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This essay is dedicated to Howard Zinn who has been an unfailing infuence in the creation of it...
The Vietnam “War” was the paradigm of what was to come. JFK's choice to
be the prime mover of the grandiose plan to blend military tactics with
business practices, was Robert McNamara (1916-2009), he too a Harvard
man, intelligence offcer during WWII, and best of all, an experienced whiz
kid of commercialism who had restructured the Ford Motor Company from
being a family mom and pop motor company into that of a slick, modern
affair.
It is obvious that Mac's push for radical change was going to agitate some
fellows whose feet he had stepped on. These furious ones were the senior
offcers who had seen combat in World War II and the Korean War, and
who were referred to as the “brown shoes.” They, often being so
disorientated with their disgust for Mac's new principles of war conduct,
often forgot that they were in Asian jungles and not Europe—just not
getting it right when conducting battles with their tactics of days long gone
by. The confusion, the rancor, was felt by the troops who concluded that
most offcers were only interested in their promotion opportunities, and
did not really know what they were doing. Mac's weird hybrid way of
commanding-managing an army in Vietnam, had created an offcer corps
that did not very well know the basics of soldiering—its core function. Too
many other considerations were in the way, and the resulting muddiness
contributed to producing one of the DisUnited States' most disgraceful
historical episodes.
It was Confucius (551-479 BC) who said “To allow people to go to war
without frst instructing them is to betray them.” (A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy by Professor Wing-Tsit Chan, page 42.) Mac was great at
betrayal! Midstream the Vietnam “snafu” he resigned his post, Secretary of
Defense, in November 1967, causing an incredible uproar among his offcer
corps and the grunts stationed on the Cambodian border some distance
from where Jacqueline Kennedy, visiting Angkor Wat, had vacationed that
same month! When hundreds of feld offcers were fragged to death by
recalcitrant infantrymen, the Pentagon was forced to form an all-volunteer
army (1973). Today, generals squeak like politicians, and company Chief
Executive Offcers bark like generals used to!
For it was the Vietnam incursion that had served as a prima facie “business”
logistics experiment, and that that (sic) had put the nihil obstat imprimatur on
the marriage between the military and the industrial sectors of the
galloping American economy suffering to escape the 1962 recession.
“What's good for General Motors, is good for the United States of
America!” War is good good—goody good good.
The Vietnam “War” had taken up the economic slack, and had set invoices
fying for defective howitzer projectiles, C-rations, mosquito repellent,
boots with steel-plated soles, medicines, R&R (Rest & Recuperation) fights
throughout the Pacifc, uniforms, tanks, sundry packs, canteens, ammo
packs, faulty M-16 rifes, dog tags rimmed with black rubber bands, fags,
air mattresses, poncho liners, entrenching tools, plastic knives, forks, and
spoons, and, for sure, conexes (containers) jammed packed with beer and,
for the medics, bottles flled with 500 pills of 10mg Libriums. Who wasn't
in on the very frst gargantuan military-industrial windfall wrought from the
drawing boards of some of the DisUnited States' most prestigious logistics'
experts? Corrupt supply sergeants thought they were in heaven! Even draft-
dodging anti-war activists—when the spread sheets were fnally broken
down into the proft columns—stopped throwing rocks, washed the
stinking tear gas off themselves, put on jackets and ties, and happily
volunteered to join the ranks of the Yuppies. The Americans just want to
have their cake and eat it, too!
If you had been an offcer in the U S Army during the Vietnam debacle,
you might have heard mention of Sun Tzu's classic, The Art of War. Majors
and colonels were almost ecstatic that they had read the tome, because
doing so had given them some sort of prestige—some kind of recognition
that they could read and were up on their military history, its tactics, its
strategies. Nevertheless, regards the Vietnam fasco, it can be said that there
were two very important pieces of advice in Sun Tzu's genuinely wise
collection of the do's and dont's of warfare that had gone over the heads of
the DUS's army buffs.
The frst of these is Sun Tzu's monition that when warfare is in reality
necessary—it should be avoided at all costs—confict must be immediate
and precise, and after the victory, troops should be recalled home and not
stationed in captured zones; but, if they are to remain, they must conduct
themselves in a virtuous manner with those whom they had vanquished.
This meant that efforts had to be made to win the hearts and minds of the
once enemy forces—a very wise concept anathema to Pentagon personnel
programmed to be self-righteous thugs.
Even Sun Tzu, two thousand years ago, suggested wars in far off places will
cause a drain on a nation's economy thus causing enormous stress for its
citizens. Wars should not be protracted; and, the best way to fght is to use
the weapons of the conquered nation to fnish off the rest of its forces. This
second Tzuian precept gives us a hint at how Sun Tzu might have
conducted warfare in today's economic standoff between economically
competing nations—particularly the DUS and China.
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