; and (3) there is an urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
 The subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable
exclusively by a regional trial court.
 Injunction cannot be a substitute for other suits for recovery of possession.
 A person entitled to recover possession of property from another who is in actual possession
thereof, is ordinarily not allowed to avail himself of the remedy of injunction but must bring the
necessary action for recovery of possession.
 Injunction is not the proper remedy when questions of title are raised.
 The sole object is to preserve the status quo until the issues of the case can be heard so that no
advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of another.
 As a general rule, a court should not transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party
to another except when there is a clear finding of right of ownership and possession of a land in
favor of the party (i.e. Torrens title). A certificate of title vests not only ownership over a land but
also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the right of ownership.

Bokingo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006)

Bokingo filed an application for titling of the subject land before the DENR, which was opposed by
Busa on the ground that it was inherited by them from their late father. Busa requested for a land
survey but this was prevented by Bokingo. Busa filed a relief of injunction with the RTC against
Bokingo. Bokingo filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim. Bokingo contended that it could be gleaned from the complaint that the issue
between the parties involved the possession of the land. It was held that Busa's complaint had not
sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it was principally an
action to enjoin Bokingo from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject
land. It could not be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.

Idolor v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141853, February 7, 2001)

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the requisites must be present (1) there must exist a
clear and positive right over the property in question which should be judicially protected through the
writ; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In this
case, Idolor had one-year redemption period from the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she
failed to exercise this right. Hence, there was no more right to speak of over the foreclosed property
to entitle her to the issuance of a writ on injunction.

Savellano v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 134343, January 30, 2001)

Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one
party and place it into that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. In this
case, Savellano filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession of Real Property with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction" against private respondents. He claimed that he was the owner of the parcels of land,
which the respondents denied stating that they had been occupying the land for 17 years already.
To resolve the issue, the trial court had the land surveyed. According to the surveyor's report,
Savellano owned the lots occupied by the respondents. The trial court granted an injunction even
before hearing the case on the merits and solely on the basis of a narrative report. It had not yet
proven that Savellano's titles cover the premises being occupied by the respondents that would
entitle the issuance of the injunction.

Federated Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127967, December 14, 2005)

Federated Realty Corporation (FCR) was the registered owner of a parcel of land adjoining a military
reservation. FCR hired workers to fence the lot in preparation for the construction of a building
thereon. The fence construction was suspended when Captain Molina, with his armed men, ordered
them to stop the construction asserting that the lot in question formed part of the military reservation.
FCR filed a complaint for injunction. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was proper since
FCR was able to prove a clear and unmistakable right over the property by virtue of the Certificate of
Title.

Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 164459, April 24, 2007)

The injunction bond needs to be put up by the party seeking the issuance of a writ of injunction. The
bond is to answer for the damages that the other party sustained if found out at the end of the case
that the writ of injunction shouldn't have been issued in the first place. Malice or bad faith is not a
requirement before the other party may avail of the injunction bond.

Posted 17th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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2.
JUL
 17

Recovery of Real Property: Accion Publiciana and Accion

Reivindicatoria
Accion Publiciana

 An ordinary civil proceeding to recover the better right of possession.

 The issue involved is not possession de facto but possession de jure.
 The action is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of 1 year from the
forcible entry or from the unlawful withholding of possession.
 Judgment is conclusive only on the question of possession, and not that of ownership. It does not
bind the title or affect the ownership of the property involved.
 Plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.
Accion Reivindicatoria

 An ordinary civil proceeding to recover possession based on ownership.

 The issue involved is ownership, which ordinarily includes possession. (Exception: An owner may
not be entitled possession because the possessor has some rights to be respected (i.e. contract of
lease)).
Jurisdiction:

Regional Trial Court (Assessed Value of the Property > Php 20, 000)

Metropolitan Trial Court (Assessed Value of the Property <= Php 20, 000)

Prescription:

Within 10 years

Bokingo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006)

The nature of the case should be based on the allegations in the complaint. Busa's complaint had
not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it was principally an
action to enjoin Bokingo from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject
land. It could not be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.

Hilario v. Salvador (G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005)

The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed that
Salvador vacate the property and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana,
or one for the recovery of possession of the real property. It was not an accion reinvindicatoria or a
suit for the recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

The jurisdiction should have been lodged with the MTC because while Hilario failed to allege the
value of the property, a 1991 tax declaration, stating that the value was about Php5, 000, was
attached.

Urieta v. Aguilar (G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010)

The accion publiciana had not yet prescribed even if the possession was in 1968 and yet the case
was filed in 1995 because the last demand to vacate was in 1994. Thus, it was still within the 10-
year prescriptive period.

Bongato v. Malvar (G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002)

Malvar already had knowledge of Bongato's house since 1987. The cause of action for forcible entry
filed by Malvar had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment in 1992. Hence,
even if Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession could not be wrested through a summary
action for ejectment of Bongato, who had been occupying it for more than 1 year.

Malvar should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of
action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.

Encarnacion v. Amigo (G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006)

There was nothing in the allegation stating that saying that somebody tolerated the possession.
Thus, it could not be considered as possession by tolerance. From the very beginning, it was
unlawful. If the possession from the beginning is unlawful, it could not be unlawful detainer, but a
forcible entry case, which prescribes within 1 year from the entry.

De Leon v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96107, June 19, 1995)

A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical possession. The case filed by De Leon was
not an unlawful detainer since it involved more than the issue of possession. De Leon prayed that
Inayan be ordered to vacate the premises, pay back rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and
exemplary damages and litigation fees.

Where the issues of the case extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits,
such as for instance, the respective rights of parties under various contractual arrangements and the
validity thereof, the case is converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary
 estimation," thereby placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 39430, December 3, 1990)

In an ejectment case, the decision of the MTC on the issue on ownership is merely provisional. It is
not final. It shall not bar any other suit pertaining to the ownership of the property (accion publiciana,
acction reivindicatoria).

Posted 17th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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3.
JUL

17

Recovery of Real Property: (Accion Interdictal) Forcible Entry and

Unlawful Detainer

Forcible Entry

 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth".
 The possession is unlawful from the time of entry.

Unlawful Detainer

 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession".
 The possession is at first lawful and later becomes illegal.

Nature

They are summary in nature because they involve disturbance of social order, which must be abated
as promptly as possible.
Rationale

To provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved without delay in the determination thereof.

Jurisdiction

Municipal Trial Court/Metropolitan Trial Court

Issue

Mere physical or material possession (possession de facto); not juridical or civil possession, which
arises from ownership (possession de jure)

Prescription

Within 1 year from the date of actual entry (Forcible Entry) or from the date the last demand to
vacate (Unlawful Detainer)

Peralta-Labrador v. Bagarin (G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005)

It was clear that Peralta-Labrador's averment was a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior
physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by Bulgarin.
Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred 2 years prior to the
filing of the complaint in 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed and the
Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The complaint therefore should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action
to recover ownership as well as possession.

Nuñez v. SLTEAS (G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010)

If the unlawful entry was done through strategy or stealth, the 1-year prescriptive period should be
counted from the date of the discovery. The forcible entry requisite of prior possession does not
necessarily mean physical occupation of the property. It can mean doing acts of possession
(payment of real property tax).

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006)

The ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te complaint,
is an unlawful detainer case. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between then, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.

In such case, the unlawful possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Since the last demand was sent on January 14, 1997 and the action was filed in September, 8,
1997, the action was instituted well within the 1 year period reckoned from the date when the last
demand was sent.

De La Paz v. Panis (G.R. No. L-57023, June 22, 1995)

The action was not for forcible entry; there was no allegation in the complaint that the petitioners
were denied possession of the land in question through any of the methods stated in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, although private respondents prior possession was clearly alleged.

Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there was no lease contract
between the parties, and the demand to vacate made upon the private respondents did not make
them tenants of the petitioners.

In order to gain possession of the land occupied by the private respondents, the proper remedy
adopted by the petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of possession before the then Court of
First Instance. Respondent judge, therefore, had jurisdiction over the case and should not have
dismissed it on the ground of lack thereof.

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995)

This case involved a fence encroaching upon the parcel of land of a neighbor. It was not a forcible
entry case because there was no unlawful entry dispossessing the neighbor of the property. It was
also not for unlawful detainer because there was no contract or agreement making the possession
lawful at first and then it expired or was terminated making the possession unlawful. It was for
accion reivindicatoria since it was a recovery of ownership.

Ocampo v. Dionisio (G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014)

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action.

A forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the
recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the right to
possess the same.

The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that the
petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior physical
possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the parcel of land.

Suarez v. Emboy (G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement of facts to
determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the complaint fails to state
the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
 effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
accion reividicatoria.

In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how Emboy
entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about the details on who
specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not commit an error
in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.

Posted 17th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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4.
JUL

17

Recovery of Personal Property: Replevin

Replevin

 Manual delivery of personal property

 Applicant to state in an affidavit that he is the owner of the property claimed; that he is entitled to its
possession; and that it is wrongfully detained by another
 Applicant has the burden of proof
 Principal remedy (to regain the possession)
 Provisional remedy (to retain the thing wrongfully detained by another)
 Prescription: 4-8 years from the time the possession is lost
 Not applicable to a property in custodia legis
Arabesque Industrial Phils. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101431, December 14, 1992)

The Court of Appeals correctly set aside the writ of replevin. Such writ could not be properly
directed against a lawful possessor of a chattel. In this case, PDEC had the right to retain
possession of the tugboat until the repair fees were fully settled by AIPI.

Chua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79021, May 17, 1993)

 Where a personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the
seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal complaint and there are conflicting
claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin.

Posted 17th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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5.
JUL

16

Action to Recover is Based on Ownership: Action for Reconveyance

Action for Reconveyance

 The decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought is the transfer of the
property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful
and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
 The complaint must allege (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed the land in
the concept of owner, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the land.
 The property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value for the action
to prosper.
 This is an action in personam, which judgment binds only the same parties and their privies or
successors-in-interest n the same action arising from the same cause, and not strangers.
Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006)

Caro v. Sucaldito (G.R. No. 157536, May 16, 2005)

A person who has a legal standing is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit. Caro did not have the legal standing to file for the reconveyance of the subject land. Caro,
not being the owner of the subject land but a mere applicant for a free patent, could not be
considered as a party-in-interest with a personality to file an action for reconveyance against
Sucaldito.

PEZA v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 138971, June 6, 2001)

Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another's name. This cannot be availed once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser
for value. Since the property had already been passed to PEZA in an expropriation proceedings, it
was entitled to enjoy the security afforded to innocent 3rd persons and their title to the property must
be observed. The respondents, however, were not without remedy. They could sue their co-heirs
for damages for defrauding them and falsely representing that they were the only heirs enabling
them to appropriate the land in favor of PEZA.

Gasataya v. Mabasa (G.R. No. 148147, February 16, 2007)

Reconveyance is available not only to the owner of a property but also to the person with a better
right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously registered. In this case
Mabasa's father was granted a homestead patent, which he mortgaged to DBP to secure a loan. He
failed to pay his debt so the mortgage was foreclosed. Mabasa repurchased the lots through a deed
of conditional sale. Mabasa entered into an agreement with Gasataya to assume payment of her
obligation with DBP. Gasataya stopped paying DBP, which resulted to the revocation of Mabasa's
right to repurchase the land. DBP then held a public auction to sell the land and Gasataya was the
highest bidder. Gasataya deliberately stopped the payment to DBP so he could acquire the lots in a
public auction. While Mabasa was not the legal owner of the lots, she had a better right to the lots
than Gasataya because (1) the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP gave her the right to
repurchase the lots and (2) her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had Gasataya not
defrauded her.

Posted 16th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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6.
JUL

16

Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424 (May 2, 2006) Case
Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Action to Recover is based on Ownership

Facts:

Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a house without any color of title
whatsoever. Valdez orally asked Fabella several times to vacate the property but the latter
stubbornly refused.

The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to the filing of a complaint for
unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella.
The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA, on the other hand,
reversed the decision. It held that Valdez failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they
failed to show that they had given Fabella the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated
the possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases.

Issue:

Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for unlawful detainer.

Held:

No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the tolerance must be present right from
the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would substantiate the claim of Valdez
that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Fabella. The complaint contained
only bare allegations that Fabella without any color of title whatsoever occupied the land by building
their house in the said land thereby depriving Valdez the possession thereof. Nothing had been said
on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express
contract existed between the parties.

The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from the start and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and then built
a house thereon without the permission and consent of Valdez and before them, their mother.
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer not of forcible entry.

There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
There was also no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of Valdez to allege the
key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.

Posted 16th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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7.
JUL
 8

Urieta v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 164402 (July 5, 2010) Case Digest

Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvidicatoria

Facts:

Aguilar filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages alleging that in 1997 her
husband Ignacio was issued a Torrens Title over a parcel of land. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio
allowed Anastacia to construct a house on the southern portion of the land and to stay therein
temporarily.

In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition the parcel of land. They asked Elderlina, who
took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate the land but the former did
not heed her demand.

Aguilar filed a case for accion publiciana against Elderlina. In her answer, Elderlina did not dispute
that Ignacio had the title to the land. However, she asserted that in 1973, Ignacio sold to her mother
Anastacia the southern portion of the land shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

Held:

The objective of accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the
parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property. This decision, however, is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
decision of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. The decision in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.
The ruling in this case was limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties had a
better right to possession. The decision was not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership. As such, the ruling was not a bar for the parties to file an action for the determination of
the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of OCT No. P-9354 could
be properly threshed out.

Posted 8th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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8.
JUL

Suarez v. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944 (March 12, 2014) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Facts:

A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-
2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were claiming that they inherited it from their
mother Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.

Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and transfer to Lot No.
1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-
A-2.

In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita requiring them to vacate the lot
and informed them that she had already purchased the lot from the former's relatives. Felix and
Marilou did not heed the demand so Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful
detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate.
There was practically no specific allegation as to when and how possession by tolerance of them
began.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.

Held:

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be alleged:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement of facts to
determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the complaint fails to state
the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
accion reinvidicatoria.
In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how Emboy
entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about the details on who
specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not commit an error
in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.

Posted 8th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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9.
JUL

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442 (December 6, 2006)

Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Facts:

Reyes owned the lot rented by Dela Cruz for well over 40 years. In 1989, a fire struck the premises
and destroyed Dela Cruz's house. After the fire, Dela Cruz returned to the lot and rebuilt her house.
Reyes, however, made several demands to vacate the lot but Dela Cruz did not comply. Despite
the setback, Reyes did not initiate court proceedings against Dela Cruz.

In 1996, Reyes sold the lot to Tan Te. Despite the sale, Dela Cruz did not give up the lot. In 1997,
Tan Te sent Dela Cruz a written demand to vacate the lot, which the latter ignored. Tan Te tried to
settle the dispute but failed.

As a result, Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with the MeTC against Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz filed
her answer and alleged that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as more than 1 year had already elapsed from her forcible entry.

Issues:

Whether or not the ejectment complaint was a forcible entry case.

Whether or not 1 year had already elapsed from the forcible entry.
Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.

Held:

After the fire, Reyes merely tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by Dela Cruz. When the lot
was sold to Tan Te, the rights of Reyes were transferred to the former, who for a time tolerated the
stay of Dela Cruz until she decided to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being in
1997.

The ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te complaint,
is an unlawful detainer case. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between then, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.

In such case, the unlawful possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Since the last demand was sent on January 14, 1997 and the action was filed in September, 8,
1997, the action was instituted well within the 1 year period reckoned from the date when the last
demand was sent.

Since the nature of the complaint was one of unlawful detainer and it was constituted within the 1
year period, then the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Posted 8th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

Add a comment
10.
JUL

Nuñez v. SLTEAS, G.R. No. 180542 (April 12, 2010) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Facts:

The spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng executed a deed of assignment over their
parcel of land in favor of SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. (SLTEAS) in 1999. SLTEAS left the parcel
of land idle and unguarded for some time due to important business concerns.

In 2003, an ocular inspection conducted by SLTEAS revealed that Nuñez and 21 other individuals
were already occupying the parcel of land and were refusing to vacate despite of verbal demands
 made by SLTEAS.

SLTEAS filed a complaint for forcible entry against Nuñez, who alleged to have a subsisting lease
agreement over the parcel of land with Maria Sylianteng. He argued that SLTEAS did not meet the
first requirement of a forcible entry case because it left the parcel of land idle and unguarded. He
also had been occupying the parcel of land since 1999.

Issue:

Whether or not the first element of forcible entry was wanting.

Held:

Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.

The parcel of land was acquired by SLTEAS by virtue of the 1999 Deed of Assignment. Although it
did not immediately put the same to active use, SLTEAS appeared to have registered the property in
its name in 2002, paid the real taxes along side the sundry expenses incidental thereto.

Therefore, the first element of forcible entry was satisfied in this case.

Posted 8th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

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 YAN, JENNIFER A. BRANZUELA, JENNYLYN A. RICARTE, AND HERMINIGILDO F. SABANATE, Respondents.
RICHARD RAMIREZ Y TULUNGHARI, Accused-Appellants.
HINE ZARATE-FERNANDEZ, EXECUTIVE JUDGE AND PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, Complain
AN MATEO, RIZAL, Respondent.
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5095 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARTIN S.

CORPORATION (NOW KNOWN AS CAVITEX INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION), Petitioners, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, WESTMONT INVESTMENT COR
NTOSTAN, AND MANUEL ESTRELLA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 221058, March 21, 2018 - WESTMONT INVESTMENT, CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
, Petitioner, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, Respondent.; G.R. No. 221135, March 21, 2018 - SIMEON CUA, VICENTE CUALOPING, AND HENRY CUALOPING
HONY T. REYES, Petitioner, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, LUIS JUAN VIRATA, UEM-MARA PHILIPPINES CORP., WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORP., MARIZA
RELLA, Respondents.
VIRGIE S. ATIN-AN, BELTRAN P. SAINGAN, MABEL P. DALING, MONICA Y. DOMINGO, AND ELIZABETH Q. PINONO, Petitioners, v. STA. LUCIA REAL

GELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND

N OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP), Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PATRIA CHIONG AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.; A.M. No
178083 - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.
EDWIN SANCHEZ Y SALVO A.K.A. "DADA," Accused-Appellant.
POUSES FLORENCIO AND LUCRESIA DAVIS, Respondents.
Respondent.
ESTOR AÑO Y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESURRECION JUANILLO MANZANO, JR. AND REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, ACCUSED, REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused-Appellant.
CARAG MABASA, Complainants, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, MANILA, Respondent.
mplainant, v. ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN, Respondent.
CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA A.K.A. "IPYANG", AND DEREK JOSEPH LUMAYA, ACCUSED, CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA A.K.A. "IPYANG", Accused-

THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, BRANCH 59, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
ainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR., Respondent.
ROMEO ANTIDO Y LANTAYAN A.K.A. ROMEO ANTIGO Y LANTAYAN ALIAS "JON-JON", Accused-Appellant.
Y MAYOR OF CEBU, Petitioner, v. JOEL CAPILI GARGANERA, FOR AND ON HIS BEHALF, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE CITIES O
dent.
ENT, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DANNY BANAYAT, Accused-Appellant.
SURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
TTACHED PICTURES) AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS.
ISHORE CHUGANI, ET AL., Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
E COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 37, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILOILO CITY, A

(SUBSTITUTED HEREIN BY ITS ASSIGNEE AND SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST, BIENVENIDO B.M. AMORA, JR.), Respondent.
. PERAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY (RTC), BRANCH 10, ON THE ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION OF UTILITY WORKER I CATALINA Z.

v. ANTONIO T. VILAR, Respondent.; G.R. No. 225546, , March 06, 2018 - GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, v. ANTO

ORATION, Respondent.
BONIFACIO GAYLON Y ROBRIDILLO, A.K.A. "BONI", Accused-Appellants.
ALFREDO OPEÑA Y BACLAGON, Accused-Appellants.
HORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Respondent.
AND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.; G.R. Nos. 218020-21, March 21, 2018 - LAND BANK OF

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
N C. DIMARUCOT AND NAILYN TAÑEDO-DIMARUCOT, Respondents.
HILIPPINES, Respondent.
OEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE, Accused-Appellants.
RITZ BARING MORENO, Accused-Appellants.
REPRESENTED BY DANILO DAVID S. MARIANO, MARY THERESE IRENE S. MARIANO, MA. CATALINA SOPHIA S. MARIANO, JOSE MARIO S. MARIANO
VA, REPRESENTED IN THIS ACT BY IRENE LOURDES M. VILLANUEVA THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT EDITHA S. SANTUYO AND BENJAMIN B.

CAMAY, JR., UTILITY WORKER I, BRANCH 61, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOGO CITY, CEBU.
TENG MONER Y ADAM, Accused-Appellants.
RAUL MARTINEZ AND LITO GRANADA, Accused-Appellants.
HNNY K. SULLANO, Respondent.
IF), Petitioner, v. NAGA AMPASO, Respondent.
VILLARIN CLEMENO, Accused-Appellant.
NTURA AND THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF TAGUIG, Respondents.
AL MADRELEJOS Y QUILILAN, Accused-Appellant.
NELSON NUYTE Y ASMA, Accused-Appellant.
P. CORTES, Respondent.
HE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. RUBY M. DALAWIS, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF MONKAYO-MONTEVI

er, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

E COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. VLADIMIR A. BRAVO, COURT INTERPRETE II, BRANCH 24, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
FFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. VLADIMIR A. BRAVO, COURT INTERPRETER II, BRANCH 24, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, NIÑO G. MONTER AND CONSTANTE M. CASTIL ALIAS JUNJUN, ALIAS TANSYONG, Accused-Appellants.
PAGBILAO CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.), Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.; G.R. No.
RNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION, Respondent.
PEZ AND ANALYN DE LOS SANTOS-LOPEZ, Petitioners, v. JOEL LUCENIO AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS AND AUTHORITY UNDER HI

R CAPACITY AS OIC-CITY TREASURER OF PASIG CITY, Petitioners, v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
TO CITIZENSHIP OF MANISH C. MAHTANI, MANISH C. MAHTANI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
MARCELINO CRISPO Y DESCALSO ALIAS "GOGO" AND ENRICO HERRERA Y MONTES, Accused-Appellants.
TOBIAS AND SHELLIDIE VALDEZ, Respondents.
CLOVER A. VILLARTA, Accused-Appellant.
LVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent.
"JAKE" P. MACASAET,* ENRIQUE P. ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES (DECEASED),** Respondents.; G.R. No. 196720, March 05, 2018 - AMA
etitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NARCISO "JUN" Y. SANTIAGO, JR., Respondents.; G.R. No. 197324, March 05, 2018 - AMADO "JAK
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CASIMIRO "ITO" YNARES, Respondents.
NC., Complainants, v. ATTY. ARCHIE S. BARIBAR, Respondent.
HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD, Accused.; HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO, Accused-Appellant.
IA, JR., FRANCISCO RIZABAL, PABLITO RIZABAL, MARCIAL RIZABAL ROMINES, PELAGIO RIZABAL ARYAP AND RENATO RIZABAL, Complainants, v

mplainant, v. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI, Respondent.

III, ATTY. EVARISTA TARCE AND ESTER L. SERVACIO, Respondents.
PPINE ISLANDS, Respondent.
IE GRACE M. COTE, Respondent.
NG SOLUTIONS, INC., Respondent.
ELVIN M. MIRANDA, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, REAL, QUEZON (FORMER ACTING PRESIDIN

AL SHIERAV AHMAD Y SALIH, Accused-Appellant.

N L. CHAN, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ZUELO APOSTOL, Respondents.
SURVIVING HEIRS, NAMELY: MARIA THERESA MOYA SIOSON, ROSEMARIE MOYA KITHCART AND MARIA CORAZON MOYA GARCIA, Petitioner, v.
CORPORATION, FOR ITSELF AND AS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF CENTURY PEAK CORPORATION, Respondents.
A. MORA, OSA, ALBERT D. MANALILI, AND ALICIA MANABAT, Petitioners, v. VIRGINIA PASCUA, M.D., Respondent.
MAURICIO CABAJAR VIBAR, Accused-Appellants.
CIES, INC., WILHEMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT HOLDING LTD., AND CAPT. SONNY VALENCIA, Respondents.
NORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND CAMILO LOYOLA SABIO, Respondents.
THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO HAVE STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES PLACED UNDER CORPORATE REHABILITATION WITH PRAYER
Respondent.
D INSURANCE COMMISSION (IC), Petitioners, v. COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
OEL DOMINGO, Accused-Appellant.
OLO, JR., CLERK OF COURT IV, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, MALAYBALAY CITY, BUKIDNON, Complainant, v. REBA A. BELIGOLO, COURT
Respondent.
ES, OF THE REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondent.
HE DIRECTOR OF THE LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU (LMB), Petitioner, v. FILEMON SAROMO, Respondent.
RPORATED, Complainant, v. ATTY. EGMEDIO J. CASTILLON, JR., Respondent.
RICHAEL LUNA Y TORSILINO, Accused-Appellant.
998 - 2018 ChanRobles Publishing Company | Disclaimer | E-mail Restrictions ChanRobles™ Virtual Law Library™ | chanro

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144103. August 31, 2005]

AGUEDA DE VERA-CRUZ, MARIO, EVANGELINE, EDRONEL,

ANGELITO, TEODORO JR. and FERNANDO, all surnamed DELA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. SABINA MIGUEL, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2000 that reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayay, Isabela, Branch 20, in Civil
Case No. 20-235, for Recovery of Possession with Damages, ordering respondent
Sabina Miguel to vacate the land, subject matter of this case, to remove her house
and/or whatever improvements she introduced thereon, to pay rent, and to pay costs of
suit.
Petitioners Agueda de Vera-Cruz, Mario, Evangeline, Edronel, Angelito, Teodoro,
Jr., and Fernando, all surnamed Dela Cruz, are the registered owners of a parcel of
land situated at the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela, described as Lot 7035-A-8-B-5
containing an area of 17,796 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-70778 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela which was issued on 17 January
1974.[2]
The origin[3] of Lot 7035-A-8-B-5 is as follows:
Lot 7035-A-8-B-5 is a subdivided portion of Lot 7035-A which was formerly part of a
homestead applied for in 1921 by Angel Madrid over lands situated in Santiago, Isabela.
The application was approved in 1935. On 08 August 1947, the Bureau of Lands found
him to be in exclusive occupation of the lands subject of the homestead. On 11 July
1950, an order for the issuance of the patent was entered, and Patent V-5993 was
issued on 27 September 1950. Pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1267 on 2 October 1950. Since the homestead
consisted of three lots, upon petition of Madrid, the OCT was substituted with TCTs No.
T-2385 for Lot 7035-A, No. T-2386 for Lot 7036-B and No. T-2387 for Lot 7036-A.
After the death of Angel Madrid on 23 April 1955, his widow, Cipriana Madrid, and
his children extrajudicially partitioned his estate wherein Lot 7035-A and a portion of Lot
7036-B were adjudicated to the widow, while Lot 7036-A and the remainder of Lot 7036-
B were given to the children. On 30 September 1955, Cipriana Madrid sold the entire
Lot 7035-A to spouses Teodoro Dela Cruz and Agueda de Vera for P18,000.00. On 04
January 1956 and 21 April 1956, Cipriana Madrid and the other heirs sold two portions
of Lot 7036-B with an aggregate area of 10,200 square meters to Teodoro Dela Cruz.
New TCTs were issued in the names of the vendees.
On 01 June 1956, Teodoro Dela Cruz commenced an accion publiciana docketed
as Civil Case No. BR. II-79 (CA-31309-R) in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Isabela
against Silverio Corpus and twenty-three (23) others for alleged illegal occupation of Lot
7035-A.
On 18 January 1957, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed Civil Case No. BR. II-141 (CA-31252) in the CFI of Isabela for
reversion of homestead consisting of Lots 7035-A, 7036-A and 7036-B of the Santiago,
Isabela Cadastre, against the widow and heirs of homesteader Angel Madrid, Agueda
de Vera, Teodoro Dela Cruz and others.
Teodoro Dela Cruz likewise filed an accion publiciana (BR. II-79) with the CFI of
Isabela and forcible entry and detainer cases with the Justice of the Peace Court of San
Mateo, Isabela (110 and 111) against other occupants of the lots he bought. Some of
the defendants in said cases and the defendants in BR. II-79, totaling 38, filed a
complaint-in-intervention in the reversion case (BR. II-141).
In the reversion case, the CFI dismissed the amended complaint and amended
complaint-in-intervention and, among other things, ordered the thirty-eight intervenors to
surrender the material and peaceful possession of the portions they are occupying,
together with their buildings and improvements within Lot 7035-A, to Teodoro Dela
Cruz.
As to BR. II-79, the CFI rendered judgment declaring Teodoro Dela Cruz the
absolute owner of Lot 7035-A. It forfeited in favor of Teodoro Dela Cruz all the buildings
and improvements of the defendants and ordered the latter to vacate and surrender the
material and peaceful possession of the portions they are occupying to the former, and
to pay rentals or damages.
Only BR. II-141 and BR. II-79 were appealed to the Court of Appeals which
promulgated its decision on 23 July 1965, affirming in all respects the judgments of the
CFI. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari which
was denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela, filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of contracts of sale, annulment of TCT and reconveyance of
property described as Lot 7035-A before Branch 3 of the CFI of Isabela which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1913.[4] Said court dismissed the complaint on 28
September 1967.
On 30 June 1987, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Cauayay, Isabela,
for Recovery of Possession with Damages against respondent for allegedly occupying
two hundred (200) square meters, more or less, of Lot 7035-A-8-B-5 without any legal
right to do so, much less their consent or permission, and has failed and refused to
vacate the premises despite repeated demands. They prayed that respondent be
ordered to vacate the land, and to pay them P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P500.00 a
month as rental, and moral and exemplary damages as the court may find just and
reasonable.[5] The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
20-235.
On 04 August 1987, respondent filed her answer with counterclaim alleging that the
land being claimed by petitioners is different from the land where her house is standing
and that the land was given or awarded to her by the Municipal Government of San
Mateo, Isabela. She added that she has been occupying the land since February 1946
and no one molested her in her actual possession and use thereof except the claims of
petitioners which she came to know only on 04 July 1987 when she received the
summons.[6]
In their answer to counterclaim dated 14 August 1987, petitioners denied the
allegations in the counterclaim and asserted that respondents claim is an utter and
gross falsity because the land is part of a registered land duly titled in their names and,
previously, in their predecessors-in-interest.[7]
On 29 January 1988, the court terminated the pre-trial and set the case for hearing
after counsel, instead of moving that respondent be declared as in default, moved for its
termination due to the latters absence despite notice.[8]
Before the case can be heard, petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
the ground that respondent has not raised any genuine issue except as to the question
of damages. They said that in a decision rendered by the CFI of Isabela in Civil Case
No. 1913[9]entitled, The Municipality of San Mateo v. Teodoro Dela Cruz, et al., it was
adjudged that the land occupied by respondent belonged exclusively to Teodoro Dela
Cruz, their predecessor, and that said decision has long become final and is res
judicata as to the ownership of the land in question. They said that since their
predecessor-in-interest was declared as the true and legal owner, the municipality had
no power or authority to dispose or award any portion of the land in favor of third
parties.[10]
On 29 February 1988, respondent filed her opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment on the ground that the pre-trial was terminated without the issues being
simplified, nor stipulations or admissions being made on facts and
documents.[11] Petitioners filed a rejoinder dated 17 March 1988.[12]
On 27 April 1988, the RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring petitioners the
owners of the land in question and ordered respondent to vacate the same and to
remove whatever improvement she has introduced on the lot. The court set the case for
hearing with respect to petitioners claim for damages.[13]
On 12 May 1988, respondent filed a notice of appeal from the summary
judgment.[14]
On 25 May 1988, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
and to Set for Reception of Evidence on the Damages[15] which respondent opposed.[16]
In an order dated 07 June 1988, the court denied the motion to execute the decision
pending appeal, but granted the motion to set the case for hearing for the reception of
the evidence on damages. To avoid multiplicity of appeal, it held in abeyance the
transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals until after the rendition of the decision
on the issue of damages.[17]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] which respondent opposed.[19] On
24 June 1988, the court denied the motion.
On 22 July 1988, the court rendered its decision on petitioners claim for
damages,[20] ordering respondent to pay petitioners P146.66 a month beginning July
1987, and every month thereafter until the former shall have vacated the premises. On
05 August 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.[21] Petitioners, on the other hand,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be reconsidered, amended
or modified to include the award of attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and exemplary
damages in their favor.[22] The court denied the motion on 11 August 1988. Thus,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal.[23]
On 16 February 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,[24] setting aside the
summary judgment dated 27 April 1988 and the judgment on the rental value dated 22
July 1988. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment of April 27, 1988 and the judgment on rental
value dated July 22, 1988 are SET ASIDE and the trial court is directed to conduct
further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines set forth above, and thereafter
to render the proper decision.

On 22 June 1990, pre-trial was conducted and terminated with the parties
manifesting that they cannot settle the case and that they failed to enter into a
stipulation of facts. The parties agreed to litigate the case on only one issue whether or
not respondent Sabina Miguel is inside or outside the land of the petitioners which is
covered by TCT No. T-70778.[25]
After trial, on 08 January 1991, the court rendered a decision[26] in this wise:

The court resolves the issue in favor of the plaintiffs. The evidence is overwhelming
that defendant is occupying an area within the titled land of the plaintiffs. This is
established by the testimony of Angelito dela Cruz and the Sketch Plan marked as
Exhibit D and D-1 showing that the land occupied by the defendant is inside the titled
land of the plaintiffs. Furthermore, defendant admitted that the area she is occupying
is a part of the land bounded on the North by Mabini St., East by Magsaysay St., West
by Quezon St., and South by Bonifacio St. This is the description of the entire land,
consisting of one block, owned and titled in the name of the plaintiffs.

...

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Sabina Miguel ordering said defendant to vacate the premises of the land in
question described in paragraph 2 of the complaint and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-70778 and to remove her house and/or whatever
improvements she introduced on the land, and to pay the plaintiffs P15,000.00
representing the rental value of the land occupied by her at the rate of P500.00 from
the time the complaint was filed on July 30, 1987. Costs against the defendant.

Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. [27] On 12 July 2000, the
latter reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The decision [28] partly reads as
follows:

After a thorough and careful evaluation of the records hereof and the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the parcel of land which is registered in
the name of plaintiffs-appellees includes the land being occupied by defendant-
appellant. However, as the Court go deeper into the peculiar circumstances hereof,
one important question surfaces: Can plaintiffs-appellees recover the said land from
defendant-appellant who has been in peaceful possession thereof for more than 40
years and has performed all acts consistent with her claim of ownership?

...
The Court rules that plaintiffs-appellees are guilty of laches for their unexplained and
unreasonable delay in asserting their right to the subject land and instituting action to
recover the same from defendant-appellant who has been in possession thereof for
more than forty years (40). The records show that the complaint for recovery of
possession was filed only on June 30, 1987 despite the fact that defendant-appellant
has occupied the subject land since February 14, 1946 up to the present.

...

There is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees long inaction in asserting their right to
the subject land bar them from recovering the same from defendant-appellant under
the equitable principle of laches. The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent
and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

The Court further notes that plaintiffs-appellants did not object to nor complained of
the acts of ownership being exercised by defendant-appellant over the subject land. It
is apparent from the records that in 1946, the latter, together with her husband (who
was already deceased at the time the instant case was initiated), has built a hut on the
subject land to serve as their dwelling. In 1954, another one of strong material was
constructed, which defendant-appellant still occupies to date. Defendant-Appellant
has never been asked to vacate. Neither was she evicted therefrom despite the fact that
plaintiffs-appellees were also residing in the same municipality where the subject land
is located. Much to this, as early as September 30, 1955, when the parcel of land now
covered by TCT No. T-70778 was purchased by plaintiff-appellee Agueda de Vera-
Cruz and her husband, from Cipriano Gamino, they knew that some other persons,
like defendant-appellant, were in possession of the other parts thereof.

...

Thus, the Court cannot look with favor at plaintiffs-appellees who, by their delay and
inaction, knowingly induce defendant-appellant to spend time and effort over the
subject land, and thereafter, claim title after more than 40 years of silence.

...

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision, dated February 8, 1991, of the
court a quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering
plaintiffs-appellees to cause the segregation of the 600 square meters parcel of land,
forming part of Lot 7035-A-8-B-5, LRC-Psd 60052, under TCT No. T-70778,
presently occupied by defendant-appellant Sabrina Miguel, and to convey the same to
said defendant-appellant. After the segregation shall have been accomplished, the
Register of Deeds of Isabela is hereby ordered to issue a new certificate of title
covering the portion of the land pertaining to plaintiffs-appellees and another
certificate of title in favor of defendant-appellant Sabrina Miguel covering the 600
square meters which she occupies.

Petitioners now assail the decision before this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari advancing the following arguments:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE

ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT A TORRENS TITLE IS
INDEFEASIBLE

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EQUITABLE

DOCTRINE OF LACHES APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE

A) THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS A REMEDY WHICH IS GROUNDED IN EQUITY

AND IT IS TO BE APPLIED IF AND ONLY IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A
PARTICULAR CASE WARRANT IT[29]
Petitioners contend that when the Court of Appeals ruled that they were guilty of
laches because they supposedly did not protest respondents long and continuous
occupancy of the lot in question, it was in effect saying that the land subject of the
present controversy has been acquired by acquisitive prescription which is contrary to
law and jurisprudence that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system
cannot lose it by prescription.
A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals clearly shows that prescription
was not the basis of the decision. Nowhere in said decision did it say that respondent
acquired the property occupied by her through prescription. In fact, the Court of Appeals
was fully aware that adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of
ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title, and that title
to a registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner may not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession because the efficacy and integrity of the Torrens
system must be protected. What it used in reaching its conclusion was the exception
LACHES.
The law[30] provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless,
while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches.[31]
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which
works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the
peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise
could be a valid claim. It is different from and applies independently of prescription.
While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is
statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.[32] Laches means the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [33]
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the equitable
doctrine of laches in the case at bar. They argue that they and their predecessor-in-
interest, Teodoro Dela Cruz, were never remiss, and have not delayed, in asserting
their ownership over the property subject of the present case because they have been
litigating this issue as far back as 1956 and lasting over ten years, and successfully
warding off the respective claims of the illegal occupants, the Republic of the Philippines
and the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela.[34]
Now, the question is: Should laches be applied in the case before us knowing that
petitioners after purchasing Lot 7035-A on 30 September 1955 engaged in court battles
against illegal occupants thereof, the Republic of the Philippines and the Municipality of
San Mateo, Isabela, for more than ten years resulting in the upholding by the courts of
their ownership over the land in question?
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot
work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.[35]
Having filed accion publiciana and forcible entry and detainer cases in the 1950s
against the illegal occupants of Lot 7035-A, though not against respondent, and having
successfully overcome the reversion case filed by the Republic and the Reconveyance
case filed by the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela, it cannot be said that petitioners
slept on their rights in asserting their ownership over Lot 7035-A. How then can
petitioners be said to have failed or neglected to assert their right on the land when they
have been judicially fighting to be recognized as the legal owner of Lot 7035-A?
The Court of Appeals ruled that since respondent has been in peaceful and
unmolested possession of the subject land since 1946, petitioners are barred from
recovering the same under the principle of laches. In support thereof, it cited the cases
of Ching v. Court of Appeals,[36] Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals,[37] Heirs of Batiog
Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,[38] Tambot v. Court of Appeals,[39]Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co.[40] and Vda. de Delima v. Tio.[41]
 From the records, it appears that respondent cannot have entered and possessed
the land under litigation in 1946. The Court of Appeals in its decision in the consolidated
cases of Republic of the Philippines v. Marita Madrid, et al. and Teodoro de la Cruz v.
Silverio Corpuz, et al.[42] made a factual finding that the land was in the exclusive
possession of Angel Madrid, the homestead applicant in 1947. This notwithstanding,
and regardless of whether respondent entered the lot in 1946 or in 1954, the application
of laches, as stated above, should be determined in accordance with the circumstances
present in a particular case.
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not on all fours with the case on hand.
The case of Ching v. Court of Appeals involves a landowners property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name. In Caragay-Layno v. Court of
Appeals, the issue was the fraudulent or mistaken inclusion of property in a certificate of
title. In Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, the subject matter was the sale of
land without the required approval of the executive authority. The case of Tambot v.
Court of Appeals likewise involves a conveyance of land via a deed of sale. In Wright,
Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., what was questioned was the acquisition and
ownership of mining claims which were covered by reconstituted certificates of title.
In Vda. de Delima v. Tio, what was questioned was the selling by a husband of the
wifes paraphernal property without the latters consent.
In all these cases, the parties in possession of the properties under litigation had
titles thereto or had documents showing that the ownership over these properties was
transferred to them. In the case before us, respondent is not the registered owner of the
lot she is occupying and she has failed to adduce evidence showing that the property
has been conveyed to her by the petitioners or by the original owner thereof.
Respondent has no evidence of her ownership over the lot where her house is erected.
Her allegation[43] that the lot was awarded or given through a resolution by the Municipal
Government of San Mateo, Isabela, cannot be given credence. She did not even
produce a copy of said resolution. Even if respondent were able to produce a copy
thereof, the same will be of no use since it has been judicially nullified. Furthermore, as
admitted by respondent, she and her husband tried to procure ownership papers over
the land, but to no avail.[44] Petitioners, on the other hand, have shown that the courts
have upheld their ownership over Lot 7035-A, and have ruled in their favor and against
the reversion case[45] filed by the Republic and on the case for reconveyance[46] of Lot
7035-A filed by the Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela.
We are not unmindful of the Tax Declarations[47] held by respondent but same are
not proofs of ownership. A tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership.[48] Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, it is, at
best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership.[49] Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.[50]
An examination of the tax declarations reveals that the property covered is not even
specified and described with particularity -- the exact location and borders were not
mentioned. Respondent utterly failed to show her ownership of the land in question. In
fact, the RTC and the Court of Appeals have declared that the land being occupied by
respondent is within the land registered in the names of petitioners. [51] With this finding,
respondents claim that the land she is occupying is different from the land being
claimed by petitioners completely crumbles. Thus, it is clear that respondent, without
any authority or right, is occupying petitioners land.
Having no title or document to overcome petitioners ownership over the land in
question, respondent is therefore an intruder or squatter whose occupation of the land is
merely being tolerated. A squatter has no possessory rights over the land intruded
upon.[52] As such, her occupancy of the land is only at the owners sufferance, her acts
are merely tolerated and cannot affect the owners possession. She is necessarily bound
to an implied promise that she will vacate upon demand.[53]
Respondent argues that petitioners, despite all the opportunity they had to implead
respondent in the cases they filed in 1956 against those occupying Lot 7035-A,
deliberately ignored and failed to do so. In doing so, petitioners slept on their rights and
practically allowed laches to set in.
We find this feeble. Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent already
occupied the lot in question in 1956, we cannot put all the blame on petitioners if
respondent and her husband were not impleaded. It must be remembered that there
were many people who occupied the subject land. If petitioners committed an oversight
in not impleading respondent, she, having an interest on the land, should have
intervened in the cases just like what the other occupants did. This, she did not do. It is
simply impossible for her not to know that there were on-going court cases involving the
land she is occupying. She testified that the lot she is occupying is bounded on the east
by the lot of one Wenceslao Urmaneta.[54] As can be gleaned from the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases[55] of Republic of the Philippines v. Marita
Madrid, et al., and Teodoro de la Cruz v. Silverio Corpuz, et al., this Urmaneta was one
of the defendants in the accion publiciana case and was an intervenor in the reversion
case filed by the Republic. Contrary to the posture of an adjacent neighbor, respondent
exhibited a lethargic stance. Her failure to join and to get involved in the proceedings in
order to protect her rights, if there were any, over the land shows her apathy on the
matter. This lack of concern and inaction on her part show that she failed to protect any
right she had on the land. The laches of one nullifies the laches of the other. One who
seeks equity must himself be deserving of equity.[56] While all the people around her
were fighting tooth and nail over Lot 7035-A, respondent simply watched on the
sidelines, oblivious of what the courts will pronounce on the matter. Acting the way she
did, she does not deserve equity.
This Court has ruled that unless there are intervening rights of third persons which
may be affected or prejudiced by a decision directing the return of the lot to petitioners,
the equitable defense of laches will not apply as against the registered owners.[57] In the
case at bar, there being no intervening third persons whose rights will be affected or
prejudiced if possession of the subject lot is restored to the petitioners, the return of the
same is in order.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the equitable doctrine of laches
shall not apply.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 12 July 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated 08 January 1991 is REINSTATED. Costs against the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] CA Rollo, pp. 43-51; Penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. with Associate Justices
Eubolo G. Verzola and Roberto A. Barrios, concurring.
[2] Exh. A, Records, pp. 35-36.
[3] See consolidated cases of Republic of the Philippines v. Marita Madrid, et al., CA-G.R. No. 31252-R,
23 July 1965 and Teodoro de la Cruz v. Silverio Corpuz, et al., CA-G.R. No. 31309-R, 23 July
1965; Rollo, pp. 52-85.
[4] Exh. B; Records, pp. 37-49.
[5] Records, pp. 1-3.
[6] Id. at 6-7.
[7] Id. at 10.
[8] Id. at 30.
[9] Exh. B, Records, pp. 37-49.
[10] Records, pp. 32-34.
[11] Id. at 53.
[12] Id. at 54.
[13] Id. at 60-64.
[14] Id. at 65.
[15] Id. at 66-67.
[16] Id. at 68-69.
[17] Id. at 72.
[18] Id. at 73.
[19] Id. at 75.
[20] Id. at 82-83.
[21] Id. at 85.
[22] Id. at 87-88.
[23] Id. at 93.
[24] Id. at 98-104; Penned by Associate Justice Serafin E. Camilon with Associate Justices Jaime M.
Lantin and Regina G. Ordoez-Benitez, concurring.
[25] Id. at 115.
[26] Id. at 133-135.
[27] Id. at 136.
[28] CA Rollo, pp. 43-51.
[29] Rollo, p. 12.
[30] Act. No. 496, 46 (The Land Registration Act), now P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
[31] Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, G.R. No. 132677, 20 October 2000, 344
SCRA 95, 106-107.
[32] Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, G.R. No. L-27088, 31 July 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 609-610.
[33] Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112519, 14 November 1996, 264 SCRA 181,
192-193; Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121038, 22 July 1999, 311 SCRA 18, 26.
[34] See Exh. B, Records, pp. 37-49, and consolidated cases of Republic of the Philippines v. Marita
Madrid, et al., CA-G.R. No. 31252-R, 23 July 1965 and Teodoro de la Cruz v. Silverio Corpuz, et
al., CA-G.R. No. 31309-R, 23 July 1965, Rollo, pp. 52-85.
[35] Romero v. Natividad, G.R. No. 161943, 28 June 2005; Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 46364, 06
April 1990, 184 SCRA 190, 197.
[36] G.R. No. 59731, 11 January 1990, 181 SCRA 9.
[37] G.R. No. L-52064, 26 December 1984, 133 SCRA 718.
[38] Supra, Note 32.
[39] G.R. No. 462238, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 202.
[40] G.R. No. L-18904, 11 July 1964, 11 SCRA 508.
[41] G.R. No. L-27181, 30 April 1970, 32 SCRA 516.
[42] Supra, Note 34; Rollo, p. 58.
[43] Records, p. 6; TSN, 21 July 1988, pp. 23-24.
[44] TSN, 07 December 1990, p. 7.
[45] Supra, Note 3.
[46] Exh. B, Records, pp. 37-49.
[47] Exhs. 1 and 2; Records, pp. 70-71.
[48] Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, G.R. No. L-65334, 26 December 1984, 133 SCRA 820, 825.
[49] Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120166, 03 August 1998, 293 SCRA 567, 576.
[50] Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, G.R. No. 4000, 05 January 1909, 12 Phil. 384, 388-389.
[51] See Exh. D; Records, p. 57.
[52] Pendot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49022, 12 April 1989, 172 SCRA 20, 29, citing Astudillo v. Board
of Directors of PHHC, G.R. No. L-28066, 22 September 1976, 73 SCRA 15, 19.
[53] Banez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-30351, 11 September 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22.
[54] TSN, 07 December 1990, p. 3.
[55] Supra, Note 34.
[56] Jandusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48714, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 376, 387.
[57] Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68687, 31 January 1987, 147 SCRA 611, 621;
Javier v. Concepcion, Jr., G.R. No. L-36566, 7 November 1979, 94 SCRA 213, 223.

OCT

DAVAO SAW MILL vs. APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO

LIGHT & POWER CO. INC.. G.R. No. L-40411. August 7, 1935.
Facts:

Davao Sawmill Co. Inc.'s machineries were built in a land owned by a lessor. Some machinery was
mounted on the foundations of cement. In their contract of lease, it was stated that after the
expiration of the contract, all the improvements and building introduced shall pass to the
ownership to the lessor.

On a separate case, Sawmill apparently executed the machinery in a chattel mortgage in favor of
Davao Light. A writ of execution was issued against Sawmill to take the possession of the
machinery and other properties by Light.

It was noted the Sawmill treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel
mortgages on it.

ISSUE: Whether the machinery was movables or not.

RULING:

The SC ruled that the machinery were movables. It was Davao Sawmill's intention of treating it as
personal property as they executed it in chattel mortgages. Sawmill should have registered its
protest before or at the time of the sale of property. Also, the machinery was not connected to
the industry the land owner intended. In fact, the land was later to be returned to the lessor.
 The SC affirmed the lower court's decision.

Posted 4th October 2014 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Case Digest Property

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1.
2.
OCT
 30

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN CALIMOSO, and LIBY CALIMOSO v.

AXEL ROULLO / GR No. 198594 / January 25, 2016 / BRION,
SECOND DIVISION
(RIGHT OF WAY)

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint for easement of right of way in which damage would be done to the estate of
the petitioners claiming that the route was the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public
road.

Petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement stating that it would cause substantial damage
and there are alternatives.

The RTC granted respondent’s complaint. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the requirements of a valid right of way demand is present.

RULING: NO.

“To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be met:

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.”

“The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the
property subject to the easement is called the servient estate. Here, the respondent’s lot is the dominant
estate and the petitioners’ lot is the servient estate.”

“Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there
are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the
tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would
be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement,
we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.”

“In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would cause the destruction
of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’ property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest
distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an
option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.”

“We have held that ‘mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
of setting up a compulsory easement’; that ‘a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient
estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way.’”
Posted 30th October 2016 by Vinson Gabato
 Labels: Case Digest Property Right of Way

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3.
OCT

30

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES / GR

No. 207406 / January 13, 2016 / LEONEN, SECOND DIVISION
(MARRIAGE LICENSE, DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE)

FACTS:

On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After some time, Eduardo discovered that petitioner was
married to a Gina Gaerlan on July 1987, before the Family Code became effective. She then filed for
bigamy.

The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA affirmed that decision. In his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner argues that there is no bigamy as there was no proof of existence of an essential requisite of
marriage in the first marriage which was the marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether the essential requisites of marriage was present in the first marriage.

RULING: YES.

The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of bigamy. The SC stated that “petitioner was still legally
married to Gina when he married Alice.”

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the
marriage void from the beginning:

No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

“The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents the state’s “involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.”

“To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”

“Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar” but the SC held that the
Certification “does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It
does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.”
“Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife. The first marriage contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the
existence of petitioner’s first marriage.”

“A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.”

“In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and
voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer.
The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4,
1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not
procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was
pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words,
petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.”

“Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was
his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.”

“As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, that parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.”

“The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
Posted 30th October 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Bigamy Case Digest

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4.
AUG

20

WHEN QUESTIONS OF FACTS MAY BE HEARD BY THE

SUPREME COURT

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;

(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court's;

(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;

(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record;

and

(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Related Cases:

G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016 / MARK REYNALD MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, v.
REGINALD FUENTES ALIAS "REGIE," ROBERT CALILAN ALIAS "BOBBY," AND ALAIN DELON
LINDO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016 / CARLOS BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. FAMILY CARE
HOSPITAL, INC. AND RAMON S. INSO, M.D.,Respondents.

G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016 / BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. FELICIANO
P. LEGASPI, Respondent.

Posted 20th August 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Civil Procedure

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5.
6.
AUG

16
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA,
appellant. G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004
FACTS:

Appellant (who was pregnant at that time), in her testimony, stated that she and her husband, Ben
Genosa, had a quarrel. When she was about to pack her clothes as the quarrel had escalated, her
husband allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer
holding her by the neck. Ben got a blade, as the drawer - that contained a gun, was locked. She
however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his
wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of
her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben.
He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.

It should be noted that appellant was physically abused by her husband. The defense presented Dra.
Natividad Dayan, a decorated clinical psychologist. Dra. Dayan believed that appellant is a battered
woman or is suffering the Battered Woman Syndrome. Another decorated expert, Dr. Alfredo
Pajarillo, a physician, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband appellant's mental
condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma.

ISSUE: Whether passion and obfuscation can be availed by the appellant.

RULING:

YES. The Court held that there present was the circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of
mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. For
passion and obfuscation to be applied there should be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and the act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

In this case, the battering incident preceded victim's death. He also threatened to kill her while
dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. More importantly, appellant
was eight months pregnant at the time. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was
directed at the lives of both appellant and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was
filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die, thus shooting her
husband.

Upon this sequence, there was no lapse in time before the commission of the crime. Also, as
appellant has an anxiety brought about her Battered Woman Syndrome, those who suffer this
syndrome relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at
the time.
 Posted 16th August 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Battered Woman Syndrome Case Digest Criminal Law

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7.
AUG

16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PFC FLORO

MALEJANA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 145002 January 24, 2006.
FACTS:

Appellant was charged for the murder of Janus Roces. One Andres Madrid testified that while sitting
in front of his jeep, Appellant asked where Roces was and upon noticing Roces nearby, accused
brandished an armalite rifle and fired a shot into the air. He then proceeded to shoot Roces. Madrid
tries to assist Roces but was futile. This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Domingo Luvidioro was also presented as witness. As property custodian of the PNP, he issued to
appellant an M-16 armalite rifle. When it was returned, fewer came with it.

The defense presented ballistics expert Vicente R. De Vera, who testified that the wounds of Roces
would not not have been caused by an M-16 rifle at a near distance as it was have been more severe.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals held appellant guilty of murder.

ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of murder.

RULING:
YES. Aside from finding the testimony of de Vera not compelling enough to controvert the
testimonies of Madrid et al., and that there was treachery in the killing of Roces, the defense tried to
contend that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was present.

To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind, the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.

The assertion that Roces and appellant had an argument does not provide justifiable basis for
applying to him this mitigating circumstance. Also, the cause that produced the passion and
obfuscation has not been established nor proven by clear and convincing evidence.

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8.
AUG

16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DENNIS TORPIO y

ESTRERA, appellant. G.R. No. 138984. June 4, 2004
FACTS:

Anthony Rapas and Dennis Torpio were drinking liquor. When defendant did not want to drink
anymore, Rapas got angry and then bathed defendant with gin. Rapas then boxed and tried to stab
him but failed he was crawling under the table. Defendant was able to escape and went to his house.
There, defendant's father tried to stop him from pursuing Rapas - but failed to do so.

Defendant then looked for Rapas and successfully stabbed him. The morning after, he voluntarily
surrendered to the police.

The trial court found defendant guilty of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation but
found mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party preceded
the act; the accused acted to vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by the victim, and
voluntary surrender.
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, as the penalty was reclusion perpetua, that there was
no treachery as he did not consciously adopt a mode of attack to ensure the accomplishment of his
criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer nor
there was evident premeditation as the prosecution failed to prove that he had planned and prepared
any plot to kill the victim. Further, no direct and positive evidence had been shown that sufficient
time had elapsed between his determination to commit the crime and its execution to enable him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.

ISSUES: Whether there was treachery or evident meditation and whether all the mitigating
circumstances the trial court found are present.

RULING:

NO. It should be clear that treachery and evident premeditation, must be proven with equal certainty
as the commission of the crime charged. Such circumstances cannot be presumed; nor can they be
based on mere surmises or speculations. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the
accused.

In this case, there was no evidence showing any method or means employed by the defendant in
order to ensure his safety from any retaliation that could be put up by the victim. Defendant only
acted to avenge Rapay's acts done against him and confronted Rapay while bleeding from his
wounds.

Evident premeditation requires that the execution of the criminal act by the accused be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

In this case, there is no evident premeditation as it was not shown that defendant had definitely
resolved to commit the offense and had reflected on the means to bring about the execution
following an appreciable length of time.

The utterance of defendant that he must kill Rapay was not considered by the Court as a product of
serious and determined reflection. The interval between the time when the appellant made this
statement and when he actually stabbed Anthony was not sufficient or considerable enough as to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The Court held that defendant should only be guilty of homicide.

NO. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and the immediate vindication of a grave
offense were only present.

Voluntary surrender was present as defendant lost no time in submitting himself to the authorities
by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer.

The immediate vindication of a grave offense was appreciated as defendant was humiliated and
wounded by the Rapay. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased , it was nonetheless a grave
offense.
Sufficient provocation, however, cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of
a grave offense. The two circumstances should only be considered as one because it arose from one
and the same incident.
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9.
10.
AUG

16

ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent. G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004.
FACTS:

Arturo Romera and his friends were heading to Biasong to play volleyball. On their way there, One of
them, Franklin Generol made fun of Bebing Zuluetas. The victim, Roy Mangaya-ay sided with
Zuluetas and scolded Generol. Romera who sided with Generol threatened the others then left.

The victim and his friends arrived in Balaguan, a kilometer away from Antonio Mangaya-ay's house,
Romera was seen carrying a bolo waiting for them. Romera chased them and the victim, who
slipped, was stabbed. The victim woke up at the provincial hospital after surgery.

Romera's testimony was as follows: The victim, who was drunk, went to Romera's house and
disturbed his family. When Romera opened the door, the victim thrust him bolo at him and telling
him he would kill Romera. Romera went outside and prevented the victim from entering. Outside,
the victim tried to hacked Romera again in which he deflected the blow and then stabbed the victim.

Romera contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him up and
thrust a bolo at him without warning as he opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying
the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated
his thinking and reasoning processes.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of
the bolo, there was no more danger to his life.

Romera was convicted of frustrated homicide.

The CA affirmed the trial court's decision and reiterated that the unlawful aggression ceased to exist
when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the
justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.

ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in
this case

RULING:

YES. Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his
house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his
thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Romera stabbed the victim as
a result of those provocations and while he was still in a fit of rage.

The Court also stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating
circumstances. They should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.

Posted 16th August 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Case Digest Criminal Law

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11.
AUG

16
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SALVADOR
SANCHEZ y ESPIRITU, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 175832.
October 15, 2008.
FACTS:

Salvador Sanchez was senteced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), meriting him the
penalty of life imprisonment by the RTC.

He was caught in a buy-bust operation led by SP02 Sevilla. The seized items was marked by Sevilla
and was then brought to the station. The laboratory results confirmed that the illegal drugs were
shabu.

Sanchez claim that at that time, he was putting his children to sleep when three police officers
forcibly entered in his house and arrested him. He was detained without being investigated.

The decision of the RTC was brought to the Court of Appeals through a petition. Sanchez held that
the police violated Sec. 21 Art. II of RA 9165. The Court reasoned that the corpus delicti was proven
beyond reasonable doubt and the essential elements of sale of illegal drugs was present.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
NO. The Court pointed three mistakes by the authorities. First is their non-observance of the
requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. There was no
photograph of the seized items during the buy-bust operation and no representative of the media or
public officer to sign the inventory of the seized items. The non-observance of the rule creates doubt
on the integrity of the seized items whether real or framed. The marking of Sevilla was not essential
as he could have done it anytime after the arrest was made.

Second, the “chain of custody” over the confiscated items was not proven. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal for the
prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same
one allegedly seized from the accused. There was doubt on the authenticity of the items on who
handled it between the arrest and the court hearing. The testimony of Sevilla showed that the
handler of the items were unknown.

Hence, the decision of the CA was reversed and the petitioner was acquitted.

Posted 16th August 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Case Digest Criminal Law

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12.
AUG

16

ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR., Y BURAC, Appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Appellee. G.R. No. 173804. December 10, 2008.
FACTS:

Elpidio Bondad, Jr was caught in a buy-bust operation selling shabu. The illegal drugs were inside a
Vicks container. PO2 Dano placed the markings “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” on the substance-
filled sachet sold to him, and “EBB-ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04” on the sachets that remained inside
the “Vicks” container. Bondad was brought to the station and was asked for a drug test. The drugs
were sent to the laboratory and was confirmed as shabu.

Bondad’s claims that he was forced to come with PO2 Brubio. When Brubio saw his son inside the
billiard hall, he was made to board a police car.

The RTC found appellant guilty of violating Sec. 5 Art II of RA9165. He then filed a petition and
subsequently affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO.

The SC found out that the police violated Sec. 21 of RA 9165. The police did not take photographs of
the illegal drugs on the scene and there was no representative from the media or a public officer to
sign the copy of the inventory of the seized items.

The Court reasoned that what is important is the integrity of the illegal drugs, if it was the same
drugs from the start.

Hence, the RTC’s decision was reversed and petitioner was acquitted.

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13.
 14.
AUG

16

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. MARK DELA

CRUZ, Appellant. G.R. No. 181545. October 8, 2008.
FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was held against petitioner Mark de la Cruz. P02 Eugene Amoyo was the
designated poseur-buyer. After being arrested, Amoyo seized the two sachets of shabu. Upon
returning to the headquarters, Amoyo placed his marking on the sachets and gave it to SP04 Jorge
Tabayag along with the marked money.

In his defense, de la Cruz claimed that he was only waiting for his brother to deliver his boots when a
shoot-out commenced between the police and Amay who he knew. After the shoot-out and Amay
having escaped, he was the one arrested because he knew Amay.

The RTC found him guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision through a petition. The
Office of the Solicitor General had the same decision citing that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto.

ISSUE: Whether Mark de la Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The Court believes that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the
seized plastic sachets containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they
were brought to the police investigator.

Amoyo testified that he failed to place any marking on the sachets of shabu immediately after the
apprehension of appellant. In fact, Amoyo admitted that he only placed his markings upon being
ordered by Tabayag.

Moreover, no other witness was presented to testify or to fill the gap from the time Tabayag received
the sachets of shabu from Amoyo up to the time they were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
There was also no physical inventory and photograph of the items allegedly confiscated from
appellant.

Hence, petitioner was acquitted having his guilty not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Posted 16th August 2016 by Vinson Gabato

Labels: Case Digest Criminal Law

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by Rosanne Solite

REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., GR No. 154953, 2008-06-26

Facts:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a
portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of
the initial hearing.
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued... an Order [8] of General Default against the
whole world except as against petitioner.
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of
respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred
in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as...
required by law.
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's
Decision.
Issues:
The issues may be summarized as follows:
Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June
1945 or earlier; and
Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land
Act.
Ruling:
Respondent Failed to Prove... that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16]
certified that
"lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on]
31 December 1925." The... second certification [17] in the form of a memorandum to the
trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management
Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable
and disposable land,... Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925
per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient.
the CENRO issues certificates of land... classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of
land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the
entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which,... as per DAO No. 38, series
of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form
of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein.
The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the...
blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945.
Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and
Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.
in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession... of the land in the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the
land of the public domain in this case.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658
and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for... registration
filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
Principles:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for... registration is alienable and
disposable rests with the applicant.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and... disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
 In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

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by Raffy Adan

HEIRS OF DELFIN v. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, GR No. 187633, 2016-04-04

Facts:
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)[5] and Maria Tappa (Spouses
Tappa) filed a complaint[6] for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages
(Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),[7] Henry Calabazaron
(Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).[8] The property subject of the complaint
is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters,
located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Peñablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).[9]
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No.
3341, having been issued
OCT No. P-69103... r 18, 199
September 18, 1992,... Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo
Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open,
continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial
In their Answer,[12] respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the
original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo
and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation
of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property.
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit... stated that Genaro originally
owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that one-half (1/2) of the property was owned by
Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of
them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses
Tappa.
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and
intimidation.[23] Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.[24]
The R
TC... that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive as
the title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownersh...
ip
Respondents appealed to the CA
They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in possession of
the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free patent under
the law.
respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both extinctive and
acquisitive prescription have already set in.
They also argued that the action for quieting of title had already prescribed since the
possession of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by
Spouses Tappa in their complaint.[40] Thus, Spouses Tappa had only until 1993 to file a
complaint, which they failed to do.
Ail respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real taxes
on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the concept
of owners.[41]... respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the
subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on September
18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.
uled in favor of respondents and explained that their possession over Lot No. 3341 already
ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription.
A noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they have not been in
possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously occupying portions of it
since 1963.
first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title to
or an interest in the property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to Spouses
Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land,... while Spouses
Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property, and were able to register it under
the Torrens system, they have not become its owners.
"[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property—it
does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it
forever indefeasible."
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against
respondents;[56]Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked in this case;[57] andWhether the CA erred in finding that
respondents have acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.[58]
Ruling:
We affirm the decision of the CA.
for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1)
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[61]Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two
requisites
We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had
already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of
the Public Land Act,[62] which governs public patent applications.
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property,
while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.[71] The
complaint stated further that since 1963, the respondents "continuously occupied portion of
the subject land."[7
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999.
A cloud... ment (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2)
which is apparendy valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
 voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title
1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA
correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation m the execution of the
1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiate
Principles:

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G.R. No. L-36610 June 18, 1976 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs.
HON. AMADO B. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, and ELISEO
PALATINO, respondents. FACTS On September 6, 1972, the herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino
filed with the respondent court an application for registration of title under the Land Registration Law,
of a parcel of land situated in Bataan Province. Notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration. However, respondent trial court issued an order of general default
against all persons, including herein petitioner the Director of Lands, for the failure of anyone, including
the said Director of Lands or his representative, to appear and oppose the application. Consequently,
notice of this order of general default was received by petitioners. On January 5, 1973, respondent court
issued its order granting the application for registration. Notice of the order was received by herein
petitioners. Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to life order of general default and for
reconsideration of the order on the ground that adjudicating the lot applied for by the applicant,
respondent Palatino, is without basis in fact because the applicant could not have possessed the land
applied for at least thirty years immediately preceding the application for the reason that the land was
originally part of the United States Military Reservation reserved by the then Governor General under
Proclamation No. 10 dated February 16, 1925 and it was only on June 10, 1967 that the President of the
Philippines by Proclamation No. 210-B revoked Proclamation No. 10 and declared such portion of the
area therein embraced including the land applied for, as are classified as alienable and disposable,
opened for disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act. Trial court denied the petitioners'
motion to lift the order of general default and for reconsideration of the order. ISSUE Whether
petitioner’s contention is tenable RULING The Court had reviewed the records of this case and it is
convinced that certain essential requisites of procedural law were not complied with by the herein
petitioners. There was a failure to perfect an appeal and consequently this failure had the effect of
rendering final and executory the judgment or final order of the trial court. This fact certainly deprives
the appellate court, the Court, of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. By actual reckoning of time, it will
be seen that the period for filing and perfecting an appeal had been past overdue. Petitioners herein
have procrastinated too long on their rights and on the duties imposed on them that the Court is now
prevented from extending to them the relief they are now seeking. Through inexcusable neglect and
laches, the Government lost its case Section 13 of the aforecited Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is crystal
clear in its language and tenor: Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed
within the period so prescribed, the appeal shall be dismissed. The decision or final order granting the
registration of the parcel of land applied for by herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino, having
become final and executory, there now remains only the issuance of the decree and the certificate of
title over the property. Thus, the Court declares, following its time-honored dictum: After a decision has
become final, the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution; that it becomes
merely the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of execution. Should petitioners duly establish
by competent evidence these allegations, they may then raise the crucial question whether the private
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest may be deemed to have validly and legally commenced
occupation of the land and physically occupied the same en concepto de dueño for thirty years or more
to entitle them to registration under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act a question which cannot be
resolved now in view of the finding that there is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the
decision or final order granting registrations has long become final and executory.

Aquino vs taneda

Today is Friday, November 09, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

ereon from the date of the filing of the complaint. The defendant, in a counterclaim, demands from the plaintiff payment of the sum of P

00 (Exhibit X). In the contract the defendant acknowledged receipt of the sum of P10,000, as a part of this price, the contracting partie
hased. On March 28, 1914, the plaintiff and the defendant, by virtue of another contract (Exhibit Z), agreed to consider the previous c
ad of returning the price received by him, subscribed in favor of the plaintiff another document (Exhibit A) in which the acknowledges
ng P10,000, it was agreed that the date of their payment would be fixed upon payment of the P2,000.

Upon this payment being made no time was fixed for the payment of the other P10,000.

ivil Case No. 792), wherein he demanded of the defendant the payment of the P10,000. Before this case was decide, the plaintiff and
nderstanding that, if it be not paid within the period fixed by the court, the plaintiff might bring an action against the defendant for its co
dered judgment in that case merely fixing a period of three months, counting from October 1, 1915, for the payment of this sum of P1

The question raised by this appeal is one that relates to the defendant's counterclaim. The sum demanded in this counterclaim is the
he defendant, on March 28, 1914.

issues then in controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, and among them that of the counterclaim which is now presented
n the plaintiff and the defendant to move the court merely to fix the period within which the defendant should be obliged to pay to the
e very reason that we shall presently set forth.

5, 1913, according to Exhibit X, took possession of the same and collected their product. On March 28, 1914, the plaintiff and the def
atter had paid. Is the plaintiff obliged to return to the defendant the products to the lands that the plaintiff collected during his possess

urn of the things which were the objects of the contract, with their fruits and the price with interest. He maintains that pursuant to this p
dant employed the word rescind, it has not, in the contract executed by them, either the scope or the meaning of the words rescission
e premise that the contract is valid, for the protection of one of the contracting parties and third persons from all injury and damage th
ereby, but it does not refer to contracts that are rescinded by mutual consent and for the mutual convenience of the contracting parties
n of a previous one, and its effects, in relation to the contract so dissolved, should be determined by the agreement made by the part

ly agreed to return the fruits collect by him. The plaintiff denies this absolutely. As the contract of rescission was drawn up in writing, i
at, besides what is set forth in the written contract, the plaintiff also agreed verbally, to return the fruits collected, the plaintiff, on his p
ditions, the presumption that the written contract contains all the agreements should prevail and, consequently, the defendant's conte

ch he received from the plaintiff as [a part of] the price of the land, it should be understood that the plaintiff, reciprocally, also bound hi
y 5, 1913, when the contract of purchase and sale was executed, until March 28, 1914, when it was rescinded. The record shows, ho
ale in March, 1914, the plaintiff returned the lands; and that the defendant, on his part, instead of returning the part of the price, P10,0
hese P12,000 is the interest on the P10,000 for one year, at the rate of 20 per cent per annum. According to that, after the defendant
s interest pertains to the first year previous to the rescission, then it had accrued and was due when this contract of rescission was e
to the first year prior to the rescission, the year in which no interest was due would be the following year. Thus the result would be tha
h the defendant invokes to sustain the contrary. We accept the conclusion that the interest which the defendant bound himself to pay
cission. Applying, by inversion, the defendant's argument, we believe that we ought to conclude that the plaintiff could not have boun
t of the price which he received.

unt, his possession, until the contract of purchase and sale was dissolved and the lands were returned by him, was in good faith. As s
plied to the instant case.

ows, for the improvement of the land and in order to produce the fruits which he collected, he incurred expenses in an amount such t

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