1
Citibank v. Sabeniano
FACTS:
1. In consideration for a loan with Citibank,
N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), private
respondent Douglas Anama executed a
promissory note to pay the plaintiff bank the
sum of P418,000.00 in sixty (60) equal
successive monthly installments.
2. To secure payment of the loan, Anama also
constituted a Chattel Mortgage in favor of
petitioner, on various machineries and
equipment.
3. However, for failure and refusal of the
private respondent to pay the monthly
installments despite repeated demands,
petitioner filed a verified complaint against
Anama in the Manila CFI for the collection of his
unpaid balance, for the delivery and possession
of the chattels covered preparatory to the
foreclosure.
4. Anama submitted his Answer with
Counterclaim, denying the material averments
of the complaint, and averring, inter alia that
the remedy of replevin was improper and the
writ of seizure should be vacated.
5. The trial court, upon proof of default of the
private respondent in the payment of the said
loan, issued an Order of Replevin. Despite the
issuance of the said order however, actual
delivery of possession did not take place
because of negotiations for an amicable
settlement. A pre-trial conference was held and
the petitioner then took over private
respondent’s business as receiver. But when
settlement failed, the lower court tried the case
on the merits.
7. Petitioner presented a Motion for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering
the sheriff to seize and dispose of the
properties involved.
8. Private respondent opposed the motion
claiming, among others, (1) that
Citibank’s P400,000 replevin bond to answer for
damages was grossly inadequate; (2) that he
was never in default to justify the seizure;
xxx (4) that his supposed obligations with
Citibank were fully secured and his mortgaged
properties are more than sufficient to secure
payment thereof; xxx
9. The trial court issued an Order granting the
Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order but the same was denied. As a
consequence, the sheriff seized subject
properties, dismantled and removed them from
the premises where they were installed,
delivered them to petitioner’s possession and
advertised them for sale at public auction.
10. Private respondent filed with the CA a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Injunction. Finding that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions, the CA granted the
petition, holding that the provisions of the Rules
of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not
been complied with, in that (1) there was no
Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint
for Replevin; (2) the bond posted by Citibank
was insufficient; and (3) there was non-
compliance with the requirement of a receiver’s
bond and oath of office. Hence the present
petition for certiorari with TRO by Citibank.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CA erred in finding that the issuance of
writ of replevin was improper
2. W/N CA erred in finding that the complaint
did not comply with the requirements of an
affidavit of merit
3. W/N CA erred in finding that the bond
posted by petitioner is insufficient
4. W/N CA erred in finding that petitioner did
not comply with Section 5, Rule 59
HELD:
1. No. (See highlighted ruling.)
2. Qualified yes. While petitioner is correct
insofar as it contends that substantial
compliance with the affidavit requirement may
be permissible pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of
the ROC, petitioner’s complaint does notallege
all the facts that should be set forth in an
affidavit of merit.

The Court held that the absence of an affidavit
of merit is not fatal where the petition itself,
which is under oath, recites the following facts
constitutive of the grounds for the petition: (1)
that plaintiff owns the property particularly
describing the same, or that he is entitled to its
possession; (2) wrongful detention by
defendant of said property; (3) that the
property is not taken by virtue of a tax
assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized
under execution or attachment or, if it is so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and
the (4) the actual value of the property.
Although the complaint alleges that petitioner
is entitled to the possession of subject
properties by virtue of the chattel mortgage
executed by the private respondent, upon the
latter’s default on its obligation, and the
defendant’s alleged “wrongful detention” of the
same, the said complaint does not state that
subject properties were not taken by virtue of a
tax assessment or fine imposed pursuant to law
or seized under execution or attachment or, if
they were so seized, that they are exempt from
such seizure. Then too, petitioner stated the
value of subject properties at a “probable value
of P200,000.00, more or less”.
Although respondent’s defense of lack of
affidavit of merit is meritorious, procedurally,
such a defense is unfortunately no longer
available for failure to plead the same in the
Answer as required by the omnibus motion
rule.
3.Yes. ROC requires the plaintiff to “give a
bond, executed to the defendant in double the
value of the property as stated in the affidavit x
x x .” Since the valuation made by the petitioner
has been disputed by the respondent, the lower
court should have determined first the actual
value of the properties. It was thus an error for
the said court to approve the bond, which was
based merely on the probable value of the
properties. A replevin bond is intended to
answer for damages and to indemnify the
defendant against any loss that he may suffer
2
by reason of its being compelled to surrender
the possession of the disputed property
pending trial of the action.
The remedies provided under Section 5, Rule
60, are alternative remedies. Conformably, a
defendant in a replevin suit may demand the
return of possession of the property replevined
by filing a redelivery bond executed to the
plaintiff in double the value of the property as
stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit within the
period specified in Sections 5 and
6. Alternatively, “the defendant may object to
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon;” but if he does so,
“he cannot require the return of the property”
by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Sections
5 and 6. The private respondent did not opt to
cause redelivery of the properties to him by
filing a counter-bond precisely because he
objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted
by plaintiff. Therefore, he need not file a
counter-bond or redelivery bond.
4. No. CA found that the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not
complied with by the petitioner, particularly the
filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an
oath. However, the old Rules of Court which
was in effect at the time this case was still at
trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a
receiver was not generally required of the
applicant, except when the application was
made ex parte. CA was right in finding a defect
in such assumption of receivership in that the
requirement of taking an oath has not been
complied with.
– For erroneously issuing the alias writ of
seizure without inquiring into the sufficiency of
the replevin bond and for allowing petitioner
to assume receivership without the requisite
oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in dealing with the situation. Under the
Revised Rules of Court, the property seized
under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a
possessor has every right to be respected in its

possession and may not be deprived of it
without due process. Petition DISMISSED.
National Power Corporation vs Codilla, Jr.
GR 170491, April 4, 2007
Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry
owned and operated by private respondent
Bangpai Shipping Co., allegedly bumped and
damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which
was then moored at Cebu International Port.
Thus, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a
complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for alleged
damages caused on the petitioner’s power
barges. Subsequently, petitioner impleaded
herein private respondent Wallem Shipping Inc.
as additional defendant.
After adducing evidence during the trial of the
case, petitioner filed a formal offer of evidence
before the lower court. Private respondents
filed their respective objections to petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence.
Public respondent judge issued the assailed
order denying the admission and excluding
from the records some of petitioner’s exhibits
and submarkings on the ground that the
documents formally offered as evidence were
photocopies, not the originals. Respondent
Wallem Shipping invoked that Xerox copies do
not constitute the electronic evidence defined
in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Electronic
Evidence. Further, respondent judge ruled that
the information in those Xerox or photocopies
was not received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically, and that electronic
evidence must be authenticated, which the
petitioner failed to do. Finally, the required
Affidavit to prove admissibility and evidentiary
weight of the alleged electronic evidence was
not executed, much less presented in evidence.
On petition for certiorari, CA ruled in favor of
respondent judge.
Issue:
3
Whether or not petitioner is correct in its
contention that the photocopies it offered as
formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on
its inimitable interpretation of the Rules of
Electronic Evidence.
Held:
An “electronic document” refers to information
or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written
expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
or affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced eletronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable
by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. The rules use the word
“information” to define an electronic document
received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
This would suggest that an electronic document
is relevant only in terms of the information
contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as
proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a
paper-based document is the manner by which
information is processed; clearly the
information contained in an electronic
document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the
photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as
signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. Hence, the argument
of the petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through electronic
process, then these photocopies are electronic
document as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
 4

preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having , which retained custody until July 20, 1979
thus declared that the offered photocopies are
not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be The cargo was
considered as the functional equivalent of their hauled by Mabuhay Brokerage
original as decreed in the law. to its warehouse
Petition denied.

Home Insurance Corporation v. CA July 26, 1979

–
BEST EVIDENCE RULER130.3. Original The cargo was
document must be produced; exceptions. delivered to the consignee Filipro Phil.
(now Nestl
—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of é
adocument, no evidence shall be admissible )
other than the original document itself, except When Nestl
in the following cases: é
opened the skidded plywood cases,
a. When the original has been lost or one engine was found to be damaged
destroyed, or cannot be produced in —
court, without bad faith on the part fan cover was brokenand misaligned; cap
ofthe offeror; deformed, so
Nestl
b. When the original is in the custody or é
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered,and the refused to accept the unit
latter fails to produce it after .
reasonable notice; Nestl
é
c. When the original consists of numerous
accounts/other documents w/c cannot filed a claim
be examined in court withoutgreat loss against E. Razon,Mabuhay, the Port Authority,
of time & the fact sought to be and Nestl
established from them is only the é’s
general result of the whole; & insurer Home Insurance [Home],
for P49,170.00
d. When the original is a public record in . When the
the custody of a public officer or is othercompanies denied liability
recorded in a public office. ,
Home Insurance paid
FACTS the claim and
was issued a subrogation receipt
- April 25, 1979 INREDECO shipped from the US for $6,070.00.
two hydraulic engines through M/S Oriental Home sued Mabuhay for the recovery of the
Statesman amount it paid to Nestl
-May 17, 1979 The cargo arrived in Manila é
aboard the M/S Pacific Conveyor .
-It was turned over to E. Razon Arrastre Mabuhay again denied liability.The

Manila RTC dismissed
Home’s
complaint.
The
insurance contract between Home and Nestl
é engine, which still retained value despite its
was
not presented
and that the
other supportingdocuments were all only
photocopies
(no explanation given for the failure to submit
originals)
The crates of the shipment did not comply with
the accepted international standards, taking
intoconsideration the length of the voyage and
the transshipment of the cargo
Whatever damage was sustained by the engine
must have occurred while it was at sea, for
which Mabuhaycould not be held liable
The RTC judgment was affirmed on appeal
to the CA.
Home could be excused from presenting the
original of the insurance contract only if there
wasproof that this had been lost (Unrebutted
claim: original was in its possession all the
time)
Home failed to establish a valid subrogation,
which could not be presumed, + prove amount
it paid to Nestl
é handling of the cargo before it actually received
Even if a valid subrogation could be established,
Mabuhay was not an absolute insurer against all
risks
5
It appeared that Mabuhay exercised
extraordinary diligence for the safe delivery of
the cargo
No evidence of what happened to the damaged
defects
Home’s argument
s
Its action against Mabuhay supposedly arose
from its contract of insurance with Nestlé.
Having paid Nestlé,Home claims it is rightfully
subrogated under such contract to
Nestlé’s rights
The law or presumption of negligence operates
against the carrier Mabuhay
HOLDINGFailure to present the original
insurance contract (or even a copy of it), must
prove fatal to
Home’s
petition.RATIO
It may be assumed for the sake of argument
that the subrogation receipt may be used to
establish the relationshipbetween Home and
Nestlé and the amount paid to settle the claim.
However, the subrogation receipt alone is not
sufficient to prove Home’s claim
, holding Mabuhay liable for the damage.In the
absence of proof of stipulations to the contrary,
the hauler can be liable only to any damage
thatoccurred from the time it received the
cargo until it finally delivered it to the
consignee. It cannot be held responsiblefor
it, particularly since there was no indication
from the externalappearance of the crates,
which Mabuhay did not open, that the engine
was damaged.

As a mere subrogee of Nestlé, Home can
exercise only such rights against the parties
handling the cargo aswere granted to Nestlé
under the insurance contract. The rights
transferred to Home by Nestlé
— informations for libel against Guevarra. The
still assuming therewas a valid subrogation
— malicious intent published an article, a squib in
might not include the right to sue Mabuhay.
What the insurance contract could have shown
/ proved: SCOPE OF THE COVERAGE
WON hauling was included or WON coverage is
limited to the transport of the cargo while at
sea
WON the agreement was not only a marine
transportation insurance but covered all phases
of the cargo'sshipment, from the time the cargo
was loaded on the vessel in the US until it was
delivered to NestléSince the original contract of
insurance has not been presented, there is no
acceptable evidence of thesestipulations. It is
curious that Home Insurance disregarded the
best evidence rule, knowing that the best
evidence ofthe insurance contract was its
original copy, which was presumably in its
possession.
On the presumption of negligence
Home cites NCC 1735:
Art. 1735.
In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article,if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been
atfault or to have acted negligently unless they
proved that they observed extraordinary
diligence asrequired in Article 1733.This
presumption is applicable only if the shipper or
consignee has, to begin with, a right of action
against the carrier.It has not been shown that
Home, as
Nestlé’s
supposed subrogee, has acquired such a right
against Mabuhay.
HOME’S
6
PETITION DENIED
Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes
FACTS Fiscal of Pampanga filed two
informations alleged that Guevarra with
verse, of which a translation in Spanish was
included therein, intended to impeach the
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dayrit and
Nepomuceno. Fiscal attempted to present as
evidence exhibits A, B, C and D which are copies
of the Ing Magumasid containing the article
with the innuendo, another article in the
vernacular published in the same weekly, and
its translation into Spanish. Counsel for
defendant objected to this evidence. Objection
was sustained by the court. The petitioner
contends that the exhibits in question are the
best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of
the information, and should therefore be
admitted; while the respondents maintain that,
inasmuch as the libelous articles were not
quoted in the information, said evidence cannot
be admitted without amending the information.
The prosecution asked for an amendment to
the information, but the court denied the
petition on the ground that it would impair the
rights of the defendant, holding that the
omission of the libelous article in the original
was fatal to the prosecution. - -
ISSUE: Are exhibits ABCD admissible or not?
HELD: YES. The general rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases
of libel or slander. The evidence must be
relevant and not hearsay. The rule of procedure
which requires the production of best evidence
is applicable to the present case. And certainly,
the copies of the weekly where the libelous
article was published, and its translation,
constitute the best evidence of the libel
charged. The newspaper itself is the best
evidence of an article published in it.

Ong Ching PO v. CA
FACTS:
On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to
private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of
Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said
sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale
written in English. Subsequently, the document
was registered with the RD of Manila, which
issued a TCT dated September 2, 1947 in the
name of private respondent Parian.
According to private respondent, she entrusted
the administration of the lot and building to the
brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching
Po when the spouses settled in Iloilo. When her
husband died, she demanded that the lot be
vacated because she was going to sell it.
Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the
said premises.
On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for
unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching
Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court
dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila
and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that
on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po
bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong.
The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a
Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English
translation of said document read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale
hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot
located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an
(sic) area consisting 213 square meters
including a one-story house erected thereon
unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by
me and consequently I have executed and
signed the government registered title (sic) the
said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon,
now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po
unequivocally. And the purpose of this
document is to precisely serve as proof of the
sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of
Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another
document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the
7
Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching
Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance
of the new title by the City Register of Deeds
and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I
certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong,
the same property sold by Joi Jong to private
respondent Parian in 1947.
On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po,
Jimmy and David filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against private
respondent in the RTC, Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent
Parian filed an action for quieting of title
against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife,
petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila.
Upon her motion, the case was consolidated
with the earlier civil case. (petitioner Ong Ching
Po died in October 1986.)
On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent.
On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said
court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
According to petitioners, the CA erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the
Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B)
in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of
petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied
trust existed between petitioners and private
respondent (as stated in Exh. B)
RULING:
The petition is dismissed
1. The CA did not give any credence to Exhibit
“B” and its translation, because these
documents had not been properly
authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to
adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due
execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit “B”.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the
deed of sale executed by Joi Jong in favor of

private respondent (Exh. “A”) is a notarized
document.
2. As to the contention of petitioners that all
the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts,
deed of sale (Exh. “B”) and transfer certificate
of title were in their possession, private
respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners
when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true,
are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as
even a mere administrator or manager may
lawfully perform them pursuant to his
appointment or employment
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in
the name of private respondent and her
husband. The rental receipts were also in the
name of her husband.
3. We cannot go along with the claim that
petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private
respondent as a dummy to have the title over
the parcel of land registered in her name
because being an alien he was disqualified to
own real property in the Philippines. To sustain
such an outrageous contention would be giving
a high premium to a violation of our
nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit “B” is in existence and
that it was duly executed, still petitioners
cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by
virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
8
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to
participate in the “disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization” of all “lands of the
public domain and other natural resources of
the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital
of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have
been disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen;
therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring
and owning real property. Assuming that the
genuineness and due execution of Exhibit “B”
has been established, the same is null and void,
it being contrary to law.
On expressed trust:
There is no document showing the
establishment of an express trust by petitioner
Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent
Parian as trustee. Not even Exhibit “B” can be
considered as such a document because private
respondent, the registered owner of the
property subject of said “deed of sale,” was not
a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove
the existence of the express trust will not
suffice.
Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, “No express trust concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be
proved by parole evidence.”
On implied trust:
Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they
cannot prove an express trust in writing, they
can prove an implied trust orally. While an
implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must
be trustworthy and received by the courts with
extreme caution, because such kind of evidence
may be easily fabricated. It cannot be made to
rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.

Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in
a financial position to acquire the land and to
introduce the improvements thereon. On the
other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in
court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam
Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.
1. It is not correct to say that private
respondent never took possession of the
property. Under the law, possession is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article
1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “when
the sale is made through a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred.” If what petitioners
meant was that private respondent never lived
in the building constructed on said land, it was
because her family had settled in Iloilo.
2. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or
destroyed. When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and lost or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may
be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document.
The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order
may be changed if necessary in the discretion of
the court.
The due execution of the document may be
established by
1. the person or persons who executed it;
2. by the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged;
3. or by any person who was present and saw
it executed or who after its execution, saw it
and recognized the signatures;
9
4. or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof.
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was
present when said document was executed, but
the trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she
not sign said document, even merely as a
witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct
or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only
on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong
Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently
resided, or after the deed of sale was executed.
The Court does not believe that she was
present during the execution and signing of the
deed of sale involved therein, notwithstanding
her pretensions to the contrary.
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Baldomero Inchiong, Jr. is one
of the signatory of apromissory note in the
amount of Php. 50,000.00 that resulted to his
present liability with Rene C. Naybe and
Gregorio D. Pantanosas which hold themselves
jointly and severally liable to private respondent
Philipine Bank of Communocations. Said
promissory note was due on May 5, 1983
without the promissory having paid their
obligation.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE
TO PAY THE OBLIGATION PROVIDED IN THE
PROMISSORY NOTE AS JOINTLY AND
SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH NAYBE AND
PONTANOSAS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATION.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is liable up to the extent of the
provision under the promissory note and for
being one of the three signatories therein as
“jointly and solidarilly liable.” Any one, some or
all of them may be proceeded against for the
entire obligation. The choice is left to the

solidary creditor to determine against whom he
will enforce collection.
Pontanosas consequent dismissal of the
said case does not deemed him as having
discharged petitioner from liability. And with
regards to Naybe, the court have never
obtained jurisdiction over him. Thus, petitioner
may only have recourse against his co-makers,
as provided by law.
N.B.
The promissory note "is not a public deed with
the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere
commercial paper which does not bear the
signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol
evidence may "overcome" the contents of the
promissory note. 9 The first paragraph of the
parol evidence rule 10 states:
When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.Clearly, the rule does not specify
that the written agreement be a public
document. What is required is that the
agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact
founded on "long experience that written
evidence is so much more certain and accurate
than that which rests in fleeting memory only,
that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing,
to admit weaker evidence to control and vary
the stronger and to show that the
parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by
them." 11 Thus, for the parol evidence rule to
apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both
parties. 12 As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or
extrinsic evidence.
Case Digest – DEAD MAN STATUTE
10
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA AND PAQUITA
LEZAMA, PETITIONERS V. HON. JESUS
RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE OF CFI ILOILO,
JOSE DINEROS AND CA, RESPONDENTS
GR no. L-25643 June 27 1968Castro, J.1.
Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together
with 2 others filed anaction in the CFI Iloilo for
the annulment of a judgment rendered against
the ice plant by CFI Manila in acivil case. The
defendants included spouses Jose Manuel and
Paquita Lezama and Marciano C.
Roque(judgment was rendered in his favor in
the earlier civil case). It was alleged that
because of the mismanagement by the
Lezamas, the ice plant was placed under
thereceivership of Dineros; that Roque brought
an action in CFI Manila against the ice plant for
the collectionof P150,000 which Roque
supposedly lent to the ice plant; that instead of
serving the summons againstDineros, it was
served on the spouses; and that through the
collusion of the spouses and roque, the
latterwas able to obtain a judgment against the
ice plant. The spouses answered by admitting
that the ice plant was placed in receivership,
but Mr. Lezama remainedas president and had
authority to receive in behalf of the company.
They denied collusion with Roque. At the
Hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a
subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as a
witnesssummoned by the plaintiffs. This was
granted over the objection of the petitioners
who invoked Rule 130sec. 20(b). said provision
deals with 2 different matters which rest on
different grounds of policy:
a.Disqualification of husband and wife to testify
on each other's behalf & their privilege not
to testifyagainst each other. Common law
theory: relationship of spouses, not their
pecuniary interest is thebasis of the disq
ualification. “disqualification by relationship”
b. it is repugnant in every fair-minded person
to compel a wife or husband to be the subject
of theother's condemnation and to subjecting

the culprit to the humiliation of being
condemned by thewords of his intimate life
partner
The request for subpoena indicated that
Paquita was to do no more than testify as an
adverse party in thecase, and indeed, in the
light of the allegations both in the complaint
and in the answer, the request wasapparently
one that could reasonably be expected to be
made. Dineros alleged that in obtaining a
judgement against the ice plant, the spouses in
gross and evident badfaith, and in fraudulent
conspiracy made it appear that the ice
plant obtained a P150k loan from Roque
andallegedly upon an authority vested by the
board of directors. Also, that the spouses
manipulated the bookso fthe ice plant to make
it appear that the loan was obtained. The
spouses answered by denying the allegations
above, that they did not contest the complaint
forcollection since they believed that the action
was legitimate and the allegations were true.
The spouses did not deny the allegation that it
was Paquita, who as secretary signed the
minutes of themeeting where Jose Manuel was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan.
Dineros wanted Paquita not as a witness for or
against her husband but as an adverse party
in the case asprovided for in Rule 132 sec. 6.a.
Judge Jesus Rodriguez, affirmed the petition to
bring in Paquita as a witness and required her
toappear. The spouses filed an action for
certiorari but the CA dismissed the petition. MR
deniedhence this appeal.
ISSUE: In a case where the wife is a co-
defendant in a suit charging fraud against the
spouses, can the wifebe compelled to testify as
an adverse party witness concerning her
participation in the alleged fraudwithout
violating Sec. 20B of Rule 130?
Held: NO. It was argued that she may be
compelled to testify but her testimony would
be receivable only against her. On theother
hand, it was argued that it will violate Rule 130
11
sec. 20(b).What was alleged was fraudulent
conspiracy, the wife is called upon to testify as
an adverse party witness on thebases of her
participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme
(as secretary). She will be asked to testify on
what actually transpired during the meeting.
Whether her testimony will turn out tobe
adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the
inevitable result would be to pit her against her
husband. Theinterests of the 2 are necessarily
interrelated. A testimony against her own
interest would show the existence ofcollusive
fraud and she may unwittingly testify against
the interests of her husband.It was argued that
as an exception to the rule (based on the
wording of the rule) was that there was no
reason whyeither of them may not be examined
as a witness for or against himself or herself
alone. Even if this was acceptable,it would be
inapplicable in this case where the main
charge is collusive fraud between the spouses
and a thirdperson, and the evident purpose
of examination was to prove the charge.Finally
it was alleged that to prevent the wife from
testifying would encourage alliance of husband
and wife as aninstrument of fraud (best way of
preventing discovery since co-conspirator is
made immune to the mostconvenient mode of
discovery available to the opposite party). SC:
sec. 6 of rule 132 is a mere concession, that
ruleof discovery should not be expanded in
meaning or scopse as to allow examination of
fone's spouse in a situationwhere this natural
repugnance obtains Besides it wasn’t shown
that no other evidence that Dineros could
use to prove the charge.
Held: resolution appealed from REVERSED. Case
remanded for further proceedings
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO,
MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by
her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORIO
GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, Et
Al., Petitioner,
v.
ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T.
GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO, assisted by

ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO,
etc., Et Al., Respondents.
FACTS: The disputed lot was formerly owned
by Andres Guerrero, father of
the petitioners. Andres physically
possessed and cultivated the land through a
tenancy agreement. Shortly after the beginning
of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted
the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, who
was to enjoy the owner’s share in the
produce of the land. After the death of Andres
in 1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the
deceased.Petitioners alleged that the land was
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the
name of Andres Guerrero as early as
1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners
discovered that the land was titled in the name
of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis
of a “Deed of Sale of Land” dated
1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt
Cristina. They further alleged that
notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs
of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his
application of the registration of the land in his
favor. Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor
of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the
petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold
the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a
partnership constituted by them.
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in
favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and
that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise
fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants
allegedly knew that the property belonged
to Andres Guerrero.
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter
of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the
petitioners. She testified that the money used
for the illness of her mother was obtained from
Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for
the loans obtained. This was objected to by the
counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a),
Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the
trial court allowed the witness to continue, but
upon a written motion to disqualify on the
same basis, the trial court declared Laura and
12
Jose Cervantes disqualified from testifying in
the case.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for
the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case
to another Branch.” This was
denied. Petitioners then failed to appear at the
set schedule for trial, and the trial court judge
issued an order stating that petitioners “are
deemed to have waived their right to further
present or formally offer their evidence in
court” as a consequence of their non-
appearance.Petitioners filed a “Manifestation”
that they did not waive their rights to present
further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’
witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence.
They added that they reserved such right upon
the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari
which they were preparing to file.
Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even
ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the
amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose
Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
testifying in the case and their testimonies
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence
and their preclusion from presenting further
proof was correctly sustained by the CA?
RULING
Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the
present case, and neither is they assignors of
the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by
whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to
establish that it was not Cristina who owned the
disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to
Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged
the property to Manuel.
The present case is not a claim or demand
against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not
the executors or administrators or
representatives of such deceased. They are

being sued as claimants of ownership in their
individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot
is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero.
Thus, the dead man’s rule is clearly inapplicable.
Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other
witnesses testified and it was error to hold that
the testimonial evidence should have been
formally offered, or that without such offer,
such evidence was waived. The offer of
testimonial evidence is affected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify
before the court upon appropriate questions.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on
the basis of defendants’ evidence and without
regard to the proofs that petitioner has
presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’
evidence and their preclusion from presenting
further proof was incorrect.
GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE
VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P.
VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA
P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR.,
JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA,
LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P.
VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR
VICENTE, respondents-appellees.
FACTS: The three (3) haciendas known as San
Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombrede Maria
situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros
Oriental, were originally owned by the
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas
[TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late
Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest
of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for
the purchase of said haciendas. However, he
did not have sufficient funds to pay the price.
Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA,
offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago
Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin
Villegas. The amount realized from
the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas
still fell short of the purchase price of the three
haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty
13
undertaken by private respondent Vicente,
Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the
latter fields’ nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13, 807.00.
Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised
TABACALERA to debit from his account the
amount of P13, 807.00 as payment for the
balance of the purchase price. However, as only
the amount of P12, 460.24 was actually needed
to complete the purchase price, only the latter
amount was debited from private respondent's
account. As the amount of P12, 460.24 had
already been debited from private respondent's
account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely
be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
period of five (5) years starting with crop-year
1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the gross
income, said rent to be deducted from the
money advanced by private respondent and any
balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered
by Vicente together with the lots at the end of
the stipulated period of lease. On December 10,
1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of
sale covering the three haciendas in favor of
Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were
thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva.
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered
to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-
1950 milling season in January and February,
1950. On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a
"Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor of
Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the
Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627
square meters, more or less. On November 12,
1951, Villanueva died. On October 7, 1954, the
day before the intestate proceedings were
ordered closed and the estate of the late
Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs,
private respondent Vicente instituted an action
for recovery of property and damages before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his capacity
as administrator of the intestate estate of
Praxedes Villanueva. Private respondent
Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his

entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to
sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in
his favor on October 24, 1949. Petitioner Goni
filed an answer with counterclaim for
accounting of the produce of fields’ nos. 4 and
13, as well as the surrender thereof on June 20,
1955, the end of the fifth crop-year, plus moral
damages. On December 18, 1959, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering therein
defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente
field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale
covering fields’ nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of
Vicente.
ISSUE
Whether it was correct for the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to have admitted Vicente’s
testimonial on matters of fact before the death
of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a
claim against his estate, in violation of Rule 130
Sec. 20(a).
RULING
Yes, they were correct to admit Vicente’s
testimony. The object and purpose of the rule is
to guard against the false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party and further to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in
regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It
is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff
when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and
the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased. But in this case, such provision
is inapplicable since such protection was
effectively waived when counsel for petitioners
cross-examined Vicente. A waiver occurs when
plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the
representative of the estate or when counsel
for the representative cross-examined the
plaintiff as to matters occurring during
deceased’s.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
14
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE
RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
Facts: In G.R. No. 74306 the Regional Trial Court
of Manila declared that the owner of the 1,500
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by
Stock Certificate No. 003 is owned by the
petitioner, but which was reversed by the Court
of Appeals and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the
deceased father of petitioner Vicente B.
Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the
said shares of stock. Stock Certificates No. 003
for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant
corporation was issued and registered in the
name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. Later on said certificate of stock
was personally delivered by Chuidian to the
Corporate Secretary, since then Enrique Razon
was in possession of said stock certificate even
during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from
the time the late Chuidian delivered the said
stock certificate to defendant Razon. By
agreement of the parties such certificates were
delivered for deposit with the bank under the
joint custody of the parties. The certificates
were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique
because it was the latter who paid for all the
subscription on the shares of stock in the
defendant corporation and the understanding
was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner
of the said shares of stock and was to have
possession thereof. In G.R. No. 74306,
petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of
the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a)
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to
him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the
private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did
not object to his oral testimony regarding the
oral agreement between him and the deceased
Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the
shares of stock was actually vested in the
petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the
same; and that the petitioner was subjected to
a rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.The petitioner maintains that his
aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true

nature of his agreement with the late Juan
Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership
over the said 1,500 shares of stock. In G.R. No.
74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists
that the appellate court's decision declaring his
deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of
the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc.
should have included all cash and stock
dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's
testimony is admissible.
Ruling: Yes, it is admissible. Section 20(a) Rule
130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are
interested directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as
to any matter of fact accruing before the death
of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind." The purpose of
the law is to "guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party."
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it
contemplates in that it is applicable to a
case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased
person. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T.
Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the
15
testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not
filed against the administrator of the estate,
nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private
respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's
counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section
20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
private respondent is deemed to have waived
the rule.
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR.
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
FACTS: Edgar filed a petition for the annulment
of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. In
his petition, he cited the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz me
rely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded
or irrelevant."Edgar took the witness stand and
tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential PsychiatricEvaluation Report. This
was objected to on the ground that it violated
the rule on privilegedcommunication between
physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz
filed a Manifestation expressingher "continuing
objection" to any evidence, oral or
documentary, "that would thwart the physician-
patient privileged communication rule,"Edgar
opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the
introduction of the confidential psychiatric
report asevidence, and afterwards moved to
strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the
Record.The trial court admitted the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence and
directed that theStatement for the Record filed
by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record.Ma. Paz
then elevated the issue to CA. The appellate

court dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Hence,the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence offered by
Edgar may be admitted.
RULING: Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive
is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals
clearly lays downthe requisites in order that the
privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the
privilege is claimed in acivil case; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practicemedicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to
the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the i
nformation was necessary to enable him to act i
n thatcapacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation(formerly character) of the patient. In
the instant case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to tes
tify on adocument executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not
fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony
be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because histestimony cannot have
the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patientand
executed the report.Counsel for petitioner
indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony
of private respondent on the groundthat it was
privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the
ruleon privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a
fatal mistake. For,in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right tomake such objection
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted
TEODORO R. REGALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR
No. 105938, 1996-09-20
16
Facts: Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal... defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares
of stocks in the named corporations
Among the defendants named in the case are
herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were
then... partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law
Firm). In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the... members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as
well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law
Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition... of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]...
espondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (hereinafter referred to as
respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit
Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendan...
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of
the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved
in PCGG Case No. 33. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers
subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR
OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with
Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly
grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as
parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent Roco. In its "Comment," respondent
PCGG set the following conditions precedent for
the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the

disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the... deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.[9]...
respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the
Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33,
for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG Hence, the
ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,...
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under
the facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and
the other information requested by the PCGG.
Issue: whether or not this duty may be asserted
in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'
client(s) in the case at bar.
Ruling: the general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or... identity of his client
The reasons advanced for the general rule are
well established. First, the court has a right to
know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist
only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client. Third, the
privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship. Finally, due process
considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
the general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability, his identity is privileged.
17
2. Where the government's lawyers have
no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name
is... privileged.
there exist other situations which could qualify
as exceptions to the general rule.
information relating to the identity of a client
may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then
reveal client confidences. Summarizing these
exceptions, in The circumstances involving the
engagement of lawyers in the case at bench,
therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case
falls under at least two exceptions to the
general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said
client's... connection with the very fact in issue
of the case, which is privileged information,
because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects
the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client
relationship Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of...
testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a... crime."[47] An important distinction must
be made between a case where a client takes
on the services of an attorney for illicit
purposes, seeking advice about how to go
around the law for the purpose of committing
illegal activities and a case where a client thinks
he might have previously... committed
something illegal and consults his attorney
about it. The first case clearly does not fall
within the privilege because the same cannot
be invoked for purposes illegal. The second
case falls within the exception because whether
or not the act for which the... advice turns out
to be illegal, his name cannot be used or

disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not
yet in the hands of the prosecution, which
might lead to possible action against him.
There are, after all, alternative sources of
information available to the prosecutor which
do not depend on utilizing a defendant's
counsel as a convenient and readily available
source of information in the building of a case
against the latter. Compelling disclosure of...
the client's name in circumstances such as the
one which exists in the case at bench amounts
to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and
will not countenance.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners'
right not to reveal the identity of their clients
under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing
to their clients, because the facts of the instant
case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to
the rule that the client's name is... not
privileged information.respondents failed to
show -... and absolutely nothing exists in the
records of the case at bar - that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. We find that the
condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case
No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege.The condition also constitutes a
transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan
and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt
one similarly situated litigant from prosecution
without allowing the same exemption to the
others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not
only... touches upon the question of the
identity of their clients but also on documents
related to the suspected transactions, not only
in violation of the attorney-client privilege but
also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it,...
this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the
expense of such rights.
Principles:
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
18
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to
the end that nothing be taken or be withheld
from him, save by the rules of law, legally...
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may... expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense. But it
is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of... him for any client, violation
of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He
must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client. An effective lawyer-client relationship
is largely... dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and
client which in turn requires a situation which
encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange
and flow of information. It necessarily follows
that in order to attain effective representation,
the lawyer... must invoke the privilege not as a
matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
Justice Benjamin Cardoz Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior,"

COMPANY vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION G.R. No. L-21724, 27 April 1967
FACTS:A widow filed a claim for workmen’s
compensation for the death of Raymundo, her
husband. She claimed that his husband died of
tuberculosis which was contracted while in the
employ of NDC. According to WCC, there is
inescapable conclusion is that the nature of Ray
mundo’s work, which involved heavy lifting,
must have had an adverse effect on his illness
whichshortly led to his death. Petitioner
contended, however, that the widow’s
testimony was self
serving and therefore inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow’s testimony w
as self-serving.
RULING:
No. Self
serving evidence is evidence made by a party
out of court at one time; it does not include a
party’s testimony as a witness in court. It is
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay
evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for
crossexamination by the adverse party, and on
the
consideration that its admission would open the
door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. O
n the other hand, a party’s testimony in court is
sworn and affords the other party the opportun
ity for cross-examination.
People v Sope (1946)
Self-serving evidence / J.
JaranillaFACTS:Dimalanta, Sope and Cruz were
charged with robbery. (1st information against
Sope and Cruz; 2nd information onDimalanta as
co-conspirator. CFI tried the case jointly) The
CFI found them guilty.The testimony of Juliana
Chan stated that:
When she was on her way home at 6pm, a
calesastopped in front of her from the calesa,
came down Sope and Cruz. Sope pointed a
revolver at her Cruz poked a hard object at her
back Dimalanta remained in the calesa
19
Cruz ordered her to board the rig of the calesa
whileSope stayed behind. Cruz and Dimalanta
pretended to be peace officers andthat she was
found violation the law–unlawfully dealingin US
Army goods (they were pointing at her back for
such indication) They stopped at “Victory Cafe”
Dimalanta and Cruzasked her to have coffee
with them, yet still threateningher to give them
money. She gave P200.She reported the
incident so the 3 of them were arrested
She claims that Dimalanta’s lawyer (Atty. VEGA)
offered to settle the case by paying back P200
on the conditionthat she would not testify
against Dimalanta because shedid not really see
him among those who held her upanyway. She
turned this down. Atty. RESURECION (also in
behalf of Dimalanta)managed to pay her P120
Dimalanta did not appeal.
Sope and Cruz appealed contending:
Their guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not
proven. That she was actually carrying
contraband itemsand for fear of discovery, her
husband fled thescene and did not come back
for her (the SC, inthe ratio, seem to connote
that they testifiedthis during the trial) Her
testimony is inconsistent and contradicteach
other. The CFI convicted them on the basisof
her lone testimony By what she testified, it
should have beenbribery not robbery!
OSG CONTENDS : repeated negotiations for the
droppingof the case is an admission on the part
of the conspirator Dimalanta.
ISSUE: WoN they were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?YES!
DISPOSITIVE: Conviction
Contradictions and inconsistencies of the
principalwitness are not serious enough to
affect her credibility. The trial judge had
opportunity to observe herdemeaner while on
the stand and gave it full weight andcredit as
against those of the appellants. It was duly
established that their lawyers managed to
negotiate the dropping of the case by paying
the amount allegedly taken from her
Admission by conduct in this case:

The repeated offer of a conspirator constitutes
a strong indication and an implied admission of
guilt of saidconspirator and the 2 accused in this
case.
Re: It is not bribery, it is robbery! Prosecutor
was right incharging the accused of Robbery.
They pretended to be peace officers
and employedthreats and intimidation to obtain
P200 this isobviously robbery. Although it
seems true what the appellants testifiedthat
Juliana Chua was carrying a bundle
containingcontraband and for fear of discovery
her husband ranaway and did not come back,
there was no evidenceregarding said
contraband other than the testimony of
theaccused WHICH IS NOT POSITIVE NOR
CONVINCING.
Re: Self-serving testimonies
Such testimony coming as it does from the
accused whonaturally want to exculpate
themselves, cannot beregarded as free from
bias and desire to so intensify thedetails thereof
as to suit their case.The disappearance of the
husband does nothing tounfavorable to the
prosecution because he might havegone to a
policeman
PEOPLE VS. YATCO
Facts:
1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is stillunknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the
murderof one Jose Ramos.
2.During the progress of the trial, counsel for
the defendant Panganibaninterposed a general
objection to any evidence on such confession
made by defendant consunji on the ground that
it was hearsay andtherefore incompetent as
against the other accused Panganiban.
3.The lower court ordered the exclusion of the
objected evidence but on a different ground
which is “the prosecution could not be
permitted to
introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and AlfonsoPanganiban to prove
20
conspiracy between them, without prior proof
ofsuch conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances”.
4. OSG filed a petition for cetiorari before the
SC for the review andannulment of the lower
Court's order completely excluding anyevidence
on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused
Juan Consunjiand Alfonso Panganiban without
prior proof of conspiracy.
Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in
excluding the prosecutions’s
evidence (extra-judicial confession by
Consunji)?
No. We believe that the lower Court committed
a grave abuse of discretion inordering the
complete exclusion of the prosecution's
evidence on the allegedconfessions of the
accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when theruling was made.Section 14, Rule 123,
Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility
of theextrajudicial confession of an accused,
freely and voluntarily made, asevidence against
him.SEC. 14. Confession.—The declaration of an
accused expresslyacknowledging the truth of
his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given
inevidence against him.Under the rule of
multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji'sconfession may not be competent as
against his co-accused Panganiban,being
hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the confession of
Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt and
should be admitted.
Rule on admissibility
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a caseof any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no

indication of bad faith on the part of the
Attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept thetestimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will beconnected later. At any rate, in
the final determination and consideration ofthe
case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from theinadmissible,
and reject what, under the rules of evidence,
should beexcluded. There is greater reason to
adhere to such policy in criminal caseswhere
questions arise as to admissibility of evidence
for the prosecution, forthe unjustified exclusion
of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the charges,
from which the People can nolonger appeal.
Issue #2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is
applicable in the case at bar?
No. The rule cited by the Court below in support
of its exclusion of theproffered evidence is Sec.
12 of Rule 123, providing that the act or
declarationof a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. Manifestly, the
rule refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises ("during its
existence ") and in furtherance of its object, and
not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an
end .Besides, the prosecution had not yet
offered the confessions to prove conspiracy
between the two accused, nor as evidence
against both of them.In fact, the alleged
confessions (both in writing and in tape
recordings) had not yet even been identified,
much less formally offered in evidence. For all
we know, the prosecution might still be able to
adduce other proof ofconspiracy between
Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence.
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule
123 also applies to the confessions in question,
it was premature for therespondent Court to
21
exclude them completely on the ground that
there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
Issue #3: WON the court has the power to
disregard evidence? (Relatedto the topic
Objections) The court does not have the said
power.The exclusion of the proferred
confessions was not made on the basis of
theobjection interposed by Panganiban's
counsel, but upon an altogether different
ground, which the Court issued
motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to
Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of
the other accused Panganiban, on the ground
that it was hearsay as to the latter. Butthe
Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up
its own objection to theconfessions—that it
could not be admitted to prove conspiracy
betweenConsunji and Panganiban without prior
evidence of such conspiracy by anumber of
indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc.
and completelyexcluded the confessions on
that ground. By so doing, the Court over looked
that the right to object is a mere privilege which
the parties may waive; and ifthe ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made,
the objection isdeemed waived and the Court
has no power, on its own motion, to disregard
the evidence
Topic: Prior Testimony (Rule 130, Section 47)
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS et al
[G.R. No. L-22793, May 16, 1967]
Facts:
At first, petitioners, thru their mother as
guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan for
acknowledgment and support. The first civil
case was dismissed on the ground that parties
have already come to an amicable settlement.
1 year and eight months thereafter, petitioners,
this time thru their maternal grandfather as
guardian ad litem, commenced the present
action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations

Court for acknowledgment and support,
involving the same parties, cause of action and
subject matter.The case was again dismissed by
reason of res judicata and insufficiency of
evidence.
On appeal, petitioners contends that the
testimony of their witnesses, who were unable
to testify in the 2nd trial must be admissible,
applying Rule 130 Sec 41.
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The
testimony of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a
former case between the same parties, relating
to the same matter, the adverse party having
had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may
be given in evidence.
Notably, the witnesses were subpoenaed by the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number
of times. But, they did not appear to testify.
These witnesses were neither dead nor outside
of the Philippines.
Issue:
Are the witnesses' testimonies in the former
trial within the coverage of the rule of
admissibility intended for witnesses of the class
unable to testify?
Held:
NO. They cannot be categorized as witnesses of
the class unable to testify. The witnesses in
question were available. Only, they refused to
testify. No other person that prevented them
from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not
come within the legal purview of those unable
to testify.
To emphasize, subsequent failure or refusal to
appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since
testifying at the first trial does not amount to
inability to testify. To be qualified, such inability
should proceed from a grave cause, almost
22
amounting to death, as when the witness is old
and has lost the power of speech.
MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven
by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-
type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. the
two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder
on the right and then fall ona ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus
veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision.By reason of such
collision, a criminal case was filed before the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.Counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in asmuch
as these witnesses are not available to testify in
the civil case.
ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in
evidence.
HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs
containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, MarceloMendoza and Fernando
Ramos should not be admitted in evidence for
failure of respondent to comply with
therequisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. For Section 47, Rule 130
to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable
totestify; (b) his testimony or deposition was
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative,between the same parties
or those representing the same interests; (c)
the former case involved the same subjectas
that in the present case, although on different

causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in theformer trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former
case. Admittedly, respondent failed to show
the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by
the Rules for a testimonygiven in a former case
or proceeding to be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, notbeing a
party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no
opportunity to cross-examine the three
witnesses in said case.The criminal case
was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The
cases dealingwith the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to thecriminal
cases instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI
was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the threewitnesses are
still admissible on the ground that petitioner
PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at
the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered inevidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege whichthe
party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is awaiver of the provisions of the law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay,
but on account of failure to object thereto, the
same may be admitted and considered as
sufficientto prove the facts therein asserted.
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but,when no objection
is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to
be considered and given the importance it
deserves. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did
not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case when the same were offered in evidence in
the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of
the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were
23
admitted by both petitioners. Moreover,
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the
TSN containing the testimony of Donato
Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI
argues that the TSNs of the testimonies
of plaintiff’s witnesses inthe criminal case
should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony
of Ganiban which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to
have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that
the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of
the adverse party in the criminal case should
not be admitted and at the same time insist
that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for
the accused beadmitted in its favor. To disallow
admission in evidence of the TSNs of
the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to
admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
would be unfair.
Ferrer v. Inchausti (issue and held)
Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the admission
in evidence of the day-book kept by Ramon
Martinez Viademonte, Jr., during his lifetime,
alleging that it has not been proven that the
entries in said book were made at the same
time that those events occurred; that the
witness who identified it did not see Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., in the act of
making the said entries, and that, even if it were
so, still the writing contained in the book, being
a mere memorandum of an interested party,
can not be admitted at the trial.
The above objection can be met and disposed
of by the provisions of section 298, No. 13 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that
evidence may be given upon trial of
monuments and inscriptions in public places as
evidence of common reputation; and entries in
family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the
said booklet be made at the same time as the
 24

occurrence of those events; hence, the written

memorandum in the same is not subject to the
defect attributed to it, The witness Joaquin Jose
de Inchausti declared affirmatively that the
memorandum under consideration has been
written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, whose handwriting
he was familiar with, and the testimony of this
witness contains some reference to a member
of the family, now dead, and concerning the
family genealogy of the same.