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314. Goitia v. DOCTRINE: SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. — The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and
Campos - Rueda, treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.
35 Phils 252
FACTS:
MANLONGAT That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that
she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living
separate from her husband.
HELD:
The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is
dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on
the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate
it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict
legal sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. the pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment
of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means
of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the
marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
315. Mariano FACTS: Case is an action by the husband to compel wife to return to the marital home & cohabit w/ him.
Arroyo v. Dolores ● 1910: Mariano & Dolores married. Even with short intervals of separation, they lived together as
Vasques de husband and wife until July 4, 1929 in Iloilo.
Arroyo, ● After many efforts convincing Dolores to return the matrimonial home, Mariano initiated this
G.R. No. L-17014, petition to compel Dolores to do so.
42 Phil 54 ● Dolores admitted the marriage & leaving their home. She alleged as defense that she had been
compelled to leave by his husband’s cruel treatment. She prayed for affirmative relief consisting of
August 11, 1921 (1) a decree of separation, (2) liquidation of conjugal partnership; (3) allowance for counsel fees &
Street, J. permanent separate maintenance.
● Lower court decided in favor of Dolores, reaching the conclusion that Mariano was more to blame
OCULTO than Dolores- authorized her to live apart from her husband, granted P400 monthly alimony, &
directed Mariano to pay Dolores’ counsel fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dolores act of leaving the matrimonial home is justified - - - NO
Whether or not Dolores should receive allowance for her separate maintenance - - - NO
Whether Dolores can be compelled by the Court to return home and cohabit w/ Mariano - - - NO
HELD:
● No. Dolores’ abandonment of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.
○ Dolores is afflicted with w/ a disposition of jealousy towards her Mariano in an aggravated
degree. This has caused difficulties to their marital relations. In so far as the proof in record
shows that neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity or has
given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relation with any person, the tales of cruelty
against Mariano are no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles normal to a
married couple. Dolores’ complaint is not well-founded.
● No. Provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears
that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from
the fault of the husband.
Articles 142 & 143 of the Civil Code clearly expressed the obligation imposed by the law on the husband to
maintain the wife as his duty universally recognized in civil society.
○ Goitia v Campos Rueda: where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to
live apart from her husband, she can compel him to make provision for her separate
maintenance.
○ HOWEVER, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts
should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of
the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a
state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned.
○ Davidson v Davidson: an action for support of the wife separate from the husband will only
be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative. The imperative necessity is the only
ground which such proceeding can be maintained.
The duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties admitted.
Cruelty in law: What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are
not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of
passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty.
● Dolores is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit
with Mariano. However, it is not within the province of the courts to compel her to do so.
○ Experience of countries where the court of justice has assumed to compel the cohabitation
of a married couple shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. In the
past, contempt in case of disobedience was met with imprisonment, and later a decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights.
○ Court is unable to hold that Mariano is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for
the Dolores’ return to the marital domicile, which is sought in his petition. He is certainly
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife presented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return.
Decision is REVERSED. Court declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause and that she is admonished that it is her duty to return.
ISSUE: WON Lourdes is entitled to demand for maintenance despite leaving their conjugal dwelling.
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the wife by the husband,
gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown it was the husband who took his wife to her parents' home
where he left her. The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from
accepting any later, because according to the latter, she was demanding for more, only indicates that even
before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already providing something for the
separate maintenance. Considering that the wife has no income of her own, while the husband has an
employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by the trial court for the wife's monthly support does not seem to be
unreasonable. Needless to state that, as the separation has been brought about by the husband and under
the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the
parties shall take place.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is hereby revived, without costs. So ordered.
Facts:
● Petitions for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
● July 11, 1942 - Erlinda Kalaw (petitioner) and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony ad lived
together for 30 years.
● 1972 - they were separated from bed and board (legally separated) for undisclosed reasons
● They had 6 children namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age
50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
● Due to overdose of drugs that was intook by Potenciano, (200mg of Zoloft depressant) his health
was deteriorated.
● February 25, 1998 - Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the his age (86), frail health, poor eyesight, and impaired judgement.
● Upon Potenciano’s leave with no return, Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of
lawyer Potenciano Illusorio.
● CA denied due course, as it hereby dismissed for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject of the petition and granted Erlinda’s visitation rights.
● October 11, 1999 - Potenciano filed an appeal via certiorari that he never refused to see Erlinda and
their children.
Issue:
● W/N the wife, ERLINDA ILUSORIO, may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel Potenciano to
live with her
Held:
● No. Erlinda Illusario cannot secure a writ of habeas corpus for Potenciano to live with her.
● The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant
of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
● The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of
the individual to discern his actions.
● He did not object to see his children and wife; Court observed that he is in rightful state of mind -
able to make his own rightful choices.
● No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs. In G.R. No.
139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. Designation of domicile
Issue: W/N a married woman can acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during
the existence of the marriage.
Held. YES.
As a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the
theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that,
from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote,
strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony
prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. "Under modern laws it
is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile from of the wife is determined by that of her
husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her
husband where the theorical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties
by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to
cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of
the husband's domicile.
FC 70, 194, 94 (1) and (last par.), 121 (1) and (last par.), 146
FC 73 as amended by RA 10572 (May 24, 2013), compare with NCC 117, FC Art. 94 (2), (3); FC Art. 121 (2), (3) Art. II Sec. 14 and
Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. R.A. 7192, “An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development and Nation
Building”
F. Related rights/obligations
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage should be declared void on the ground of Psychological Incapacity – NO. Petition
GRANTED.
HELD:
1. Justice Vitug: psychological incapacity refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; this condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
2. It should be characterized by: a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence and c) incurability
3. In the present case:
○ There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity—but
merely a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations
○ Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity
○ It is essential to show that the parties are incapable of meeting their marital responsibilities
and not mere failure
○ No gravity in the problem, neither juridical antecedence nor incurability
4. Court invited two amici curiae (Most rev Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno) [Molina Doctrine]
a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff- any doubt
should be resolved in --favor of the validity and continuation of the marriage—permanence,
solidarity and inviolability of marriage
b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
1. medically or clinically identified;
2. alleged in the complaint;
3. sufficiently proven by experts and
4. clearly explained in the decision—the evidence must convince the court that the
parties or one of them, was mentally or psychologically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
c. The incapacity must be proven existing during the time of the celebration of the marriage
d. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable—
incapacity must be relevant to assumption of marriage obligations not necessarily those not
related to marriage like exercise of profession
e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage- illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability
and not a refusal, neglect or difficulty much less ill will
f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts 68-71 of family code (to
husband and wife) and ARTs 220, 221 and 225 (parents and their children)
g. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts—Art 36 taken from the Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law (1983)- what is
decreed to be canonically void be also civilly void
h) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to
appear as counsel for the state
ISSUE: WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of
name?
HELD: NO
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. While it is
true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register.
The civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real
name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A
name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul.
In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead,
prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage
to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows:
● Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible
means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of
the wife by the husband (talaq); xxx xxx xxx (c) Judicial decree (faskh).
Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
● Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
become irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be
severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda
(Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of
the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083).
Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing
laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband
(Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372,
Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
● Art. 370. A married woman may use:
○ (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
○ (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
○ (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as "Mrs." Art. 371.
○ In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees
otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless,
no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such
circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be
applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname.
In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been
alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition
for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course
and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
ISSUE:
● W/N parents-in-law may be included in a petition under RA 9262 –YES
HELD:
Sec. 3 of VAWC defines violence against women and their children as “any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.
Sec 47 of VAWC expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. — For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as VAWC, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Therefore, general provisions of the RPC which by their nature are necessarily applicable may be applied
suppletorily.
In addition, Sec 5 of VAWC expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children
may be committed by an offender through another person.
322. San Diego vs FACTS: Petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13, 2010 2 and October 5,
RTC, G.R. No. 2010 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied
193960, Jan. 07, petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
2013 ANTECEDENTS:
● That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, the above-named
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, . . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
y SAN DIEGO, petitioner,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's
COURT, BRANCH 59, back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and
ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA), BY ITS dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
PRESIDING JUDGE ● After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
PARASQUIAMBAO; THE
OFFICE OF THE CITY
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009.
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES ● August 12, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion
CITY (PAMPANGA); AND to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident, he was no
ABC, respondents.
longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
PERLAS-BERNAB, ● Private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
J incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to
YNIGUEZ petitioner, but the latter could not pay. She asked if he was responsible for spreading rumors about
her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner which he retaliated to
which he inflicted on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
● The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties' dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a
prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the petitioner.
HELD. NO.
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. . . .
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered
as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or
her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of
such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.
Finally, the Court Ends the Order 9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the
Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party,
to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com Case No. 09-5210. SO ORDERED.
ISSUE/S:
● WoN issuing a TPO ex parte is violative of the petitioner’s rights to due process, ergo the TPO must
be lifted. - NO
HELD:
● Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262)
● We find no merit to declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
● The court is authorized to issue a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Thus, it is within
the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that
the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
This is clearly stated in R.A. No. 9262, and is not violative of the petitioner’s right to due process.
● It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.
● A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
● The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim.
● It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
● WHEREFORE, the petition to lift the TPO is DENIED. The RTC hereby ORDERED to resolve with
dispatch respondent's Petition for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
● SO ORDERED.
RTC Ruling:
TPO given, was made permanent thereafter. Ordered BBB to provide support (62.9k/month)
● BBB petitioned to CA, issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their
children, (c) directives for him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings
who shall be awarded custody of the children.
ISSUE:
● W/N acts of VAWC can be compromised- NO
● W/N the RTC should determine who will be awarded the custody of the children. -YES
HELD:
● Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a
TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially
being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend
that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements. It bears
stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 041011SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women
● Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue
of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. AM No. 10416SC, on the other hand, directs the
referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by
R.A. No. 9262.
● the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO.
Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO relative to who shall be granted custody over the three
children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing
financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.
● Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they
want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then
the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children
would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be
modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt
to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial
support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant
to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the
children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or
increased proportionately
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated
August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order,
dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except
items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the
aforecited items after determining with dispatch the following: (1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise
custody over the three children; (2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and (3) the
amount and manner of providing financial support.
● Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two
children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.
● In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident
status in September of 2008.
● AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no Financial support, and
only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to
augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse,
BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB
had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.
ISSUE:
W/N Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse
under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place
outside the Philippines?
HELD:
YES. We say that even if the alleged extramarital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional
anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond
the reach of Philippine courts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.