II.

QUASI-DELICT

a. Historical Background – read the fulltext for the history 

1.Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in
the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers.
Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property.
It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had
Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.
Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for
his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

b. Definition
1.Picart vs Smith, GR L-12219, March 15, 1918
FACTS:
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on
the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he
did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse
fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – La Union – absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such
as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
RULING:
Yes, he is liable.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

2.Cusi, et al vs PNR, GR L-29889, May 31, 1979

Facts: Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party
which broke up at about 11 o'clock that evening, the spouses proceeded home
in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the
railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that
there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train,
Cusi merely slack ened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same
time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision
between the two.
This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to lose the earnings
they used to enjoy as successful career people.
The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross negligence of
Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the collision; that had he made a full
stop before traversing the crossing as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992
(Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of the train,
and thus, there would have been no collision.

Issue: WON Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the collision

Ruling: NO, Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that
care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.
Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were
manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the
operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the other, the
3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena
was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the
warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as
observed by the lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle,
thus: "... he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his
whistle. That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the
fact that notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes, the train did not stop
until it reached a distance of around 100 meters."
Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to
avoid injury to -himself and to others. We find no need for him to have made a
full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no
reason to anticipate the impending danger
The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the
railroad crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before
proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no
warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming
train. They safely traversed the crossing. On their return home, the situation at
the crossing did not in the least change, except for the absence of the guard or
flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for passage
as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened his speed and
proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of speed for going over
railroad crossings

3.Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa
Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip
when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping
counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died
after 14 days. She was 6 years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake
and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed
a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral
damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneth’s act of
clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent
in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled
that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a
defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the
store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of
negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule
that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time
to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor
whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e.,
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by
the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of
the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of
a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory
negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we
accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could
not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of
Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an
inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer
waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the
child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was
just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The
time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would
want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.

4.Child Learning vs Tagorio, 426 SCRA 236

FACTS: Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and
maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the boy’s comfort
room in Marymount. He started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He
then decided to open the window to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell
down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which includes
the Spouses Limon. They claim that the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s
comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of
the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had
exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience
of its students. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the
Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not the school was negligent for
the boy’s accidental fall. RULING: YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed
to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a
defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the
window where Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was defective. The architect witness
testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in place. Further, the fact that
Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside.

That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character
as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the
doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the
window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the
window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact
is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it
was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-
working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part. Petitioners’
argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the
employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this
case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the
window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate
cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence.
PETITION DENIED.
c. Degrees of Negligence
1. Ilao-Oretar vs Ronquillo, 535 SCRA 633
Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo had not been blessed with a child despite
several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-
consultant and chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center. Dr.
Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted
through the patient‘s abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine
the real cause of her infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva
Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures
including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the
scheduled time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor
was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‘s Medical Center for breach
of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed
for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the
hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and other available reliefs and
remedies. The RTC decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual damages but ruled that
the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been
deprived of any job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court of
Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to arrive at the scheduled time for the
procedure
HELD:
It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just
gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that
excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules
out its characterization as gross.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta‘s negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages. Neither
are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney‘s fees as, contrary to the
finding of the CA that the spouses “were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest,” the
records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court.

2. Amado vs Rio, 95 Phil 33

Facts:
This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her original complaint, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect
from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son, Filomeno
Managuit, who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The main allegation of said original
complaint was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o’clock in the morning, while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on
board M/S ’Pilar II’ as such seaman, he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and as a
consequence of which, he was drowned."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 1, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that said allegation does not show
that the death of plaintiff’s son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment," and that,
accordingly, the complaint does not state a cause of action. This motion was granted and the complaint dismissed,
accordingly, by an order dated December 11, 1950. A motion for the reconsideration of this order having been
denied, plaintiff appealed to this Court, which, on October 30, 1952, rendered a decision affirming the order
appealed from, but "without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff, the mother of the deceased seaman, to file an
amended complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice by the clerk of the trial court that the record of this case
had been remanded to and received by the trial court, without costs." Hence, on December 22, 1952, plaintiff filed
an amended complaint, paragraph 4 of which alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the
course of his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant’s M/S ’Pilar II’, which was
anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by
the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned."cralaw virtua1aw
library
A motion to dismiss this amended complaint upon the ground of failure to state a cause of action was granted and
the case, consequently, dismissed without costs. A reconsideration of this action having been denied, the case is
once again before us on appeal.

Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. The same was amended, first, by Act No. 3812, then, by Commonwealth Act No. 210 and, lastly, by Republic
Act 772. The latter, however, took effect on June 20, 1952 or after the accident upon which plaintiff bases her
cause of action. Hence, in the consideration of this case, we shall disregard the provisions of said Republic Act No.
772. Sections 2 and 4 of Act No. 2428, prior to its latest amendment, read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the
result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.."

"SEC. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent
of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the
laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same."cralaw virtua1aw library

Issue: WON whether the accident was compensable? Was the negligence of notorious?
Ruling: "The phrase ’due to and in the pursuance of’ used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to ’arising out of and in the course of’. Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Muller
Construction Co. v. Industrial Board (283 Ill., 148; 118 N. E., 1028; 1 W. C. L., 943), said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

‘The words ’arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the
words ’in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the
use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries
arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workmen’s
employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk
or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all
persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular
employment are excluded.’"

Adopting a liberal view, it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his
employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where — according to the amended
complaint — he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his
employment. Indeed, the latter was not "the origin or cause of said accident. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may
have grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or
incidental to such work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said
bill. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which
any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed
had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had.

"Gross negligence is defined to be the want of even slight care and diligence." (Mobile & M. R. Co. v. Aschcraft
[1872] 48 Ala., 15.)

"By gross negligence is meant ’such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is
conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to
person or property of others.’ . . The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property." (Wall v. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo., 275; see, also, The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by
Francisco, 2nd ed., p. 877.)

It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang,
Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the
safety" of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness
and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury."cralaw virtua1aw library

In none of these cases was the danger as apparent or imminent as when Filomeno Managuit jumped into the sea
to recover his 2-peso bill. Hence, there is more reason to hold that his death was caused by his notorious
negligence.
So, also, if, while Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up
the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to
compensation, his act being obviously innocent. In such case, it could be said, in the words of the Lord President in
Lauchlan v. Anderson (S. C. 529), that "He had the right to be at the place . . . he was within the time during which
he was employed . . . and he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do — a workman of his
sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again." (See Ramos
v. Poblete Et. Al., 40 Off. Gaz., 3474). Jumping into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it
entails being clear, potent and obvious.

d. Standard of Conduct
i. General Rule
1. Picart vs Smith, supra
2. Sicam vs Jorge, GR 159617, August 8, 2007

FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in
Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were
found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in
the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the
pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification
for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents
appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual
value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they
are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner;
and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

3. Corinthian Gardens vs Sps. Tanjuangco, GR 160795, June 27, 2008

FACTS:
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City,
which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. ). On the other hand, Frank and Teresita
Cuaso own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a
relocation survey was necessary.
As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house,
Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.
Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz Construction Co., Inc.
build their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square meters. No amicable settlement
was reached between the parties.
Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused,
prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
** The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house,
and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to
litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence.
 The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been
involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held
answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Corinthian Gardens Association is liable for negligence, in approving the building plan
and whether or not it acted in good faith in doing so.

HELD: YES, Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its
approval of the Cuasos' building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection and not actual site
measurement. Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into Tanjangcos'
property - despite the inspection conducted - constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the
injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
ii. Special Circumstances
1. Hrs. of Completo vs Albayada, GR 172200, July 6, 2010
FACTS:
Parties:Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, 527th Base
Security Squadron, 520th Airbase, Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base (VAB), Pasay City. Petitioner
Redentor Completo (Completo), was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, owned and operated by co-petitioner
Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).
Antecedent Facts: Armando Albayda Jr. filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasay City alleging that
while on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, a taxi driven by Redentor
Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Albayda alleged that the proximate cause
of the incident was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the accident was in the employ of Abiad.
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab along 8th Street, VAB, when
suddenly he heard a strange sound from the rear right side of the taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he
found Albayda lying on the road and holding his left leg. He immediately rendered assistance and brought Albayda
to PAFGH for emergency treatment. He also asserted that he was an experienced driver who, in accordance with
traffic rules and regulations and common courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already reduced his speed to
twenty (20) kilometers per hour even before reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets.
In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed, causing him to suddenly lose control of the bicycle and
hit the rear door on the right side of the taxicab. The trial court ruled in favor of Albayda. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling but modified the amount of damages.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not Completo was the one who caused the collision;
2. Whether or not Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family; and
3. Whether or not the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees to Albayda had no basis.
HELD:
1. YES. Completo was the one who caused the collision.
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the
motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the
diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
In this regard, the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact. It was proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding
at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious
physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
Completo did not slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was also
proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is
fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care
to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle. At the slow speed of ten
miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles per
hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-second action may be insufficient to avoid an accident. It
is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa.
Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent
differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the
bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more
dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa.
2. YES. Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees, but the employers' responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer
was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In other
words, the burden of proof is on the employer. The trial court's finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable
care to avoid collision with Albayda at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the
part of Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
quasi-delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and
direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee.
The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees, employers
should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures
for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he
required the latter to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Abiad likewise stressed that Completo
was never involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and that, as operator of the taxicab, he would
wake up early to personally check the condition of the vehicle before it is used.The protestation of Abiad to escape
liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial
evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal
presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
3. The award for moral and temperate damages to Albayda had a valid basis.
However, award of attorney's fees was deleted. Albayda incurred a considerable amount for the necessary and
reasonable medical expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn increased wages, cost of
occupational therapy, and harm from conditions caused by prolonged immobilization. Temperate damages, more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable
under the circumstances. Doubtless, Albayda suffered immeasurable pain because of the incident caused by
petitioners' negligence. The court vicariously feels the pain the plaintiff [Albayda] suffered a number of times- fter
he was bumped by defendants' cab, when the doctors bore holes into his left knee, when he was tractioned, when
he was subjected to an operation and after operation. When he took the witness stand to testify, pain was written
[on] his face. He does deserve moral damages. Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. The permanent deformity and the scar left by the wounds suffered by Albayba will forever be a reminder
of the pain and suffering that he had endured and continues to endure because of petitioners' negligence.
Thus, the award of moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) is proper.
However, the award of attorney's fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in
refusing to satisfy respondent's just and valid claim.
2. Pacis vs Morales, GR 169467, Feb. 25, 2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top
Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the
store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which
was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left
the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it
on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to
return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred
in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him
because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was
reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for
the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs,
compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code,
petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100
of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case,
instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an
independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners
based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any
person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own
negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the
“Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling
of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any
injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business
dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns
accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an
accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the
gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should
have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept
a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to
repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much
less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability
in this case.

iii. Children
1.Taylor vs Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles
of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he
was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his
age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found
20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for
damages due to the company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the
power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the
company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led
to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps.
It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce
an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by
his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be
any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he
cannot demand reparation therefor from another.”

2.Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377 supra

iv. Experts

1.Culion vs Philippines, 55 Phil 129

Facts:
Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing
trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline
consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in
machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor
needed to be installed. In the course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the
gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s
trial run, the engine stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally
engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the
recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts
that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.
Issue:
Whether or not Quest was negligent.
Ruling: YES.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable
for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason,
possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his
mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we
think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate
precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the
Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether
the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.