*Camporedondo vs. NLRC, GR No.

129049, August 6, 1999

Case digest:
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129049 August 6, 1999
BALTAZAR G. CAMPOREDONDO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City,
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS (PNRC), represented by GOVERNOR ROMEO C.
ESPINO and DR. CELSO SAMSON, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
At issue in this case is whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC for short) is a
government owned and controlled corporation or it has been "impliedly converted to a private
organization" subject to the jurisdiction of labor tribunals in a complaint filed by petitioner, a
former PNRC chapter administrator in Surigao del Norte, for illegal dismissal and damages, as he
was forced to "retire" after he was required to restitute shortages and unremitted collections in the
total sum of P135,927.78.
Having obviously no merit, we dismiss the petition.
All suitors must come to court with clean hands. This is especially true of paid staff of the
Philippine National Red Cross. Like its unpaid volunteers, they must be men of unquestioned
honesty and integrity serving in selfless manner to aid the sick and wounded of armed forces in
time of war, acting in voluntary relief in time of peace and war, maintaining a system of national
and international relief in meeting emergency relief needs caused by typhoons, floods, fires,
earthquakes, and other natural disasters, and promoting such service in time of peace and war to
improve the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people.1 Paid staff of the PNRC are
government employees who are members of the Government Service Insurance System and
covered by the Civil Service Law. Unlike government service in other agencies, Red Cross service
demands of its paid staff uberrima fides, the utmost good faith and dedication to work.
Since 1980, petitioner was employed with the PNRC, and until his early "retirement" on
December 15, 1995, he was administrator of the Surigao del Norte Chapter, Philippine National
Red Cross.2
In July, 1995, a field auditor of the PNRC conducted an audit of the books of account of the
Surigao del Norte Chapter headed by petitioner and found him short in the total sum of
P109,000.00.3
On November 21, 1995, Dr. Celso Samson, Secretary General of the PNRC wrote petitioner
requiring him to restitute within seventy two (72) hours from notice, the total sum of P135,927.78
representing cash shortage, technical shortage and unremitted collections.4
On December 15, 1995, petitioner applied for early retirement from the service, and later wrote
Dr. Samson requesting for a re-audit by an independent auditor of his accounts. However, Dr.
Samson denied the request.5
On May 28, 1996, petitioner filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch X, Butuan City, a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and underpayment
of wages against the Philippine National Red Cross and its key officials.6
On June 14, 1996, respondent Philippine National Red Cross filed with the Surigao del Norte
provincial office, Department of Labor and Employment, a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the PNRC is a government
corporation whose employees are members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
and embraced within the Civil Service Law and regulations.7
On July 25, 1996, petitioner filed an opposition to motion to dismiss arguing that there was
between the PNRC and its duly appointed paid staff, an employer-employee relationship,
governed by the Labor Code of the Philippines.8
On October 11, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that the Philippine National Red Cross is a government corporation with an
original charter, having been created by Republic Act No. 95.9
On November 12, 1996, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on
October 14, 1996.10
On November 20, 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and appeal memorandum with the
National Labor Relations Commission.11
On March 21, 1997, the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, issued a resolution
dismissing the appeal and confirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter that dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.12
Hence, this recourse.
On July 7, 1997, we resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10)
days from notice.13
On August 7, 1997, respondent Philippine National Red Cross filed its comment.14 On November
7, 1997, the Solicitor General filed its comments.15
Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original
charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for
the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those
with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private
corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be
exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations
and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and
in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be alloted one lottery draw a year by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its existing
lottery draws for blood program.
Having served in the Philippine National Red Cross for a number of years since his initial
employment, he must know that it is a government corporation with its own charter and that he
was covered by compulsory membership in the Government Service Insurance System, which is
why he could apply, as he did, for "early" retirement from the service under Presidential Decree
No. 1146 or Republic Act No. 1616.16

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition, and AFFIRMS the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission.1âwphi1.nêt
Double costs taxed against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

*SC vs. NLRC 168 SCRA 122

Case digest:
CASE 8 NSC vs NLRC 168 SCRA 122
CASE 8: NSC vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122(1988) J: PADILLAG.R. No. 68970: NASECO VS
NLRC G.R. No. 70295: CREDO VS NLRC FACTS: Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an
employee of the NationalService Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides
manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was
administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying instructions to correct/add
remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after
being called to explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a
complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO for placing her on forced
leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated
a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's
termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to explain her side in connection with the
charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of
opportunity to be heard. The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct
NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of
service. Both parties appealed to NLRC, and rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate
Credo to her former position with six months’ back wages and without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.In
G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in finding that: 1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law
on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for a valid or
authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if
proved, could be considered to have been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid
or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave abuse of discretion
the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages and limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months. ISSUE: 1.
Whether or not the decision of NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. 2. Whether NLRC has
a jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement.

*Lopez vs. CSC, 194 SCRA 269

Case digest:

REYNALDO D. LOPEZ,
petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR. G.R. No. 92140 February 19, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was
appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South Harbor
and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was reorganized, and the
number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three
to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a placement committee of the PPA, Luz was rated third. Luz
protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA General Manager said Luz was not qualified
for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA
complied. Still, the CSC found that the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate
supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and
not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It
directed the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’

appointment and instead substituting its decision for that of the PPA.
RULING:
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not disputed by petitioner
Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to the heads of
departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the respondents. In the appointment,
placement and promotion of civil service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing
power, especially where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the
best position to screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity,
performance and capabilities of the future appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only
to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service
eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the
appointing authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656)
does not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving becomes
ministerial. The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments
shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of
Luego v
.
Civil Service Commission,
143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check
if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is
approved; if not it is disapproved." We further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would
have constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The
Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
Petition is GRANTED.

*Torregoza vs. CSC, 211 SCRA 230

RODELA D. TORREGOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
The petition filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to review the decision of the
respondent Civil Service Commission, dated July 4, 1991, denying the petitioner the privilege granted
under Republic Act No. 6850, entitled "An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain
Conditions to Government Employees Appointed Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who Have
Rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service, and for Other Purposes". The petition prays
for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the appropriate
civil service eligibility pursuant to the aforestated law, for having worked in the Legal Office, Office of
the President, Malacanang, Manila, since January 18, 1978, to the present.

The original appointment of the petitioner on January 18, 1978, was one of the six (6) Staff Aide
positions, in the aforementioned office, specifically Item No. 198-6, (P.D. No. 1050), issued by then
Presidential Assistant Juan C. Tuvera for a period of six (6) months. On June 5, 1978, less than five
months after the first appointment, petitioner was given another appointment to the same position
effective "as of June 18, 1978" and with a notation that "This appointment is declared confidential."
(Rollo, p. 39)

Obviously, since 1978 to February 8, 1990 when Republic Act No. 6850 became a law, petitioner never
left the same position. Then on March 5, 1990, respondent Commission issued the "Rules
Implementing Republic Act No. 6850, enabling the petitioner to file her application for the appropriate
eligibility to the position she has been occupying for the last thirteen (13) years and having accordingly
rendered efficient service. (The Solicitor General's Comment, pp. 3 & 13)

Petitioner's request was returned unacted upon by respondent's field office in Malacanang, Manila for
the reason that based on the service recordsubmitted by the Personnel Office of the Office of the
President, petitioner's position had allegedly been declared confidential. (Ibid., p. 4)

In the course of time, after the Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act No. 6758) was passed, the
same position was reclassified as Clerk II in July 1989. (Rollo, p. 5)

Subsequently, Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento sent a letter to the respondent dated
November 7, 1990, (Petition, Annex "G") requesting that based on the present certified function and
actual duties of the petitioner, the position be restored to the career service and that said petitioner be
granted the civil service eligibility under R.A. No. 6850. (Rollo, p. 33).
Respondent Commission denied petitioner's request on January 28, 1991, after determining that
petitioner's appointment in 1978 was declared by the Office of the President as "confidential in nature",
nevertheless, respondent stated that "an analysis of the duties and responsibilities of the subject
position reveals that they are the same with the other positions in the career service x x x" and
specifically held, that:
"In view of the foregoing, the request for restoration of the position of Clerk II to career service is
hereby granted effective January 1, 1991. However, the incumbent shall continue to occupy the
position in a confidential status. Any subsequent appointment to subject position shall be covered by
career service policies." (Petition, Annex "A")
On February 27, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision, but the
respondent stood firm in its resolution dated July 4, 1991, by issuing the following ruling:
"After due consideration of the instant request for reconsideration of Torregoza, this Commission finds
no ample reason to disturb its Opinion of January 28, 1991. The Office of the President declared her
previous appointments as primarily confidential and they were all attested as such by this Commission.
These twin actions, i.e., declaration by the Office of the President and confirmation by this
Commission made the appointments in question to be primarily confidential. Moreover, granting en
arguendo that the position in question may not have been properly and validly declared as primarily
confidential, all concerned were of the belief that the appointments issued to Torregoza as Clerk II were
indeed primarily confidential. Further, it cannot also be denied that from the time her first appointment
was issued up to the time that she requested for the change of the status of her appointment, Torregoza
enjoyed the benefits of the primarily confidential nature of her position. She is, therefore, estopped
from questioning and impugning the validity of her previous appointments specially now, that she
stands to benefit from the provisions of R.A. 6850, with a declaration of her appointment as temporary.
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Commission resolves to deny the instant request
of Rodela Torregoza, Clerk II, Office of the President that she be issued a temporary appointment as
Clerk II effective July 1, 1989, the effectivity date of RA 6758 for lack of merit. Hence, CSC Opinion
of January 28, 1991 is hereby affirmed." (Petition, Annex "H")
From the above facts, there are two (2) issues to be resolved, however, one is subordinate to the other.
The principal issue is whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued by this Court to compel the
respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the privilege of securing an appropriate civil service
eligibility under Republic Act No. 6850. The answer to this is NO. The simple reason being that under
the law granting the privilege to government employees, there is a wide latitude of discretion given to
the Commission which determines in Section 1 thereof, "who are qualified to avail themselves of the
privilege granted under this Act." With such discretion, Section 2 of the same law requires the Civil
Service Commission to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this Act using certain
standards. Following are the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6850:
"Section 1. All government employees as of the approval of this Act who are holding career civil
service positions appointed under provisional or temporary status who have rendered at least a total of
seven (7) years of efficient service may be granted the civil service eligibility that will qualify them for
permanent appointment to their present positions.
"The Civil Service Commission shall formulate performance evaluation standards in order to determine
those temporary employees who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this
Act.
"The civil service eligibility herein granted may apply to such other positions as the Civil Service
Commission may deem appropriate.
"Sec. 2. The Civil Service Commission shall promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this
Act consistent with the merit and fitness principle within ninety (90) days after its effectivity."
From the above, it is crystal-clear that the Writ of Mandamus will not lie as the responsibility of the
respondent Commission in implementing the law is not ministerial, besides, what the law granted is a
mere privilege and not a right to those who are qualified according to the standards to be set by the
Commission.
In Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., (142 SCRA 439), citing other cases, this Court held that the "Remedy of
mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not where the
reinstatement involves the exercise of sound judgment and discretion by the appointing power, absent a
showing of a clear and certain right by petitioner."
The other question that this Court deems appropriate for resolution is the categorization of the position
in the Legal Office, Office of the President, Malacanang, Manila. This categorization attaches to the
entire Office of the President under Republic Act No. 6040, which provides:
"Sec. 5. The Non-Competitive Service. - The non-competitive service shall be composed of positions
expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
"The following specific officers and employees shall be embraced in the non-competitive service:
"(b) The secretarial and office staff of the President, of the Vice-President, of the President of the
Senate, of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and of each Member of the Congress of the
Philippines including the personnel of all offices of the Chairmen of committees of both Houses of the
Congress;"
This particular law has never been repealed and therefore, it is still controlling with respect to the
classification of the secretarial and office staff positions in the Office of the President as belonging to
the non-competitive service. Thus, any subsequent classification of the same positions has to be made
with the specific sanction of the legislative branch. The mere fact that the functions of the position in
question are parallel or the same as those in the career civil service positions, do not make the said
position eligible for conferment of the civil service eligibility specially given to other government
employees in the competitive service.
Furthermore, the classification under the Salary Standardization Act, also known as the "Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989", Republic Act No. 6758, did not in effect amend the specific
above-quoted provision of R.A. 6040. For the statement of policy of the former is distinctly clear as it
states the following:
"SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard
shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this
purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and
administer a unified Compensation Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the
System, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all
government entities, as mandated by the Constitution."
Moreover, this Court noted with alarm the attempt of the respondent Commission in subjecting the
position in question to the coverage of the "career service policies" after the incumbent shall have
ceased to occupy the position in a confidential status, without the necessary enabling act after the
legislative branch of the Government has placed the secretarial and office staff of the Office of the
President under the non-competitive category. To do so is a glaring violation of Republic Act No. 6040,
the specific provision of which is quoted above.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

*Leyson vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 134990, April 27, 2000

Case digest:
LEYSON v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R No. 134990, April 27, 2000
Facts:
International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the
lighterage or shipping business, entered into a 1-year contract with:
*Legaspi Oil Company, Inc (LEGASPI OIL)
*Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT)
*United Coconut Chemicals (UNITED COCONUT), for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through
MT TRANSASIA
► UCPB owns the majority shareholdings of these CIFF companies.
► Under the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three-month advance
notice
Was given to the other party.
►However, prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIFF companies with ther new President, Oscar
Torralba, terminated the contract WITHOUT the requisite advance notice.
►The CIFF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest
Maritime Corporation.
► Leyson, Executive VP of ITTC, filled with Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against Oscar
Torralba alleging the following:
•Beach of contract –unliteral cancellation of valid and existing contract;
•Bad faith =falsfiaction of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia;
•Manipulation – influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia;
•Unreasonable denial of requirement imposed;
•Double standardsand inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag;
•Engaged and entered into a contract with SoutWest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner of
•Mt Marialag; and
•Overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to Cocochem.
► Also, Leyson charged Antiporda (Chairman of UCPB and CIFF Oil Mills) and Torralba with
violation of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman alleging the aforesaid irregularities
And corrupt practices.
► OMBUDSMAN:
DISMISSED the complaint based on the finding that the case was a simple breach of contract with
damaged which should have been filled in the regular court.
It said that the office has NO jurisdiaction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of
the contract entered into by CIFF and ITTC.
The entities involved are private corporations over which the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.
► Pettioners contentions:
✔ coconut levy funds are public funds and that corporations formed and organized from those
funds.
or whose controlling stocks are from those funds should be regarded and govermment and/or
controlled corporations. Since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by

private respondents was given or owned by the CIFF, it follows that they are government and/or
controlled corporations.
✔ Petitioner also asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the
 jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
✔ He also asserts that the repondent’s conclusion that his complaint refers to a breach of contract
is
respondednts violated the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act when they entered into a contract
with
Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly diadvantagenous to the govermment in
general
and to CIFF in particular.
►Respondednts’ contentions:
✔ CIFF companies were duly organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporations. Their
Stockholders are private individuals and entities.
✔ They are not public officers as deifined under The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are
Private executives appointed by the Bpard of Directors of the CIFF companies
Wheather or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of disrection. –NO
Held:
PETITION DISMISSED.
► Definition of “government owned or controlled corporation” contained in par.(13), Sec.2,
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e, any agency organized as a stock or
Non-stock corporation vested functions to public needs whether governmental or
Proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
Wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corpotratios, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
Percent of its capital stock.
The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely:
Any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation
Vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; amd,
Owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentatlities either wholly , or, where applicable
as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock
Corporations:
✔ The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.
✔ Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition
of government owned or controlled corporation.
► Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXOIRT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to
the
Second requite.
✔ Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no
Showing that GRANEXPORTand/or UNITED COCONUT was vested withfunctions relating to public
needs where governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo.
► The Court thus concludes that the CIFF companies are, as found by public respondent private
Corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction
► With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessart to resolve the other issue raised by petitioner.
*Cruz vs. CSC, GR No. 144464, November 22, 2001

SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Zenaida Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan and Gilda Cruz were charged
with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service after a fact-
finding investigation disclosed that Paitim impersonated Gilda Cruz in the non-professional career civil
service examinations conducted on July 30, 1989 in Quezon City. Petitioners denied the charges against
them, declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter and subsequently moved to
dismiss on the ground of denial of due process because the Civil Service Commission (CSC) was the
complainant, the prosecutor and the judge, all at the same time. The motion was denied. The CSC, in a
resolution dated July 1, 1998, found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their dismissal from the
government service. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals viaa petition for review
which was, however, dismissed. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
this recourse. The Civil Service Commission is vested with the appellate jurisdiction in all
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from office and where the
complaint was filed by a private citizen. This appellate jurisdiction does not contemplate a case where
the acts complained of was committed against the Commission itself as when the employee committed
irregularity or anomaly in the conduct of its examinations.

Factual findings of administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission, if supported by substantial
evidence, are binding on this Court. There is no denial of administrative due process where after being
formally charged, respondents submitted their answer and given opportunity to defend themselves.

SYLLABUS1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPELLATE

JURISDICTION OVER ALL ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; REFERS TO CASES FILED AGAINST
EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS; DOES NOT REFER
TO IRREGULARITIES OR ANOMALIES CONNECTED TO EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE
DIRECT CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. —Petitioners
maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case.
Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative
Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private
citizen against the government employee. Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision
is applicable to instances where administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection
with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case
at bar. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating.

*Ontiveros vs. CA, GR No. 145401, May 7, 2001

MANUEL L. ONTIVEROS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and the DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition seeking review on certiorari of the decision,1 dated June 30, 2002, and the
resolution,2 dated October 11, 2000, of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner
Manuel L. Ontiveros from the then Ministry of Tourism.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner was Security Officer I in the Investigation and Security Division of the Ministry of Tourism,
having been appointed to that position on July 27, 1976. On May 26, 1986, he was dismissed from the
service for inefficiency, incompetence, and unauthorized absences. The Memorandum of then Minister
of Tourism Jose Antonio U. Gonzales, dismissing petitioner, read:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Article III of Proclamation 3, your services as Security Officer
I is hereby terminated effective as of the close of office hours on May 26, 1986, based on the following
grounds:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
2. Frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness in reporting for duty, loafing, or frequent unauthorized
absences from duty during regular office hours.
You are instructed to secure your money and property accountabilities for your last salary payment.3
On June 10, 1986, petitioner appealed to the CSC, invoking his status as a civil service eligible and a
permanent employee.4
Petitioner reiterated his appeal in a letter, dated August 11, 1997, to the CSC.5 In response, CSC
Director IV Angelito G. Grande informed petitioner that jurisdiction over his appeal was vested in the
Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 of then President Corazon C. Aquino and for
that reason his (petitioner 's) appeal could not be given due course by the CSC.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CSC through Chairman
Corazon Alma G. de Leon and Commissioners Thelma P. Gaminde and Jose F. Erestain, Jr. In
Resolution No. 982464,7 the CSC stated:
Pursuant to the Provisional Constitution and the various Executive orders issued by then President
Aquino when she was the sole law-making authority, the different Departments of Government were
authorized to carry on reorganization programs. No specific causes for removal were given in the
Provisional Constitution because at that time, there was no setting up of clear-cut policies and
guidelines on reorganization to protect the security of tenure of civil servants. This was the prevailing
situation following the issuance on February 25, 1986 of Proclamation No. 1 calling "all appointive
public officials to submit their courtesy resignations." This calling was echoed under Section 16, Art.
XVIII of the [1987] Constitution which explicitly authorizes the removal of career civil service
employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986.

Despite the foregoing circumstances, Ontiveros was removed from the service on the bases of two
administrative offenses. Therefore, it is with more reason that his separation from the service under the
[Provisional] Constitution was justified, especially considering that the same is for cause.8
Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals. But his petition, as well as his motion for
reconsideration, was denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC had no jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal, the proper appellate body being the Review Committee established under E.O. No.
17. In addition, the appeals court held that review of petitioner's dismissal was barred by laches. Hence
this petition.
First. Petitioner argues that his case does not fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction because
his separation from the service was not in consequence of the re-organization of the government, as
provided in the Provisional (also known as the Freedom Constitution), but was for cause; hence, appeal
lies with the CSC.
The contention has no merit. Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitutional provided that "All elective
and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25. 1986"
(emphasis added). To be sure, petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of a proclamation or executive
order of the President of the Philippines nor by reason of the designation or appointment and
qualification of his successor. It must also be noted that E.O. No. 120, which reorganized the then
Ministry of Tourism, was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino only on January 20, 1987,
whereas petitioner was dismissed on May 26, 1986.
However, the memorandum of then Tourism Minister Jose Antonio U. Gonzales, dismissing petitioner
from the service, clearly stated that it was being issued pursuant to Art. III, §2 of the Provisional
Constitution. And indeed, just two days after petitioner had been dismissed, E.O. No. 17 was issued on
May 28, 1986, providing in pertinent part as follows:
SECTION 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the
Head of each Ministry shall see to it that the separation or replacement of officers and employees is
made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the career civil
service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New
Government.
Any office, agency, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, which is not
attached to any ministry, including any of the constitutional commission and state colleges and
universities, shall be considered a ministry for purposes of this Order.
The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment of its
personnel, including the identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid assessment of the
incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment as expeditiously as possible but not later than
February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public service.
SEC. 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment, shall determine
who shall be separated from the service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned
a notice of separation, which shall indicate therein the reason/s or ground/s for such separation and the
fact that, the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration pursuant
to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either
personally by the official or employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.
SEC. 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or in-efficiency in the discharge of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
In Radia v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. J7,9 the retroactive application of E.O. No.
17 to past dismissals was affirmed. It was held:
[E.O. No.17] is a self-limiting act and its provisions are not only non-penal in nature, but also clearly
more favorable than those of Art. III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. As such, there is no legal nor
moral obstacle to the retrospective application of Executive Order No. 17 to "those already separated
from the service on the issuance of this Order, including those whose resignations were accepted or
whose successors have been appointed/designated." (Section 6)10
In thus case, it is clear that petitioner's dismissal came within the coverage of E.O. No. 17, §3(3) and
(5). Pursuant to §2 of the order, the memorandum of dismissal of Minister Gonzales is considered the
act of the then President.
Nor can it be argued that this case is not covered by Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitution since the
grounds for petitioner's dismissal are grounds under civil service laws and regulations. E.O. No. 17
provided the grounds for the separation of employees from the service not to bring their cases under
ordinary civil service laws and regulations but to provide limits on what otherwise would be absolute
discretion and thus prevent an abuse of power. But certainly, it was not the intention to make such cases
subject to processing by regular procedures that could defeat the summary nature required by
government reorganization following the establishment of a revolutionary government.11
Second. Petitioner argues that the Review Committee did not have jurisdiction over his appeal because
it was created only after he had been dismissed on May 26, 1986.
E.O. No. 17, which was issued on May 28, 1986, took effect only on June 2, 1986, after petitioner had
already been dismissed on May 26, 1986. However, §6 of the said order provides:
A petition for reconsideration may be filed with the [Review] Committee by the separated official or
employee within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of separation. In case of those already
separated from the service upon issuance of this Order. including those whose resignations were
accepted or whose successors have been appointed/designated, the petition shall be filed within ten (10)
days from the date of publication of this Order in a newspaper of general circulation. (emphasis added)
It is not disputed that petitioner failed to file SUCH petition or reconsideration with the Review
Committee within 10 days from after publication of E.O. No. 17. As petitioner never filed an appeal
with the Review Committee, his separation from the service became final.Third. Petitioner also
contends that the CSC should have dismissed his appeal out-right or indorsed his appeal to the Review
Committee as was done in the cases of Radia12 and Sto. Domingo v. Ordonez.13
In the Radia case, the apparent reason for the indorsement was that at the time the appeal was filed with
the CSC on May 28, 1986, E.O. No. 17 had not yet been published on June 2, 1986. Here, petitioner
appealed to the CSC on June 10, 1986, when the Review Committee had already been created. He
therefore cannot use the CSC's inaction as an excuse for his mistake in appealing to the wrong forum.
One wrong does not make another wrong right.14
In any event, as found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner is also guilty of laches. Petitioner claims that
"on many occasions" he went to the CSC to follow up his appeal. But the fact is that it was only on
August 11, 1997, more than a decade from the time he had filed an appeal to the CSC on June 10,
1986, that petitioner wrote a letter reiterating his appeal. It is noteworthy that in his letter, petitioner
made no mention of any "follow up" he allegedly had made of his case in the CSC. There is no
evidence of this claim except petitioner's allegations. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed in its
decision, "Petitioner as appellant had a duty to inquire and inform himself on the progress of his
appeal. He cannot be allowed to benefit from his long inaction and lethargy by resurrecting his appeal
and reap a windfall in backwages and other benefits."15
In view of the conclusions reached in this case and the fact that this Court is not a trier of facts, there is
no further need to discuss whether the grounds stated in the memorandum of then Minister of Tourism
Jose Antonio U. Gonzales dismissing petitioner really exist.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

*Hon. Alma de Leon vs. CA, et al. GR No. 127182, Jan. 22, 2001

HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON.
RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and SECRETARY RAFAEL
M. ALUNAN, III, Department of Interior and Local Government, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and JACOB F. MONTESA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is private respondents motion for reconsideration of the January 22, 2001 Decision of
the Court, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664
and reinstated Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission.
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28,
1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary.
Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig,[1] we held that since private respondent was not a Career
Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not
possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be
transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990,[2] where
the nature of private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of
Local Government, was first contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992,
holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. The pertinent
portion thereof reads -
The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was
appointed on August 28, 1996 by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a
permanent appointment by then Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as permanent by the
Civil Service Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the appropriate eligibility
for the position at that time and a member of the Philippine bar.
There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of
appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6)
members sometime in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's
incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given
on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appointment
of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible.
Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be
removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be
passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in
the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of
judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court,[3] would bar a re-
litigation of the nature of private respondents appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated
in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be contoverted anew and should be
finally laid to rest.[4]
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if
blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It
must be stressed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the
principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed
purpose of all law and jurisprudence.[5]
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent who was appointed in 1986
pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, though not a CES eligible, possessed all the requirements for the
position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES
eligibility was not, at that time, a requirement for the same position.
A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the
law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES
eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by
the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments
shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions
shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in
exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that
such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he
shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements
for membership in the CES, to wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the requirements for membership in the
CES. Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall be admitted into the CES without having
satisfactorily completed the program;
b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of positions falling within the CES duly
nominated by their Department Heads;
c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-participant shall be enrolled in the
roster of CES eligibles and shall be qualified for appointment by the President to the appropriate rank
in the CES upon recommendation of the Board. He may then be assigned to any position in the CES by
the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES
eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondents appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent with the
Freedom Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization
Plan allows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently
acquire the needed eligibility.
It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned appointment was made on October 16,
1987, before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was
given in 1990, as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility
is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility
shall be temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the requirements for a position
embraced in the CES. The Court finds no reason to make an exception in the instant controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal,[6] we ruled that security of
tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to rank and not to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and
flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of
CES personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary,[7] justify his transfer to other CES
position without violating his right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with
FINALITY.

*Hon. Alma de Leon vs. CA, et al. GR No. 127182, Jan. 22, 2001
DE LEON v. CA
HON. ALMA DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON.
RAMON ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and SECRETARY RAFAEL
ALUNAN, III, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB MONTESA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 127182 January 22, 2001 En Banc
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and declared
as null and void: Department Order No. 94-370 issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government, relieving private respondent of his duties as Department Legal Counsel/Director III and
reassigning him as Assistant Regional Director of Region XI; and Administrative Order No. 235 issued
by then President Fidel Ramos, dropping private respondent from the rolls of public service on the
ground of serious neglect of duty and absences without official leave. Private respondent Atty. Jacob
Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government,
now Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
Inspite of not being a Career
Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service (CES), private
respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Commission. Subsequently,
then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262, reorganizing the DILG. Then
Secretary Luis Santos, who succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of Legal
Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of the Secretary
to perform special assignments. This prompted private respondent to file before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto against Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor Patricio. On September 26, 1990,
the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private respondent and ordered his reinstatement to his former
position. Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1,
1989. Pursuant thereto, the position of Department Service Chiefs, which include the Department Legal
Counsel, was reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of
Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was reinstated to
the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III. Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, citing as
reasons the interest of public service and the smooth flow of operations in the concerned offices, issued
Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This order relieved private respondent of his current
duties and responsibilities and reassigned him as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region
XI. Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day
sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary
Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department Legal
Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. Acting Secretary Aguirre, by memorandum, reiterated to private
respondent that the issuance of said department order transferring him to Region XI, was in keeping
with the interest of the public service and of the Career Executive Service provision on assignment,
reassignment, and transfer. Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI
immediately. Private respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department
order, but to no avail. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission by private respondent, the former
issued a resolution which sustained the latter’s reassignment on the following grounds: (a) the
reassignment was not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution or of private respondent's
right to security of tenure; (b) the reassignment did not entail any reduction in rank or status; (c) private
respondent could be reassigned from one station to another without his consent as the rule against
unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who is appointed to a particular station, and not merely
assigned thereto. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Civil
Service Commission. The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in
Region XI, stressing that his continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the
interest of public service. Private respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the
DILG shall be constrained to consider him on absence without leave and as a consequence, drop him
from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the court. Upon the recommendation
of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order No. 235, dropping private respondent
from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of duty and absences without leave. Later, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent and rendered as
null and void Department Order No. 94- 370. The Court of Appeals ordered that private respondent be
retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or Department Legal Counsel in the DILG, without loss
of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges. The DILG Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner
his with held salaries corresponding to the period July 15-21, 1995 and his back salaries, if also
withheld, corresponding to the period July 22, 1995 to September 27, 1995. Both petitioners and
private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for backwages and his salary that was illegally withheld
from the time the resolution of the Civil Service Commission was issued up to his actual reinstatement
to office. Respondent likewise prayed for the award of RATA during the period of his illegal dismissal.
Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent with
Administrative Order No. 235 issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from the roster of
public servants. They further argued that until and unless the said order is declared invalid, the
presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon private respondent to comply there with
so as not to prejudice the public service. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by public respondents for lack of merit and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or
Partial Motion for Reconsideration. It modified its earlier decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to
release to petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages, including allowances or RATA and other
benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he not been illegally removed,
corresponding to the period from July 15, 1995 up to his actual reinstatement to office. Dissatisfied,
petitioners filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position can be
appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
RULING:
No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive Service.
Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President from a
list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the
basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to
assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional
cases, appoint any person who is not a CES eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently
take the required CES examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in
such examination. Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES
eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is
done by the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. In the case of Achacoso v.
Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it
could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moment's notice. The mere fact that a
position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security or tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of
his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated.
In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service eligibility
as evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive Service Officer or a
member of the Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's appointment did not attain
permanency. Not having taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility
for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal
Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary. The cases
on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the present case. As his
appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility
and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply
to him because he is not a Career Executive Service Officer, is without merit. As correctly pointed out
by the Solicitor General, non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never
meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium
vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not
enjoy. Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside
and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.

*PAGCOR vs. Rilloraza, GR No. 141141, June 25, 2001

Case digest:
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza
G. R. 141141 (June 25, 2001)

Facts: Rilloraza was a casino operations manager. He was dismissed by PAGCOR for gross
misconduct, dishonesty and loss of
confidence. The CSC and CA found Rilloraza guilty only of simple negligence. PAGCOR contends
that since Rilloraza is a confidential employee,
he may be dismissed for lack of confidence.

Issue: Whether CA gravely erred when it failed and refused to consider that respondent was a
confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by reason of loss of confidence.

Held: Rilloraza is not a confidential appointee. Although his tasks require faith
andconfidence in his competence to perform it, such does not by any means elevate
Rilloraza’s position as primarily confidential. It is the nature, not the name of the position, that
classifies it as primarily confidential.

********

FACTS:
On 05 Nov 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and loss of confidence were brought against Carlos Rilloraza, a casino
operations manager of petitioner PAGCOR. On 02 Dec 1997, the PAGCOR Board issued a resolution
dismissing respondent.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not all PAGCOR employees are confidential employees.

HELD:
NO. The classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon
the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. The exemption provided in the charter pertains
to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service.
Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure.

*Abella vs. CSC, GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004

Case digest:
G.R. NO. 152574, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
[PANGANIBAN.]
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department
Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of
Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and
Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated
April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position.
On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994
with Section 4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES). These
positions require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment. But, this provides that incumbents to CES shall retain their permanent appointment but
upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, they shall be under temporary status until they
qualify.
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)
on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment
as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was
submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the
ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the
disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as
Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999. Petitioner appealed
the disapproval of his permanent appointment by respondent to the Civil Service Commission, which
issued Resolution No. 000059, dated January 10, 2000, affirming the action taken by respondent.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in Resolution No. 001143 dated
May 11, 2000.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to question
the disapproval and was not the real party in interest.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioner has the personality and the real party in interest to question the disapproval of
his appointment.
Whether the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived
petitioner his property right without due process of law, is constitutional.
Whether the CSC correctly denied his appointment.
Ruling:
A. Personality and real party in interest.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s
discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. While there is
justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to
preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC,
should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal. On this point, the concepts of
“legal standing” and “real party in interest” become relevant.
The question in legal standing is whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ If
legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to
contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, the petitioner was prejudiced by the
disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested right to the
position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be granted
the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which
justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.
A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the
avails of the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a
mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected by the
CSC’s Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also
injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent
capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved
appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
B. Due Process
Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to
carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define
and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue
guidelines to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES
position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the
requirements of the position, which in petitioner’s case was a Career Service Executive Eligibility
(CSEE). The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the
positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in a
permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of
prospectivity of regulations; hence, it is not an post facto law or a bill of attainder.
In the present case, the government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right
to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his
reemployment years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to
comply with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
On petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him
of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the
circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every
affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are
not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
C. Whether CSC correctly denied his appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The
appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the
imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner
was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his
eligibility to the position he was appointed to.
The Petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it
prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as department manager III
of the Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.

*UP vs. Regino, 221 SCRA 598

Case digest:

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS,

petitioners, vs
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondents. G.R. No. 88167, 221 SCRA 598 (May 3, 1993)
Original Court:
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
Subject Matter:
Jurisdiction over the university with academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
Facts
: Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of Economics,
was dismissed on 22 Jun 1982 after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for
causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod.
Issue
: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the university which was vested under its charter, Act No.
1870, with academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
Held :
YES. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil
Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to do so because it was created by a special law
and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by P.D. 807
and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission.

*Samson vs. CA, 145 SCRA 654

Case digest:

Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)Facts:

Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan.The newly-elected mayor, Marcial
Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifyingthe services of Talens as
non-competetive and terminating his employment on theground of “lack and loss of confidence”. He
appointed Liwas as replacement.
Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, like the Secretary, renders non-competitive service which
is primarily confidential and highly technical in nature wheretermination may be made due to lack and
loss of confidence.However, respondent contends that
he is not a non-competitive employee
and thus,can only be removed for cause and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filedwith the
Court of First Instance of Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order,to enjoin the petitioner
mayor, treasurer, and auditor from enforcing the same, and tocompel all the said public officials to pay
private respondent the salaries andemoluments due to him. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor
of Talens.
Issue:
Is the termination without cause or due process of Talen’s services as AssistantSecretary to the Mayor
legal on the ground of lack or loss of confidence?
Ruling:
NO. The position of Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor cannot be classifiedas non-competitive.
Since the position is
not enumerated nor does it qualify asSecretary or Head of Departments under Section 5 of the Civil
Service Law
, thenthe
position is classified as competitive
. Employees of competitive classificationcannot be terminated on the ground of lack or loss of
confidence, rather only for cause and agter due process.

*CSC vs. Dela Cruz, GR No. 158737, August 31, 2004

Case digest:
CSC vs Saturnino dela Cruz, August 31, 2004

G.R. No. 158737

- Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to
review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Saturnino de la Cruz vs. Civil Service
Commission. In that decision, the appellate court set aside CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451,
consequently approving Saturnino de la Cruz appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation
Office.
- Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office (ATO), DOTC,
presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer
- Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the DOTC her
protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer,
claiming that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.
 Then DOTC Secretary Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit. Calamba,
dissatisfied, appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to CSC-NCR. CSC-NCR rendered its
decision recalling the approval of respondents appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation
Officer.
 After an initial evaluation of the protest, the contested position requires four (4) years of work
experience in position/s involving management per QS Manual and/or four years of experience in
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules
and regulations. WHEREFORE, the appeal of Annabella A. Calamba is hereby granted. The
appointment of Saturnino De la Cruz as Chief Aviation Regulation Officer is disapproved.
 The SC is of the view that experience-wise, Mr. dela Cruz did not meet the requirements of the
contested position as of the date of his appointment there to.
 Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. In a decision, the CA granted the
petition by setting aside CSC Resolution and approving respondents appointment as Chief of the
Aviation Safety Regulation Office as the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of
his appointment was well within the supervisory standard. These positions, spanning more than 13
years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation Safety Division of the ATO definitely met the
minimum supervisory experience required of respondent for the position.
 The SC, agrees with petitioner that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an
appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the
date of resolution of the protest against it.
 But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent failed to meet the experience
requirement to qualify for the contested position, the SC is still inclined to uphold the appellate courts
approval of respondents appointment. Petitioner itself has, on several occasions, allowed the
appointment of personnel who were initially lacking in experience but subsequently obtained the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

*General vs. Roco, GR Nos. 143366 & 143524, Jan. 29, 2001
Case digest:
FACTS:
Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26 Aug 1996 as
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank
Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President Joseph Estrada. From his
appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was only conferred CES eligibility by the
Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not
a CES eligible, was appointed by then President Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant
thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued
a memorandum directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent
Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary for

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.

HELD:
NO. Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career executive service may attain
security of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the appropriate CES rank.

*Montecillo vs. CSC, GR No. 131954, June 28, 2001

Case digest:

Montecillo vs. CSC

G.R. No. 131954. June 28, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991, on the ground that
its issuance amounted to an abuse of respondents power to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to
the Civil Service Law.
Employee positions in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) were re-classified during the
latter part of 1995 to conform with position descriptions and corresponding salary grades in the civil
service. Accordingly, while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified, three of its
employees --petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos --applied
for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary to the Assistant General Manager or Private
Secretary C, as the position later came to be known.
At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying the position of Department Secretary
and were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years.
When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC FO) by
MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO refused to approve petitioners appointments as
permanent on the ground that the position applied for was a primarily confidential and co-terminous
position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent.
ISSUE:
WON CSC abused its rule-making power
HELD:
AFFIRMED. Respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may
properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6,
Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22,
s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and
therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve. The assailed memorandum
circular can not be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law. On the contrary, it was issued
pursuant to a power expressly vested by law upon respondent. As such, it must be respected by this
Court as a valid issuance of a constitutionally independent body.

*CSC & PAGCOR vs. Salas, GR No. 123708, June 19, 1997
Case digest:
FACTS:
On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security staff
member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated by
the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

HELD:
NO. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the
position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is
no longer predominant.

*Vistan vs. Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524

Case digest:
Vistan v Nicolas; A.M. No. MTJ-87-79; 13 Sep 1991; 201 SCRA 524 (1991)
Published on 15 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine
FACTS:
Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of the campaign
period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating handbills/letters
addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a
congressional seat.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge.
HELD:
YES. For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench,
respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the statude of his office,
and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the
Code of Judicial Conduct

*Cabagnot vs. CSC, 223 SCRA 59

Case digest:
Fact:
*A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government of Aklan was
approved by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration (JCLGPA) thru the
Director of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision.
*The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364) regular plantilla positionsfrom the
previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with the office of the Governor allocatedone hundred forty
four (144) from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with theOffice of the Governor allocated
one hundred fourty four (144) from the previous sixty (60)positions.  Governor Corazon L. Cabagnot
issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officialsand employees to apply for any of the authorized
positions in the new staffing pattern forthe evaluation and assessment of the Provincial Placement
Committee which she subsequently created thru Executive Order No. 0II-88.
* Governor Corazon L. Cabagnot issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officialsand employees
to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffing pattern forthe evaluation and
assessment of the Provincial Placement Committee which she subsequently created thru Executive
Order No. 0II-88.
* The list of employees newly appointed and re-appointed was posted. Individual letterswere sent to
all employees in the list directing them to accomplish and submit the necessary documents to complete
their appointment and to report to their assigned offices.
*21 supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to Cabagnot pursuant to Section18 of the Rules
on Government Reorganization issued by the Civil Services Commissionand Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12
of Republic Act 6656 (1988) entitled An Act to Protect theSecurity of Tenure of Civil Service Officers
and Employees in the Implementation ofGovernment Reorganization . They prayed that they be
appointed to the positions theyapplied for to which they are eligible, having the required educational
background, trainingand experience. They likewise sent Cabagnot individual letters reiterating
theirqualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments to positions lowerin rank
than their positions prior to the reorganization.
*Cabagnot denied their appeal reasoning that since reorganization renders all positionsvacant, the
employees have no vested right to their original positions. Moreover, as theappointing authority, she
enjoys the prerogative to transfer employees to offices other thanthose they previously occupied if such
is necessary to make them function more effectively.Lastly, the appointments of private respondents
did not violate the Civil Service Law onsecurity of tenure as the items offered them carried the same
rate and salary they werereceiving prior to the reorganization, i.e., there was no diminution or reduction
of theirsalary.
*17 of the original 21, private respondents herein, instituted a collective appeal beforethe Civil Service
Regional Office in Iloilo City.
*Civil Service Commission found Cabagnot to have violated Sec. 7 of the Rules onReorganization and
Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. of 1988 providing preference forappointment of employees holding
permanent positions considering that privaterespondents who were all holding permanent
appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization were proposed to positions much lower than
their former items despite the fact that their old items were carried over in the new staffing pattern.
*Cabagnot filed a motion for reconsideration to which the CSC promulgatged its 2ndresolution
declaring that private respondents have been demoted. Moreover, Cabagnot wasfound to have violated
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656 providing preference for appointmentof permanent employees to the
new positions or if there are not enough comparable ones,to positions next lower in rank. Petitioner
filed the present petition.
ISSUE
WON, as a result of the reorganization undertaken by the Provincial Government of Aklan, thesecurity
of tenure of the appealing employees is impaired.
HELD/RATIO
YES.A glaring disparity exists between the former positions held by private respondents andthe
positions proposed to them by petitioner. This is fairly obvious in the case of respondentsBautista, et al.
who were given positions which were, not only lower by two grades to as much as fourteen, but which
also changed the nature of their work. This is also true with respect to respondents Martirez, et al. who
were given positions lower by one grade despite the showingthat comparable positions exist. In the
case of respondents Silva, et al. there were differences intheir proposed positions, by one or two steps.
Finally, in the case of Briones, the disparityconsists, not so much in the salary grade and/or step, but in
the nature of the work.
*Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 6656 declares as the policy of the State, the protection of thesecurity of tenure
of civil service officers and employees in the reorganization of the variousagencies of the government.
Sec. 2 requires prior determination of a valid cause after duenotice and hearing before any officer or
employee in the career service can be removed, ordemoted, which in effect is a removal.
*In order to show that valid cause for demotion exists, Cabagnot submits an evaluationsupposedly
made by the Placement Committee showing that the employees wererecommended to positions to
which they are best fitted and where they would be performing more effectively as demanded by the
interest of public service.
*However, the employees raise some serious objections regarding this evaluation. [1]This supposed
evaluation was not certified by any member of the Placement Committee.[2] The evaluation is not
complete, meaning, not all of the employees have their respectiveevaluation. [3] Its validity is dubious
because different typewriters were used which couldmean that other entries were belatedly entered. [4]
This evaluation was not submittedbefore the CSC and offered only to this Court for the first time.
*In view of the seriousness of the objections raised against the evaluation which wasthe only proof
evidencing the existence of valid cause for demotion, it was expected thatpetitioner would meet
squarely these objections. However, she chose to ignore the same.Thus, as a result of the
reorganization of the provincial government of Aklan, these employees have been demoted by their
assignment to positions which are lower than thosethey previously held, or which, though of equivalent
salary grade and step, drasticallychanges the nature of their work without a showing by petitioner of
the existence of a validcause for such demotion, which in effect is a removal, determined after due
notice andhearing.
*Citing Mendoza v. Quisumbing: If a person is dismissed from his job, he should beinformed of the
reason. The reason should be in the Civil Service Law or, at least, in the law authorizing the removal.
The reason must have a reasonable relationship to the employee's merit and fitness for the job. He
must be given, before he is fired, an aopportunity to show that the cause for removal does not apply to
him. Elementary principlesof fairness and compassion are essential. Only then can the reconciliation
and unity so earnestly sought today be achieved.
 Assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rateof
compensation is a clear case of demotion tantamount to removal when no cause isshown for it or when
it is not a part of any disciplinary action. Thus, petitioner stresses thefact that since private respondents
would be receiving the same rate of salary they werereceiving before the reorganization, therefore they
are not demoted. In the case of Floreza,we ruled that there was demotion even if Floreza was allowed
to receive the same salaryas his previous higher position. .Similarly, we find that private respondents,
notwithstandingnon-diminution of their salary, have been demoted. This arbitrariness has no place in
agovernment that nurtures the constitutional mandates of security of tenure and
dueprocess.
 In addition to a finding of demotion, the CSC also found petitioner to have violated therule on
preference for appointment of permanent employees based on Sec. 4 of RA 6656,Sec. 7 of Rules on
Organization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988 of the CSC. Therule means that "old employees
should be considered first" on the assumption, though notabsolutely true, that they have gained "not
only superior skills but also greater dedication tothe public service." This is not to say, however, that
they should be automatically appointedbecause "the law does not preclude the infusion of new blood,
younger dynamism, ornecessary talents into the government service" provided that the acts of the
appointingpower are "bonafide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosen hasthe
needed qualifications." It is less than accurate, however, to conclude that petitionerviolated the rule on
preference for appointment of permanent employees because not allappointees to the positions
formerly held by private respondents or to those comparablepositions were new appointees.
 Citing Gayatao v. CSC: It is within the power of public respondent to order there instatement of
government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. As thecentral personnel agency, CSC
has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and
due process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons
clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and
strengthening the civil service.

*Abalos vs. CSC, 196 SCRA 81

Case digest:
160. FRANCISCO ABALOS VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS:
After assuming office as Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte, the petitioner, by resolution of the
provincial board, filed with the Tanodbayan a complaint for malversation against his predecessor,
Arsenio A. Quibranza, for having used for personal purposes several bulldozers belonging to the
province. Cited as witnesses were the operators of the bulldozers, private respondents Villabona and
Yap, who allegedly executed.
These sworn statements were disowned in a joint affidavit executed on September 25, 1986, by the
private respondents, who claimed that the earlier statements were spurious. As a consequence, identical
memoranda complaint against the late Governor Arsenio A. Quibranza, thereby causing embarrassment
to the Office of the
In the meantime you are hereby suspended from work effective upon receipt thereof, until after the
termination of
On October 14, 1987, the private respondents were informed in another memorandum that formal
charges for "dishonesty and intentionally making false statements in material facts" had been filed
against them, which they should answer within 72 hours. Curiously, however, they were informed in a
separate memorandum issued on that same date that their services as equipment operators had been
terminated.
The resolution of CSRO No. 12 declaring their dismissal illegal having been sustained by the Civil
Service the investigation to be conducted in accordance with law.
1.The charge against the private respondents did not have to be investigated because they had
themselves already admitted their guilt; and
2.They could be summarily dismissed under Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree.
The petitioner stresses that on September 28, 1987, the private respondents admitted their guilt in
affidavits which he said he submitted later to the Civil Service Commission as an annex to his formal
appeal. Such sworn confessions rendered the usual investigation unnecessary as, according to him, "it
will just be a waste of government time and money to investigate a charge that has already been
admitted by the respondents. By pleading guilty, respondents waived whatever rights to a formal
investigation they had."
ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Service Commission is correct in affirming the order of Civil Service
Regional Office
No. 12 directing the reinstatement in the Provincial Engineer's Office, Lanao del Sur, of Sergio
Villabona and Eduardo Yap, Jr. on the ground that they had been illegally dismissed.
HELD:
YES. The problem with this argument is that the private respondents have rejected their supposed
confession as having been extracted from them without benefit of legal assistance. They invoke Article
III, Section 17, of the Constitution, which, together with Section 12(l), might have been the reason for
the dismissal by the Ombudsman on February 1, 1990, of the complaint for people filed against them
by the petitioner.
The results of the proceedings before the Ombudsman are, of course, not decisive of the administrative
charges.
Nevertheless, the private respondents should have been given a chance to prove in an investigation
duly called that they did not execute the affidavits against former Governor Quibranza and that they
were tricked into admitting the offense imputed to them. They were not accorded this opportunity.
Instead they were simply informed that, in view of the charge and their supposed admission thereof,
they were being summarily dismissed from the service.

The petitioner also invokes Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 and argues that in view of the private
respondents'
admission of the charge against them, they could be summarily dismissed under this section.
Section 40 read:
Sec. 40. Summary Proceedings. — No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be
immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a)When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.
(b)When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c)When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed. Provided, That removal or dismissal except those
by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission.
It is the petitioner's contention that the private respondents come under Item (a) because the charge
against them was serious and the evidence of their guilt was strong, being no less than their own sworn
confessions.
There was therefore no need of a formal investigation and no hindrance to their summary dismissal.
We do not have to rule at this time on the degree of the offense imputed to the private respondents. But
we will say here that, in view of their rejection of the confessions supposedly made by them, the
evidence of their guilt cannot by any standard be regarded as strong. Indeed, that guilt had yet to be
established by preponderant evidence, especially against the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the
perjury charge against them. Consequently, we cannot find that Item (a) of Section 40 could be validly
applied against the private respondents to justify their summary dismissal.
The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of Section 40 as against
strong protests that it was violative of due process in so far as it deprived the civil servant of the right to
defend himself against the ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been
upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing sentiment that the law
should be re-examined more closely in deference to the right to a hearing that it was foreclosing.
Fortunately, the question has been rendered moot and academic by the Congress of the Philippines,
which has itself seen fit to remove it from our statute books. The Court is happy to note the little-
known fact that at the instance of Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, a recognized constitutionalist with a
vigilant regard for due process, and Representative Narciso D. Monfort, himself an avowed advocate of
fair play, Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, which was approved on May 20, 1988,
and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988.
The private respondents were dismissed on October 14, 1987, when Section 40 was still in force. But
as already explained, it was not applicable even then in the case at bar.
There is no question that the repeal of Section 40 will further bolster the independence and integrity of
the Civil Service and protect its members from the arbitrary exercise of authority by officials with less
than the proper respect for due process of law.

-CHING

*Jacinto vs. CA, GR No. 124540, November 17, 1997

Case digest:
FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. They
incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. DECS Sec. Cariño
immediately issued a return-to-work order, but it was ignored by petitioners. Sec. Cariño issued formal
charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged with gross
misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work
directives; etc. During the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the charges
against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them guilty as charged and
imposed the penalty of dismissal except Jacinto which is and Agustin who were meted only six (6)
months suspension.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): dismissed the appeals for lack of merit
CSC: set aside the Orders of the MSPB; found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six (6)
months suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of
back salaries; the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations;
imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the service without
payment of back salaries
CA: Affirmed decision of CSC
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether civil servants are guilty of grave misconduct in participating in mass actions.
HELD: Yes. The terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes. Workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its
exercise with the proviso “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. The Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
The teachers have given cause for their suspension, for being absent in their classes and joining in the
mass actions. They were not fully innocent of the charges against them although they were eventually
found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not grave misconduct or
other offense warranting their dismissal from the service; “being found liable for a lesser offense is not
equivalent to exoneration.” In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, there was a finding that there was no proof
that she joined the unlawful mass actions.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification.

*Central Bank vs. CSC, 171 SCRA 744

G.R. No. 80455-56 April 10, 1989
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ANGELA P. JORDAN, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and BASILAO E. BORJA, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
May the Civil Service Commission disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of another
person whom it believes is more qualified for the position? This is the primordial issue addressed in
this petition for certiorari brought to this Court by the petitioners Dr. Angela 0. Jordan ** and the
Central Bank of the Philippines under Section 7, Paragraph A, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
They are questioning Resolution Nos. 87-156 1 and 87-375 2 of the Civil Service Commission dated
May 26, 1987 and October 16, 1987, respectively. The questioned resolutions directed the immediate
revocation of the appointment of Dr. Angela P. Jordan to the position of Assistant Bank Physician of the
Central Bank of the Philippines and the issuance of an appointment in favor of herein private
respondent, Dr. Basilio E. Borja to the said position.
On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of the Central Bank, with a representative of the Civil
Service Commission in attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the vacant position of Assistant
Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Salary Grade 22). It found Dr. Jordan, who then
had the rank of Coordinating Assistant (Salary Grade 20) as the only next-in-rank employee. After
considering further the qualifications of Dr. Jordan, said Board certified her for promotion to the
position of Assistant Bank Physician and submitted the proposal to the Office of the Governor of the
Central Bank.
On the other hand, it appears that as early as July, 1984, respondent Borja filed an application for the
position of Medical Director in the Central Bank. His papers were acted upon by the Promotions Board
and he was considered for the position of Physician (Salary Grade 16). The bank approved the Board's
proposal in a Resolution dated October 5, 1984. 3 On October 9, 1984, respondent Borja reported for
duty. On October 15, 1984, he was issued his appointment as Physician.
On January 2, 1985, the promotion of Dr. Jordan to Assistant Bank Physician was approved by the
Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank under Personnel Action No. 001, Series of 1985. 4 On
January 10, 1985, Dr. Jordan was designated to act as Assistant Bank Physician. On January 30, 1985,
she was issued an appointment as Assistant Bank Physician to take effect January 2, 1985. On February
15, 1985, private respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment claiming that he was the next-in-rank
employee and that he was more qualified than she. On May 16, 1985, the Bank dismissed the protest on
the grounds that the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period; that protestant is not the next in-
rank employee as regards the contested position and, as such, he was no legal personality to file the
protest; and, that the protestee aside from being the next-in-rank employee, met the requirements for
promotion.
Private respondent appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB for short). In its decision dated October
28, 1986, the MSB found the appeal meritorious and ruled that private respondent should have been the
one appointed as Assistant Bank Physician. The Bank, through Mr. Sebastian V. Palanca, Jr., Special
Assistant to the Governor, in an undated petition for reconsideration, prayed that the MSB decision be
set aside and that the Bank's decision upholding the appointment of Dr. Jordan be left undisturbed. On
January 28, 1987, e set aside its decision of October 28, 1986 and confirmed the approval of the
appointment of Dr. Jordan to the contested position.
On March 5, 1987, private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission on the grounds that he
was denied due process of law inasmuch as he was not furnished a copy of the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Bank, and that the decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 is contrary
to the merit and fitness principles enshrined in the Civil Service Law and the Constitution.
In the first indorsement dated March 19, 1987, the Commission forwarded the appeal to the Office of
the Governor of the Central Bank for his comment with the request that his comment be transmitted to
the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt. Likewise, Dr. Jordan was furnished a copy of the
appeal for her to submit her answer/comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt with a warning
that her failure to do so shall be considered a waiver of her right to submit the same. Instead of
submitting her comment, Dr. Jordan filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment.
The Central Bank, through Mr. Sebastian Palanca, Jr. filed a similar motion alleging that the Bank
received notice of the appeal on April 1, 1987. However, the Commission denied the motion of Dr.
Jordan on the ground that a protest case is not strictly an adversary proceeding where protestant and
protestee play active participation. 5
On May 26, 1987, the Commission issued Resolution No. 87156 setting aside the decision of the MSB
dated January 28, 1987 and directing the appointment of private respondent to the contested position.
On June 10, 1987, the petitioner Central Bank filed a petition for reconsideration that the department
head enjoys wide latitude of discretion as regards the appointment of department personnel and that the
question all to who is more competent is of no consequence since private respondent was not yet an
employee of the Central Bank at the time Dr. Jordan was considered for promotion. However, the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission in Resolution No. 87- 375 dated
October 16, 1987 on the sole ground that its Resolution dated May 26, 1987 had become final and
executory on account of the failure of Dr. Jordan to file a motion for reconsideration and that the
motion for reconsideration filed by Mr. Palanca, Jr. for and in behalf of the Central Bank cannot be said
to have been filed in behalf of Dr. Jordan inasmuch as the Central Bank has no personality to file a
motion for reconsideration as it does not stand to be adversely affected or personally aggrieved by the
decision of the Commission.
Hence, the present petition.
It is the contention of the petitioner Central Bank that the Civil Service Commission acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in revoking the appointment of Dr. Jordan and in directing the issuance of the
appointment in favor of Dr. Borja when all the while the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were certified by
the Promotions Board and a representative of the Civil Service Commission who was present in the
deliberations of the same board. Petitioner Bank added that the power of the Commission is limited to
determining whether or not the appointee has the appropriate eligibility and qualification and that once
such qualification was certified, the Commission is duty bound to attest to the appointment. 6
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the decision of
the Merit Systems Board dated October 28, 1986 had already become final and executory for failure of
Dr. Jordan to appeal or seek reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said decision
citing Section 2, Board Resolution No. Ill in relation to Section 39, Presidential Decree No. 807. The
Solicitor General also stressed that the petition is devoid of merit.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the Central Bank lacks the legal personality to
contest the validity of Resolution Nos. 87-375 and 87-156 as it does not stand to be adversely affected
or personally aggrieved by the decision of the Commission, citing Sections 7 and 10 of Resolution No.
811329 of the Commission. 8
It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection and
appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is a management prerogative which is
generally unhampered by judicial intervention. 9 Within the parameters of this principle, the right to
select and appoint employees is the prerogative of the employer which may be exercised without being
held liable therefor provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees
under special laws or under valid agreements and provided further that such prerogatives are not
exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.10
There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the power of appointment
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act. At
issue in this petition is the extent of the power of the Civil Service Commission to approve or
disapprove a particular appointment. May the Commission revoke an appointment and direct the
issuance of the appointment to somebody else whom it believes is more qualified for the position?
Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, 11 the Commissioner of Civil Service has the final authority on
appointments. 12 But the situation has changed under the new law, Presidential Decree No. 807, 13
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, wherein the Commission is not authorized to curtail the
discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended. 14 The
authority of the Commission is limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the law governing the Civil Service.
In the case at bar, the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were never disputed. The fact that she was qualified
was attested to by the Promotions Board. A representative of the Commission was present in the
deliberation of the said board.
Private respondent anchors his protest on the ground that he is more qualified than the appointee. It is
well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Laws. 15 The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
Private respondent alleges, however, that the power of appointment is not absolute and that the
Commission is empowered to approve or disapprove the same, citing Section 9(h) of Article V of the
Civil Service Decree and Section 4 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343. This is correct
As noted earlier, the appointment is subject to verification by the Commission as to whether or not the
appointing authority complied with the requirements of the law, otherwise, it may revoke the
appointment. However, to conclude that the Commissioner may also direct the appointment of
individuals other than the choice of the appointing power is certainly not contemplated by the law.
Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Civil Service Commission is
authorized to perform the following functions with respect to appointments in the Civil Service, to wit:
Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except
those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission has the authority to check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment must be approved; if not it should be disapproved. No other criterion may be employed by
the Commission when it acts on an appointment.
Thus, when as in this case, it is not disputed that the appointee, Dr. Jordan, is qualified for the contested
position, the Commission exceeded its power in revoking her appointment on the ground that private
respondent is more qualified. The Commission cannot substitute its will for that of the appointing
authority.
It may be true that private respondent has an edge over Dr. Jordan in terms of educational attainment
inasmuch as the former holds a post-graduate degree in Medicine from a foreign educational institution
and considering that he has had experience and training in reputable institutions here and abroad.
However, under the pertinent rules on promotion obtaining in the Central Bank, 16 educational
attainment and training experience are just among the factors to be considered in the promotion of its
employees. The other factors to be considered are performance rating, experience and outstanding
accomplishments, physical characteristics and personality traits and potential.
After evaluating the qualifications of Dr. Jordan, the Central Bank arrived at the conclusion that she
outranks the others in point of experience, rank, salary and service in the Bank. Dr. Jordan holds the
degree of Doctor of Medicine and is a graduate of the University of the Philippines. She had been with
the Central Bank since September 6, 1976. It appears that during this span of time, she had displayed a
high degree of efficiency, dedication and initiative in discharging the duties and responsibilities of her
position. She also attended various seminars, conferences, symposia and other special training courses
that enriched her knowledge in the field of medicine.
Prior to her promotion to the contested position, she held the position of bank physician from
September 6, 1976 to July 9, 1981. On July 9, 1981, Dr. Jordan was promoted to the position of
coordinating assistant. On the other hand, the private respondent was appointed to the position of bank
physician only on October 9, 1984. On one occasion private respondent was found guilty of dishonesty
for failing to reveal in his information sheet that he has a sister-in-law employed in the Central Bank.
17
The stand of the Commission that the appointee did not hold a special medical position prior to her
appointment, unlike in the case of the private respondent who held the position of bank physician is
devoid of merit. The position of coordinating assistant which was held by Dr. Jordan prior to her
promotion in the Medical and Dental Unit where she belongs is filled up only by qualified and
competent physicians.
On the basis of the foregoing, the appointing authority found that Dr. Jordan satisfied all the
requirements set by the Central Bank on promotion the wisdom of which cannot be questioned.
It must be stressed that the law does not impose a rigid or mechanical standard on the appointing
power. The appointing person enjoys sufficient discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis
of their fitness to perform the duties and to assume the responsibilities of the position to be filled. 18 As
earlier ruled in Reyes vs. Abeleda, 19 at least sufficient discretion, if not plenary, should be granted to
those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices concerned, primarily the department
heads. They are in the position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office thus
vacated. Unless the law speaks in mandatory and peremptory tone, there should be full recognition of
the wide scope of such discretionary authority. The power of appointment is essentially a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.19a
The Commission disregarded the performance ratings of Dr. Jordan submitted by the Central Bank on
the ground that the same were not signed by Dr. Jordan's immediate superior. It ruled that the absence
of performance ratings in the case of private respondent, considering his point of service, places the
protestee and the protestant on equal footing.
We disagree. As pointed out by the Central Bank, it was not possible to require Dr. Ricarte Reyes, Dr.
Jordan's immediate superior to sign her performance ratings since the former had already retired as
early as March 23, 1984, which was before the end of the first semester of 1984. Thus, at the time the
contested position was filled up it was Mr. Sebastian Palanca, Jr. who served as the immediate
supervisor of Dr. Jordan in the unit where she belongs and hence her performance ratings were signed
by the latter.
The relation of the position of Dr. Jordan and private respondent is as follows:
Physician -position to which private (Salary Grade 16) respondent was appointed on October 5, 1984
Coordinating Assistant - position of Dr. Jordan as of (Salary Grade 20) 1984 and before her
appointment as Assistant Bank Physician
Assistant Bank Physician - position to which Dr. Jordan was (Salary Grade 22) considered on October
3, 1984 and to which she was appointed on January 2, 1985. 20
Dr. Jordan holds the position of coordinating assistant (Salary Grade 20) which is next in rank to the
contested position of Assistant Bank Physician (Salary Grade 22). Private respondent holds the position
of Physician (Salary Grade 16) which without doubt is not next in rank to the contested position. As the
position of private respondent is not next-in- rank, the Commission should have dismissed his appeal as
he had no legal personality to contest the appointment of Dr. Jordan. Only employees who are next-in-
rank may protest an appointment. 21 In implementing Section 19 of P.D. No. 807 the Civil Service
Commission promulgated Resolution No. 83-34322 which provides as follows:
Within fifteen (15) days from notice of issuance of an appointment, a next in-rank employee who is
competent and qualified and who feels aggrieved by the promotion of another may file a protest to the
ministry or agency head. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Court takes note that at the time Dr. Jordan was considered and recommended for promotion to the
contested position on October 3, 1984, private respondent was not yet an employee of the Central
Bank. It was only on October 5, 1984 that he was appointed as physician and he assumed the position
only on October 9, 1984. It was, therefore, impossible to consider him for appointment to the contested
position before that time.
Anent the argument of the respondents that the Central Bank lacks the legal personality to contest the
decision of the Commission and hence the decision became final and executory for failure of Dr.
Jordan to file a motion for reconsideration, the Court finds the argument untenable. In an earlier case,
23 this Court held that it is the appointing authority who stands adversely affected where the Civil
Service Commission disapproves the appointment made. This rule is acknowledged by the Solicitor
General. However, the Solicitor General contradicted himself by insisting that the decision of the MSB
dated October 28, 1981 became final and executory for failure of Dr. Jordan to file a motion for
reconsideration when all the while the Central Bank filed a timely motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner Central Bank, as the appointing authority is the one which can defend its appointment since
it knows the reasons for the same. Any final determination of the issue can only be enforced through it.
Moreover, it is the act of the appointing authority that is being questioned. Indeed, when the
Commission directed the Central Bank to submit its Comment on the appeal filed by private respondent
the Commission must have been aware that the participation of the Central Bank is indispensable.
Although the Commission also directed Dr. Jordan to file a separate Comment, it denied the latter's
request for an extension of time within which to file the same on the ground that a protest case is not
strictly an adversary proceedings where the protestant and the protestee play active roles. The
Commission pointed out that a protest case is an action of the protestant against a determination made
by the appointing authority, a determination which only the appointing authority could defend
inasmuch as it is the latter who knows the reasons for such determination.24 Thus, for the Commission
to say thereafter that the decision became final and executory for failure of Dr. Jordan to appeal is
obviously erroneous. As a matter of fact that Commission is now in estoppel. After making the parties
believe that the Central Bank may participate in the controversy, the Commission cannot later make a
total tum about by alleging that the participation of the Central Bank is inconsequential as it lacks the
requisite legal personality.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated
May 26, 1987 and October 16, 1987, respectively, are hereby declared null and void and the
Commission is directed to attest the appointment of Dr. Angela Jordan as Assistant Bank Physician. No
costs.
This Decision is immediately executory.