ATLANTIC STUDIES ON SOCIETY IN CHANGE

NO. 56
Editor-in-Chief: Bela Kiraly Associate Editor-in-Chief: Peter Pastor
EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS NO. CCLV

Copyright (c) by Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.

ISBN 0-88033-152-6 LCCN 88-62290
WAR AND SOCIETY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
VOL. XXVI

THE FALL OF THE MEDIEVAL

KINGDOM OF HUNGARY: MOHACS 1526
- BUDA 1541

by Geza Perjes
Translated by Maria D. Fenyo with a Foreword by Janos M. Bak

Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado

Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes, New Jersey
Distributed by Columbia University Press 1989
 The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary:
Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Cover Page
• Preface to the Series
• About This Book
• Preface to the American Edition
• Preface to the Hungarian Edition (1977)
• PART I
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICSOF THE HUNGARIAN-TURKISH WARS
• CHAPTER I
METHODOLOGY
• The Model of War
• Rationality of Ottoman Politics
• The Ottoman Leadership and Intelligence
• Economic Strategy
• Ottoman Diplomacy
• CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE OTTOMANSTATE IN THE 1520s
• The Makeup and Resources of the State
• The Strength of the Ottoman Army in 1526
• Estimates in the Sources and Studies: the Supply Side
• Calculation from the 1526 Column of March
• Mobilization and Aufmarsch
• Provisions and Transport of Foodstuff
• Strategy
• First Phase: from 1356 to 1453.
• Second Phase: from 1463 to 1521
• Third Phase: from the Capture of Belgrade e to the Peace of Adrianople, 1521-1568.
• Tactics
• CHAPTER III
HUNGARYS MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE JAGELLONIAN PERIOD
• The Economic Background
• The Army
• Supreme Command and Strategy
• Branches of Service, Tactics, and Morale
• Domestic Affairs and Government
• CHAPTER IV
SULEYMAN'S PROPOSAL:AN OUTLINE OF OTTOMAN AND HUNGARIAN POLICIES BETWEEN 1520
AND 1541
• Historiography
• Suleymans Peace Offer of 1520 and His Attack in 1521
• Suleymans Second Peace Offer, Its Rejection, and the "Punitive Expedition of 1526
• The Apparent Realization of Suleymans Concept in 1529
• Events From Late 1529 to 1538
• The Peace of Nagyvarad
• The Death of King John
• The Fall of Buda and the Withdrawal of "Suleymans Proposal
• Conclusion
• PART II
THE BATTLE OF MOHACS
• CHAPTER V
OBJECTIVES AND PLANS OF THE TWO SIDES
• Sources
• Military Planning.The Question of River Defense in Southern Hungary
• Timing and Planning
• Plans for an Advance into the Balkans
• CHAPTER VI
PREPARATIONS ON THE HUNGARIAN SIDE.OTTOMAN ADVANCE
• Hungarian Reconnaissance and Assessment of Ottoman Intentions
• Peace Plans, the Financial Situation, and Preparations
• The Ottoman Armies March Across the Balkans
• CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE
• The Fall of Petervarad and Ujlak.The Ottoman Army Reaches the Drava
• Where to Fight the Battle? Conflict between Court and Notability
• Strength of the Hungarian Forces on the Eve of the Battle
• CHAPTER VIII
THE HUNGARIAN BATTLE PLAN AND THEDEPLOYMENT OF THE OTTOMAN FORCES
• The Battlefield at Mohacs
• Difficulties of the Ottoman Deployment
• The Deployment of the Hungarian Army
• The Advance of the Ottoman Army to the Battlefield. Disorientation of the Supreme Command
• The First Hungarian Attack. Tomoris Battle Plan: A Reconstruction
• CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE
• The First Phase
• The Second Phase and Conclusion
• CHAPTER X
END OF THE 1526 CAMPAIGN
• Ottoman Advance to Buda
• The Ottomans Leave the Country
• The Death of Louis II
• Mohacs from the Ottoman Point of View: Triumph or Failure?
• GLOSSARY
• GLOSSARY OF PERSONS
• REFERENCES
• Endnotes
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., conducts research,organizes conferences, and publishes scholarly books in
historyand related fields. The Open Society Fund helped us incompleting research and holding conferences. The
editorial work for this volume was done by Professor JanosM. Bak with the assistance of Professors Gustav Bayerle
andMarjorie Sinel and Dr. Gabriele P. Scardellato. The preparationof the manuscript for publication was
administered by PatriciaStracquatanio of Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc. Themaps were prepared by Mrs.
Ida Etelka Romann. To all these institutions and persons I wish to express my mostsincere appreciation and thanks.
Bela K. Kiraly
Highland Lakes, N.J. Professor Emeritus of
March 15, 1988 HistoryEditor-in-Chief

Preface to the Series

The present volume is the twenty-sixth of a series which, whencompleted, will present a comprehensive survey of
theinteractions between war and society in East Central Europe fromthe eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. In
some cases, andthis volume is a case in point, we reach much farther back intime if and when the exposition of a
particular subject seems toadvance our goals. These volumes deal with the peoples whosehomelands lie between the
Germans to the west and Adriatic Seasto the south. They constitute a particular civilization, anintegral part of
Europe, yet substantially different from theWest. Within the area there are intriguing variations inlanguage, religion,
and government; so too, are theredifferences in concepts of national defense, of the charactersof the armed forces,
and of ways of waging war. Study of thiscomplex subject demands a multi-disciplinary approach: therefore,we have
involved scholars from several disciplines, fromuniversities and other scholarly institutions of the UnitedStates,
Canada, and Western Europe, as well as the East CentralEuropean socialist countries and the Soviet Union.
Most of the volumes contain papers selected from thosepresented at our twenty international and
interdisciplinaryconferences; others, like this volume, are solicited to make theseries as comprehensive as possible.
Our investigation focuses on a comparative survey of militarybehavior and organization in these various nations and
ethnicgroups, to see what is peculiar to them, what has been sociallyand culturally determined, and what in their
conduct of war wasdue to circumstance. Besides making a historical survey, we tryto define different patterns of
military behavior, including thedecision making processes, the attitudes and actions of diversesocial classes, and the
restraints of them shown in war.
We endeavor, in this and future volumes, to presentconsiderable material on social, economic, political,
andtechnological changes, and on changes in the sciences and ininternational relations and their effects on the
development ofdoctrines of national defense and practices in militaryorganization, command, strategy, and tactics.
We present data onthe social origins and mobility of the officer corps of thevarious services, and above all, on the
civil-militaryrelationship and the origins of the East Central European brandof militarism. The studies will, we hope,
result in a betterunderstanding of the societies, governments, and politics ofEast Central Europe, most of whose
peoples are now members ofthe Warsaw Treaty Organization, although one country is a memberof NATO and two
are non-aligned.
Our methodology takes into account that in the last threedecades the study of war and national defense systems has
movedaway from narrow concern with battles, campaigns, and leaders,and has come to concern itself with the
evolution of society asa whole. In fact, the interdependence of changes in society andchanges in warfare, and the
proposition that militaryinstitutions closely reflect the character of the society ofwhich they are a part have come to
be accepted by historians,political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and otherstudents of war and national
defense. Recognition of this factconstitutes one of the central concerns of our approach to thesubject. Works in
Western languages adequately cover thediplomatic, political, intellectual, social, and economichistories of these
peoples and this area. In contrast, fewsubstantial studies of their national defense systems have yetappeared in
Western languages. Similarly, although somesubstantial, comprehensive accounts of the non military aspectsof the
history of the whole region have been published in theWest. However, before the present series, nothing had
appearedin any Western language on the regions national defense systems.Nor is there any study of mutual effects
of the concepts andpractices of national defense in East Central Europe. Thus, ourcomparative study of War and
Society in East Central Europe hasbeen a pioneering work. The Editor-in-Chief has, of course, theduty of assuring
the comprehensive coverage, cohesion, internalbalance, and scholarly standards of the series he launched.
Hecheerfully accepts this responsibility and intends this work tobe neither a justification nor a condemnation of the
policies,attitudes, or activities of any of the nations involved. At thesame time, because so many different
disciplines, languages,interpretations, and schools of thought are represented, thepolicy in these, past and future
volumes has been, and shall be,not to interfere with the contributions of the variousparticipants, but to present them
as a sampling of the schoolsof thought and the standards of scholarship in the manycountries to which the
contributors belong.
Bela Kiraly
About This Book
As the editor of this series states in his preface, the Englishtranslation of the present monograph is an important
steptowards presenting recent Hungarian scholarship to a wideraudience. I might go even further: by publishing
Geza Perjes'smonograph, we acquaint the reader with more than one aspect ofcontemporary Hungarian intellectual
history simultaneously. Thisbook can be seen as serving several functions and fitting withinthree more or less
different contexts. While not all of thesefunctions were consciously chosen by the author, once a text ispresented to
the public, it acquires its own right to life andmay assume roles ("readings") not necessarily intended by itsmaker.
The Decline of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, originallyentitled Mohacs, is a meticulous reconstruction of
events ofsome four and half centuries ago by a practical and theoreticalexpert of military science; it is also a cardinal
piece in ahistoric-political debate that pushed history writing into theforefront of public interest in the Hungary of
the 1970s; and,because of these first two functions, it is a major statementabout historical and not-so-historical
choices and alternativesof an endangered country in the middle of central Europe.Chronologically speaking, we
should start with the secondaspect, for it was the "Mohacs debate" that had moved the authorto turn to this topic, as
he himself states in the preface tothe Hungarian edition (below, p. xxi). However, logically, andespecially for the
reader outside Hungary, the first, themonographic, aspect is surely the most obvious; and since thatrequires the least
circumstantial presentation let me start withthat.
The author, born in 1917, belongs to the last prewar graduatingclass of the prestigious Ludovika Academy, the
century-oldofficer training school of Hungary. Having seen action in theUkrainian-Russian theater of World War II,
Capt. Perjes turned toscholarship and became one of the first practitioners of theresurrected discipline of sociology.
However, sociology was soondenounced as '"bourgeois pseudo-science", and Perjes was forcedout of academia.
After quite a few years of involuntary silencehe was able to return to intellectual work, and in the lastthirty-odd
years he has written extensively on Hungarian history(military and otherwise) and military science, above all on
thefamous founder of "modern" military thinking, Clausewitz. [1]Thus, when (for specific reasons to be discussed
below) heturned to the analysis of the historical battle of Mohacs, hebrought with him the experience of an active
officer as well asthe insights of a military theorist, qualities which few if anyof the other writers on this topic have
had at their command.Having studied most of the available sources and the relevantliterature on the age, he
attempted a systematic reconstructionof the battle, its prehistory, the probable battle plan of thecommanders, the
details of its course and its immediateconsequences. To do so, he called upon contemporary behavioralsciences, on
calculations based on practical data about movingtroops and materiel as well as on traditional historicalresearch.
Some of the specific arguments on troop strength andthe like may appear tedious to the non-military reader,
buteditor and author agreed to present them in their original form,for it is unlikely that anyone will ever take the
pains torepeat such calculations. (Altogether, we accepted the author'swish to edit his Hungarian text as little as
possible, preciselybecause details are so important for the monographic and, evenmore, for the other aspects of this
work.) The many tables andsketches demonstrate amply the expertise of Dr. Perjes in thesematters. One more
"experimental" aspect may be worth noting:owing to growing interest in the age, particularly for the
450thanniversary in 1976, a film was shot about Mohacs, and Dr.Perjes had the rare advantage as a scholar of being
asked toassist in its preparation. This task allowed him to explore theterrain for the practical reason of moving actors
and extras onthe field. His acknowledgments to participants in that project(below, p. xxi) tell about the value of this
experience for hiswriting of the present monograph.
Anyone scanning the bibliography of Perjes's writings will notethat before 1970 he did not touch the problems
offifteenth-sixteenth century Turco-Hungarian warfare. As hehimself has noted several times, it was the publication
of abook by the noted writer and film-critic, Istvan Nemeskurty, in1966 about the years following Mohacs that
triggered both his"angry response", and, in the subsequent years, the Mohacsdebate, of which the present book is an
important document.Nemeskurty's book was an unusual] piece on the Hungarian scene:neither historical novel nor
learned monograph with the usualfootnoting, in fact it is not very different from highlysuccessful English-language
books on historical topics, like those of Barbara Tuchman. Hungarians have for centuries regardedthe battle of 1526
as the crucial historical tragedy whichexplained the problems of the subsequent 500-odd years. Surelynot a
deheroizing attempt, yet one which claimed to berealistic, Nemeskurty's book proposed that the lost battle,though a
major debacle, was not the last chance of the "nation",but rather that lack of unity and low public morale in
thefollowing decades brought about the final decline of thekingdom. It became a best seller, came out in several
neweditions, and started a many-sided debate in professionaljournals, literary-political magazines, and even in the
dailypress. Clearly, the author here, just as later with books on thepeasant war of 1514, on the fall of Buda, and on
the SecondWorld War, touched a very sensitive nerve of Hungarian publicconsciousness.
Since few of the protagonists, writings are known outside ofHungary, and the major issues are referred to anal
debated inthe present volume, it would be tedious to rehearse thearguments presented in the course of the ten to
twelve years ofthe "Mohacs debate." [2] The discussion itself ran alongseveral lines. Strong words were exchanged
between"professional" historians and the "dilettante" writer, theformer accusing the latter of innumerable factual
mistakes andunwarranted conclusions and altogether questioning thelegitimacy of writing "parallel history." While
some reviewershailed the realism of the book in contrast to the romanticpathos of traditional history writing, most
historianschallenged the basic tenet of a second chance, or even severalchances, after Mohacs on the basis of
numbers (of soldiers,commanders etc.). It was at this stage that Perjes entered thering with a long article (that
became a book) on "A Country Castto the Roadside" [3] in which he presented innuce theargument of his later
monograph: he found good reason to believethat there was an "offer" from Stambul that would have
allowedHungary to survive as an Turkish satellite, especially becausethe Carpathian Basin was beyond the
reasonable radius ofoperation of the Ottoman army.
For a while the debate was centered around the years after1526, but soon several protagonists, Perjes included,
shifted topre-1526 problems, and by the time the wind of the battle's450th anniversary filled the sails of the
discussion, the causes of the defeatwere receiving as much attention as the real and imaginedconsequences. Most
critics of Perjes doubted the mere existenceof the "Suleyman's offer", particularly before 1526, for whichno explicit
documentary evidence survives; others pointed to thetypical method of "gradual conquest" used by the Ottomans on
theBalkans which might have included a temporary "offer" of thissort, but in the last resort would have led to the
same result.Several historians, who had done extensive archival research onthe period, and others, who were experts
in the one or the otherspecific field, joined the debate and pointed both to allegedinaccuracies in Perjes's details and
to the problematiccharacter of his working hypotheses. In some cases, hypothesisstands against hypothesis; in
others, details may need revisionor polishing. These are, however, features characteristic ofactive scholarly debate.
There can be no doubt that the authorof the present monograph grinds an axe; the book was writtenwith both "anger"
and "devotion" (cum ira et studio). Indeed,the tone of the debate was at some stages so bitter that one isnot surprised
at the author's words in the preface, where hespeaks of "another battle" which surrounded the writing of hisbook.
The study the readers hold in their hands is a summary ofall that which Perjes now believes to be the result of
hisinquiry, including a few passages responding to some of hiscritics. Historians of our day are not always anxious
toestablish final and only truths; hence this monograph can standon its own, regardless whether any one of its
hypotheses willprove to be better founded than those of its critics. Thereconstruction of the battle itself and much
about itssurroundings will most certainly not become obsolete for sometime to come as it is unlikely that either
significant newsources on matters military, or many researchers willing tospend as much time on the terrain as our
author did, will befound. Political, diplomatic, and economic history consists, asPerjes points out in his
methodological preface (p. 7, below),of too many factors and too many conjectures to allow similarlong-term
prognoses about the validity of Perjes's conclusions.The reader will notice, especially when reaching Chapter IV,that
Perjes was right to change the title of the book: one ofhis most detailed analyses is devoted to the fate of the
countryin the decade and a half between Mohacs and the final divisionof historical Hungary into three regions, an
event that was,indeed, decisive for the country's development for centuries tocome. Because so little is generally
known about this periodoutside of Hungary (and even within, to be sure), the authorchose to include extensive
passages from the sources, just as hedid for the chapters reconstructing the battle. Since few if anyof these texts are
easily available in modern translations otherthan Hungarian, it seemed appropriate to keep them, even if
theytranscend the usual ratio between text and quotation. Also,here, too, nonspecialists may find the personal and
politicalarguments rather detailed, but I should like to assure them thatthe author is not shadowboxing, but talking to
a readershipstrongly influenced by centuries old prejudices, for example,against King John Szapolyai, or Friar
George. And this is alsothe part which bears most explicitly on issues that are notmerely scholarly - and not only
historical.
Central Europe is a region where daily political issues areoften debated in the guise of history, almost as much as
inChina, where emperors of thousands of years ago served asprotagonists on pro- or anti-Maoist datsebaos.
Questions ofnational identity, of independence, of alliances, and ofpolitical choices are often expressed in images,
monuments,dramas, and even rock operas about events many centuries past.The decision of St. Stephen to call for
Bavarian missionaries orthe role of General Arthur Gorgey in the defeat of 1849 areissues of public debate as vivid
as events in the private livesof American presidential candidates or government influence -peddling scandals on this
side of the Atlantic. Of course, theheated debates are not truly aimed at the king who died 900years ago or the
commander of the Honved army, but at politicalchoices of today, such as western or eastern orientation,
orcompromise with a neighboring great power vs. heroic, even ifhopeless, resistance.
Clearly, the Mohacs debate has been closely connected withmatters of national life and death, not only in the
years1966-80, but much earlier as well. As Perjes notes, the "Mohacscomplex" is as old as the battle itself. Mohacs
was a paradigmfor writers on Hungarian national resurrection and a shorthandfor nemzethalal ("national demise")
for the Romantics. Morerecently, the ex-prime minister of Hungary, who engineered theHungarian declaration of
war against the USSR in 1941 (and hadto pay for this act with his life as a war criminal in 1946),wrote in 1943 a
book about Hungarian politics after Mohacs [4] surely not because he was a devoted scholar of sixteenth
centurypolitics, but as a disguised apology for his choice to maneuverthe country into Hitler's war. That the recent
debate around Mohacs, which began ten years after another defeat andanother compromise of another "King Janos
(John)", was not withoutdeep political implications is beyond doubt. To be sure, mostprotagonists, our author
included, did not consciously refer tohistorical parallels, even if the notion of realism vs.romanticism in politics may
have been on their minds. Justanecdotically: a major critic of the existence of "Suleyman'soffer" read about the
Mohacs debate first in the newsletter ofthe jail where he served time for his role in 1956. When hedecided to argue
against the real possibility of an honorablecompromise close to four and half centuries before, was heconsciously
warning against the impending compromise of the"consolidation"?
Historians tend to fight over details and conceptions for theirown sake, moved by their own professional instincts.
Butplaywrights, poets, and hundreds of writers ofletters-to-the-editor would hardly be mobilized by merelycritical
concerns for archival precision. They, obviously, wereengaged in debates of immediate concern, in this case, about
thechances of resisting an overwhelming foe, about the merits ofRealpolitik, or the preference of a stance motivated
by nationalself-esteem (ideological or otherwise ) to rational decisionsregardless of sympathies, and many more.
Perhaps the '"battle"around this book, albeit not chosen by the author, was also aconcatenation of historical
conditions and trends, not very muchunlike the one fought on the field of Mohacs in August 1526.
I believe, it is useful even for readers many thousands ofmiles away from the theater of both battles to keep
thesecontexts in mind to appreciate the achievement of the author andthe place of his book in contemporary
Hungarian historicalscholarship and politics.
Janos M. Bak
The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541
by Geza Perjes
To my wife
Preface to the American Edition
The original title of this book was "Mohacs", the name of thetown near which the Ottoman army annihilated the
Hungarian armyon August 29, 1626. King Louis II, a significant portion of thearistocracy and of the Church
hierarchy, several hundred nobles,and about 20,000 troops lost their lives. Hungarian traditionassociates the fall of
the medieval kingdom with this singlebattle. All the humiliation, suffering, loss of life and goodsthat preceded and
followed it-- during 150 years of Ottomanrule--have been compressed into the one word Mohacs, even thoughit
should be obvious that all this happened as a result of afateful concatenation of historical circumstances and not of
asingle encounter. Of course, the identification of a historicalturning point with a famous battle is not a unique
Hungarianfeature: "Hastings", "Agincourt", "Waterloo", "Sedan", the"Marne", and "Stalingrad" are well-known
parallels.
In contrast to this fixation on one event, which I call the"Mohacs complex" of Hungarian public opinion, it is my
beliefthe country's fate can be understood only in a wider contextwhich includes at least the fifteen years from the
battle ofMohacs in 1526 to the Fall of Buda in 1541. In fact the laststage of the decline which characterized the
Kingdom of Hungaryafter the death of King Matthias Corvinus in 1490 began by 1520at the latest and ended with
the threefold partition of thecountry in 1541. The decades between these dates were decisivefor the crucial
relationship between Hungary and the OttomanEmpire. In all likelihood the Ottomans originally did not intendto
break up the country or to conquer it, but rather to use itas a buffer state between themselves and the Habsburg
lands.Such intentions on the part of the sultan can be detected asearly as around 1520. Only when the Hungarian
governmentrejected the collaboration proposed by the Porte in 1520 and onseveral occasions thereafter--to which I
refer as "Suleyman'soffer',--did the Ottomans launch the decisive attack againstHungary in 1526.
Although after the battle of Mohacs Hungary was lying prostrateand defenseless at the feet of Sultan Suleyman, he
did notincorporate it into his empire. In 1528 he even "returned" thecountry, which he considered his by right of
conquest, to KingJohn (Szapolyai), who had been elected by the "Hungarian Party"in opposition to Ferdinand of
Habsburg. The relationship betweenSuleyman and John was regulated by a treaty of alliance and ofmutual
assistance. This alliance functioned more or less satisfactorilyuntil John's death in 1540; it helped consolidate
Szapolyai'sreign and thus rescue the political integrity of the kingdom.Even if it did not succeed in putting an end to
civil strife,the country enjoyed some peace. From the Ottoman point of view,Hungary's function as a buffer state, a
"defensive bastion ofIslam", gave Suleyman considerable freedom of action against theHabsburgs along both
offensive and defensive lines. When KingJohn died, Ferdinand I, who, until then ruled only the smallerportion of the
country, obtained the support of a great numberof Hungarian magnates, including some who earlier had stood
onSzapolyai's side, and launched an attack on Buda, the capital ofHungary. Suleyman had to realize that his strategy
no longerworked; therefore, anticipating Ferdinand, his troops capturedBuda in 1541 and soon thereafter the central
region of thecountry as well.
Thus at the end of the period under review Hungary's positionbetween two empires was decided for a century and a
half tocome. The country was divided into three parts: the western andnorthern regions came under Habsburg rule,
the central portionwas absorbed into the Ottoman Empire, and the eastern part,Transylvania, was on its way to
become a semi-dependentprincipality under Ottoman suzerainty. The Ottomans foundthemselves in the possession
of an area that was relatively poorand difficult to defend and thus, even though victors, wereplaced in an
unfavorable political, economic, and militaryposition.
This interpretation of the age of "Mohacs"' when presented byme some ten years ago, was received with almost
exclusivelynegative criticism by Hungarian historians. I cannot present allthe exchanges of the debate that ensued
because its materialwould fill a separate volume, yet I shall discuss thosecounter-arguments that seem most
important. Even so, many ofthese will have to be relegated to the notes so that they do notinterrupt the flow of the
argument and destroy the structure ofthe presentation.
I cannot forego the opportunity to thank Professor Bela KKiraly, who offered to publish a revised version of my
book inhis series on war and society in east central Europe. Iearnestly hope that this study, however controversial it
may bein parts, fits the profile of the series and is consonant withthe mission undertaken by Professor Kiraly: to
acquaint theworld with the history, so replete in tragic turns, of thenations of east central Europe.
Geza Perjes
Budapest, August, 1987
Preface to the Hungarian Edition (1977)
I wish to thank first of all Istvan Nemeskurty who thrust meinto the "Mohacs issue" with his book which begs
rebuttal butwhich was written with true feeling and dedication. Seldom haveI experienced in my academic or
scholarly work such a powerfulemotional and rational impetus to examine a problem than afterhaving read his
thoughts about the years following Mohacs.
I must also thank the Institute of Military History for itsgenerous support. The prerequisite for reconstructing a
battleis to become familiar with the terrain on which it was fought,and I would never have had this opportunity
without theirsupport. I received immeasurable help from Lt Colonel LaszloCsendes, head of the Map Library of the
Institute, who led theexpeditions to Mohacs, with relentless enthusiasm, and gaveinvaluable advice on matters of
topography and cartography. Thediscussions with my colleagues, the military historians GyulaRazso and Endre
Marosi, who participated in the survey of theterrain, were extremely fruitful.
The shots on location by the televised film on Mohacs, and thetopographical and geological investigation
accompanying ithelped me considerably in my work. The film's editor, KatalinVikol, and its director, Istvan
Szakaly, had the courage toincorporate the new interpretation of the battle into theirfilm. Adapting the results of
research to the requirements oftelevision in itself promoted the study.
The exchanges with Laszlo Rapcsanyi in the program on Mohacsbroadcast over Radio Kossuth, Budapest, were also
of great helpto me. His fresh insights as a reporter and his quick grasp ofbasic issues contributed greatly to the
elucidation of theproblems. I must also thank Borderguards-Major Ferenc Vallai,and his detachment for their
enthusiastic and tireless support.Thanks to his familiarity with the terrain, Major Vallai, as oneof the "managers" of
the battlefield of Mohacs, was of uniquevalue for reconstructing the essential moments of the battle.The other
"manager", Lajos Szentkiralyi, retired vice-presidentof the council of the village of Majs, as someone long
familiarwith the area as well as a passionate explorer of the battle ofMohacs, contributed no less assistance. I take
this occasion tothank the two geologists, Andras Galacz and Gyula Gabris, fortheir advice, their enthusiastic
collaboration, and scientificobjectivity.
Last but not least, I thank my wife for her moral andintellectual support in the midst of the skirmishes surrounding
the "Mohacsdebate." Practically no day passed without us discussing somerelevant problem, and these lively
exchanges were a great helpto me in the final formulation of my ideas. She providedconsiderable assistance in
organizing the manuscript,especially in improving its style. Writing this book amounted toa minor battle in itself. It
felt good to find at my side, inthis struggle, a persevering comrade who was prepared for everysacrifice. That is why
I dedicate this book to her.
 PART I

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE

HUNGARIAN-TURKISH WARS
CHAPTER I
METHODOLOGY
The Model of War
One of the reasons why the debates about Mohacs continue livelier than ever is the lack of
sufficient sources. Because of the terribledestruction of the country's archives, particularly during
the TurkishWars, few of the Hungarian records have survived, while those ofOttoman
provenance, if they did survive, are just now becomingavailable. To a large extent we must rely
on foreign sources todetermine how the situation was viewed from both the Hungarianand
Turkish sides: what considerations led the governments to optfor war; how they intended to wage
it; even the course of eventsthemselves. The reliability of these sources is often debatable.
Theirauthors--ambassadors, statesmen, or soldiers--being foreigners,cannot be expected to be
properly acquainted with the inner springsof action, while several among them approach the
subject withoutright bias.
Analysis of the few available sources has been hampered by theemotionally heated atmosphere
in Hungary: the shock of the collapse of the great and strong medieval kingdom of Hungary in
thespace of a few hours as the result of a single battle has been felt eversince 1526. Since
Hungarian public awareness could never acceptthat the defeat had become inevitable because of
the fateful conjunctionof historical circumstances, the only acceptable explanation wasthat it had
resulted from human weakness and from sinful omissions.Once this answer had been formulated
in the "collectivememory", it no longer seemed necessary to examine systematicallyand
objectively the few available sources.
In cases where the lack of sources is compounded by confusion ininterpretation, constructing
models to define the possible frameworkfor human action becomes especially important. Models
providethe frame of reference for such objective factors as the economic,social, political, and
military parameters while excluding subjectiveand moralizing judgments. By fulfilling this
function, they providea structure for interpreting historical situations and events which can
accommodate the individual data and allow the historian to fillthe gaps.
Since, in the case of Mohacs, we are dealing primarily withmilitary events, the task is to
construct a model for late medievaland early modern wars, including those between Hungary and
theOttoman Empire. In doing this we can build upon the findings of thebehavioral sciences
which have shed new light on many aspects ofhuman behavior and on the decision-making
process.[5]
The starting point for the behavioral sciences is the observationthat human beings, on the whole,
behave in a rational manner, inparticular where important and fundamental issues are
concerned.Scientists have also concluded that human beings base their decisionson their inner
image of the environment and simulate theiralternatives within that image. Equally important is
the observationthat rational behavior and decision-making are possible onlywithin the framework
of some type of organization. Finally, studentsof human behavior have found that rationality is
not total, butlimited, because the image of the environment which we create isnever complete -
because our information is incomplete - and we areunable to assess accurately even the
incomplete data that are availableto us. Human beings are not capable of optimum decisions,
butat best of satisfactory ones. Human rationality consists to a considerableextent of the fact that
this limitation is recognized and the compromise accepted.
These insights can be also applied to historical research. If primitiveorganisms are capable of
forming a model of their environmentand of storing the data in form of images--and biological
researchhas proven that this is the case--we have no reason to believe thatit would not have
always been so with human beings. We may ratherassume that men and women reached
decisions in the course ofhistory on the basis of an image, and by simulating the data containedin
it, they have harmonized the goals with the means. Inother words, humans have behaved
rationally. I emphasize thehistoricity of these facts, because rationality is quite often viewed asa
function of scientific and technological development, and humanbeings regarded as being unable
to behave rationally in former timessince they lacked necessary knowledge.[6]
In such a project as this, the first task is, therefore, to reconstruct that environment and model in
which the historical activity underreview occurred. The chances for a successful reconstruction
of thistype happen to be very good for military history. It may be assumed a priori that because
war is a serious business, politicians and soldiers have established accurately the model of war in
their image.We have argued that in serious matters human beings are likely todecide rationally.
Therefore, data that have survived of militaryplans and other documents related to war may be
regarded as solidfacets of a model. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to assemble thefactors for
the model of war, even for the past, because they arelimited in number and can be fairly easily
established. (This is farfrom being the case when it comes to models of decision-making
inpolitical, social, or economic matters. In those cases the number offactors to be considered is
large, far more difficult to determine, andtheir interrelationship extremely complex.)
In military decisions, three factors must be included in our model:forces (or ratio of forces),
terrain, and timing. As to the forces, theantagonists usually have a fairly accurate picture of the
militarypotential of their own country and of the power of their army, as wellas a reasonable
estimate of how these compared with those of theiropponent. Generally speaking, even the
terrain (the theater of operationsand the battleground) is well known to both sides. As for
thetiming, it is a matter of simple calculation made on the basis of forceand terrain which seeks
to determine when the hostilities shouldbegin, how much time is needed to unite the forces for
the decisivestrike, and whether the time available for the purpose is sufficient.
Thanks to early works in military science we can conclude thatthe evaluation of a military
situation has always focused on theassessment of these three factors. Giles of Rome, in his
thirteenth century work De regimine principum asked: "What factors must wetake into
consideration if we are to engage in open battle?" In his reply he lists the forces of the enemy,
one's own forces, the terrain,the advantages of the position, and so forth.[7] In Le rozier des
guerresof the fifteenth century, the commander is instructed to weigh thefollowing factors:
1) the number of enemy troops;2) their preparedness:3) their valor; 4) their stamina;5) their
cleverness and dedication;6) the means of putting them to flight;7) the state of their horses;8)
their weapons;9) their food supply;10) the direction of the wind and the position of the sun;11)
the location of the enemy's positions;12) and the support the enemy may expect.
After listing all these factors the author comments: "It is difficult todefeat the one who knows
how to assess correctly his own and hisenemy's forces."[8] Machiavelli repeated this
enumeration almostverbatim[9] while Savorgnano, in the sixteenth century, provided anear-
complete system for the assessment of the situation in his Artemilitare.[10] Montecuccoli also
published a detailed list of factors andtheir order of importance[11] and in Hungary Count
Miklos Zrinyi gavean account of the pertinent factors in his Vitez hadnagy [The
BraveCommander]. In this work he analyzed the decision-making processfrom the moment of
assessment of the situation, through the decisionitself, to the planning and execution stage.[12]
Modern behavioralscience identifies these same phases in the decision-making process.[13]
Thus research in military history may attempt to establish withgreater confidence than any other
branch of history a model of itsspecific concern - that of war. At the same time it can rely on
anassumption of rationality: on the fact that politicians and soldiershave acted rationally in the
assessment of the objectives of wars andof the means at their disposal; of the sacrifices worth
making toattain their goal; the inherent risk, and the three classical factorsdiscussed above - the
forces, the terrain, and the timing. This assumptionsimplifies matters considerably because, in a
given situation,the number of possible rational decisions is limited - optimallyreduced to a single
one - whenever the intentions and strengthof the enemy forces are exactly known. Irrational
decisions,the number of which may be infinite, can be excluded from an interpretation from the
start, particularly since a rich store of datahas accumulated regarding the inner workings of
armies of the past.In contrast, economic historians, for example, can reconstruct theoperations of
agricultural and industrial enterprises, of mines, or ofcommercial firms of the past only at the
cost of extremely detailedand laborious work on the basis of scattered data. Artisans, miners,and
merchants rarely wrote books about how their enterprises functioned and illiterate peasants wrote
none at all. On the other hand,complete and coherent works have survived describing the
innerworkings of armies. Moreover, a good many descriptions have beenproduced on the course
of specific wars. After all, wars were consideredat one time the most interesting, the most
worthwhile, the mostnoble human activity; hence they were front-page news in papers aswell as
in historical analysis.
With this wealth of sources we can establish the model of war withconsiderable accuracy for
practically any period and thereby fix theparameters of military operations. For instance, we
have fairly gooddata on the methods for placing armies on a war-footing, theirorganization,
training, strength, morale, equipment, and tactics. Wehave accurate knowledge of the rights and
duties of officers and men,of the system of rewards and punishments. There is practically
noproblem in determining the range, accuracy, and impact of specifickinds of arrows, firearms,
or cannons. On the basis of our knowledgeof the food and fodder requirements of soldiers, riding
horses, anddraft animals, we can calculate what would be the requirements invictuals and fodder
for a given number of men and horse for a day, amonth, or a year. Similarly, we can determine
how much storagespace and what means of transportation were needed to carry andstore these
supplies. Knowing the rate of advance of the infantry, thecavalry, and artillery, one can compute
the distance an army is ableto cover in one or several days. If we happen to know where a
givenarmy was on a certain day, we can establish with high probabilitythe spot reached on the
following day. There are so many good bookson the science of building fortifications and of the
technique ofsieges, that if we know the system used in constructing a particularcastle and the size
of its garrison and artillery, we can predict to theday how long it would withstand a siege. All
told, it is hardlynecessary to emphasize how many useful points of reference thismethodical
approach offers for analyzing a particular war and forinterpreting even fragmentary evidence.
The knowledge of the logic and structure of war is especiallyhelpful when we are not familiar
with the political conceptions of the governments concerned. Since war is an instrument of
politics, thereis a close relationship between political objectives and militarystrategy. The most
important consideration in the choice of meansin all walks of life, is whether they are appropriate
for attaining thedesired goal and, if so, whether they are worth the sacrifices andrisks they entail.
It is the same in the relationship between politicsand war: in order to attain their political
objectives states resort toarms--assuming it is not the enemy that has compelled them toresort to
it--if they are certain of victory. Whether the price whichmust be paid for victory is in proportion
with the political objectivebecomes the object of special evaluation. If the price appears to
behigh, the leadership may give up the military solution or will look fora cheaper version, such
as not waging an all-out war, but merely onewith limited objectives. Thus the political aims
directly determinethe character of war: for the sake of great, essential political endsgreat military
efforts must be made--after all, the enemy is alsolikely to increase its efforts, precisely because
the stakes are high.Such considerations explain why so many different kinds of warhave been
waged in the course of history, from total war to armedobservation, even though the logic of war
has always been the same.And, in turn, because the political objective determines war sodirectly,
the study of a particular war permits us to infer with highprobability its political aims.
These reflections on war and politics are of prime significance forresearch on Mohacs, because
we have no reliable information on theexact political ends that had prompted the Ottomans to
launch a waragainst Hungary in 1526. Being familiar with the course of the warhelps us draw
inferences regarding its military goals; another stepand we may become acquainted with the
political objective of thewar as well. One main purpose of this book is to take that step. It willbe
assumed that the Ottoman imperial leadership acted according tothe logic of war, and that its
decisions, in general, were based onrational assessments. If this assumption is mistaken then our
entireprocedure and all the results obtained become highly debatable.However, there are many
historians who do assume that the Turkishleadership was irrational; therefore, my first task is to
argue thevalidity of my assumption about the rational character of Ottomanleadership.
Rationality of Ottoman Politics
As a typical statement about the lack of rationality of Ottomanpolicy, let me quote the British historian Paul Coles:
The empire of the Ottoman sultan was organized for plundering and itsubsisted on plunder. The resources which
sustained the growth ofConstantinople into a great metropolis could only be obtained by raidingacross the
frontiers.... A retreat behind stable frontiers would leadinevitably to the disintegration of the central authority as a
result of itsinability to remain in control of the instruments of war and conquestwhich it had called into existence....
Even when the empire becameanchored to Constantinople it was sustained by booty...of the border-lands. The
perpetual search, in Gibbon's phrase, for "new enemies andnew subjects" was not a policy, weighed against
alternatives; it was alaw of life, the principle which animated what had now become a largeand complex
society.[14]
This opinion immediately elicits contradiction. First of all onemight ask: how could a world empire come about, and
how could itsurvive for several centuries, if it was merely instinct, excluding theweighing of alternatives, that was at
work? And even if we happenedto be ignorant of the extensive and well-organized commercial net-work that
ensured the supply of the cities of the Ottoman empire,particularly Constantinople, we would still have to query: is
itpossible to believe that the supply of masses in the order of millions,and over centuries, was secured merely by
plunder?[15] Even theassertion that the increase in the number of land-grant recipientsserving in the cavalry (timars)
required further conquests of lands isquestionable because in several provinces targeted for conquest thissystem was
not applied (Egypt, Baghdad, Basra, etc.)[16] Finally, ifexpansion was the raison d'etre of the Ottoman Empire, it
becomesdifficult to understand how it could survive for centuries once theperiod of conquests had come to a close
towards the end of thesixteenth century. Therefore, I find it very difficult to accept Coles'opinion; but, instead of
merely rejecting his assertions, let me try toidentify some of the rational elements of Ottoman policies. I
shalldemonstrate my point on the conscious gathering of intelligence by the sultans, on the systematic economic
strategies underlying Ottomanexpansion, and the skillful diplomacy of the Sublime Porte.
The Ottoman Leadership and Intelligence
The basis for any kind of decision is knowledge of pertinent data.Hence, in the discussion of the rationality of
Ottoman decisions, weneed to explore how well informed the leadership was about thestate of the world. Was it
knowledgeable about European, or evenworld politics? According to some authors, since Ottoman leaders didnot
maintain permanent ambassadors at foreign courts, they couldnot have been well informed in diplomatic
matters.[17] While admittedlythe diplomatic network which came about in the sixteenthcentury was an effective
means of securing accurate politicalinformation, the practice of spying, the classical means for
obtaininginformation, lost none of its importance. There is considerable evidencethat the Ottomans had an efficient
intelligence-collectingservice. Murad II (1421-1451) and Mohammed II (1451-1481) werealready able to obtain
accurate information from their spies on theBalkan states, Hungary, and Italy. [18] This intelligence service
continuedto function very well during the sixteenth century. Karl Brandi,the German historian probably best versed
in the diplomatic historyof that century, wrote that "admirable spies and agents kept theTurkish government well
informed of everything which went on inEurope."[19] Turkish leaders also received valuable information
fromforeign ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, especially the Frenchand Venetians. It was the general opinion in
Europe that the Venetianskept the Ottomans informed of European conditions; hencethey were often accused of
treason.[20] But they were not alone: accordingto contemporary sources the plans of the Nicopolis campaign
hadbeen forwarded to Constantinople by the duke of Milan.[21] whileVenice informed the Porte regarding the
military concepts of thecrusade planned in 1490 by Pope Innocent VIII, the Porte found outabout the anti-Turkish
alliance of 1500 between the pope, Venice,and Hungary through its own spies.[22] Turkish spies were active
onHungarian soil as well.
Obviously their own information was the basis of the precisedescription by the Turkish historian, Sead-Eddin, of
conditions inHungary after the death of King Matthias:
When the king of Hungary Janko [that is, Matthias] descended tohell...the emirs from the borderlands reported to
the Porte that sincethis good-for-hell had no descendants other than the son that was bornto him out of wedlock, by
an unbelieving girl, the Bans who were theguardians of Hungary, ashamed of having to bow their heads in front
ofthis man of obscure origins, brought in the son of the king of nearbyPoland and installed him on the throne of
Hungary. . .. Thus a great dealof dissatisfaction prevailed among the notables who had sold themselvesto the devil.
The affairs of Hungary are very confused, and theplans of their Bans are all for naught, because of the opposition.
Hencethe occupation of the country depends only on whether the sultanshould direct his campaign of conquest in
that direction.[23]
On May 4, 1526, the papal legate Antonio Burgio wrote fromBuda: "The king wants to discuss matters of state with
the representativesof the common nobility in secret.... This is necessary becauseof the many spies who manage to
infiltrate everywhere wheneverdiscussions are public."[24] It is very interesting to note that evenGyorgy Szeremi,
whose chronicle contains many fables and gossipbut who was surprisingly well informed on everyday matters,
alsofelt that one of the causes of the degeneration of Hungary was theTurkish intelligence network covering the
whole country.[25]
As is well known, Ottoman leaders were particularly interested ingeography as a basis for military and political
decisions. SultanMohammed II encouraged the collection of data of strategic relevance.The "world map" of the
famous Turkish geographer, Piri Reis,was studied extensively by Sultan Selim (1512-1520), and we mayguess that
the reason its eastern half, depicting the Indian Ocean,cannot be found is that the sultan must have cut it off and kept
it.[26]As regards Hungary, the commanders along the borders were continuouslyreceiving instructions from
Constantinople to reconnoiterits roads, its waters, its mountains.[27]
Economic Strategy
One of the best proofs for the rationality of political decisions canbe found by inquiring into their relationship to
economic concerns.Even a brief sketch of Ottoman expansion viewed from this anglecan demonstrate the central
role of economic strategy for the sultansof the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[28]
Once the Ottomans had Asia Minor under their control theyconverted Bursa into the center for their north-south and
east-westcommerce. Commerce of the ports of southwest Anatolia--Palatia,Ephesus, Smyrna--was oriented in this
direction and the silk tradefrom Persia was rerouted from Trebizond to Bursa. The occupationin 1391 of the two
ports in southern Anatolia, Antalya and Alanya,was also prompted by economic concerns; these were the
transitports for goods from India and South-East Asia. Similarly, economicconsiderations were involved in the
occupation of Karamania in 1468:the Turks were thus able to control the land route of the easterncommerce.
Expansion along the Black Sea followed the samelogic. The Ottomans had already taken over part of the Black
Seacommerce when they captured Constantinople. Between 1460 and1480 Trebizond, Kaffa, Azov, Kilia, and
Akkerman also fell into theirhands and thus the Black Sea became a Turkish lake. Henceforththe Empire could
intervene in the Polish, Moldavian, and Russiancommerce directed towards the Black Sea, and at the same
timeensure the undisturbed supply of the capital, thanks to the agriculturalproducts from those lands.
A new chapter of Ottoman history opens with the occupation ofSyria and Egypt in 1516-17. By conquering these
provinces theEmpire could participate in the greatest business of the age: trade inIndian spices, particularly pepper.
Towards the end of the MiddleAges a long chain of commercial exchanges connected the spicemarkets of India,
Ceylon, and Indonesia with China at one end, andVenice at the other. Arabian dhows carried the valuable goods
fromIndia; Ormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf and Aden at theentrance to the Red Sea were the two main
points of transfer. Thecommercial road led from Ormuz to Basra, whence caravans carriedthe merchandise through
Mesopotamia to Baghdad, then to Aleppo.The spices unloaded at Aden were carried by small vessels along
thehazardous Red Sea to Suez; from here caravans departed for Alexandria.
Venetian vessels carried the goods from Aleppo or, moreexactly, from its port, Tripoli, and from Alexandria to
Venice to bedistributed to the markets of Europe (See Map 1).
These classical routes of the commerce in spices were completelyinterrupted when Vasco da Gama discovered a
new route leading toIndia by rounding the Cape of Good Hope (1497). The Portugueseacquired control over the
most important Indian spice marketsrapidly and brutally and conducted a merciless pirate warfareagainst Arab
merchants on the ocean. Thus the quantity of spicethat reached Aleppo and Alexandria notably diminished for a
while,and Lisbon replaced Venice as the center of the spice trade. In thefifteenth century the Mameluke sultanate
which ruled over Syriaand Egypt and controlled the caravan routes collected about half amillion gold ducats worth
of customs fees annually; the drop in thistraffic caused by Portuguese explorations and expansion towardsIndia
affected it deeply. This loss, in turn, contributed greatly to theweakening of the state of the Mamelukes, to such an
extent thatSultan Selim was able to administer a decisive blow to them andoccupy Syria and Egypt in only two
campaigns.
The Portuguese economic historian V. M. Magelhaes-Godinhowrites: "Undoubtedly one of the objects of Selim's
expansionist policieswas India, or at least control over the routes leading to thislegendary world.'' [29] Since the
Ottomans could not reach the PersianGulf because of Persia, Selim concentrated his efforts on the RedSea. Of
course, even control of that route exceeded the capabilities ofthe Empire of that time because, in order to re-establish
traffic onthe Indian Ocean it would have needed a fleet. It was not possible,however, to construct such a fleet in the
area of the Red Sea becauseof the lack of raw materials, primarily wood. Thus Selim could dolittle else than
encourage the Venetians to continue to engage in thespice trade so that he, having replaced the Mameluke sultans,
mightprofit from duties. Actually, the spice trade gradually revived alongthe traditional routes because the
Portuguese did not have enoughships or bases to maintain control over the Indian Ocean as a wholeand to intercept
all shipments by Arab merchants.
The active intervention of the Ottoman Empire was also delayedby the fact that dangerous revolts occurred in Syria
in 1520 and inEgypt in 1523; as long as conditions were not under control politicallyand militarily it could not even
think of taking a standagainst the Portuguese. Only in 1529 did the conditions become
settled enough to allow the Ottomans to take the first measurestowards ensuring the shipping lanes on the Red Sea
and IndianOcean. In fact, they went all out: they began to dig a channel at Suez,and, on the shores of the Red Sea
they set up huge shipyards towhich the materials needed for shipbuilding were carried en massefrom other parts of
the Empire. The work was progressing, someforty galleys were ready for launching, and a further twenty
underconstruction when in 1532 news was received of the attack againstCyprus, and the troops as well as a large
quantity of artillery werehurriedly carried away.
Thus the Ottomans had to wait another six years to launch anattack against the Portuguese. In 1538, 76 vessels
carrying about20,000 troops and strong artillery sailed from the Red Sea to occupyDiu, the most important
Portuguese base in India. However, theIndian Ocean presented difficulties too formidable for the Turkishnavy, used
to the much easier shipping conditions on the Mediterranean,and thus this undertaking, and several others, ended in
failure.
The occupation of Syria and Egypt seriously affected Persia aswell. New sources of conflict between the two
empires were added tothe old ones. Persia had always sought alliance with the Westagainst the Turks and was now
finally able to obtain it: the Portuguesesold them firearms, and thereby, it seemed, Persia succeededin balancing the
tactical advantage of the Ottomans. The help wasindeed significant: by 1525 the Persian army had 400 canons
and10-15,000 muskets. Nevertheless, the Turkish army remained thestronger. In 1534-35 it occupied Iraq and
managed to force the rulerof Basra to recognize the overlordship of the Sultan. Thus theOttoman Empire acquired
control over the spice route through thePersian Gulf as well, especially after 1546, when its army marchedinto
Basra.
The Portuguese, meanwhile, had abandoned the idea of closingthe route leading to the Near East and sought an
understandingwith the Ottomans. Consequently, the spice trade flowed freely onceagain along the traditional routes
which, in the long run, profitedeveryone. The Indians could sell their merchandise freely, as did theArabs, whose
trade was not hindered any more by the Portuguese.The Portuguese themselves gained because, though they
continuedto use the route around the Cape of Good Hope, their possession ofOrmuz meant they could collect
customs from the Arab ships reachingthe Persian Gulf. The Ottomans secured regular income bycollecting customs
from the caravans crossing their territories and
from Venetian ships. The Venetians profited too, since they carriedthe spices to the European markets.
Many commentators have argued that the occupation of Syria andEgypt was more significant than the capture of
Constantinople.Halil Inalcik, for example, writes: "An equally important result ofSelim's conquest was that the
Ottomans now controlled the world'srichest centers of the transit trade. Ottoman state income doubled,the treasury
in the palace was able to support his plans for world-wide conquests."[30] Egypt was not only a route for spices, but
also forthe gold from West Africa, and it was, moreover, one of the breadbasketsof the Empire, along with Syria. It
should come as no surprisethat the Egyptian budget enjoyed a yearly surplus of half a millionducats, which was
delivered to Constantinople in gold.
In his great work on the Mediterranean Fernand Braudel devoteda whole chapter to the "Geography of Islam."[31]
The Muslim worldincluded the main caravan routes, the water zones (the Mediterranean,the Persian Gulf, the Indian
Ocean, and the Red Sea), and theoases of the Sudan--a long road leading from the Atlantic to thePacific, with the
Mediterranean at its center. Although this enormousarea was in the possession of Islam from the seventh century,the
Arabs, as well as the Ottoman Turks of the sixteenth century,"missed the opportunity', of creating a unified empire
from it. Byoccupying the Balkans the Empire became fatefully involved inEuropean politics, and, therefore, writes
Braudel, "the real problemsremained hidden from the sultans." They did not finish the constructionof the Suez canal,
nor the fight against the Portuguese; theyneglected to occupy the lower regions of the Volga River and thuswere
unable to open the silk routes; they became lost in the strugglesaround the Mediterranean. Braudel's analysis sheds
light on some-thing Eurocentric historians are inclined to forget, that the OttomanEmpire was a world power, and
Europe was but one scene, and noteven the most important one, of its activities. However, it is verydoubtful,
whether their world empire could have been maintainedwithout controlling the Balkans and the islands of the
Mediterranean.Maybe the "many lost opportunities" were just as logicallydefined as were the ones not missed by the
Ottomans.
All in all, the Ottoman sultans managed to build a world empireby consciously taking economic factors into
consideration; hencerational economic calculations can be seen as determining to a great extent their political
decisions. This example suggests that therationality of Ottoman politics was in no way less developed thanthat of
any other power of the times.
Ottoman Diplomacy
Had the Ottoman Turks been nothing but a barbarian power withsights set on easily obtainable booty, as some
authors assert, thenall they would have had to do was to wage wars, leaving asidediplomacy. Yet we know that
Turkish diplomacy was most active,flexible, and circumspect, and often saved the government fromdifficult
situations.
The peace of Szeged, signed in 1444 by King Wladislas I andSultan Murad, is a well-known episode of European
history. Themotive for the peace, on the part of the Ottomans, was twofold: theyhad suffered defeats in the
preceding years, and a dangerous revoltwas fomenting in Asia Minor. The Porte was inclined to makesignificant
concessions: it offered, in exchange for peace, severalSerbian fortresses, including Galamboc, as well as hostages,
the twosons of George Brankovic , the ruler of Serbia. This price seemedacceptable to the Hungarian government,
since war did not promisebetter results. (The futility of an attack became, of course, soonobvious when Wladislas
broke the peace, marched into the Balkans,and his army suffered an annihilating defeat, losing thousands ofmen,
including the young king himself in the battle of Varna.)[32]
Half a century later, in 1491, the French ambassador, PhilippeCommines, was negotiating in Venice for continued
support for hisking when he received, one night, a secret visitor: the ambassador ofSultan Bajazid II. He came to
convince Commines of the advantagesfor France of making friends with the Sultan instead of Venice. Atthis time
war with Venice was already in the cards; hence theobjective of the move was obvious: to isolate the opponent
diplomatically.Although the maneuver did not succeed, nevertheless it isa good illustration of how carefully thought
out Ottoman diplomacywas.[33] We also know how masterfully this diplomacy was able toavoid involving the
Empire in a two-front war with Persia andEuropean enemies. According to Dorothy Vaughan: "A threat fromPersia
could produce in Constantinople a sudden willingness tomake peace in Europe, and also the converse."[34]
Undoubtedly, the most important development in the history ofsixteenth-century Europe was the 1519 imperial
election of Charlesof Habsburg, King of Spain and ruler of the Netherlands, the Austrianprovinces, Naples, Sardinia,
Sicily, and the American colonies.Practically all governments objected to the election because it wasclear that the
formation of so large an empire would upset theEuropean balance of power.[35] By this time there was no inter-
national issue which did not bear on Ottoman foreign policy, and thepromotion of the Spanish king to the imperial
throne was particularlyunsettling for the Porte. After all, the emperor also bore thetitles "Ruler of Jerusalem, Prince
of Athens and Persia, and Ruler ofAsia and Africa", which the Sultan considered an open challenge; henever
referred to Charles by any term other than "King of Isphamia"[Spain]. There were a number of other conflicts of
interest betweenthem. The persecution of the Moors in Spain elicited great indignationin the entire Muslim world,
and the attacks against the BarbaryStates of North Africa could not be a matter of indifference to theOttoman
Empire, whether from a religious or a strategic point ofview. Already Bajezid and Selim had sent aid to them, in a
waypreempting the great confrontations of later centuries. Spanish ruleover Naples represented a specific threat to
Turkish positions in theBalkans and the Mediterranean. Added to all this was the dangerthat the emperor, with his
great power and prestige, might bringabout the oft-mentioned but never realized crusade. At this juncturesuch an
eventuality seemed possible, since Charles had promised acrusade in the campaign preceding his election, and the
Ottomangovernment must have been aware of this. The significance of theelection of Charles V as Emperor was
registered by several contemporaryTurkish historians. Kemal pashazade, for example, saw correctlythat the
European balance had been upset by Charles ascendingthe imperial throne: "The King of Aleman-country
[Germany]--on account of whose tyranny the rulers of the unbelieving countriescomplain--repressed the rulers of the
neighboring countries anddeprived them of their prestige with his power and aggressiveness."He has excellent
soldiers who are "always ready to attack thefollowers of Islam and to besmirch Rum, the refuge of salvation,
withtheir godless feet, and are merely awaiting an appropriate occasion."[36]
For our particular topic it is important, of course, that King Louis II of Hungary was related to the Emperor by
marriage and that theHouse of Habsburg and the Polish-Bohemian-Hungarian dynasty ofthe Jagiellonians were
connected by a treaty of inheritance andmarriage.[37] Therefore, one had to expect--as eventually happened--that
Hungary would fall under Habsburg influence, which wouldindeed imply great dangers for the Ottoman Empire. It
was, finallythe fear of the power of Charles V that produced the Turkish-Frenchalliance. According to Inalcik, both
the Ottoman and Bourbon rulersrecognized that they needed one another against the common Habsburgthreat.
All things considered, it seems, therefore, highly probable that theOttoman leadership based its decisions on reliable
information andon careful assessments. Hence, I feel justified to proceed on theassumption that the political and
military leaders of Constantinopleacted rationally, and that we have good reason to apply to ourinquiry the model
based on the logic of war.
CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE OTTOMANSTATE IN
THE 1520s

The Makeup and Resources of the State

[38]
Since war is a social phenomenon, and the army a product of thesociety that wages war, we cannot measure the
military potential ofa state merely by its army. Geographical factors, national resources,the population, its ethnic and
social composition, the volume ofproduction, the state of transportation, as well as the political systemmust all be
taken into account. Hence, before discussing thesize, mobilization, strategy, and tactics of the Ottoman armed
forces,it is useful to provide a brief survey of these factors.
When Süleyman acceded to the throne in 1520, the OttomanEmpire, extending over three continents, was larger than
any Europeanstate. Twelve to thirteen million inhabitants would be a conservativeestimate of its population. As a
comparison, the population ofHungary was around four million at the time.[39]
Agriculturally, the Empire produced enough to provide a surplusfor export, and, except for a few articles, it was
self-sufficient in rawmaterials. As a consequence of the tributes collected from vassalstates (Wallachia, Moldavia,
the Tartar Khanate of Crimea), of thelarge amount of taxes paid by its huge population, and of the tariffson the
transit trade crossing the Empire, the revenues of the statewere plentiful indeed. In the fiscal year 1526-27 the state
revenuesamounted to 477 million aspers, the equivalent of about 9.5 millionin gold ducats. By way of comparison,
Spain's income towards theend of the sixteenth century was 9 million a year, that of France 5million, and that of
Venice 4 million in gold ducats. According tocontemporary estimates, at the beginning of the sixteenth century
fielding and maintaining an army of 60,000 and a fleet of 150 vesselscost about 800,000 ducats.[40]
In addition to the material resources, the organization of thestate, the primary function of which was to sustain the
army and toattain maximum military efficiency in order to continue the war,was the main factor that explains the
tremendous military might ofthe Empire. The most important administrative officials, in peace asin war, occupied
high military posts, and, in turn, the higher rankingmilitary commanders also functioned as governors of their
areas.This intertwining of civilian and military functions may not beenough, in and of itself, to explain the
impressive military achievements,since in the early feudal age the civilian and military functionswere held by the
same aristocracy in western Europe as well.But the Ottoman state and military organization was also characterized
by the fact that the bulk of the officials came not from the ranksof the nobility, but were of foreign background.
Furthermore, theywere slaves whose life, property, and whole being depended on thesultan; hence they obeyed
orders blindly and without reservation.The resistance by noble estates which hampered administration inthe western
countries was something entirely alien to the OttomanEmpire.
The body of officials was not only obedient, but even thought alikeas a consequence of the uniform education and
training it underwentat the seraglio. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thestratum of officials in those
European countries which had em-barked on a process of centralization received their training indifferent schools,
and it was only in the course of the exercise of theirfunction that they became a body with a uniform spirit. Even
thisuniformity applied only to the officials in the central government,rather than to the provincial officials.
Instructions emanating fromthe court were often misinterpreted in the provinces or were poorlycarried out;
worthwhile ideas and plans of governments frequentlyremained a dead letter. To understand the grandiose
militaryachievements of the Ottoman Empire we must never lose sight of itswell-oiled administrative machinery,
certainly outstanding for thetimes: it was able to supply men, funds, materials, everything thearmy needed,
punctually and in sufficient quantities. An enormous area, a huge population, ample resources, well-functioning
state organs, the intertwining of the civilian and military machineries--almost all the conditions necessary to field
astrong army and to fight victorious campaigns were present in theOttoman state. Added to all this was the fanatical
religious ideologywhich inspired the soldiers and ensured discipline. Unlike the Christian religion, Islam taught not
a life of piety, but rather one ofcombat and toughness. Accordingly, an equitable and consistentsystem of rewards
placed military merits above all else.
The Ottoman army was characterized by the fact that it comprised two diametrically opposite elements representing
two mutually exclusive historical categories: a feudal and a professionalmilitary. These two forms of organization
grew out of two essentiallydifferent social and economic structures, yet they were united in theOttoman army not as
a passing phenomenon, as in the case of someEuropean states, but as a feature that was to last for centuries. To
besure, troops maintained by the central power on a permanent basishad always been an ingredient of western feudal
armies, and, inturn, remnants of feudal complements remained even in the paidstanding armies. Yet it can be usually
determined for a given moment which was the dominant form and which the complementaryone. In the Ottoman
army, however, one institution did not replacethe other, and we would be hard put to say which of the two
derivedorganically from the given social structure. About the French armiesof the fifteenth century, it can be safely
asserted that they werefeudal, even though they already included contingents of mercenaries, whereas in the
seventeenth century the French army was astanding army, even if it had still some feudal complements. Incontrast
there is no such clear-cut difference between the Ottomanarmy of the fourteenth and the seventeenth century.
Furthermore, the Ottoman armed forces remained free for a longtime of all those vulnerabilities and functional
disturbances that onemight expect to have hampered them. The feudal soldiery neverturned into an undisciplined,
unleadable, individualistic force, inappropriate for carrying out planned operations, as had the bands ofknights of
western Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.Moreover, it never occurred to anyone that there should be
somekind of territorial or time limitation to their service, as happened inthe West: the feudal sipahi remained under
arms as long as thecampaign lasted, and his service did not come to an end at thefrontiers of the empire.
The troops of the permanent standing army--the janissaries andthe Porte's sipahis--had grown accustomed to each
other in theschools, were trained uniformly, and lived together for long years.
Their number did not vary as did that of the standing armies in the West, where only the cadres served in peacetime,
to be rounded out in time of war by means of recruitment and impressment. And while the mercenary soldiers of the
West were recruited from the dregs of society, the professional soldiers of the Ottoman army formed a select elite.
The technical equipment of the Ottoman army was always up-todate. Its artillery and its engineers were able to
resolve all tasks,tasks that were anything but negligible during the long march fromConstantinople to Buda or to
Vienna, with sieges along the way.These skills were successfully imported from Europe. As the topofficials of the
government were rootless and untrammeled by tradition, they could easily adopt all innovations from the West and
makeuse of foreign experts without regard to expense.Much like the Romans, the Ottomans paid special
attention,particularly at the beginning, to the construction and maintenanceof roads so important to efficient
administration and for the movement of troops. The supply of the messenger service, the maintenance of inns, and
the upkeep of the infrastructure were entrusted tothe population of the area and relentlessly controlled.[41]The
Turkish sapper units deserve special attention. The sappers,or "master builders" as they are termed in one of the
Ottomanchronicles, had to throw bridges over three rivers for the Hungariancampaign: the Sava, the Danube, and
the Drava. In the OttomanEmpire as elsewhere the usual method of bridge construction wasthe pontoon-bridge. The
sanjaks of the surrounding areas wererequired to provide the boats for the pontoons in accordance withorders issued
well before the campaign started. When, in 1521, inconnection with the campaign for the capture of Belgrade and
Sabac,orders were issued beforehand for the construction of boats, but, forlack of time, the boats were not ready, the
army had to build aregular bridge on pillars--which was carried away by a suddenflood. The construction of bridges,
and the crossing of rivers ingeneral, is one of the most delicate maneuvers any army has to face.For instance, in
1526, at the crossing of the Drava, the works weresupervised directly by the Grand Vezir Ibrahim in person, and
evenSuleyman I himself spent some time at the site. In 1526 the bridgeover the Drava at Eszek was built in five
days; by all indications,however, four of the five had to be spent on making the swampy areaon the northern bank
transmittable since it took but a single day to prepare the pontoon bridge over the river itself. For the crossing ofthe
marshes a dam left behind from Roman times (the remnants ofwhich can still be found) may have been utilized.
When the Turksinstalled themselves in Hungary on a permanent basis, the part ofthe bridge at Eszek that actually
crossed the river continued to be apontoon bridge, whereas the marshes along the bank were crossedby a bridge on
supports, and the dam which led towards the Dravawas raised even higher.
In 1526 the Turks built two bridges over the Danube: one at Buda,in order to cross over to the left bank for their
withdrawal, anotherat Petervarad. The bridge from Buda to Pest, about 700 meters inlength, was completed in six
days with "continuous" labor, that is,working day and night. The army would have needed five days tocross had the
bridge not broken up on the night of the fourth day,forcing the last troops and the rearguard to cross by boat. The
bridgeat Petervarad was completed in five days.[42]
These considerable accomplishments demonstrate the thoroughcompetence of the Ottoman sappers. Of course, the
construction ofthe bridges over the Sava, Drava, and Danube was done underrather favorable conditions since the
materials could be shipped tothe site on water. The greatest technical difficulties in militarybridge-building derive
precisely from the fact that the rivers may cutacross the line of advance of the armies, so that materials have to
betransported over land. To bridge the Sava it was possible to ship thesupplies up the Danube, the Morava, and the
Sava itself; as for theDrava or the Danube, the entire fleet could row up.
The maritime fleet of the Ottoman Empire, given its geography,played a role in most of its wars which were
conducted simultaneously on land and on sea. The war plans of the Porte were oftenpredicated on a combined and
synchronized use of army and navy.Moreover, the very fact that this nation of the steppes, traditionallyon horseback,
became the greatest sea-power on earth in a matter ofa single century indicates the tremendous economic power of
theEmpire and its inner resilience. As in other areas of military technology, these results were achieved thanks to
experts from abroad. Thecapacity of the Ottoman Empire for shipbuilding was enormous. Inthe fourteenth and mid-
fifteenth century the superiority of Veniceon the seas was unquestioned, but at the siege of Constantinople therole
played by the Ottoman fleet was already decisive. In 1470 no fewer than 300 Turkish vessels participated in the
attack on Negroponte. At this time the Venetian fleet still towered over the Ottomanin quality: it did not recoil from
battle even when outnumbered six toone. In the following century, however, this difference decreased, forthe great
mass of Ottoman ships acquired superiority of numbers. In1490 a Turkish fleet of 270 vessels was able to capture
Lepantoagainst the united Venetian and French forces of 150 ships. Indicative of the staggering power of the
Ottoman Empire is that, in 1571,although they lost 200 ships at the battle of Lepanto, within a yearthere were again
250 ships under the sultan's flag.
Two types of seagoing naval vessels were built. The galley of 20oars, the crew of which consisted of 30-35 sailors
and 200 oarsmen(4 rowers assigned to one oar), plus 100 fighters, and the bastardewith 72 oars pulled by
approximately 500 oarsmen (7 to an oar), ableto carry 216 fighters on deck. Thus, for a fleet of 100 vessels,20-
25,000 oarsmen, 34,000 sailors, and 12-13,000 soldiers had tobe provided.[43]
The role of the navy equaled that of the army in the conquests;moreover, it provided the Empire with enormous
economic returnsby controlling the commerce of the Near East and on the Black Seaand by fighting against pirates.
Being able to curtail the cerealimports of Venice, the most dangerous rival of the Empire, it becamean excellent tool
of political pressure as well. We have seen, how-ever, that the Ottoman sailors were only masters of the situation
onthe Mediterranean, for they were unable to cope with the difficultshipping conditions on the Indian Ocean.

The Strength of the Ottoman Army in 1526

Our present knowledge does not include the exact number ofOttoman troops who fought at the battle of Mohacs.
According tocontemporary or near-contemporary estimates, the number wassomewhere between 200,000 and
500,000, but we frequently readthe comment that only 60,000 or 100,000 of this great mass wascombat worthy. In
the last hundred years a number of authors estimated the effectives at no more than 60-100,000. Jeno
Gyalokaycalculated 75,000 and, most recently, Gyula Kaldy-Nagy estimatedthe number of "regulars" at 60,000,
noting that there were someirregulars as well.[44] In view of these extreme divergences, I feel obliged to come up
with my own estimates. By way of warning, Imust point out that the number of Ottoman troops participating inthe
battle of Mohacs is important to us not primarily in order toemphasize their numerical superiority over the
Hungarian army.Even if we accept the lowest estimates, the Turkish side still enjoyedat least a two to one numerical
advantage, and that, in itself, issufficient to explain their victory. Rather we are concerned with thetactical problems,
and the problems of command, of logistics, and ofmarching techniques. The numbers are relevant from the point
ofview of logistics since, naturally, it is far more difficult to supply alarger army with food and forage. This was the
reason why Turenne,Montecuccoli, and Zrinyi defined the upper limit of the effectives ofan army at 40 to
50,000.[45] The data seem to show that the Ottomanstate, rich in resources, highly centralized, and boasting of a
mosteffective administration, was the only one capable of exceeding thislimit without running the risk of men and
horses perishing for wantof food and forage. Of course, even their army experienced problemsof supply, but we
must not forget that the army was operating attheaters far removed from the center of the Empire, at distances
atwhich no European army would have been able to function.
At the same time, much as in the case of European militaryleaders, the mobilization of large masses entailed
extraordinaryproblems of command. Actually, this is the real reason why we dealin such detail with the issue of the
size of the Ottoman army: it ismost relevant to its march, to its deployment, and to its battleformation. All the data
seem to indicate, in fact, that bringing thearmy to the field of Mohacs and deploying for battle entailed extraordinary
difficulties for the Ottoman command. These problems had adecisive bearing on the outcome of the battle itself; in
fact, in thefirst phase of the battle, the Hungarian army gained significantadvantages. It also seems the Hungarian
high command expecteddifficulties in the deployment of the Turkish forces, and it chose tofight the battle at the very
spot where it could expect to derivemaximum advantage from the situation--if, indeed, we are correctin identifying
the location. All this makes it possible to reconstructthe whole battle in a way markedly different from former
attempts.The following examination serves a purpose, even from the methodological point of view. We will attempt
with the help of statistical procedures to analyze the raw data in earlier interpretations andbring them into some sort
of rational order. It is hardly necessary to point out that, since we are resorting to statistics, our results can beno
more than estimates.
The Ottoman troops comprised four groups: the timar soldiers orsipahis contributed by the timars, the professional
troops (janissaries and sipahis of the Porte), the irregulars, and the contingents fromthe vassal states (Moldavia,
Wallachia, and the Tartar Khanate ofCrimea). After the professional soldiers, who outnumbered the othergroups, it
was the timar sipahis who had the greatest combat value.Nevertheless, it is most difficult to arrive at an estimate of
thenumber of this group. While trying to find my way through the mazeof contradictory figures, I found the
complaint of Sir Paul Rycaut, anOttoman specialist from the seventeenth century, very convincing,indeed: "It is not
easy to make sense out of the matter...."[46]

Estimates in the Sources and Studies: the Supply Side

First of all, we must work out a reasonably reliable number oftimar estate owners, that is, those landowners who had
to providetroops in proportion to their revenues. Even the most recent pertinent estimates are highly divergent:
according to Omar Barkan theynumbered 27,868 at the time of Suleyman I, while Inalcik gives theirnumber as
40,000. Along with Kaldy-Nagy, I accept the figure ofBarkan as a point of departure.[47]
There were three principal groups of timar landowners: 1) thesmall timars, whose income did not exceed 20,000
aspers; 2) thezeamet owners, with 20-100,000 asper income; and 3) the hassowners, whose income exceeded
100,000 aspers. The military obligations of these three categories differed: the first category provideda timariot
soldier for every 3,000 aspers of revenue, the second, onefor every 4,000, and the third, one for every 5,000.[48]
To determine the total number of timariot soldiers it would bemost useful to know the distribution of the size of the
timar estatesand the proportion of the owners, income. According to Kaldy-Nagy, the small timar owners amounted
to 95% of all landowners; thefigures supplied by Rycaut (1670) and Count Marsigli (1732) aresummarized in Table
1, but they differ in the ratios. It seemsreasonable to assume for the entire Empire that 0.5% were hassowners, 9.5%
zeamet owners, and 90% small timar owners. Grantedthat the data in this table are not from the period of Süleyman,
theseratios could not have changed substantially in the course of approximately 150 years.
Table 1.
The Distribution of Timar OwnersAccording to Rycaut and Marsigli
Owners of
Author Province

No. % No. % No. % No. %

Rycaut Anatolia 16 0.21 297 3.83 7440 95.96 7763 100

Rumelia 23 0.25 1076 11.67 8194 88.18 9292 100

Marsigli Anatolia 61 0.72 793 9.30 7674 89.99 8628 100

Rumelia 23 0.19 960 8.04 10842 91.76 11816 100

As to income distribution, Marsigli's figures provide some orientation. At the end of the seventeenth century,
the total income of thetimar estates in Anatolia and Rumelia might have been distributedas follows:
hass estates: 7.2%zeamet estates: 40.6%small timar estates: 52.2%
A rounded-out calculation using the figures of Marsigli is presentedin Table 2:
Table 2.
The Probable Distribution of Timar Estate Ownersof Their Income and of the Soldiery Provided
Zeamet Timar
Hass
Estates Total

Owners in % 0.5 9.5 90.0 100

number 140 2,660 25,200 28,000

Income in % 7.2 40.6 52.2 100

in mill. aspers 13.3 75.1 96.6 185

5,000 4,000 3,000

Aspers per soldier due
No. of soldiers provided 2,660 18,775 32,200 53,635

No. of soldiers & owners 2,800 21,435 57,400 81,635

Avg. #. of soldiers/landowner 20.0 8.1 2.3 2.9

In 1526, as on other occasions, some provinces of the eastern portionof the Empire did not participate in the
Hungarian campaign. According to the chronicler Lufti, although they were mobilized, thetroops of Diakbekr,
Caraman, Rum, Syria, and of the Egyptianeyalets remained at their peacetime stations. If we assume theyrepresented
about a third of the total forces, we must subtractroughly 25,000, leaving us with about 57,000 sipahis, the figure
given by Kochu Bey for the eyalets of Anatolia and Rumelia.[49]
The probability of these estimates is enhanced by the data provided in Table 3, which contains the figures given by
Kochu Bey,Ayni Ali, Ali Chaus, and Rycaut.[50] The most important fact, for ourpurposes, is the similarity of the
figures in Table 3 for the ratio oftimariot soldiers to those of Table 2.
Table 3.
Number and Proportion of Timar Owners and SoldiersAccording to Various Authors
Number of
Author Period Area Owners Sipahis Ratio

Kochu Bey Suleyman Rumelia& Anatolia 19,000 57,000 3.0

Ayn Ali 1610 Empire as a whole 37,386 109,500 2.9

Ali Chaus 1653 Empire as a whole 54,775 164,400 3.0

Rycaut mid-17th Rumelia& Anatolia 17,745 49,000 2.8

Such are the data that can be puzzled out from the sources and the literature. As we can see, the number of timar
soldiers must havebeen around 57,000. This figure, however, is only theoretical, because in practice a number of
circumstances come into play. It islikely that as long as the Empire kept expanding--that is, roughlyspeaking, down
to the end of Suleyman's reign--the timar ownersprovided more soldiers than the kanun prescribed, because thetimar
estates established in recently conquered areas were given tosoldiers who distinguished themselves in the campaign.
It alsofrequently happened that the income of the timars was raised evenif the size of their estates did not increase as
a reward for meritsearned in the campaign. Thus it was largely in the interest of thebejlerbeyilik and sanjak beyi
owning hass estates, as well as of thesub-begs and subasis owning zeamets, to participate in the war withas many
soldiers as possible, for victory and rewards were far morelikely with large numbers. Hence Kochu Bey's words, that
in thetime of Suleyman, the timar owners participated in the campaignswith considerably more soldiers than
prescribed, do not sound at allexaggerated.
On the other hand, the number of fighters may have been negatively affected by the owner's illness or financial
problems. Moreover, disobedience may also have played a part: some timars mayhave simply disregarded the draft.
Finally, there were cases ofcheating: for instance, the landowners might show up for the musterwith a complete
contingent, but then decide to send some home toavoid having to provide for them. However, such instances
wereunlikely under Suleyman. On the contrary, the chroniclers write ofperfect discipline and enthusiasm, and report
how well the prescriptions of the kanuns were observed at the muster. For instance,Kemal Pashazade writes
regarding the muster held at Belgrade in1526:
The beys competed with one another each of them striving to outdo theothers, and each of them striving to present
troops as well equipped aspossible.... The number of cavalry and infantry were like the blades ofgrass in the field
and their armament was found to conform perfectlywith the official roster determined by the kanun.[51]
It is relatively simple to determine the number of professionalsoldiers. The janissaries must have numbered around
10-12,000, the Porte's sipahis around 54,000, and the number of artillerymenis known to have been 695.[52]
It is far more difficult to estimate the size of the irregular troops.Among them were the akindjis, the gonuluk, the
assab, the musellem,the voinuks, etc. Their total may have been 5040,000. While theywere of limited value in open
battle-comparable to the Hungariannoble levy and local militia--the akindjis in particular were veryhelpful from the
strategic point of view, because they carried outlong-range raids with unusual cruelty, terrorizing and paralyzingthe
enemy's hinterland. The Tartars performed similar roles; theynumbered 10,000 in the campaign of 1532; hence we
may assumethere were about as many of them in 1526.
All told, the data provided by Ferdi and Kochu Bey, presented inTable 4, must be close to reality. Although the
numbers given byFerdi pertain to the troops who participated in the campaign of 1529,while Kochu Bey gives
information regarding Süleyman's reign ingeneral, the situation in 1526 could not have been radically different.
Table 4.
Effectives according to Ferdi and Kochu Bey [53]
Kochu Bey
Ferdi
Professional soldiers 32,000 36,000

Timariotsover 60,000 47-110,000

Irregular troops 60,000 48-60,000

Tartars over 10,000 10,000

Total 182,000 140-200,000

Modern historians have arrived at divergent numbers of theOttoman army's effectives fighting at Mohacs. The
estimate of Gyalokay deserves special discussion. He agreed with those who feelthat the number 150-200,000 is an
exaggeration, believing thatwhile at the outset, at Constantinople, the strength of the armymight have been 130,000,
those actually participating in the battlenumbered only 90,000, assuming that the army had suffered 25%losses
during the march to Belgrade and another 10% in the combatspreceding Mohacs. [54] This calculation is not
convincing. The 25%subtracted for losses during the march is excessive; such a loss couldonly have occurred during
forced marches over an extended period oftime, or if logistics had failed. Neither of these was the case. The pace of
advance did not exceed 13 km/day.[55] Nor do we have anyevidence about failures of logistical service, which is
not surprisingknowing the excellence of Ottoman logistical command and the factthat the army was advancing in
secure territories of the Empire.Gyalokay refers to Napoleon's advance during the Russian campaign of 1812.
Indeed, the Grande Armee suffered catastrophiclosses in the course of their advance, but the explanation of
theselosses is common knowledge: the inadequacy of the French logisticalsystem and the scorched earth tactics of
the retreating Russians. [56]Hence, we better dismiss these assumed losses and estimate the sizeof the Ottoman
army reaching Mohacs at 150,000 troops, not counting the effectives of the train, the servants, and other support
personnel.

Calculation from the 1526 Column of March

This figure can be compared to results derived from militaryscience. The size of an army can be inferred from the
length of itscolumn of march: all we need to know is how long it took for the hostto cross a specific spot. From the
diary of Süleyman and from thechronicle of Ferdi we know that it took the army of 1526 three daysand three nights
to cross the bridge constructed at Eszek. [57]
The first question, therefore, is what was the capacity of thebridge, that is, its width. Süleyman's diary specifies that
it was 2rofs which, according to the translator of the text, Jozsef Thury, isequal to 1.4 meters. This, however, seems
most unlikely, becauseneither cannon nor cart would have been able to cross such a narrowbridge. There is some
confusion here. Ferdi gives the length of thebridge built at Sabac in 1521 as 1,800 rofs (which would be
theequivalent to 1,200 meters if one rof was 67 cm.), which is anunacceptable figure because the width of the Sava
at Sabac could nothave been over 300 meters. On the other hand, the length of thebridge built over the Danube in
1526 is given by Kemal Pashazade as 980 rofs, which sounds plausible, being equal to 660 meters. Thewidth of
military bridges in this period was at least 3.5 meters, andwe have no reason to believe the Ottomans built them any
narrower.Moreover, the Hungarian chronicler Szeremi observed the Turkscross the Danube at Buda in 1529. He
noted that the bridge was 12feet wide, that is, almost 4 meters, and three camels could pass on itside by side. [58]
Given the fact that the Ottoman army crossed the bridge at Eszekin three days and three nights and that at least four
hours a day hadto be devoted to maintenance--tightening the anchors and theropes, changing the damaged boards--
then the actual crossing musthave taken 60 hours. Counting with a speed of 4.54 km/h, the totallength of the
marching column must have been between 270 and 300km. what does this mean in terms of numbers?
Since the greater part of the army was composed of cavalry, wewill assume that 100,000 of the 150,000 were
mounted. This is alsothe sum of regulars, sipahis furnished by the timars, the irregularcavalry and the Tartars, as
calculated above. The length of a columnof 100,000 cavalrymen, if the horses were led across the bridge threeby
three, is 100 km. For the infantry we may add another 12 to 15km, depending on whether they were marching by
fives or by fours;the distance between the ranks can be taken as 1.2 meters on theaverage. [59]
The computation of the length of the artillery's column of march ismore problematic. There are two sources of
uncertainty involved:one is the number of guns, the other the composition of the batteries.For the former we have to
rely on Ferdi's estimate of 300 guns,confirmed by the estimate of Pal Tomori, the commander-in-chief ofthe
Hungarian army in 1526. As to the composition of the batteries,we may assume that the Ottoman artillery, set up by
European experts, was organized much like the western ones. By extrapolatingthe suggestions on the "standard" set-
up of field artillery of thesixteenth-century military author Reinhard Solms, [60] the probabledistribution of the
Turkish artillery in Table 5.

Table 5.
Probable Distribution of the Ottoman Artillery in 1526
Distribution of a field artillery of 54 cannon as recommended by R. Solms
24 lb. 12 lb. 6 lb. 3 lb.

24 lb. half- half quarter falco-

snake khartoum snake snake nette Total

Piece 6 8 10 10 20 54

% 11.2 14.8 18.5 18.5 37.0 100

Extrapolated to the 300 cannons estimated for 1526

Piece 33 45 55 55 112 300

Technical data and calculations:

Wgt.of cannon(t) 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.4

Carts 2 2 2 1 1

Horses 16 16 1 12 6 4

length of 40 40 25 25 20

Draft needs: cart+horses (m)

Min. length of column (km) 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.3 8.2

Weight of ball(kg) 12 12 6 3 1.5

Weight of powder/ 6 6 3 1.5 0.8

shot(kg)

Weight of 59.4 81.0 49.5 24.8 25.8 240.5

powder+ balls for 100 shots for each cannon (t)

On the basis of this calculation the artillery's column of march,without the carts and camels carrying ammunition,
but addingappropriate distance between carts (330 X 8m = ca. 2.5 km), can beassumed to have been 11-12 km.
A calculation of the total length of the army's column of march and the time required for their crossing the bridge
gives the following figures:

Table 6.
Length of Column of March and Time Required for Crossing
Time in hours
Length in km
Cavalry 100 20-22

Infantry 12-15 3-4

Artillery 10- 10-11 2-3

TOTAL 123-127 25-29

To these lengths and times for the crossing of the troops, we haveto add the train. The factors determining its size
are the weight ofthe ammunition, of food, and of forage. Five to six hundred cartswere needed to transport the
ammunition for the artillery and about300 carts to haul the cannons. While these numbers may appearexaggerated,
other fragmentary data enhance their probability. [61]
In computing the weight of the food transported we start from thefact that, similarly to European armies, the daily
ration of bread andrice of each soldier was 1 kg. Although we have found no relevantdata, we may take it for
granted that the logistics of food supplyamong the Turks was the same as with European armies. The grainmust have
been ground and stored in magazines erected well beforethe start of the campaign, while bread was baked on the
spot andbrought to the troops by cart or beasts of burden. It is also probablethat there were four daily distributions of
bread among the troops. Itmay be assumed, however, that a larger quantity had been accumulated for the crossing at
Eszek and the subsequent stages, becausethe swampy terrain cut the troops off from the supplies on board thebarges
on the Danube. Assuming the rations of bread in possessionof the troops to be sufficient for eight days, we may
calculate 1,200tons for the 150,000 soldiers.
Finally we must compute the necessary amount of forage. If thehorses were given forage cereal, their daily ration
would be 15 kg,but if they received only green fodder, they would need 25 kg. The number of riding horses and
draft animals can be conservativelyestimated at 200,000; hence the daily ration of forage must haveamounted to
3,000 tons. Since a supply of four days of forage wascollected each time, as was the practice in the European armies,
thetotal can be estimated at 12,000 tons. Although we do not haveprecise information pertaining to any of this, we
do know, for instance, that in 1526, 20 of the 77 days needed to cross the Balkanswere days of rest, and we may
assume that forage was collected oneach of those days. Süleyman's diary mentions foraging on twooccasions, each
time because the soldiers assigned to the detail wereattacked by the "Vlachs." [62]
All things considered, the weight to be transported included: 240tons of ammunition, 1,200 tons of food, 1>12,000
tons of forageadding up to a total of 11,300-13,400 tons. [63]
In summary, if we count 130 km for the troops and 17s230 km forthe train, the length of the column of the army as a
whole must havebeen 300430 km. A column of such length would have required6>70 hours to cross the bridge--a
figure that corresponds, by andlarge, to the reports from Ottoman sources about the time it took.
Contemporary data also support these estimates. Tomori's intelligence deserves particular attention since he was
well acquaintedwith the Ottoman army; moreover, his excellent reconnaissanceservice provided news regarding the
enemy from the moment itstarted to assemble at Adrianople. What seems confusing, primafacie, is that on one
occasion he gave the strength of the Ottomanforces as 300,000, at another time as 70,ooo.[64] If we look at
thematter more closely, however, both statements may be valid. WhenTomori was referring to 300,000 troops, he
was also including theirregulars of lesser combat value, the drivers, the leaders of thebeasts of burden, and the
servants. On the other hand, when he cited70,000, he must have been referring only to the soldiers provided bythe
timars and to the regulars of high combat value. Of course, thelower estimate was not entirely fair, because the
county nobles of the levy and the peasant soldiers in the Hungarian army did not fightany better than the Ottoman
irregulars. From the point of view ofpsychology, however, the underestimation of the forces of the enemywas in fact
appropriate at the moment of the report: just before thedecisive battle. Indeed, the news about 300,000 enemies had
elicitedan enormous consternation in the Hungarian war council, andthe knowledge of overwhelming superiority of
the foe would haveundermined the self-confidence of the army. I shall return to thismatter in some detail later.

Mobilization and Aufmarsch

[65]
The Ottoman system of mobilizing and moving troops across theBalkans (Aufmarsch) against Hungary evolved in
the fifteenth century and seems to have remained unchanged until the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699.
The decision in matters of war was made by the sultan, in agreement with the grand vezir. The details were defined
by the leadingofficials of the Ottoman state in the divan [divan-i humayun]. Therethe grand vezir, the two chief
justices of the army, the begler begs ofAnatolia and Rumelia and their treasurers (later, even the defterdars of Syria
and Egypt), the janissary agha representing the army,the kapudan basa or admiral of the sea representing the navy,
andthe secretary of state [the nisanci], discussed the methods of the war,primarily the mobilization, the financial and
other technical issues.The decision of the sultan, together with the measures enacted bythis council, were then borne
by "messengers swift as meteors," thechaus, to the four corners of the Empire, putting into motion thepowerful
military machinery of the Ottoman state.
I he order of mobilization specified first of all the task falling uponeach individual component of the army. The
army was divided intotwo parts: one to take part in the campaign and one to stay home.The military force of the
eyalets near the theater of operations, onthe one hand, and the professional forces garrisoned in the capital,on the
other, formed the army that went on the campaign. Thesoldiers from the eyalets far removed from the theater of
operationsremained at their home bases, yet they too were mobilized to fulfillborderguard duties and tasks
pertaining to internal order war-ranted by the state of war. At the moment of mobilization the coffers of the treasury
were filled, most likely to store money in case the wardid not come to a rapid end. Likewise special measures were
takenfor increased vigilance in Constantinople, a task entrusted to thekapudan basa who was also the begler beg for
Gallipoli.
The individual timar landowners received their orders for mobilization via the chain of begler begs, sanjak begs, and
alajbegs; they were then required to show up at the venue appointed for theassembly within one month. If the war
took place in Europe, thesoldiery from the eyalet of Rumelia usually met at Sofia, whereasthe troops from Anatolia
crossed the Bosporus at Gallipoli and joinedthe sultan at Adrianople. The sultan himself traveled from
Constantinople accompanied by the court, the janissaries, and the sipahis of the Porte.
At this time the beys of the akindjis also received their orders tomobilize, and the drafting process got underway.
Being troops fromthe border areas, the akindjis assembled at some border fortress,usually at Semendria. Instructions
were also issued to the azabsgarrisoning the individual castles summoning them to the venue forthe assembly, as
well as to the azabs and sailors stationed in otherparts of the Empire. The azabs of the castles in the sanjaks
ofSemendria, Zvornik, and Vidin, in or near the area of deployment forthe European campaigns, were always led
out, and, since they werethe ones to provide the crews for the Danubian fleet, they wereusually directed to wherever
the fleet was assembling.
Since the Danube was of decisive importance from a logisticalpoint of view, the formation of the Danubian fleet was
outlined inconsiderable detail. The majority of the naval units sailed from theirbases on the Black Sea, whereas the
barges, or at least some of them,were built in the months preceding the campaign in the sanjaksalong the Danube
and the Sava from the income of the hasslandowners in the area. There must have been important shipyardsat
Zvornik where up to 300 vessels were launched on certain occasions. Some of the artillery pieces were transported
from the arsenals in the capital by ship, while others were founded in the cannonfoundry at Uskub.
No matter which direction the war took on land, the naval fleetwas always placed on war-footing. The kapudans of
the fleets atAlexandria, Rhodes, Morea, and Valona were instructed to cruisethe Mediterranean and protect the
coasts of the Empire. [66] Once thearmy had assembled, a divan was held at Adrianople or in Sofia to discuss
operational matters. On these occasions the principal officers of the border areas had considerable influence, for it
was theirfunction to carry out reconnaissance of enemy territory; hence theywere expected to be well informed
about enemy forces, the terrain,and all other circumstances of military importance. At one of themore important
stations along the route a muster was held wherethe troops were inspected.
The march from Adrianople to Belgrade took 50 to 70 days andwas divided into stages. The columns of march were
highly segmented in order to avoid jams; hence they followed each other atseveral days, interval. Where the going
was difficult, as on thestretch between Philippopolis and Sofia, in the mountainous areabetween the Balkan and
Rhodope chains, one part of the army--usually the troops from the eyalet of Anatolia--turned off from themain road
leading through the narrows at Kapu Derbend and advanced towards Sofia along the valleys of Topolnica and
Slatica.Since the main line of the army's advance was the road from Constantinople to Nis and from there to
Belgrade, and the surroundingareas were its base for procuring provisions, the population in thisarea had to be
protected from the soldiers; hence, extremely strictdiscipline was maintained throughout. Soldiers who pillaged
fromthe inhabitants or spoiled the crops were severely punished. [67]

Calculation from the 1526 Column of March

This figure can be compared to results derived from militaryscience. The size of an army can be inferred from the
length of itscolumn of march: all we need to know is how long it took for the hostto cross a specific spot. From the
diary of Süleyman and from thechronicle of Ferdi we know that it took the army of 1526 three daysand three nights
to cross the bridge constructed at Eszek. [57]
The first question, therefore, is what was the capacity of thebridge, that is, its width. Süleyman's diary specifies that
it was 2rofs which, according to the translator of the text, Jozsef Thury, isequal to 1.4 meters. This, however, seems
most unlikely, becauseneither cannon nor cart would have been able to cross such a narrowbridge. There is some
confusion here. Ferdi gives the length of thebridge built at Sabac in 1521 as 1,800 rofs (which would be
theequivalent to 1,200 meters if one rof was 67 cm.), which is anunacceptable figure because the width of the Sava
at Sabac could nothave been over 300 meters. On the other hand, the length of thebridge built over the Danube in
1526 is given by Kemal Pashazade as 980 rofs, which sounds plausible, being equal to 660 meters. Thewidth of
military bridges in this period was at least 3.5 meters, andwe have no reason to believe the Ottomans built them any
narrower.Moreover, the Hungarian chronicler Szeremi observed the Turkscross the Danube at Buda in 1529. He
noted that the bridge was 12feet wide, that is, almost 4 meters, and three camels could pass on itside by side. [58]
Given the fact that the Ottoman army crossed the bridge at Eszekin three days and three nights and that at least four
hours a day hadto be devoted to maintenance--tightening the anchors and theropes, changing the damaged boards--
then the actual crossing musthave taken 60 hours. Counting with a speed of 4.54 km/h, the totallength of the
marching column must have been between 270 and 300km. what does this mean in terms of numbers?
Since the greater part of the army was composed of cavalry, wewill assume that 100,000 of the 150,000 were
mounted. This is alsothe sum of regulars, sipahis furnished by the timars, the irregularcavalry and the Tartars, as
calculated above. The length of a columnof 100,000 cavalrymen, if the horses were led across the bridge threeby
three, is 100 km. For the infantry we may add another 12 to 15km, depending on whether they were marching by
fives or by fours;the distance between the ranks can be taken as 1.2 meters on theaverage. [59]
The computation of the length of the artillery's column of march ismore problematic. There are two sources of
uncertainty involved:one is the number of guns, the other the composition of the batteries.For the former we have to
rely on Ferdi's estimate of 300 guns,confirmed by the estimate of Pal Tomori, the commander-in-chief ofthe
Hungarian army in 1526. As to the composition of the batteries,we may assume that the Ottoman artillery, set up by
European experts, was organized much like the western ones. By extrapolatingthe suggestions on the "standard" set-
up of field artillery of thesixteenth-century military author Reinhard Solms, [60] the probabledistribution of the
Turkish artillery in Table 5.

Table 5.
Probable Distribution of the Ottoman Artillery in 1526
Distribution of a field artillery of 54 cannon as recommended by R. Solms
24 lb. 12 lb. 6 lb. 3 lb.

24 lb. half- half quarter falco-

snake khartoum snake snake nette Total

Piece 6 8 10 10 20 54

% 11.2 14.8 18.5 18.5 37.0 100

Extrapolated to the 300 cannons estimated for 1526

Piece 33 45 55 55 112 300

Technical data and calculations:

Wgt.of cannon(t) 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.4

Carts 2 2 2 1 1

Horses 16 16 1 12 6 4

length of 40 40 25 25 20

Draft needs: cart+horses (m)

Min. length of column (km) 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.3 8.2

Weight of ball(kg) 12 12 6 3 1.5

Weight of powder/ 6 6 3 1.5 0.8

shot(kg)

Weight of 59.4 81.0 49.5 24.8 25.8 240.5

powder+ balls for 100 shots for each cannon (t)

On the basis of this calculation the artillery's column of march,without the carts and camels carrying ammunition,
but addingappropriate distance between carts (330 X 8m = ca. 2.5 km), can beassumed to have been 11-12 km.
A calculation of the total length of the army's column of march and the time required for their crossing the bridge
gives the following figures:
Table 6.
Length of Column of March and Time Required for Crossing
Time in hours
Length in km
Cavalry 100 20-22

Infantry 12-15 3-4

Artillery 10- 10-11 2-3

TOTAL 123-127 25-29

To these lengths and times for the crossing of the troops, we haveto add the train. The factors determining its size
are the weight ofthe ammunition, of food, and of forage. Five to six hundred cartswere needed to transport the
ammunition for the artillery and about300 carts to haul the cannons. While these numbers may appearexaggerated,
other fragmentary data enhance their probability. [61]
In computing the weight of the food transported we start from thefact that, similarly to European armies, the daily
ration of bread andrice of each soldier was 1 kg. Although we have found no relevantdata, we may take it for
granted that the logistics of food supplyamong the Turks was the same as with European armies. The grainmust have
been ground and stored in magazines erected well beforethe start of the campaign, while bread was baked on the
spot andbrought to the troops by cart or beasts of burden. It is also probablethat there were four daily distributions of
bread among the troops. Itmay be assumed, however, that a larger quantity had been accumulated for the crossing at
Eszek and the subsequent stages, becausethe swampy terrain cut the troops off from the supplies on board thebarges
on the Danube. Assuming the rations of bread in possessionof the troops to be sufficient for eight days, we may
calculate 1,200tons for the 150,000 soldiers.
Finally we must compute the necessary amount of forage. If thehorses were given forage cereal, their daily ration
would be 15 kg,but if they received only green fodder, they would need 25 kg. The number of riding horses and
draft animals can be conservativelyestimated at 200,000; hence the daily ration of forage must haveamounted to
3,000 tons. Since a supply of four days of forage wascollected each time, as was the practice in the European armies,
thetotal can be estimated at 12,000 tons. Although we do not haveprecise information pertaining to any of this, we
do know, for instance, that in 1526, 20 of the 77 days needed to cross the Balkanswere days of rest, and we may
assume that forage was collected oneach of those days. Süleyman's diary mentions foraging on twooccasions, each
time because the soldiers assigned to the detail wereattacked by the "Vlachs." [62]
All things considered, the weight to be transported included: 240tons of ammunition, 1,200 tons of food, 1>12,000
tons of forageadding up to a total of 11,300-13,400 tons. [63]
In summary, if we count 130 km for the troops and 17s230 km forthe train, the length of the column of the army as a
whole must havebeen 300430 km. A column of such length would have required6>70 hours to cross the bridge--a
figure that corresponds, by andlarge, to the reports from Ottoman sources about the time it took.
Contemporary data also support these estimates. Tomori's intelligence deserves particular attention since he was
well acquaintedwith the Ottoman army; moreover, his excellent reconnaissanceservice provided news regarding the
enemy from the moment itstarted to assemble at Adrianople. What seems confusing, primafacie, is that on one
occasion he gave the strength of the Ottomanforces as 300,000, at another time as 70,ooo.[64] If we look at
thematter more closely, however, both statements may be valid. WhenTomori was referring to 300,000 troops, he
was also including theirregulars of lesser combat value, the drivers, the leaders of thebeasts of burden, and the
servants. On the other hand, when he cited70,000, he must have been referring only to the soldiers provided bythe
timars and to the regulars of high combat value. Of course, thelower estimate was not entirely fair, because the
county nobles of the levy and the peasant soldiers in the Hungarian army did not fightany better than the Ottoman
irregulars. From the point of view ofpsychology, however, the underestimation of the forces of the enemywas in fact
appropriate at the moment of the report: just before thedecisive battle. Indeed, the news about 300,000 enemies had
elicitedan enormous consternation in the Hungarian war council, andthe knowledge of overwhelming superiority of
the foe would haveundermined the self-confidence of the army. I shall return to thismatter in some detail later.

Mobilization and Aufmarsch

[65]
The Ottoman system of mobilizing and moving troops across theBalkans (Aufmarsch) against Hungary evolved in
the fifteenth century and seems to have remained unchanged until the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699.
The decision in matters of war was made by the sultan, in agreement with the grand vezir. The details were defined
by the leadingofficials of the Ottoman state in the divan [divan-i humayun]. Therethe grand vezir, the two chief
justices of the army, the begler begs ofAnatolia and Rumelia and their treasurers (later, even the defterdars of Syria
and Egypt), the janissary agha representing the army,the kapudan basa or admiral of the sea representing the navy,
andthe secretary of state [the nisanci], discussed the methods of the war,primarily the mobilization, the financial and
other technical issues.The decision of the sultan, together with the measures enacted bythis council, were then borne
by "messengers swift as meteors," thechaus, to the four corners of the Empire, putting into motion thepowerful
military machinery of the Ottoman state.
I he order of mobilization specified first of all the task falling uponeach individual component of the army. The
army was divided intotwo parts: one to take part in the campaign and one to stay home.The military force of the
eyalets near the theater of operations, onthe one hand, and the professional forces garrisoned in the capital,on the
other, formed the army that went on the campaign. Thesoldiers from the eyalets far removed from the theater of
operationsremained at their home bases, yet they too were mobilized to fulfillborderguard duties and tasks
pertaining to internal order war-ranted by the state of war. At the moment of mobilization the coffers of the treasury
were filled, most likely to store money in case the wardid not come to a rapid end. Likewise special measures were
takenfor increased vigilance in Constantinople, a task entrusted to thekapudan basa who was also the begler beg for
Gallipoli.
The individual timar landowners received their orders for mobilization via the chain of begler begs, sanjak begs, and
alajbegs; they were then required to show up at the venue appointed for theassembly within one month. If the war
took place in Europe, thesoldiery from the eyalet of Rumelia usually met at Sofia, whereasthe troops from Anatolia
crossed the Bosporus at Gallipoli and joinedthe sultan at Adrianople. The sultan himself traveled from
Constantinople accompanied by the court, the janissaries, and the sipahis of the Porte.
At this time the beys of the akindjis also received their orders tomobilize, and the drafting process got underway.
Being troops fromthe border areas, the akindjis assembled at some border fortress,usually at Semendria. Instructions
were also issued to the azabsgarrisoning the individual castles summoning them to the venue forthe assembly, as
well as to the azabs and sailors stationed in otherparts of the Empire. The azabs of the castles in the sanjaks
ofSemendria, Zvornik, and Vidin, in or near the area of deployment forthe European campaigns, were always led
out, and, since they werethe ones to provide the crews for the Danubian fleet, they wereusually directed to wherever
the fleet was assembling.
Since the Danube was of decisive importance from a logisticalpoint of view, the formation of the Danubian fleet was
outlined inconsiderable detail. The majority of the naval units sailed from theirbases on the Black Sea, whereas the
barges, or at least some of them,were built in the months preceding the campaign in the sanjaksalong the Danube
and the Sava from the income of the hasslandowners in the area. There must have been important shipyardsat
Zvornik where up to 300 vessels were launched on certain occasions. Some of the artillery pieces were transported
from the arsenals in the capital by ship, while others were founded in the cannonfoundry at Uskub.
No matter which direction the war took on land, the naval fleetwas always placed on war-footing. The kapudans of
the fleets atAlexandria, Rhodes, Morea, and Valona were instructed to cruisethe Mediterranean and protect the
coasts of the Empire. [66] Once thearmy had assembled, a divan was held at Adrianople or in Sofia to discuss
operational matters. On these occasions the principal officers of the border areas had considerable influence, for it
was theirfunction to carry out reconnaissance of enemy territory; hence theywere expected to be well informed
about enemy forces, the terrain,and all other circumstances of military importance. At one of themore important
stations along the route a muster was held wherethe troops were inspected.
The march from Adrianople to Belgrade took 50 to 70 days andwas divided into stages. The columns of march were
highly segmented in order to avoid jams; hence they followed each other atseveral days, interval. Where the going
was difficult, as on thestretch between Philippopolis and Sofia, in the mountainous areabetween the Balkan and
Rhodope chains, one part of the army--usually the troops from the eyalet of Anatolia--turned off from themain road
leading through the narrows at Kapu Derbend and advanced towards Sofia along the valleys of Topolnica and
Slatica.Since the main line of the army's advance was the road from Constantinople to Nis and from there to
Belgrade, and the surroundingareas were its base for procuring provisions, the population in thisarea had to be
protected from the soldiers; hence, extremely strictdiscipline was maintained throughout. Soldiers who pillaged
fromthe inhabitants or spoiled the crops were severely punished. [67]

Provisions and Transport of Foodstuff

[68]
One of the most serious problems facing the campaigns conductedin this period was how to provide the armies with
sufficient food andforage. Under the existing level of agricultural development, andwith the low population density,
the armies could not count on theirsoldiers, horses, and draft animals being fed from local resources;the food had to
be secured even before the campaign was launched.Of course, locally available food--above all green forage--was
utilized, but staple items, primarily grain for bread, had to be broughtalong. All this implied extreme material
burdens, because transportation was difficult and expensive, given the poor roads and theprimitive technology. In
general, the cost of food and fodderamounted to 15 to 30% of all military expenses.
Simultaneously with the order to mobilize, the Ottoman government began to accumulate the food necessary for the
campaign. Theyseem to have intended to send the army into battle with at least twoto three months of food reserves.
[69] The Ottoman government organized transport with considerable foresight. Goods and equipmentwere carried
by ship, cart, and camelback. [70] Transport by water wasthe simplest and most economical. For this very reason,
the captureof Belgrade in 1521 was a significant achievement from the Ottomanpoint of view, since it enabled them
to navigate the river throughoutits length within Ottoman control. Until then the grain had to becollected in Sofia
and carried to Belgrade by camelback.
The rational approach of those in charge of the Turkish supplyservice, the arpa emini, is demonstrated by their
choice of the camelas mode of transport. It is a safe and economical mode, since thecamel is an extremely
undemanding animal, tough and well suitedto carry heavy loads. Moreover, it is much faster than the ox andcheaper
than the horse. The abovementioned 10,000 cartloads ofcereal could be transported by 30,000 camels. [71]
Usually a cart required a driver and four horses to pull it, whereasa single driver could take care of up to six camels.
By using camels,some 5,000 persons and 10,000 horses fewer were needed, not tomention the financial savings,
inasmuch as the price of one horse,while it did not equal that of a hundred camels, as Busbeque claims,was certainly
equal to that of a dozen. At the same time the choice ofthe camel was also very advantageous from the point of view
oftransport and marching technology. One animal could carry a load of200 kg, and since four to six camels could
travel side by side on anaverage road, for each kilometer of column 2-300 tons of freight canbe calculated, while
carts would have been able to carry no morethan 35 or 40 tons. Consequently the length of the train could bereduced
by more than 80%.

Strategy
[72]
The strategy applied depends on the relations of power, on spaceand time, but first and foremost, on the political
objective of the war.As these factors changed in the course of time, the Ottoman leadership resorted to different
strategies in its wars against the Hungarians. For the period from the fourteenth century, to the mid-
fifteenth,precisely until the peace of Adrianople (1568), three clearly distinctphases in Ottoman strategy can be
distinguished.
First Phase: from 1356 to 1453.
The occupation of Gallipoli in 1356 was a decisive event in thehistory of the Ottomans: they acquired a safe
crossover point toEurope. In the following years, the Turks occupied the Byzantinepossessions in Eastern Rumelia,
Thrace, and Eastern Macedonia,took the passes across the Balkan mountains, and, in 1383, set footin Bulgaria with
the occupation of Sofia. The occupied territories,designated as Rumelia, were attached to the Empire, and, as a
resultof the most thorough work of organization, they soon became, inSead-Eddin's words, "safety itself, and the
permanent abode of peaceof mind in harmony", where the sultan "was most mindful of maintaining religious peace
and organizing a Muslim state, as well as ofpreparing the fight to spread the faith."[73]
In the 1390s the Ottoman forces reached the line of the Danube, and, with the capture of Vidin, Nicopolis, Sistov,
and Silistra, established important bridgeheads for their advance into Wallachia. Inthis period they also took Uskub
in Serbia; the city became the seatof the sanjak. The Mongolian attack of 1402 put a temporary halt tothe expansion,
but it soon started up again with the capture ofGiuirgevo in 1416, of Saloniki in 1430, Janina in 1431, and
Krusevacin 1434. By the end of the period the borders of the Ottoman Empirein the Balkans ran along the Danube
as far upstream as Orsova.
The speed of conquest was spectacular. The bulk of the occupiedarea fell into Ottoman hands in less than a
generation, a significantachievement, even if we know that it was attained at the expense ofthe weak Byzantine
Empire and of a Bulgaria and Serbia undermined by internal strife. The systematic nature of the conquest wasreadily
apparent as well. To cite Johann Zinkeisen's simile, theacquisitions grew around Gallipoli like annual rings of a tree.
Itseems that each step forward was the consequence of careful andrational assessments giving equal weight to
political and strategicconsiderations. Except for Galamboc and Szendro the conquestsproved to be lasting during this
phase. The Turks undertook nounplanned ventures and, except for the raids designed to obtainbooty and
information, they engaged in no large-scale campaignsother than the siege of Belgrade in 1440.
From the strategic point of view the Ottoman state was in a betterposition than the Christian powers during this
phase. First of all, itslines of operation were much shorter, which gave them considerableadvantage in concentrating
troops and in logistics. In 1389 at thebattle of Kosovo the Ottoman armies were 200 km from their operational base,
Philippopolis, as the crow flies, whereas the Hungarianand Wallachian contingents of the Christian host were 400 to
600km from their home. The strategic superiority of the Ottoman forceswas enhanced by the fact that they stood on
the interior line vis-a-visEurope or Asia and the Balkan states. Being in the center, they hadlittle difficulty in
transferring forces from one trouble spot to another, whereas their adversaries were either unable to unite
theirforces--as in the case of Hungary or the principality of Karaman--orcould do so only by lengthy, exhausting,
and time-consumingmarches, as in the case of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia.
While its geographical position offered the Ottoman state considerable advantages already at this early stage, in the
fifteenth century, these advantages became even more marked and providedalmost total protection. The Ottomans
were able to halt all attacksat the borders, whereas the Christians had to negotiate long marches beyond their
frontiers. They had to move more than 400 to600 km to the battle of Nicopolis, the second Kosovo campaign,
orduring the ~long campaign,' of 1444; during the campaign of Varna,800 km. Under these circumstances, even if
the Christian forces hadscored a victory in one campaign or another, even if the Europeanpowers could have acted
jointly, it is still doubtful whether theycould have found the means to carry on a protracted war consistingof several
campaigns--on account of the extreme distances and thedifficulty of the terrain--and nothing short of such a war
could haveoverthrown the Ottoman Empire.
Partly because of the distance to the theater of operations, butmostly because of delays at the outset, the campaigns
of the Christian forces started in the fall and more than once dragged on into thewinter. This late start was due to the
slowly grinding mill of thefeudal administration and the need to await the harvest in order toprovide the troops with
food and fodder.
Already in this period the significance of the Danube as a meansof transport and communication was apparent. Even
though theHungarian fleet on the Danube was still superior to the Ottomanone, by 1440 the latter succeeded in
blockading the river at Belgradewith one hundred ships.
Before the capture of Constantinople the Ottoman Empire wasnever quite secure because its European and Asian
provinces wereseparated by the sea. The Ottoman fleet was still too weak toguarantee safe crossing from one
continent to the other. Even thefortification at Gallipoli could not fully compensate for this weakness. In contrast,
Christian fleets could easily sail into the Black Seaand bolster an army which, avoiding the cumbersome
mountainroutes of the Balkans, would have reached the coast. All this wastrue in theory only, however, because
under the given circumstancesthe maritime powers were unable to conclude an alliance amongthemselves and with a
continental power, namely Hungary, whichwould have enabled them to carry out combined military operations.In
1444 it did seem that such a fortunate conjuncture had comeabout, and this was the main reason for launching the
Varna campaign in the first place; but the fleet provided by the maritimepowers was not up to the task by a long
shot. It was unable toprevent the Ottoman army from crossing the straits, nor could itgive support to the Christian
forces at the decisive encounter.
Second Phase: from 1463 to 1521
The capture of Constantinople in 1453 was an epochal date for theOttoman Empire just as it was for all Europe. It
put an end to thegeographic division of the Empire and to the defence problems whichthis division entailed.
Constantinople itself was an ideal center foran empire which was soon to extend from the River Sava to the Nile.The
very position of the city granted considerable economic advantages: the master of the Bosporus controlled the
significant commerce in the Black Sea. No wonder that after the shock and consternation caused by the fall of
Byzantium, Venice was the first toconclude an economic agreement with the Porte.
From a military perspective Constantinople was an ideal capital.In addition to the fact that its capture unified the
Empire, the city,surrounded as it is by the sea on three sides, was very nearlyimpregnable. The only reason the
Byzantine Empire, moribund andcompletely unable to defend itself, survived as long as it did, was theexceptionally
advantageous strategic location of its capital.
Following the capture of Constantinople, the talented and dynamic Sultan Mehmet II, known in history as the
"World Conqueror", kept the machinery of the Ottoman state in high gear,adding huge areas to the Empire: Albania,
Greece, Serbia, Bosnia,and Karamania. But the machinery did not slow down even after hisdeath; Selim I extended
Ottoman power to Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. The economic, political, and military power of all otherstates
paled in comparison. The two most directly concerned andrelatively strongest powers, Venice and Hungary under
MatthiasCorvinus, were forced into the defensive.
The direction of Ottoman expansion in Europe became clearlyvisible: while Serbia and Bosnia were absorbed into
the Empire,Wallachia, the Tartar Khanate of Crimea, and eventually Moldaviawere merely converted into vassal
states. It is not clear why thesultan did not attack Hungary and why he gave up the idea ofadvancing in that direction
after his unsuccessful siege of Belgrade.Perhaps the mishap at Belgrade indicated that the Empire could notexpand
further until Serbia and Bosnia were transformed into asecure base of operations. After these two countries were
occupiedand converted into military bases, further expansion was hamperedby Ottoman involvement in the Near
East. Furthermore, the significant political and military power of Hungary under Matthias Corvinus no doubt had
something to do with this hesitation.
Recently Inalcik has expressed the view, very probably true, that Mehmet II was not in the least interested in
occupying Hungary andregarded the Danube and the Sava as the definitive boundary line ofhis Empire. [74] I
believe that Mehmet's objective was merely to convert the Balkans into an organic part of the Empire, which
naturallyled him to strive to limit Hungarian and Venetian influence in thearea. From this perspective the siege of
Belgrade in 1456 cannot beregarded as the first stage of a grand design on Hungary; it wasmeant merely to deprive
the Hungarians of this essential base forattacks against the Balkans. At the same time, the fortress was alsothe most
appropriate base for attacks against Hungary: its lossrendered the country altogether defenseless. Whatever the case,
onething was certain: the balance of power had tipped definitely in favorof the Ottomans; to expel them from
Europe had now become ahopeless endeavor. This realization determined the policies of theEuropean powers. Even
Matthias gave up the concept of a great waragainst the Turks because he felt his own strength insufficient andhe
could hardly count on outside help.
A memorandum addressed by Pope Leo X to the European powersillustrates well the impossibility of a great
European cooperativewar aimed at the expulsion of the Ottomans. [75] It is worth dealingwith this text in some
detail, for it contains much more militaryrealism than the fantastic projects put forth time and again in thisperiod.
The memorandum also sheds light on the political difficultieswhich needed to be overcome in order to launch such a
majorundertaking. The pope raised several questions: Should a war belaunched against the Turks? If yes, should it
be an offensive or adefensive war? What were the obstacles to the war and how couldthese be overcome? Should all
rulers participate, or only some--andwho would those be? By what means and modes should the war bewaged?
The answer to the first question was a definite yes. According tothe authors of the memorandum there was no doubt
regarding thesecond question either: the war had to be an offensive one. The thirdquestion raised the greatest
number of problems, because the primeobstacle to the war was the disharmony and jealousy among theChristian
countries. A general peace, or at least an armistice, wouldhave to be declared, and the sources of disagreement
would have tobe entrusted to arbitration by the pope and the college of cardinals.It would be most advisable to bring
about a Holy Alliance, the members of which would obligate themselves to intervene againstthose who disturbed the
peace. The answer to the fourth questionwas that the emperor and the king of France should bear the majorpart of
the burdens of war, and all other rulers should participate inthe joint effort in an appropriate manner.
The bulk of the memorandum was taken up with a discussion ofthe means and manner of conducting the hostilities.
Most importantwas to raise adequate funds. Eight hundred thousand ducats wouldbe needed, and its provision was
regarded by the authors withsomewhat excessive optimism: one part of the sum would come fromthe personal
income of the rulers, another part from the nobility andthe clergy, and a third part from the commoners. One third of
themoney would be earmarked for fielding and equipping the army,two-thirds for its upkeep. As regards the army
itself, 60,000 infantry, 4,000 heavy cavalry, and 12,000 light cavalry would be required.The infantry would be
supplied by Switzerland, Germany, Spain,and Bohemia, the heavy cavalry by France and Italy, the lightcavalry by
Spain, Italy, Albania, and Greece. Venice, Naples, Genoa,France, Portugal and Spain would contribute to the fleet.
Since theOttomans had 300 warships, the Christian states would need atleast 150.
The authors of the memorandum believed that results could onlybe obtained by forces operating under a joint
command; dissipationof the forces must be prevented at all cost. The direction and objective of the attack would be
Constantinople. Three routes of deployment came under consideration: through Hungary along the Danube, along
the coasts of Dalmatia and Illyria, or from Italy toGreece by sea, then on foot along the coast, through Macedonia,
toConstantinople It would be advisable if Hungary and Poland undertook diversionary attacks against the border
provinces of the Ottoman state while the army was marching on Constantinople. Finally,the memorandum
mentioned the issue of the division of the reconquered territories, but stopped short of making specific
recommendations, entrusting the solution to meetings following the hostilities.
The project met with cool reception at the courts of Europe. Theking of France replied after almost a year's silence,
and even thenonly at the prompting of the pope. In his reply he greeted the planwith enthusiasm, yet he essential]y
rejected it. In particular, heexpressed doubts about the financial aspects. He felt it would beentirely hopeless to
extort money from the people because they nolonger trusted their governments: they had been fooled by
referencesto a campaign against the Turk on so many previous occasions. Nor was the king in favor of using the
forces jointly because, according tohim, this would inevitably lead to rivalry between the nations.
The emperor took even longer to answer. Then the reply wasprepared with typical German thoroughness; it included
what practically amounted to a counter-proposal. This proposal was motivatedprimarily by envy of the king of
France. The emperor proposed thatthe English and French rulers be omitted from the venture, at leastin the first
year, because they would need all that time to cope withthe unrest provoked by the proclamation of the war-tax. His
ownplan was just the opposite of the one the pope had suggested andconsidered primarily the interests of the Holy
Roman Empire. Rather than a one-time blow, he proposed the division of the war intofour campaigns with the
following objectives: in the first year thereconquest of the lands held by the Ottoman Empire in Africa andSyria; in
the second year the recovery of its holdings in Europe; inthe third year the siege of Constantinople; in the fourth
year theoccupation of the Asian territories.
All this demonstrates how impossible it was, already at that time,to block the expansion of the Ottoman Empire and
consequently howinevitable was the fall of Hungary in the following period.
Third Phase: from the Capture of Belgrade e to the Peace of Adrianople, 1521-1568.
The capture of Belgrade was in every way a prerequisite for thedecisive Ottoman attack against Hungary, since the
army could nothave by-passed such a powerful fortress. Furthermore, the fall of thecastle entailed the collapse of the
system of fortifications along thesouthern border of Hungary, as a result of which the country becamepractically
defenseless. [76]
Considering that the fall of medieval Hungary, the main subject ofthis book, was the central event in this period,
Ottoman strategy andits relationship to politics will be discussed in some detail in subsequent chapters. Therefore,
only, a few theoretical issues should beraised here, as a background for the strategic decisions of thisperiod.
On the relationship between politics and war we should readClausewitz. It was he who established the maxim that
"war is...acontinuation of political activity by other means. The political objectis the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and means can never beconsidered in isolation from their purpose." [77] There can be no doubtthat the
Ottoman leadership acted according to this principle. Thegreat wars, normally led by the sultan in person, were
alwayslaunched for the sake of well defined political objectives. Of course,the troops in the border provinces carried
out steady forays into theneighboring lands to obtain booty, but even in these political objectives were not entirely
absent: the exhaustion of the adversary, byforcing him to military, hence economic efforts, which tired him tothe
point at which he became unable to defend himself. This wasexactly what happened in the case of Hungary, as we
shall see inmore detail.
We may also detect in the application of Ottoman military strategy those propositions which, according to
Clausewitz, form thescientific foundation for the art of war. Thus it can be asserted thatOttoman military leaders
knew that "defense is the stronger form offighting with negative purpose, attack the weaker form with thenegative
purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones,so that strategic results can be traced back to certain
centers ofgravity." [78] While the Turks did not put all this in writing--nor didthe Europeans, for that matter, before
Clausewitz--from a survey ofthe episodes of individual wars and campaigns we may conclude thatthey did follow
these principles in practice. As regards specific strategic planning, the. Ottoman leadership, as I have argued earlier,
made their decisions on the basis of accurate information. Theytook good care to assess the principal factors--force,
space andtime--correctly. It seems that in all cases they had an accuratepicture of the military strength and potential
of the army of theiradversary. They also had fair knowledge of the battlegrounds thatmight come into consideration.
Finally, they usually timed theiraction well, and knew well how to make time their ally.
The strategic leadership techniques of the Ottomans were quitesophisticated, enabling them to carry out victorious
campaigns intheaters of operation as far removed from the center of the Empire asPersia, Egypt, or Hungary. No
army in Europe at this time couldhave done the same. Such distant campaigns required, of course,precise yet
flexible coordination of military and logistical operations,the prerequisite for which was their outstanding logistical
servicedescribed above. The Ottoman military leaders were masters of theart of moving large masses to the area of
concentration and to thetheater of war. We have seen how painstakingly they organized themarch of their army
across the Balkans. Their numerous cavalrywas likewise directed with considerable ease, before and during
thebattle, to the side or the rear of the foe.
We can obtain a clear outline of the dynamics and structure of theHungarian wars from the more important Ottoman
campaigns ofthis period, as well as of the range beyond which they could notextend themselves. It seems that it was
precisely in Hungary thatthe sphere of the Ottoman machinery of conquest reached its outerlimit; the frontiers in the
process of definition at this time did notvary essentially until the Ottoman collapse in the late seventeenthcentury.
The capture of Eger (1596), Kanizsa (1600), Varad (1660),and Ersekujvar (1663) in the following period, albeit
significantadditions, amounted to an extension of conquests in width withoutreally transcending the radius of
operation.
It was this radius that explains why the Ottomans waged onlylimited warfare against Hungary. [79] The restrictions
on the military
objective in turn entailed a reduction of the political objective,namely, the initial delay of conquering Hungary. It is
precisely thisself-control, and the description of the considerations which finallyled Suleyman to launch an all-out
war against Hungary that constitutes the subject matter of this book. The radius of effective action,the significance
of which exceeds the merely military aspects, deserves treatment in some detail.
The radius or range of action is the limit of operation of an army,determined by its speed of advance, the logistical
service, as well asthe time allotted to the campaign. In the early modern period armieswere able to march an average
of 20 km a day. Since, however, thetroops and the draft animals required rest periods, and time for thedistribution of
food and foraging, it was necessary to halt everyfourth or fifth day; hence the average length of march was no
morethan 15 km a day. Because of the difficulties of transport, foodsupplies, and quartering, the campaigns seldom
continued into thewinter; the campaigning season stretched from spring to fall. If wetake 180 days and multiply this
number by the number of kilometersadvanced by the troops, we obtain 2,700 km, the radius of the army'soperation.
If, however, the army had to return to its own countrybefore the coming of winter, as was usually the case, then the
radiusof action is half of that, that is, 1,350 km. But even this distance isexcessive since we have counted only the
days of actual advance,disregarding the days spent on maneuvers and fighting battles. Aminimum of 30 days had to
be allotted for such purposes, whichmeans that we have to deduct 30 X 15 = 450 km from the total. Thereremains
approximately 950 km.
Obviously, exceeding this distance would be most risky, because ifthe decisive battle did not take place within the
aforementioned 30days then the army would have to return without accomplishing itstask, to avoid the onset of
winter. If an open and decisive battle didtake place late in this time-span, no matter what the outcome, thearmy
would have been in a difficult position. If victorious, it couldnot exploit its victory, being unable to pursue the
enemy beyond itsrange. If defeated, it would be threatened with almost complete *annihilation, since it would have
to cover considerable ground to finda haven within its own boundaries, while demoralized and with theenemy at its
heels. The logistical difficulties increased in proportionto the distance.
Let us apply these considerations to the Turkish-Hungarian wars.n begin with, it should be noted first, that the
Ottomans wereunable to take the entire country; had they been able to occupy it,there can be no doubt that they
would have done so. Second, once thecampaign season was over, only part of the Turkish forces spent thewinter in
Hungary, for two reasons: (1) it was impossible to find food,forage, and lodging for such a large mass of people
during the wintermonths; and (2) as landowners and administrators the timar landowners could not be absent from
their residence over such a longperiod. Finally, it is obvious that while the Ottoman Turks could notannex or absorb
Hungary, neither could they allow the Habsburgs totake over--hence they did have to occupy as much of the land as
possible. [80]
The occupied zone had to include Buda because of its strategicsignificance. The possession of Buda was essential to
the OttomanEmpire for three reasons: it enabled them to control the Danube; itprevented the Habsburgs from
launching an attack against theEmpire along the Danube; and, being midway between Vienna and Transylvania, it
was an obstacle to Habsburg designs on the latter.But no matter what advantages the Ottoman forces may
havederived from possessing Buda these could not make up for theoverwhelming disadvantage of being beyond
their range of effectiveness and lying far closer to Vienna than to Constantinople. Thedistance of Vienna-Buda is
240 km, which can be covered in 16 days,march; Constantinople-Buda is, however, 1,460 km, 97 days' march(of
which Belgrade-Buda is about a third, 460 km, 31 days, march).From these figures it follows that holding on to
Buda was almost amatter of accident for the Turks. No fortification can withstand asiege beyond a certain period if
relief does not arrive. It was highlyunlikely that an Ottoman relief army would be able to reach Buda intime.
Assuming they set off at the same time, the Habsburg forceswere hardly more than two weeks away, the Ottomans
more thanthree months. The imperial forces would have had about 80 days tocarry out their siege which, under
normal circumstances, would bemore than sufficient to take the castle.
The reasons why the Ottoman Turks were able to hold on to Budafor a century and a half--and, with it the central
portions of thecountry, in spite of unfavorable strategic conditions--were notstrictly military Rather, it was the fact
that under the prevailingeconomic, social, and political conditions the Habsburg provincesand the Holy Roman
Empire could not field an army powerfulenough to challenge the Turks, nor was it possible for them to beginthe
campaign in the spring or early summer early enough to initiateand to complete the siege before the arrival of the
Ottoman reliefforce. When, however, these conditions changed, the situation of theOttomans in Hungary became
untenable.
A survey of the sieges undertaken in the period of the Ottomandomination provides clear evidence for the foregoing.
The Christianforces besieged Buda seven times in vain: in 1530, 1540, 1541, 1598,1602, 1603, and 168-not
counting 1542, when their campaignbogged down as early as the siege of Pest, across the river. Thus thesiege was
attempted eight times, but only twice, in 1541 and 1684,were the assailants able to initiate the siege in May or July;
sixtimes they reached Buda as late as September or October. Evenwhen the siege was launched early enough it still
had to be abandoned because of inadequate preparations and organization; whenthey started in autumn the besiegers
were turned away either by theappearance of the relief expedition or by the coming of bad weather.
Buda was recaptured only in 1686. On this occasion the Austrian,Hungarian, and Imperial forces reached Pest or
Buda on June 17
and 18 and launched the siege in a matter of days. The Ottomanrelief expedition showed up near the castle only on
August 13, thatis, on the 57th day of the siege, but did not venture to attack thebesieging Christian forces. The castle
fell on September 2, on the77th day. Had the Christian host not delayed its departure, butstarted off in May, it could
have embarked on the siege a monthearlier and completed it even before the arrival of the relief force.After the fall
of Buda the theater of operations shifted to the southern regions of the country; in spite of repeated efforts, the
Ottomanswere unable to recapture Buda, or even to get near it. Once the castlewas lost, the Turkish army was no
longer able to confront theChristian forces in pitched battle. It was forced out of Hungary aftera further series of
defeats.
From that time on, however, the law of range of effective actionworked against the Christians. The overly extended
supply line puta brake on military operations and made it practically impossible forthe Christians to operate beyond
the River Sava. Their main objective was to capture and hold Belgrade, but in this they failed.

Tactics
[81]
At the time of the occupation of Gallipoli the nomadic tacticsfamiliar from warfare on the steppes still prevailed in
the Ottomanarmy. It is hard to say whether these tactics were the same as thoseused by the Huns and Mongols. On
the basis of logic and sparse data,it seems, however, that the Turks used a degenerate, no longereffective version of
nomadic warfare. It may also be assumed that, asa result of the change in the mode of production and the
introductionof feudal arrangements, this kind of warfare lost its economic andsocial base. Two facts support this
assumption. The formation of thebody of janissaries was to complement the easily panicked mass oflight cavalry
which was predominant in the classical form of nomadic warfare. The janissaries provided a solid, unshakable
nucleuswhich the classical application of nomadic warfare did not require.Furthermore, barely half a century after
the capture of Gallipoli in1402, the masters of nomadic warfare, the Mongols, administeredthe Ottoman army a
crushing defeat. The process must have beensimilar to the one experienced by the Hungarians after they settledin the
Carpathian basin. When they abandoned nomadic animal husbandry and adopted settled agriculture, the framework
and organization of the feudal Hungarian state evolved, including, ofcourse, radical transformations of warfare as
well. And they, too,were beaten by the Mongols some two to three centuries after thesetransformations.
Nevertheless, Ottoman tactics were generally superior to thetactics employed by the European knights in the
fourteenth andfifteenth centuries. The speed of their light cavalry, their mobility,as well as the solidity of leadership
deriving from strict disciplineand a despotic administration gave the Ottomans decisive superiority in tactical
maneuvering over the individualistic, undisciplined,hence almost unmanageable knights, incapable of varying
theirbattle formation. It followed that enveloping and turning attacks, aswell as feints and ambushes, acquired a
decisive importance inOttoman fighting. At the same time the unshakable stonewall of thejanissaries provided much
security to the continuously milling, nowattacking, now retreating, mass of cavalry which was inclined topanic
precisely because of its loose style of fighting.
It would seem, then, that these tactics left nothing to be desired;taking a closer look, however, one may discover
weaknesses which,though covered up by the strong points, eventually spelled catastrophe. First of all, the combat
formation did not have a closed, massive,thrusting nucleus capable of shock attacks, like that of the armoredknights
in European armies. The light cavalry was not fit for shock;it could do no more than harass, tire out, and finally
disperse theenemy on the verge of disintegration. A closed attack could havebeen the task of the janissaries, but they
were reserved for defense.Yet the defensive attitude of the janissaries was no solution to thedefense of the army as a
whole either, because the light cavalry wasby its very nature entirely useless for defense. To use a simile,
theOttoman combat formation was like a castle where the janissariesrepresented the citadel that makes a last stand
possible, but whichhas no bastions, curtines, or forward positions. The Ottoman troopswere never able to withstand
the assault of the armored knights.But, since the western cavalry was unable to carry out any othermaneuver, they
could not exploit their initial success in battle. Howeffective the assault of the Christian cavalry was and how
defenseless the Ottoman army facing it becomes obvious not only fromthe course of specific battles, as
reconstructed from the sources, butalso from the candid admissions of Turkish historians regarding thefear which
seized the Ottoman troops in the face of the massive cavalry assault. [82] Ottoman military leaders, recognizing the
dangerof the assaults by armored knights, attempted to break up the solidranks of the Christian forces. One means
employed was the archercavalry, which sent a shower of arrows on the enemy from all sides.Another, even more
effective device was suddenly to open up theranks, so that the shock assault would hit nothing but air. [83]
The balance was somewhat restored when with the passing offeudalism the \Western armored cavalry began to
decline and theknights could not well withstand the fire of the janissaries who, inthe meantime, had acquired
muskets. But then, the fighting potential of the timariot sipahis and their ability for maneuvers derivingfrom
nomadic tactics and requiring quick, precise execution, greatdiscipline, and thorough training, decreased as well.
Mercenarytroops might have offered an alternative, as they had in Europewhere they became a concomitant of the
new tactics that developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. [84] There are indications thatthe Ottoman leaders
were well aware of their army's tactical inferiority, and this was probably the explanation for the enormous increase
in the number of professional soldiers in the seventeenthcentury. [85] Yet this could only be a partial solution as
long as thetimariots remained a substantial proportion of the military setupwhile, in the rest of Europe, the role and
significance of the feudalforces dwindled drastically after the evolution of a standing army ofregular soldiers. But
social and political considerations seem to haveprecluded a thorough reform abolition of the timar system. [86]
The great transformations that changed military art in earlymodern Europe did not affect Ottoman tactics and
military organization. The synchronization of the various services and the mutuallycomplementing utilization of
shock and firepower, typical for thisrevolution, were never assimilated by the Ottoman army. Theyonly avoided
catastrophe because of the strategic deadlock whichcharacterized the wars between Austria and the Ottoman
Empireafter the fall of Hungary, when no more pitched battles were fought.
CHAPTER III
HUNGARYS MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE
JAGELLONIAN PERIOD
Since very little detailed information is available on the militaryconditions of Hungary in the decades preceding
Mohacs, the picturepresented in this chapter cannot but remain sketchy. Yet, I hope,this outline will reveal the
blatant disproportion between Turkishand Hungarian forces, as well as point to issues that demand
furtherinvestigation.

The Economic Background

[87]
while the Hungarian nobility has often been accused of squandering the wealth of the country in the Jagellonian
period, thus undermining its defense, [88] there is good reason to believe that Hungary'sfinances had hit rock bottom
immediately after the death of KingMatthias. Such a sudden economic depression suggests that theroots of the
malady reached much further back in time.
Economic historians have characterized the cause of the economicdownturn by the paradox formulated by Oszkar
Paulinyi, the leading historian of Hungary's mining and minting: "rich land--poorcountry." [89] Indeed, medieval
Hungary had plenty of almost everything, not only agricultural produce. From the point of view ofnational wealth,
abundant agrarian production is, of course, a valuein itself, but it does entail the risk of having to pay for
importedindustrial commodities with animals, wine, and grain on the foreignmarkets. Given the same investment in
labor the value of industrialproducts is generally higher; hence the balance of payments of acountry relying on
agrarian exports alone may easily become unfavorable. Furthermore, foreign-made manufactured goods
representdangerous and even harmful competition for the fledgling industryof a country, to the detriment of its
industrial and urban development.
This was the case in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Hungary. Yet the real trouble was, surprising as it may sound,
thecounty's enormous wealth in precious metals, above all gold. Inmedieval Europe an increasing amount of
precious metal was required to supply means of exchange for the expanding internationalcommerce; hence demand
for Hungarian gold and silver kept growing. Consequently, the balance of trade and payment, unfavorable tobegin
with because of the large share of agricultural products in thecountry's export, became even less favorable, for
Hungary was ableto obtain more and more manufactures in exchange for her preciousmetals.
As a result of this unfavorable balance of trade the development ofcities and of the urban population slowed down
considerably and,according to some historians, stopped altogether. The details of thisprocess in the western and
northern regions of the country are fairlywell known; some growth seems to have taken place in the centralareas, but
its nature and extent are not quite clear yet. In any case,in comparison with the prosperity of European cities, the
poverty ofHungarian towns is striking. In the mid-sixteenth century thewealth of the 160 richest citizens of
Augsburg amounted to almosthalf a million gold florins, those of Nordlingen to 300,000 florins.Towards the end of
the fifteenth century, the annual income of citieslike Florence, Milan, or Naples was between 300,000 and
600,000gold ducats; that of Venice reached the million. In contrast, thewealth of Selmecbanya, Kormocbanya, and
Besztercebanya, thethree leading mining towns of northern Hungary, amounted to atotal of no more than 80,000
gold florins in the mid-sixteenth century. [90] These examples intend to illustrate the well-known fact thatcapital
wealth in the Hungarian urban economy was incomparablysmaller than that of western burghers. The cash reserves
of thepeasantry and of the nobility, who derived their income from agriculture, were even more limited. For
instance, the annual income of theprimate of Hungary, the archbishop of Esztergom, who, ownedwhole counties of
the kingdom, was around 35,000 gold florins in the1520s, that of the archbishop of Kalocsa between 20,000 and
22,000florins, while the wealth of the richest bishops did not exceed 10,000to 25,000 florins. [91] The sums
reported to have been left behind at thedeath of some prelates may have seemed fabulous, yet these sumsremained
dead treasures because of limited commerce and credit.
The nobility, including the aristocracy, had to struggle constantlywith shortage of money and could cover
extraordinary expenses onlyby short-term loans or by mortgaging their estates. It is typical, forexample, that when
Werboczy, chief justice of the realm and wellknown for his great landed acquisitions, was to go on a missionabroad,
he had to take out a loan to be able to represent the countryin a proper manner. [92] Indeed, the land of Hungary was
rich, but thecountry remained poor.
This poverty, deriving from the inner springs of the economy, wasexacerbated by the extreme burden of the Turkish
wars--a burdenthe inhabitants of western European countries could not even imagine. Of course, war was not an
inexpensive enterprise even amongwestern countries, but they were not subjected to constant warfarealong their
borders in times of peace, nor had to fear that theirneighbor would invade without cause or prior declaration of
war,cause havoc, enslave hundreds of thousands of human beings, andwithdraw loaded with booty. From the
moment the Ottoman Turksappeared at the border, the Hungarian state had to build andmaintain castles at
tremendous expense along a 2,000 km longfrontier, garrison them, and keep additional troops to supplementtheir
permanent defense by a mobile force. According to very approximate calculations, the annual expenditure for
maintaining theborder defense accounted for almost the entire regular income of thekingdom. If the expenses of a
year appear as anything below thisamount, this meant that the garrisons were not paid and the upkeepof the castles
was neglected. [93]
It seems that as a result of the two processes of impoverishmentdescribed above Hungary's economy collapsed in the
Jagellonianperiod. From the point of view of defense, the consequences wherecatastrophic. To begin with, the
military reforms initiated by Matthias Corvinus [94] had to be given up, which meant that the Hungarianmilitary
could not keep pace with the European development. Thesereforms would have required considerable funds, and the
state couldhave obtained these funds only from a flourishing urban society.King Matthias financed his standing
army not from funds suppliedby the Hungarian cities, but from tributes paid by the conqueredprovinces and from the
unprecedented heavy taxes imposed on thepeasantry. After his death it had become impossible to retain astanding
army, but, since the Ottoman threat did not go away and defense could not be neglected, a quick solution had to be
found: thereintroduction of the old feudal arrangements. This solution, how-ever, only increased the power of the
aristocracy at the expense ofthe crown's authority, which, in turn, weakened coordinated defenseefforts and the
central command.

The Army
[95]
Feudal military arrangements do not in themselves preclude thepossibility of fielding professional troops as well.
Indeed, the basicdifference between the armies of Matthias Corvinus and those of hisJagiello successors was not in
their composition but in the fact thatthe former were solely under the control of the crown, while thelatter were
maintained mostly by the aristocracy. Professionalscould serve in the regular standing troops or as soldiers hired at
timeof great wars; they could be Magyars, non-Magyars from Hungary,or foreigners. In terms of social background
they were also quite amix: nobles and peasants, townsmen and marginalized vagrantscould all be found in their
ranks.
The two major sections of the army were the standing troops andthe forces mobilized for campaigns:
I. Troops permanently under the banners; mostly stationed at thefrontier castles or in border areas.
a. The royal banderium. Of its 1000 men, 600 served along theborders.
b. Banderia of the barons. The troops provided by the voivode ofTransylvania, the ban of Croatia, the comes of the
Szekely, andof Temes; 1600 all told.
c. Garrisons of the frontier castles. Some 6-10,000 troops.
d. Mercenaries hired by the towns in the vicinity of the borders andserving in the castles; their numbers are
unknown.
e. Sailors of the river flotilla. Their strength is unknown. At thetime of King Matthias they numbered 10,000 but a
record from1523 has merely 1,000.
f. The light cavalry of the Rac, that is, the Serbian hussars--soldiers who had fled from the Ottomans and served in
Hungary.
II. Troops mobilized in times of war. Most could be deployed withinthe country only.
a. The banderia of the queen, the prelates, and the barons. Theireffectives were 14-15,000.
b. Soldiers provided by the towns, from 10 to 100 per town; theirtotal strength is unknown.
c. Regulars from the counties. Their total number is also unknown.
d. Troops provided by the nations enjoying special status. TheJaszok, the Cumans, the Szekely, and the Vlach,
numbering4-5,000.
e. The noble levy. An army composed of those noblemen who did notserve as regulars at the court or under some
lord. They numbered 20-25,000.
f. Local levy (militia portalis). Soldiers supplied and equipped bylandowners. The rate of expected service varied
from district todistrict; the southern counties, closer to the Turkish threat,usually provided a larger number of such
soldiers. The militiawas levied according to servile holdings (porta), and since at thistime there were some 250,000
plots, with a rate between 3% and10%, the number of this militia must have been around 10-18,000.
In case of general mobilization the army could be complementedby mass levy and foreign mercenaries. The mass
levy was raisedonly in extreme danger and could include all men of arms-bearingage. The high ratio of Hungarian
cavalry in the armed forces,particularly the light cavalry, had to be balanced by foreign mercenaries with heavy
equipment; since their numbers depended onfunds available, there could not have been very many of them.
Thus, according to very rough estimates, the effectives of the armyin case of war might have been as follows:
I.Standing troops:
Banderia: 2,660

Garrisons of frontier castles: 6-8,000 (?)

Regulars from the towns: 500 (?)

Sailors of the river flotilla: 1,000

Rac hussars: 2-5,000

Total: 12-17,000

II. Mobilized troops:

Banderia: 14-15,000

Professionals from the towns: 1,000

Professionals from the counties: 5,000

Special troops furnished by Cumans, etc.: 4-5,000

Noble levy: 20-25,000

Local levy: 10-18,000

Total: 60-80,000 [96]

III.Foreign Mercenaries: 10,000 (?)

IV. Mass levy: 60-70,000

Total: 70-90,000

Grand Total: 142-177,000

These numbers were, however, valid only under optimal circumstances, for the deteriorating economic conditions
and the steadyshortage of funds never allowed for this many troops. The size of theforces for a decisive battle was
limited by further circumstances.First, one must deduct the garrisons of the castles far removed fromthe actual
theater of operations, since they had to remain at theirpost even at time of general mobilization. Far more
constricting was the fact that the Ottomans could invade the country from anywherebetween Transylvania and the
Adriatic Sea; hence the forces fromthe outlying flanks could not be united with those from centralHungary until the
line of Turkish attack became clear. Since theOttomans could not do without the Danube as their main line ofsupply
and reinforcement, the probability of an attack from thedirection of Belgrade was high, but no one could be sure of it
until themain forces actually arrived there. Even then the danger remainedthat smaller contingents might be diverted
to attack Croatia orTransylvania to tie up at least parts of the forces in these provinces.On the other hand, if the
Hungarian government reached a decisionon where to concentrate its forces only after the Ottoman army
hadassembled at Belgrade and its intention of attacking Buda becameobvious, it was already too late to assemble all
forces somewhere near Tolna because the distance between Belgrade and Tolna wasmuch less than that between
Tolna and Transylvania or Croatia (ascan be seen on Map 2).
There were other problems with regard to mobilization and recruitment. The fairly limited military worth of the
noble levy isevident from a plethora of sources, and the leaders of the countrywere well aware of it. Hence on
several occasions the idea came upthat the nobles should pay a tax, in lieu of serving personally, andregulars be
hired. Although such a measure was never actuallyintroduced, the question does arise: what would taxing the
nobilityhave entailed, and to what extent would it have enhanced themilitary might of the country? The question is
all the more legitimate since Hungarian historians are inclined to find the panacea forall the country's problems in
the taxation of the nobility. What wasthe financial potential of the nobility? Since this issue has neverbeen explored
by Hungarian historians the best I can do is to makesome very vague estimates.
That agricultural production is less profitable than manufactureand commerce is true even in our days and more so
in times whentrade in grain and cattle was limited by poor transportation. Eventhough the percentage of the nobility
exceeded that of the burghersin the population of early sixteenth-centuly Hungary, the bulk of itsrevenues came
from agriculture; hence its income could scarcelyhave exceeded that of the cities. Still, let us assume that the
incomeof the two classes was equivalent--although it is likely that theincome of the urban sector was higher--and
make an estimate onthis basis. According to the annual budget of the kingdom under thetreasurers Elek Thurzo and
Pal Varadi, in 1523 the taxes of thetowns, the Saxons, and the Jews amounted to approximately 30,000florins. [97]
Following our earlier hypothesis, taxes that might havebeen collected from the nobility would have been at most of a
similarorder of magnitude. Thus, with an additional 30,000 florins, 1250regulars could have been hired for a whole
year, or 2500 for a half ayear. While there can be no doubt that these mercenaries wouldhave been, militarily
speaking, more valuable than the 12-14,000men of the noble levy, it is also certain that they--and by implication,
therefore, a hypothetical taxing of the nobility--would not havesolved the problem of the country's defense.
The other issue is that of the local levies, the militia portalis. Fora long time historians believed that these levies,
first decreed underKing Sigismund, had never been used, primarily because the rulingclass feared an armed
peasantry. Most recent research, however,has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that such levies
didfunction and often included peasants. [98] It is worth noting that whilein 1514, after the great rural uprising of
that year, the completedisarming of the peasantry had been decreed, a series of subsequentnational diets did in fact
call the peasants to arms.
It is difficult to determine the combat value of this local or peasantmilitia. More likely it was higher than that of the
noble levy; we cangather that much from the fact that diets considered using thembeyond the borders of the country,
which was not even mentionedregarding the noble levy. Yet we may argue, as a matter of logic, thatit was futile to
expect resounding military feats from these peasantsoldiers, for they were summoned on the spur of the moment
from their ploughs and could not have been up to the task of seriousfighting for lack of equipment and training. And
would the doubtfulmilitary contribution of the peasantry make up for the loss of theirabsence from production? The
contemporaries disagree on this scorewhich, essentially, is the debate between proponents of national usmercenary
armies. The enthusiastic dilettantes, with Machiavelliin the lead, observing the unruly, rootless mercenaries,
alwaysready to commit atrocities against civilians, advocated a nationalarmy in which all classes would serve. [99]
On the other hand, thespecialists, the technicians experienced in matters of war, emphasized the expertise of the
mercenaries and proposed a simple remedy: regular pay. The prescription was simple medicine, yet therewere not
many states which had the money to follow it. Hence therewere incessant complaints about the paid soldiery, even if
theirmilitary worth was obvious enough and even if they were everywhere preferred to soldier-peasants or to a
national army in general.Technically speaking, of course, mercenaries were the true carriersof military progress,
responsible for every innovation in the art ofwarfare. In late medieval Hungary the diet was in charge of
proclaimingmobilization but we know little about its procedure. It can be assumed that the banderia were mobilized
by those who provided andequipped them and were led by them to the point of assembly. As faras the noble levy,
the soldiers from the towns, and the local orpeasant militia were concerned, their organization was in the handsof the
county and municipal authorities. Mobilization took place onthe basis of rolls which included information regarding
the financialcondition of the nobles and of the towns and the numbers of servileplots. Most likely, the ordinances of
the diet which prohibited serfsfrom moving or from being moved by force from their village afterthe census was
taken were meant to ensure smooth recruitment incase of war. The troops from the counties and the local
militiamarched to battle under appointed captains.
The field army was headed by a commander-in-chief appointed bythe king. A military council was attached to assist
the commander.thus some sort of general staff came into being. Concurrently withmobilization the diet ordered the
placing of the castles on warfooting and the acquisition of war materials; regulated the circulation of money with an
eye to paying the soldiers in good currency; *prohibited the export of agricultural products in order to facilitatethe
provisioning of troops; and took measures to stock food andfodder for the campaign. [100] We have already
mentioned that theconstant lack of funds hampered the country's defense. In the Jagellonian period Hungary was
unable to wage war from her ownresources. The country had to rely on foreign aid, which was provided mainly by
the papacy and the Venetians. This dependence hadserious consequences. Preparations for war require time;
therefore,the Hungarian government would have preferred to obtain the fundslong before hostilities broke out. But
since it was not possible toknow in advance the exact intentions of the Ottomans, the popes anddoges usually paid
only when the war seemed a matter of certainty,for they suspected that the Hungarians would spend the
moneywhether war broke out or not. In his final report for 1523, LorenzoOrio, the Venetian ambassador, wrote that
the papal nuncio hadbrought:
50,000 ducats with him, to use for fielding an army against the Turksand in defense of Hungary.... When he reached
Buda, the primate, theking, and all the Hungarians did everything in their power to lay theirhands on this sum, but
he refused to hand it over saying that...he hadreceived instructions from the cardinals not to disburse the
moneyunless there is a need for it. Since there was no need for it at themoment, it was superfluous to spend it,
particularly since the newscame in that the Hungarians had defeated the Turks at that verytime. [101]
The secretary of the embassy, Massero, commented that theHungarian lords wanted to use the money to defray the
king's debtto the treasury. Funds, of course, were needed not only for a majorconfrontation; the garrisons of the
castles had to be paid even in timeof off"icial peace. The hesitations regarding financial aid could delaymobilization
even in case of all-out war and caused the country to beless well-prepared for the onslaught than it should and could
havebeen. Last, but not least, because of its dependence on foreign aid,Hungarian politics became an appendage of
the policies of others,and foreign interests weighed heavily in political and military decisions.
The Hungarian government made several attempts to procure thenecessary funds for war from within the country. A
sales tax wasintroduced and once again taxing the nobility was contemplated. As more effective measures, the
debasement of the coinage and the useof church treasures for minting money were planned. Debasement ofthe
coinage was decreed in 1521 when, after the fall of Belgrade, amajor attack by the sultan seemed imminent. By that
time thepractice of debasing the coinage had become accepted all acrossEurope; although a double-edged sword,
there were no other meansto secure funds at the moment. The leaders of the country cannot bereally blamed for it,
because, as Zsuzsanna Hermann demonstrated,it was "an emergency solution and the country's situation
wassufficient justification to resort to an emergency measure."
By debasing the coinage the treasury made a profit of about60,000 florins--a sum sufficient to hire 2-2500
mercenaries for ayear, or double that number for half a year. Assuming the strengthof Hungary's army to be around
5040,000, this difference was notinsignificant. The trouble was that this device, intended as a onetime remedy, had
to be used again and again because the Ottomansdid not attack in 1522, nor in 1523, but only in 1526. To
quoteHermann, "this decision had catastrophic consequences; by 1526 ithad rendered the long latent but growing
economic and politicalcrisis so deep and encompassing that the state seemed to disintegrate even without the
intervention of the Turks." [102] Moreover, inflation had reached such proportions that the troops were reluctant
toaccept the bad money. [103] The treasures of the Church were appropriated in 1526. Apparently, melting the gold
and silver vessels andminting them into money would have helped, but papal permissionarrived at the last minute,
the treasures were collected too late, andfinally nothing was minted at all. [104]

Supreme Command and Strategy

Without exception monographs dealing with the period accuse theruling class of military incompetence. I am
convinced, however, thatthis judgment has to be rejected out of hand. Military expertise inthis period was mostly
empirical; the importance of theory, of knowledge acquired through books, was minimal. It simply does not
makesense to assume that men who practiced soldiering from boyhood on,and whose families had accumulated
military experience over several generations, were incompetent. But besides these a prioriconsiderations, written
evidence also contradicts the historians, assumption. The army in the Jagellonian age did essentially fulfill itsrole,
the general misery and the lack of financial resources notwithstanding. It was able to protect the borders of the
country, while themobile forces carried out remarkable feats of arms in smaller andsometimes in more large-scale
military ventures. Several foreignobservers, though generally speaking not exactly favorable to theHungarians, had a
good opinion of the military. While they weremostly accusing the Hungarians of barbaric crudeness, debauchery,and
irresponsible squandering, they did coõáõáõáncede them one virtue:the Hungarians could fight! The papal nuncio,
Count Burgio, õáwrotethat: "if Hungary were ruled properly, the Turks would have nomightier enemy." [105]
According to the French traveler, Pierre Choque, "this is the nation the Turks fear most." [106] Nor can it be
overlooked that military experts were always included in Hungariandelegations sent abroad for the purpose of
discussing collaborationwith foreign armies. King Louis recorded in March, 1522, thatmembers of the delegation
sent to the Holy Roman Empire had"experience in military matters and were able to discuss and reachdecisions
regarding the means of waging war with the Germanprinces." [107] It is not likely that the participants at the
Reichstagwould have deigned to discuss military matters with mere dilettantes.
An apparent contradiction is inherent in references in the literature to a shortage in Hungary of military experts; so
that in 1526 thecourt had to invite two Austrians, Nicholas Salm and ChristopherFrangepan, as commanders-in-
chief. [108] Such an invitation may havebeen sent, but the reason was certainly not that appropriate leaderscould not
be found among the Hungarian lords. First of all, there wasthe palatine Istvan Bathori who, as ispan of Temes, was
undoubtedly well versed in military matters and would have deserved thecommand as behooving his office. The
reason the king did not selecthim was probably his personal unpopularity. (Indeed, when longafter mobilization a
secret vote was taken as to who should beappointed commander-in-chief, Bathori received not a single vote.)Istvan
Deshazi, who had been delegated to the Imperial diet in 1522,mentioned Bathori, along with Szapolyai, as the most
competentman to lead Hungarian armies, "a commander well versed in war." [109]
The other man, Janos Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, could nothave been placed at the helm of the troops
because, as alreadymentioned, the direction of the Ottoman attack remained unclear fora long time; it might have
threatened Transylvania itself. HenceSzapolyai had to remain in his territory. Furthermore, for a longtime it was
planned that Szapolyai would break into Turkish territory along with the voivode of \Wallachia; thus he could not
havefilled the post of commander-in-chief in Hungary. When the situation cleared up, and Szapolyai was expected
to join the main bodyat ToIna, he was indeed elected commander in a secret ballot. EvenSzeremi, who cared for him
not in the least, agreed that he wascompetent, and so did the Bavarian ambassador who visited Hungary in 1527 and
with whom he discussed the possibility of a greatanti-Ottoman campaign in some detail. [110]
Unfavorable judgments over the abilities of Hungarian leadersdisregard the obvious, namely, that money and a well-
equippedarmy are as important for a successful campaign as talent. Forinstance, in 1526, when the Venetian
ambassador Suriano reportedthat there "no longer were such brave captains as in the time of KingMatthias, because
the king does not make them practice the management of arms...they are ignorant and inexperienced when itcomes
to warfare...", he seems oblivious of the fact that the commanders of Matthias had under them well-paid and
supplied troopsnot continuously hampered by a shortage of funds and by politicalintrigue. Actually, Suriano
admitted that Szapolyai, Bathori--whowas still in Temes at the time--and Janos Korbavai, the ban ofCroatia, were
exceptions. [111]
As to the strategy of the war against the Turks, the alternativeswere limited. Offensive moves were out of question
because of theeconomic crisis and the generally unfavorable conditions, unless thegovernment received substantial
financial aid. The country had tobe satisfied with defense along the line of the border fortificationserected during the
preceding centuries. Every country naturallystrives to hold up an attack long before it reaches its frontiers.
Thepowerful medieval kingdom of Hungary applied this principle in thewars against the Ottomans at the expense of
the weakened Balkanstates, at times by resorting to force, at times by diplomacy. Thekings of Hungary occupied
parts of Serbia, Bosnia, and Dalmatiaand erected a line of defense on their territory. Wallachia and Moldavia were
frequently won or forced into vassalage, as a protective shield against the Turks. At least in its military aspects,
themethod was no different from the one the Habsburgs were to applylater vis-a-vis Hungary. Well before the time
Ferdinand of Habsburgwas elected King of Hungary, the principle that Hungary shouldserve as the advance post in
the face of the Turks had been workedout in Vienna. [112]
In the early fifteenth century a line of defense was formed at adistance of 50-100 km south of the Hungarian border,
stretching allthe way from Belgrade to Klissa. [113] There was a second line to therear, already on Hungarian
territory, along the southern border ofTransylvania, through Karansebes and Temesvar, then along theDanube, the
Sava, and the Drava. This line of fortification did liveup to expectations, even in the Jagellonian period down to
1521when the Turks captured Belgrade, its keystone and served thecountry well in spite of the fact that the garrisons
often went unpaid.But from the moment of the capture of Belgrade, the country becamedefenseless against Ottoman
attacks. Hungarians, Turks, and thirdparties were all well aware of this predicament. [114]
Several factors account for the strategic value of Belgrade fromthe Ottoman point of view. First of all, the fortress
lay astride themilitary road leading from the valley of the Morava, the natural lineof advance of the army, through
Szendro (Smederovo). Since thecastle was erected at the confluence of the Danube and the Sava, itcould control
traffic on both rivers. Moreover, from Belgrade it waspossible to dominate the area on the right bank of the Danube,
viaEszek, the central portions of the country along the River Tisza, aswell as Transylvania along the River Maros
and through the IronGate. Finally, the castle formed a military unit along with that ofSabac, for it ensured free
shipping along the Danube and the Sava forthe Ottoman river flotilla, so that land and naval forces couldcollaborate
most effectively. [115] More specifically, the Ottomans werevirtually free to ferry their troops into the rear of the
Hungarian forces which had penetrated into the region of Srem (Szeremseg),thus jeopardizing the Hungarians, line
of supply. Thus the region ofSrem which, until that time, had provided the Hungarians with amost favorable terrain
of operations, now turned practically into amousetrap.
After the fall of Belgrade the Hungarians, choices were reduced totwo: to engage the enemy now penetrating
unhampered into thecountry in a pitched battle, or to avoid battle. If the first alternativewere chosen there was
scarcely any prospect of success because ofthe crying disproportion of forces. From a strictly military point ofview,
therefore, the second alternative seemed preferable, all themore so since, according to our discussion above, the
Ottoman armyhad only three months to carry out military operations in Hungary.Thus, had the Hungarian army
decided not to wage battle in thisperiod, or at least to avoid it for a certain length of time, the enemywould either
have had to withdraw without accomplishing its mission or, reaching the end of its range of action, wage battle
underdoubtful strategic conditions. Delaying the decisive encounter wouldalso entail fighting it further to the rear.
Such a retreat, however,would have meant surrendering a considerable portion of the country to plunder and
depredation. It is not difficult to see the enormouseconomic and political liabilities implied in such a choice. The
Hungarian government could hardly assume such a sacrifice, especiallysince the nobility of the part of the country
exposed to destruction bythe Turks would have objected to such an alternative tooth and nail.Hence the decision to
fight a pitched battle against overwhelmingodds.

Branches of Service, Tactics, and Morale

The decisive force of the Hungarian army were its armor-cladknights against which the Turkish light cavalry could
not standup. [116] After the dissolution of King Matthias's mercenary army thesearmored knights assumed even
greater significance. This explainswhy in the late fifteenth century more than half of the banderialsoldiers had to be
heavy cavalry. From 1498 onwards only thosebanderia which were recruited in the southern regions for immediate
border defense were allowed to include the same number of lightcavalry as heavy horse. [117]
But since it was expensive to outfit the heavy cavalry, the bulk ofthe army still had to be light cavalry. Moreover,
border defensewhere extensive areas had to be protected by small forces and masshad to be compensated for by
speed (just as in China, the ByzantineEmpire, or Spain), also required light cavalry. Their elite wasformed by the
hussars of Serbian (rac) background. Hungary's lightcavalry before the arrival of the Serbian refugees, provided by
theCuman, Jasz, and Szekely contingents, was far from competent inthe raiding tactics needed for the constant
fighting along the borders. Hence outsiders, such as Serbs, had to be hired for the purpose.(Nor was this a peculiarly
Hungarian solution: China and the Byzantine Empire likewise had to resort to a foreign force of lightcavalry to
defend their borders.)[118] Of course, after a while thehussars became assimilated; in fact, as we know, they came
to be atypically Hungarian branch of service. In the Jagellonian period theproportion of Serbs within this corps must
have still been considerable. The combat value of the hussars--whether Hungarian or Serbian--was rather high. They
acquired a European-wide reputationas masters of the raiding warfare carried out day in and day outalong the
borders, as attested to by numerous contemporaries. [119]According to the Venetian ambassador Suriano, the
Hungarianarmored cavalry was inadequate, but the light cavalry was "the bestin the world." [120] The light cavalry
furnished by the noble levy and thepeasants of the local militia was far from being as useful. Indeed, itcould not
have been otherwise, for their equipment and trainingwere equally deficient.
The strike capacity of the Hungarian army was extraordinarilyweakened by a lack of significant infantry. The light
infantry it hadwas far below the quality of the regular infantry of Western countries, even below that of the
janissaries. [121] Most of them were armedonly with bow and arrows, and only the militia from the
northernprovinces and the regulars supplied by the towns bore firearms. OnEuropean battlefields in this period, the
infantry, equipped partlywith firearms and partly with pikes, was the decisive branch ofservice, and even the cavalry
had to adapt to its peculiarities andbase its tactics upon it. Thus Hungarian military organization adjusted relatively
well to border skirmishes, but it remained unaffected by the great reforms warfare was undergoing in the \\Test.
Thereason for this lag, as we have seen, was lack of funds.
Considering the geography of the Hungarian theater of operations, the Danube flotilla and its sailors were crucial.
[122] Their maintasks were to control the waterways, to secure the routes of reinforcement and supply, and,
furthermore, to provide support for theland forces. The rapid deterioration of the country's economy maybest be
measured by the decline of this branch of service. At the timeof King Matthias their effectives were still around
10,000, but in theJagellonian period they dwindled to 1000. Presumably, the numberof boats declined
correspondingly; thus, if there were 360 of themunder Matthias, there could not have been more than 50 at thistime.
[123]
Hungarian artillery was very weak. The fortifications were moreor less adequately provided with cannons, but
artillery for the fieldarmy had to be supplied partly from the castles, partly with ordnance on loan from abroad. [124]
The provisioning system seems to have functioned adequately.This was hardly surprising, since the country was
well off in victuals. Moreover, the rivers, the Danube especially, facilitated transport. Although the papal nuncio
Burgio did report, in 1526, that theHungarian army was short of food, this must have applied only to afraction of the
troops. Indeed, no other source makes mention of anyserious shortcoming in food supply. [125]
Finally a few words on the discipline and morale of the field troopsand the castle garrisons which formed the
backbone of the army. Itseems that the extremely poor discipline of the soldiery, often mentioned in the sources, had
something to do with the general conditions in the country, with party strife, and with the rift between thearistocracy
and the middle ranks of the nobility. The tumultuousscenes at the diets were mirrored in the army; the lower
ranksexpressed their opinions freely, participated in the military councils,and occasionally influenced the councils,
decisions by their mutinousbehavior. The general rule of military sociology, that the troops who must confront the
enemy on a daily basis and whose bodily integrityand lives are at stake do not trust the general staff, nor anyone
"fromthe etappe", became increasingly manifest in this period. The soldiers referred to the military counsellors and
the men of the court aswindbags and cowards. [126]
It does not follow from all this that such soldiers did not fight wellor did not fulfill their duties. The garrisons,
subjected to constantpressure from the Turks, could not allow themselves to neglectmilitary preparedness, if only for
the sake of self-preservation. Athorough knowledge of the handling of weapons was a matter of lifeand death, as
was the conscientious execution of all duties. Thesesoldiers showed their mettle in the course of protracted border
warsof the period, even under the most adverse conditions. We mayassume that the morale was high, for the troops
were eager to entercombat and were quite confident of victory at the eve of the battle ofMohacs. It is not likely that
this extreme self-confidence was basedon blind presumption; it seems more likely that it evolved as aconsequence of
the successful military raids carried out over severalgeneration s.

Domestic Affairs and Government

In discussing the military power of the Ottoman Empire we paidconsiderable attention to the economic, social, and
political institutions behind the armed force. We ought to do the same for Hungary.Unfortunately, however, any
such attempt would be futile on thebasis of the present state of our knowledge. [127] As a leading specialistof the
period, Zsuzsanna Hermann, has said, Hungarian historiography is a long way from:
providing even a superficial survey of the complex web of contrasts andharmonization of interests behind the actual
tragic scene precedingMohacs, or a picture of the constantly shifting alliances of its participants. It is not an easy
task to understand even the outline plot of thisfast-paced drama. I must admit, for my own part, that I undertook
toprovide a relatively clear chronicle of this drama with more than a littletrepidation. [128]
How much more trepidation is then allowed for someone who did notspend decades researching this very period!
The reason for all this, that we still know so little about thecircumstances surrounding the greatest disaster in our
history, isnot merely the scarcity of reliable sources, but also that attitude ofmany authors who start out from the
end, the fall of the medievalHungarian state, blame with righteous indignation the "contemptible" ruling class for
"wasting the country", and "discover" in that theonly cause for the disaster without ever deeming it necessary
tostudy the few surviving sources. The words of Gyula Szekfu, one ofthe outstanding figures of modern Hungarian
historiography, aretypical in this regard: "It is completely superfluous to survey thedecisions of the many diets held
in these years, for nobody paid heedto whatever measures were adopted to remedy the financial plight ofthe country,
to restore the royal estates, or to defend the frontiers." [129]
In the past ten or fifteen years, however, Hungarian historianshave changed their attitudes decisively. Several
valuable monographs dealing with the economic, social, political, and militaryaspects of the period have appeared
which set aside the moralizingtone and concentrate on the facts. Yet, partly because of the force oftradition, and
partly because of ill-conceived didactic and ideologicalconsiderations, some historians still feel prompted to indulge
inaccusations even while providing reliable objective data on theevents. The following excerpt from a recent work
on Mohacs istypical for such an approach:
The Hungary of Mohacs was paralyzed in the face of the Turkishonslaught, almost unable to defend itself. It follows,
of course, that allthose whose task would have been the organization and direction ofdefense are to be held
responsible. The leaders of the Hungarian state,those who had a say in directing the fate of the country, made
themselves culpable of unpardonable ommissions against the country inwhich they were born, in which they lived,
and in which they hoped tofind a more restful, more sensible end than the one that awaitedthem .... As a
consequence of a long series of irresponsible moves theysucceeded in dispatching. . .the Hungarian medieval state
into perditionand collapse. [130]
Hungarian historical literature is rich in prescriptions about theruling class that should have been "more willing to
bring sacrifices",or "wiser" and 'braver", and so on, but little is said about whatexactly should have been done, and
even less, what realistically could have been done. It is worth quoting the wise words of thenineteenth-century
historian, Ferenc Salamon:
The writers of the generation immediately following 1526 in particularfilled with bitterness because of the disaster
of Mohacs, do not stoprepeating all the negative things about the leading figures of thepreceding period. Yet, had
these severe historians been forced to confront the conditions prevailing before 1526 it is rather doubtful thatthey
could have come up with a practical solution. [131]
Indeed, even with the wisdom of hindsight, it is hardly possible topropose a workable solution. Having thought
through each temptingalternative step by step, I, too, have to admit that none of themwould have offered a way out.
Hence, all that remains is to outline onthe relationships between state, politics, and war in the Jagellonianperiod in
order to demonstrate this quagmire.
To begin with, it must be pointed out that the ruling class was farfrom short-sighted; it had a clear understanding of
the Ottomanthreat. In fact, it can be safely asserted that this threat haunted itlike a nightmare. No particular wisdom
or virtue was required torealize the danger, since the forces were so disproportionate and thestakes so high. The
consequence of Ottoman conquest was seen asnothing less than social, economic, and political, in a word,
total,annihilation. Nor can it be averred that the leaders remained inactive. Hungarian foreign politics may never
have been more activethan at that time: ambassadors were coming and going, engaged inconstant negotiations with
foreign powers regarding the great waragainst the Turks. No matter what source we consult, all agree thatthe
military issue was in the forefront. At least half of the decisionsof the diets which, according to Szekfu, do not
deserve examinationor study, had something to do with military issues. Yet, to avert thedanger more funds would
have been needed, and these, as we haveseen, were not available. Once again it would be a historical to findthe
explanation of this shortcoming in the "wasteful finances" of theruling class, as Istvan Brodarics, one of the crown
witnesses of theevents, asserts. [132] of course, we also cannot claim that the country'sleaders had always had their
hands immaculately clean of anywrongdoing, or that there were no incidents of corruption and embezzlement. We
must bear in mind, however, that not even EmperorCharles V could cover the expenses of his wars from the income
ofthe state. It would be naive to assume that even the most puritanical *management of funds in that "poor country
of a rich land" could haveprovided the necessary finances.
We have argued that the number of goal-oriented rational solutions in any given situation is usually quite small,
while that of the useless or irrational ones is infinite. Moreover, it is a psychologicalfact that in tight situations, when
there is simply no chance ofreaching a rational solution, people are seized by panic and resort tosolutions which
might never have occurred to them under morenormal circumstances. Such was the predicament of the
Hungarianruling class. Since the primary means, the funds, were lacking, thepoliticians adopted one measure after
another even though it shouldhave been obvious from the start that none of them could provide thedesired result.
When the resident foreign ambassadors sarcasticallypredicted, before each meeting of the diet, that the Estates
wouldring about many measures, but none would have any effect, theywere, sadly, correct. However, in contrast to
Szekfu's assertion, thisfailure was due not to disinterest or irresponsibility, but to thosevires majores which the men
of the early sixteenth century could notovercome.
There was no obvious, effective prescription to cure the ills of thecountry; and this was precisely the circumstance
that engenderedbitter party strife and, consequently, that anarchy which virtually paralyzed the state machinery.
Everyone, whether it be the courthe aristocracy, or the common nobles, the pro-Habsburg party, thepro-Venetians,
or those who trusted in help from Rome, soughtdifferent way of saving the country. This party strife, at the moments
ofthe greatest crisis, entailed frequent changes in the personnel of the government. Each party strove to have its own
representatives appointed; chaos ensued. Nothing indicates better how the circle of possibilities had shriveled than
the fact that the parties of the aristocracy and of the lesser nobility were more than once incapable of reaching a
consensus at their joint meetings because each party was advocating some miraculous cure; nevertheless, when after
a lot of squabbling and passionate scenes they split to carry on the debate separately, the decisions they reached
hardlydiffered from one another.
The most striking fact of the history of the period is the lack ofprestige of the ruler and of government in gene
nobility adopted a threatening stance vis-a-vis the aristocracy, but often even the king did not feel safe in their
presence. While no decisions could be found to provide a radical solution to Hungary's ills, even those laws and
regulations that were promulgated and which might have provided some degree of relief to the country andits
defense could not be carried out conscientiously because of thegovernment's low standing. Only in the last moment,
at the diet ofApril 24, 1526, barely four months before the battle of Mohacs, thenobility proposed and pushed
through a number of measures whichaimed at significantly strengthening the power of the king. According to
Vilmos Fraknoi:
The lesser nobility...disregarded its previous program. It now supported decisions that diametrically opposed the
aims it had pursued fordecades, and negated all the results it had managed to obtain so far; itconsecrated royal
power by destroying the institutions brought about torestrict that power. In the preamble to their decision, the
estatesrequested the ruler that he "make use of his prestige and power" ingoverning the country. Thus they
authorized the king "to decide himselfupon mature consideration" in all matters regarding the increase andhandling
of royal revenues and the defense of the country. [133]
Indeed, the king had never enjoyed this much power during thethirty-six years of Jagellonian rule. Nevertheless, by
present-daystandards of historical analysis, it would hardly be possible to describe the powers bestowed upon Louis
as "unlimited." One canspeak of unlimited authority or of absolute monarchy only if theruler, backed by the
citizenry, had succeeded in destroying thepower of the aristocracy and of the lesser nobility, had excludedthem from
the administration of the state, and had assumed solecommand over the army, placing a ban on the private armies of
thelords. Such a state of affairs, however, could never come about as aconsequence of the support, let alone the
initiative, of the nobility.On the contrary, it usually resulted from a long struggle betweencrown and nobility. Hence
it is conceptually incorrect to speak of theunlimited powers of Louis II, not to mention the fact that thesepowers
were far from unlimited in practice.
Even if the ruler had been able to deal with the affairs of thecountry with absolute power, there could be no illusions
regardingvictory. Let us assume for a moment that a surge of enthusiasm hadsuddenly enabled the Hungarian state
machinery to function likeclockwork: would that have produced substantially larger funds fordefense? Assuredly
not. Moreover, is it possible to believe that withhis "unlimited" powers Louis II would have been able to cure
allthose ills which had accumulated to such a disastrous extent overthe previous forty years?
To summarize: both the society of Hungary and the state whichformed the foundation of the army were extremely
weak at themoment of the showdown; hence military efforts fell far short ofwhat was required or desirable. The
situation was rendered evenmore serious by the diplomatic isolation of the country, owing towhich it could expect
no help from any quarter.
CHAPTER IV
SULEYMAN'S PROPOSAL:AN OUTLINE OF
OTTOMAN AND HUNGARIAN POLICIES BETWEEN
1520 AND 1541

By "Suleyman's proposal", I mean that general policy of the sultanand, by implication, of the Ottoman leadership,
that Hungary'sterritorial and political integrity be preserved. Hungary would notbe absorbed into the empire as long
as no ruler from the house ofHabsburg was elected and foreign policy remained pro-Ottoman(that is, anti-
Habsburg). [134]

As I will show, some historians have acknowledged this policy ofSuleyman's, but have ignored its military aspects
or discussed themonly tangentially. In my studies precisely the military aspect is to beemphasized. In fact, this
aspect constitutes the gist of my explanation for the Porte's initial cautiousness vis-a-vis Hungary. In themodel I
have constructed of the Ottoman-Hungarian wars, the oft-mentioned range of action played a central role. As
discussed above,it did not extend far enough to include all of the territory of Hungary.And because Ottoman leaders
could not but include this model alongwith the notion of range of action in their image, their politicaldecision was
logical enough: Hungary must not be annexed! In myearlier study I had stated:

The basis of Suleyman's concept was a sound military consideration

which, far from advocating the annexation of Hungary, actually barred
that possibility; to allow Hungary to retain its independence and its
territorial integrity and to use the country as a buffer-state against the
Habsburgs, would definitely constitute the more secure, peaceful, and
cheaper solution from the Ottoman viewpoint. Circumstances forced
the Turks to absorb the land which became the source of constant
trouble on account of its militarily exposed position, as well as a source
of terrible financial drain on account of its poverty. [135]

I had reached my interpretation on the basis of the study of theperiod 1526 to 1541; but, in the course, of examining
the eventspreceding 1526, I discovered that "Suleyman's offer" applied to thoseyears as well. [136]

Historiography

Several authors had reached the same conclusion. Mihaly Horvath wrote: "at that time (that is, in 1526) Suleyman
had no desireto conquer Hungary. He set the Danube and Sava rivers as theboundaries of his tremendous empire,
and did not intend to advancebeyond them." [137] In Jozsef Thury's study on Ottoman chronicles weread:

He [Suleyman] did not intend to conquer Hungary, because he knew

right well that he would only be able to hold on to this fresh conquest,
wedged between Christian states, if its inhabitants were converted to
Islam--something he could not expect--or if the area were settled by a
large number of Turks, for which purpose, however, he felt the population
would be insufficient. In other words: he did not venture to extend
his Empire that far. [138]

In the 1940s the internationally recognized Hungarian specialistof Ottoman history, Lajos Fekete, wrote:

even after his victory at Mohacs, Sultan Suleyman would have settled
for Hungarian integrity, as a state wedged between the Ottoman and
Habsburg dynasties, but preferably as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire....
With the death of King John...the Turkish view of the Hungarian issue
changed radically. The sultan could no longer expect Hungary
to preserve its independence vis-a-vis the German emperor, on the
contrary, he had to consider the possibility that the Holy Roman
Empire, in union with the Kingdom of Hungary, would be able to reach
 the lower Danube, and challenge Turkish power somewhere in the
Balkans. If, on the other hand, his empire had to become contiguous
with that of the Holy Roman emperor, it would be to his advantage if
the Turkish border were not along the lower Danube, but to the north
of Buda. [139]

In our own days, on the basis of research conducted in Turkisharchives, Gyula Kaldy-Nagy was able to be more
specific:

The revenues [collected by the Turkish state] from Hungary. . .could cover barely one-third of the expenditures. The
deficit, an annual 17-18 million aspers. . .had to be brought to Buda from Istanbul in gold coins. Together with the
cost of outfitting and maintaining the fortresses the Hungarian base cost Suleyman 300,000 gold pieces annually.
Suleyman foresaw this burden in 1529, when he marched into Buda, and for the second time he refrained from
keeping it. The accounts cited bear witness to the fact that Suleyman occupied Buda and the regions on both sides of
the Danube not for the sake of increasing the size of his Empire. It was the unforeseen political situation that
prompted him to occupy Buda in order to secure a solid base against the Habsburgs, rather than the other way
around. [140]

This was also the view of Nicolae Jorga. [141] Similarly, Halil Inalcikdiscussing Mehemmed, writes:

The Ottomans established the Danube as the Empire's natural northern boundary. It became the Conqueror's policy
to prevent any foreign static from establishing itself in the Balkan peninsula south of the Danube from Belgrade to
the Black Sea as the northern limit of the Empire.

Elsewhere, in connection with 1526, he writes: "The Ottomanswithdrew from Hungary, occupying only Srem.... At
first the Ottomans tried to make Hungary a vassal state, like Moldavia, since itwas considered too difficult and too
expensive to establish directOttoman rule in a completely foreign country on the far side of theDanube." [142]

Suleymans Peace Offer of 1520 and His Attack in 1521

[143]

Hence, according to Inalcik, the Ottoman leadership observed theprinciple not to extend the boundaries of the
Empire beyond theDanube and the Sava already at the time of Mehmed II. Theevents of the Jagellonian period seem
to bear out this assertion.From 1490 to 1521, apart from the constant skirmishes along theborders, and from the
occasional siege of castles, there was but onegreat war, and in that Hungary was the aggressor. Strange as it
maysound, Hungarian policy was the more aggressive, and the repeatedly renewed truce usually came about on the
initiative of the Porte.

It is not particularly difficult to explain the paradoxical behaviorof the two parties. The reason for the peaceful
intent, or moreprecisely, the intention of avoiding a "great" war on the part of thelurks, was clear: not to engage in a
war on two or more fronts. From1490 on the Ottoman Empire waged wars against the Mamelukesultans (148~91);
Montenegro (1496); Poland (1497--99); Venice,France, and Hungary (148~91); the Persians and the internalenemy
instigated by them (150~1514); Dulkadir (1515); and againthe Mameluke sultans in the campaigns against Syria and
Egypt(1516--17). The stakes were indeed high in these wars: the conquestof areas of fabulous wealth, such as Syria
and Egypt, the strengthening of positions along the Mediterranean Sea, or the repression ofrebellions threatening the
very existence of the Empire. In comparison, the conflict with Hungary pales in significance; nor could therebe any
question of deriving economic benefits from its conquest.

The aggressiveness shown by the Hungarians seems almost beyond comprehension. What is more, considering the
conditions prevailing within the country, and the European situation which precluded effective foreign help, it may
even be qualified as foolhardy.But our stern judgment is bound to turn more lenient if we take acloser look at the
predicament of the country and the mentalityarising out of that predicament among the ruling class and amongthe
people as well. Even if the Ottomans refrained from launchingan all-out assault, the continuous fighting along the
borders, thedestruction caused by the raids, and the terrific burdens imposed bythe defense of the borders were
becoming less and less bearable. Theconclusion was obvious: by the time the Turks launched the greatattack aimed
at annihilating the country--and no one doubted that they eventually would--the strength of the country would have
beensapped to such an extent that it would simply drop like an overripeapple into the lap of the conqueror. To alter
this situation became,therefore, a necessity imposed by Realpolitik. As for psychologicalconditions, the intense
hatred and contempt felt for Islam, as well asthe consciousness of belonging to European Christian civilization,had
such deep roots in the makeup of the mind of the people, that thenotion of compromise, of peaceful coexistence,
could not even arise.

Let us observe the evolution of Turkish-Hungarian relations from1490 on. In the decade following the death of King
Matthias, official,formal peace prevailed between the two countries. Hungary was theone to denounce the peace
when a Turkish emissary came to Buda in1499 to offer to extend it. The Hungarian government rejected theoffer
because it saw a golden opportunity for a showdown such as ithad not seen for quite some time. Among France,
Poland, andVenice, an anti-Ottoman alliance, which Hungary was invited tojoin, emerged. Substantial financial help
was in the offing--a prerequisite, we know, for any serious undertaking. At the beginning ofthe war (in 1501 and in
1002), the Hungarian forces carried outbrilliant actions, penetrating deep into Ottoman territory; yet thesewere far
from sufficient to break the power of the foe. With thealliance itself about to dissolve, the Hungarian government
decidedto sign an armistice with the Turks for seven years.

Yet another opportunity for waging an all-out war came up in1510. In 1508 the king of France, the emperor, and the
pope formedthe League of Cambray, aimed against Venice. The League appealedto Hungary to join, offering
Dalmatia as a reward. The Hungariangovernment, however, knew full well that the Ottoman government,intent on
maintaining the balance of power in Europe, would nottolerate the destruction of Venice with which it had close
economicties; hence Hungary was liable to confront the Turks as well. Eventhough the allies offered to help if this
were to happen, the court,assessing the worth of such promises soberly, preferred not to enterthe alliance. The
common nobility, completely unfamiliar with thepolicies of the great European powers, vehemently attacked
thecourt for passing up the opportunity to regain Dalmatia. But theking, Count Palatine Imre Perenyi, and
Archbishop Bakocz remained adamant. The words Bakocz used to ally the fears of theVenetian ambassador were
indicative of their thinking: Hungarywould not be able to retain Dalmatia in any event, while drawing theire of the
Turks, and, by the time help could arrive--if it arrived atall--Hungary would be long lost. Thus the government, with
commendable common sense, kept the country out of adventurousundertakings; in fact, in 1511 it renewed the
armistice with theOttoman Empire for another five years.

In the following years, however, the Hungarian government tookthe above-mentioned plans of Pope Leo's crusade
quite seriously,and this led, as we know, to the great peasant war of 1514. At theend of that very year, in a letter to
King Wladislas the pope painteda rosy picture of the preparations for the large-scale campaign inorder to dissuade
the Hungarian government from extending thearmistice. He was so concerned about a possible extension of
theHungarian-Turkish armistice that he wrote a letter appealing to therulers of Europe to dissuade the King of
Hungary from reaching anagreement, even warning the king, in the form of a veiled threat, ofthe grave
consequences such a move might entail. To Francis I ofFrance he wrote: "Write to the King of Hungary not to
concludepeace or armistice with the Turks under any circumstance...becausehis country would not be able to
withstand their attack anywaywithout support from us and from the Christian rulers." He evenissued a direct
warning to Wladislas: "I warn you against signing apeace or armistice with the Turks." Nevertheless, the
Hungariangovernment did extend the armistice in 1516, and again in 1519.[144]

Thus the Hungarian leaders had to walk a tightrope: they had tomanifest extreme caution every time the West came
forth with theidea of crusade; but they also had to mind the image of the country,that it remain, in the eyes of the
West, "the bastion of Christianity",for this was the only way it could obtain the indispensable, if notparticularly
generous, financial help without which it would havebeen altogether unable to protect its borders.

The armistice agreement concluded with the Porte in 1519 lost itsvalidity long before it would have expired. In
September 1520 SultanSelim died, and, according to Ottoman legal tradition, an agreementconcluded by the
deceased sultan did not oblige his successor. Hence,in December 1520, a Turkish emissary arrived in Buda, offering
toextend the armistice. While the gesture appeared to be routine, fromcertain data, as well as from the
circumstances, one might concludethat this time the conditions were different, for the stakes weremuch higher than
the ones involved in the agreement concludedwith Selim.

In his final report for the year 1523 the secretary to the Venetianambassador to Hungary, Massaro, wrote:

The Hungarians, had they not been hoping for a general campaign,
could have made peace with the Turk. With this hope in mind they sent
out the Bishop of Scardona, as their own ambassador, to all the
Christian rulers, and especially to our Signer. The message was that
they would conclude separate peace with the Turk, granting them the
right of free transit, not concerned with the damages they cause and the
danger they constitute to anyone whose territory they are crossing. [145]

According to another source, (and asserted by the sixteenthcentury Italian historian Sagundino), [146] the treaty
proposed did notconcern the right of transit, but merely the payment of a tribute.

The following passage, found in a vernacular document from thecollection of the historian Verancsics, is
particularly relevant:
 In this year [1520] the emperor Selim died, and his son Suleyman was
elected emperor to succeed him .... Suleyman immediately sent a distinguished
emissary to the Hungarian King Louis in order to conclude a
treaty of eternal armistice with him. Indeed, King Louis would have
agreed, had not the pope from Rome objected that he [Louis] should not
conclude an armistice with the Turk under any circumstance, because
even if the Turk should invade Hungary, he [the pope] would provide
enough funds and contribute enough soldiers to enable him [Louis] to
confront the Turk. Consequently, the king was misled. [147]

The Ottoman chronicler, Djeladzade, though he makes no mention of the conditions stipulated, refers not to an
armistice, but to"peace", and even "friendship":

when...Suleyman acceded to the throne of the Empire, in order to

renew the custom of the ceremony of courtesy on the occasion of
succession, and in order to lay the foundations for peace and friendship...
sent out one of his humble servants to [the King of Hungary] with
a supreme document. [148]

Only one author, Ludovico Tubero, claims that the conditions ofpeace were the same as in the time of Selim. [149]

The first four sources, though they provide differing versions,agree on one thing: namely, that the conditions
stipulated by Süleyman differed fundamentally from those of Selim. In trying to makesense of the details provided
by the four sources, it would appearthey point to some kind of offer of alliance. While Massaro is the onlyone to
mention the right of transit, the "eternal armistice" referredto in the Hungarian source, as well as the "peace and
friendship"mentioned by Djeladzade, may easily be reconciled with that interpretation. Nor does the tribute
mentioned by Sagundino contradictthis interpretation, since the issue of tribute frequently came up inagreements
concluded with the Porte. [150]

All this, of course, does not have the strength of incontrovertibleevidence. Absolute certainty could only be obtained
if the contemporary diplomatic records testified that Suleyman had stipulated suchconditions. Since such records do
not exist, we must have recourse tothe methodology outlined in the first chapter; that is, basing ourconclusions on
the model of war and on the perception the participants may have had of it, let us make sense of the data available
andreconstruct the decisions taken by the Ottoman and Hungarianstatesmen.

The evidence according to which the leaders of the powers mostdirectly concerned--Austria, the Holy Roman
Empire, Venice, andRome--got excited by any report intimating that the Hungarianswere about to reach an
agreement with the Ottomans and wouldallow Ottoman armies to cross Hungarian territory, now acquiresspecial
significance. Their concern becomes all the more understandable since, under the reign of Matthias Corvinus, the
plunderingOttoman armies crossing Hungary caused havoc in Stir and Corinthian. It is hardly imaginable that the
Ottomans crossed the country without obtaining permission from the Hungarian government.[151]

As we have seen, Massaro had already referred to the possibilityof the Ottomans being granted right of transit, a
possibility even theHoly Roman Empire expected might come true. In 1521, at theimperial diet in Worms, it was
agreed that the Hungarians should beallowed to sign an armistice with the Ottomans, but it was alsostipulated that
no harm should befall the Empire--which could only mean that the agreement should not include granting the
Ottomansright of transit through Hungary. [152] At the Imperial diet in Nurnbergin 1522 a proposal was made to the
effect that, even if the HolyRoman Empire could not provide Hungary with substantial aid,something should,
nevertheless, be provided; otherwise the Hungarians would be forced to reach an agreement with the Ottomans.
[153]

The Hungarian government, however, did not accept the offer ofpeace; instead, it urgently sent out emissaries to all
the powersconcerned with requests for help. Considering that the Hungariangovernments had extended the armistice
with the Porte over thepreceding twenty years precisely because they could not count onany substantial assistance
from the West, this decision seems incomprehensible, especially since under the existing conjuncture inEurope the
cause of a general war against the Ottomans appearedless likely than ever. Charles had concluded a peace with the
sultan,while carrying on war in Africa. Venice continued to cultivate goodrelations with the Porte. Last, but not
least, the emperor and theking of France were on the verge of a major conflict. Certainly theleaders in Buda were
aware of this state of affairs and the rebellionof Djambedri Ghazali, and the difficulties encountered by the Ottoman
state in Syria, produced no improvement from the Hungarianpoint of view. [154] We must assume, therefore, that
the Hungariangovernment refused to sign a peace treaty because the cost wasconsidered too high. Indeed, the price
could only have been authorization for the transit of troops and the payment of tribute.
Although we regard it almost certain that the Hungarian government rejected the offer of peace because of the high
price tag,nevertheless we must also consider another possibility. DomokosKosary asserts that Suleyman's conditions
were the same as those ofSelim earlier; hence the government simply made a mistake when itopted "for delay and
lengthy missions" and "failed to reflect that itwas unnecessary to provoke the Sultan on a relatively minor issue";in
other words they should have accepted the proposal. [155] The root ofthe problem, continues Kosary, lay in a faulty
assessment of thesituation, in particular, that the government overlooked two basicfactors: first, that the Ottoman
Empire, which had concluded itsconquests in the east and had grown even stronger as a result, was now turning
westwards; and second, the drastic reduction of thechances of securing assistance from the European powers.
Kosarydeclares that we cannot achieve much by indulging in the usualmoralizing tone, because the mistaken
measures adopted by thegovernment "derived rather from assimilated reflexes, the routinemeasures which the
managers of Hungarian policy had been applying over a long period apparently without running into
majordifficulties, and which went unpunished. Now it was suddenly discovered, however, that these measures
entailed a mortal danger, onaccount of the international conjuncture." [156]

Referring to the methodological concepts outlined in Chapter I,lets us consider the Hungarian state an
"organization', and, consequently, propose that the decision-making process went throughthree hierarchical levels--
that is, the political, the administrative,and the operative. If we also assume that at its highest, the political,level,
only creative, innovative decisions are possible, then the use ofthe term "routine" is misplaced. Routine or
"programmed" decisionscan only occur at the administrative and especially at the operativelevels. [157]

Suleymans Second Peace Offer, Its Rejection, and the "Punitive Expedition of
1526
[184]
The assault on Rhodes, planned already in 1520, but delayedbecause of the urgency of the Hungarian problem, was
launched bythe Ottoman army and fleet in the summer of 1522. The Knights ofSaint John waged their heroic battle
by themselves, abandoned bythe Europeans, and had to give up the hopeless struggle in December. Thus this
extremely important island, of key strategic value forthe domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, fell under
Ottomansovereignty.
Now Suleyman was definitely determined to settle conditions inSyria and Egypt; he probably contracted peace with
Persia in orderto ensure his rear. The objective, to restore the spice trade, whichhad been interrupted by the
Portuguese, was supposed to be the taskof Ahmed Pasha, appointed governor of Egypt in 1523. The
Ottomanleadership had probably drawn up the rough outlines of a plan; itwas elaborated shortly thereafter in detail
by Selman Reis andsubmitted to the sultan, via the Grand Vezir Ibrahim, in 1525.Selman Reis proposed tough
intervention against the Portuguese,but, because of the already discussed shortcomings of the fleet,warned against a
clash on the open seas. Instead, he proposed tostrengthen the base at Jiddah and increase the size of the fleet.
Wehave seen that the construction of vessels ran into difficulties because of the lack of raw materials; hence the
execution of the planwas postponed.
The realization of the plan was also impeded when Ahmed Pasharebelled and proclaimed himself the ruler of Egypt.
Although thisrebellion was suppressed in the spring of 1524, the sultan had tosend his favorite courtier, the very
talented Ibrahim, recently appointed Grand Vezir, to settle matters once and for all. Ibrahim setout for Egypt in
December 1524 and disarmed the restless withextremely clever measures. Having consolidated Ottoman rule,
hereturned to Constantinople in September 1525.
In the meantime, in 1524, disturbances broke out once again in Syria; hence the Ottoman leaders had every reason to
focus theirattention and energies on the affairs of the East, yet were preventedfrom doing so by the European
situation. The war between theemperor and the king of France continued, but, while it was notpossible to predict the
outcome, the balance seemed to tip in favor ofthe emperor. Ottoman policy was now stymied: in order to
preventCharles V's hegemony over Europe--first of all, of course, overHungary--it would have to intervene swiftly,
but could not do sobecause of Eastern affairs. In the East it should have reestablishedthe spice trade, which
guaranteed a fabulous income, but it wasprevented in this endeavor by developments in Europe. This explains the
respite of five years granted Hungary after 1521, eventhough the Ottomans had voiced their designs against
Hungaryopenly, as we know from the report of Marco Minio. [185]
Consequently, the Ottoman leaders could do no better than towear down Hungary's resistance by constant raids and
at the sametime prepare the attack against Hungary by politically and strategically significant campaigns in such
direction where they could expect the least resistance. Two states came under consideration:Wallachia and Poland.
To obtain firm control over Wallachia wouldserve the double purpose of applying political pressure againstHungary
and of obtaining a base for military operations. Hungary'sinfluence over the area had to be short-circuited. From the
manyvoivodes and voivode nominees competing against one another, theOttomans had to promote the one who
would be capable of reestablishing order in the country and also willing to accept the sultan'ssovereignty. In 1522
the Empire struggled almost continuouslyagainst a rapid succession of voivodes, yet was unable to achieveresults, to
large extent because of Szapolyai, who intervened in thestruggle with his Transylvanian forces. Since it was a
principle ofOttoman policy vis-a-vis Wallachia not to annex the country, butmerely to draw it into a relationship of
vassalage, when Radulfinally emerged victorious among the voivode nominees in 1523, hewas allowed to retain his
office.
The conquest of Poland was never a political objective of the Porte.The Porte merely wanted to neutralize the
country in view of thefinal confrontation with Hungary. The Ottomans waged a war withthis limited aim against
Poland, and not with their own forces, butby proxy, with the forces of the Khanate of Crimean Tartars who were
their vassals. As a consequence of their destructive raids, KingSigismund himself initiated peace in 1525.
The Hungarian government was fully aware that the intermissionmerely provided a breathing space; it entertained
no illusions regarding the ultimate goals of the sultan. Louis II wrote to the king ofPoland in that vein in March
1522: having received reports of thevast preparations undertaken by the Turks, he requested that Sigismund meet
with him personally in order to discuss the matter or, ifthat were not possible, that Sigismund also send delegates to
theImperial council, about to meet in Nurnberg, and at which theOttoman threat was on the agenda. Louis had
already sent twoemissaries: "Both are quite familiar with the border counties andtheir state of alert; in fact, one of
them has even fought against thefoe." According to reports the Ottomans were preparing to attackalong three
directions: in Transylvania; from Belgrade, "since, without doubt, they cannot advance anywhere except along the
Danubebecause of their enormous fleet; and towards Slavonia." [186]
We have seen that Hungary could not do without foreign aid. Butwhat kind of aid could Hungary count on in this
period? Charles V,given his war against the French, could provide nothing. He madethis clear already in 1521 when
he advised Louis II to sign anarmistice with the Ottomans. Ferdinand of Habsburg could givesupport only to the
extent of intervening at the Imperial diet onbehalf of Hungary. Moreover, he assumed some of the burden of
thedefense of the Croatian castles by sending funds and troops there,which, of course, enhanced his political
influence in the area as well.Hungary expected help from Rome, more than from any other sourcebecause first of all,
the precondition of foreign aid was that theEuropean powers cease waging wars against one another: the Hungarian
government might have hoped that an appeal by the pope,head of the Christian world, who was at the moment not
directlyinvolved in the conflicts, would be heeded by the warring states. Ofcourse, while this was mere illusion on
its part, there is no doubtthat the popes were motivated by idealistic considerations. Furthermore, the papacy had
helped before, and with not inconsiderablefunds, and it would be blindness on our part to disregard the factthat the
Ottoman menace was a threat to Italy itself, includingRome. Pope Adrian was no less frightened by an Ottoman
attackthan his predecessor, Leo X, was. When, in 1523, reports to the effect that the Hungarian to compromise with
the Turks reached Rome,the pope and his entourage were seized by outright panic.
The Hungarian emissaries also continuously lobbied for assistance at the Imperial diets. At the diets of 1522 and
1523, as well asat the meeting of Wiener Neustadt in 1523, where military expertsdelegated by the Imperial diet
negotiated with the Hungarians, thefollowing was made crystal clear: the empire could not contributebecause of the
emperor's war; there could be no question of regularhelp, only of occasional assistance; but even occasional help
wasbound to arrive late in a given crisis, because the specific unit ofassistance--the so-called "Romzug" or
"Turkenhilfe"--was grantedfor only six months. Deducting the month and a half or two monthsrequired for marching
to the area of conflict and back, this impliedonly four months of actual fighting. The bond uniting the Imperiallands,
never strong to begin with, was becoming increasingly looserbecause of the progress of Protestantism. Luther
himself, while hedid not reject the notion of an anti-Turkish war outright, wasagainst the idea of such a war being
led by the emperor or pope. TheGerman troops refused to accept their salary in Hungarian coinssince their intrinsic
value had diminished by one half as a result ofthe debasement of the currency. The estates within the Empiretotally
distrusted the Hungarian government on account of theanarachy prevailing in the country. Ferdinand of Habsburg
himselfdid not expect much to come out of Imperial assistance. In May 1523he wrote to Louis II: "both of us are
lost, because it is impossible toresist such a powerful enemy as the Turk.... As for the assistancefrom the Empire,
well, it is not worth a wooden penny." [187]
Poland, whose ruler was tied to the king of Hungary by closekinship relations, would have been the most natural
ally, all themore so since Sigismund was just as worried about Habsburg ruleover Hungary as Suleyman was. On
one occasion he averred: "Wewill take care not to allow anyone [but specifically Ferdinand ofHabsburg] to usurp
the rule of our cousin [Louis II], especially notsomeone of whom we disapprove." [188] We have seen, however,
whatpressure the Ottomans had applied to Poland, pressure compoundedby the kings confrontations with the
Teutonic Knights and theRussians.
The interests of Venice and the Ottoman Empire were not at odds;in fact, they coincided entirely. Both were directly
concerned when the European balance was upset by Charles V. Moreover, only theOttomans could help Venice
displace the Portuguese from the spicetrade, whereas the Ottomans could not do without the expertise ofthe
Republic's experienced merchants. Venice, which until then hadmade considerable sacrifices to help defend the
castles of Dalmatiaand Croatia, was now contributing, but only reluctantly, whereasmore than once she had
provided the Turks with outright support forone or another of their undertakings.
Thus the diplomatic situation was at its very worst from theHungarian point of view, and it was made worse still by
the economic depression within the country. The losses of territory merelyincreased the expense of maintaining the
castles and the alreadylopsided imbalance in state revenues.
The royal council briefed Bishop Brodarics, Hungary's ambassador to Rome, as follows:
We have lost Osztrovica, and more losses are to come; the troubles aregetting progressively worse. Hungary's
meager revenues are insufficient for the defense of such an extensive line of border castles. TheCrown had
enjoyed large incomes from Bosnia, sizable tax returnscame to fill the treasury, from Croatia and Dalmatia,
even under KingMatthias; the lower region--Temes, Srem, Pozsega, and Valko--werestill intact, and the enemy
far less strong, now those areas are exposedto destruction, to such an extent that the defense of the scattered
fortsin the areas that are still in our hands require frightful investments.Thirty-two thousand pieces of gold are
needed every year to pay thebans of Croatia and to supply the country's castles, even in time ofpeace. In the
Jajce, surrounded by the enemy...food and arms may beintroduced only under strong escort; hence it costs
almost as much.Temesvar, Szoreny [Severin], and recently also Petervarad and Titelabsorb incredible sums
each year. If we take all this into considerationit becomes evident that Osztrovica and the castles lost earlier
fell not asa result of neglect on our part t, but because of our poverty You writethat His Holiness would be more
favorably disposed towards us if Hebegins to hear more encouraging news about the state of our country.We
wish we could write to him of better fortune in the future! But,knowing our situation, we fear that the contents of
our letters arebound to become increasingly grim, unless His Holiness and the Christian rulers come to our
help with deeds and not with words alone. [189]
In this hopeless situation, negotiations with a Turkish emissarywere renewed in Buda in February 1524. It is not
possible to deter-mine whether the emissary had arrived just recently, or whetherthis was the same person who had
arrived in 1520 and who might have been kept captive every since. [190] We do know, however, that
thenegotiations were conducted in secret and that the emissary wasunder guard, presumably to prevent him from
communicating withthe uninitiated. [191] Secrecy was so well maintained that only one ofthe diplomats stationed in
Buda, the nimble Venetian ambassador,well endowed in funds, and an expert in such matters, got wind ofthe
negotiations. He reported the matter to Venice, whence the newsspread, via the court in Rome, to Ferdinand of
Habsburg. Ferdinandfelt hurt and wrote to Louis II in an unusually tough tone: "According to my information the
secret peace negotiations" had advanced toa point where "they say they are near conclusion", but let Louis noteven
think of signing peace because, even if there were no treaty ofalliance between them, kinship would suffice in itself
to oblige himnot to reach agreements without consulting the other. Let him,therefore, refrain from taking this step
"as a result of which he[Louis] would get into a predicament from which there was noreturn. If it was a matter of
those conditions that have been reportedto us by the Pope, then it would merely prepare for your and yourcountry's
demise." [192]
Furthermore, Ferdinand rudely admonished Schneidpock, hisambassador in Buda, for not having obtained
knowledge of theaffair. [193] Schneidpock defended himself, and it is thanks to his replies, discovered only
recently, that historians have been able togain some insight on the negotiations. Towards the end of
AprilSchneidpock wrote a letter to justify himself to Salamanca, Ferdinand's chief minister; in it he described the
information that theHungarians wanted to sign a treaty of alliance with the Porte as"empty prattle." In the following
days he reported directly to Ferdinand, informing him that he had made inquiries of the Hungarianking, the queen,
as well as the papal nuncio, yet none of them knewanything about the matter. In a further letter to Ferdinand, dated
May 4, he reported that: the papal nuncio refused to disburse themoneys allocated to the Hungarians by Rome
whereupon theythreatened to accept the stipulations of the Porte, which includedpaying tribute and allowing the
Ottoman armies the right of transit.But the same false rumors were spread by the Hungarians atNurnberg, in order to
extort as much money as possible from thediet. Schneidpock concluded his letter: "From all this Your Majestywill
understand how this rumor arose. I get along well with theKing, Queen, and some of the secret councilors as regards
theaffairs that are settled here, but none of them knows anything aboutthe matter; finally, an individual told me
about the origins of therumor, just as I had described it here." [194]
However, Schneidpock's information about the negotiations ishard to believe in its entirety. I am skeptical when he
writes thatneither king nor queen knew anything about the matter; the issuebeing top secret, they had to deny
everything by virtue of their office.To say that the royal couple was ignorant of the matter provesnothing. It is
obvious that the ambassador was quite uninformedand irresponsibly concocted false stories regarding the
extortionindulged in by the Hungarians in order to mislead his superior(s)and to cover up his mistake.[195]
I am of the opinion that the secret negotiations did indeed includethe topic of tribute and the right of free passage for
the Ottomanforces. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that, on June 19,Burgio appealed to the Hungarian
grandees not to conclude a peacetreaty. On December 29 the nuncio informed Rome that, according toTomori, the
Hungarians could obtain peace if they would only allowthe Ottomans to cross Hungarian territory. [196]
Edgar Artner writes, apparently on the basis of a document in theVatican archives, that Tomori went to Buda in
January 1525 topersuade the government to conclude a peace, even at the expense ofallowing the right of transit.
The following year, a month before thebattle of Mohacs, he again appealed to the king to conclude a peacetreaty.
[197]
Also, we know that Tomori had negotiated with Bali Bey, thecommander of Belgrade, on two occasions. According
to Artner: "Thewhole thing was, in fact, a ruse concocted by Bali Beg, to obtainHungarian secrets, as Campeggio
had suspected all along." [198] It isdifficult to accept, albeit not impossible, that Campeggio saw matters in this
light, for it is unlikely that he would be kept informed ofthe nature of the negotiations. But the historian cannot be
satisfiedwith such an explanation. There are two things we cannot assumeabout Bali Bey, who happened to be one
of the most outstandingsoldiers of the Empire. One is that he had no recourse other than toobtain secrets from
Tomori, while he himself was in charge of anexcellent intelligence service collecting information about
Hungary.The other unbelievable notion is that Bali Bey should deem his greatand much-feared adversary Tomori,
the one so feared by soldiers, asthe kind or person who would blabber about state secrets. It is morelikely that the
two leaders were appointed by their respective governments to meet and to discuss some especially important
topic,and this topic could only have been peace. If these negotiations led tono results, the reason ought to be sought
in the fact that Bali Beg, oninstructions from his government, continued to demand the right offree transit,
something Tomori could not grant without royal authorization.
The dispatches from Bishop Brodarics for this period are highlyrelevant. Brodarics had been sent as ambassador to
Rome. Theobject of his mission was to convince the papal court to restore peacein Europe, as well as to solicit
financial assistance. Viewing mattersfrom closer up he noted, with growing pessimism, that there wasalmost no
hope of obtaining financial help. Brodarics related hisexperiences in several letters to the king of Poland, with whom
hewas on good terms. Thus, in the summer of 1523, he wrote: '"There isalmost nothing left of the hope of peace
among the Christian rulers,',whereas the financial assistance, although often discussed, wasnowhere in sight. The
news from Buda was that they intended toconclude peace with the Turks, something that considerably
worriedpeople in Rome. Papal envoys promised "heaven and earth", butgave nothing. Brodarics, therefore,
requested that Sigismund talk toLouis about seeking a solution "rather than count on peace [amongEuropean rulers]
or financial assistance, and lose the country as aresult, God forbid!" Indeed, it is amazing that Louis would not listen
to Sigismund, and "conclude peace or armistice especially since theChristian rulers are at war with one another, and
there is absolutelyno hope for help." And Brodarics formulated that great truth ofRealpolitik: he who gains time,
gains life. "It would be advisable toconclude an armistice, and both majesties [Sigismund and Louis]would then be
free to settle matters to their satisfaction....,[199]
Indeed, Poland was able to conclude peace with the Ottomansunder different circumstances; yet it appears that
Brodarics felt thatpeace was the only chance of survival for Hungary, even consideringthe far more burdensome
stipulations the Hungarians had to face.when, after Mohacs, peace was concluded between Suleyman andKing John
at the price of those very conditions, Brodarics wrote thathe stuck to his opinion, already expressed to the late King
Louis,that "Hungary's only refuge is friendship with the Turks." [200]
A serious imperative must have prompted Brodarics, one of themost honest figures of the generation of Mohacs, to
write such words.This imperative could have been nothing else than a wish to save thecountry from annihilation.
Szekfu did not recognize this--or refusedto recognize it--when he wrote: 'This respect for and inherited fearof the
Turks was derived from his south Slav lineage, for the Turkshad been torturing the Southern Slavs for two hundred
years; thiswas what clouded the lucidity of Brodarics' political judgment, andconverted him into the foremost
theoretical and practical advocate ofan alliance with the Turks." [201] Apart from the fact that such a thesisis
inadmissible from a methodological perspective because it makesuse of the vague motion of national character (not
to mention itsnationalist overtones), it is also vulnerable because it entirely disregards political reality, that is, the
fact that the Hungarians shouldindeed have explored every avenue for a modus vivendi with theTurks. Instead,
Szekfu seems to expect some romantic, unrealistic,almost Don Quixotesque attitude from the generation of
Mohacs.This perception has become practically the ideology of Hungarianhistoriography since the nineteenth
century. For example, accordingto one of Hungary's greatest historians, Laszlo Szalay:
Help was needed once again. And let the young reader not think thatthere was something humiliating for the nation
in this constantbegging for help. Far from it. The solution Venice, France, and KingSigismund had found, to
conclude peace and even an alliance with the Turk, and thus to be safe from his might, was likewise available to
theHungarians. Such overtures were indeed made to the court at Buda bySuleyman, as well as by his predecessors;
the haughtiness with whichthe ambassador of Wassily who, in the name of the tsar wanted toconclude close
friendship with the Sultan, was turned away, would nothave applied in the case of Hungary. But the proud nation
refused toturn unfaithful to its traditional policy, even in its decline and fall; evenin its misery, brought upon it by
the government and the oligarchy, itinsisted on continuing to serve the cause of Christianity and civilization. [202]
One is simply astonished; here we have a vision of the "proudHungarian nation" which, knowing no compromise or
humility,bares its chest and shouts to the world "thrust your dagger here!"This attitude--the oft-mentioned Mohacs
complex--has been passedon from generation to generation. It was the attitude of Pal Torok inhis discussion of the
peace proposal of 1524 and his refusal toconcede the possibility of a proposal from the Süleyman to Louis II. [203]
It is a fact that there is no record in writing of the conditionstipulated by the sultan, the right of transit. Yet, in the
knowledgeof the circumstances, I assert with conviction that the sultan couldnot have asked for less. As regards the
declaration, although warwas never declared formally, both times after the proposals of peacewere turned down the
Ottomans actually launched a war--in 1521after the proposal of 1520, and in 1526 after the proposal of 1524.
Pal Torok states correctly that Brodarics made no mention of theOttoman peace proposal in his description of the
battle of Mohacs.Istvanffy and other historians of the past 150 years also skirt aroundthe issue, and Szalay, as we
have seen, does not mention it explicitly.Fraknoi and Szekfu are totally silent about the matter. Since we arefamiliar
with Brodarics's attitude from his correspondence the question remains, why did he keep silent about the matter in
his Descriptio? (We shall see, further on, that this description is unreliable, fora number of reasons.) One reason is
that it was actually meant as adefensive response to the accusations Cuspinianus had raisedagainst the Hungarians.
[204] Moreover, the first representative of the"Mohacs complex" was precisely Brodarics. The tendency to seek
theexplanation of the demise of the powerful Hungarian state of theMiddle Ages in the personal weaknesses of its
rulers (unless he doesthis in spite of his personal convictions) is already manifest in his writings. He avoids the
notion that this demise might have been historically determined or produced by other factors.
As noted, Pal Torok states that the Ottomans asked for the rightof free passage only across Croatia. It is difficult to
see why theTurks would confine themselves to this request which, at best, mighthave facilitated a decisive assault on
Italy but not a campaignagainst Austria or the Holy Roman Empire. Because of the Alps theonly possible line of
attack against Austria led across the Hungarianplains, especially since the Turkish army could hardly have
donewithout the Danube as its main line of supply.
There are two other relevant developments in the period 1522 to1526. One of these was the peace treaty the Poles
signed with theTurks. King Sigismund wanted to include Hungary in the treaty; hewrote to the Primate of
Esztergom, in the summer of 1525: "We havebeen waiting rather a long time...for His Majesty King Louis
toconsider and conclude a peace with the emperor [Süleyman], butsince all this time we have been unable to obtain
assurances in thatregard from His Majesty we decided to send our own ambassador tothe Emperor of the Turks."
[205] He did instruct his ambassador, however, to represent the cause of the Hungarians as well and to try toinclude
them in the treaty. He informed the pope of the dispatch ofthe ambassador: '<Your Holiness may recall that your
predecessorshave promised, to me and to His Majesty King Louis that, bringingabout peace among the Christian
rulers, preparations would bemade for the great campaign; trusting in this promise I and mymajestic cousin [Louis]
have both suffered considerable damages...."Hence, he states, he had no choice but to conclude peace with theTurks.
[206]
Brodarics reported to Sigismund regarding the effect of this measure on diplomatic circles in Rome: everyone
understood his decisionand would not be surprised "if Hungary were to follow the exampleset by your Majesty."
[207] Indeed, the Polish emissary did bring up atthe Porte the matter of concluding peace with the
Hungarians,although we do not know whether he had authorization from theHungarian government. The Ottoman
leaders, however, insisted theHungarians sue for peace via its own emissary.
The other development closely related to the events precedingMohacs, while of an internal and economic nature,
transcended these to become a European affair. [208] The episode began as early as1495. At that time Janos Thurzo
signed a contract with the Fuggerfamily to exploit the country's richest copper ore resources atBesztercebanya and
vicinity. Implicit in this joint enterprise wasparticipation in the exploitation and minting of silver. This
"jointenterprise", however, was canceled temporarily by the Diet atRakos, held in the summer of 1525. This diet
declared, on the onehand, the cessation of minting the nova moneta, introduced in 1521,worth less than its face
value, and raised completely groundlessaccusations of fraud against a Christianized Jew, one Imre Szerencses. On
the other hand, the contract with the Fuggers (or theFukars--the "stingy ones" as they were called in Hungary)
regarding the exploitation of the mines was denounced. In fact, the Fuggerswere required to pay damages. The diet
went even further. Themasses were instigated, according to contemporary reports, by the"Hungarian lords and their
party followers," to plunder the house ofSzerencses. This was followed by an assault on the depots in Buda aswell
and the confiscation of the moneys found there, including thepapal aid which had been deposited by Burgio. A few
weeks later, atthe gathering of the lesser nobility in Hatvan, Imre Szerencsesturned from accused to plaintiff and,
citing figures out of the blue,enumerated the damages the Fuggers had caused the country. Theroyal court, and
probably some foreign entrepreneurs competingagainst the Fuggers, backed Szerencses. So it happened that theagent
of the Fuggers at Buda, now held captive, was forced to writea promissory note to the effect that his masters would
reimburse theHungarian government for the damages caused. Of course, thehouse of Fuggers, more precisely Jacob
Fugger, did not leave thematter at that. Denying the claims of Szerencses, he wrote his agentat Cracow: "I will
demand that everything taken from me be returned. Let them cover the debt owed by the king, as well as thesums I
had paid out to the Hungarians on the basis of the contract,and furthermore, [demand] that I be reinstated in the
business." [209]He added:
I have already arranged that Hungarian copper not be transportedacross Austrian lands, and I will try, and I hope
will succeed, inpreventing copper from crossing German lands as well.... Insofar asyou can, stop shipments of lead
to Hungary.... Production will soon haltin the gold mines; we have already ordered such a halt in our own mines. We
can see that not much more than half the previous rate isbeing produced in the silver mines. Thus, our business will
be increasingly missed, day after day, and the country of the Hungarians will seehow far it can get by its methods.
[210]
Jacob Fugger also resorted to political pressures. He solicitedmoral support from practically every court in Europe,
and indeed hegot some. Everyone from the German emperor to the pope took upthe Fuggers' cause; Charles V even
threatened to mobilize his wholeempire against the Hungarians. The pope warned Louis: "Demandand insist that
justice be done to the Fuggers." [211] Even Ferdinand ofHabsburg blamed his brother-in-law, Louis. Finally, the
Hungariangovernment was forced to back down. It restored the rights of theFuggers and paid damages, while the
government received a loan of50,000 forints. To quote Hermann: "Giving an account of this 50,000forint loan
Dernschwam [the agent of the Fuggers] observed: 'thiswas the small sum of money available to King Louis to
prepare forthe Turkish attack., Suleyman's army started out from Turkey theday after the contract was signed." [212]
We must consider, moreover, the political struggle waged withinthe country which had almost completely paralyzed
the government.At Hatvan the lesser nobility expelled Bathory from his office ascount palatine and placed Werboczi
in his stead, but the latter had toflee for his live in the summer of 1526, leaving the office once againin the hands of
Bathory. Thus, on the eve of Mohacs, Hungary wasleft to its own devices, struggling with a thousand political
andeconomic ills, militarily unprepared. The Ottomans, on the otherhand, had created a clear-cut situation,
diplomatically and militarily.They had concluded peace with all potential enemies: Persia, Venice,Poland, and
Wallachia. The army too had done good work. While itwas unable to capture Jajce and some other castles, it did
takeOrsova and Severin. These two castles were significant because theyhad provided the Hungarians with a base
for expeditions againstWallachia; moreover, they controlled Danubian shipping, not onlyfrom a military but also
from an engineering point of view.
The Ottomans had responded to the rejection of their first peaceproposal with the occupation of Belgrade; now, in
1524, no one,whether in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe, doubted that theHungarian reluctance to sign for peace
would elicit yet another
Turkish attack. This came only in 1526, the cause of the delay being,almost certainly, the need to consolidate control
over Egypt, economically so critical for the Empire. The importance Suleymanattached to this control was
demonstrated, as we have seen, by hisdispatch of the grand Vezir himself to Egypt. Having returned fromhis mission
in September 1525 Ibrahim reacted to the situation byimmediately presenting to Suleyman the plan against the
Portuguese elaborated by Selman Reis. The divan, however, decided thatthe Hungarian issue had to be resolved
first. [213]
Indeed, the resolution of the issue brooked no further delay. InFebruary 1525 Francis I suffered a decisive defeat at
Pavia, the kinghimself falling into the hands of the emperor. There can be no doubtthat Suleyman quickly learned of
the events and that he recognizedtheir implications. what he, along with several other Europeanrulers had feared
now came to pass: Charles V, having defeated theFrench, was absolute lord over Europe. However, we may take it
forgranted that the attack against Hungary was not decided on therequest of the king of France. The statement of
Kemal Pashazademust be given a broad interpretation: "One of the reasons, amongseveral, for this great campaign,
was the promise given the king ofFrance, who had shown inclination and friendship towards theexalted Porte,
regarding his liberation from the oppression of Hispania's ruler [Charles V]." [214] France had sent two emissaries
torequest assistance: one was killed while crossing Bosnia--hencethat request did not reach the Porte--while the
other arrived inDecember 1525, the campaign having been decided upon long ago; infact, the army was already
mobilizing. The mobilization before theemissary's arrival must be emphasized because the interpretation isoften
given that the policies of the Turks were strongly influenced byFrench diplomacy. My conviction is that this was not
the case. I tendto agree with those who claim that the Porte derived greater benefitsfrom Franco-Turkish
collaboration than did the French. [215]
Thus the campaign of 1526, leading to the Hungarian defeat atMohacs, got under way. A detailed account of the
campaign will befound in the second part of our work.

The Apparent Realization of Suleymans Concept in 1529

[216]
According to the Turkish chroniclers, Suleyman launched the waragainst Hungary in 1526 as a "warning, to King
Louis. The warningsucceeded only too well since, as a consequence of the kings death,the inheritance treaty
between the Habsburgs and the Jagiellosautomatically went into effect. Suleyman had actually promoted thevery
thing he was guarding against: Habsburg influence in Hungary.
Suleyman was quick to recognize the unpleasant, even disastrous,consequence of his overwhelming victory. From
Buda he sent amessage to Queen Mary in which he virtually expressed regretsregarding the affair and informed her
that he came to Hungary notto deprive Louis II of his throne but rather--and here he resorted totraditional Turkish
phraseology--in order to take "revenge for theoffense he had suffered." If the king had lived then Suleyman
wouldhave allowed him to retain his throne in exchange for a certaintribute and would have given him back his
country. [217]
Vezir Mustafa expressed himself in similar terms to the Venetianambassador in 1528: the sultan had not intended to
conquer Hungary, but merely to take control of its "keys"; in former times Selimhad conquered Tabriz, yet he had
retained only Diarbekr out of all ofPersia. [218] Here we must understand the term "keys" symbolically,because
once the principal key, Belgrade, had been captured, thecastles acquired in 1526 were not nearly as significant.
Actually, theterm refers to the objective attained by war with a limited objective,namely, that Hungary's prospects
for an ultimate victory had beenreduced to near zero.
It was also in the interest of Ferdinand of Habsburg to obtaincontrol of Hungary. In one of his letters dating from
1532 he evaluated Hungary's significance as follows: the country was the size oftwo ordinary kingdoms, and it
would be a disgrace to allow the Turksto take it over. Hungary supplied the hereditary provinces withmeat and other
food items and, moreover, formed a "protective wall"against the Turks. Should the Turk lay hands on Hungary, he
wouldnot cease his destructive incursions into Austria, even if he did conclude peace. The castles of Hungary--that
is, Gyor, Komarom,and others in the Western region--could not be replaced. Furthermore, there was none better than
the Hungarian light cavalry; itwas the only worthy opponent of the Turks. [219]
Consequently, Hungary became a bone of contention between timeOttomans and the West and this position resulted
in its demise. TheHungarians, alone in all of Europe, may pride themselves that theirswas the only country described
as a "defensive bastion" both byChristians and by Moslems.
To return to the Turkish point of view, we may recall that Fernand Braudel criticized the Ottoman leadership for
becoming involved in European great power politics while losing sight of its trueinterests in the Near and Far East.
[220] I have noted that this involvement was not entirely left up to the Turks. More precisely, it was notas if they
had failed to recognize where their true interest lay; fromthe moment Constantinople became its capital, the Empire
seemedto move along a set of tracks: it was not possible to protect the capitalwithout controlling the Balkans, and
this fact naturally led to confrontation with Hungary, and then with the Habsburgs. At the sametime, the Ottomans
also could not forego the is]ands of theMediterranean, for without them their position in the Near Eastwould be in
jeopardy.
From this perspective it was entirely logical on the part of Suleyman to send another emissary to Buda, as soon as
the "nationalparty" had elected Janos (John) Szapolyai as king and the Habsburgparty had elected Ferdinand.
Although the emissary stayed thereincognito, and precious little of the negotiations leaked out, thosefamiliar with
the ways of diplomacy assumed it was a matter ofconcluding some type of treaty. In any case, the ambassadors
assigned to Buda reported to their respective governments that ifFerdinand did not give up his rights and demands
regarding Hungary and decided to attack instead, Szapolyai would turn to theTurks for help. [221]
Hungarian historians are divided three ways with regard to John.According to one interpretation, John, driven by
unbridled ambition,"discarded his scruples" and allied himself with the Turks. [222] In asecond interpretation, he
decided to take such a step only afterFerdinand attacked him in 1527 and chased him out of Buda. Thefinal
interpretation is that John allied himself with the Ottomans onthe advice of, and even under pressure from, France
and, especially,Venice.
In my opinion none of these interpretations is correct, but, each ofthem contains an element of truth. We have seen
that the peace to beconcluded with the Turks--which, of course, entailed some form ofdependence--was certainly not
a novel idea on the part of Hungarian governments. It is hardly conceivable, therefore, that John hadnot pondered
the possibility of an alliance with the Ottomans fromthe very beginning, given that the situation was steadily
deteriorating. John did send emissaries to consult with practically every courtin Europe in the interest of the great
crusade to be launched againstthe Ottomans. Nevertheless, the futility of the undertaking wasclear to him from the
beginning. Hence his diplomatic moves mustbe viewed as nothing more than some type of self justification
orwindow-dressing.
Yet we must also assume that, much as Louis II and his advisershad been strongly hampered from entering into
alliance with the"pagan" Turks by ideological considerations, neither did John opt forthat course light-heartedly. In
any case, we have primary sourcesbearing upon the matter. According to these, John turned to thescriptures for help
in reaching a decision. He summoned two monksfor council and asked them whether a Christian ruler might
enterinto alliance with the Turkish unbeliever? Verancsics states "Reading the New Testament, King John realized
that he might call uponthe Turks for help. The friars found the following in the NewTestament: `whoever does him
well, is his kin.'" [223]
We are bound to reach the same conclusion from the fact that
while the Turkish emissary had reached Buda in December 1526, itwas only in October, 1527, from Kolozsvar,
where John had takenrefuge from Ferdinand's attack, that he sent the Polish noblemanJerome Lasky to offer homage
to the sultan. Bardossy is correct inpointing out that "if John had finally decided to ask the Porte forassistance, it
would have been wiser if he had done it sooner." [224] But,as we have seen, the considerations coming into play
were not allrational ones, but emotional, moral, and ethical as well.
Of course, we must also realize that had John made up his mindalready at the time of the arrival of the Turkish
emissary it wouldnot have been possible to prepare the ground for a diplomatic moveof such great import, given the
communication and transportationconditions of the age. It was especially important to obtain themediation of some
third power; clearly this power had to be Venice,which was on rather tense terms with the Habsburgs, but
maintained friendly relations with the Turks. [225] Indeed, Venice fully livedup to expectations and prepared the
ground in Constantinople sowell that Lasky, who reached the capital in December, was receivedat the Porte after a
surprisingly short delay. In fact, he held in hishands the treaty, countersigned by the sultan, by the end of January.
We may logically assume from this unusual promptness thatagreement with John was also important for the Porte.
According to the treaty of alliance, the sultan "returned" Hungaryto John and, without even demanding tribute,
promised supportagainst the Habsburgs. There was no possibility of providing suchsupport that year, however,
although that was precisely what Johnneeded given that Ferdinand was continuing the hostilities and hadeven forced
John out of Hungary.
With the treaty in his hands John coped relatively well with thebitter taste of emigre life in Poland; in fact, he was
actively organizing against Ferdinand. He sent agents into Hungary, first of all,Friar George (who made his first
historical appearance), and theyprepared the ground for Szapolyai's return. John's task was madeconsiderably lighter
by the fact that, as a consequence of the unbridled plundering by foreign mercenaries, hatred toward the Germans,
only smoldering until then, leaped up in flames. Furthermore, the campaign announced by the Turks for the
following year madeeven the convinced pro-Habsburg elements think again. Thus Ferdinand's position in the
country was thoroughly shaken.
The Hungarian campaign of the following year was already decided in the fall of 1528 by the Porte. In discussing
the events of 1529Eurocentric and Hungarocentric historians usually limit themselvesto a discussion of the
Hungarian aspects and to the siege of Vienna.Yet, from the Ottoman perspective, there were two other
importantevents. while one of these was not directly related to the policies ofthe Porte, almost certainly it did not
elude the attention of Turkishstatesmen. This event was the venture of the pirate chief Hayreddinon the island of
Penon, into the harbor of the port of Algiers. Bytaking possession of this island Hayreddin became the
uncontestedmaster of the coast of North Africa. While this was a most dangerousdevelopment for Charles V, it was
a very favorable one for theOttomans. Thus, it became imperative to win over the pirate chief--something which the
Ottomans managed to accomplish in 1532.[226]
The other event, while significant militarily and politically, wasnevertheless primarily of economic importance:
work had begun onthe canal connecting the Nile and the Red Sea. [227] The project'sobjective was obvious: to
ensure an uninterrupted waterway for thespice trade, all the way from India to the Mediterranean Sea.
These two events were relevant for two reasons. First, they confirm the point which I have made repeatedly:
Ottoman policies werebeing developed on a world-scale. From this assertion I also concludethat the 1529 campaign
was important mainly because of the security which it signified for the Ottomans. In contrast, the events ofNorth
Africa and of the Near and Far East affected the very being ofthe Ottoman Empire economically, politically, and
militarily. Hencethere is even less reason to believe that, as some scholars haveasserted recently, the Ottoman Turks
also intended to bring Austriaunder their rule as part of, or in addition to their world-wide agenda.
The army of the sultan reached Belgrade on July 17, and, exactlyone month later, arrived at the field of Mohacs
where the famousmeeting between Suleyman and King John took place. The survivingreports of the meeting contain
conflicting information. However, it iscertain that Suleyman received John with great pomp and ceremony, as
behooves a sovereign ruler. The discussions took place inSuleyman's tent. It is not known exactly what topics they
touched upon, but the report of Bishop Ferenc Frangepan, a member ofJohn's retinue, seems reliable: "It was
decided that we be allowed tolive by our own laws, and that we may retain the country in peace,without having to
pay tribute or accept [Turkish] sovereignty." [228] Ofcourse, not surrendering sovereignty to the sultan did not, for
allthat, imply that Hungary could follow a foreign policy conflictingwith Turkish objectives. Essentially, therefore,
the agreementmeant a relationship similar to the one that later evolved betweenthe sultan and Transylvania with one
important difference: unlikethe ruler of Transylvania, John was not required to pay tribute.
Principally, the Ottoman sources reveal that John kissed Suleyman's hand when they met. It is not easy to accept the
notion thatthe once so powerful king of Hungary was humbled to such a point;yet, we must think of John with
nothing but appreciation for thisultimate sacrifice for the sake of his country. Frangepan's reply tothe reproachful
letter of the Bishop of Ravello is indicative: "You say,he kissed the hand of the Turkish emperor. Well, what is
wrong withkissing the hand of a ruler? If we may kiss the foot of Christ'slieutenant for but small consideration in
return, why should we notkiss the hand of the lieutenant of Mehemmed, if by so doing we cansave so many souls?"
[229]
Advancing from Mohacs the Ottoman army reached the approaches of Buda on September 3 and was able to capture
the castle,defended by Ferdinand's troops, in a matter of days. The commanderof the castle, Tamas Nadasdy, was
taken prisoner. The sultan remained in Buda for only a few days, the army continuing on its wayfor the siege of
Vienna. First, however, he replaced John on histhrone, handing over the Hungarian crown which had fallen
intoOttoman hands.
The siege of Vienna was initiated on September 22. Ferdinand'sposition was not particularly rosy: Charles V, busy
in Italy, hadrequested troops from him. He received negligible help from hisprovinces or from the Holy Roman
Empire, and even that help wasslow in arriving. Thus, around September 20, when the Akindjiswere already raiding
the edges of the country, he still had no morethan 12,000 soldiers. Nevertheless, the charges of the enemy brokeup
against the walls of the castle thanks to the excellent organization of the defense, the heroic resistance of the
garrison, and, last butnot least, because of the Ottoman's lack of siege artillery. Finally, the Ottoman army, having
far exceeded its range of action andstruggling against confusion in timing, abandoned the siege andstarted for home.
The day of Kassim, the end of the campaignseason, was nearing, and, unfortunately for the Turkish army, thetrials
occasioned by the bleak weather, which set in unexpectedly,only added to its distress. After a difficult march the
army arrivedback in Buda by the end of October, almost like a defeated host.
As we have seen, the objective of the campaign was to restoreJohn to the throne and force Ferdinand to give up his
claim toHungary. The latter objective was not achieved, providing furtherevidence of the uncertainties involved in
wars with limited aims.But John's reign was indeed consolidated, at least temporarily. ThusSuleyman's concept
came near to realization: the king of Hungaryhad become his ally, and the country itself was a buffer zone vis-a-
visthe Habsburgs.
It required no particular genius on Suleyman and his advisers,part to realize that Szapolyai could fulfill his
obligations as an allyonly if his rule were consolidated and if the economic, political, andmilitary conditions of the
country improved. This is the only explanation for the following conditions enforced by Suleyman. He did
notrequire tribute, something almost unprecedented in the annals ofTurkish history. Furthermore, he advised his
troops to spare thecountry when crossing Hungary. His clerk noted in his diary forAugust 7: "It was announced in
the camp that all the belongings ofthe infidels could be taken from them, but their villages were not tobe set on fire,
and no one was to be taken captive." [230] For "all theirbelongings" we should probably understand food, forage,
beasts ofburden, and other items necessary to supply the army--somethingnatural even in present-day warfare. But
the fact that Suleymanprohibited arson and the capture of slaves is most noteworthy be-cause it was entirely unusual
in the course of Ottoman campaigns.As we have seen, the most important task of the irregulars wasprecisely to sow
terror, which they achieved primarily by burningsettlements to the ground. To forbid, in time of war, abduction of
theenemy's population was equally unheard of; after all, since theirregulars collected no pay, they obtained their
reward mainly byselling captives. Even the professional soldiers often obtained extraincome in this manner.
Incidentally, it is interesting that Szereminoted the prohibition of taking captives, yet added that the Ottoman troops,
demoralized by the unsuccessful siege of Vienna and thedifficult retreat, did not heed orders. He wrote:
King John received from the emperor of the Turks the captives they had taken. . .. And we, hearing that the emperor
intended to return the captives, felt elated. The king sent Gasser Raskay to the emperor, and he left with a
detachment. When he arrived, he immediately told the emperor that the king had sent for the captives. The emperor
gave instructions to Ajaz pasha to release the captives. But when the Turkish cavalrymen and janissary infantryman
heard this, they immediately began to shake their shaven heads and mutinously repeated: "That we give up our
captives? Impossible! Not a single one of the Hungarians will be returned. Let the emperor beware! . . .." Ajaz pasha
informed Gasser, to that effect through an interpreter, and Raskay got frightened. We expected him to return as the
savior of souls; but we saw him arrive without any of the captives. [231]
By returning the crown the sultan meant to legitimize John's rulein the eyes of his people. Djeladzade comments:
The king of Hungary had a crown called a korona, which was inlaid with precious stones and had considerable
value, and which had been removed from the treasury at Buda and placed in the possession of the Sultan. As long as
the kings are not in possession of the crown they cannot be the real rulers of the country and none of their subjects
obey their orders. Since, according to their laws, they respect that crown, and the validity of the king's orders
depends upon it, King John humbly requested the exalted court to return the crown. The graciousness of the
padishah manifested itself: he sent John the aforementioned artfully crafted crown inlaid with precious stones so that
now, in the completeness of his royal majesty, he may become glorious and outstanding among rulers by following
their tradition.[232]
Incidentally, what Djeladzade provides here is a wonderful summary of the essence of the "doctrine of the Holy
Crown -so wellinformed were the Turks regarding Hungarian matters.
The sultan intervened personally to enhance John's prestige. Hecalled a meeting at Obuda, and there he enjoined the
Hungarianlords to be loyal to John. Given his excellent feel for politics, the highpoint of the meeting, dramatically
set, came when Suleyman ledforth Archbishop Pal Varday and Peter Perenyi, Guardian of theCrown, under a guard
of honor (that is, in captivity), and releasedthem to the mercy of John, asking forgiveness on their behalf In order to
appreciate fully the significance of the episode we must become familiar with the events leading up to it. While Pal
Vardayhad intervened effectively on the side of John, he abandoned thelatter during the 1527 attack and went over
to Ferdinand. In 1529,however, when Süleyman marched against Vienna, Varday voluntarily joined the sultan with
600 cavalrymen. On October 5 Suleyman's clerk recorded the event in the following terms: "An infidel begcalled
Archbishop who, according to their religion, is the head of allthe ulemas [priests and scholars] in the county, and
above whomthere can be no other beg, paid homage to the padishah, and joinedthe camp of the Sultan." [233] The
event was also recorded as follows:The whole army greeted him [Varday] with great shouts of joy. Asthey said, it
was great joy for them to see the greatest priest of theChristian religion come over to their side. Süleyman himself
addressed him kindly, bidding him not to worry about anything." [234]Varday related the event in basically the
same terms. Suleyman, hewrote in a letter, gave him a better welcome than one might expecteven from a Christian
ruler and promised mercy to all those whoshifted their allegiance to John. [235]
Peter Perenyi had fallen into Ottoman captivity, along with thecrown in his custody, near Siklos. Much like Varday
he had abandoned John; thus he too was technically a traitor. Nevertheless,Suleyman did not encourage Szapolyai to
punish him but, on thecontrary, to take him back into his good graces. According to Istvanffy, John who, in any
case, was neither "merciless" nor "bloodthirsty," shook their hands, and restored their estates and their highoffices
on the spot. To be sure, John was prompted to forgive not onlyby Suleyman's intercession, nor even by his "kindness
of heart," butalso by his political acumen: after all, winning over the two influential lords could only help him
consolidate his power.
Szeremi is in basic agreement with other sources in his description of the meeting called by Suleyman:
In the meantime Archbishop Pal and Peter Perenyi returned from theemperor of the Turks bearing his
admonitions, that all the greatHungarian lords should heed King John. As for me [Suleyman], Ipromise, upon
my faith, the Prophet Mehemmed, and all my goodfortune that, if God be willing, I will return to you the entire
provinceof Srem, the castles and the estates, with the exception of only two, Belgrade and Sabac. Moreover, I
will return all the castles I havecaptured in Bosnia at the time of Laszlo [Wladislas II]. And I want youto take
an oath of loyalty to King John. And both of them personallyswore that they will serve King John as they had
previously [beforethey shifted their allegiance], and will be far from doing as the pharaohs [sic! for Pharisees]
had done. [236]
As already mentioned, Szeremi had a tendency to invent fables,yet some of his communications constitute valuable
sources. Thispart of his work, titled "About Hungary's Demise", is of decisiverelevance, for two reasons. First, it
jibes with Suleyman's oath,described above, with what is contained in the profession offaith he made to Lasky:
I, Sultan Suleyman...hereby swear that I will never forsake you, mybrother in faith, even if all my empires and
states and all my powershould crumble; and, even if I were left alone, or with merely one, two,or three, or what
would a]ready be a lot, four circumcised Moslems, Iwould still owe it to you to find you and to tell you, after I
have foundyou: 'Indeed, here I am, ready to do your bidding.' [237]
The other noteworthy part of Szeremi's text is Suleyman's declaration that he would retain Belgrade and Sabac and
return thecastles of the Srem and of Bosnia. The declaration fits perfectly wellwith my reconstruction of the Porte's
general policy. Belgrade andSabac, anoted, were essential to maintain control over Hungary. Evenif there is no
reason to doubt Suleyman's peaceful intentions regarding Hungary, it should be clear that he was not guided by
altruisticconsiderations, but strictly by a political rationale deriving from theinterests of the Ottoman Empire.
However, no policy can succeedunless backed by power. These two castles were precisely the key tothe application
of force. In short, should it occur to John to denouncethe alliance, Ottoman military power could make him think
again aslong as it controlled these two castles. On the other hand, relinquishing the castles of Bosnia entailed no
special sacrifice, for these didnot particularly facilitate political and military pressures againstHungary, whereas, in
the hands of the ally, John, they could stillserve the purpose of allowing Ottoman forces to advance acrossthem, and
even threaten the common enemy, Ferdinand of Habsburg, with their help.
Suleyman at least partially fulfilled his promise. In 1533 hereturned the province of Srem, along with Petervarad,
Szalankemen, Titel, and Eszek. We do not know about the return of thecastles of Bosnia; either Szeremi was not
well informed or--and thisseems more likely--the sultan considered it dangerous to entrustthe defense of these
castles to Hungarian forces, now that Ferdinandhad renewed his attacks.
Süleyman placed Tamas Nadasdy, another key personality ofHungarian domestic and foreign policy, on John's side.
Nadasdy, asmentioned, fell into Ottoman captivity at the siege of Buda. He hadsided with Ferdinand from the start,
playing a decisive role in theformation of the Habsburg party in Hungary and in the election ofFerdinand as king.
Now Suleyman gave him the choice: serve Johnor be executed. Of course, Nadasdy chose the first alternative.
Süleyman delegated Ludovico Gritti, the illegitimate son of theDoge of Venice, living in Constantinople, to stay by
John's side,along with some Ottoman troops. The mission of the extremelytalented Gritti was manifold: he
represented the interests of theEmpire in Hungary; he kept an eye on John and on the Hungarianlords; he functioned
as advisor, especially in economic matters; andfinally, he carried out quartermaster duties by setting up depots
tosupply the Ottoman army when crossing the country. Moreover, thesultan, in a most tactful manner, retained the
rights of militarysupervision. He left a garrison conspicuously at Eszek rather thansomewhere in the center of the
country, evidently with the purposeof securing this most important bridgehead if the army should haveto return to
Hungary to repel the attacks of the Habsburgs. Thismeasure was indeed justified since the military significance of
Eszekwas known to Vienna as well. In 1537 Vienna sent an army underthe command of Katzianer specifically to
take Eszek.
Such were the measures instituted by Suleyman for regularizingconditions in Hungary and for consolidating John's
rule. Obviously,they evince a high degree of political acumen.
How should the events of 1529 be interpreted today, given theresults of recent research and a diametrically different
historicalperspective? Certainly not the way Szekfu had done: "In this campaign Hungary no longer constituted an
obstacle for the Turk butrather an area of deployment which neither could, nor was willing toresist. The sword with
which Hungary had defended Christianityagainst the pagans for one hundred and fifty years had fallen fromher
hands; it had been knocked out by the civil war and by King Johnwhose three-year rule was long enough to bring
about this major change" [238] The pathos of these sentences is indeed moving andbeautiful! Their sentiment is a
worthy sequel to the picture LaszloSzalay had painted of the "stalwart Hungarian nation" which withstood the flood
of invasion and refused to be conquered. The onlyproblem is: the picture is readily proven to be false. Given
Szekfü'sgreat expertise and tremendous knowledge of the subject-matter, itcannot be assumed that he may have been
unaware of the facts,which were as follows. It was not King John who struck the swordout of Hungary's hand, and it
was not his three-year rule that put anend to the anti-Turkish struggles of the previous century and a half.His role
was to empty the bitter cup which the Jagellonian periodhad bequeathed him. Nor can it be assumed that Szekfü had
notread carefully this portion of Francis Frangepan's letter to theBishop of Ravello: "the truth is that those of us who
swear by KingJohn--and because of which the followers of Ferdinand refer to us asTurks--had we not preserved the
country until now, it would havebeen lost long ago by the good Christians of the party of Ferdinand?" [239]
Let me quote King John himself. In December 1529 the popeexcommunicated him for his alliance with the sultan.
(Incidentally,alliance with the Turks was by no means unheard of in the annals ofpapal diplomacy, and the
excommunication of John was dictated notby religious conviction, but by political necessity: it was Charles
V,plundering Rome and holding the pope hostage, who forced thehands of the pontiff.) John wrote:
Your holiness, instead of collecting souls as Peter had done when hetook in Cornelius and a hundred of his
followers, has thrust thousandsof souls out of the Church. I declare, in front of God, Your Holiness, andthe
whole Christian world, that I am content with my fate, that I do notcovet the provinces or countries of others,
that I do not wish harm ordanger to befall upon anyone but let me live in this much abusedcountry of mine and
serve God and Christianity. If I am not given thischance then I assure Your Holiness that I will defend myself
and mycountry by every means at my disposal...although I have no intentionof stepping out from the embrace of
the Church of whom I have alwaysbeen an obedient son. [240]
It is a pity that Szekfü paid no attention to these lines which areimbued with John's sense of devotion to his country.
All things considered, 1529 was a most important landmark in thehistory of Turkish-Hungarian relations. In
Hungary, the issue ofOttoman orientation, long in question, was finally decided. Hungarybecame a buffer state and,
what is more, the "defensive bastion ofIslam" in the face of Christianity. The solution must have satisfiedboth
parties completely. Hungary was granted the peace she neededso badly. She no longer had to fight the hopeless
struggle against theOttomans and, at the same time, received protection against theHabsburgs; it follows
automatically that Ferdinand too would haveto give up his hopeless struggle for the country; hence the danger
offoreign wars, as well as of civil wars, receded into the distance. Whatdid the future bring, and how long did the
country have to suffer theconsequences of loss of independence? Under the given circumstances--the tremendous
misery pervading the country--this question could not become the subject of deliberations, especially sincethe
prerequisite for overcoming Ottoman dependence was peace andcollaboration amongst the European powers. It was
far beyond thepotential of the Hungarian government to bring about such peaceand cooperation; whereas the
Ottoman Empire, having eliminatedthe Habsburg danger, could now focus its attention and energies onthe affairs of
the Near and Far East.
This interpretation has but one weak link: name]y, that whileSuleyman did succeed in chasing Ferdinand out of the
country in1529, he was nevertheless unable to bid him to do his will because ofthe failure of the campaign against
Vienna. Hence Ferdinand neverdid give up his claim to Hungary. This in turn meant that Ferdinandwould not halt
his attacks against Hungary; hence neither foreignnor domestic wars would cease; hence John's rule could not
beconsolidated. It was only a relatively strong Hungary that couldhave performed the function Suleyman had
assigned to it. As forFerdinand's renewed attacks, the Porte could not defend Hungaryagainst them because, as we
have seen, Buda was closer to Viennathan to Istanbul or even to Belgrade. The limits of operations of theOttoman
army--deriving from its "range of action"--were also thelimits of Turkish policy. Ottoman leaders were perfectly
aware thatthey could not annex Vienna, but they had not reckoned with thepossibility of besieging it in vain. The
lesson learned in 1529 deter-mined Ottoman strategy for the next century and a half, inasmuchas the siege of Vienna
was not attempted again until 1683. Thefailure of the siege could lead to but one conclusion: greater spacehad to be
conceded to diplomatic negotiations, and John had to be given a greater role in them. In fact, he even attempted to
concludepeace with Ferdinand by direct negotiation.
On the other hand, Ferdinand and the Hungarian ruling class--tobe more precise, only part of that class, for the time
being--came tothe conclusion, following 1529 and the unsuccessful Ottoman campaign of 1532 which ended near
Koszeg, that Suleyman's hand couldnot reach Vienna and reached even Buda only with difficulty; hencethe
protection he had promised Szapolyai was of dubious value.Indeed, such was the case, and this explains the events
of the comingyears, and the abandonment of a Suleyman's proposal" in 1541.

Events From Late 1529 to 1538

[241]
As soon as the Ottoman army had left Hungary, Ferdinand renewed his attack. Although relatively small forces took
part, theresults achieved were nevertheless significant: the western parts ofTransdanubia, Nagyszombat, Trencsen,
Eger, and Kassa all fell intoFerdinand's possession. Moreover, the Saxons of Transylvania sidedwith him. The civil
war continued.
John got into a most difficult situation. The troops of Ferdinand,continuing their campaign in 1530, once again
placed Buda undersiege. That would have been trouble enough in itself, but then camea completely unexpected
blow: the Ottoman relief forces, whose taskwould have been to compel the Austrian army to retreat by breakinginto
and destroying Austria and Moravia, destroyed and plunderedCsallokoz Island in the Danube instead--an area spared
until then.They took Hungarian men, women, and children captive. Accordingto some sources this was the result of
a misunderstanding, theOttoman forces being under the impression that they had alreadyreached Austrian territory.
Of course, this interpretation is hard toaccept, especially since the Ottoman commander refused to returnthe captives
even after he was informed they were Hungarians.While this expedition did not meet Suleyman's expectations in
theleast, John's position also was not made any easier: the fact wasundeniable, the Ottoman ally was devastating and
plundering Hungary.
In October 1530, at a time when Ferdinand was still engaged inthe siege of Buda, his emissaries reached
Constantinople to offerpeace and tribute to the sultan, in exchange for acceptance of Habsburg claims to Hungary.
Naturally the sultan refused to negotiateon such a basis. He sent Ferdinand the following message:
Hungary is mine because I conquered it with my saber; if something ismine, I may give it to whom I please.
King John came, he bowed to meand requested the country, and I placed what he requested into hishands. Your
emissaries come to seek my friendship, yet you state inyour letter that you are the King of Hungary, the country
I hadconquered with my saber. This will not lead to friendship. [242]
In the meantime, John conducted negotiations with Ferdinand torestore peace, with the full knowledge of the Porte.
Primate Vardaywas one of those who initiated the negotiations. In January 1530 hewrote Szalahazi, Ferdinand's
chancellor: "Let your Lordship remember his country, and let him consider its interests, so that Christianblood may
be shed no longer and that this land, already devastated,not fall under the disgraceful yoke of the unbelievers--
somethingthat would surely come about soon unless we turn our attention toits peace and recovery immediately."
The lords who were on John'sside, Varday continued, were willing to negotiate, and, he assumed,those on
Ferdinand's side were inclined to do likewise. Thus theymust meet and let Szalahazi warn Ferdinand "to agree to
such ameeting and, setting his stubbornness aside, not to reject a respectable compromise.... In other words, I beg
your Lordship to set asidehatred, the desire for revenge, and animosity for the sake of ourcountry, our common
tongue. Enough Christian blood has been spiltalready; there is enough rubble and charred ruins and cursingagainst
God to wipe out even the name of Christian." [243] Werboczisaw matters in a similar light: "I wish with all my
heart, for the goodof Christianity and the peace of all of us that, after so many vicissitudes, we finally serve God and
work on restoring our hard-pressedcountry." [244]
The lords on Ferdinand's side agreed. Ferdinand called a diet tomeet in Pozsony on May 8, 1530, where despair over
the miserablestate of the country was openly voiced. The participants blamed thetroubles on the divided rule, and,
since they were on Ferdinand'sside, they naturally argued that Ferdinand should remain and Johnshould resign. The
picture we get from the document in which thecomplaints were recorded is indeed heart-rending: destruction and
misery were everywhere; the mercenaries of Ferdinand were exploiting the people and committing atrocities; his
councillors, unfamiliar with conditions in the country, merely enhanced the troublesby their unwarranted and
unfriendly interference. They insistedthat they wanted Ferdinand for king, that only he was able to defendthe
country: "If Your Majesty is not capable of this, have the goodgrace of speaking out honestly rather than letting us
all perish, andthen we may seek a way to help ourselves and thwart the impendingdanger." [245] The estates
forwarded the document not only to Ferdinand, but to Charles V as well, and even to the estates of the HolyRoman
Empire who were meeting at Augsburg at the time. Theenvoy of Hungary traveled to Augsburg and described the
patheticsituation of the country in emphatic rhetoric, underlining the factthat if Hungary did not receive effective
succor from the Holy RomanEmpire it would be forced to purchase the mercy of the sultan bypaying tribute and that
the Hungarian estates would even resort to"further" means.
The negotiations did get under way, but Ferdinand stipulatedimpossible conditions, for example, that John should
abdicate immediately; this condition could not be met, even if John's party happened to agree because the Ottomans
simply would not have allowed it.
In view of the impossibility of mediating between the two kingsand the misery resulting from the division of the
country and theparty strife, some of the lords began to organize. Their plan was tocall together the nobility of both
parties and to discuss ways ofsaving the country. They decided to meet at Veszprem. The letter ofinvitation stated:
We all know well how much our country, formerly respected by allnations of the world, is suffering in the
present times of danger, andthat it has practically reached a point of agony, torn apart, downtrodden, and
divided. Therefore, unless we quickly undertake everythingpossible to preserve it, even its remaining parts will
soon go under. Justas at one time it was unity and solidarity that won and kept this land,from now on it is also
solidarity, consensus, and mutual love that canhelp it survive through its present and future ills. We, who love
ourChristian faith, our land, and our salvation have met...so that theHungarian nation, almost ruined by party-
strife and civil war, mayreturn to its unity and be saved. . .. Therefore we appeal to you. . .to sendyour fellow-
citizens, so that, setting aside all hatred, animosity, partystrife, the coveting of the estates of others, and with
God and the future peace of our country as our sole concern. . .let us discuss only that whichmay contribute to
mutual agreement, to the union of the Hungariannation, to the defense of our land and the preservation of our
faith. [246]
The meeting of Veszprem never took place since both kings barredtheir lords from attending; the lesser nobility that
arrived there, notfinding any of the grandees, dispersed without accomplishing anything. The nobility continued its
efforts until January 1532 when, atan assembly in Kenese, the following resolution was passed:
Those of us present will recognize as our king, among the rulerscompeting for the crown, the one most apt a,
defend the country; andwith that goal in mind, we shall send ambassadors to both Ferdinandand John. Let
those sent to Ferdinand find out whether he is willingand whether he has the power to defend us against the
Turks and tosave us from so much misery, not in words, not in writing, but in deeds,in action. If Ferdinand,
moreover, promises to maintain our libertiesmore earnestly, we will all take his side. Our ambassadors to John
shallask him how he intends to defend the country? Will he recover theborder castles, with the exception of
Belgrade and Sabac, from Suleyman, not in words but in reality? Does he have assurances that fromnow on the
Turks will leave the country in peace? For only under thoseconditions do we all want to recognize him as our
ruler. [247]
The endeavors of the nobility bore no results in the long run, butthat is hardly surprising; in relation to the stakes for
which theHabsburg and the Ottoman empires were fighting, the interests ofHungary were indeed negligible.
The situation in Hungary was becoming increasingly depressingfor Süleyman. Through his emissaries Ferdinand
had openly laidclaim to the country, and his successful attacks clearly demonstrated that he meant his claim
seriously. Hence, by the end of 1530Suleyman had already decided to lead another host into Hungary in1532.
Possibly, his decision was influenced by the fact that he wasdetermined to settle the affairs of the Near and Far East;
consequently his rear in Europe had to be assured. The Near Easterntrade was beginning to recover from the blow
administered by thePortuguese and was bringing increasing revenues into the coffers ofthe Empire. [248] Naturally,
the Ottomans were intent on securingthese trade routes to the fullest extent by challenging the Portuguese.
Such an attack, however, as we have seen, required exceptional efforts on the part of the Empire. Incidentally, we
may get apicture of the revival of the Near Eastern trade from the dataprovided by Magelha-Godinho in Table 7
below.
Table 7.
Variations in the Quantity of Eastern GoodsOff-loaded in Venice between 1514 and 1531
Goods
Year Quantity in tons Ratio (1514=100)

1514 2140 100.0

1515 2084 97.4

1516 1600 74.8

1517 ... ...

1518 1420 66.4

1519 150 7.0

1520 3000 (?) 140.2

1521 300 14.0

1522 623 29.1

1523 154 7.2

1524 100 4.7

1525 200 9.3

1526 720 33.6

1527 1300 60.7

1528 1100 51.4

1529 ... ...

1530 2500 116.8

1531 3026 141.4

Table 7 provides indications of the political and military vicissitudes of the Near and Far East with almost
mathematical precision.In 1514, the initial year, the caravan routes of Syria and Egypt werestill under the control of
the Mameluke sultans. The total quantityof Levantine goods loaded at Tripoli or Alexandria and unloaded inVenice
was 2,140 tons. In order to get an idea of the damagessuffered by the Near Eastern trade as a result of the
Portugueseintervention, let us note that in the last years of peace, in 1495-98and 1501, an annual average of 6,600
tons was handled in Venice--that is, about three times as much as in 1514. In the period from1502 to 1513, however,
the total quantity of Eastern goods unloadedamounted to 6,334 tons. After 1514 the quantity was decreasing; infact,
in 1517 no merchandise reached Venice at all. The Ottomanshad occupied Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517;
obviously, the decrease in trade was caused by these campaigns. The exceptionallylarge figure for 1520--3,000 tons-
-is most likely due to some misinterpretation of the data, the figure being altogether at variance withthe general
trend; such a mass of goods could not have been shipped,if only because that was the year of the rebellion in Syria.
Apart fromthis, however, the decrease was precipitous, reaching a low point in1524~.7% of the quantity shipped in
1514. It is not difficult to findan explanation: these were the years of renewed rebellion in Syriaand Egypt. The
abuses of the thoroughly corrupt officials in theseprovinces fanned the flames of rebellion. Finally the Grand
VezirIbrahim restored order, and this no doubt explains why, from 1526on, the trade kept growing, exceeding the
trade in 1514 by almost17% by 1530. We do not know the reason for the sudden drop in 1529.By 1531, however,
the trade in Levantine goods was 41.4% greaterthan it had been in 1514. Undoubtedly, the rise in traffic was due in
part to the greater number of vessels involved in the fight against the Portuguese in the 1530s, as a result of the Red
Sea shipbuildingprogram. Last but not least, we must mention the extremely wisepolicies of the Porte vis-a-vis
Venice: encouragement and support forthe Republic in its efforts to revive the Near Eastern trade in everypossible
way.
Of course, the increasingly lively Near Eastern trade handled bythe Ottomans and Venetians was not well viewed by
the Portuguese;they sought an alliance with the Persians and Charles V against theTurks. [249] The alliance was
concluded only in the spring of 1532, butmost probably the Porte had an inkling of it beforehand. The strikeagainst
the Persians was carried out in 1534, but Suleyman first hadto disentangle himself in Europe, more precisely in
Hungary.
The sole objective of the campaign of 1532 was to gain recognitionfor the rule of John and to force the Habsburgs to
give up their claimsto Hungary. As early as February 1531 the French king wrote toRome that the Ottomans were
busily preparing for war and that thesultan's objective was "to attack all of Christendom if the Emperorand his
brother are not willing to reach some kind of an agreementwith King John." [250] A letter from Lyons giving an
account of thehappenings at the imperial diet in Regensburg was equally interesting. It related the following news:
If the Emperor and his brother forswear their claim to Hungary andleave the country in the hands of King John,
they can be granted thekind of peace they want from the Turks, and for as long as they like; but under no
circumstance would the Turk tolerate the brother of theEmperor [in Hungary], or accept him as neighbor. [251]
Thus Suleyman would have preferred a peaceful solution, all themore so, since French diplomacy, while it did not
expect him to giveup the idea of war altogether, nevertheless advised him to turnagainst Italy rather than the Holy
Roman Empire. [252] This desire onthe part of France was quite natural since she was also interested inItaly, but
most likely it did not make much of an impression on theOttoman leaders. Yet the argument the French
Ambassador, Rincon, presented in Constantinople to dissuade the Turks from attacking the Holy Roman Empire
must have made them reflect: thesultan would be merely playing into the hands of Charles V by suchan attack, since
the Imperial estates would surely not remain indifferent if the German lands were in jeopardy, in which case they
werebound to back the Emperor. Thus an Ottoman attack would bringabout precisely the kind of German unity that
would be detrimentalto both France and the Turks.
Nor did Süleyman fail to heed the warning, or rather request, ofKing John. The indications are that while John was
not convincedthat the sultan could defeat the Habsburgs, he knew perfectly wellthat it would be once again Hungary
that bore the brunt of the war,inasmuch as it would become the area of deployment for the Ottoman army. For this
reason he asked the sultan, back in the fall of1531, to give up the idea of war, explaining that his negotiationswith
Ferdinand were progressing well and that they were close to anagreement. The sultan responded that, as far as he
was concerned,there was nothing he would like better than peace in Hungary, buthe would also like some kind of
guarantee to the effect that CharlesV and Ferdinand would not intervene. If John could achieve what hepromised,
then Suleyman would refrain from launching a war, buthe had to have a final answer by March, presumably because
ifJohn's attempt bore no fruit, he would still have time to mobilize.John received the message in January 1532. His
task, therefore, wasto persuade Ferdinand and the emperor to accept peace promptly.He sent his ambassador,
Verancsics, to Rome posthaste to convincethe pope to intercede with the emperor. It would have been unpleasant for
the pope to comply with such a request since he had reachedan agreement with the emperor shortly beforehand;
instead, he advised John to send an ambassador to the German diet inRegensburg to try to convince them not to vote
in favor of theanti-Turkish aid. Heeding the advice, John sent Lasky to Regensburg. Lasky cleverly used the fact that
it would not be to theadvantage of the German states if Ferdinand were to rule overHungary in any case, partly
because they did not favor the extensionof Habsburg power in general, and partly because a connectionbetween
Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire in the person ofFerdinand would elicit the danger of Ottoman intervention
andwould require greater and greater efforts on their part. Lasky,taking advantage of this mood, argued that the
sultan would desistfrom his campaign if Ferdinand gave up his claim to Hungary. Since,however, reliable news
reached Regensburg regarding the sultan'sextensive war preparations, and finally about the launching of
thecampaign--for by then the deadline prescribed by Süleyman hadlong expired--all Lasky and the French diplomats
could achieve wasthat the estates voted for aid only as far as the borders of Austria. [253]
Such were the circumstances that explain the peculiarities of thecampaign of 1532. Even the choice of its line of
advance was curious:rather than advancing along the Danube, which would have madelogistics so much easier, the
army advanced towards Vienna bycutting across Transdanubia. According to one theory, the sultanchose this
direction because, in response to the French request, hewanted to retain the option of turning against Italy. This
theory,however, is not convincing. It is possible, however that Süleymanchose this line of advance on the request
and advice of John. TheHungarian king, as we have seen, was intent on saving the countryfrom the devastation
which inevitably ensued from the transit of theTurkish army. Naturally, he would urge the Turks to march
throughthe areas in Ferdinand's possession, that is, the western part of thecountry. Djeladzade's observation is
relevant: "When the land ofHungary had the honor of being kissed by the hoofs of the war-horseof the victorious
padishah, the conquering banners were turned inthe direction of that part of Hungary that owed allegiance not
toKing John but to the senseless enemy." [254]

Continued...
As for Charles V, he explicitly warned Ferdinand against war andwrote:

...it would no more lead to success than previous attempts. Especially

since the Voivode [John], by occupying Kassa, has obtained an advantageous
position, and his prestige has also undoubtedly risen. The Turks,
as your letters indicate, are supporting John as well, and he has even
succeeded in luring over several persons from your side. In general
there is little trust among the inhabitants of the country [towards
Ferdinand]. If you now launch war, you will merely provide the Turk
with an opportunity to occupy the country in its entirety, and for
good.... Therefore think it over carefully: what would be most
appropriate for your interests?
Charles V added that he could provide no assistance whatsoever,except by showing good will to those Hungarian
lords counting onhis support, ';but even if he definitely declared that he would come totheir aid, that would be a
most difficult promise to keep.'' [280]

Bishop Frangepan, who usually did not mince his words, alsowarned Ferdinand against the senseless undertaking:

Your Majestic King, please do recall how many years you have spent
waging war against my Majestic royal lord and the portion of the
country under his power. Consider how much worry you have inflicted
upon yourself, how much exhaustion you have suffered, how much
money you have spent, and what you have achieved in exchange. The
antagonism of your majesties has achieved nothing except the devastation
of the rich country, driving so many souls into Turkish captivity for
ever, and has brought about the imminent danger that Hungary will
fall into the hands of the enemies of Jesus Christ, the Muslim unbelievers.
In this sense your majesties have achieved more than enough in
other regards, nothing.

Frangepan proposed that Ferdinand should give encouragementand arms to Hungary in order to unite the efforts for
liberating thecountry from the Turkish yoke, rather than devastate with theirforces even those parts of the country
hitherto untouched by thelurks. [281]

This wise advice, however, had no effect. Ferdinand's mind wasmade up; in fact, in his blindness he even believed
he could obtainthe sultan's backing for his plan. Therefore, he sent an emissary toConstantinople in the spring of
1537. When the emissary presentedhis request the grand vezir responded: "Yesterday I read the letteryour king had
written to me, in which he is making a not toohonorable request.... Not so much in my own name, but rather at
thecommand of the emperor [that is, the sultan], I say to you that he ismost amazed that King Ferdinand should lay
claim to territories which the emperor had acquired, by the grace and will of God, byforce of arms, and which he
regards as his own. In fact, the emperoris at a loss to understand on what grounds Ferdinand is claimingHungary."
The right of inheritance to which Ferdinand had madereference, continued the grand vezir, had lapsed the moment
thesultan occupied Hungary. [282] Ferdinand could have found out, beyondany reasonable doubt, that the sultan
insisted on backingJohn; furthermore, the Porte had decided that when John died theHungarians might elect anyone
they liked for their king, exceptFerdinand. Also, the general political predicament did not favorFerdinand. Hungary
under a Turkish protectorate was not only acceptablebut even desirable, to several European powers. In addition to
thesympathies of French diplomacy and, to some extent, of the Polesand the English, Ottoman domination was not
without its attractionseither in the Holy Roman Empire or even in the provincesunder Ferdinand. Ferenc Frangepan's
letter of 1537 to Elek Thurzois relevant; he explained that should the news spread that the Turkswere authorizing
free royal elections in Hungary, the Hungarianswould naturally prefer to survive under a ruler chosen from theirown
nation rather than perish under Ferdinand. The Bohemiansthe Moravians, and the Silesians would be most pleased
becausethen, instead of having to fight against so powerful an enemy as theTurks, on behalf of Ferdinand, they
"could spend their time fishingpeaceably in their ponds." The German estates also felt that theyhad been paying the
Turkish tax for the defense of Hungary entirelyunnecessarily since Hungary could fend for itself under a
Hungarianking just as well as under the protection of Ferdinand, and perhapsbetter. [283] The great Mediterranean
War broke out soon after these diplomaticpreliminaries. In July Ottoman forces invaded Italy fromsea, counting on
French support. However, the French did not liveup to their commitment as allies and the Turks had to give up
theirundertaking. Soon thereafter peace negotiations began betweenFrance and Emperor Charles V, and Venice
decided to join theImperial side. [284] In Hungary, too, the sounds of war carried the day. Towardsend of the
summer of 1537 Ferdinand dispatched not one but two armies into the country. The private armies of the aristocrats
tookpart in the ensuing conflict and inflicted a great deal of suffering onthe poor, but their depredations were far
exceeded by the havoccaused by Ferdinand's unpaid and starving German, Italian, andSpanish mercenaries. The
diets echoed the complaints of the population. Let me cite one of their complaints: if the army goes unpaid, "itis
forced to live from the tears shed by the population of the provinces, as has become the custom in our land. Indeed,
the troops leavenothing behind for the miserable masses except their naked andbattered bodies." [285]

It may be said that this unbridled abuse on the part of the troopswas inevitable, given the almost insoluble problems
of supply. Butthe horrors were exacerbated when the commander explicitlyauthorized the troops to wage war
without mercy to terrorize theenemy and to oblige it to sue quickly for peace. In 1537 Ferdinandinstructed his
commander, Lenart Fels: "You must carry out yourfeats with toughness and resolve, in order to cause confusion
andgreat fear in the Voivode [John] and among his leading men, andthus procure all the more favorable terms for an
honorable peace." [286]

At first the troops under the command of Fels, advancing towardsnorthern Hungary were successful, but the attack
soon bogged downand then came to a complete halt. The soldiers were not receivingtheir pay, and the army
disintegrated. Ferdinand's second army,advancing towards Eszek under Katzianer, was annihilated by theOttomans.
These failures convinced Ferdinand that his objectivewould be obtained only through peaceful means. He renewed
negotiations with John, and the resultant peace of Nagyvarad was signedon February 24, 1538.

The Peace of Nagyvarad

[287]

The peace of Nagyvarad was in reality a compromise reached bytwo disenchanted kings: Ferdinand was frustrated
in his efforts toreach a military decision, whereas John was disappointed in hishopes for Ottoman protection. They
agreed, therefore, that Johnwould remain king of Hungary as long as he lived, but that after hisdeath the crown
would revert to Ferdinand regardless of whether John left a male heir. The two parties were committed to secrecy,
inorder to avoid Ottoman reprisals; but, in case the agreement came tolight, and the Turks took up arms against
John, Ferdinand committed himself to come to John's defense.

The treaty was based on the rather risky illusion that the militarypower of the Habsburgs was sufficient to withstand
the onslaught ofthe Ottomans and to preserve the territorial and administrativeintegrity of the country. This illusion
proved fateful, for it causedSuleyman to withdraw his proposal; in other words, the treatybrought about precisely the
situation which it was meant to preventand made matters worse by turning the country into a battlegroundfor a
century and a half.

The treaty of Nagyvarad was the first serious, specific warningSuleyman received that his "proposal", which had
been accepted byJohn and his supporters only with all kinds of reservations, and theresulting alliance could only
offer a temporary solution, ready to bedenounced at the first opportunity. In any case, both parties regarded the
treaty as little more than a scrap of paper almost from themoment of signature.

Yet, in the short term, the treaty of Nagyvarad did have significance; in fact, we may even assert that John derived
more than alittle benefit from it. Apart from the risk entailed by possible reprisals on the part of the sultan, the
contract provided him withsomething which had become a matter of survival: peace. We haveseen above that John
needed peace to consolidate his rule. Morethan once Ferdinand had launched campaigns that were bound tofail.
Nevertheless these efforts did succeed in weakening John'sposition.

Moreover, the contract made it possible for John to marry thePolish princess Isabella, whose parents had made it a
condition ofmarriage that Ferdinand recognize John's rule. A heir might wellresult from the marriage, and, the treaty
of Nagyvarad notwithstanding, the newborn had a far better chance of acquiring the crownthan Ferdinand, especially
since the Porte would never consent torecognize Ferdinand's rule. Thus we may rightly suspect that Johnhad
masterminded the treaty with political wisdom as well as a fairdose of guile. It may even be said that he had led
Ferdinand by thenose.

Incidentally, the events immediately following the conclusion ofthe treaty gave a tangible demonstration of its value.
The treatystipulated that, if revealed, and if the Ottomans should attack JohnFerdinand was obliged to come to his
assistance. Only a few weeks

after signing rumors spread that Suleyman, having found out aboutit, was getting ready to march against John. In
fact, shortly thereafter, specific information regarding the sultan's preparations arrivedalthough some of the
intelligence indicated that the attack was to bedirected against Moldavia.

Since John's conscience, and that of his followers, was not entirelyclear--after all, they had broken the treaty
concluded with thesultan--they assumed, in their fright, that the attack was aimed atHungary. Therefore they ordered
mobilization and, most importantas regards our issue, asked Ferdinand to send help. From thatmoment the
worthlessness of the treaty of Nagyvarad was madeabundantly clear because Ferdinand sent a ridiculously small
contingent, no more than a few thousand mercenaries. Fortunately forthe country, the intelligence regarding the
attack against Moldaviaproved to be correct. In August 1538 the Ottoman army invaded theprovince. The sultan
appointed a new voivode, added the southernparts of the province to his empire, then headed home with the
army.According to Ottoman sources, the attack was prompted by Moldavia's alliance with powers opposed to the
Porte. [288] This was indeed the situation since, as we have seen, the voivode of Moldaviahad entered into an
alliance with Ferdinand in 1536. Suleymanwanted to deprive the voivode of any opportunity to act against
theinterests of the Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, I must mention again, for the sake of a more realisticperspective of the relations of forces, that all the
happenings inHungary were of only secondary concern for the Porte. Far moreimportant events were taking place in
the Mediterranean and theNear East; all of which entailed a fair amount of danger. In February, the "Holy League",
the alliance of Charles V, the pope, andVenice, was born, with the express objective of breaking Ottomanpower in
the Mediterranean Sea. The allied fleet began to assembleat Corfu in the spring. In the summer Suleyman received
information to the effect that the emperor and the king of France hadconcluded the Peace of Nice.

The year 1539 brought no dramatic developments; but an incidentboded ill for John, as well as for the country as a
whole. Ferdinandonce again indulged in subversion at the Porte, going as far as toreveal the contents of the treaty of
Nagyvarad. Suleyman reacted tothe news: "Indeed, these two faithless kings do not deserve the crown!" [289]
Suleyman's indignation was entirely justified. After all,John did owe his crown to Suleyman, who refrained even
now fromdoing what he could have done already in 1526: annex the country,or any part of it.

The Death of King John

[290]

The following year, 1540, was far more eventful. The rebellion ofIstvan Maylad in Transylvania threatened John's
rule from within.This most restless and unreliable grandee first turned to the Portefor help. He offered a yearly
tribute should the sultan agree to theseparation of Transylvania from Hungary. He attempted to gain thePorte's
support for his plan by hinting at the possibility that theestates of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia would
excludeboth John and Ferdinand from the throne, and would offer theirloyalty to the sultan instead. Nothing reveals
the unreality of theplot better than the somewhat tongue-in-cheek reply from the Porte:the sultan could obtain
everything that Maylad now proposed betterand more securely from John directly.

Rejected by the Porte, the rebels now turned to Ferdinand. Theyrequested military assistance, offering that
Transylvania might joinFerdinand. King John immediately recognized the danger, and,though suffering bad health
and with his wife in an advanced stageof pregnancy, he nevertheless set out to restore order in the province. His
appearance on the scene was immediately effective: theSaxon towns--the main source of the rebellion--sent a
delegation tohim, and Maylad's co-commander, Imre Balassa, begged for mercy atJohn's feet.

An emissary arrived from Charles V while John was staying inTransylvania. He assured John of the emperor's
sincere good will,referring to Hungary as the "defensive bastion of Christianity."Since he had reliable information
regarding Ottoman preparationsagainst Hungary, he requested John's permission for an Imperialguard to occupy
Buda, its salary to be paid by Charles. If John didnot dare take this chance for fear of the Turk, let him reinforce
Budaand provide it with a strong Hungarian garrison at the emperor'sexpense. [291] In 1536 John himself had
requested that the emperoroccupy Buda and Temesvar. At that time Charles was unable to comply because of the
unfavorable diplomatic situation, but now,since he had been able to settle disputes with the king of France afew
months earlier, he had the freedom to act against the Ottomans.

John rejected the proposal for several reasons. On the one hand,when the emissary, dispatched in April, had reached
Gyulafehervar,the relationship between the emperor and the king of France haddeteriorated once again. On the other
hand, the extents since thetreaty of Nagyvarad proved clearly that the Habsburgs could not berelied on for protection
from the Ottomans. He decided that thetreaty of Nagyvarad itself had become moot on account of Ferdinand's
betrayal of it; using the betrayal as an excuse, he wanted tomake sure that the child soon to be born would received
the crown.Thus, he needed Suleyman's continued protection.

John left Gyulafehervar for Szaszsebes, where the good tidingsreached him: on July 7 Isabella had given birth to a
male heir.Heartened by the news the ailing prince mounted a horse in order toannounce the birth to the townspeople.
But soon he fell seriously ill.Feeling the approach of death, John willed the following: let hisfollowers protect his
wife and son and let them place the crown onthe child's head if they saw fit; but, no matter how things stood, letthem
not choose a king from the House of Habsburg, in order to avoideven more serious trials than what the country had
already undergone under his own rule. Let them remain under the protection ofthe sultan, for this was the only way
to preserve the integrity of thecountry, the only way to restore order, and the only way the fate ofhis wife and son
would be assured. His conviction was that "theycould expect the good of their country and of themselves only
fromSuleyman." He would not have come up with such an idea if thecountry could have expected salvation from
Christian rulers, butthere was absolutely no prospect for such an eventuality. [292]

John was a ruler with a tragic fate. We must recognize that he wasimbued with a sense of great responsibility
towards his country.Moreover, he assessed the situation with clear-sighted political acumen and used the limited
means at his disposal well, sometimesbrilliantly, on behalf of the country. He hit upon the only possiblesolution of
the problems resulting from Mohacs: the political andterritorial integrity of Hungary required the protection of
Suleyman.While his policies became indecisive in the mid-thirties, in the lastfew years of his life he once again
returned to the path he had embarked upon at the beginning. Death prevented him from achieving his ends. In the
fall of 1539 the papal nuncio, Rorario, wrote:

I am well acquainted with King John's methods, and know how clever]y
he maintains himself in the face of the Porte.... Many things he does
 merely to convince the Turk that he is not on such good terms with the
King of the Romans and with the Emperor as he is reputed to be.... If
this be the case we must feel sorry for him because, no matter what,
there is no other way to preserve Hungary for Christendom. Without
him the country would have gone to the dogs long ago. [293]

Significantly, the same sentiment is reflected in poems of the age.A preacher in 1538 wrote: "Our good king saw
clearly/ The greatstrength of the pagans/ Wisely did he act then/ Making peace withthem."

After John's death opinion was divided three ways regardingHungary's fate. Those on Ferdinand's side felt that the
treaty ofNagyvarad should take immediate effect. Those on John's side, withFriar George in the lead, knowing well
that the observance of thetreaty would result in immediate intervention on the part of thesultan and that the
Habsburgs could not expect any help to withstand that intervention in the near future, felt that the right movewould
be to delay the execution of the treaty and elect the son ofJohn as king. The third camp, composed of Perenyi,
Frangepan, andothers, wanted the treaty to become effective, but only on the condition that Charles V and Ferdinand
provided serious military assistance forthwith.

The third party met at Eger, and they sent from there the following letter, dated August 30, to Charles V:

[with the death of king John] public affairs are in danger. We are afraid
that the emperor of the Turks will either take over the country directly
or grab the country under the guise of bringing help for the son of the
deceased. We are too weak to resist him. The deceased king reached an
agreement with your Imperial Majesty and your brother [Ferdinand]
main]y because of this menace. Your Majesty is our only hope, and for
this reason we are trying to sway our relatives and friends to our view,
hoping that your Imperial Majesty will take a determined stand. We
consider it absolutely necessary that Your Majesty and your brother
should deal with the issues firmly or give it up altogether. Half-hearted
handling of the issue will guarantee failure.... If Buda, the head of the
country. . should fall into Turkish hands, everything is lost ...

Hence Charles should strive to occupy the country, which could beaccomplished in one of two ways: by concluding
a treaty with theTurks in exchange for tribute or by waging war. For this purpose,however, it would be necessary to
sign peace with the king of France.

Although Your Majesty might have to sacrifice something for thebenefit of the Most Christian King you would gain
it back with usury[that is, with interest] if you could obtain Hungary freely and in whole.But if Your Majesty does
not wish to resort to either of those means--something we would most regret--then we beg him, for the love of
God,not to want our perdition, but rather persuade your brother to give upthat portion of the country he now holds;
and then we would attempt topreserve our country, by hook or crook, on our own... [294]

In this confused situation the onerous burden of the country'ssalvation fell on the shoulders of Friar George, who
already hadplayed a decisive role during John's lifetime. Though he was fullyaware that the lords looked askance at
his growing influence, he feltthat the best way to gain followers for his policy was to appeal to themost powerful to
assume the duties of governor next to the infantking and Isabella. He selected Perenyi over Werboczi, Balint
Torok,and Peter Petrovics, for he knew that Perenyi wanted the treaty ofNagyvarad to become immediately
effective. He hoped to win Perenyi over by such an offer, and others along with him. Since hisrelationship with
Perenyi was tense, he did not think it advisable toapproach him directly. He requested the beg of Belgrade, Bali, to
actas intermediary, since the latter had treated Perenyi well when hewas a captive and had maintained good relations
with him eversince. Though Bali Beg accepted the mission, Perenyi rejected theoffer; moreover, he passed Friar
George's letter to Bali Beg on toFerdinand. According to Mihaly Horvath, Perenyi rejected the offerbecause he was
convinced that it "would not be possible to defend thecause of the prince against Ferdinand." [295] No doubt Ferenc
Frangepan must have seen the situation in the same light because, in earlyAugust, he held discussions with several
magnates at Gyongyos andsided with Ferdinand, appealing to the estates of Transylvania to dolikewise. Friar
George not on]y saw matters clearly, but also tookaction with vigor and dispatch. The most urgent task was to
reassure the sultan that the death of John entailed no change. For thisvery reason the very young John Silismund was
quickly elected king. The coronation ceremony was omitted, since they did not wishto disregard the treaty of
Nagyvarad completely, and a coronationwould have implied the exclusion of Ferdinand from the inheritanceof the
throne, whereas an elected king could resign at any time. Theomission was intended to assuage Ferdinand and to
prevent armedintervention on his part.

The prerequisite for the success of this strategy, however, wasthat Friar George have Buda firmly in his hands. His
control of thecity was all the more essential since it was rumored that Ferdinandwas preparing to conquer it. In
August, therefore, Friar Georgedispatched his loyal follower, Gyorgy Horvath, the captain of Nagyvarad, to Buda,
with reliable troops, and adopted special safetymeasures for the castle's defense. Friar George himself traveled
withthe body of John and the treasury from Transylvania to Szekesfehervar, where burial took place in the tomb of
the kings. Shortlythereafter John Sigismund was proclaimed king on the field ofRakos. The estates assembled there
resolved that they would notelect a king from the House of Habsburg even if some evil shouldbefall John
Sigismund.

Furthermore, Friar George sent an emissary to the Polish kingSigismund, asking him to reassure Ferdinand that the
treaty ofNagyvarad was still valid and his right to the crown uncontested. headded a warning to the effect that
Ferdinand should not cause anytrouble and by trying to prevent the election of the king, in consideration of the
Turks. Far more important, however, was the delegation sent to the Porte, the task of which was to obtain the
sultan'sconsent to the election of John Sigismund.

The news of John's death had prompted Ferdinand to engage infeverish activity. He believed the time had come to
obtain all ofHungary As had occurred so many times in the past, however, hedid not assess the situation realistically;
he paid no heed to thedifficult situation of the country, in the shadow of the Ottomanmenace, and, continuing to
underestimate the power of the Ottomans in spite of his many bitter experiences, he once again began tochase the
"mirage of a settlement of accounts by arms." [296] Ferdinanddid all this despite the fact that, because of Charles `s
passivity andthe sorry state of his own finances, he should have expected lesssuccess than ever.

He also had an altogether mistaken view of the position of thePorte. He believed that the sultan would give in and
agree to hisrule. He refused to believe Friar George who had told Ferdinand'semissary that the treaty of Nagyvarad
was not timely and whobegged for patience. He was convinced that the sultan had droppedJohn already in his
lifetime; hence Isabella and the infant had noprospects in Hungary; furthermore, they would have to flee thecountry
for their lives (in which case he would have had the addedbenefit of not having to pay the widow the compensation
mentionedin the treaty). Prompted by such vain hopes Ferdinand caused FriarGeorge a great deal of trouble. He sent
an emissary to convinceIsabella who, in any case, was hesitant, capricious, and hated FriarGeorge passionately, to
abdicate the throne in the name of her son.Negotiations were conducted with the Hungarian lords, several ofwhom,
Frangepan and Perenyi included, went over to Ferdinand'sside. In the meantime, Maylad was once again growing
restless inTransylvania.

The most serious threat to Hungary was Ferdinand's militarymoves. His general, Fels, advanced upon Esztergom,
Visegrad, andthen Buda. It was the Hungarian councilors, more particularlyThurzo, Revay, Frangepan, and Perenyi,
who persuaded him toundertake this move, although it was not alien to his temperament.The stand taken by the
Hungarian lords was motivated to a largeextent by the consideration that with the loss of Buda the situationof
Isabella and John Sigismund would become altogether hopeless--as a consequence of which they would not even
have to return theSzapolyai estates in their possession.
The immediate excuse for launching the campaign was the election of John Sigismund and the decision not to elect a
king from theHouse of Habsburg even if some evil should befall him taken by theassembly at Rakos. The troops
under Fels began their maneuvers atthe beginning of October. Having taken Esztergom, Visegrad, andVac, they
marched under Buda and began its siege. But the undertaking, inadequately prepared in every respect, soon had to
beabandoned. The consequences of this poorly conceived move weresoon felt. Lasky, who was busy at
Constantinople at this time, wroteto Ferdinand as follows: "Your Majesty should know that neitherpeace nor
armistice can be obtained; that tomorrow the Sultan isalready heading to Adrianople [that is, the assembly point for
campaigns against Europe, usually launched in the spring].... He isheading there with the intention of securing
Hungary for himself.Your troops have spoilt everything, as I had predicted orally and in writing to Your Majesty,
but you preferred to follow a differentcounsel...." [297]

The delegation Friar George had dispatched to the Porte in October 1540 was received most courteously by the
sultan. The sultanratified the election of John Sigismund and gave him the country torule. At the same time he sent
Maylad and the Transylvanians awarning in no uncertain terms--for the latter had not given up theiradventurous
design--that they should put an end to their separatistaction and obey the government functioning by the side of
JohnSigismund. Yet Suleyman's recognition of John Sigismund's rulewas no longer sincere. He had given up his
original strategy and haddecided to annex the central portion of Hungary.

Suleyman indicated his change of policy by making Peter Perenyi's son, whom he held as a hostage, into a renegade.
Lasky, stillambassador at Constantinople, gave the following account of thisevent: 'Yesterday the son of Peter
Perenyi was introduced to theGreat Lord and will undergo circumcision at Adrianople." [298] PeterPerenyi had been
in Turkish captivity on two occasions, and on bothoccasions the sultan had released him on condition he serve John.
Aswe know, the sultan was not prompted by humanitarian considerations,but by cogent political reasons: he meant
to consolidateJohn's rule. He retained Perenyi's son as hostage to ensure thefather's loyalty. Now, by making his son
a renegade, he gave incontrovertible evidence that he no longer attached importance to Perenyi's allegiance;
consequently, neither did he care whether themagnates of Hungary supported John Sigismund or not.

Moreover, we have far more direct proofs that Suleyman was nolonger speaking sincerely. The French ambassador
to Venice reported on September 25, 1540: 'The news we have is that theKingdom of Hungary has been divided into
three parts [by thesultan]."[299] In another letter, dated October 8, describing the extensive war preparations of
Charles V, the ambassador reported thatthe emperor was undertaking an expedition the like of which hadnever been
seen, and if Venice did not conclude peace with theTurks--something Venice had done already, by the way--the
emperor would corner the sultan, for "the sultan had never been in sucha tight spot, considering that the Persians are
restless, and he hadlost John." Ferdinand too was counting on the support of the Hungarian lords. Then followed a
section which contradicted the preceding ones to some extent, for the ambassador wrote that the
emperor'spredicament was not quite so favorable, but what really matteredwas the ambassador's statement "that the
promise the Emperor hadgiven to help the Hungarians serves only to incite the Turks to movein and enslave this
country [Hungary] and place a pasha at itshelm" [300]

It becomes clear from this report that the sultan had not onlydecided to occupy Buda, but also that he was in a
difficult positionbecause of the chaos in Hungary: the pro-Ottoman party had sidedwith Ferdinand, whose troops
were besieging Buda. Moreover, theforces of the emperor might also arrive on the scene. The probabilityof Friar
George coming out on top had diminished considerably,particularly since there were irreconcilable differences
betweenhim and Isabella to the point that the queen was negotiating withFerdinand and even contemplating handing
over Buda. Here thenotion of range of action enters into the political balance with all itsweight: regardless of the
danger, the Ottoman forces, with theexception of some smaller units, could not have reached and relievedBuda,
besieged by Ferdinand's forces, before July or August of thefollowing year. It was essential, therefore, that Friar
George be ableto hold out in Buda until the sultan's army reached the city, and, inorder to encourage him, the sultan
had to make him believe that his"proposal" was still valid.

The Fall of Buda and the Withdrawal of "Suleymans Proposal"

[301]

In the spring of 1541 Roggendorf, Ferdinand's general, launchedthe siege of Buda. While the timid and vacillating
leadership of theold and ailing Roggendorf, as well as the usual lack of funds, did notaugur well for the success of
the undertaking, the situation of thedefenders was not rosy either. Several circumstances hamperedtheir efforts--lack
of unity, to begin with. The tension betweenIsabella and Friar George had reached a breaking point. The
queendowager, in despair, was negotiating with Ferdinand, and evenencouraged the citizens of Buda to seek
contacts with Roggendorf inorder to hand the castle over. It was only by chance that the designfailed.

The siege had to be abandoned after several fruitless assaultssince the grand army led by the sultan was approaching.
The troops,seized by panic, withdrew from under the castle in the greatestdisarray, forming an easy prey for the
Ottoman troops camped nearthe castle and the defenders sallying forth from it. Five days laterthe sultan arrived
under Buda and took the castle by subterfuge.

It is worth examining the account of the occupation of Buda aspresented in the contemporary and near-
contemporary Hungarianand Turkish sources. According to the contemporary Verancsics fourfactors prompted
Suleyman to take Buda: "The first factor militatingin favor of the capture of Buda by the Turkish emperor was
toprevent some prominent Hungarians acquiring the country." HereVerancsics was hinting at Maylad's rebellion and
his offer to thePorte. The second factor was the shift of Bishop Frangepan andPerenyi to Ferdinand's side. The third
factor was Ferdinand's attackon Buda, encouraged as he was by Elek Thurzo and Ferenc Revai: "Ifhe wanted to
become king of Hungary, now was the time." After thetroops of Ferdinand laid siege to Buda, and after the sultan
had beeninformed that Perenyi and Frangepan had shifted their allegianceand that Isabella was negotiating with
Ferdinand, he could hesitateno longer. The fourth factor were the quarrels between IsabellaFriar George, and Balint
Torok. "The latter two both secretly coveted regency over the prince and the country." [302]

Szeremi, the other contemporary, provides a remarkable accountof Buda's occupation by the Ottomans. He describes
the situation,beginning with the 1540 siege of the city, as follows:

King Ferdinand gave orders that his camp lay siege to Buda and not to
give up the undertaking under any circumstance until the Germans
captured the city. The queen would have preferred to leave Buda and go
over to the Germans, and the Hungarian lords were prepared to allow
it. But every generation is concerned about the fate of the next. The
Hungarians would have liked to hand over the castle of Buda to the
Germans, but three considerations prevented them from doing so.
First, if the Germans were to enter or were allowed in, they would, in
 the long run, not be able to defend it against the Turkish emperor.
Secondly, the Germans would not favor the Hungarian lords nor even
the lesser nobility, but would exterminate them to the last man.
Thirdly, by handing over the castle the Hungarians would not be true
to their word given to the Turkish emperor, while the Turkish emperor
had the power to hold Buda against the Germans. [303]

Istvanffy's account is also interesting and provides a more or lessauthentic account of Buda's occupation. He also
refers to a discussion by the Ottoman leaders concerning Hungary's fate and that ofJohn Sigismund and his mother,
Isabella. After describing how thetroops of Roggendorf quit their siege of Buda in panic, Istvanffycontinues with a
description of how John Sigismund and the Hungarian lords who had been defending the castle were lured
intoSuleyman's camp. W}mile Suleyman entertained them he sent hisforces into the city on the pretext of a simple
visit. Once inside theyquickly took control of all its gates and other strategic points andthen commanded that the
inhabitants lay down their arms. WhenSuleyman had been told that the population had obeyed and that thecity was
in his control he sent the infant king back to his mother.After some delay all of the Hungarian lords who had
accompaniedJohn Sigismund were also allowed to return to the city with theexception of Balint Torok who was
detained by the sultan. Suleymanand his retinue then discussed Hungary's fate. Istvanffy reportedthat their
deliberations were lengthy, but in the end Suleymandecided to send Isabella and her son to Transylvania, which
theywould be allowed to hold together with "a part of southern Hungary,along with Lippa and Temesvar, and those
salt mines and goldmines which she held in the lifetime of John." Friar George would bethe infant's tutor and would
also be in charge of the affairs of thecountry. The sultan also promised, in a letter to Isabella, that assoon as her son
came of age, he would entrust Buda to him. [304]

There are three important points to note in Istvanffy's account ofthe fall of Buda. The first is his statement that the
Ottoman leadersonly reached a final decision regarding the occupation of the centralportions of the country, and the
separation of Transylvania, afterthey had occupied Buda. This conflicts with the information obtained from
Venetian sources that the Porte had decided to dividethe country as early as the Fall of 1540. Future research
mustdetermine which report is accurate.

The second important point is Istvanffy's report of the variousopinions expressed by the pashas in their discussion of
Hungary'sfuture. In particular the chronicler noted the argument made byMehmed that Buda might fall into
Habsburg hands because of thelimited range of action of the Ottoman forces. As we know, Viennawas much closer
to Buda than to Constantinople; hence the Habsburg menace could be neutralized only by extremely costly
campaignswhich could be mounted in response to attacks only a year after thelatter had occurred. These strategical
considerations were definitelythe reason why Suleyman opted for the occupation of the city and itscastle.
Finally, Istvanffy reported Suleyman's promise to Isabella andthe Hungarian lords to return the country to John
Sigismund whenhe came of age and the chronicler saw with his own eyes theilluminated manuscript in which the
promise was recorded. According to Thury, however, there was no such document. With thepresent state of research
it is not possible to determine whetherSuleyman meant his promise seriously or whether he made it merelyfor the
sake of avoiding complications and in order to reassure FriarGeorge.

At any rate, Ferenc Forgach, a great admirer of Suleyman, categorically asserted in his work, written around 1570,
that Suleymandid indeed intend to return Hungary to John Sigismund. He wrotethat "everything Suleyman had
agreed to with respect to John wasalso applicable to his son", and he added that Suleyman had promised to return all
territories belonging to the kingdom, except theSrem, and that John Sigismund need only pay a gift, but no
tribute.His only condition was that John Sigismund should not ally himselfwith the Habsburgs. "He [Suleyman]
decided that he would obtainthe hand of the daughter of the French king Francis for John IIwithout asking for
anything in return. These intentions are provenby the fact that he had returned Buda, Becse, and Becskerek to
Johnand had a golden crown prepared for John's son when he went toBelgrade at the time of the siege of Sziget in
1566." He not onlyencouraged Isabella to make peace with Ferdinand, "demonstratingthereby his generosity and
great love towards John Sigismund", butwould even have allowed John Sigismund to marry the daughter
ofFerdinand, or anyone else, provided "that not a single stone" ofTransylvania be handed over to the Habsburgs.
[305] Again, it will bethe task of further research to determine the accuracy of thesereports of Suleyman's intentions.
However, with regard to theevents preceding the death of John Sigismund in 1571, the possibility that Suleyman
really intended to reunify Hungary cannot be excluded.

Let me now discuss the Turkish sources. The fethname of thesultan regarding the occupation of Buda states:

In the preceding years I have conquered Hungary and its capital, Buda
by the grace of God, thanks to my victorious saber; but, since in those
times it was very far from the Moslem Empire, and hence it would have
been difficult to administer it, whereas King John agreed to pay tribute
for it, I transferred the kingdom of Hungary to him and to his son, King
 Istefa [John Sigismund] after him. But the king of Germany, Hungary's
neighbor, the unbeliever named Ferandus [Ferdinand] who,
cursed djaur as he is continually at war with the followers of Islam
and has always been a vengeful rebel would have liked to become King
of Hungary. Therefore his unbelieving brother named Karlo [Charles
V], allied to the King of Ispania [Spain] and with the support of other
unbelievers of depraved lives, assembled a huge army from the provinces
that are hotbeds of error, and placed guns and weapons on his
innumerable boats on the Danube. The cursed one named Perenyi, one
of the Hungarian magnates, also joined him. Moving with all these
forces he took power for himself in Hungary and laid siege to the city of
Buda.

Giving an account of the siege of Buda and the retreat of Roggendorf's forces, the fethname explains that Buda had
to be occupied sothat it could be converted into "one of the homes of Islam" and thendescribes how Transylvania
was given to the son of John. [306]

Two important points in this account are to be noted. One is thatthe fethname justified bestowing Hungary to John
with the argument that "at that time it fell very far from the Moslem Empire", anargument also mentioned by
Istvanffy. However, since Buda wasjust as far from the Ottoman Empire in 1529 as in 1541, theargument makes
little sense. Perhaps it is the result of an error intranslation. There can be no doubt, however, that this statementbears
on the notion of range of action. The other noteworthy detail isthat the fethname is silent about the promise made to
John Sigismund or, more exactly, to Isabella.

According to the Ottoman chronicler Ferdi, Suleyman had spokento the Hungarian lords as follows: "The King of
Vienna Ferendianus[Ferdinand] will not allow you to hold Budim [Buda]; he is constantly disturbing you.
Therefore, it would be more appropriate if Igave you the country of Transylvania and its appurtenances, andyou go
thither to live." [307] Djeladzade, the other Ottoman historian,noted that the pashas had decided that Buda had to be
occupied.

Moreover, he also reported that Suleyman had a contract drafted inwhich John's infant son was granted a sandjak in
Transylvania and,when he came of age, the kingdom of Hungary, "in place of hisfather." According to Thury's
interpretation, Suleyman's contractwas merely a verbal commitment, adding that the contemporary ornear-
contemporary Hungarian writers were also unaware of a written promise or document. [308] But, as I have noted,
Istvanffy said thathe had seen the document. Finally, I also note that Evlia Chelebi,the great Turkish world traveler
and historian of the seventeenthcentury reported that Suleyman occupied Buda and placed it in thehands of a vezir
"in order to avoid so much trouble and worryresulting from the Islamic troops having to come to the help of thecity."
[309]

Conclusion

The true interests of the Ottoman Empire tied it to the Near andFar East and to the Black Sea area. The affairs of
Europe merelydepleted its energies without offering any significant compensation.

After the capture of Constantinople the Porte could not help butbecome involved in European politics, because the
necessary condition for retaining the city was control over the Balkans, which inturn unavoidably led them to
Hungary and eventually to confrontation with the Habsburg Empire. Hungary in the 1520s did notrepresent a threat
to the Ottoman Empire, nor did it constitute aprosperous area worth conquering; its significance derived simplyfrom
the fact that the country could be used as a buffer state vis-a-visthe Habsburgs. The leaders of the Empire saw
clearly that theycould not compel Hungary to assume this role, since it lay beyondtheir range of action. Therefore,
they sought peaceful means toachieve their end: a relationship of alliance in which Hungary wouldadjust its foreign
policy to that of the Empire, but would otherwiseretain its independence, its territorial and administrative
integrity.This was the essence of "Suleyman's proposal." If this concept couldhave been realized, the Ottoman
Empire could have avoided theHungarian wars which proved so expensive and involved so manycasualties. In the
long run these wars achieved nothing; on thecontrary, they contributed to the decline of the Empire.

The acceptance of the "proposal" would have certainly been advantageous to Hungary in the short term, because it
would have putan end to the war which exhausted and jeopardized its very existence, while preserving the unity of
the country. Hence, King John'spolicies are justified. The gist of the matter is not the eventualconsequence of the
alliance with the Turk, but rather what could beand had to be done at the moment for the country's survival.Perhaps
the acceptance of Suleyman's proposal also would havebeen advantageous in the longer term. With Transylvania as
anexample, we cannot disregard the possibility that Turkish sovereignty need not have entailed a separation from the
civilization ofWestern Christendom. It is not even possible to imagine a fate worsethan that which actually befell
Hungary as a consequence of therejection of that proposal.
Should we therefore raise the issue of who is to blame, andcontinue to point the finger at the generation of Mohacs,
albeit froman opposite point of view? To blame that generation either for havingrejected the proposal or for having
lost the battle of Mohacs would beequally anachronistic. Hungary, wedged between two great powers,was bound to
perish. All of Suleyman's wisdom and all of the powerof his empire were not sufficient to overrule certain objective
andsubjective factors. The range of action of Ottoman forces could not beextended; hence Suleyman could not
provide the defense the countryneeded to face up to the Habsburgs. Furthermore, he could notconquer the deeply
rooted Hungarian distrust and hatred of theTurks which contributed decisively to the rejection of the proOttoman
orientation in the Hungarian ruling class. Moreover, thefeudal lords living in the western part of the country could
not beprotected against the attacks of Ferdinand, either by John or bySuleyman; hence they became pro-Habsburg
by necessity.
Does this mean that there was no other option, that everythingwas predetermined? On the basis of the results of our
research I canonly answer yes, there was no other option. However, this does notmean that the individual plays no
role in history. It does mean,however, that the conclusion I have reached on the basis of historicalfacts, while not
completely excluding the role of the participants,places them in the background in relation to the elemental
forcesthat constitute the foundation of historical events. If I must call itfatalism, I still prefer that to the romantic
illusions implied in thenotion of the "stalwart Hungarian nation", or the concept of Szekfu,based as it is on
categories in the history of ideas and vague notionsof national character, which appeal to the crassest passions of
Hungarianconsciousness and which derive from the wounds inflicted by the Peace Treaty of Trianon. Moreover, I
also am not referring to theelegiac mood conjured by phrases like "site of mourning reddened bythe blood of
heroes." I risked to speak out about "Optimism Derivingfrom Mohacs" in my essay Az orszagut szelere vetett orszag
[A CountryCast to the Roadside], and I persist in that conviction: if a nationis capable of surviving such a disaster,
then it has every reason tocontemplate history with healthy self consciousness and look intothe future with
optimism. Both the interpretation of Hungarian-Turkish relations resultingfrom Mohacs and the issue raised in my
monograph titled Az orszagutszelere vetett orszag [A Country Cast to the Roadside] haveelicited intense reaction
and sharp debate among a considerableportion of Hungarian historians. [310] I expect, and welcome, furtherreaction
as a consequence of the present work. I await commentand even criticisms which are not too friendly, with pleasure
because,after all, there is an "issue" involved, and this issue cannot beclarified by one person proceeding alone. Even
from the discussionpresented here it is clear that we must try to visualize events farapart in space and time, with
broad ramifications, while individualproblems have yet to be resolved. We are facing an extremely
ambitiousresearch program in which the systematic analysis of archivalmaterials, from Madrid to Istanbul, from
London to Rome, will playdecisive roles. Also, as the present work demonstrates, the reinterpretation of published
sources is an equally urgent task. For bothtasks we need fresh perspectives, new hypotheses, and a completebreak
with rooted beliefs, a tabula rasa. At this moment it stillseems that "Suleyman's proposal" is the best working
hypothesisbecause, as I have proposed already some time ago: "Suleyman'sproposal acts like a magnet which
arranges and orients the datawhich at first sight appears unwieldy and even contradictory." [311]

The other important task is to uncover the nature and impactthe oft-mentioned "Mohacs complex." How was this
complex generated, how did it affect contemporaries, the chroniclers, and laterhistorians? Present-day researchers of
the Jagellonian period andthe period of Mohacs cannot help but observe, at every step, thattheir sources are biased.
Of course, political and other points of viewoften played a part, especially in the dispatches of foreign
ambassadors,but the distorting impact of the Mohacs complex is morepervasive. We should be able to determine the
direction of this bias, its angle of reflection, from case to case. Of course, this can be noeasy task, for reality can
probably be arrived at from a model basedon unquestionably authentic data and on logical considerations. Ifdubious
data were included some logical contradiction would inevitably develop and interfere with the otherwise reliable
functioningof the model. We can postulate several such models, but perhaps thisbook already has convinced the
reader that one of the most promising is the model based on the relationship between war and politics.
 PART II
THE BATTLE OF MOHACS
CHAPTER V
OBJECTIVES AND PLANS OF THE TWO SIDES
To describe the course of the entire 1526 campaign would be auseful and necessary project, but the question is
whether it can bedone with the available sources. Considering the dearth of evidenceon the period, as already
discussed, it is rather doubtful. The sourceson the strictly military aspects of the battle of Mohacs are evenscantier
and less reliable than those relating to politics.

Sources
There are two important sources for the reconstruction of themilitary events on the Hungarian side. The dispatches
of the papalnuncio, Baron Burgio, [312] and the narrative of Bishop Stephen Brodarics, De conftictu Hungarorum
cum turcis ad Mohatz verissimadescriptio (The true description of the battle waged on the field ofMohacs by the
Hungarians against the Turks.) [313] Unfortunately,neither author was familiar with the military metier.
Moreover,both wrote about the events with bias, although each had a differentway to grind.
Burgio admitted that he "understood little', about the "militaryprofession." [314] We find specific evidence of his
ignorance everywherein his account. Even his data did not exceed the level of informationavailable to the run-of-
the-mill foreign diplomat. While he participated in many a deliberation of the government, naturally, he wasleft out
precisely from the most significant military discussion because of the necessary security measures. Thus he got his
militaryinformation second or third hand, perhaps from agents; there areindications that prominent persons more
than once deliberatelymisled him in private conversations, especially when there seemedthe opportunity of
extracting money from him. (And unfamiliar as hewas with military matters, he was unable to assess the reliability
ofsuch information.)Reportedly, Burgio had an impulsive temperament, lacking the most important qualification for
a successful diplomat, name]y, cooldetachment. However Hungarians may be moved by the degree ofhis empathy
with their cause, such feelings were not exactly advantageous in assessing the facts. Moreover, his dispatches were
affected by mood and emotion. He could write about a matter firstpessimistically and then optimistically. He was
quite aware of hisown moodiness; as he wrote in a letter to a prelate: "Please, Majestydo not be shocked by the
inconsistencies with which I judge thesituation of Hungary in my letters: I have depicted it as desperateearlier, and
now I am hopeful once again. These changes of mood arecaused by the events." [315] Of course, Burgio's
dispatches reflect hisposition: however sympathetic he may have been to the cause ofHungary, he naturally saw
issues and judged personalities primarily from the Vatican's point of view.
The reliability of Bishop Brodarics is also questionable. First ofall, he was the very first representative of the
"Mohacs complex:" theleitmotif of his entire account is that the disaster was the consequence of personal
weaknesses and errors. Furthermore, since hewas a courtier and an unwavering follower of the king, he shifted
theresponsibility for the failures onto those magnates and nobles of thearmy who had been opposed to the court or at
least critical of it. Hewas probably not a member of the military council, but, even if hehad been, the indications are
that he could not have participated inall deliberations. When he did participate in military discussions heoften
misunderstood or entirely missed what was debated, becauseof his unfamiliarity with military matters.
A description by Christopher Frangepan of the campaign and thebattle and a report of his deputy have also survived.
Although theywere military experts, they took no part in the campaign, wrote theirreports on the basis of hearsay--
hence their reliability may bequestioned. Moreover, Frangepan was not unbiased, for he hated theHungarians. [316]
As for his deputy, his reliability may be measured byhis stating that the Ottomans built three bridges across the
Drava,when, of course, we know that they had built but one.
While in contrast to previous historians, I have reduced considerably the value of the sources from the Hungarian
side, the oppositeoperation must be performed in regards to Ottoman sources. Previous research on Mohacs has
made little use of Ottoman sources, andeven that was badly done. As a consequence of their hypercritical attitude
some Hungarian historians have given no credence to thechronicles, whereas others have accepted only those parts
as truewhich are conspicuously not. They have hardly used the diary ofSuleyman, although it is an "operations
diary" in the modern senseof the term and is completely reliable. Less heed was paid to Luftiand Ferdi, who
understood military matters well, than to Djeladzade, who indulged in poetic license, did not understand
militarymatters, and deliberately distorted certain facts. In consulting Turkish sources scholars have entirely
overlooked the most essentialaspect of the battle of Mohacs, namely, the placement of the Ottoman armies onto the
field of battle. On the basis of this evidence it issafe to assert that deploying this enormous army entailed
extremedifficulties. Moreover, these difficulties could be foreseen by theHungarian side, and, as already mentioned,
Tomori and his companions had indeed taken them into consideration in their battle plans.
Let me stress once more that my reconstruction of the battle ofMohacs and of the preceding campaign is in many
aspects hypothetical. The gaps in our knowledge do not permit otherwise. Moreover,the area of Mohacs, including
the battlefield, has undergoneconsiderable change over time: villages vanished and new ones werebuilt, the bed of
the Danube and of the smaller rivers in the regionhave shifted as a result, causing the wet swampy areas, so
extensiveat one time, to disappear. Of course, modern agriculture and technological progress in general also have
produced much change.
Nevertheless, the probability of these hypotheses is quite high,first of all, because the available data fit even the
model establishedregarding military operations of the age. (Actually, the reliability ofspecific data can be judged by
whether they fit into the model or not.)The proposition about the Ottoman and Hungarian leaders, expertise in
military science is also based on our thinking in terms of themodel: these leaders mastered the routines, the
"methods", asClausewitz called them, which enabled them to reach correct decisions. If one discards the many
exaggerations and the almost mystical aura attached to the person of commander, one can easily seethat the
decisions faced by the leaders on both sides required littlemilitary "genius", but all the more mastery of routine
based onmilitary experience and practical knowledge.

Military Planning.The Question of River Defense in Southern Hungary

I have attempted to argue convincingly that the Ottoman objective in 1526 was not to absorb the country into the
empire; there isno better proof for this argument than the fact that the armyeventually withdrew from the country.
The objective, rather, was tocompel the government to accept the peace offered on two previousoccasions. This
political objective could not be achieved by a war ofannihilation, but only by a war with limited objectives in which
theOttoman army was intent on achieving two tasks: to destroy theHungarian forces and to occupy the capital. The
Hungarian government had rejected Suleyman's peace proposal because it did not wantto surrender the country's
independence. The attack of the Ottomanarmy necessarily followed this rejection. The task of the militaryleadership
was to defend against the Ottoman attack. These were,then, the political and military objectives of the war of 1526.
Thetask now is to reconstruct the military plans of the antagonists byexamining the three main factors of war: force,
space, and timing(see p. 6 sqq.).Force. As calculated earlier the strength of the Ottoman army inthe Hungarian
theater was about 150,000; the total mobilized forceof Hungary can be estimated at 60-80,000, or 110-130,000 if
weinclude mercenaries and the local peasant levy. Even if mobilizationhad not been hampered by grave financial
problems, it was highlyunlikely that the Hungarians could unite all armed forces of the country because of the range
of territory to be defended. Thus it waspossible that in the decisive battle a mere 30-40,000 Hungarians hadto face
150,000 Ottoman soldiers.Space. We have seen that the Ottoman army could not do withoutthe Danube as its main
line of supply. Thus it was quite certain thatthe army would advance along the Danube to occupy Buda, one ofthe
objectives of the campaign. It was also very unlikely that itwould advance on the left bank of the river, i.e., the area
between theDanube and Tisza rivers. [317] The only reasonable possibility for theOttomans was to advance on the
right bank, along the itineraryBelgrade-Petervarad-Eszek-Tolna-Buda. The Hungarian army wasjust as dependent on
the Danube as its opponents. Actually, a "military road" via Eszek to Belgrade is known already from theeleventh-
twelfth century. Gyalokay also attributes great importance to the Danubian transport, but he explains the sultan's
choiceas an indication for his intent to wage a decisive battle against theHungarians, and by assuming that Suleyman
received informationon the start of the king's movement he selected the same route. As amatter of fact, it was just
the opposite: the Hungarian army advanced along the right bank because it could be sure that the Turksalso took that
route (see Map 3). [318]
Hungarian historians have condemned the country's leaders fornot having tried to hold up the Ottomans along the
three obstacleson their route: at the crossings of the Sava, at that of the Drava andin the swampy valley of the
Karasso. This conclusion is totallyunfounded, based as it is on two mistaken assumptions: first, onacceptance at face
value of the criticisms by Brodarics and Burgio;second, on exaggerated judgment of the effectiveness of a
defencebased on rivers or swamps, resulting from the lack of proper assessment of the theoretical and practical
implications of a forced crossing.
Since the matter is of central importance, let me deal with it insome detail. First of all, it has been demonstrated
above that afterthe fall of Belgrade Hungary was generally believed to be defenseless. [319] This consensus of
Hungarian, Ottoman, and other experts implied that neither the Sava, nor the Drava, nor the Karassowas ever seen as
a real chance for defense. Let me briefly review thetheoretical and practical issues regarding defensive battles
alongrivers or swamps in order to clarify the basis of this unequivocalstance of the contemporaries.
Clausewitz asserts that defense along rivers offers chances ofsuccess only if the river is a major one, such as the
Rhine or theDanube, and even then only along their middle or lower course. Twodecisive factors must be taken into
account when crossing a riveragainst opposition: one is the throwing of a bridge, and the other thebridgehead on the
opposite side to secure the building operation.Since it is impossible to know just where the attackers will attemptto
cross, the defense has to guard a long sector of the river bank bydistributing his forces evenly. The time required to
build a bridgedetermines the distance between the smaller units guarding the line of the river; if we divide the sector
of the river to be defended by thedistance between these smaller units, we obtain the number of unitsinto which the
forces should be divided. We divide the effectivenessof the army by the number of smaller units to obtain the
numericalstrength of each. Then, if we compare the size of these units with thesize of that part of the enemy force
which may reach the oppositebank by means of pontoons, barges, rafts, etc., while the bridge isbeing built, we can
determine whether or not it is possible to wageriver defence with any chance of success. Generally, it is not
possibleto force a crossing if the defence is able to assemble a superior forceat least twice the size of the troops that
managed to cross into thebridgehead. [320]
Thus three factors must be taken into account: 1) the width of theriver; 2) the number of craft available for crossing
it, since this woulddetermine the size of the force that can be transported into thebridgehead; and 3) the strength of
the defense. If these three factorsdo not favor the attack, then the crossing is not likely to succeed,regardless of the
size of the attacking army.
The defense of a river line can be successful if there is no possibility of circumventing the defending force; hence its
flanks must reston some insurmountable obstacle, such as the sea, a neutral country,or a mountainous region. It
follows from this that river defenceneeds to be generally more extended than an ordinary line of defence. The roads
along the river available to move the force attackingthe bridgehead are also of crucial importance for success. If
there areno such roads, their construction becomes an organic part of thesystem of defence.
It is a peculiarity of river defence that only a negative result maybe obtained: to repel the enemy attack. It cannot
have a positive result, such as the destruction of the foe, since the river is just asmuch an obstacle for counterattack
as it is for the advancing enemy.Moreover, river defense is extremely rigid: if the enemy shouldsucceed in breaking
across the line at any one location then thewhole line of defence is likely to collapse rapidly, given that it is
notpossible to pull the troops together on time at the decisive spot,because of their widespread deployment.
If it is not undertaken for the sake of obtaining a decision, that is,of presenting a crossing at any price, river defense
may serve to gaintime. Gaining time may indeed offer extraordinary advantages,especially when it comes to a
defensive campaign. But it is onlypossible if the enemy does not dispose of sufficient craft in the area.
So far no mention was made of the strength of the attack in ourdiscussion. Yet this is not a negligible factor. If the
superiority of theoffense is great, and the flanks of the river defense do not rest onsome kind of an obstacle, then the
offense can get around thedefensive positions more easily while still leaving forces along theriver to tie down the
defense.
Let us apply these principles to river defense in Southern Hungary. In the case of the Sava there could be no serious
problem forthe Ottomans. With the capture of Belgrade, Zimony, and Sabac,they had obtained strong bridgeheads
across the river. Moreover,the Hungarian Danube flotilla was far weaker than the Ottoman.According to Brodarics,
Tomori "had considerable numbers of soldiers to man the boats, yet these were far less numerous than whatthe
enemy had." [321] Istvanffy writes: "[Tomori] had a small flotilla,quite strong, composed of small craft called sajka
or naszad [sloop]--but it was no match for the enemy fleet composed of so-called piratebiremes for pirates were the
ones to use such ships on the high seasand on other large vessels." [322] According to Ottoman sources, theirflotilla
consisted of 800 vessels, of which only a fraction was meantfor war, the remainder being for transport. Incidentally,
this figureis no exaggeration; according to intelligence reports, the construction of ships an the sanjaks along the
Danube, the Sava, and theMorava had been in full swing since 1524. [323] In contrast, the Hungarian river fleet,
along with the transport barges, amounted to no more than 200. The waters were thus dominated by the Ottomans,
whichas already mentioned, enabled them to land troops when and wherethey liked behind the Hungarian forces that
might have penetratedinto Srem.
As for the Drava, to begin with, it did not even satisfy the numberone requirement for successful defense against
river crossings, sinceit was not very wide. Judging from the first military charts datingfrom around 1770 the Drava
at Eszek could have not been more than170-190 meters wide. Indeed, this width corresponds to the length ofthe
bridge built at Eszek, according to the diaries of Suleyman. [324]Since the sector of the river to be defended was at
least 100 km, andthe Drava above Eszek was narrower, and wider below it, we maytake 200 meters as an average
(see Map No. 45.)
Unfortunately, we do not know exactly how long it took to build abridge across a river 200 meters wide in that
period, even thoughSuleyman's clerk recorded the construction of the bridge in detail.The works were begun on
August 15. The entry for that day reads:"This morning they very quickly started to build a bridge across theDrava."
Work continued on the 16th, and on the 17th the clerk noted:"The construction of the bridgehead is completed; all
that remains isto set up the ships." It seems that was done on the 18th since on the19th the following was recorded:
"Today with God's help the bridgewas completed." [325] Thus, we can see that in addition to bridging theDrava by
means of ships, the two other necessary operations, building a bridge and establishing a bridgehead, were also
completed.
A further question is the number of soldiers the Ottomans wereable to ferry into the bridgehead. The answer would
have to dependon the number and capacity of the crafts available. According toKemal Pashazade, the smaller craft
carried 20 soldiers. Ferdi speaksof 30 soldiers per craft. [326] If we accept the latter figure, and assumethat one-
fourth of the flotilla was available for crossing, we cancount on 6,000 troops ferried in every echelon. If we take 25
minutes for the crossing of each echelon, [327] the Ottomans should have beenable to ferry about 12,000 soldiers
per hour across the Drava. Buteven if we assume hitches and technical difficulties and take aconservative 40
minutes as the turnaround time, 30 000 soldierscould cross in 3-3 1/2 hours.
As to the Hungarian side, let us assume that it was able to muster60,000 men for the defense of the Drava in time.
Assuming 100 km [328]of riverbank to be defended upstream from the mouth of the Drava,the best defensive setup
would be to divide the Hungarian army infive equal groups of 12,000 men each, separated from each other by20 km.
If the Ottomans undertook the crossing between groups 3and 4, and if these groups initiated immediately the march
towardsthe bridgehead, and assuming, moreover, that the length of thecolumn of march was 8-9 km, their vanguard
would reach the spot inthree hours, the rearguard in five. They would require an additionalhalf an hour to launch
their attack. We have seen that during thistime, and even sooner, the Ottomans could send 30,000 soldiers intothe
bridgehead. Thus the 24,000 men of the two Hungarian groupswould be insufficient to thwart the crossing.
These computations demonstrate Clausewitz's tenet that thewidth of the river and the number of craft are
determining factorswhen inferred. [329]
I have not yet considered the additional observation of Clausewitz, about the requirement that the river to be
defended may not becircumvented. In the case of the Drava this condition was lacking:the fact that it emptied into
the Danube enabled the Ottomans toembark their troops, row up the Danube, and disembark at anygiven point to
attack the defenders in the rear, should the crossingfail. Another disadvantage from the Hungarian point of rear
wasthat the northern bank of the Drava was swampy in this period,hampering the movements of the defenders.
Finally, the Ottomansenjoyed a further advantage: they could send elite troops into thebridgehead, while the
Hungarians, not knowing where the crossingwould take place, had to distribute their best troops more or lessevenly
between the defending divisions. Thus only a small part ofthem could participate in the attack against the
bridgehead.Hungarian military historians believed the swamps of theKarasso to be a another significant obstacle.
Indeed, the area wascovered by extensive marshes in that period. Brodarics writes: "Inthis area, not far from
Mohacs, there was a stream which can bereferred to as swampy water rather than an outright swamp or river,and
which the inhabitants call the Karasso...'' [330] Istvanffy describesthe area between Mohacs and the Drava as a plain
"on which noforest or bush grows, but which is bisected by a swollen brook soswampy...that no matter how close
you look you cannot determinewhich way it flows; the reeds, the sedge, and the bottomless mudprevent crossing,
except in the winter, when it is frozen." [331] Indeedaccording to the earliest military map, the bed of the Karasso
wasbordered by a swamp 1.5 to 3 km wide. Still, it was not an insurmountable obstacle. The swamp was usually
crossed by severalpaths or fillings which were difficult to be made impassable. TheHungarian forces, therefore,
would have to be deployed to blockthese approaches. Such a deployment, however, would have rendered the
defense rigid, and the Ottomans would have had nodifficulty in breaking through. Incidentally, numerical
superioritybecomes decisive when the terrain is swampy, bushy, or forested; theOttoman army could have easily
overrun the small Hungarian force.Final]y, much as in the case of the Drava, the Ottomans might haverowed up the
Danube to attack the defensive positions from the rear,not to mention the fact that they could easily circumvent the
obstacle from the west.
The contemporary experts did--correctly--not regard the Sava,the Drava, or the Karasso as serious obstacles. How
then has theopinion that the Ottomans ought to have been detained along theserivers become so general among
historians of Mohacs? Essentiallybecause they have accepted at face value Brodarics's and Burgio'sremarks.
Brodarics relates that Tomori, informed of the Ottomanpreparations on March 20, 1526, recommended to the king
that theenemy be prevented from crossing the Sava. [332] On April 24 Burgiowrote: "This morning [Tomori] leaves,
with the help of God, ...todefend the crossing of the Sava, should the Turks attack from thatdirection." [333] We
should note that in January he had readily acceptedthe opinion that since the bridgehead across the Sava was in
Ottoman hands, the Turks could not be stopped there. [334] The issue ismentioned once again in his report dated
July 13: "If there had been4,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in readiness at the Sava, asTomori had requested, then--
possibly--we could have stopped theTurks from crossing the river." [335] By that time the court alreadyknew that
the bridge over the Sava, build by the commander ofBelgrade, Bali Beg, was near completion, and that the
Ottomansmight begin to cross within ten days. Finally, on June 30, when thefirst echelon of the Ottoman main army
had reached Belgrade, andits vanguard was already in the Srem, he wrote: "I lost hope of usbeing able to hold the
line of the Sava." He continued: "His majestygave orders, that the palatine and the archbishop of Kalocsa shouldcall
the population of the border areas to arms, detain the foe and, ifstill possible, prevent the Turks from crossing the
Sava. And if thisno longer be possible, let them confront the Turks on this side of theriver." [336] We should note,
moreover, that by this time it was no longera matter of defending the Sava, but only the Drava. In other
words,"Sava" must be a slip of the pen, or else Burgio was unable todifferentiate between the two rivers.Istvanffy
also writes about this matter: "Tomori...reported thatSuleyman. ..is coming to Hungary with his host. He could be
stoppedat the crossing of the Sava..." On the other hand, Istvanffy alsowrote that Tomori's plan was contested.
"Suleyman, already inpossession of Belgrade and Sabac, always brings along a large army.
He cannot be detained or prevented from crossing the Danube or theSava by any means at our disposal." [337]
In short, those who objected to the plan of using the Sava as adefense line were absolutely right. As for the reports
of Burgio, theyshow how poorly informed he was. We happen to know that the kingdispatched the palatine Bathori
not to the Sava, but to the Drava;also, it is inconceivable that anyone should have been thinking of thedefense of the
Sava towards the end of June, a time when the bridgebuilt by the Ottomans had been standing for over a week and
theirtroops were in the Srem. Nor can we make much sense of Brodarics'sand Burgio's reports on the defense of the
Drava. Brodarics contradicts himself when he argues that the line of the Drava could havebeen defended. Elsewhere
he writes:
At Tolna we held large assemblies almost every day. We also debated about how the line of the Drava might be
held, if the Sava and Petervarad were already lost, while the Turks were approaching szek.... Hence the palatine,
who had been entrusted with the task already earlier, was once again instructed to hurry and beat the enemy to the
crossing of the Drava. But finally the matter of defending the line of the Drava was dropped. [338]
Incidentally, at this time, the Ottoman army was only 40-50 kmfrom Eszek,--as the king and his entourage well
knew--while Bathori at Tolna was 100 km away; hence by no means could he have"beaten" the Ottomans to it.
As for Burgio, let us remember that in his letter of January hegave credence to intelligence reports about the Turks
that it was a"simple task" to throw a bridge across the Drava and that it was notpossible to set up a line of defense
there. Clearly, the Hungarianmilitary leaders agreed. Thus, one is surprised to read, that in hisreport dated July 13,
Burgio was worried that, because of the rapidadvance of the Turks, "not even the crossing of the Drava can
bedefended." [339] And two weeks later he was to write: "The king wants tohold the line of the Drava, which is
certainly not an easy task. Andif we see the disorganization, the disorientation, and the poverty thatsurrounds his
majesty, our only hope in holding the Drava rests in the cowardice of the enemy, more than anything else." [340] On
August5 and 6 Burgio reported: "the king told me that he is going to proceedto Tolna and prevent the Turks from
crossing the Drava,' and: "Theking is going forth to defend the line of the Drava." [341] The Ottomanarmy reached
Eszek on August 14, but as late as the 13th Burgiowas still confident that Bathori and Ambrus Sarkany would be
ableto occupy Eszek before the Turks. [342]
Twice the king entrusted Bathori with the mission of defendingthe line of the Drava. Istvanffy describes the matter
in the same veinas Brodarics, but adds that in both instances the court was not at allconvinced that this defense was
viable. On the first instance hewrites that the palatine left to prevent the Ottoman army fromcrossing or, "failing this,
since the situation was doubtful and mostrisky, at least to delay their crossing by minor skirmishes." On thesecond
instance he writes that the task of the palatine was to occupyEszek "and strive to prevent the enemy from crossing,
but should hefail because of the enemy's enormous host and power, to delay himuntil such time as the troops
expected from various places can reachthe camp of the king." [343]
Delaying the Ottoman crossing was an entirely different matterfrom attempting an all-out defense along the Drava.
ChristopherFrangepan also writes about fighting to gain time--something that,according to him, "would have made it
possible to inflict seriousdamage" on the Ottoman army. [344] Given our knowledge of the technical and tactical
aspects of river crossings, it is hard to see howsmaller units might have been able to delay the sultan. Maybe in
ourown days, in the age of rapid-fire weapons, such a maneuver ispossible, but when fighting was essentially hand-
to-hand combatthere was little chance of success. Tomori was clearly aware of thehopelessness of such a tactic.
After the fall of Petervarad on July 28and the onset of the Ottoman march towards Ujlak there could be no doubt
about their intent to cross at Eszek. Tomori would have hadample time to reach the Drava, y et he did not.
The idea of river defense along the Karasso did not originate insources from Hungary, for these do not mention it
all. However, oneof the Ottoman chroniclers, Kemal Pashazade, raised this issue:
Between that field [i.e., the battleground of Mohacs] and the Dravathere is a large swamp resulting from the
overflow of a riser. It isextremely difficult to cross: the terrain is so swampy that it can carryneither man nor horse,
and wherever one steps one is bound to sink. Ifthe miserable king with his dogs had come to the edge of the swamp,
setup his batteries, and fired against the attackers, he could have prevented the soldiers of the true faith from
entering the game-pack ofjihad. [345]
Kemal Pashazade was a most respectable scholar, writer andimam, but had little knowledge of military matters. He
obtained hisimpression from the undoubtedly difficult crossing of the swamps,but forgot that it would have been just
as difficult for the Hungarians to move; and the prerequisite for delaying tactics conducted bysmall forces--and there
could be no question of more than that--isprecisely high mobility.
Another Ottoman chronicler, Ferdi, also mentions the swamps ofKarasso in passing: "It was as difficult to cross the
aforementionedmarshes as to cross the eye of a needle." [346] He does not intimate thatthe Hungarians should have
mounted their defense along theswamps.
We must conclude, therefore, that Brodarics and Burgio exaggerated the chances of defense along the river by far. If
there had beenthe slightest hope of detaining the Ottoman army along the Drava,then the troops would have been
called to assemble, not at Tolna, buton the north bank of the river. In late July the king summonedBatthyany, the ban
of Croatia, not to Eszek, but to Valpo where itwould have been impossible to defend the line of the Drava. [347]
All told, as far as terrain was concerned, all advantages were onthe Ottoman side. While it offered the Hungarians
no possibility ofa sound footing, it ensured the greatest possibility of strategicmaneuver for the attackers.

Timing and Planning

The time frame for the operations of major Ottoman forces againstHungary was defined by two dates: the army
reached Belgrade onthe end of June or early July and had to head back in order to reachits garrisons before winter by
October 26th, Kassim gunu, at thelatest. Hence, it had three and a half (maximum four) months toengage the
Hungarian army in battle, take Buda, and starts back.
Apparently, the Hungarian command was well aware of theseconstraints, for it ordered the troops to assemble at
Tolna on July 2,and mercenaries were hired for three months. [348] Yet, the governmentwas unable to take
advantage of these few months for a number ofreasons. As with any feudal army, the "feudal" system of
mobilization was cumbersome, uncertain, and slow; the serious shortage offunds in 1526 delayed hiring
mercenaries. Furthermore, the Hungarian government found out the main thrust of the attack onlyquite late. Until
then it was uncertain whether parts of the Ottomanmight not move against Transylvania or Croatia.
The Hungarian military leaders were also at a disadvantagewhen it came to a decisive battle against the sultan's
army. TheHungarian commanders had to await the Transylvanian and Croatian force, and the arrival of the foreign
mercenaries in order toconcentrate the largest possible force for the battle (see Map No. 2,above). Because of this
inevitable time lag the Hungarians had toavoid battle and gain time. But battles, in general, can only beavoided by
retreat, and in this case retreat entailed giving up thesouthern regions of the country. If the Hungarian command
wasunwilling to make this sacrifice it had to wage battle, even if itsforces were inferior. Hence the time factor did
not favor the Hungarians either.
In summary then, no matter which factor we consider, the Hungarians, chances of victory were extremely slim.
From the actual events, it is relatively easy to reconstruct theplans of the Ottoman high command: advance with
their main forcesalong the right bank of the Danube while taking the fortressesendangering the lines of supply (Titel,
Petervarad, and Ujlak); thencross the Drava at Eszek, seek out the Hungarian forces, defeatthem in a decisive battle,
and capture Buda.
It is not so easy to conjecture the plans of the Hungarian leadersfrom the contradictory data in the unprofessional
descriptions of Burgio and Brodarics. The reconstruction is further hindered by theobvious disagreements between
the royal court, Tomori, Szapolyai,and other commanders, particularly in regard to the time and placeof open battle.
It seems that the king and his entourage would havepreferred a delay in time and space, whereas the magnates and
thenobles of the southern regions would not hear of it. Finally, theyopted for fighting the decisive battle as far south
as possible, evenwithout the troops from Transylvania and Croatia. It seems theplain of Mohacs was the site selected
from the start. [349]
The sources are very explicit on this issue: Tolna was intendedmerely as a point of assembly. [350] On June 24
Louis II wrote that thearmy was going to assemble at Tolna, and "from there we willadvance with all our forces and
with foreign auxiliaries to whereverwe are needed." In a July 24th letter the king's aim was "Tolna andthe southern
region", and in one of July 31st "Tolna and beyond." [351]
We have no idea how military decisions were reached at court. Weknow that the session of the diet which opened on
April 24 instructedthe king to form a war council "composed of men with militaryexperience", but we have no
information about its membership orhow this council actually functioned. [352] It could not direct the eventsvery
actively, partly because the mobilization process and themarching of troops into assembly areas were in the hands of
thebanderial commanders and the captains of the counties, and partlybecause until it could be determined where the
Ottomans wouldattack, it did not have the Croatian and Transylvanian forces at itsdisposal, nor could it give them
instructions on account of thedistances involved. Coordination between Tomori and the militarycouncil was fairly
close, although it would appear that it was notalways smooth, since several times Tomori offered to resign.

Plans for an Advance into the Balkans

A plan according to which Szapolyai was to attack Ottomanterritories, along with the voivode of Wallachia, was
typical of thetimes. (Tomori knew nothing about this plan, and it is possible thatsome of the military councilors did
not know about it either.)
Brodarics gives the following account of it:
Someone familiar with the plans of the enemy and the state of hisaffairs informed the king, via a secret emissary,
that it would be mostadvisable if the voivode of Transylvania and the voivode of Wallachiafor it seemed that in this
instance the king could count also on hisloyalty would either attack the unsuspecting enemy in the back or,while the
enemy was heading straight towards the king, the two wouldunite their forces and break into Thrace, which had
been deprived of allits garrisons. Thus they could defeat the enemy by placing him undercrossfire or by compelling
him to turn back and hurry to defend his ownempire. Because of reasons too elaborate to list, this advice
provedsuspect from the start but later the king told the archbishop of Esztergom about it. When the latter expressed
his approval the king sent amessage by Orban Batthyany, who was on his way to Moldavia, ordering the voivode of
Transylvania to give the matter most serious consideration and act as he deemed best for the country; and, should
heapprove of the plan, to lead his own and all of Transylvania s troops,along with the voivode of Wallachia, to the
said area. [353]
When Szapolyai became king, Ferdinand and his party did theirbest to destroy his credit and prestige with the
slander that he haddeliberately stayed away from the battle of Mohacs. A letter of KingJohn, sent to Pope Innocent
VIII, was found not long ago. In thisSzapolyai defends himself against the false charges and describesmatters pretty
much in agreement with Brodarics, adding only thatthe certain "somebody" who suggested the plan was none other
thanthe voivode of Wallachia. According to him the king, the queen,Thurzo, Szalkai and Brodarics all knew about
the plan. [354] FromIstvanffy's presentation, however, it would appear that the membersof the military council were
also informed. He writes:
This plan, which came too late, and was not very promising anyhow,was completely condemned by several who
were familiar with theTurkish way of waging war; for they did not believe that once the enemycrossed the Danube
and the Sava to reach the interior of Hungary itcould be forced to retreat, no matter how great the danger
threateningits own people.
Istvanffy also adds that even before the mission of Orban Battyany, the king had ordered the venture via Gaspar
Vingarti, and ina rather curious fashion:
He seriously ordered Szapolyai to come to him with his army in a hurry but--at someone s persuasion--he also
ordered Szapolyai, in a letterdelivered secretly to cross the Danube and ravage Serbia and Bulgariawith fire and iron
with his own troops and those of voivode Radul ofWallachia . . ." [355]
Brodarics was also aware of the Vingarti mission, but says nothing about the orders delivered in secret. He probably
knew nothingabout that, nor did those who opposed the plan so strenuously.
We do not know just when Vingarti was dispatched by the king.We do know that Orban Batthyany was sent from
Buda to thearchbishop of Esztergom on July 18, "with a certain secret mission." [356] It is likely that he was to
discuss this enterprise withArchbishop Szalkai. On June 25 it was Szapolyai's emissary, JanosSzalanczy, who
arrived in Buda on some "secret", mission. [357] If thismission was indeed the proposal or the reply to the proposal
the kinghad sent via Vingarti, then he must have left at least three weeksearlier, given the distance of 500-600 km
between Buda and Kolozsvar or Gyulafehervar.
On the other hand, Burgio writes on June 18 that the emissariesof the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia arrived
in Buda, and hebelieves he knows just why. The voivode of Moldavia sent a messagethat he had received orders
from the sultan to attack Poland, together with Tartars, who were already assembling, but he refused toparticipate in
such a venture, preferring to cooperate with the Poles.The voivode of Wallachia supposedly sent a message to the
effectthat part of the Ottoman army was assembling at Nicopolis to attackTransylvania through Wallachia, and thus
he could not providehelp. [358]
There are many obscure points here. It is unlikely that Suleymanintended to launch a war against the king of Poland,
with whom hehad just recently signed peace, precisely to prevent him from comingto the assistance of Louis II. The
report of the voivode of Wallachiamust also be taken with a grain of salt. For, as we shall see, all theimportant
components of the Ottoman army were advancing towards Belgrade, while none of the Turkish sources mentions
troopsdispatched to Nicopolis. The voivode probably sent his emissary inthe last week of May by which time the
whole of the Ottoman armywas negotiating the difficult passes across the Balkan mountains; it is almost
inconceivable that the reconnaissance of the voivode ofWallachia would have reported that significant units were
assembling at Nicopolis. So either Burgio was mistaken or--as is morelikely--the two Romanian voivodes were bent
on misleading theking of Hungary. This is all the more likely as we know fromOttoman sources that the emissary of
the voivode of Moldavia hadsought out the sultan in Adrianople at the beginning of May, bringing tribute, whereas
the emissary of the voivode of Wallachia metthe sultan in Sofia on May 30. It is possible, and even probable,
thatthis was the time Radul of Wallachia had to leave his son as hostagewith the Ottomans.
A few days ("a little while"--in the words of Brodarics) before theking's departure from Buda, he sent Istvan Bathory
to Szapolyaiwith the message "that he should set aside all other designs, as theapproach of the enemy warrants that
he hasten to the king with allTransylvanian forces." This must have taken place around July 20.[359]Szapolyai,
disoriented by the contradictory orders, dispatchedGyorgy Bacsy to the king. Bacsy was able to reach the king in
thelast days of July at Pentele. Brodarics gives the following account:
Here [at Pentele] was where Gyorgy Bacsy reached us with the message from the voivode of Transylvania. The
content of the message was the voivode was at a loss about what action to take, since he had received so many
different orders in the past few days; first he received some letters from the king, then came several emissaries--
including GasparVingarti Horvath, the royal steward--with the order that he should report to the king. Then came
Orban Batthyany, who communicated acertain plan about attacking the enemy in the back with the help of
thevoivode of Wallachia; finally came Istvan Bathori of Somlyo, who repeated the first order, without explicitly
retracting the one the kinghad sent via Orban Batthyany. Thus he was at a loss to understand what to do amidst all
these changes of plans, and which of these manyorders to carry out; he was prepared to do anything his royal
majesty should command, yet he felt the plan according to which he ought tojoin the king was the best. It was too
late to attack the Turks in theback, and very dangerous at that, and by now would be most difficult to carry out even
if it were useful, because the voivode of Wallachia, with whom he was supposed to collaborate, had been forced to
send his only son into the Turkish camp as a pledge of security.
Thereupon the king reportedly ordered Bacsy that he should hurry to the voivode, riding day and night as fast as he
could, and let him know that the king approves of the voivodes plan, which now, as the enemy has already crossed
the borders of the country, is best. Setting aside all other concerns and plans the voivode shouldhurry to the king
with all the Transylvanian troops and other troops hemay encounter on the way towards the camp of the king. Let
him bringanyone he can find into the camp of the king, not only nobles andknights, but peasants as well. [360]
According to Szapolyai's report, he had previously, on severaloccasions, proposed to the king that he be allowed to
join the army ofthe king, since Transylvania was not in danger. The aforementionedJanos Szalanczy must have
brought just such a message. "Severalweeks had passed", wrote Szapolyai (King John by then), with thesedebates,
and this was the reason he missed the battle of Mohacs.Brodarics confirms this interpretation: "It was mainly this
affairthat stopped the voivode from joining the fight on time." [361] We shallsee that this was not necessarily the
case: Szapolyai could haveparticipated in the decisive battle, but only if it took place muchfurther north than
Mohacs.
All this, let us admit, causes shivers: the court had such a hopelessview of the country's predicament--and it was not
alone in thisrespect--that an impossible plan, which should have been dismissedas fantastic, seemed an acceptable
way out. What was even moreserious, the indecisive, hesitant young king, discarding the opinionof the experts,
decided in favor of a plan without informing thecompetent authorities about it, on the advice of a very narrow
cliquewho were all dilettantes in military matters: it is not surprising that,the lesser nobility, used to war, was most
distrustful of the court.Whoever has served in time of war knows that there is nothing morediscouraging and more
upsetting for the soldier on the line than thefeeling of being sent to the slaughterhouse by incompetent leaders.
CHAPTER VI
PREPARATIONS ON THE HUNGARIAN
SIDE.OTTOMAN ADVANCE
Hungarian Reconnaissance and Assessment of Ottoman Intentions
Thanks to its efficient reconnaissance, [362] the Hungarian government was able to monitor Ottoman preparations
from the autumn of1525 on. The court received reports on Ottoman preparations andmovements through diplomatic
channels; reports from Ragusa wereespecially valuable according to Brodarics and Burgio; Tomori kept"many
spies" and received important information from deserters aswell. We have specific data regarding the intelligence
service operated by Szapolyai; the surviving municipal accounts of the city ofNagyszeben contain many entries,
such as: "Knez Demeter was sentto Wallachia, along with an assistant, to obtain news about the routeselected by the
Ottomans. Expense: 4 florins."[363]
As for Burgio's information on the Ottomans, one must be careful,for much of it is mere kitchen gossip. For
instance, it is hard tobelieve that as late as the fall of 1525 the Ottoman leaders wouldstill not know which route to
choose for an attack on Hungary. InJanuary 1526 Burgio wrote: the voivode of the Serbs, Pavel Bakic,who deserted
from the Ottoman side, informed Tomori that it wasdecided during one of the divans of the Sultan to march against
Budathrough Transylvania because "they could easily enlist 60,000 menalong the way." The following day,
however, "a Serbian", summonedto the divan, talked the Ottomans out of this plan, proposing theroute through
Belgrade. [364] Either Bakic was telling a tall tale--whichis unlikely--or Burgio's fantasy constructed the whole
affair frombits and pieces of news that reached him. It is altogether inconceivable that the participants at a most
secret military meeting should divulge its proceedings, or that Sultan Suleyman would ask foradvice from just
anyone who happened to drop by. Moreover, as wehave seen, the Ottoman leaders had been aware of the advantages
ofthe Belgrade route even in the fifteenth century.
No matter how well Hungarian reconnaissance functioned. itcould not possibly have uncovered every detail of the
Ottoman planof attack. Thus the government could not have known whether theattack would be directed against
Hungary only or against Croatiaand Transylvania as well. This would become clear only once theentire Ottoman
force had reached Belgrade. But it may be presumedthat the Ottoman leaders did disseminate false news to mislead
theenemy. This would explain why, towards the end of March 1526.Louis II wrote to Batthyany to remain in his
place with his troopsand prepare the defense of these provinces. As late as June Szapolyai still felt that Transylvania
was threatened. [365] Only about themiddle of July did the king appeal to Batthyany and Szapolyai tohurry to
central Hungary with their forces. [366] It can be assumed,therefore, that only then did the Ottoman intentions
become clear.By that time the entire Ottoman army had reached Belgrade.

Peace Plans, the Financial Situation, and Preparations

Familiar with the international situation and the relationship offorces, the court as well as Tomori and some of the
magnates sawclearly that Hungary was bound to lose the war. But the shortsighted lesser nobility were not aware of
this. According to Burgio'sreport of February 2 the court continued to discuss the issue of peace,and even sent an
emissary to the king of Poland: "I think he was sentabout the issue of peace; though nothing can be decided without
thediet, they [the estates] still try to prepare the letter of credence forthe ambassador and other matters needed for
negotiations; if onlythey could manage to convince the people about the need for peace." [367]Of course, "people"
refers here to the lesser nobility.
At the beginning of March Burgio reported that Tomori had beennegotiating with Chaus Behram, the Turkish envoy
retained in Budasince 1524. Tomori told Behram that he may regain his freedom if he does something to deserve it.
And he made Behram write a letter to the Turkish court to the effect that the king was offering peace or at least
armistice to the sultan, and added that the Hungarians expected a reply within three weeks. King Louis does not dare
send an emissary to Turkey now and for good reason: this is why they arc attempting to initiate negotiations through
the intermediary of the Polish king and of chavush Behram." [368]
The following excerpt from Burgio's report dates from much later,from July 31:
Archbishop Tomori attempts to persuade the king In secret, through the intermediary of the bishop of Bosnia to send
an emissary to the sultan and ask for peace, even at the price of paying tribute if nothing else will do.... While the
aristocrats would readily accept such a proposal, they dare not say so out loud because not all are assembled as yet
[i.e., at this time mobilization was still proceeding and the armies were advancing towards Tolna--G.P.], and they
are afraid of the nobility." [369]
Regarding the Ottoman reception of the peace feelers Tomorimakes some interesting remarks. In his letter to the
king dated June25 we read: the Ottoman leaders have announced that the Hungarians "intend send an annual sum of
10,000 marks to Imperial Majesty [Suleyman], and all the people [i.e., the troops] rejoiced; but theemperor will not
accept." [370] The Ottoman leaders seem to have knowna thing or two about the psychology of the soldier. They
probablymade a public announcement of Louis' offer of peace in order tobolster the self-confidence of the troops:
the enemy is afraid of war;therefore he must be weak.
Considering the relation of forces, the chaotic internal conditions,and the severe lack of funds, one not only
understands the government's inclination to sue for peace, but also cannot help but approveof it. The only thing one
cannot approve of was that Hungary optedfor peace when there was no chance of its being granted and turneddown
peace when it was actually offered.
The sources of financial aid were drying up to the point where thelack of funds was becoming increasingly
oppressive. In mid-MarchBurgio reported that he had no more than 30,000 gold pieces left. [371]If all went well this
money was enough to hire 5,000 mercenaries forthree months. They could expect more funds from three sources
only:the war tax, which required a decision by the diet; further donations by the pope; and the sequestration of
church treasures, which alsorequired the permission of the pope.
The Consistory at the Vatican agreed to grant further aid onMarch 26. Disbursement, however, was very
cumbersome: the sumreached Vienna only at the beginning of June, and Burgio had it inhis hands in the middle of
the month. The pope's permission to makeuse of the church treasures arrived at the same time--too late, sincethere
was no time left for minting money out of the treasures. [372]
The court tried everything to obtain aid from foreign powers. Itsent desperate letters depicting in dramatic tones the
great dangersthreatening the country. Some are worth quoting. In his letter ofMarch 25 to Venice, Louis II wrote, for
the first time, that he felt itwas unnecessary to give details regarding the disproportion offorces, for the Signoria
must be well aware of it. He continued: "Weyearned for peace among the [Christian] rulers and a
concertedcampaign [against the Ottomans], for this would have been our onlysalvation." But it seems only God can
help us now, because thedanger is imminent and, "weakened and exhausted by so manyyears of strife, we do not feel
strong enough to resist...." Therefore,he urgently requested money, so that he could at least hire somesoldiers. [373]
Another letter to Venice, dated June 21, reflected complete despair: "The Emperor of the Turks himself is but three
or fourdays, march away from Belgrade. He is coming against us and ourcountry with all his might...which our very
depleted forces cannotmatch." [374]
As already mentioned, the Ottoman diplomats prepared the campaign so adeptly that Hungary, completely isolated,
could turn to noone for help. Brodarics discusses the attitude of the king of Poland inthis connection:
With King Sigismund of Poland a kinsman of the king, things were different, since he went as far as to sign a treaty
of alliance with the Turks not long ago to parry the danger threatening his country. He was unable to obtain peace by
any other means, given the dissension that prevailed among the Christian rulers. It seemed, therefore, that this brave
prince, who had always kept his word, would not offer any help against a ruler allied to him.''[375]
Brodarics implies that Sigismund had acted wisely in requesting peace from the Ottomans; however, he keeps silent
about the factthat he himself had implored from Rome over many years the king ofPoland to persuade King Louis to
do likewise. By neglecting tomention any attempt at Hungarian-Ottoman peace negotiations,Bodarics was in fact the
initiator of the "Mohacs complex."
Unfortunately we have no reliable information on the ceaselessdiscussions at court on what to do. Burgio's reports
are obviouslybased on incomplete information, and Brodarics did not write aboutthese negotiations, for he was ill at
the time.
Burgio took part in some of the meetings. He wrote his firstpertinent report on March 5 relating that he had read out
the pope'sbrief in which he enjoined Charles V to come to the aid of Hungary:"everyone was moved by it, no eyes
remained dry." [376] The pope,however, was perfectly aware that there was no chance to turn theemperor away
from his ambition to become the leader of a worldpower and to move him to come to Hungary's rescue. According
to Burgio, at this meeting of the council it was decidedto send the banderia to the frontiers on April 24. It is hard to
see,however, what possible military advantage could have been derivedfrom such a move, whereas the dangers it
entailed are obvious: thetroops dispatched would have consumed the little money which wasat the country's
disposal, and when the Ottomans launched theirgreat attack there would be nothing left to pay the troops. Indeed,the
banderia did not get sent down, perhaps because of the irresponsibility and disobedience of the magnates; it is also
possible, however, that the whole project was but a feint, since the Hungarians had to give evidence of some activity
in order to make Burgio open up his purse.
In his report of March 27 Burgio provides an account of a meetingof the governing council. At that occasion it was
allegedly decidedthat only half of the banderia would be dispatched to the frontier andone-tenth of the peasants
would be armed and held in readiness.Some lords also proposed that the diet meet near the frontier, atSzeged or
Pecs, and that the nobility come equipped to fight "withprovisions and all the necessary material." It is a pity that
Burgiodid not specify which "lords" made this proposal, [377] for it is hard tobelieve that anyone actually
entertained such an idea. While thedispatch of the banderia is doubtful, Burgio's report regarding the nobility is
unbelievable. Such a project would have implied that thenobility stayed under arms from spring to fall, at a time
when evenattending the diet was an enormous burden for many. This is indicated by a decision of 1526: "Because
diets are being held continuously, the poorer nobility is at such expense that many, in order tomeet the costs, have
had to pawn their cattle and have turnedcompletely into peasants; therefore, let it be decreed that from nowon the
diet will meet only when absolutely necessary." [378] Burgioregretted that the king rejected the proposal, since he
was all infavor of it. Louis insisted that the diet be held at Buda and wasapparently supported, wisely, by some
"other lords".Burgio talks about many other thing as well: about endless debates during council meetings, mutual
recriminations, indecisiveness, lack of a sense of responsibility, and so forth. Hungarianhistorians have made
abundant use of this information to demonstrate to what extent the fate of the country was in the hands ofutterly
corrupt, irresponsible, ignorant, and base creatures. It wouldbe difficult to prove the contrary, for lack of pertinent
sources, nor isit my intention to present the generation of Mohacs as an assemblyof knights with shining armor. But
even if the eminencies were allangels, there was--as already discussed several times--no way theycould have saved
the country. Let us now turn to the military decisions of the diet of April 24.One of the most important decrees
regulated the duties of thetreasurer: his task was to take immediate care of the pay for thegarrisons in the frontier
fortifications, to secure funds for it from theroyal revenues or, if necessary, from taxes; to equip the royal banderium
and cover the expenses of its maintenance; to procure,through his agents, the military equipment needed for war--
gunpowder, cannonballs, ships, etc. The diet obliged the magnatesand prelates to provide soldiery in excess of what
the law prescribed.As to the peasants, it ordered that they report for duty at the rate of20% rather than the usual rate
of 3-10%. In fact, in case of extremenecessity the law even provided the mechanism for calling all peasants to arms.
The estates decided that those landed nobles who were not compelled to present banderia contribute, nevertheless,
financially tothe contracting of soldiers in their respective provinces. The diet alsoprescribed a census of the
population of arms-bearing age and required the administrative organs to send the eventually mobilized units to the
points of assembly under the command of competentcaptains. It also adopted provisions for a military council to
functionalongside the king and for the selection of a conmmander-in-chief. [379]
All these measures were useful, well thought-out, and appropriate; one cannot claim that in this extreme situation the
estatesagreed to half-measures. The trouble was that all the good will in theworld could not compensate for the host
of accumulated troubles. Atany rate, Burgio's report on the diet sounds a gross exaggerationwhen it states that the
estates "are not aware of what they areconfronted with, or how to defend the country, and it does not evenoccur to
them to deal with the issues." [380] He must have been onceagain in a bad mood when he wrote this report, because
a week laterhe saw the situation in an altogether different light: "His Majestyand the royal council have finally
decided that they will go to war;not only did they decide, but they are determined to go no matterwhat. As far as I
can understand, I am convinced that they will fightwith great enthusiasm and the best equipment they can come
upwith." [381]
The court decreed mobilization around June 1(), adding that theunits should assemble at Tolna on July 2. As already
mentioned,Hungarian historical research has not yet investigated the system ofmobilization of the Jagellonian
period; hence we cannot know how itwas carried out in 1526. On several occasions Burgio commends thenobility
for its great enthusiasm and vitality. Let us quote a few suchinstances because, while Hungarian historians are busy
repeatinghis negative assessments, they are more bashful when it came topraise. On June 24 he reported:
Here everyone is working on the defence of the country, striving to theutmost; but all projects encounter great
obstacles and make but slowprogress for lack of funds.... The only thing that comforts me somewhatis that all
Hungarians, great and small, with whom I talked aredetermined to fight and come so bravely to the defence of the
countryand of themselves that if only they had the military equipment to goalong with their determination we could
reasonably hope to win." [382]
On August 20, that is, nine days before the battle of Mohacs, hewrote: "The Hungarians do have the spirit and
determination tofight; if nothing else were needed, we could still expect success." [383]
While these declarations of Burio restore somewhat hat the properbalance, they certainly do not mean that the
mobilization of theHungarian army in 1526 proceeded smoothly. In fact, it proceededslowly, the units assembled
with great difficulty and in disarray,much as it was usual everywhere in the age of feudal decentralization. If we add
to these typical shortcomings all the difficultiessaddling the country, we must be surprised that the Hungarianarmy
was ready for battle on the field of Mohacs at all.

The Ottoman Armies March Across the Balkans

Suleyman left Constantinople with his retinue and the janissarieson April 23, reaching Adrianople on May 3. The
army campedaround the city; the whole area "was covered with tents like coopedchicken." [384] They rested for
four days, during which time the "divanmet for a few days to decide matters relating to the campaign." [385] OnMay
8 they continued on their way, sending the janissaries ahead,"since the roads were narrow." [386] The objective of
the maneuver wasto break up the extremely long column of march into segments, orechelons, as is done even
nowadays.
The army of the sultan reached Philippopolis (Plovdiv) on May19 [387] Here too a divan was held, this time with
the participation ofBehram pasha, the commander of the Anatolian army. The unitsfrom Anatolia had marched from
their peacetime stations to theassembly point at Bigaz where they underwent their first muster;then crossed the
straight at Gallipoli and reached Plovdiv, viaAdrianople, on May 21.
At Plovdiv the mass of troops was so considerable that the columnof march had to be extended even further. As
Djeladzade reports:"Since there could have been a great deal of trouble and damagederiving from the jamming of
troops and units and the crowding ofanimals, the commanding grand vezir received an order from theSultan to
march a day ahead with the entire Rumelian army, someservants from the Sublime Court, and a detachment of
arillery." [388] By"one day" Djeladzade did not accurately define the distance betweenthe Rumelian forces and the
remainder of the armies since theRumelian forces themselves marched in at least two echelons. From Suleyman's
diary we may conclude that the janissaries of the sultanreached the same station as the Rumelian army with four or
fivedays' delay.
The most difficult stage of the march was from Plovdiv to Sofia,separated by the Balkan mountains. The troops
marched along tworoutes: the sultan's janissaries, probably together with the artilleryand the train, crossed the
mountains via the pass at Kapu-derbend(the gate of Trajan), while the Rumelian and Anatolian armies usedthe
Zlatica-Teteveni pass. [389]
The sultan reached Sofia on May 29 and stayed there until June4. [390] Here too a divan was held and the Rumelian
army "paraded" infront of the sultans for inspection. Although the troops advancedslowly they suffered from the
oppressive heat. Kemal Pashazadewrote: "There was a terrible heat, as if air and water had been aboil;blood poured
through the pores of the skin instead of perspiration;the difficulties of the march were like the tortures of hell."
Fortunately, "Allah the Merciful', had pity on the true soldiers of the faith,and "rain came every day, softening the
hard surface of the earthand tempering the heat of the summer." [391]
Sofia was a very important station for resupplying the army.Ferdi wrote: "The camels carrying the provisions
arrived too, and therental fees for them were paid out of the state treasury. Competentpersons were sent to other
areas of the Empire to collect food." [392] Asalready mentioned, the discipline of march in the Ottoman forceswas
strict indeed, and the inhabitants of the villages and townsalong the way were spared. Ferdi wrote that "His Majesty
the Judgeof the World kept such strict discipline in the armies that he set upchaus to guard the fields along the way;
hence no harm befell thepeasants at all; for whoever damaged but one blade of grass receiveda thousand blows in
punishment." [393] In some instances, soldiers weredecapitated for pillaging.
In Sofia Ibrahim was given the order to "gather the world-conquering banners around him and advance with the
aforementioned victorious division to enable the invincible army to cross theSava, onto the island of Srem." [394]
His troops were reinforced with150 pieces of artillery and 2,000 janissaries. This communication of Kemal
Pashazade should be interpreted to mean that the Sultanentrusted Ibrahim with the organization of the crossing, of
the Sava;the bridge itself was completed long before he reached Belgrade.
The sultan reached Nis on June 9. Bali Beg reported to him here.most probably to inform him of the latest
developments in Hungary.Presumably it was on basis of this report that Kemal Pashazadewrote:
Spies had informed the Hungarian king that the sultan had launchedhis attack. This news made the life of the
evil-hearted king completelybitter.... Summoning to his court the commanders of his forces and themost
distinguished men of his entourage, he reported the frighteningnews.... Final]y, these evil ones decided to
organize a general levy andto inform all the Christian nations who could be of help to them greatand small, and
particularly to request help from the kings of Bohemiaand Poland who function as the pillars of the unbelievers
that theythemselves should now strive with all their power to provide soldiersand the necessary military
equipment. [395]
So far Bali's spies were well informed, indeed. Yet the followinginformation of Kemal Pashazade was not correct:
There were a hundred thousand knights prepared to fight and the samenumber or even more of infantry.... They
gathered behind the Sava andthe Drava, saving: "with these two waters we will bar the way to theangry and
evil enemy, and will thwart his attack." Contemptuous ofdivine providence and deviating from the path of
salvation they allowedthemselves to be tempted by the devil and placed their trust in water. [396]
It is not the figure of several hundred thousand that astonishes,for this was just the usual exaggeration of Ottoman
chroniclers; it isthe statement regarding the defense of the two rivers, for, as wehave seen, the Hungarian high
command did not feel the least bitsecure behind them. It is unlikely that Bali would have reported inthis sense since
only a few days after the Sultan's having reachedNis the bridge over the Sava w as completed without the
Hungarianshaving hampered its construction. It is also likely that the Hungarian defence of the Drava was a figment
of Kemal Pashazade'simagination, because at the time of Bali's report no signs could bedetected of such an
intention.
Moreover, Lufti was quite definite that the Hungarians had noplans for defending themselves along either river. He
paraphrasedKing Louis' words thus: "The best thing would be to give them bait.... If they throw a bridge across the
Sava, let us pay no attention; let them cross that river, then the Drava, and, as soon as theyhave crossed, we will cut
off all the avenues of approach in front ofthem...." [397] It was probably at the recommendation of Bali Beg
thatSuleyman entrusted Ibrahim, in Nis, with launching the siege ofPetervarad as soon as he crossed the Sava.
Ibrahim reached Belgrade on June 30 with the army under his command. As we know, bythen the bridge across the
Sava had been ready for over a week. [398]The troops of the sanjak of Bosnia, the akindjis, the flotilla rowingup
from the Black Sea, as well as the transport barges built in theneighboring sanjaks and manned by azabs and
oarsmen recruitedfrom all over the empire joined the main forces at Belgrade. Theassembly of the troops from
Rumelia lasted until July 11. Suleymanand his retinue reached Belgrade on July 9 [399]
A great muster was held. Ferdi wrote:
The begs and the sipah-salar, as soon as their troops had been inspected in accordance with the defter of Khakan in
full battle dress,immediately crossed into enemy territory, namely the Srem, using thebridge. The regiments and
other units of the blessed army filed by infront of the vezirs a whole week. The Anatolian army and the kapuhalki
were the last to pass inspection. [400]
Only the march of the sultan's janissaries can be described on thebasis of Süleyman's diary with any exactitude. The
distance ofroughly 1,000 km was covered in 77 days, of which 20 were devotedto rest; thus the average daily march
was 13 km or 17 km, discounting the days of rest. The rate of march of the other units must havebeen basically
similar. There are data regarding the advance of theRumelian army from Sofia: it left Sofia on June 4 and arrived
atBelgrade on June 30; thus the march took 26 days. The distancecovered was roughly 370 km; the average daily
performance was 14km or 19 km if we subtract the 6 days of rest. It may be worth notingthat the rate of march of
large armies was about the same well intomodern times, until the motorization of troops.
CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE
The Fall of Petervarad and Ujlak.The Ottoman Army Reaches the Drava
As already mentioned, on June 19, during the advance along thevalley of the Morava, Grand Vezir Ibrahim was
instructed by thesultan to capture Petervarad. According to Ottoman sources thecastle was a "stumbling block"
along the "highway of the holystruggle" [401] by which we must understand that it closed off access tothe Danube,
hampering the movements of the fleet. Moreover, itcould endanger the supply lines if by-passed and left in the rear
ofthe Ottoman armies (see Map No. 6). Thanks to reconnaissanceconducted by Bali Beg, the Ottoman high
command obtained thefollowing correct information about the Hungarians: on July 8 theking was still in Buda, over
1,000 troops were stationed at the castleof Petervarad, and the "accursed priest", Tomori, was in the vicinitywith
2,000 soldiers [402]
Ibrahim launched the siege of the castle on July 14 with theRumelian army, the 2,000 janissaries assigned to him,
the 150artillery pieces, and the flotilla. Once under the castle they immediately started constructing the siege
trenches and battery positionsand soon, together with the artillery, launched a barrage. On July 17the Anatolian
army joined the besiegers. The garrison of the castleheld out bravely and made a few sallies. It repelled the assaults
ofthe Ottomans repeatedly and inflicted on them significant losses.The Ottomans were able to take the castle on July
28 only afterundermining and blowing up one of the bastions and storming itthrough the breach. [403] With only a
handful of men on the northernbank of the Danube Tomori could not come to the rescue of thedefenders. By this
time the troops of the bishop of Pecs, of the chapter of Esztergom, and of the abbey of Szekszard were all in
hiscamp, to be joined later by Peter Perenyi and his banderium; yet hisforces still numbered no more than
4,000.[404]
It seems the Ottoman command wanted to present the union ofthe forces from Croatia and Transylvania with the
royal forces bydispatching the army of Ibrahim with extraordinary urgency fromPetervarad to Ujlak, the siege of
which was launched as ear]y asAugust 1. It was undertaken with the same generous expenditure ofmateriel as that of
Petervarad. The defenders of this much weakercastle were compelled to surrender in a week. [405]
In the meantime, smaller units captured the castles of the Sremone by one, sometimes even without a fight, because
the garrisonsfled rather than await the arrival of the enemy. Thus the roadtowards the Drava lay open. Touching
upon Sotin, Vukovo, andBorovo, the army reached Eszek on August 14 [406] The ships arrivedthere at the same
time or shortly thereafter, as we know from one ofBurgio's reports. [407] The fact that the Ottomans began to build
thebridge "in a great hurry" as soon as they reached Eszek also indicates important it was for the Ottoman command
to advance asrapidly as possible. The bridge was ready by the 19th; the crossingbegan on the 21st, went on
continuously, and was completed by the23rd. The bridge was dismantled or burnt down while the army wason its
way to the river Karasso. [408]
After the fall of Petervarad Tomori moved to Bacs. A few dayslater he proceeded to the mouth of the river Karasso
and, crossingthe Danube, stopped somewhere in the area of Baranyakisfalud andHercegszollos, sending only smaller
patrols on detail to the Drava.

Where to Fight the Battle? Conflict between Court and Notability

We have already mentioned that since the Hungarian government was well aware that it would not be able to hold
up theOttomans either at the Sava or at the Drava, it decided to fight apitched battle. It may be assumed that Mohacs
had been selected asthe battlefield from the start. The letters of Louis II indicate that hewanted to move further
southward, leaving Tolna behind, and we also know that in the last week of June the palatine asked the kingto send
money and troops to Mohacs. [409]
It is possible, however, that the king accepted this p]an only underpressure from the military council; in reality,
along with his immediate entourage, he wanted either to avoid battle altogether, or to fightit much further to the
north, awaiting the arrival of the forces fromCroatia and Transylvania and of the foreign mercenaries. Naturally this
line of thinking implied that the southern parts, or an evenlarger portion of the country, would have to be forfeited. It
is impossible to arrive at a precise assessment of these different intentionsbecause of the contradictions and the
chronological inaccuracies inthe sources available to us. At any rate all signs indicate deepdivisions between the
court and the nobility.
To begin with, the king's decision to wait so long in Buda needs tobe explained. He left on July 20, according to
Burgio, on the 23rd,according to Brodarics. [410] He was supposed to have reached Tolnathree weeks earlier.
Presumably the reason for the delay was notmerely that it took a long time to form the royal banderium becauseof a
lack of funds, as Burgio maintains, or that the nobility likewisereached Tolna with\ considerable delay, but also the
fact that theking and his entourage were becoming increasingly convinced thatno battle must be fought before
uniting all possible forces. Somenobles seem to have got wind of this dilatory plan, which causedunrest in their
ranks. After describing the king's lack of preparedness, Burgio's report of July 5 read:
My opinion is rather that His Majesty will retreat, and we will end up by losing even the areas on this side of the
Drava.... It cannot be denied that His Majesty's life is in danger. If they do not go down to the battlefield he will fall
into the hands of his own subjects, and that could end only badly, for no one would hesitate to blame him and his
advisers for the fall of the country. But if His Majesty does go down to fight all the w ay to the Drava, he would be
poorly equipped and ill prepared and I dare say that in addition to the dangers from the enemy his own subjects
would also present a threat, because everyone is dissatisfied with him. Especially the voivode Szapolyai and his
followers are against him and--it is strongly suspected--they are in cahoots with the Turks. So his Majesty will have
no other recourse than to flee the country. [411]
It is curious that Burgio wrote this report after the session of thediet at which the nobility unanimously backed the
king, grantinghim plenipotentiary powers and leasing \0lerboczi in the lurch.Either Burgio was wrong or, if not,
there was a sudden change in themood of the nobility. The only thing one can think of is that thecourt's military
projects had aroused the distrust of the nobility.Incidentally, there is no foundation to Burgio's remark about
Szapolyai's attitude and intentions. From our point of view what matters were the hesitations of the king: should he
remain in Buda or goto war?
Nor can we know which party, the court or the nobility, wasresponsible for the delay of the assembly at Tolna.
Brodarics wrotethat the king advanced towards Tolna slowly, hoping that otherswould "join him along the way."
[412] This, however, seems most unlikely, if only because most of the nobility, coming from differentregions of the
country, would not use the Buda-Tolna road. We alsoknow from Burgio that the Palatine himself told the king that
thenobility would go to war only once the king was on his way. [413] InBurgio's report of July 8 we again find hints
that the court wantedthe king to remain in Buda. Although the royal banderium was notyet outfitted, in Burgio's
opinion, "it would be better for the king toproceed than to await the arrival of the Turks in Buda." [414]
These clues jibe with the reluctance shown by the king to getinvolved in battle, and the fantastic project of a
campaign againstBulgaria and Serbia which he entertained during these very weeks;only in the days immediately
preceding his departure from Buda didhe definitely give up on this project. Some light is shed upon thesecret
intentions of the king by Burgio's report of August 5:
The king told me he will go down to Tolna and will prevent the Turks from crossing the Drava. Failing this he
would like to withdraw to Slavonia, for two reasons: first, because the bishop of Zagreb and the ban of Croatia,
Ferenc Batthyany, are in Slavonia and he considers them his most loyal men, and because this is where he has least
to fear from the intrigues of his subjects, moreover, because in this province he and Archduke Ferdinand have a
good many castles.... [415]
The king reached Tolna on August 6 and remained there until the 13th. .According to Brodarics, "they held
protracted debates" there.Once again the palatine was instructed to hurry and to reach theDrava before the enemy to
prevent his crossing. Some magnates,however, refused, while others referred to their privileges and theirright, as
great lords, to fight only under the banner of the king; inshort, the idea of defending the Drava line was dropped.
The palatine had already reached Mohacs, while the others remained behindtalking about privileges. Brodarics tells
us that the king declared inthe general assembly:
"I can see that everyone is using my person as an excuse.... I accepted this great danger personally exposing my own
life to all the fickleness of fortune, for the sake of the country and for your welfare. So that none may find an excuse
for their cowardice in my person and so that they would not blame me for anything, tomorrow, with the help of God
omnipotent, I will accompany you to that place w here others will not go without me." Then the king issued orders
to set off on the following day, although there were some who, well aware of the dangers involved, tried to dissuade
him from this undertaking, but in vain. [416]
Burgio, on the other hand, provides the following account:
the king sent Ambrus Sarkany from Tolna to Eszek to defend the castle and prevent the Turks from throwing a
bridge across the Drava, by way of troops he ordered part of the papal infantry to accompany him. His Majesty also
sent down Count Palatine Istvan Bathory, along with some lords, their banderia, and the soldiers from the provinces,
while the archbishop of Kalocsa, who is now at Bacs, is to cross the Danube and join Sarkany and Bathory as well.
[417]
Two days later he wrote: "The only news since the thirteenth,when I wrote my last letter, is that His Majesty ordered
those lordsand noblemen from the provinces he had dispatched to Eszek previously, but had not gone, finally to get
on their way; and now indeedthey are moving." [418]
There is diametrical contradiction between the accounts providedby Brodarics and by Burgio; according to the latter
the noblemenfinally agreed to go--although almost certainly they did not go to theDrava, as we shall see. The
problem common to both accounts is thatthere could have been no serious intent of defending the line of theDrava:
as we have seen, at this time the Ottomans were much closer to the Drava than the Hungarians at Tolna. Thanks to
his reconnaissance, Tomori knew with almost hourly precision where the Ottoman forces were and which way they
were heading. Of course thecourt was kept duly informed.
While it is true that Brodarics knew precious little about militaryaffairs, he was surely not that inept at
comprehending militarydiscussions. The debate must have been about whether or not tofight the battle. After all, in
his very first sentence Brodarics statesthat the "king's continued advance" was also mentioned. The lastsentence of
the king's outburst--"I will accompany you to the place~here others will not go without me"--points clearly to the
fact thatthe main issue was whether to advance to meet the enemy, and notwhether to defend the Drava. The
contradiction is so blatant thatone cannot help suspecting that Brodarics was silent about theessence of the debate
because by describing the scene in such pathetic tones he meant to erect an immortal monument to the tragicfate of
the young king.
Whatever was debated in Tolna, major decisions were not madeuntil the discussions at Bata on August 16. [419]
The king summonedTomori, who was stationed at the Karasso, and appointed himtogether with Gyorgy Szapolyai
as commanders-in-chief, with theproviso that should Janos Szapolyai and Frangepan arrive, theywould take over.
The council also reached final decision about fighting the battle at Mohacs. We know this partly because, according
toBrodarics, "the leaders left" right after the debate "in order todesignate a camp site near the town of Mohacs."
Here we must addthat it was probably not just a matter of finding a camp site, butrather to reconnoiter thoroughly
the prospective battlefield and itsvicinity. We also know, from Ottoman sources, that it was at Batathat they decided
to fight the battle at Mohacs. Suleyman's clerknoted on August 19: "A scoundrel came here [to Eszek] from
Buda,and brought the news that 'at the fifth stage after crossing theDrava, you will meet with the evil king." [420]
The battlefield wasactually five days' march from the Drava, and the Ottomans indeedreached it five days after their
crossing.
It was also decided that the troops along the Karasso would bebrought up to Mohacs. After Tomori and Perenyi
explored the fieldat Mohacs they went to the Karasso. A strange scene took placethere. It is reported by Brodarics as
follows:
After he arrived here and called together his soldiers and the commanders of his units, he informed them about the
king's wish to pull back the camp, which was also his own wish. The soldiers, however, grumbled and objected to
pulling back just when they were within reach of the enemy. They felt they had to confront the enemy and fight
bravely, as true men ought.... They also insisted they knew that the formerly courageous and invincible army of the
Ottomans had perished, first at the battle of Belgrade and then at the siege of Rhodes.... Let them isolate the king
and all the brave warriors from the cowardly mass of priests and other war-dodgers bent on softening the king, so
outstanding in body and in spirit, whom they wanted to spoil with their cowardice and their unmanly advice, in order
to turn the brave youths into their own image. [421]
Several insights may be gained from this scene. First, it shows thelack of discipline among the soldiers, a lack, one
should point out,which mirrored the anarchical conditions prevailing in society atlarge. Second, the soldiers,
inspired resolve to fight is noteworthy.We already spoke of the high morale of the troops, especially thosefighting in
the border areas, and how superior they felt to theOttomans. This morale was not due to lack of self-criticism or
tooverconfidence, but rather to an awareness deriving from the successful skirmishes fought in the border areas over
several generations. The reference to the losses suffered by the Ottomans in thebattles of the preceding year is also
striking. Burgio's report of May30 had already made the same claim, almost word for word:
The archbishop of Kalocsa advises the king to leave for the border areas immediately, and he encourages everyone
by saying that the Turkish army is large in numbers only, but is not well trained, the troops being too young and
inexperienced in war because the Turks lost the flower of their soldiery on the island of Rhodes (where they had
been fighting against the Knights of Saint John), as well as in other wars. [422]
This assessment must have originated with Tomori, the veryTomori who had felt that the struggle against the
overwhelmingpower of the Ottoman Empire was hopeless and tried to talk the kinginto signing a peace. Most likely
he meant to compensate for thenews regarding the might of the Ottomans; while he could notincrease the
effectiveness of the Hungarian forces or improve itsequipment, at least he could enhance its morale. We shall see
that hewould try to do so again at a critical moment.
From all this follows that the debates at Tolna centered not on thedefense along the Drava, but whether or not to
engage the enemy ina decisive battle, and, if so, when and where. We have seen thenegative effect the court's
hesitation had on the mood of the nobility.The reports on the discussions at Tolna only exacerbated matters.The
troops knew about the proposed delay, for--as we know fromBrodarics's communication--the discussions were held
in a "populous assembly." Thus when Tomori tried "to persuade them"--asBrodarics puts it--to draw back further,
the troops were convincedthat the king's point of view had prevailed in the discussions and,even when Tomori
assured them of his own commitment to theorder, refused to follow.
Hence the forces under the command of Tomori and Perenyiremained by the Karasso, while the other part of the
army marchedsouthward to the field at Mohacs, where more and more units weregathering. The king himself
remained at Ujfalva, immediately to thenorth of Mohacs. Then late one night the camp at Mohacs, andeventually the
king himself, received a report from reconnaissancethat the bulk of the Ottoman forces had already crossed the
Drava;at the same time the lords at the Mohacs camp requested thepresence of the ruler in order to discuss what was
to be done. [423] Allthis must have taken place in the night of the 23rd to the 24th, for weknow the army of Rumelia
and the janissaries of the sultan were onthe northern side of the river by the dawn of the 23rd; only the armyof
Anatolia and the baggage train had yet to cross. The personbearing the news must have left at this time; since his
path wasdifficult, often across the swampy terrain, even a good horsemanmust have needed 12-14 hours to cover the
distance of 70 kmseparating the Drava from the Karasso, and from there 20-25 kmmore to Ujfalva.

Continued...
At this point messages from Szapolyai and Frangepan arrivedsimultaneously. The two commanders, as we read in
Brodarics:
disapproved of the advice of those who guided the king prematurely so close to the enemy; according to them the
king should have awaited the enemy either in Buda or at any other more distant place until all the forces of the
country and all outside help were assembled. They requested the king not to engage in battle at least until their
arrival. According to the voivode the troops from Transylvania were so excellent in numbers and military potential
that the king could have faith in them for victory. But the king remembered the decision of the council, and
considering that the enemy was so close, and the troops so eager to fight he knew that if he did not listen they would
accuse him personally of bad leadership for missing the opportunity. Hesitating amidst these thoughts he finally
decided to attempt to convince at least the magnates to await the voivode and Count Kristof [Frangepan], and to
remove the camp to a safer location if hard pressed by the enemy....
When the king received the news of the Turks' crossing of the Drava,he sent Brodarics to the camp to convince the
magnates, and especially the commanders, the archbishop of Esztergom and the palatine, to postpone the battle, as
he knew that the other dignitaries and the masses were always inclined to follow the guidance of these two. He
enjoined the chancellor to convey every message the voivode and Kristof had sent to the king and to enlighten them
about the great danger threatening the country should the king and so many great lords, the cream of the Hungarian
nation, and its army be exposed to obvious danger. Because should the king happen to fall in battle (and, indeed,
given the strength and preparations of the enemy as compared with their own small numbers this was to be feared),
what would prevent [the enemy] from taking all Hungary with ease? Moreover, he mentioned that until the arrival of
others--the voivode with troops from Transylvania, the ban from Slavonia, Kristof from Croatia, the Czech,
Moravian and Silesian soldiers, and all the other auxiliaries expected--it would be better to bring the army into safe
positions or, if forced by the enemy, to retreat. Indeed, Hungary would suffer less damage even if the enemy were
allowed to roam freely and ravage the area between Mohacs and Pozsony than if this great host, including the king
and so many lords and soldiers, were to be wasted in a single battle.
In accordance with his orders, the chancellor communicated these arguments to the leaders, whom he visited in turns
during the night, and then to the whole council; but the effect was as if he had brought no message at a]l, so blinded
were the soldiers by their eagerness to fight in the vain expectation of victory and by their leaders not daring to
dissuade the troops, hell-bent on fighting, from waging battle The king visited the camp at dawn and once more
attempted what he had tried to achieve through the chancel]or. The advisers of all estates and nationalities were
summoned to the king for this purpose. [424]
Brodarics gives the following dramatic account of this last important meeting:
The king discussed with the advisors and the military men in detail what to do since none of those expected from
Transylvania, Slavonia, Croatia, Bohemia, and Germany had arrived. It is certain that most of these will show up
soon. On the other hand, the enemy is near, at most two miles from the royal camp, and most likely wants to fight as
soon as possible. What do they advise the king to do? Should he relocate the camp to another site with a view to
postponing the battle until the arrival of others, or should they test their fortune in battle against the enemy?
Pal Tomori had been called away from the other camp, especially for the purpose of taking part in this meeting.
Since it seemed that he also favored fighting the enemy right away, the king asked him, in surprise, in what did he
place his hopes? In order to dissuade Tomori from his plan, the king called upon him to report to the whole
assembly the number of troops under his command and those of the enemy, for the king knew right well that Tomori
had better information than anyone else, since he had many spies in his service and deserters kept reporting to him.
In answer to the first question Tomori said that in his opinion there were no more than 20,000 troops in his camp and
in that of the king together (for the two were separate, as mentioned earlier). In answer to the second question he
said that, according to the best of his knowledge, the enemy had about 300,000 soldiers. But when he noticed that
the number of our troops, negligible in comparison with those of the enemy, astounded everyone, he suddenly added
that we need not be so afraid of the enemy because this large mass w as mostly unarmed and unable to fight. When
the king once again urged him to estimate how many thousands of the enemy consisted of elite troops capable of
fighting, Tomori replied that he guessed at 70,000. But they found even this number exceeded our own strength by
far, especially when Tomori added that the Turks also had more than 300 major pieces of ordnance.
As they were debating these issues at length, the great majority, partly swayed by the advice of the friar, and partly
because of their own enthusiasm, believed the battle must take place, even though there were some who were afraid,
for some reason, to express their views openly. In the course of the discussion some delegates came as
representatives from the other camp. First they met with the king in a separate room and then, emerging with the
king, they advised the members of the assembly, in the name of the others, not to attempt to convince the king to
delay the battle, for they were correctly informed regarding the strength of the enemy: while their numbers were
great, victory was within reach, all they had to do is take advantage of the good fortune God had placed in their
hands. Let them therefore accompany the king and, with the help of God let the two camps unite since they were
closer to the enemy and in better position to attack. Should the assembly attempt to dissuade the king they would
expose themselves to great danger. Moreover they added that unless the king's troops set out towards the other camp
right away, they would turn against it instead of the enemy.
Once these matters regarding the battle had been presented to the members of the assembly even those who thought
in simple terms were so terrorized by this terrible betrayal that they unanimously opted for battle. [425]
For centuries public opinion on the subject of the battle of Mohacswas determined by this passage in Brodarics's
work, blaming thehotheaded nobility for the disaster and turning Tomori into a scapegoat. Brodarics knew and
respected Tomori and spoke kindly of him;in any case, being a gentle person, he related the events in gentleterms
and was far from pointing his finger at anyone. It is clear,however, that all the elements for an indictment are present
in hisaccount. A few decades later Istvanffy could go as far as stating:
Thus the king nevertheless came to the conclusion that Tomori as we]l as the council and a large fraction of the
commanders approved of the audacious and dubious encounter; the notion of battle gripped their soul with fateful
stubbornness.... But we must rather condemn the overconfidence and lack of sense of those who should have
considered how uneven the fight would be instead of underestimating or despising the power of the mighty enemy
and deluding themselves with hopes for victory. They should not have dragged the good and wise king who was
reluctant and had practically predicted defeat, into a position from which it became impossible to retreat without
obvious danger and great confusion....
This was the memorable yet unfortunate battle of Mohacs by which we lost the former glories of our nation. The
flower and elite of the nobility and of the soldiery and everything our country possessed, was annihilated in that
single tragic battle. This was the beginning of our inexpiable ignominy; we groaned under the unbearable yoke of
the barbarians, suffered servitude under the domination of foreign nations. We are correct and justified, therefore, in
condemning the audacious and foolhardy individuals who decided in favor of battle in spite of the unfavorable
omens, who threw the brave and gentle young king as prey to the enemy, and sent the fatherland into misfortune and
destruction, and in damning them with the most atrocious curses. [426]
Zrinyi, who relies heavily on Istvanffy and to whom the text ofBrodarics was probably also known, divides the
blame betweenLouis II and Tomori equally; in fact, he cites them as negativeexamples in his argument on military
science. [427] Apparently Zrinyidid not have the opportunity to study the battle of Mohacs in depth,and therefore he
accepted the accounts provided by Brodarics andIstvanffy. A more in-depth examination would have shown that
atthe military council it was not a clash between cool common senseand blind passion, but rather of two opposing
strategic concepts.Louis, concept, which he apparently advocated from the outset andexpressed clearly by declaring
that he would surrender the country even as far as Pozsony, was to avoid a battle that was bound to belost. On the
other hand, to Tomori and his companions, handing oversuch a large portion of the country as prey to the enemy
was anunacceptable alternative, especially if there was a chance of success.
Indeed, the choice was most difficult. It was extremely risky tofight the overwhelming might of the Ottomans
without the Transylvanian and Croatian forces and the mercenaries expected fromabroad. However, from the point
of view of strength, space, and time,we have seen that even if the battle had been postponed in time--hence in space-
-it was still most doubtful that additional troops, forinstance from Transylvania, would have been able to take
part.Then the battle could still not have been won, but the country wouldhave been ravaged by the Ottomans.
The above-quoted excerpt of Brodarics is one of the most beautifulsections of his work: the tone of the account is
exalted, his stylesoaring, and it is carefully composed--it is a dramatic and overpowering scene! No wonder that
these pages attracted readers, attentionand left an indelible mark in their memory. There is another section,however,
where the issue of responsibility comes up, and this one isfar from being as well written and convincing. There the
authorwants to defend the country against those ill-intentioned rumorsand charges which were disseminated
throughout Europe in theweeks immediately following the battle and which blamed the Hungarians for
irresponsibility, heedlessness, and lack of military competence. Here his style is bland, his whole argument weak.
There will be some who would blame the boldness of those who insisted on battle with so much passion, and will
qualify it as great foolhardiness; and indeed there are some who do so. But the accusers forget that there were m any
factors in operation which might have persuaded even the wisest and most powerful ruler to act this way--first of all,
the wonderful, unique, and almost fateful enthusiasm of the soldiers and the hope of assured victory which lived
unshakably in their souls. Added to this were the secret negotiations conducted by Pal Tomori with a significant
portion of the foe s army, i.e., with those who were born to Christian parents or were Christians themselves--
Germans and Italians employed to man the artillery.
And here Brodarics mentions an argument he had never mentioned before although it is of decisive relevance and
was probablybrought up by Tomori and his friends at the military council: "Moreover, a retreat did not seem
sufficiently safe because, the foe being sonear, they would have had to retreat from a force which, because ofthe
speed of its mounts, was able to do nothing better than carry out a chase." [428] Thus, while in the spirit of the
"Mohacs complex" he shiftsthe emphasis from the determining factors to the incidental andpersonal ones, he makes
no mention of this extremely importantfactor; but when he has to defend the Hungarians he brings up thisargument
from the realm of military science. Indeed, this argumentwas well founded: there can be no doubt that had the
Hungarianarmy pulled back, the Ottomans would have exhausted them,ground them up, and harassed them to death
with their extensivecavalry.
In any case, how far would they have had to retreat? Where wouldthe other forces been able to join the army of the
king? The only forcethat mattered from this aspect was that of Szapolyai, since thetroops of Frangepan and the
foreign units could hardly have exceeded 4-5,000.
We have seen that the king sent Bacsy to Szapolyai in late Julywith the final order to rejoin him. We know from
Szapolyai's letter,already quoted, that he was indeed on his way towards centralHungary and that he had requested
the king, by way of the emissary, to await his arrival; in fact, Szapolyai himself, "boarding alight vehicle", hurried
forward, to convince the king personally. Hewas late, however, because "of lack of time, the proximity of
theOttomans, and the fatally belligerent mood of the Hungarians...although he was not far away the night of the day
on which the kingwas defeated." [429] We do not know just what Szapolyai meant by being"not far away" from the
king: one day's march, or two? It hardlymatters. What matters is where his troops were at the time of themilitary
council, that is, on August 24-25. All we know is that onAugust 10 Szapolyai was still sending out orders for
mobilization,summoning all units to Torda for the 15th. [430] Let us assume, therefore, that Szapolyai left Torda the
day after the troops arrived there.In nine days--from August 16 to 25~ounting with a rate of marchof 20 km a day,
which, as we have mentioned, was almost a forcedmarch, he could cover a distance of 180 km, reaching the area
ofTotvarad in the valley of the Maros River, or the area of Kapolnas,40 to 50 km east of Lippa.
Had the Hungarian army initiated a retreat on August 25, andassuming the Ottomans did not interfere--indeed, a
most unlikely assumption--the probability of Szapolyai joining the main forcesmay be ascertained from Table 8
below:
Table 8.
Distances of Major Forces on August 26, 1526
Distance in km
Forces Location on August 25 to Tolna to Buda to Pozsony

Royal army Mohacs 60 250 450

Ottoman army South of the Karasso 100 290 490

Szapolyai's army Totvarad-Kapolnas 350 380 560

The table indicates that Szapolyai could not have reached Tolna,Buda, or even Pozsony ahead of the Ottoman
forces. Nor can weoverlook the fact that even if his forces had been much closer, theDanube would have made
it difficult for him to join the king; anyattempt to cross would undoubtedly have been challenged by
theOttoman army and fleet. Nor could the king's army have crossed theDanube to unite with Szapolyai's
forces with the Ottoman pursuersat its heels.
We know that Szapolyai was a competent leader, but how could heassume he would be able to join forces
with the king? It is possiblethat around August 5 when he sent his emissary to the king? he washoping the
latter had not advanced beyond Tolna. Perhaps he evenbelieved the king was still in Buda. It is obvious from
his messagethat he disapproved of the king's leaving Buda. Moreover, he probably did not expect the
Ottoman forces to capture the castles of theSrem as fast as they had and to reach the Drava so soon. In any
case,one thing is certain: Szapolyai and Frangepan counted on surrendering the southern portions of the
country. This was a more naturaland far more bearable compromise for them than it was for the bulkof the
Hungarian nobility.
To sum up: Brodarics's almost incidental comment, to the effectthat it was too late to retreat, refers to a fact
that must have hadconsiderable weight in the discussions of the military council; hence,it was not simply out
of hotheadedness that the nobility opted forbattle.
There is another striking detail in Brodarics's account, namelyTomori's indecisive, almost unmanly behavior
This picture is instark contrast with everything we know about him. He might nothave been a great military
leader? but he was a brave man. It is inconceivable that he would have been frightened or that he lethimself
be influenced by some loud-mouth petty noblemen. Hencewe must assume that he decided that the battle had
to be fought onthe basis of a careful assessment of the situation as his sense andconscience dictated.
According to Brodarics's presentation the indecisive, disturbed, tongue-tied Tomori was confronting a
sensiblethoughtful king in the debates. But if we take a closer look at thequoted text, and take everything that
happened into considerationthe falseness of this presentation become obvious right away. Indeed, Tomori
must have felt a moment's hesitation when he had toanswer the kings queries regarding the relationship of
forces because the king was not playing fair. There must ha re been twodistinct versions of the strength of the
Ottomans--a real one, forofficial use " so to speak, and another which underestimated thestrength of the
Ottomans considerably, for the benefit of the troops.When Tomori proposed peace he must have resorted to
the officialversion, but the king must have known the other version as wellincluding the function that it
played. Thus it was not altogether fairon the part of the king to force Tomori to reveal the actual situationin
front of the military council, which, according to Brodarics, included soldiers of lower ranks. The king did
not behave wisely onthis occasion. The main issue was whether or not there was apossibility for withdrawal.
Since there was not, and the fight had totake place, then, by obliging Tomori to reveal the actual situation,the
cat was let out of the bag. The only advantage enjoyed by thesmall Hungarian force was its self-confidence.
What good did it do totamper with that?
Another circumstance may also have weakened Tomori's positionin the debate. Perhaps he was in favor of
battle not only because ofnegative factors, i.e., the difficulties of carrying out a retreat, butalso because he had
a plan that raised the prospect of a victory butwhich he could not mention for the sake of secrecy. We will
deal withthis matter later.
Strength of the Hungarian Forces on the Eve of the Battle
After this dramatic war council Tomori hurried back to his troopsalong the Karasso and, as Brodarics
writes: managed to convince his troops, with great difficulty, to retreat a little and agree to join the troops of
the king. Thus the following day our camp was united with theirs at about half a mile from Mohacs, but in
such a way that the soldiers did not intermingle, because a small open space remained between the two
camps. [431]
This must have happened on August 25 or 26. By then the Ottomanvanguard had reached the Karasso and
from that time until the dayof the battle skirmishes were fought between the Hungarian andOttoman light
cavalries.
In the meantime troops were arriving from all corners of thecountry. One of the most significant of these was
the Croatian-Slavonian army led by Ferenc Batthyany, numbering about 4,000 to5,000. [432]
Let us now rehearse once more what the size of the army was onthe day of the battle. Brodarics wrote of 24-
25,000, but in one of hisletters written after the battle he mentions only 20,000. [433] We havewell-founded
doubts regarding the accuracy of these figures. On theone hand, his notion of figures was rather hazy. He
kept reportingdata such as: "Along with the troops of Queen Mary and of theArchbishop of Esztergom the
king had about 3,000 cavalry andinfantry as he left Buda." But at Tolna "the king had 4,000 cavalryor a little
more." The palatine arrived with a "few men"; GyorgySzapolyai arrived with "3,000 cavalry or a little
more"; Batthyany"brought approximately 3,000 cavalry and a much smaller numberof infantry", and so on.
[434]
The figure 25,000 seems to be a very low estimate; it would meanthat only half of the 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers
which, according toIstvanffy, central Hungary could muster, were actually mobilized. [435]There are no data
indicating that great lords or noblemen refusedservice in 1526; on the contrary, Burgio writes with great
appreciation of the enthusiasm with which the mobilization was carried out.In fact it seemed as if taking part
in the battle was a point of honor.For instance, Bishop Varday had a certificate issued stating that heleft the
army against his will." [436]
Another argument in favor of a larger number of troops is that theking had called the fifth of the peasantry
to arms rather than thecustomary tenth or less. Later he raised the proportion to "everyother man", and,
finally, he had the sword dipped in blood carried around in the villages signifying universal mobilization.
[437] In fact, hegave special instructions to mobilize the lepers and round them upinto a separate unit.
Naturally, not all peasants were actually underarms, but we have no reason to suppose that the southern
provincesdid not call a great number of them under the banners.
Even the losses would lead us to not believe the 25,000 figure.Brodarics himself estimated the casualties at
10,000 infantry and4,000 cavalry, [438] which would have meant that half the army remained on the
battlefield. Such a rate of casualties occurs mostrarely in history, mostly when the battle involves
encirclement orwhen the victors pursue the defeated relentlessly. Neither was thecase at Mohacs. The
Ottoman sources estimated Hungarian losseseven higher--at 40,000 to 50,000. This is obviously an
exaggeration.Suleyman's clerk writes of 50,000 Hungarian cavalry and 4,000infantry on the day of the battle,
but four days later he notes that"they buried 20,000 infantry and 4,000 armored Hungarians", including
"about 2,000 who had been captured alive" and beheaded. [439]The burial of the corpses was supervised by
the grand vezir, hissecretary, and the defterdar. Since they were the ones to report thesefigures to the sultan
these may be considered accurate. But if thisfigure is correct, and if we accept Brodarics's figure of 25,000,
thiswould imply that the entire Hungarian host remained on the battlefield, which is impossible.
All things considered, it seems likely that the effectives of theHungarian army were between 50,000 and
60,000, rather than25,000. Of course, one cannot help but shiver at the thought that theHungarian high
command itself had no idea how many soldiers wereunder its command. Did they not hold a muster, and did
the "quartermasters" of the army not figure out how many rations wereneeded for the men and the horses?
Or was Brodarics the only one toremain in ignorance? We have seen, however, that at the last military
council on August 24 or 25 Tomori also referred to 20,000 men.It is true that although by then he was
commander-in-chief, he wasstationed not with the main body of the army, but at the Karassocamp, where he
could not monitor the troops gathering at Mohacs.
CHAPTER VIII
THE HUNGARIAN BATTLE PLAN AND
THEDEPLOYMENT OF THE OTTOMAN FORCES
It is no longer possible to insist on what had become practically anaxiom of Hungarian interpretations, namely that
the Hungarianswent into battle without any plan or foresight. In my opinion Tomoriand his companions had a
brilliant idea; indeed, they played uponthe only chance of obtaining a victory or a tie. Of course, the chancesfor such
an outcome still remained small, but it was to their credit asmilitary experts that they recognized the opportunity.
To reconstruct the Hungarian battle plan one must start from thepremise that whatever side is compelled to remain
on the defensivebecause of its relative weakness may improve its chances by choosingthe right terrain; in other
words, the weaker side must meet the foeat the spot where the latter's attack would run into the greatestdifficulties.
This principle points to the first task: to become acquainted with the battlefield of Mohacs and the area where
theOttomans had to deploy for battle.

The Battlefield at Mohacs

According to the geologists the battlefield of Mohacs "belongs tothe end of the neo-pleistocene era...it came into
being as part of theflood era of the Danube--a formation covered with deposits of sand,loess, and silt." [440] On its
eastern edge the field is bordered by the floodregion of the Danube which, at the level of Satorhely
(Foldvar?)stretched all the way to the postal road; on its western and southernside it is bordered by a plateau 25 to
30 meters high. The Borzastream, which has its sources at the Nagynyarad and Majs, emptiesinto the lake of
Dalyok; it has steep banks even though its course hasbeen regulated. Since it is likely that this was the case in 1526
aswell, the stream represented a significant obstacle to the movementof troops (see Map 7).
Brodarics describes the area to the south of the Borza stretching all the way to the plateau as a "large, wide plain."
[441] This descriptioncan be accepted only with reservations. He himself adds that theresere valleys on the
battlefield and that the field was uneven, asindeed it remains to this day. As geologists have emphasized: "Itslargely
smooth, even surface is criss-crossed by relatively deep depressions and high ridges which must have resulted from
the haphazard deposits carried by the flooding of the river [i.e., the Danube]." [442] In any case, Brodarics's
description implies the unevennature of the terrain when he states: "We hurried forward over thestretches that were
at times flat, at times uneven." [443] The differencein level between the densely alternating dips and ridges
oftenamounts to 4 or 5 meters--that is, such dips might conceal entireunits. When Brodardics described the area as a
"plain" he assessedthe terrain from the perspective of a civilian, neglecting factors suchas declivity, rise and dip, so
decisive to a military expert.
Brodarics states that the battlefield was "interrupted neither byforests nor by streams." [444] This statement led
Gyalokay to doubt thecorrectness of the description, arguing that he "forgot" about theBorza stream and made no
mention of the forest at the foot of theterrace noted by another eyewitness and participant of the battle. [445]In this
instance, however, we should take Brodarics's word. Heneglected to mention the Borza because, as we shall see, the
Hungarian army lined up to the south of it; that is, the stream was notincluded in the area described. Gyalokay,
referring to one of Burgio'sreports, asserts there was a forest on the battlefield. Burgio wrote,probably on the basis
of eyewitness communication, that after theirsuccessful first attack the Hungarians chased the Turks all the wayto a
forest. The Italian term for forest is selva, but Burgio used theLatin word silva, which means not only a forest but
also a clump oftrees or bushes. Thus it is possible that what the eyewitness sawwere the orchards of the village of
Foldvar within the area of thebattlefield, which indeed play an important role in our account.Moreover, Gyalokay
argues that the census of 1669 also mentions aforest which was planted after Mohacs: "It is most unlikely", hewrites,
"that the Turks would undertake forestation anywhere inHungary during their rule." Apart from the fact that it is
alwaysproblematic to identify precisely areas mentioned in censuses, planting or forestation is certainly not a
requisite for the evolution offorests. Where cultivation ceases--and this must have happenedafter the destruction of
Foldvar--the forest soon grows over the areaof the settlement and cultivation. During our visits to the locationwe
also noted that the forest or bush had invaded areas which werecovered with vinyards only 40-50 years ago.
What Brodarics notes about the moment of the initiation of thebattle has decisive importance for its reconstruction:
there was a large wide plain interrupted by neither forests nor bush nor rivers or hills; only to the left, between here
and the Danube, was a swampy area densely covered with reed and grass in which many were to meet their death.
Facing us a long hill extended in a semi-circle [collis erat longum protensus, in theatri quodammoda formam], and
the camp of the Turkish emperor was on the other side of it. A small village with a church lay at the bottom of the
slope of the hill. The name of the village was Foldvar; here is where the enemy placed its artillery. Only later,
towards the end of the battle, did we notice that this place was swarming with the troops known as janissaries, who
completely filled the area even beyond the houses of the village.... The king...gave the signal for the attack. The
sound of the trumpets and horns mixed with the battle cries of the soldiers.... At the same moment we saw a
multitude of enemy soldiers descend slowly from the hill across. [446]
There can be no doubt about the authenticity of this descriptionsince Brodarics was recording the mood of a
historical momentdeeply carved in his memory, However, the same cannot be said ofother parts of the same
description, not recorded under the impact ofevents. For example the only toponymic information in his report,the
place-name Foldvar, is by no means as reliable as the elementsof the preceding passage. Yet, regardless, whether the
village wasindeed called Foldvar, four pieces of information are not to bedismissed: that there was a village across
from the Hungarian army,at the bottom of the terrace; that the Ottoman artillery was placedthere; that at the moment
of the attack a large number of enemysoldiers was descending the slope of the terrace ("slowly", whichleads one to
assume that the slope was steep); and finally, that thesultan was staying with these troops.
The terrace demands special attention. It may be surmised that itwas steeper than in our own days, in which case it
may have causedserious difficulties for the Ottoman troops. A description fromaround 1620 speaks of an ascent on
"a path of difficult access." [447] Lufti writes that the Hungarians "had dug a ditch, one end of whichreached as far
as a mountain [by which probably the Nyarad side ofthe terrace was meant, and the other the Danube." On two
furtheroccasions he makes mention of some kind of trench which caused theOttoman high command a great deal of
worry. [448] It is absolutelyimpossible that the Hungarians could have dug a ditch or trench ofa size to constitute a
serious obstacle; it is more likely that the ditchLufti refers to was nothing but the bottom of the terrace. It ispossible
that the Ottomans lowered themselves slowly, in spite ofurgency, because the terrace was steep and slippery as a
result of theprotracted rains in the preceding days.
The preceding comments regarding the incline of the slope arebased on the description of Ottoman chronicles and
on an examination of the map. Whelm we visited the location for the first time wewere disappointed to note that the
slope was not as steep as we hadassumed. But could not 400 years of rain and wind have decreasedthe incline of the
slope? Hence we found it necessary to include ageologist in the team, and he indeed affirmed that erosion could
haveaffected the incline since the days of the battle, especially if the areahad been under cultivation. The geologist's
conclusion was that thequestion could be definitely answered only on the basis of soilanalysis and of a knowledge of
the cultivation history of the area.The first military survey of the area suggests that the terrace wascovered by fields
or vineyards, as confirmed by the testimony of thelocals. Regarding the cultivation history, to quote geologist
AndrasGalacz, "the erosion of the terrace is a process that can be observedeven today; if the terrace was also
cultivated during the eighteenthcentury, the erosion might have been hastened." Therefore, he continues, the leveling
of the slope of the terrace at Majs could havebeen intensive for only 2-250 years since 1526. But even during
thisrelatively short period a morphological change may have occurred,especially if there was human intervention.
[449] As for the soil, theresults of an analysis were not conclusive.
On the whole, our assumption regarding the terrace as an obstaclewas borne out; local experts told us that the slope
is almost unmanageable in times of rain. There was, indeed, heavy rainfall in theweeks preceding the battle of
Mohacs and on the eve of the battleitself. Hence the slope must have constituted a rather serious obstacle for the
Ottoman troops.

Difficulties of the Ottoman Deployment

Once the Ottoman army had crossed the Drava and the swampyterrain on the northern side of the river at the cost of
considerabledifficulties, they reached the swampy valley of the Karasso. Crossing it along the line Baranyavar-
Baranyaban-Baranyakisfalud onAugust 28, it camped along a stretch of about 9 km. [450] According toZrinyi and
other contemporary experts, the camp had to be this widesince the width of a camp composed of 25,000 soldiers was
1.5 kmand its depth 600 meters. The spread of the Ottoman camp, with astrength of 150,000 men must have been at
least 9 km (see Mapsketch 8).
To fight the Hungarians the Ottoman army had to reach the fieldof Mohacs, within a day's march, on the day of the
battle. Thedeployment of 150,000 soldiers for battle was no simple matter, andthe Hungarian commanders were well
aware of the difficulties.Naturally they would select a battleground that would render thedeployment of the Ottoman
army even more difficult. This spot wasprecisely the area in front of the terrace, on the "plain" of Mohacs.
Regarding the possibilities of the deployment of the Ottomanforces the Hungarian command could count on the
following developments: The day before the battle the Ottoman forces would campon the northern bank of the
Karasso and initiate their deploymentfrom there. The site could not be south of the Karasso because thenthe
Ottoman army would have to negotiate the swamps along thestream on the day of the battle in order to begin its
deployment. TheOttoman army could not proceed in marching formation to the fieldat Mohacs because the end of
the column of march, which was120-130 km long, would then reach the scene of the battle only 4-5days later.
Moreover, it was a basic military principle, as Tomori andcompanions well knew, that the attacker has to form his
order ofbattle long before reaching the battlefield because it would be extremely dangerous to execute complex
maneuvers in full view of theenemy, exposed to attacks. [451]
Furthermore, the right wing of the Ottoman army had to bendtowards the Eszek-Mohacs road, or else it might have
found itselffacing the marshes of Dalyok. Therefore, the army had to movediagonally leftward and bend towards the
right upon attaining theterrace, so that its front line would be aligned with the terrace itself.Also fields occupied a
significant portion of the area of deployment ofthe Ottoman army, and it is not easy to advance on arable land.
Thearea of deployment, which totalled about 57 km squared, included about adozen villages. According to our
computations, the yearly requirement in grain of the inhabitants of these villages could be obtainedfrom about 5,000
cadastral hold, roughly half the area above. Thisimplies that only about half the area was devoted to cultivation.
[452] Asa consequence of heavy rainfalls the soil was completely soaked.Thus Tomori and his companions must
also have expected that theadvance would be rendered difficult by the mud. It is even possiblethat the water table
was high as a consequence of the extensiverains, and the low-lying areas may have been covered with
water.Djeladzade writes that when the Ottomans glanced down from theterrace "the waters of the Danube spread
like a sea." It seems,therefore, that the area between Buziglica and Baranyakisfalud,87-89 meters above sea level,
was under water. The Anatolian armyon the right wing was expected to deploy precisely in this area.
Finally, there were no maps in this period to make it possible toevaluate the terrain; thus familiarity with the terrain
was a mostimportant consideration in the selection of a battlefield. Tomori andcompanions could count on the fact
that the Ottoman leadership wasnot familiar with the details of the terrain. Since during the threedays preceding the
battle the Hungarian light cavalry was continually fighting against the Ottoman reconnaissance we may conclude
that they intended to prevent the Ottoman leaders from obtainingsuch information.
All these factors taken together, it could be expected that twosurprises would await the Ottoman command during
deployment.One of these was that the army could deploy for battle only along the6-7 km segment between Majs and
Buziglica. If we consider merelythe 120,000 cavalry, then, allowing 1.5 meters per horseman anddeployment of ten
ranks deep, the front would still have to be 15 km,far longer than the distance available. All this would become
clearonly after the army reached the terrace; hence the order of battlewould have to be altered at the last moment:
the Ottoman commanders would have to increase the depth of the units in order to squeezethis enormous mass into
this narrow segment. Such rearrangementof the order of battle would require considerable time. The othersurprise
provided by the terrain, as Tomori and companions werewont to know, would be the terrace itself. It was impossible
toprepare for an onslaught on its wet, slippery slopes, and even ameasured descent would prove difficult.
Such were the difficulties affecting the deployment of the Ottoman forces which could be foreseen by the Hungarian
command. Wemust point out that the recognition of these factors required nogenius, merely common sense and
expertise. Consequently, Tomoriand companions could assume that the Ottomans would not reachthe field at
Mohacs all at the same time or in the best of physicalconditions; they may have counted on defeating the
components ofthe army one by one, thus neutralizing the advantage of superiorforce. I will argue that they based
their battle plan on this insight.

The Deployment of the Hungarian Army

The description by Brodarics quoted above provides the groundwork for our reconstruction of the deployment. But
first a briefhistoriographical sketch seems in order here. At the turn of thecentury it was generally believed that
"Foldvar" was located at ornear the present-day hamlet of Satorhely. [453] Thus it was quite natural to place the
Ottoman army in this spot and the Hungarians to thenorth, roughly at the level of Kolked. The only thing the
historiansneglected to consider was that the "line of hills akin to an amphitheater", which undoubtedly refers to the
terrace of Majs and Buziglica, cannot be seen from this location, since the distance is around10 km (see Map 9/a).
In 1926, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of. the battle.Jeno Gyalokay and Barna Halmay arrived at the
conviction thatFoldvar, or the village so-named by Brodarics, was not at Satorhely,but at the foot of the terrace.
[454] Accordingly, they argued that theOttoman army was in front of the terrace and the Hungarian armynorth of the
Borza, about 1-1.5 km from Satorhely, roughly at thelevel of Torokdomb. However, this conclusion is unacceptable
because the Hungarian army would have been about 5 km fromthe terrace and from Foldvar: no human eye could
have seen theOttomans from such a distance, on hills which appear as a faint bluestreak on the horizon; nor could
the Ottomans have seen the Hungarians although we know, from the Ottoman sources, that they hada clear view of
the Hungarian army once they reached the terrace. [455]Moreover, the fact that the Hungarian infantry, though it did
notapproach the Ottomans at the same time as the cavalry, nevertheless arrived there not much later, also disproves
Gyalokay's assumption: infantry, particularly when advancing in battle order, cannotcover 5 km in less than 1-1.5
hours. Nor can we disregard the factthat, as mentioned, Brodarics does not refer to the Borza; hence thestream must
have been in the rear of the army. More recently, LajosBende, departing radically from the interpretation of
Gyalokay andHalmay, has located the Hungarian host south of the Borza, at thelevel of the village of Udvar, at 2-2.5
km from the terrace. In myopinion, he is right. [456]
There has been similar disagreement among scholars regardingthe Hungarian order of battle. According to older
interpretations,the Hungarians lined up in two echelons, with the first echelondivided into three segments: a right
wing, a center, and a left wing.Gyalokay came to the conclusion that the first echelon was dividedinto only two parts
on the basis of the fact that Brodarics does notmention a center and names only the commanders of the two
wings:Batthyany and Perenyi. [457] It seems, however, that Gyalokay wasmisled by his literal interpretation of
Brodarics and overlooked thatthe author was a neophyte in military matters and perhaps unawareof the implications
of this or that order of battle. In any case, it is striking that Brodarics's interpretation hinges on personalities rather
than facts. He was interested primarily in the grandees, mentions only their names in describing the order of battle,
and completely omits the names of mercenary commanders. His presentation refers to the infantry only three times
and says nothing aboutits role in the battle, whereas we know that they bore the brunt of itin the second half. His
presentation is inconsistent: he asserts thatthere "was some infantry" in the second echelon, but neglects tomention
what happened to all the rest, 10-12,000 of them. [458]
Gyalokay's reconstruction, relying on information from Brodarics,does not stand up against scrutiny; it becomes
even more questionable given certain theoretical considerations and certain specificdata. To begin with, the tripartite
division of the order of battle is theclassical solution; it is not safe for the wings to execute encirclementwithout a
center, nor is it safe to break through with the centerwithout cover on the flanks. Furthermore, according to
Gyalokay theinfantry was distributed among the cavalry; undoubtedly it wascustomary, particularly in the
seventeenth century, to assignsmaller infantry units to the cavalry and vice versa; yet bodies madeup exclusively of
infantry or cavalry were always retained, for bydiluting cavalry or infantry the commanders would have
sacrificedthe advantages of the shock power of both branches and the firepower of the infantry. The force of the
shock attack of the Hungarianarmored cavalry of the time was quite considerable. Tomori andcompanions based
their battle plan precisely on this asset. It wouldhave been inconsistent to slow down the swoop of the cavalry
bystationing infantry in their midst. All in al], the sources confirm thefollowing assumptions. First: the Hungarian
army was divided intothree parts. This is confirmed by Lufti and Ferdi. [459] The right wingattacked the Rumelian
army, the center attacked the army of thesultan, and the left wing tackled the Anatolian army. Moreover,Lufti writes:
"ten thousand musketeers were positioned in front ofthe king and the bans", [460] (which is not quite true because
there werearchers among the infantry), confirming the presence of largemasses of infantry in the first echelon.
Second: at the end of thebattle only the infantry stood and fought in closed ranks against theOttoman janissaries and
artillery in the center.
Having thus determined the probable area of deployment of the Hungarian army and the threefold division of the
first echelon, theorientation and extent of the Hungarian frontline remains to beascertained. Since it could be
assumed that the Ottoman forceswould adjust themselves to the terrace, the Hungarian army had toline up parallel to
it on the field of Mohacs, facing southwest.
In determining the breadth of the frontline we may start from thefollowing assumptions. Just like the right wing of
the Ottomans, theleft wing of the Hungarians could not spread much beyond theMohacs-Eszek road to the east
because then it would find theswamps in its rear. Since there is no doubt that the Hungarian rightwing was the one
that clashed with the Rumelian army on theOttoman left, both must have stood in the area between Majs
andFoldvar. Thus the spread of the Hungarian army must have beenabout 4 km. This was rather a long stretch,
considering the numberof effectives; but we know from Brodarics that the Hungarian commanders-in-chief strove to
"spread as wide as it was at all possible"to lessen the danger of encirclement [461] (see Map 9/a).
We also know from Brodarics that the second echelon stood in five"ranks', and that the king took his position in the
fourth. Its deployment was perforce narrower than that of the first echelon and can beestimated from the number of
troops that could be mustered by thepersonalities involved, listed by Brodarics. They could not haveconstituted more
than one-seventh or one-eighth of the personnel ofthe first echelon; hence it may be more correct to use the
term"reserves" rather than "echelon." These reserves were formed by thebulk of the knights in heavy armor, the
wings defended by the lightcavalry and infantry units.
While it is difficult to accept Brodarics, communication regardingthe strength of the Hungarian army, w-e must rely
on him to avoidthe danger of pure guesswork. If we assume that there were 25,000effectives and, furthermore, that
the infantry numbering 10,000stood as a solid mass at the center, then the order of battle was asfollows; if the
infantry stood ten ranks deep, the center must havespread about 1 km; half of the 3 km of front line remained for
theright wing under Batthyany, and half for the left (the cavalry) underPerenyi. Six thousand cavalrymen, arranged
in six ranks, wereplaced along a 1.5 km long front. Even if the effectives exceeded25,000, which is most likely, the
spread of the army could not havebeen over 4 km; rather, the commanders may have increased thedepth by
arranging the cavalry in ten rather than six ranks.
Even if only this part of this reconstruction is correct that thespread of the second echelon was much less than that of
the first itis clear that the Hungarian high command was not counting on anextended battle and did not intend to
await idly the onslaught of theOttomans. In the assumed order of battle the army had no chance ofresisting, and a
defeat on either wing would have immediatelyentailed a complete collapse because of the narrowness of the
secondechelon. On the other hand, the order of battle was most appropriatefor a desperate tout-va rush--to rush the
enemy's opposite wing byboth wings, then bend towards the center of the enemy formationand attack it
simultaneously with the Hungarian center and thesecond echelon.
As regards the artillery, we cannot accept Brodarics's communication that it stood behind the first echelon. [462] On
the one hand, itwould have been unheard of to place the artillery, which can fire onlya flat trajectory, behind your
own troops. That could have had butone of two consequences: either the artillery refrained from firingwhen the
attack was launched, or, if it did not, it would fire straightinto those in front of it. But we know from Brodarics, as
confirmed byOttoman sources, that the moment the attack was launched theartillery began to fire. Thus the artillery
could only have been placedwithin the first echelon, presumably distributed along the entirefront. Istvanffy may
have doubted Brodarics's description, for hewrites: "The medium range horse artillery, numbering about
eightypieces, was placed appropriately between the first and second lines,although some believed that they should
be placed immediately infront of the lines, so that they may be fired before it should come tohand-to-hand combat."
[463] However, we do not know where Istvanffygot the idea that there was a debate regarding the place of
theartillery. As for the commanders-in-chief, we know from Brodarics thatTomori and Gyorgy Szapolyai were with
the front echelon, "but theirpositions were not defined, so that they could move to where mostneeded." [464]
Finally, Brodarics's statement that the council of warseriously considered surrounding the army with carts and
fightingagainst the Turks under their protection needs to be refuted. [465] In alllikelihood Brodarics misunderstood
something, for nobody could have seriously considered such a maneuver. The extensive artillerycontingent of the
Ottomans would have blasted the camp of cartsapart in no time. Furthermore, enclosing oneself into such an
encampment would have deprived the Hungarian army of its mainasset: the armed cavalry assault. We know from
Istvanffy that theproposal concerned merely protecting the two wings with a row ofcarts. [466]
The Advance of the Ottoman Army to the Battlefield. Disorientation of the
Supreme Command
[467]
As mentioned before, on August 28 the Ottoman army encampedon the northern banks of the Karasso. In the
afternoon it wasannounced that the battle would be fought on the following day. Weknow from Djeladzade that in
the evening the imams held rousingsermons, the camp was lit up, and the bands played martial music.
On the 29th the army began to deploy right after the morningprayers, that is around 0500 hours. Although there are a
few discrepancies in their accounts, all the Ottoman chroniclers agree thatthe troops started off loose formation, in
battle order. According toKemal Pashazade, as soon as dawn began to smile announcing victory, and the breeze
ofsalvation began to rise, the troops, burning from the desire to fight,went into motion like the sea, raising the
banners and the horses' tails.The infantry and the cavalry were at the center of the invincible host,and the separate
corps, fully equipped, were in line of battle on theright and left wings.
According to Ferdi, Djeladzade, and Pechevi, the Rumelian armywith the 4,000 janissaries and 150 pieces of
artillery attached to it,as well as the akindjis, started off first, under the command ofIbrahim. There may have been
two reasons for this: one, that theRumelian army had to cover a far greater distance (12-13 km) toreach the terrain
between Majs and Foldvar than the Anatolianarmy had to cover to reach the area of Buziglica (6-8 km); the
other,that Ibrahim as commander-in-chief had to survey the terrain andsort out the lineup for the battle.
Regarding the manner of deployment, we find information inSuleyman's diary, relevant to the issue: "the entire
victorious host,mounting their horses, began to advance and gradually, halting andmoving in turns, arrived on the
field of Mohacs" before 1400 hours.Thus the advance in loose formation of the order of battle was slow,and the
army had to stop several times, probably in order to rectifythe lines.
In and of itself this does not explain why the army arrived at theterrace so late. If we assume that the rate of advance
in battleformation was 2.5 km/h and given the fact that the Rumelian contingent got an early start, the whole army
should have reached theterrace by 1000 hours at the latest. Instead, the Rumelian armyreached it at noon, the center
under the sultan between 1300 and1400 hours, and the Anatolian army between 1400 and 1500 hours.
The advance was not only slow, but exhausting as well. Suleyman's clerk noted that when the army reached the
terrace "man andbeast were tired.,' That an army should be tired after a march ofmerely 6-12 km is practically
unheard of in military history. It seemsclear that the slow and arduous advance was due to the terrain andpossibly to
the fact that there were jams before reaching the terrace,on account of the narrowness of the section between
Buziglica andMajs. It is possible that the entire army had to be regrouped.
To make a long story short, the Ottoman army arrived late andtired within sight of the Hungarian army; even more
important, itwas not together. Map 9/a indicates that at 1200 hours the threecomponents of the army were some 2-3
km apart.
Once they reached the terrace the Ottoman high command metwith yet another unpleasant surprise: it became
obvious that theassault against the Hungarian army standing on the field of Mohacsbelow could not be launched
from the slippery slopes of the terrace.The attackers had to lower themselves to the field, where the
troops,necessarily in disarray, would have to be once again set in orderbefore the battle could start.
Some of the Ottoman sources reflect clearly the confusion whichseized the high command as a result of these
difficulties; othersources, however, invent a fantastic story, precisely to cover thisconfusion and the initial lack of
success of the Ottoman forces.Almost all the Ottoman sources mention that the leaders held acouncil when they
reached the terrace, but they relate the discussions in different ways. Lufti's account seems the most authentic,even if
parts of it are unclear, at any rate in the translation at my disposal. Although parts of his text have already been
quoted, let meintroduce here the entire section:
Sultan Suleyman started off in the morning with his innumerable host; 12,000 musketeers and 500 zarbuzan
marched in front of him . As soon as he reached close enough to see the dark mass of the djaurs, and a spy brought
the news that in addition to their large numbers they were also digging a wide trench that could not be crossed, one
end of which reached as far as a mountain and the other to the Danube, Sultan Suleyman, upon hearing this news,
assembled his vezirs and asked what was to be done? The vezirs answered "Oh padishah who you are the refuge of
the entire world, the hope of all Muslims! Before attacking the infidels we must have recourse to reflection and
planning, because there are so many thousand djaurs, so much cavalry, so much artillery and so many muskets and
moreover there is a trench; it would be most risky to attack without plan and foresight. It would be entirely
appropriate to consider whether the Majestic Lord has indeed decided in favor of our salvation. "Finally they decide
to set up camp, test the trench, and try to engage the infidels in battle. Since the enemy was at a distance of one day,
the army was ordered to pitch their tents.
We must trust Lufti's account all the more since its most important assertion, that the battle was postponed, is
confirmed by Suleyman's clerk. The clerk's record preserves the Ottoman perception inthe moment when the
Hungarian army launched its attack.
The infidels of depraved life fired a few cannonballs, one of which fell on the right wing; then they lined up in front
of their camp in several ranks. On our side we remained calm since the time had not yet come and men and animals
were tired. Just when it was decided around the time of the afternoon prayer, to engage in battle the next morning
the base infidels suddenly set in motion and advanced towards us.
Kemal Pashazade also writes that orders were given to pitch thetents.
At the war council it was also decided that Bali beg and Khosrevshould take up positions on the flanks of the
Hungarian army withtheir cavalrymen. After they set out--as we learn from KemalPashazade--the grand vezir rode
away "in order to inspect thecavalry set up in ambush." It is strange, however, that a commander-in-chief should
leave in order to inspect a component entrusted with an auxiliary task; therefore we cannot give KemalPashazade
credence. Perhaps the grand vezir left to survey theterrain precisely because he felt the area in front of the terrace
ofMajs and Buziglica was inappropriate for a battle, and he wouldhave preferred to fight it elsewhere. Ibrahim's
departure entitles us to yet another assumption: not in his wildest dreams could he havethought that the Hungarians,
with their handful of troops, wouldlaunch an attack.
Some of the Ottoman chroniclers present matters in an entirelydifferent light, fabricating a whole story to cover up
the mistakes ofthe high command. This was the origin of the misconception aboutthe Ottomans having set up an
ambush against the Hungarians atMohacs: by opening up their ranks the Hungarians were lured infront of their guns.
According to Kemal Pashazade, when Ibrahimreached "the vicinity of the future battleground" and saw the
Hungarians, he asked Bali beg, "the wise lion", for advice. Because theHungarians were covered in "steel from head
to toe" and could breakthrough any army "no matter how strong" with their assault, Balisuggested that instead of
awaiting the assault they open up theirranks, allow them in, and attack them from the flanks. Let thereforeIbrahim,
"the young lion", learn from Bali, the "old wolf." The sceneis also described by Djeladzade in almost these exact
words.
There was, however, an obstacle to such an ambush, namely, thefact that behind the army was the baggage train;
therefore, writesKemal Pashazade, "our ranks cannot open up to give way to thecharging cavalry--they cannot be
allowed in our midst...." Djeladzade writes:
"What would be the most appropriate plan in this instance?" asked the pasha, who was amazed. They pondered for a
while. Finally, thanks to divine inspiration, they agreed on a plan to postpone the time of the encounter for the hour
of the ikindi, send the baggage train further to the rear, and the fighters, according to custom, would divide up and
attack the contemptible infidels in the back.
According to Kemal Pashazade, Ibrahim arrived at the idea byhimself, and Bali thereupon commended him "for this
plan of profound wisdom...conceived in the lucid mind of the pasha blessedwith a talent for military leadership."
All this, however, is pure fabrication. The trouble starts when weread in the diary of Suleyman, the most authentic
account, that thebattle was postponed not until the hour of ikindi, but until thefollowing day. Moreover, while the
"young lion" Ibrahim may havelacked experience, he must nevertheless have known that the baggage train must
always be sent to the rear at the time of battle; thisis such a routine operation in every army that it required no
warcouncil, for every subordinate commander would do it as a matter ofcourse. Finally, the "plan of profound
wisdom" not withstanding, the baggage train remained where it was and even started to set upcamp. This is reported
by Kemal Pashazade himself, in a passagefollowing our quotation. Thus, obviously no ambush of any sort
wasplanned, and the whole story of the "division of troops', merelyserved the purpose of covering the confusion of
the high commandand the initial losses of the Rumelian army.
What happened after the war council? The Rumelian army lowered itself onto the plain of Mohacs and began to
bivouac, whereasthe cavalry under the command of Bali and Khosrev started towardsthe flanks of the Hungarian
army, followed by Ibrahim (see Mapsketch 9/b).
The situation of the artillery assigned to the Rumelian armydeserves special attention. Brodarics's account implies
that the artillery was positioned in some kind of depression, so that when thefiring started, the cannonballs sped
above the heads of the Hungarians. [468] The same fact emerges from Suleyman's diary: "they startedto fire the
guns, but could cause no damage." Everything points to anunheard-of situation: the artillery had been ordered into a
positionfrom which it could not fire out! Since the Ottoman artillery was inno way inferior to European artilleries, it
is inconceivable that thiswas the result of ignorance or neglect. Two circumstances mayexplain the paradox: the
order to set up camp and the terrain. Whenthe artillerymen received the order to set up camp they must havestopped
wherever they happened to be and placed their guns infiring position. They apparently settled in a depression in
front ofthe terrace, where the difference between the high and low spots wasas much as 4-5 m. Consequently, the
cannons had no firing range orcould fire only in a raised position and could not sweep the area infront of them. The
artillery commander was undoubtedly worried bythese conditions, but could do nothing, since it would have been
mostrisky to drag the cannons further forward to the next rising, so closeto the Hungarians. The fact that they built a
practically unpenetrable obstacle in front of their batteries also indicates that thesituation arose not from ignorance
or neglect but because the inappropriate terrain for setting up camp.
Thus what came to pass was precisely that which I argued thatTomori and companions had been counting upon: the
Ottoman armydid not reach the battleground all at one time; hence it could notmake use of its numerical superiority.
Indeed, the situation developed even better than expected, since the Ottomans began to set up camp which, as we
know, constitutes a moment of weakness in thelife of any force.
The First Hungarian Attack. Tomoris Battle Plan: A Reconstruction
[469]
August 29 was a "clear and rather bright day." The Hungarianarmy assumed its order of battle after sunrise. The
palatine led theking around among the troops and encouraged the soldiers. TheOttoman vanguard rode their horses
back and forth on the plain ofMohacs, clashing time and again with the Hungarian light cavalry."The enemy
was...still behind the hills", writes Brodarics, and itsintentions could not be known--whether it wanted to lure the
Hungarians into "an unfavorable position", whether it was preparing fora surprise night attack, or whether it simply
meant to exhaust theHungarians. But, as we have seen, its intention was none of these.
During the wait, "when the sun was already beginning to leanwestward", they noticed "the troops of the enemy to
the right, in thevalley beneath the hills, as they were advancing quietly, only thesunlight reverberating from the tips
of the lances betraying theirpresence." These were the troops of Bali and Khosrev. The unusualterrain explains why
only the tips of the lances could be seen fromwhere Brodarics stood; Tomori, who stood 1 to 1.5 km farther
fromhim, was able to assess correctly that this was not the main body ofthe enemy, and he dispatched only a
negligible force, a few hundredcavalrymen, against them.
Brodarics describes the scene as follows:
The friar [Tomori] suspecting the truth, that these were sent either to occupy our camp or to surround us, rode
posthaste from the first echelon to the king and ordered Gaspar Raskay, along with the other two who had been
entrusted to guard the person of the king, to reconnoiter and find out w hat the Turks had in mind, then, if possible,
to turn them aside from the direction in which they were heading. Raskay, in view of the task assigned to him earlier
refused this assignment. But since the friar insisted, and the king did not contradict the friar's orders, he spurred his
horse and galloped along with his companions and troops under him to where he was sent, so that he might not be
accused of cowardice or timidity...
Tomori probably dispatched Raskay as a standing flank defensewith the task of merely keeping an eye on the
enemy.
In the meantime, the Rumelian army must have started pitchingtheir tents on the field of Mohacs, but Brodarics says
nothing aboutit, which is a]i the more curious as this happens to be the mostimportant episode of the whole battle.
Thereupon the barons whowere with the king, "bored with the protracted wait," suggestedheading back to camp, no
doubt because seeing the Ottomans bivuacing, they must have felt there would be no fighting that day.The king,
following their advice, sent orders to Tomori to return tocamp. Then Tomori, along with Gyorgy Szapolyai, rode up
to theking "and warned him that the battle must not be postponed at anyprice, because there was less danger in
fighting part of the enemy'sforces today than in fighting the whole army on the morrow; therecan be no doubt about
victory now." Upon this advice the king"immediately" ordered the attack.
The attack was launched, and with enormous success: it caughtthe Rumelian army, busy pitching its tents,
completely by surprise.They fled in panic from the field at breakneck speed.
Everything said so far contradicts the generally held view thatTomori led the Hungarian troops without much
thought or competence. Just the opposite was the case; the plan of attack, as far as onecan reconstruct from indirect
data, was both bold and brilliant.
The sources clearly indicate that the deployment of the Ottomanarmy met with difficulties and that the army did not
reach thebattlefield at the same time. It is reasonable to suppose that Tomoriand his companions were counting on
these facts. This assumption isreinforced by the fact that the Ottomans believed that Tomori wasacting on such
expectation. Lufti, well informed in military matters,paraphrases Louis II's decision at the Hungarian war council in
thefollowing lines:
When [the Turk] reaches Mohacs tomorrow And strikes up his tents there; At this favorable opportunity we shall
attack him; When he sets up camp we will rush him and fight.
The he writes of the launching of the Hungarian attack:
While we were engaged in pitching our tents, some removing their luggage, others occupied in diverse ways, the
king spoke to the Polish and Czech bans as follows: "The Turks set up camp because they are afraid of us, and want
to ask for mercy." Having said this he became overconfident and divided his army into three groups. He sent one
group against the Rumelian army, another against the Anatolian, whereas himself, with his army of hundreds of
thousands, all helpmates of the devil, fell straight upon the middle army of Sultan Suleyman, like a mountain of iron.
What Lufti describes here is probably the conclusion the Ottomancommand derived a posteriori from the analysis of
the battle, perhaps confirmed during his interrogation by a captured subordinateofficer of Tomori who knew about
the plan. Our supposition aboutTomori's plan is strengthened both by the order of battle of theHungarian army,
which, as mentioned, was suitable only for adesperate assault, and by Raskay's mission. From the latter one
mayrightfully conclude that Tomori was quite certain the Ottomanswould not attack; hence the person of the king
was in no danger.Otherwise it seems unlikely that he would assume the enormousresponsibility of leaving the king
without a guard.
Istvanffy keeps quiet about an essential factor which had decidedly catastrophic consequences, namely that the king
and his entourage wanted to return to camp. He writes:
At the same moment a terrifying blast of the horns and a loud battle-cry arose from the camp of Suleyman, the
enormous and awe-inspiring army of cavalry and infantry guards began to descend from the hill and advance
straight against us. Then both commanders-in-chief sped to the king and reported that the enemy was marching to
battle, that we must meet them, and there could be no doubt about the prospects for victory. The king, neither
frightened nor hesitant upon receiving this report, gave out orders to call upon Christ the Savior, raise the banners
blow the trumpets, and roll the drums. [470]
The order to return to camp and its reversal played a decisive rolein the failure of Tomori's plan. In all likelihood
Tomori and Szapolyai had some difficulty convincing the king and his entouragethat battle must be launched. It is
hard to believe what Brodaricswrites about the king immediately giving orders to that effect. Thiswas a matter of
considerable importance, and if Tomori had to presentarguments, no doubt the lords had some arguments of their
own,engendering a discussion, which naturally took some time. To thiscame the fact that if the plan to postpone the
attack was droppedonly after some debate, the king and his entourage had to readythemselves once again for battle.
Taking together the information from all available sources, itbecomes clear that the Hungarian assault was launched
belatedly.Even though Brodarics does not mention the arrival of the Rumelian army, he describes the appearance of
Bali's forces accurately. Thetwo events must have taken place more or less at the same time. Hisfollowing statement,
however, fixes the moment when the attackwas launched, by which time the central army under Suleyman hada]so
made its appearance on the terrace and even had begun itsdescent. It is clear that the lords around the king wanted to
return tocamp because the Rumelian army had started to pitch their tents.Tomori intended to launch his attack
exactly at that time, but thiswas the moment when he received the king's orders to return tocamp. We cannot
suppose that the army of the sultan was alreadyvisible at this time, or else he would not have argued that they
needclash only with the smaller portion of the enemy forces. As we haveseen, the army of the sultan was at least one
hour behind theRumelian army, and apparently it caught up only partly during thediscussions among the Hungarian
leaders. This is also suggested by Kemal Pashazade's text:
The djaur army's evil leader, King Lajos, like another Siavus, rushedinto the frightful fire of the fray, and while
some of his heroic begs andbrave leaders fell, and others were captured, he stood his ground on thebattlefield. In the
meantime the troops accompanying the person of theworld-conquering sultan, consisting of innumerable cavalry and
infantry, servants and freemen--who formed the environment of the courtwhich served as refuge to the world,
arrived on the scene. The bannerssignifying victory--like the veil of the charming goddess victory--andthe flags at
the tip of the lances in the hands of the heroes completelydarkened the horizon. When the padishah reached the edge
of thebattlefield, in accordance with the law and plan of wisdom he stoodstill, like an unmovable mountain, then
pushed forward like a floodedstream .
Djeladzade's narrative tallies well with this:
When they [the Hungarian right wing] tried to encircle the Rumelianarmy, they noticed that the padishah ruling the
world was approachingwith an army in battle order and with unfurled banners, at the sight ofwhich panic seized the
djaurs. Upon this, glancing at the vision of theirlife in the mirror of death, they turned upon their heels that
veryinstant and suffering defeat, joined the troops which had remained onthe banks of the Danube.
The sequence of events and of changes in the plan can be reconstructed as follows:
1) The Rumelian army began to advance along the slope,while Bali's troops started towards the flank of the
Hungarian army.
2) Tomori galloped back to the reserves and ordered Raskayon a mission.
3) Tomori returned to the first echelon and noticed that theRumelian army had begun to pitch its tents. The
situationhe was hoping for had come about: only one-third of theOttoman army, two-fifths at most, was on the
battlefield,and even that segment about to camp. Here was themoment propitious for the attack! The king's
entourage,on the contrary, felt that the battle must be postponed,since the Ottomans were not inclined to fight. They
persuaded the king to order the return to camp, and theybegan to remove their armor.
4) Tomori received the king's order to move to camp.
5) He galloped back to the king, along with Gyorgy Szapolyai. A discussion ensued, but since Tomori's
standprevailed in the end, the king and the lords had to dontheir armor. The king sued the order to attack.
6) Then the central army under the lead of the sultan appeared on the horizon.
7) Tomori returned to his position and, although the situation had altered considerably, he opted in favor of
theassault nevertheless. He could not have done otherwiseunder the circumstances. There was still the hope thatthey
might have routed the Rumelian army by the timethe sultan's army deployed for battle in front of the terrace.
8) Although the assault against the Rumelian army wassuccessful, the Ottoman central army was already in battle
formation at the foot of the terrace and preventedTomori from wheeling around and bending to attack theartillery
and the janissaries in the back.
Quite clearly, the Hungarian army launched its attack with a loss oftempo which resulted from the delays and
hesitations caused by theorder to return to camp. This time lag proved fatal, because itcompletely upset Tomori's
plan.
The weakest point in our chain of assumptions is that Brodaricsmakes no mention of any plan by Tomori. There can
be but oneexplanation for this; neither he nor the king knew of it. This hypothesis may seem weak, but knowing
about the contradictionsbetween the court and the professional soldiers, including the nobility, it becomes very
possible indeed. It is certain that if Tomori's planwas the one reconstructed above, the king could not have
knownabout it, or else he would not have issued the order to return to camp.But why would Tomori have kept his
plan secret even from the king?Most probably because of the need for discretion--since the basicelement of the plan
relied on surprise. After what we have learnedabout the proceedings of the war council, especially that it took
placein the midst of a "populous assembly," we can have no doubt that hadthe plan been made known the efficient
Ottoman intelligence wouldsoon have found out. That Tomori did not communicate his plan withthe king at least in
a private conversation may have been because hefeared the young and indecisive Louis would be unable to keep
asecret.
Considering all this, Tomori's strange behavior during the lastwar council becomes more understandable. Since he
could not present his only convincing argument--i.e., the secret plan guaranteeing success--he had to come up with a
justification which he himselfmust have known to be spurious: the oft-mentioned underestimationof Ottoman
strength. Or did he already count on the hope, albeittacitly, that the battle might be fought against a fraction of
thesultan's army?
CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE
[471]
Although the second part of this book is entitled "the Battle ofMohacs", the chapter dealing with the battle itself is
bound to be oneof the shortest, since it is impossible to reconstruct its course accurately from the available sources.
There are but a few firm points ofreference. The best one can do is to set the significant data into alogical order and
as far as possible, avoid guesswork.
No Hungarian or Ottoman sources have yet been found whichwould cover the entire battle with all its episodes. The
Ottomancommand seems to have done some kind of evaluation after thebattle, as reflected in Lufti account, but
whether this evaluationwas ever recorded and, if so, whether the record still exists, isunknown.
All the eyewitnesses reporting on the battle could observe onlyparts of it, since it was fought along a front 5-6 km
wide. Moreover,the accounts dealing with specific episodes of the battle were written, with few exceptions, not by
professional soldiers (hence thewhole battle was for them nothing but chaos and confusion) or weredeliberately
distorted for one reason or another. Brodarics's lack ofexpertise mentioned several times; similarly, neither
Djeladzadeand Kemal Pashazade was an expert in military science, and theircredibility is often doubtful.

The First Phase

At the start of the battle the Ottoman army was deployed asfollows. The bulk of the troops under Bali and Khosrev
avoidedRaskay and did not engage in battle, especially since they were notslated to fight that day. The Rumelian
army was down on the plainof Mohacs, preparing to camp. The units under the Sultan weredescending from the
terrace at Foldvar, the Anatolian army furtherbehind. After receiving the order to attack, the Hungarian artillery
began to fire, and the right wing, with Tomori in the lead, charged atfull speed. The infantry too launched an attack
but, naturally,remained far behind the cavalry. The right wing aimed at the centerof the Rumelian army, whereas the
infantry was heading for thejanissaries and the artillery on the right flank of the Rumelians. Wehave no information
at all regarding the infantry's attack; nevertheless, we may take it for granted that they took off at the same timeas
the right wing, and, since they had to march for at least half anhour, they might have reached the janissaries and the
artilleryroughly at the same time as the second echelon. (See Map 10). Thereserves and the left ~sing under the
command of Perenyi stayed putwhich was to be expected, since the Anatolian army in front of themwas not even in
sight yet.
The charge by the right wing had enough power to effect a breakthrough. The Rumelian army, busy setting up its
tents and perhapseven unbridling the mounts--the camel train and camel drivers,mules and muleteers awkwardly
bustling among them--was caughtentirely by surprise. Seized by panic, it fled at full speed from theHungarians. The
reticent communication in Suleyman's diary provides clear evidence of this: "And since the Rumelian army
wasdispersed it was unable to resist and part of it fled in the direction ofthe ruler." According to Kemal Pashazade,
two Hungarian knightsgot within reach of the sultan before they were chopped down. Itmust have been at this time
that Tomori, fighting in the front ranks,sent Andras Bathory back to the king with the message that "victorybeing
ours", he should start with the second echelon in hot pursuit ofthe enemy. Let us quote once more Brodarics:
Then we hurried forward on this sometimes flat sometimes uneven terrain.... Our heroes stood their ground and
fought bravely against the foe. While the king's formation advanced in great haste as hastily as possible in full
armor, the right wing began to retreat, and many fled; I believe the guns of the enemy must have terrified them, as it
was only at this time that they began to fled. The rapid fire and the cannonballs whistling above the heads of those of
us next to the king aroused great fear in everyone.
Thus the attack by the right wing ultimately failed. But why? Onething is certain: the cause of the failure was not the
fire of the enemyartillery. Brodarics only "believed" that the right wing was terrifiedby the fire of the artillery, but
he also noted that the cannonballssped above them, in other words, missed their target. While the 150pieces of
artillery opening fire at the same time might indeed have had a terrifying effect, it is nevertheless difficult to believe
that theHungarian soldiers who had lived through so many battles wouldhave been frightened to the point of fleeing,
especially if the projectiles did not even strike their ranks. Moreover, the artillery did notfire at the right wing, since
that wing was attacking to the left of it,but rather at the second echelon arriving in front of it, and presumably at the
infantry as well. This is obvious from Brodarics's account;he states that the cannons began to fire only after the
second echeloninitiated its assault, which must have happened 15-20 minutes afterthe attack by the right flank.
Another statement by Brodarics alsoseems to imply a causal relationship between the artillery fire andthe rout of the
right flank. Writing about the movements of the kinghe states that Louis was no longer with his division: "I am
certainthat he disappeared from our ranks when the guns of the enemybegan to fire and the right flank began to
flee." Yet this sentencehints at simultaneity rather than a real cause and effect.
Having ruled out artillery fire as the main cause of failure, wemust search for another. We know from different
sources that thetroops on the right flank began to collect booty after their successfulcharge. Also, if a few Hungarian
warriors indeed got in the vicinityof the sultan, this would indicate that at least one contingent continued the attack.
The real reason of failure was that by this time thebulk of the Ottoman central army, including the janissaries,
hadreached the bottom of the terrace and had fired volleys at theHungarian soldiers engaged in collecting booty and
at those whowere still fighting. This shooting, unlike the firing of the artillery,had not only sound and fury, but
impact as well: it caused havoc inthe ranks of the Hungarians. According to the diary of Suleyman:"The division of
the janissaries attacked the contemptible djaursthree or four times with musket fire and tried to force them
back.,'According to Kemal Pashazade, the janissaries "distributed bulletslike hailstorm." According to Pechevi the
janissaries "fired in unisonand so accurately that the bravest among the infidels fell during thevery first assault."
Although all three communications report shooting by the janissaries as taking place at the same time as
theengagement of the Anatolian army, it is most likely that the musketfire also supported the Rumelian army. At this
stage the Hungarians, loss of tempo took effect. The failure of the right flank's chargemeant nothing less than that
the battle was hopelessly lost. It alsoappears that Tomori died a hero's death at this point.

The Second Phase and Conclusion

It is even more difficult to unravel the subsequent episodes of thebattle than the initial ones. Brodarics, who could
not identify themost important aspects of the battle in his calmer moments, musthave lost his head completely when
the cannons began to roll and hehad to struggle with his mount, which went wild at the sound of thefiring. He
projected the terror that seized him onto the entire Hungarian army and from here on his account can be taken only
with thegreatest reservations. For instance, he says nothing about the involvement of the infantry and of the left
flank. Unfortunately on thisstage we receive no specific information from the Ottoman chroniclers either. We have
nothing to rely on but suppositions regardingthe second phase.
We may take it for granted, however, that neither the infantry northe reserves were able to fight their way through
the obstacleserected by the Ottoman artillerymen and janissaries. A bloody fighttook place which the cavalry was
unable to withstand for long. Itturned back. Only the infantry continued to fight at the center. Thecavalry renewed its
charge, but was beaten back once again, andnow the flight became general. Brodarics blames everything on
theintense fire of the artillery and the dense smoke; of course, this is nota sufficient explanation.
We can find out somewhat more from the Ottoman sources, although their presentation is far from unequivocal.
They indicatethat once the attack of the reserves was thwarted they continued bybending towards the right or the
left. According to Lufti and thediary of Suleyman the king's troops bent towards the Rumelianarmy, but according to
Djeladzade and Kemal Pashazade theyturned towards the Anatolian army. Both statements are probablycorrect: the
reserves, divided, continued their attack in both directions.
Ottoman sources provide a fairly detailed account of the attack bythe left flank under the command of Perenyi. This
flank, as we haveseen, was held back by Tomori; it could only launch its attack oncethe Anatolian army appeared at
Buziglica. The second echelon musthave joined the fray after this. The janissaries took the brunt of thefight here,
decimating the ranks of the Hungarians with murderousvolleys. The Ottoman chroniclers themselves admit that the
leftflank fought well: Lufti writes that it "continued to fight for a goodwhile", and Ferdi adds that the battle was
decided only after a "few attacks and retreats." Still, there was no chance of success againstthe superior forces--the
battle had to be lost.
The infantry at the center fought the longest. These tough, experienced mercenaries knew well they could find no
place to hide fromthe Ottoman cavalry by running away, and gave their lives dearly.Apparently they fought in some
kind of quadrangle or square formation, presumably because they were already surrounded by theOttomans on all
sides. The infantry perished almost to the last man.
For all practical purposes the battle ended with the virtual annihilation of the Hungarian army. The king, 28
magnates, 7 prelates,about 500 noblemen, 10,000 infantryman and 4,000 cavalrymen losttheir lives. [472] In
conclusion one thing has to be said about the gravelosses suffered by the aristocracy and the county nobility. They
mayhave been narrow-minded, selfish, irresponsible, and foolhardy men,but they certainly rode heroically in the
forefront of that fatal attackwhich carried the country to its destruction!
CHAPTER X
END OF THE 1526 CAMPAIGN
Ottoman Advance to Buda
According to Brodarics the battle lasted altogether an hour and ahalf. We may assume, however, that he came to this
conclusionbecause he deemed the battle was over the moment he and thosearound him fled from the battlefield.
[473] In fact, the battle must havelasted much longer. The central army led by Suleyman reached theterrace around
1300-1400 hours; this was the time the battle gotunder way. The Anatolian army, however, arrived only an
hourlater; [474] hence the left wing under Perenyi could only have started itsattack then. Since according to the
Ottoman chroniclers the Hungarians fought valiantly, and the battle wavered for a while, it isunlikely that it ended in
less than an hour. That makes already twohours; if we add the time taken up by the stubborn resistance of
theinfantry, we must estimate the duration of the battle at three hoursminimum. The Ottoman sources clearly
indicate that fighting continued until the evening. The sultan's fethname proclaiming thevictory states: "In short, the
fighting and lively encounters such asthe world had never seen continued all the way to the evening." [475]
The same charter describes the escape of Louis II from the battlefield stating that "he fled under the cover of
impending darkness.."On August 29 the sun set around 1830 hours, and it was dark byabout 2000 hours. This
remark also indicates that the fightinglasted until dankness set in. The fact that the Ottoman army couldnot pitch
their tents after the battle also indicates that fightinglasted until darkness. Ferdi writes: "On this night the
battlefieldbecame the bivouac, but since most of the victorious troops could notfind their baggage they did not alight
from their mounts until themorning." [476] According to Suleyman's diary: "The victorious Sultanremained on
horseback almost until midnight with all his servants, and then turned into tent to rest; the victorious soldiers
dispersed and dismounted, but held on to the bridle until the morning..Neither the important persons nor the
common soldiers were allowed near the baggage." [477] Although Kemal Pashazade focuses onbivouacking, it is
possible to determine the time the battle wasconcluded almost to the minute from his communication. He
writes:"While some assumed the aura of martyrdom, and the champions ofthe faith were sated with combat, the
army returned to camp afterthe sun had set, before the hour of the last prayer." [478] The prayerbefore lying to rest
was recited by the Ottomans as the horizon wasdarkening. This testimony is in full agreement with the time
calculated from the above quoted fethname.
The confusion around the baggage demonstrates, by the way, thatduring the deployment and the fighting itself the
order of battle wascompletely upset. Normally the baggage of the troops has a strictlyassigned location, usually
behind the unit to which it belongs, precisely to avoid confusion. Since the troops did not know where theirbaggage
was, we must assume that unusual chaos prevailed; hencethe order of Suleyman that "no one be allowed near the
baggage." [479]Had the search continued in the dark, that is, if the troops had beenseeking their baggage and the
train seeking them, complete chaoswould have resulted. Moreover, this chaos also indicates that theHungarian attack
had caught the Ottoman army by surprise.
Thus the army spent the night on the battlefield, without shelter!food, or water; moreover, it was harassed by the
rain which beganto fall after the battle. In the morning Suleyman inspected thebattlefield and ordered that the
prisoners be led in "front of thedivan" the following day.
On the following day, August 31, the divan was held and, according to Suleyman's clerk, "the march towards Buda
was decided." [480]Probably, however, this was not really the issue; rather it was amatter of organizing the advance
and issuing the pertinent instructions, inasmuch as the occupation of Buda had been one of theobjectives of the
campaign from the start. At this time the prisoners--some 2,000 men--were beheaded, and the heads of Tomori and
hisfellow commanders were spiked on spears and carried in triumpharound the camp of the enemy; it is said that
later on they were pitched into the ground in front of the sultan's tent. [481] Even the enemypaid homage to
Tomori's martial virtues. Kemal Pashazade's linesreveal respect:
The most astute and brave among the wicked was the commander-in-chief of the decrepit and miserable king, Pauli
Tomori, a renowned leader in that country and a second Isfendiar on the battlefield. He was like hammered iron, the
more blows he received the harder he became. Had he been smitten to death like a rabid dog, he might still have
revived. When he launched a charge, like the flooding Nile, braying like an enraged elephant, even tigers and lions
would have stayed clear. [482]
The dead were buried on September 1, when 30-50,000 bodies musthave been put to rest beneath the plain of
Mohacs, Ottoman casualties included. So far only about 600-800 of these have been unearthed, mostly in the
vicinity of Satorhely, at a distance of about 4-5km from the actual battlefield. [483] What happened to the others?
Theobvious answer is that they must be resting where the battle wasfought, in front of the terrace. It is there where
about four massgraves, 700 meters long, covering quite a considerable area, mustbe. [484] But why have they not
been discovered? First of all, they werenot sought where the battle took place. Up to now the discoverieshave
always resulted from skeletal finds dug up by the plow. But wecannot count on such an accident on the battlefield
itself because,although the fields are cultivated here as well, the terrain is coveredby a relatively thick layer of earth
as a consequence of the erosion ofthe terrace, and even deep plowing would not disturb graves.
In contrast to the information from Ottoman sources, Istvanffy
wrote that the dead were buried by Dorottya Kanizsai, widow ofPalatine Perenyi. [485] She is, of course, a well
known figure in historical paintings, and "every schoolboy" knows her memorable deed. Wehave no reason to doubt
Suleyman's diary; hence we must assumethat Dorottya Kanizsai buried the corpses of those who died furtherfrom
the battle. These may have been the fatally wounded whodragged themselves away, and especially the drowned ones
whosecorpses were found long after the Ottoman army's departure, whenthe waters subsided. It is almost certain that
the corpses in the massgraves were indeed buried by the Ottomans, for the bodies piled oneach other indicate lack of
piety. The graves even include pyramidsof skulls. Moreover, according to the opinion of the anthropologistIstvan
Kiszely, a significant portion of the bodies were placed intothe graves before the rigidity of the corpse had
dissolved. As weknow, rigor mortis dissolves 24 to 48 hours after death occursDorottya Kanizsai could have
reached Mohacs only weeks later.
On the very day of the burial the Ottoman high command sent outthe akindjis at "five to ten days march" to kill,
burn, and takeprisoners. Brodarics writes: "On the day and night following thebattle the enemy rode up and down
the countryside, burning anddestroying everything on its path, showing no mercy to anyone onaccount of gender,
age, or religion, and perpetrated all kinds ofatrocities on the unfortunate nation." [486] Kemal Pashazade also
describes all this, only with a different value judgment:
The cavalry, knowing no mercy, dispersed into the provinces of the wicked one like a stream overflowing its banks
and, with the fiery meteors of its sparkling sabers, burned every home to the ground, sparing not a single one.... The
contemptible ones were slain, their goods and families destroyed.... Not a stone of the churches and monasteries
remained. [487]
Soon after the mass burial the Ottomans left the battlefield. Thedates in the diary of Suleyman probably refer only to
the professionals: the sultan and his guards left on September 2 and spent thenight at Mohacs. On the next day they
moved north after having setthe town on fire. On September 6 they left Tolna behind them. In themeantime the
sultan ordered that male prisoners taken since thebattle be executed, the women set free.
The news of the disaster of Mohacs reached Buda on August 31.Our main source for the following days is Szeremi.
The battle took place on the plain of Mohacs on Wednesday. The next day, Thursday, one of the German servants of
the queen arrived in haste from the war; he was too distraught to make it across the gate....Queen Mary rode away
from the castle of Buda with fifty knights, through the Logod Gate, with the ladies of the court. Each carried a
burning torch in her hands. The queen stopped at Logod to await her treasurer coming out of the city . . . All the
Germans of Buda went with them, as we could observe from our window. The Hungarians did not even budge,
because they are a nation that likes to remain at home and can understand only the Magyar language, moreover,
those from Buda and Pest trusted in Voivode Janos. But he was demurring, idle, by the river Tisza.... The masses of
Buda and Pest awaited Voivode Janos as their Messiah, because of the protection he would offer them; but the
voivode was not granted to them, whether by God or the devil, I know not. When the residents of Buda and Pest
found out, everyone got ready to travel to save his skin. Those who had feet ran away wherever they could . . . The
emperor of the Turks set up camp at Kelenfold. Only the poor, the lame, the blind, the deranged remained in Buda.
Those who could not lay their hands on a mount or a cart had to stay in Buda. There was a merchant of Buda who
acted as middleman between the Hungarians and the Turks and managed to obtain mercy for the Christians from the
emperor; moreover, the emperor gave him ten gold pieces as a present. The emperor entered Buda and ruled from
there, biding his time for sixteen days. Then he had a meeting with his advisors, whether to burn down the castle or
not. His advisors told him not to set fire to the castle but that the city of Buda must be burnt to the ground so that all
nations remember that the emperor of the Turks was here. Let the castle remain as his capital. The emperor
employed someone to set fires, and he was the one who told me all this on one occasion, during dinner. His name
was Antal and he had been ordered to take care of the job. Then three hundred Turks began to set fire to the city of
Buda. [488] Suleyman reached Buda on September 11. He inspected the city onthe following day. The construction
of the bridge across the Danubewas begun on the 13th. The same day Pest was set on fire.
On September 14 Suleyman's clerk noted: "There was a great fortnearby so that 5-600 janissaries were sent there
early in the morning with some cannons and 5-10,000 cavalry." The following entry forthe next day was:
"Destroying the great fortress, they looted theequipment and goods found therein, and took the men prisoner.'' [489]
The fort referred to must be the camp built by escaped inhabitants ofthe capital at Pilismarot. Its siege is described
by Brodarics:
The enemy, on a rampage in Hungary, met nowhere with serious resistance, except at Marot, not far from Esztergom
.. Many thousand among us retreated to this spot with wives and children, trusting the protection provided by nature
... Finally, since the enemy was absolutely unable to capture our camp protected by carts, it was compelled to bring
up the guns, and thus managed to blow it to pieces and cut down those within almost to a man. .. Adding up all those
who were slain and taken prisoner I dare say almost 12,000 that I know of perished in this disaster. [490]
After Pest, Buda was likewise set on fire: the city burned day andnight, while the valuables were removed from the
royal palace andloaded on ships to be carried to Constantinople. Kemal Pashazadedescribed the looting of the
palace:
He [i.e., the sultan] gathered the very valuable booty and the products of his victory from the beautiful palace of the
wicked king, which was like a garden adorned with flowers and fruit. In the treasury and the arsenal, filled to the
brim with weapons, equipment, and stores, he gathered everything he found, valuable and worthless, loaded these
onto the ships with the greatest care and dispatched them to the city of Belgrade, whence they were carried to the
capital of the country of the true believers, on the back of the huge river. [491]
While the capital cities of the country were burning in flames andtheir inhabitants butchered or carried away in
chains, the Ottomanleaders held sumptuous feasts in Buda. Suleyman gave two receptions, one of them a garden
party. [492]

The Ottomans Leave the Country

Once the bridge across the Danube was completed, on September19, the army began to cross immediately; it
continued day and nightand would have finished by the 23rd had the bridge not broken up.Fortunately for the
Ottomans only the smaller part of the armyremained on the Buda side, and it was not too difficult to ferry
themacross. [493] From Pest the army proceeded southward in two columns. We do not know the exact itinerary of
the main column, led by Suleyman,but presumably it ran parallel to the Danube, or rather to itsswampy banks.
The other column under the command of Ibrahim marched toSzeged by way of Kecskemet. While the Ottoman
sources make nomention of it, presumably Ibrahim's task was to function as a flankfor the main body against
Szapolyai on the other side of the Tisza.Szapolyai must have reached Szeged around Septernber 3 or 4,rather than
on the day of the battle as some aver. Moving parallel tothe Ottoman army, he advanced northward along the left
bank of theTisza and reached Fegyvernek around September 25. [494] His objectivemust have been to bar the way
should the Ottoman army decide tothreaten Transylvania.
Ibrahim reached Szeged on September 29. The march was ratherdifficult: the army had to struggle with lack of
water and food, andthe beasts of burden were falling by the wayside. The situationchanged in the prosperous region
of Szeged, where, as we learn fromSuleyman's diary, "the army had flour, wheat, oats, fodder, andother food
plenty." [495]
From Szeged Ibrahim's army proceeded to Titel by way of Zenta.In this area the Ottomans had to confront the
resistance of theSerbian hussars under Bosic Radic rather than just defenselessvillagers. The diary entry for October
2 reads: "It has been reportedthat one accursed named Deli-Radich captured alive three or fourhundred among those
in the area, and slaughtered about 500 more;in general, barring the roads of access, he either killed or tookprisoner
those coming from whatever direction." [496] Peter Perenyi,who escaped from the battle, also made his appearance;
it seemsthat he followed the tracks of the Ottoman army, harassing itsrearguard, capturing its scouts and the
laggards. Ibrahim dispatched Khosrev, who lured Perenyi's troops into an ambush inwhich he captured six prisoners
and killed some of the soldiers.From Titel, Ibrahim reached Petervarad on October 3, where thesappers immediately
began to build a bridge across the Danube.
The main body of the army seems to have encountered seriousresistance in the area of Bacs and had to take the city
in combat.Here, according to the sultan's diary, they took 70,000 sheep asbooty. Suleyman reached Petervarad on
October 7. The bridge was ready by the 8th, and the army initiated the crossing the same day.The sultan reached
Szalankemen on the 9th and Belgrade on the10th. Thus the campaign was concluded. [497]

The Death of Louis II

We are fairly well acquainted with the circumstances surroundingthe death of Louis II. As we remember, Brodarics
had lost sight ofhim when the Ottoman artillery began to fire:
The king was no longer with our division. He either shifted into one of the forward ranks, inasmuch as it had been
decided even earlier that the king should not remain in one place, or he was escorted away by those standing behind
him. Either event is possible.... I am certain, however, that he disappeared from our ranks when the guns began to
boom and the right wing started to run away. [498]
He then continues by arguing with the Austrian historian, Cuspinianus, that the king had not been abandoned by his
men, but that "ourunfortunate destiny decided that we should suffer not only on account of the loss of our king, but
that inner conflicts and party-strifeshould tear us apart because of the election of a new king in hisplace." The king's
bodyguards remained faithful to their lord and dideverything to save him. Hence, Brodarics was most upset by
thefalse accusations. He exclaims: "Those who did everything one canexpect of good and loyal subjects, and almost
all of whom lay there onthe field of which the king was lying, and by their sacrifice provedhow close they were to
their king and how much they loved theircountry--can they be said to have abandoned the king?" [499]
The Queen received the authentic account of the death of the king,on August 31, at Neszmely. According to
Burgio's report, UlrikCzetricz, the chamberlain of the king and his most trusted man, toldher that Louis had escaped
from the battle with him and with IstvanAczel. During the escape they reached one of the small tributaries ofthe
Danube, but when they attempted to cross it, the king's mountwent wild, reared in the water, and threw his master
for whom thearmor was already too heavy; being tired. Louis drowned in thisbrook. When Aczel saw that the king
was in danger, he jumped afterhim, but he, too, drowned. The legate adds that there were rumors implying "that the
king managed to proceed beyond the brook inwhich, according to the chamberlain, he drowned, but the
aforesaidexplanation is much more credible, because a whole week has passedsince the day of the battle, with no
sign of His Majesty. We wouldhave received news if he were alive." [500]
In the middle of October, when the Ottomans cleared the country.Czetricz and Ferenc Sarffy, the Captain of Gyor,
went down toMohacs, on instructions from the queen, to recover the body of theking. Sarffy gave Brodarics a
detailed account of his mission: "Letyour Lordship be convinced that everything that Czetricz had said atthat time
[August 31] about the death of the king was nothing butthe truth." Czetricz was able to point out the place even
before theparty reached it. He believed that the king's body might be in theswamp and jumped into the mud, seeking
the corpse of his lord. Buthe found only Louis' weapons. A bit further lay the dead body ofTrpka, the king's aide-de-
camp. Not far from this swamp they finallyfound a fresh grave and under it "as if by divine guidance," theburied
body of King Louis II. Czetricz immediately started to scratchaway the earth with his bare hands, and the others
followed hisexample. When they had unearthed the legs, Czetricz cleansed themwith two handfuls of water, and
then noted a mark on the king's rightleg. He exclaimed: "This is His Majesty the King, the corpse of myalways most
Graceful Lord, there can be no doubt!", then, falling tohis knees in tears, he kissed the corpse. Sarffy added:
I do not mean to flatter, but Your Most Respected Lordship should be kind to believe me that never had we seen a
human corpse so wholly preserved, neither disgusting nor frightening to such a degree: for not the least part if His
Majesty's body was in decomposition, there was not the slightest wound upon it, not even the prick of a needle,
except for a very minor one on his lips.
The royal corpse was dressed into a clean shirt and laid into thecasket. The cortege traveled without incident. At
Szekesfehervar themunicipal judge and members of the estates came out from the citywith the entire clergy, in
ceremonial parade towards the casket ofthe king. The coffin was carried into the city and placed in thechapter house,
where the judge also recognized Louis. [501] There isevidence that before the Sarffy-Czetritz mission found the
king'sbody, it was buried by the peasants of the vicinity who retained the king's clothing, his signet ring, and a
golden heart which he worearound his neck. A judicial document dated 1527 identifies MartonHorvath of Mlatovit
as the person who took the signet, and a numberof serfs who took Louis' clothing; they faithfully turned these over
tothe queen, who in the presence of her councillors, had them cut toshreds.
As to the fate of the golden heart, the last will of the widow QueenMary has this to say:
Since the death of my husband, the king, I have worn on myself a golden heart, which he had worn to the end of his
life. I hereby order that this heart, along with the small chain on which it hangs, be melted down and distributed
among the poor. It was the companion of two persons who were never separated in life from each other in body and
inclination until their death, and therefore let it be annihilated and let it change its form as have the bodies of those
who loved one another. [502]
Mary, of course, died only in 1558, as former Habsburg regent of theNetherlands; thus the little pendant survived
King Louis by morethan thirty years, into a time when his former realm was no more.

Mohacs from the Ottoman Point of View: Triumph or Failure?

It is quite possible that the reason Suleyman remained so long onthe battlefield covered with decaying corpses and
most certainlyinundated with their stench was that he believed King Louis fell inthe battle. Unless he was prompted
by some religious command orsanitary considerations, this would be the most likely explanationfor disposing of the
corpses--which required considerable labor--and their exact reckoning. Suleyman was most concerned about thefate
of the king, since he had launched the campaign to force theHungarian government to accept his conditions. Who
else but theking could have negotiated with him?
Perhaps it is also a sign of this interest that his first fethnameissued to proclaim the victory states that "it is not
known whetherthe king be dead or alive." [503] As the clerk of the diary dutifully notedhe sent this imperial
announcement on Septernber 4 to every province of his empire. Only in Buda did Suleyman definitely learn
thatLouis had died; and, as we have seen, he expressed what amountedto condolences in his message to the queen.
Whether the death of the young king upset him as a human being, we cannot know, but wemay take it for granted
that as statesman the news was a bitter pill.As Ferenc Salamon, one of the wisest and most lucid
Hungarianhistorians, noted some hundred years ago:
But in addition to the trait of savagery .. moderation and caution in conquest are readily apparent in Suleyman. He
avoids taking risks whether on the battlefield or in the expansion of the Empire. Buda was entirely his already in
September 1526, yet he did not stake his claim to this conquest handed to him on a silver platter. It should be clear
from this that he did not have in mind the conquest of Hungary, in whole or in part. For the time being the plan must
have been to convert it into a vassal state paying tribute, just like Wallachia, in order to secure immediate
domination of Bulgaria, Serbia, the not yet completely subdued Bosnia, and perhaps also Croatia. From such a
perspective it may be assumed that the news of the death of the Hungarian king could not have been entirely
welcome to the sultan. Since the country was left without leadership, there was no one with whom to reach an
agreement. The major fact of not holding on to Buda announced more clearly than any words might have that the
road to peaceful compromise with the sultan was not excluded--as indeed Pal Tomori had already noted before the
battle of Mohacs. [504]
If we accept this analysis, which agrees with my basic thesis, wemay conclude that Suleyman and his advisors
immediately recognized the unfortunate consequences of their brilliant victory, namelythat they had cleared the path
to the Hungarian throne for Ferdinand of Habsburg. Ferdinand's probable succession could be gagednot only from
the Habsburg-Jagiello treaty of 1515, of which Ottoman diplomacy must have been fully aware, but also from
thefeverish activities the archduke embarked upon following the deathat Mohacs of his brother-in-law. In a letter
dated as early as September 8 he appealed to the Hungarian lords, counties, towns, andcaptains of the castles to
recognize his claim. [505] We may be certainthat the Ottomans were well aware of this circular.
Nothing could be done under the circumstances, except to put animmediate end to this extremely costly campaign,
withdraw to homebase, and wait to see who would becomes king of Hungary, so that thethread of negotiations,
interrupted in 1524, could be resumed. But inorder to ensure the appropriate atmosphere for such negotiationsand to
impress upon the future Hungarian king that there was noalternative but to accept the stipulated conditions,
Suleyman had to act according to the principles of limited warfare: to inflict suchdamage to the country that would
make its leaders realize that theywould fare much better if they decided to accept his conditions.Perhaps this was the
reason for sending the akindjis on forays afterthe battle, when no more serious military resistance could be expected
from the Hungarians. The rationale for such destruction wasnot bloodthirsty cruelty or the need to allow looting for
the unpaidirregulars, but the political consideration that by spreading terrorone can effectively weaken the enemy's
powers of resistance andparalyze its government.
Can the campaign of 1526 be considered a victory from the Ottoman point of view? If we look at the political
objective, then itactually ended in failure, for no Hungarian government remainedthat could be forced to accept the
peace terms. In fact, what theleaders of the Ottoman state feared most came to pass with thedeath of the king: the
Habsburgs laid claim to Hungary, by right ofinheritance. But if we look at the military objectives we must declareit
successful, since the Hungarian army was defeated, Buda taken,and the country itself laid waste. In terms of limited
warfare,Mohacs and its aftermath may be viewed overall as a victory. In itsaftermath the government of King John
had to carry out the politicalstipulations imposed on Hungary by the Porte, if not immediatelyafter the battle, a year
and a half later.
In the long term, of course, the campaign did not solve the problems of the Ottoman leaders, for the alliance with
John eventuallyfailed, as we have seen. The breaking up of the political integrity ofHungary became inevitable,
opening up a new front which absorbedenormous funds, energy, and thousands of lives for the empire whichwas
already involved in wars in the Mediterranean and the NearEast. Whether the Ottoman Empire indeed began to
decay in thesixteenth century, as some historians maintain, remains an issue,but the failure to realize Suleyman's
concept contributed decisivelyto the drain on the strength of the empire. The serious lossessuffered in the Hungarian
wars decimated those dwindling resources which might have been much better spent in avoiding theirreplaceable
losses in the areas of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Near East.
History plays curious games: it would have been in the commoninterest of two states to find some manner of modus
vivendi, yet theycould not achieve one for reasons beyond their control. Thus, one of them, even if a great power,
entered the road toward decline; and theother--becoming dependent, partitioned, and devastated over a century and a
half--suffered irreparable losses, ground between themillstones of two adjacent empires, never to recover its
previousglory.
GLOSSARY
Agha (aga): commander, guild-master, head servant.
Agha of the Janissaries (Yeniceri agasi): commander of the Janissary (q.v.) corps.
akindji: "raider," irregular cavalry volunteers.
alay-begi: deputy officer of the sandjak-begi in the sipahi corps.
Asaf: "the (wise) vezir of Solomon", epithet for grand vezirs.
Asper: unit of silver currency in the Ottoman Empire.
Arpa emini: superintendent of grains in Istanbul.
azab: salaried auxiliary worker to the military.
Beg: 1: prince, ruler of an independent principality, 2: governor of a district
Beglerbegilik: province, the largest administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire; the office of beglerbegi.
Beglerbegi: "beg of the begs," governor of a beglerbegilik or vilayet (q.v.), in rank usually a pasha.
beshlu: auxiliary mounted soldier in garrisons.
Cebelu: an armed retainer brought to campaign by a sipahi (q.v.).
chavush: 1: courier; 2: marshal; 3: ceremonial escort.
Chelebi: title of respect in general, title of the leader of a religious order in particular.
Defterdar: director of finance, imperial exchequer.
Divan (divan-i-humayun ): imperial council, the grand vezir's (q.v.) council and the central organ of Ottoman
administration.
djami: mosque.
djaur (or kafir): "infidel," i.e., non-Muslim.
Eyalet: see vilayet.
Ferman: an imperial edict.
Fethname: an imperial charter.
gonulu: volunteer, an other appellation for akindji.
Grand Vezir, also sadr 'azam, vezir-i 'azam, vezir-i evvel: the chief vezir, head of the Divan.
Hass: an imperial estate yielding a revenue of more than 100,000 aspers.
hatib: mosque preacher who weekly invokes God's blessing on the ruling reign
ikindi: time of the afternoon prayer.
Imam: leader of the prayers in a mosque, Muslim clergy.
Janissary corps: the sultan's standing elite infantry corps.
Kanun: regulation issued by the sultan.
Kapikulu: "slave of the Porte" employed in military, administrative or Palace service.
Kapudan-i derya: the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet.
kapu-halki: the salaried officials, both administrative and military, of the Sublime Porte.
Kasim gunu (Khassim Day): November 8, the official beginning of the winter season.
mihrab: prayer niche in mosques indicating the direction of Mecca.
Musellem: "tax exempt," military auxiliary who provides engineering and labor services for tax exemption.
Nisanci: the chief of the imperial council's chancery.
Re'aya: tax-paying subject of the Ottoman Empire, as distinct from the ruling strata.
Sanjak (or liva): administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, governed by a sanjak begi (or mirliva), subdivision of a
vilayet (q.v.).
Sheikhulislam: the mufti of Istanbul, by the 16th C. the official head of the learned hierarchy.
sipah-salar: 1: the commander of the cavalry; 2: commander.
Sipahi: cavalryman, 1: holding a timar in the provinces in return for military service, 2: sipahi of the Porte, a
member of the sultan's standing cavalry corps.
Subashi (subasi): commanding a detachment of sipahis and responsible for the maintenance of order in his district.
Timar: an estate with an annual income of less than 20,000 aspers.
Topcu basi: "head-gunner," chief of the artillery corps.
'Ulema: the learned hierarchy, graduates of medrese.
Vezir: "advisor", higher Ottoman rank, member of the imperial council or in other high position.
Vilayet: province; occasionally the Turkish term beglerbegilik is used to denote the same.
Voynuk: non-Muslim (usually Slavic) auxiliary in Ottoman service.
Yaya: "foot-soldier", 1: a Turkish peasant serving as an auxiliary with the army, 2: (by the 16 th C.) one of the corps
holding land and exempt from certain taxes in return for services to the government.
Zarbuzan: various kinds of guns, especially falconets.
Zeamet (ze'amet): an estate with an annual income of 20-100,000 aspers given to officers of the sipahi army and to
provincial administrative officials.
GLOSSARY OF PERSONS
Acsady, Ignacz (1845-1906), writer, historian
Ahmed, Ottoman grand vezir under Suleyman I
Alexander the Great, king of Macedonia (336-23 BC)
Ali, chavush, (fl. early 17th C.) official of the Porte
Artner, Edgar (1895-1972), church historian
Ayni Ali, (fl. early 17th C.) official of the Porte
Bacsy, Gyorgy (fl. mid-16th C.), King John's official
Bakic, Pavel (d. 1537), Serb nobleman, moved to Hungary in 1526
Bakocz, Tamas (1442-1521), cardinal, archbishop of Esztergom, chancellor
Bali Beg, commander of Belgrade (1521)
Barta, Gabor (b. 1942), historian
Bathory, Andras (fl. 1520-30) ban of Belgrade, treasurer of King Ferdinand
Bathory, Istvan (d. 1530), aristocrat, count palatine 1519-23, 1527-30
Batthyany, Ferenc (1497-1566), ban of Croatia
Batthyany, Orban (d. 1547), writer, politician
Bardossy, Laszlo (1890-1946), politician, premier minister of Hungary
Bayezid I, Ottoman sultan 1389-1402
Bayezid II, Ottoman sultan 1481-1512
Behram chavush, Ottoman envoy to Buda, 1520
Behram, pasha beglerbegi of Anatolia in 1526
Bende, Lajos (b. 1898), historian
Braudel, Fernand (1902-86), historian
Brodalics, Istvan [Stephen] (1470-1539), bishop of Vac, humanist, historian
Busbecque, Augier Ghislain (1522-92), diplomat, writer
Burgrio, Antonio, baron (d. 1545) papal nuncio to Hungary 1523-26 and to England 1530-33
Charles V (Habsburg), Emperor 1519-1566
Colonna, Romanus Aegidius [Giles of Rome] (d. 1316) Augustinian canon, writer
Commines, Philippe (1445-1509), diplomat, writer
Corvin, Mathias--see Mathias I
Cuspinian [Spiesshammer], Johannes (1473-1529), Viennese Humanist, diplomat
Czetricz, Ulrik, chamberlain of King Louis II
Czibak, Imre (d. 1534) Hungarian magnate, commander, bishop
Deer, Jozsef (1905-74), historian
Djanbardi al-Ghazali, Mameluke commander, revolted in 1520
Doria, Andrea (1466-1560), admiral, commander of the fleet of Francis I, later of Charles V
Dozsa (Szekely) Gyorgy (d. 1514), frontier-soldier, leader of peasant war
Djzeladzade (fl. 16th C.), Ottoman high official, chronicler
Evlia (chelebi) (1611-?), Ottoman traveler, historian
Fekete, Lajos (1891-1969), historian, Turkologist
Fels, Lenart (fl. around 1530-40)> commander under Ferdinand I
Ferandus--see Ferdinand I
Ferdi (?1510-1595), Ottoman chronicler
Ferdinand I (Habsburg), king of Hungary and Bohemia 1526-64, emperor 1556-64
Forgach, Ferenc (1530/35-77) bishop of Vac, historian
Fraknoi (Franki), Vilmos (1843-1925), historian
Francis I, king of France 1515-47
Frangepan (Frankopani), Croatian-Dalmatian magnates
Frangepan, Ferenc (1483-1534), Franciscan bishop of Eger
Frangepan, Klistof [Christopher] (d. 1527), Count of Veglia, commander
Fugger von der Lilie, South German mercantile capitalist family
Gama, Vasco de (1469-1524), Portuguese explorer
Gibbon, Edward (1737-94), historian
Gritti, Lodovico (d. 1534) Venetian diplomat, businessman
Gyalokai, Jeno(1874-1945), military historian
Hayreddin Bey, commander of the 1525 Suez campaign
Hayreddin Barbarossa (1466/83-1546), corsair, Ottoman admiral, beglerbeg of Algiers
Hermann, Zsuzsanna (b. 1929), historian
Horvath, Mihaly (1809-1878), historian, minister
Ibrahim Pasha (d. 1536) Ottoman grand vezir
Inalcik, Halil (b. 1932), historian
Innocent VIII, pope 1484-92
Isabella, queen of Hungary (1519-59), daughter of King Sigismund of Poland
Istefan--see John Sigismund
Istvanffy, Miklos (1538-1615), historian, poet
John I (Szapolyai), king of Hungary 1526-40
John Sigismund, king of Hungary, prince of Transylvania 1541
Jurisich, Miklos(1490?-1543), nobleman, diplomat, commander of Koszeg in 1532
Kaldi-Nagy, Gyula (b. 1927), Turcologist
Kanizsai, Dorottya (d. after 1532), wife of Palatine Imre Perenyi, buried the dead at Mohacs
Karlo--see Charles V
Katib Mehmed zaim ( 1532-?) Ottoman historian
Katzianer, Johann (d. 1539), commander under Ferdinand I
Karoly, Arpad (1853-1940), historian
Kemal Pashazade (b. 1483) Ottoman chronicler, after 1526 Seihk-ulislam.
Kochu Bey (fl. early 16th C.), Ottoman politician, chronicler
Kosary, Domonkos (b. 1913 .), historian
Kralicza--see Isabella
Kubinyi, Andras (b. 1929), historian
Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich (1745-l813), Russian general
Laski (Lasky), Jerome [Hieronym Jaroslaw] (1496-1541), Polish aristocrat, diplomat of King John and Ferdinand I
Leo X, pope 1513-21
Louis II (Jagiello), king of Hungary and Bohemia 1516-26
Lufti, brother-in-law of Sultan Suleyman, grand vezir (1539-41), historian
Lukinich, Imre (1880-1950), historian
Luther, Martin (1483-1546)
Magelhaes-Godinho, V. M., economic historian
Macedoniai, Laszlo [Ladislas de Macedonia] (1480?-1536), bishop, diplomat
Marsigli, Luigi Ferdinando, count (1658-1730), scientist, soldier
Martinuzzi--see Utiesenic
Mary (Habsburg), queen of Hungary and Bohemia 1521-26, governor of the Netherlands 1531-55
Mathias I (Corvinus) king of Hungary 1458-90
Matuz, Jozsef (b. 1927), historian
Maximilian I (Habsburg), emperor 1493-l5l9
Maylad, Istvan (1502-1550), voivode of Transylvania, chief captain
Mehmed II (Fatih=The Conqueror), Ottoman sultan 1451-81
Montecuccoli, Raimondo (1609-81), general, military writer
Murad II, Ottoman sultan 1421-57
Mustafa, vezir in the 1520s
Nadasdy, Tamas (1498?-1562) count palatine of Hungary
Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-1821)
Nesri (d. ca. 1512-20), Ottoman chronicler and poet
Paul III, pope 1513-19
Pechevi, Ibrahim (fl. c. 1690-1710), chronicler
Perenyi, Imre, count palatine 1504-19
Perenyi, Peter (1502-48), voivode of Transylvania, chief guard of the Holy Crown
Petrovics, Peter (1485?-1557), magnate, commander
Piri Mohammed, (fl. 1520-25), grand vezir
Piri Reis (1460?-1554?), Ottoman cartographer, naval commander
Radic, Bosic (fl. 16th C.), Serbian aristocrat
Raskay, Gaspar (or Gabor) (fl. 1500-40), commander of cavalry in the battle of Mohacs, comes of Co. Nograd after
1526
Revay, Ferenc (fl. 16th C.) vice-palatine, protonotary
Roggendorf, Wilhelm (fl. 16th C.), commander under Ferdinand I
Rustan, vezir, son-in-law of Suleyman
Rycaut, Sir Paul (1628-1700), author and traveller
Salamon, Ferenc (1825-92), historian
Salm, Nikolas (fl. 1459), commander under Ferdinand I
Sarffy, Ferenc, captain of Gyor 1526-27
Sarkany, Ambrus (d. 1526), baron, ban of Belgrade
Sead-Eddin (fl. 1536) scholar, historian, Seihk-ul-Islam
Selim I ('the Grim'), Ottoman sultan 1512-20
Sigismund (Luxemburg), king of Hungary 1387-1437, emperor 1410-1437
Sigismund I (Jagiello), king of Poland 1506-48
Sinan, chavush (fl 16th C ), chronicler
Suleyman I ('the Magnificent'), Ottoman sultan 1520-66
Szapolyai--see John I
Szalahazi, Tamas (fl. 16th C.) chancellor, bishop
Szalanczy, Janos (fl 1527-57), aristocrat, diplomat
Szalay, Laszl6 (1813-64), historian, poet
Szakaly, Ferenc (b.1942), historian
Szekfu, Gyula (1883-1955), historian, writer
Szeremi, Gyorgy (1490?-1548?) royal chaplain, historian
Szerencses, Imre (fl 16th C.), royal financier, treasurer
Thurzo, Elek (1490?-1543), royal official, treasurer
Thury, J6zsef (1861-1906), Turcologist
Tomori, Pal (1475?-1526), archbishop of Kalocsa, commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army at Mohacs
Torok, Balint (d 1551), magnate, soldier
Torok, Pal (1885-1943), historian
Turenne, Henri de la Tour d'Auverge (1611-1675), marshal of France, military writer
Utiesenic (Frater Martinuzzi), Gyorgy (1482-1551), cardinal, bishop of Varad, diplomat of King John ["Friar
George"]
Varday, Pal (1483-1549), archbishop of Esztergom
Verancsics, Antal (1504-73) cardinal, archbishop of Esztergom, historian
Villier de l'Isle-Adam (1464-1573), commander of the Knights of St. John, Rhodes
Vingarti, Horvath Gaspar, royal stewart of Louis II, adherent of Ferdinand I
Wese, archbishop of Lund, diplomat
Werboczy, Istvan (1458-1541), lawyer, count palatine
Wladislas I, king of Poland (as Wladyslaw III Jagiellonczyk) 1434-44, king of Hungary 1440-44
Wladislas II, king of Bohemia (as Vladislav IV) 1471-1516, king of Hungary 1490-1516.
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Endnotes
[1] See below, p. 297-98.
[2] For the major contributions, see the entries Barta 1983;Kosary 1978; Kubinyi. These could be augmented by
many titles, e.g., from thejournal Jelenkor, 11 (1976) which, besides Perjes 1976d brought articles by Barta,Vilmos
Farago, Dezso Kereszturi Istvan Nemeskurty and Laszlo Vekerdi, or thereview of the 2d ed. of Nemeskurty 1966 by
Szakaly in Valosag 12 (1969).
[3] Perjes 1975.
[4] Bardossy 1943.
[5] For the following see Gafgen 1974, Harsanyi 1969, 1977, June 1972. Kaufmann1982; Kirsch 1977; Klaus-
Libscher 1976; Simon 1974.
[6] This interpretation is most coherently argued by the German economic historian,Wemer Sombart (1921). A
critique of this view is offered by Eucken (1940) 232sqq.
[7] Jahns 1889-91:1 190.
[8] Machiavelli 1833, Anhang 252-3.
[9] Ibid., 113.
[10] Savorgnano 1620, 39.
[11] Montecuccoli 1899, 1: 52, 82-4, 2: 206, 253-7, 273.
[12] Zrinyi 1976. Cf. also Perjes 1976.
[13] Gafgen 1974, 100; Kirsch 1977, 1: 72, 118, 139, 2: 169; Simon 1969, 304;Klaus-Libscher 1976, 1: 211;
Thomas 1978, 1: 38, 73.
[14] Coles 1968, 69-77.
[15] On the supply system of Constantinople see Inalcik 1973 145; CEH 1967, 156.The Ottoman Empire was
usually an exporter of cereals, Jorga 1908/11, 1:458, 2: 15;Kretschmayr 1920 2: 33, 34; Braudel 1966, 1: 221, 535.
[16] Inalcik 1973, 105.
[17] Lhotsky 1971, 60.
[18] Babinger 1935, 20, 403.
[19] Brandi 1939, 359.
[20] Venice was for the Ottomans oculus totius Occidentis, Gollner 1968, 7; Torok 1926,178; Vaughan 1954, 87.
[21] Vaughan 1954, 49.
[22] Kuppelwieser 1899, 141; Vaughan 1954, 87.
[23] Thury 1896, 1: 174.
[24] Burgio 1926, 92. In 1522 spies of the Ottoman Empire were arrested in Buda; seeArtner 1926, 73.
[25] Szeremi 1979, 203.
[26] Inalcik 1973, 180; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 62-3; Hess 1982.
[27] Thury 1896, 1: 191, 193.
[28] For the following, see Braudel 1966; CEH 1967; Magelhaes-Godinho 1969; Inalcik1973; Kaldy-Nagy 1974;
Pach 1963, 1968, 1985; Hegyi-Zimanyi 1986.
[29] Magelhaes-Godinho 1969, 753.
[30] Inalcik 1973, 34.
[31] Braudel 1966, 1: 170 sqq.
[32] Elekes 1952, 216 sqq.
[33] Vaughan 1954, 110.
[34] Ibid. 207.
[35] Brandi 1939; Inalcik 1973; Lapeyre 1967; Mattingly 1962.
[36] Thury 1896 1: 199 sqq.; Ferdi and Djeladzade also wrote about the coronation ofthe emperor, ibid. 2: 86, 91,
192, 233-4.
[37] Hermann 1961.34 Inalcik 1973, 58.
[38] For the following see Babinger 1935; Enzyklopaedie 1934; Fekete 1944; Hegyi 1985; Hegyi-Zimányi 1986;
Inalcik 1977, 1978; Islamoglu-Keyder 1977; Jorga 1908/11; Lybyer 1913; Matuz 1973, 1985; Perjés 1967;
Zinkeisen 1854.
[39] Barkan 1958, 30; Inalcik 1977, 73; Káldi-Nagy 1974, 83; Randa 1965; Kovacsics 1963; Magyarország
torténete 1985, 282 sqq.
[40] Braudel 1966; CHI 1970, 1: 319; Inalcik 1973, 116, 124-5; Jorga 1908/11, 2: 351;Zinkeisen 1854, 2: 594, 763-
7.
[41] Babinger 1935, 500; Jirecek 1889/91, 113.
[42] The diary of Suleyman and Ottoman chronicles contain many data on the bridgeat Eszek; cf. Thury 1896,
1:211, 264, 273, 299, 305, 321-2, 330; 2:49 60, 65, 72-3,132, 134, 151, 170, 362.
[43] Jorga 1908/11, 2: 229; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 134, 149, 158; CEH 1967, 163; Zinkeisen1854, 2: 317, 403-4, 531-2,
752.
[44] Gyalokay 1926, 196; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 82.
[45] Perjes 1970, 2.
[46] "Ce seroit un ouvrage trop pénible ... que de vouloire decrire avec exactitude lenombre de ceux que ces Zaims
et Timarios menent a la guerre. C'est pourquoi quivoudront prendre connaissance de cette milice, en doivent faire le
compte parestimation de plus au moins." Rycaut, 1670, 412.
[47] Barkan 1958, 21, 30; Inalcik 1977, 10-17; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 72 sqq.; Kaldy-Nagy1986, 181.
[48] Opinions vary as to whether the first 3-4-5,000 aspers were included in the countor not. The difference is
significant, because, if that was the case, the number oftimariot sipahi decreased by the number of timar landowners.
Rycaut tells us,however, that a zeamet owner with an income of 30,000 aspers had to provide sixsoldiers, and one
with an income of 90,000 aspers, eighteen, hence, the first 5,000aspers were not exempted. Inalcik interprets the
data in the same way and I aminclined to accept this count. Rycaut 1670, 410; Marsigli 1732, 135; Barkan 1958,21
sqq.; Inaclik 1977, 107 sqq.; Lybyer 1913, 101.
[49] Thury 1896, 1: 41l.
[50] The data ascribed to Ayni Ali and Ali Chaus are quoted after Mutefcieva 1968.
[51] Thury 1896, 1:206-7, 213, 306, 2: 61.
[52] Káldy-Nagy 1986, 18648.
[53] Thury 1896, 2: 81, 412.
[54] Gyalokay 1926, 196-8.
[55] The troops from Asia assembling at Constantinople set out on April 23 andreached the vicinity of Belgrade on
June 30; in other words, it took 77 days to covera distance of about 1,000 km. Moreover, a significant portion of the
army did notassemble at Constantinople; the troops from the Balkans joined the main bodylater while the soldiers of
several sanjaks met up only in the area of Belgrade.Hence these did not cover anything like a distance of 1,000 km.
[56] On the march oft the Ottomans across the Balkans, see Thury 1896 1: 150, 203, 301,2: 11, 58, 147 sqq. On the
failure of the supply system during Napoleon's Russiancampaign see Perjes 1963, 1968.
[57] Thury 1896 1: 312, 2:653.
[58] According to the engineer Saint Remy, the "new" type of pontoon introduced in theFrench army towards the
end of the seventeenth century could carry a bridge 14feet (about 4.5 meters) wide. According to further data, the
military bridges of theperiod were wide enough to allow five infantrymen or three cavalry to pass side byside,
roughly the equivalent of 4 meters. According to another observation datingfrom the middle of the sixteenth century
the Spaniards built a bridge 4 meterswide across the Schelde. Thury 18961: 262, 312, 2: 49; Szerémi 1979, 198;
SaintRémy 1702, 2: 138; Holub 1909, 90; Hailott 1836, 1: 275.
[59] This computation is based on the fact that the length of the column of march ofcavalry in ranks of four entails,
in practice, the same number of steps as cavalrymen; that means in our case, 100,000 steps, which correspond to 75
km. But sinceonly three horses were led side by side, the column of march must have been 100km. Cf. the data in
Jahns 1889-91; Berger 1930; and Generalstabshandbuch 1914.
[60] Tomori's estimate is in Brodarics 1f;90, 562 (=1908, 34). The number of cannons iscorroborated by Ferdi
(Thury 1896 2: 57). On the composition of the artillery andthe technical details I used Solms (as summarized by
Jahns 1889-91); cf. alsoDolleczek 1887 and Hoog 1955.
[61] According to the observation of the historian Sinan Chavush, the artillery broughtby the army operating in
Hungary in 1543, including "countless cannons, 24,000sacks of gunpowder, tools, and technical equipment" were
ferried by boat fromConstantinople to Varna, then transferred onto 1,800 carts and carried to Silistra,whence 54
ships transported the materials to Belgrade. In 1683 the Turkish army,forced to abandon the siege of Vienna in a
panic-like flight, left 160 smaller and 10heavier pieces, 8,000 carts of ammunition, 10,000 oxen, 15,000 bisons, and
5,000camels on the battlefield. For Sinan Chavush, sec Thury 189t; 2: 328; on the bootyat Vienna Hayne 1783, 105.
[62] On rations of food and forage and their transport, see Perjes 1963; 1970.
[63] The number of carts or camels that were needed to transport this weight can becalculated as follows. Since the
reports about 30,000 camels in the train of thearmy seem relatively reliable, counting with 200 kg per camel, the
total weightthey could carry would be 6,000 tons. There remain another 6-7,000 tons for which8-12,000 carts were
required if we assume that each cart could transport 600 kg.Since three camels could cross the bridge at Eszék side
by side, the 30,000 camelsformed 10,000 ranks and, taking 4 meters per rank, the length of the column wouldbe 4
km. As for the 8-12 000 carts, they would constitute a column 130 to 190 kmlong if we assume 16 meters per cart.
[64] Brodarics 1690, 661-2 (=1908, 34-5).
[65] Good records for the following are available in Suleyman s diary, in KemalPashazade, in Lufti, in Ferdi, in
Thury 1896. Useful data can be found in Lybyer1913 and Zinkeisen 1840/5 as well. For additional details. see Perjes
1967.
[66] Thury 1896, 2:58.
[67] In Suleyman's diary the comment "One soldier was decapitated for allowing hishorse to graze in the sown
field",or words to that effect, often appears. Thury 1896, 1: 341.
[68] Perjes 1967 contains further details and analysis. On logistics in general cf. Perjes1963 and 1970; van Creveld
1955; Engels 1978.
[69] Thury 1896, 2:46. In 1521, for instance, 10,000 cartloads of oats and flour wereordered to be bought up in the
sanjaks of Bulgaria and Serbia, enough to feed70,000 troops for 90 days. In 1566, 12,5(30 tons of cereal were
accumulated to feedthe Ottoman forces involved in the siege of Szigetvár, which meant food for about140,000
troops over 90 days. In 1683 about 2,400 tons of cereal were abandonedunder the walls of Vienna by the fleeing
Turks, representing rations for 100,000troops over 24 days. At Zenta the booty captured by the Christian forces
included12,000 sacks of rice, 2,500 barrels of flour, 556 cartloads of doubletoast (biscuit),and 1,400 cartloads of
oats. These supplies would have fed 100,000 troops for awhole month, and 50,000 horses for eight days. Extensive
preparations were madeto ensure adequate supplies of meat as well. For instance, in 1S44, the rulers ofWallachia
were ordered to provide 40,000 sheep and 3,000 head of cattle. In 1552the inhabitants of the Balkans were ordered
to provide 75,000 head of sheep. InJune 1526 Tomori received reports that the Ottoman forces were bringing
foodsupplies to last for three months (Mohacs Emlékezete 1976, 90). On the quantity ofcereals stored for a particular
campaign, see Káldy-Nagy 1974, 21; 1986, 192-3.On the Vienna booty, see Hayne 183, 103. Tribute in cattle and
sheep by theRomanian principalities is discussed in Veinstein 1984, 20 sqq.
[70] Perjes 1967, 359; Káldy-Nagy 1986, 192.
[71] According to Ferdi the orders in 1521 stipulated that "30,000 camels should becollected from Anatolia. ..as well
as 10,000 cartloads of wheat and oats, to be loadedonto the camels driven from Anatolia." Thury 1896, 2: 46.
Cuspinianus (1841, 20)also mentions 30,000 camels. Imperial Ambassador Ghislain Busbeque, a sharpobserver of
Ottoman conditions, was quite right: "there are two things, in myopinion, from which the Turk derives the greatest
benefit: among the products itis rice, and among its beasts of burden it is the camel; both are most beneficialwhen it
comes to distant undertakings. .. The camel is able to carry the heaviestloads, can easily cope with hunger and thirst.
and requires only minimalattention... Each time he goes into war the emperor of the Turks takes severalthousand
camels along-over forty thousand of them." Busbeque 1624, 126.
[72] On Ottoman strategy in general see Perjes 1967.
[73] Thury 1896, 1: 109.
[74] Inalcik 1973, 27, 29.
[75] Charriere 1848, 1: 31 sqq. Excerpts from the memorandum were published byZinkeisen 1840/5, 2: 594 sqq. Cf.
also Miskolczy 1926, 43-7.
[76] The importance of Belgrade was recognized by Ottoman and Christian expertsalike. Djeladzade writes: "Since
the castle of Belgrade is the key to Hungary, it isa strong fortress of the misguided ones...and it has to be taken
before all else. Ifhowever, the huge army proceeds towards Budim [that is Buda--G. P.]disregarding this itinerary it
is quite possible that the contemptible unbelieverswould assemble at Belgrade and, at the moment of withdrawal bar
the way of thearmy of the faithful." Thury 1896, 1: 55, 77, 289; 2: 49, 50. In a letter written afterthe fall of Belgrade
King Louis II wrote that the country lay open to the enemy "onland and on water." Kiss 1889, 604. The Hungarian
experts stated in front of theGerman Imperial estates gathered in Nurnberg to discuss the military aid to besent to
Hungary in 1522 that, after the fall o f Belgrade, neither the Danube nor theSava could constitute an obstacle to
Turkish advance (Torok 1926, 164). Theperspective from Venice was identical (Alberi, 1855, 3: 74-75 and Balogh
1920xxxix). Cuspinianus (1841, 18-53) also refers to Belgrade as the key to Hungary.Brodarics (1690, 559: 1908,
10), who states that with the fall of the castles ofBelgrade and Sabac it was no longer possible to hold on to the
castles of the Srem,the area between the Danube and Sava rivers , adds: "Quaerestalem hosti aditumin Hungariam
patefecerat, ut quoties Savum transire, et in Hungariamirrumpere vellet, apta posset ab eo prohiberi." During the
negotiations betweenKing John and the representatives of Charles V in 1537 the Hungarians askedthe Emperor to
recapture Belgrade because it would not be possible to defendHungary without it; Bárdossy 1943, 211.
Istvánffy(1724, 61-62;1962, 88, 93),entertains similar views regarding Belgrade.
[77] Clausewitz 1976, 87.
[78] Ibid. 71. The German Schwerpunct is correctly translated as 'center of gravity,"not "turning point."
[79] I have pointed out the significance of the range of effective action in Perjes 1967,360, while unaware of
Professor William McNeill's (1964, 41, 50) identical thesis.In my essay I established a direct relationship between
the Ottoman range ofoperation and Suleyman's policies vis-à-vis Hungary which, at the beginning,were aimed not at
annexation but rather to compel a treaty of alliance against theHabsburgs (Perjes 1975). It is most interesting to note
that Coles who explicitlydoubts that the Ottoman leaders were guided by rational considerations, describestheir
radius of action in clear and precise terms (1968, 103):"The huge size of theTurkish armies posed heavy
commissariat problems. Their large cavalry component prohibited winter campaigns because of inadequate supplies
Of fodder andthe unsuitability of winter ground conditions for mounted operations. The Turkswere therefore
restricted to summer campaigns usually extending from mid April to late October. Hungary, which was normally a
90-100 days' march fromConstantinople, represented the exhaustion point of Ottoman military capacity."Then Coles
adds that the border defense organized by the Habsburgs "slowed andfinally stopped the advance Or Ottoman armies
which were now campaigning atthe limit of their operational capacity."
[80] Ferenc Szakály (1975, 1976) doubts that the Ottoman leaders recognized thestrategic limits deriving from the
range of action and consequently dismisses myassertions regarding Suleyman's policies as unacceptable. He argues
that mypoint is disproved by Suleyman's attempt to take Vienna in 1529 which, accordingto my calculations, was
beyond the Ottoman range of effective action. Suleymanwaged other wars as well, in far more distant theaters of
operation. In fact,Szakály claims, the Ottoman military leaders were unaware of the significance oftheir range of
operation. As I have demonstrated above how well-informed andcompetent the Ottoman military leaders were, I
need not refute Szakaly'sargument in detail. It is inconceivable that Ottoman leaders were unable to makesimple
computations of space, time, and logistics in order to determine their radiusof operation. Presumably even primitive
hordes taking off for a hunt or for plunderwere capable of such computations; there can be no doubt that long-
distancemerchants, sailors, and soldiers of civilized nations calculated how much time andfood they would need to
cover a given distance. (Cf. Engels 1978, passim onAlexander the Great's relevant calculations.) As to the siege of
Vienna in 1529 wewill see that it was a campaign with limited aims; the permanent capture Of thecity was not
intended. rather it was a matter of imposing certain politicalconditions on Ferdinand of Habsburg. In the case of
even more distantcampaigns--Szakály was probably referring to the Persian and Egyptiancampaigns--the Ottoman
army was able to operate beyond the theoreticallydetermined range of action and take greater risks from a strategic
point of viewbecause it did not have to fear tactical failures, that is, defeat in battle. ThePersian forces, or the
Egyptian Mameluke army, not well supplied with fire armsor entirely unacquainted with them, were no match for
the Ottomans.
[81] For a detailed discussion of Ottoman tactics and the social conditions that explainOttoman failure to assimilate
European tactics, see Perjes 1967 and 1981.
[82] In his description of the first battle of Kosovo, the chronicler Nesri writes: "Whenthe unbelievers, clad in iron
and with sword in their hand rush straight forwardslike maddened boars, no one can stop them. They slice in two
whomever they canreach. They cannot be separated and turned back."(Thury, 1896, 1: 43.) Accordingto Sead-Eddin
"the order of battle of the unbelievers has the solidity of a wall ofmetal...." and he adds, regarding the charge of the
knights at Kosovo: "The heroescould not stand their ground in front Of this cataract, and many a stout-heartedsoldier
lost his life here." Ibid., 112.) Even in 1526, right before the battle ofMohacs, the Ottomans still worried about a
charge of the Hungarian armoredknights. Kemal Pashazade wrote: "These scoundrels of fiery character are
coveredin armor from head to foot and if all of them should attack a division in unison,they break through it, no
matter how strong it may be, much as a rushing streamtears up the mountainside."(Ibid., 237.) Moreover, as we shall
see below, in thefirst phase of the battle the Hungarian knights did disperse the cavalry fromRumelia with their
charge, although it should be noted that the Ottomans werepreparing to set up camp and were not ready for battle.
[83] We have data regarding both procedures. Concerning the first battle of Kosovo,Nesri writes: "The ruler spoke
to the archers, saying: 'Discharge your arrowsimmediately against the unbelievers, to prevent them from massing
their troops,and to make them disperse behind one another like pigs.' " (Thury, 1896, 1: 44.)The maneuver, however,
did not bear fruit, as Sead-Eddin relates. The dischargehardly bothered the Christian armored knights, and "they
suddenly charged at theleft wing of the troops of the faithful like so many boars pierced by arrows." (Ibid.,115.) The
practice of opening the ranks was more effective. An anonymouschronicler writes regarding the second battle Of
Kosovo: "The Islamic armyrealized that the unbelievers had the upper hand, and it was not possible toconfront the
iron wall directly; hence they avoided the unbelievers by separatinginto two parts, and as soon as the unbelievers
penetrated between them, thesoldiers of the faithful rallied behind them and cut them to pieces with theirswords "
(Ibid., 24.) According to the chroniclers the same tactics were consideredbefore the battle of Mohacs as well;
analyzing the situation however, it seems thatthese tactics were not viable on the occasion . We will deal wit h the
issue in detailbelow.
[84] On the evolution of tactics in modern Europe see Király 1982; Rustow 1864 andDelbruck 1929.
[85] In his memoirs dating from the end of the sixteenth century El Akhisari of Bosniamentions that the armament
and tactics of the Turkish army were lagging behindthose of Europe. (Kunt 1983, 179.)
[86] It is possible that the ruling stratum, composed of renegades and striving formodernization, as well as the
contradiction represented by the conservativeMuslim religious institution, were the explanation of this phenomenon
(Lybyer1913, 232). Extremely interesting is the pertinent memorandum Kochu Beyformulated in 1631, in which he
criticizes sharply the regular army made up ofrenegades and comes out in favor of the timar owners and the
concomitant militaryorganization: "It is thanks to the ziamet owners and the timars that the greatsultans of former
times were able to win so many brilliant victories.... Indeed, thisclass of warriors, willing to sacrifice its head and
life for the Empire and for thefaith, was a select, outstanding, fearless and obedient army. When these appearedin
full numbers in the campaigns and on the battlegrounds there was hardly anyneed for the kapi-kulus, or jnissaries
and sipahis from the Porte. There was nota single alien among them; all were soldiers and sons of soldiers who from
timeimmemorial were the owners of fields received from the padishah."(Thury 1896, 2:409-410.)
[87] For the following sec Pach 1963. Paulinyi 1972, Szucs 1963.
[88] Brodarics (1690: 559, 1908: 16), when writing about the use of church treasuresfor financing the defense, avers
that the treasury was almost emptied by malaadministratio eorum, qui rei publicae praefuerent. Cf.. Kubinyi 1981,
78-9.
[89] Paulinyi 1972, 561.
[90] Paulinyi 1972, 573.
[91] These are figures quoted by the Venetian ambassador Surian(o). cited in Balogh 1929, xvii.
[92] Fraknoi 1899, 314.
[93] Kubinyi 1971, Szakaly 1982.
[94] Rázso 1982.
[95] For the following see above all the CJH 1899; Szalay 1863; Deer 1936; Borossy1971, 1982; Bak 1982; Engel
1982; Hess 1982; Kiraly 1982; Kubinyi 1981, 1982;Razs6 1982; Szakaly 1863.
[96] This was the figure used by most contemporaries; the Venetian ambassador,Massaro, spoke of 60,000 men in
1521 (Artner 1926, 109); in 1522 the Hungariandelegates to the Imperial council at Nurnberg quoted the same figure
(Torok 1926,156), and so did those present at a meeting of Louis II, Ferdinand of Habsburg, anda Polish emissary in
1622 (Kubinyi 1981, 85). Istvanffy (1747, 58) must have hadthe same numbers in his head when he spoke of LX
amplius miliaria armatorumas the army ex Pannonia sola at the time of Mohacs.
[97] Hermann 1975, 328.
[98] Kubinyi (1981, 94) maintains that the militia did not function as an independentunit, hence faults me for
counting them separately. However, Borossy (1971, 19-20) believes that they went to war as a distinct unit and
refers to the decretumof 1459 which expressly prohibited the merging of the militia with the banderia.
[99] Machiavelli 1833, 21; Jahns 1889-91, 1:687, 2:1618. I have dealt with this issue inPerjes 1976b, 30.
[100] CJH 1899, Artt. 35, 52, 54: 1522; 19, 20, 41, 42, 44, 45: 1523; 8-14, 17: 1526.
[101] Quoted by Balogh 1929, lxiv.
[102] Hermann 1975, 314.
[103] Fraknoi 1896, 475; Artner 1926, 87; Torok 1926, 160.
[104] Burgio 1926, 56-7, 73, 80; Artner 1926, 98.