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MALLARI v. CA
265 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 110569, December 9, 1996
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms / Lawful Arrests / Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

FACTS: On December 27, 1990, Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then assigned at the Capas Police
Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest for
Homicide in 1989, was seen at Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. Immediately upon receipt of such information, with personal
knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant, they proceeded to Sta. Rita, Capas,
Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the house of appellant and arrested him.
Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition.
He was brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while the homemade
gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian.

At the time of the arrest and seizure of the gun and live ammunition, the officers did not have with them a search
and seize warrant. They did not possess the standing warrant arrest for the Homicide case as well. However, they
contended that they knew that there was a standing warrant of arrest. And at such, they did not possess the said
warrant because they were in a hurry that if they will wait for the warrant officer, they may not reach the accused
to effect his arrest immediately. When they returned to Capas Police Station, however, they reached the warrant
officer and the warrant was shown to Mallari.

After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. The
trial court and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions. He, however, insists that there was no standing warrant for his arrest, thereby making the search and
seizure invalid. He posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search and seizure
unlawful. He also claims that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in his
possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license therefor and absent this essential element of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms, it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the search and seizure could be validly effected as it was done on the occasion
of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the act of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms
in the presence of the arresting officers. Also, the Office of the Solicitor General did not attempt to point out any
evidence on record of petitioner’s non-possession of a license or permit for there really is no such evidence. It relied
on the theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or “paltik” and is illegal per se, it could not have been
the subject of license. This, according to the Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of proving that petitioner
had no license to possess the firearm.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the arresting officer needs to have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest
2.) Whether or not there is a need to prove that there is in fact no license to possess the firearm

HELD:

1.) No. The applicable provision is Section 7, Rule 113 which allows a police officer to effect arrest without the
warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. The rule allows a police officer to effect arrest without
the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. Thus, appellant’s arrest being lawful, the search and
seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.
2.) Yes. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a negative
fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the
prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, the
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testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP that petitioner was not a licensee of the
said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element
of the crime of illegal possession. The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders
petitioner's conviction erroneous.

The Court did not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, it is
illegally manufactured and cannot be issued a license or permit, and is no longer necessary to prove that it is
unlicensed. This appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition. However the Court did not yield to it because
nothing was said about such, that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is
a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed. Hence, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

RATIO: Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. - When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant
the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession
at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him
as soon as practicable.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have
the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

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PEOPLE v. CALING
208 SCRA 821, G.R. No. 94784, May 8, 1992
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms

FACTS: On August 2, 1989, Emerchon Pua, a truck driver, was drinking beer and gin in front of his house, together
with Marcelino Alindayu, and four others. Emerchon’s brother, Raymundo Pua, was also there. It was while they
were thus occupied that another truck driver, Angelito Caling, arrived at the place, driving a truck, with Felino Neri.
Caling’s truck could not pass the road leading to his employer’s house because two of Emerchon’s own trucks, were
blocking the way. Caling asked Emerchon to move his trucks, but the latter said, "Sorry, the truck won’t start."
Obviously irritated, Caling then roughly backed up his truck and took another road to his employer’s residence. Not
long afterwards, while at his employer’s house, Caling heard one of Emerchon’s trucks being started. Believing they
had been lied to and unnecessarily inconvenienced, Caling and Felino Neri decided to confront Emerchon. Neri had
with him an M-14 rifle.

Caling and Neri saw Emerchon in his truck. Caling forthwith went up the stepping or running board of the vehicle
and said to him: "Putang ina mo, pare, umaandar pala, sabi mo hindi umaandar, para kang hindi logger, pareho tayo
lahat loggers." Emerchon replied that the truck really would not start earlier, and he was unaccountably able to start
it then, "only by chance." At this point, two shots were heard from the rear of the truck, after which Caling’s
companion, Felino Neri, ran towards Emerchon stating the obvious, that he had a rifle. Caling allegedly told Neri,
"Banatan mo na, pare." Neri then fired at Emerchon, hitting him below the chest, on the left side of the abdomen.
Raymundo took hold of him, and rushed him to the Isabela Provincial Hospita. Nothing could however be done for
Emerchon. He expired from the bullet wounds inflicted on him, numbering two, according to the physician who
conducted the post-mortem examination.

The Trial Court found Caling’s guilt of the crime, as co-conspirator, and rendered judgment convicting Caling "as co-
principal of the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for
and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended.
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Caling has then appealed and attributes to the Trial Court the following errors: 1) failing to perceive that "the
evidence for the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the crime charged"; and 2) "finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm used in homicide."

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in
Homicide

HELD: No. The Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the special complex crime of
Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar
as material to the present case, is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any
firearm . . . (or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit and/or
license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion
perpetua. The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm without
license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. Now, if,
"with the use of an unlicensed firearm," a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is more
heavily punished, with the capital punishment. It is aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission
of a homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of
possession of the unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in the former. The mere possession of a firearm
without legal authority consummates the crime under PD 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier
by the firearm’s use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of
possession, and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal Code. The use of an unlicensed firearm
in the perpetration of a homicide or murder gives rise to the crime of unlawful possession in its aggravated form,
not the "special complex crime" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. A prosecution for unlawful possession
under PD 1866 can only result, assuming evidence of guilt to be adequate, in a conviction for unlawful possession,
simple or aggravated, not for homicide or murder.

In a prosecution for this offense, therefore, it is incumbent on the Government to prove, not only that the accused
was in possession of a firearm — in this case, an M-14 rifle, but also that said accused had not first obtained a license
or permit therefor from the appropriate authorities. Notable in the proofs of the prosecution is (1) the absence of
any evidence to establish that Neri’s possession of the rifle was unlawful; i.e., no license or permit had been first
obtained therefor; and (2) the absence of the rifle itself. Of course, the actuality of Felino Neri’s possession of a rifle,
supposedly an M-14, cannot but be conceded, in view of the evidence. There is, however, nothing in the record by
which a conclusion of whether that rifle is unlicensed or not — and therefore unlawfully possessed or not - may be
drawn. Given this indisputable circumstance, it is not possible to find either Neri or Caling guilty of unlawful
possession of the weapon. If the crime of simple unlawful possession of firearm cannot be ascribed to Caling or Neri,
a fortiori, the offense of unlawful possession in its aggravated form cannot be imputed to them.

RATIO: "SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. If
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."

The elements of the offense of what may be denominated "simple illegal possession" under PD 1866 are two: (a)
possession of a firearm or ammunition, and (b) lack or absence of prior license or permit to possess the same.

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PEOPLE v. MOLINA
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292 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998

Murder with Special Aggravating Circumstance of Using Unlicensed Firearms

FACTS: On August 14, 1989, at Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Ilagan, Province of Isabela, a shooting incident,
reportedly between two political factions, resulted in the death of a town mayor, a Sangguniang Bayan member and
two others; and the wounding of at least six other persons after a heated conversation at a funeral wake. The
accused, had in their respective possessions the following firearms, to wit: Veriato Molina - an M-14 armalite rifle;
Ruben Molina - a cal. 38 revolver; Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola - M-16 armalite rifles; and John
Doe, Richard Doe, Michael Doe, and Mark Doe - M-16 armalite rifles and a cal. 30 garand rifle, which were loaded
with their corresponding ammunitions, without the necessary license and/or authority to possess and carry the said
firearms and ammunitions outside their residence issued by the corresponding government authorities, and which
they used in the shooting and killing of Mayor Bonifacio Uy, Municipal Councilor Antonio Manaligod, Jaime Vargas,
and Policarpio Estrada, and the serious wounding of Manuel Mariano, Andres Figarola, Moises de la Cruz, and Wilma
Acierto with intent to kill, treachery, abuse of superiority and with the aid of armed men and of nocturnity.

The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and frustrated murder qualified by
treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. The lower court also found both accused-appellants
guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene included a Smith
and Wesson revolver (.38 caliber), bearing SN (Serial Number) C617376, and six spent shells which were found by
the NBI to have been fired from the aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, certified that said revolver had been issued to Veriato Molina of Amulung, Cagayan; and that Ruben
Molina was likewise a licensed holder of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with SN 232904. Neither appellant,
however, had a permit to carry any firearm outside his residence.

Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, filed their Notice of Appeal on several assignment
of errors upon the trial court, two of which are on the Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder Cases and
on the Illegal Possession of Firearms Case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases

HELD: In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the
firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.

Both elements have been indubitably proven by the prosecution. Witnesses categorically stated that both appellants
held firearms during the incident -- Veriato, an M-14; and Ruben, a handgun. Recovered from the scene of the crime
were a revolver, which was later confirmed as registered in the name of Appellant Veriato Molina, and spent shells
expelled from it as well as from other high-caliber weapons. Neither of the appellants, though both registered
owners of handguns, was legally authorized to carry such gun outside his residence, according to a certification
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. Neither was Appellant Veriato authorized to possess an M-14 rifle,
the weapon he used in killing Bonifacio Uy. Obviously, the use of an M-14 rifle was unauthorized because this
weapon cannot be licensed in favor of, nor carried by, private individuals. With these pieces of evidence, appellants
should be held liable for violation of Sec. 1 of PD 1866. Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866
is an offense distinct from murder; appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the
trial court.

Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense.
Thus, the unauthorized use of a weapon which has been duly licensed in the name of its owner/possessor may still
aggravate the resultant crime. In the case at bar, although appellants may have been issued their respective licenses
to possess firearms, their carrying of such weapons outside their residences and their unauthorized use thereof in
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the killing of Bonifacio Uy may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the proper penalty for
murder.

All in all, appellants may be held liable only for murder with the special aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed
firearms. Nevertheless, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellants, since the killing occurred in August
1989, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution. Appellants Veriato Molina
and Ruben Molina are found guilty of murder for the death of Bonifacio Uy with the special aggravating circumstance
of using unlicensed firearms.

RATIO: While affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the murder of the late Mayor Bonifacio Uy, the
Court applies in their favor Republic Act No. 8294, which amended PD No. 1866. Under the new law, the use of an
unlicensed weapon in the commission of homicide or murder is considered simply as an aggravating circumstance
and no longer a separate offense. Thus, said law effectively modified the court’s ruling in People vs. Quijada, in
which it was held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes - one, for the
aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and, two, for homicide or murder.

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PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
G.R. No. 61873, October 31, 1984
Parricide

FACTS: On July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother
of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde
Taborada told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango plantation.
Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut. The
windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall where he
saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo
was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.

Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officers arrived. The peace officers
shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open
the door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side. When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding as it did that appellant and Susana
Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest
testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused
could only be liable for homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide

HELD: Yes. In his testimony, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate
wife. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and
law. And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
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RATIO: The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes morality,
and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other.

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PEOPLE v. WAGAS
171 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 61704, March 8, 1989
Parricide

FACTS: On April 30, 1982, the deceased Victoria Wagas, her sister Felisca, and one Paulita, were sitting outside the
house of Berta Banis, talking about the strawberry plantation where they had picked berries that morning. Suddenly,
the accused, Nuepe Wagas, appeared before them, then slapped Victoria’s right cheek, and thereupon, Nuepe
pulled out a knife from his pocket. The women scampered away, shouting for help. As Felisca ran, she looked back
and saw that her sister Victoria had fallen into a canal and that Nuepe stabbed her twice.

Victoria’s brother, Lamor, who had been chopping firewood, heard the shouts of the women. He ran towards where
Felisca stood, and he saw Victoria sprawled on her back and bleeding, while Nuepe was standing about seven to
eight meters away from her. Lamor went after Nuepe but the latter ran away. He returned to pick up Victoria and
then rushed her to the Baguio General Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. After Victoria was
brought to the hospital, Nuepe went to their house. When the policemen arrived, they found the accused sitting
inside the bathroom, with the kitchen knife stained with fresh blood which he had purportedly used to stab his wife
to death and an empty bottle of poison (Folidol) on his side. The policemen got him.

Nuepe was then convicted of parricide. The accused did not deny the killing of his spouse. His defense was that the
killing had been committed under exceptional circumstances. He claimed that on that fateful day of April 30, he
arrived home after selling strawberries in the market, to find Victoria and a certain Jacinto Solano in the master
bedroom, engaged in what seemed to him like a sexual act. In a fit of fury, he allegedly rushed to the kitchen and
armed himself with a knife purportedly to protect himself from the man he caught with his wife and who looked
stronger than himself. When he returned to the bedroom, Jacinto had dressed up and had gone out through the
window. Giving chase and still failing to catch Jacinto, he decided to return home to confront his wife.

He, however, found her not at the family abode, but at the house of Berta Banis. He said he asked her why she had
gone to bed with another man, but she only infuriated him when she revealed her plan to separate from him. Hearing
that, Nuepe slapped his wife. She ran away, but he followed her to a slope where both of them rolled downhill. Then
he noticed that blood was gushing from Victoria’s chest. Still clutching his knife, he went home and closeted himself
in the bathroom where he broke down and cried and was later found by the police.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of causing the death of a person under exceptional circumstances is tenable

HELD: No. Article 247 prescribes the essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the
husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery. (It can be vice-versa, the wife killing the husband.) In the
instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the sexual congress between Victoria
and Jacinto Solano. On the contrary, witnesses for the prosecution testified that Victoria had been with them picking
berries all morning of that fateful day. Nothing in the record of this case did the court find any basis for doubting
this testimonial evidence and not appreciating it as sufficient proof of the fact of Victoria’s absence from their house
all morning of April 30, 1981. The improbability of the claimed adulterous rendezvous is thus apparent. In effect, the
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uncorroborated testimony of Nuepe that his wife committed the ultimate act of infidelity was successfully rebutted.
His defense, therefore, has no leg to stand on.

RATIO: The vindication of a Man’s honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto;
and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during
the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

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PEOPLE v. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver.
The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The accused went
to look for a firearm. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back
to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the
"hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his
rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in
the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet
fragments. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder.

The accused then contended that the trial court erred in convicting him for the crime charged instead of entering a
judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case

2) Whether or not the accused is liable for the injuries suffered by third persons

HELD:

1) Yes. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
2) No. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not
committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
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circumstances is not murder. The court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for
the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

RATIO: There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article
247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-
appellant of murder, therefore erred.

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PEOPLE v. MILAGROS MABANSAG

G.R. No. L-46293, January 30, 1984
Parricide

FACTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City) - The court a quo rendered judgment finding Milagros Calma
Mabansag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. The evidence for the prosecution has been
summarized in the People's brief, in that the accused had illicit relations with her co-accused Tiburcio Caparaz, to
whom she had a bigamous marriage with. The accused sought the services of violent men, accused Pagsibigan and
Peralta, to kill her husband, Francisco Mabansag, for a price. Tiburcio Caparaz was later on discharged from the
information to become a state witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a co-accused against another accused is probable rendering the former
credible

HELD: Yes. As stated above, the court has testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz. In a sense, his testimony was tainted with
treachery against his co-accused Mabansag with whom he had illicit relations and with whom he was married against
accused Pagsibigan and Peralta who appeared to be violent men of whom he should be afraid, and against Aguilar,
his own compadre. It is for this reason that the court as shown above had to very examine this testimony and to a
whether it finds support on other corroborating evidence, testimony and document There is still, however, one point
that ought to be considered. Are the circumsatnces narrated by Tiburcio Caparaz probable? For not only must the
evidence come from an able witness, but the evidence must demonstrate Probabilities and not improbabilities. The
instant case, as established by the testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz presents this situation: Accused Mabansag is faced
with a criminal prosecution by her husband, Fransisco Mabansag, for adultery or bigamy in view of her illicit relations
with Tiburcio Caparaz and her marriage (bigamous) to him. She is determined to stop Francisco Mabansag from filing
a case against her. No woman would like to face a criminal suit. What is more natural than to approach her paramour
and disclose to him her plan to kill Francisco Mabansag. She is able to obtain the services of accused Pagsibigan and
Peralta. Her choice is well made, for these men are violent men (who later on are to die violent deaths). The plan to
liquidate Francisco Mabansag is laid down for money consideration. There is nothing more common than killers for
money. The habits and movements of Francisco Mabansag are studied. Killing is a serious business. For some reason
or another, no occasion presents the right time and place to execute the plan. Circumstances are not always within
the control Of the paid assassins. Then comes March 31, 1959, and all the four conspirators, Tiburcio Caparaz,
accused Mabansag, accused Peralta. accused Pagsibigan and accused Aguilar successfully kill Fransisco Mabansag.
The court finds nothing improbable in this series of events or circumstances attested to by the testimony of Tiburcio
Caparaz.

RATIO: The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that "the matter of assigning value to declarations at the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such
testimony in the light of the defendant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a
more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. The findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better position to appreciate the same,
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having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the
trial, unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; in the case at bar, there is
no such showing.

---
PIMENTEL v. MA. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Parricide

FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On February 7, 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On
February 11 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide

HELD: No. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” The relationship between the offender and the
victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the
civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in the civil case is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

RATIO: Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial
Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
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A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

---

PEOPLE v. OYANIB
G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001
Homicide / Parricide

FACTS: In 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita Oyanib decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two children. Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all
efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito.
One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at
Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her
that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.

In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two subjects and invited his parents to a
meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day,
Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. Upon reaching Tita’s rented
place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting
knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down
to his knees.

Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. The suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus
in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake."

In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him
again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he
stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared
from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he
had nothing to do with it. Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City
and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her
paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to
surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. When
asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense.
Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they
could live together.

After trial, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of Homicide and Parricide to which he interposed an appeal with the Supreme Court to entitle him to the exceptional
privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code

HELD: Yes. Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances
provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He questioned the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and the
evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the
accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed
that Jesus’ pants were wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear,
lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. Having
admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she
has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing
evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the
husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery." There is no question that the first element is present in
the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, cccused-
appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He
saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, Accused stabbed
Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of
him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib surrendered
to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

RATIO: The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail
himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. The vindication of a Man’s honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But
killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

---

US v. ALANO
32 Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021, December 1, 1915
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out and a little
while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store nearby, which she did.

As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her
in the Chinese store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to look
for her in another Chinese store nearby, with the same result. He therefore started to return home through an alley
where he tripped on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among some grass near a
clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they
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both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at once
recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately
started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up as
he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his pocket and pursued Martin
Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and, not knowing where he had filed, returned to the
house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful
conduct and immediately stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering the house, pursued
by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where a sick woman Ricarda Garces was lying.
The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started to run, as did also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen
and gone down the stairs out of the house; but her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she reached
the ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall, he entered the house,
took some clothes and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused killed her wife “immediately thereafter” the act of sexual intercourse to entitle
him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: Yes. The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was caught, for the reason that the wronged
husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and afterwards the adulterous wife who succeeded in
getting away from the place where she was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman must be
understood to be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good
fortune to escape and immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did
not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must be understood that
the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article.

The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one continuous act.

RATIO: For a husband to be justified, it is not necessary that he sees the carnal act being committed by his wife
with his own eyes. It is enough that he surprises them under such circumstances as to show reasonably that the
carnal act is being committed or has just been committed.

---

PEOPLE v. GONZALES
69 Phil. 66, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: At the trial, the appellant testified that, on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, he
surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very one who used
to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not
to do the act again. Thereafter - the accused continued testifying - he left the house and went towards the South to
see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there,
he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush, who
was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to
overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without
intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. The Court of First Instance
of Tayabas found him guilty of parricide.

The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in question, under circumstances
indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail himself of Article 247
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HELD: No. The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege there granted is
conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but after
the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his drawers,
it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.

The court cannot entirely accept the defense sought to be established by the accused, first, because his testimony
is improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat committing
adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such circumstances, if it were true that he
had surprised the two offender in the act of adultery on returning to his house on the date in question. Secondly,
because even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article
247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing
adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that they had committed the carnal act.

RATIO: Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with
another person.

---

PEOPLE v. BITUANAN
56 Phil. 23, G.R. No. 34510, October 31, 1939
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu Alon according to Moro customs and usages.
According to the same customs and usages, the Datu divorced the couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan caught
Sabay and a Moro by the name of Ali Sabpa sleeping on the same bed. Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and
Sabay, killing the former and wounding the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case

HELD: No. The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion, was
valid. This is so because of the nature of the provisions of the Philippines, as prescribed by statute, are two only —
adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband, as determined by a proper court.
Granting, without necessarily having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not legally divorced, it
only need be said that there is no evidence in the record showing that Bituanan surprised Sabay and Ali Sabpa in the
act of adultery when he killed the latter. The privilege given in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code extends solely
to the case of a husband who surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that is, actual carnal knowledge with
her paramour. As an example, the article does not apply to a husband who catches his wife sleeping with another
man on the same bed.

RATIO: The phrase “in the act of committing sexual intercourse” does not include merely sleeping on the same
bed. Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with
another person.

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PEOPLE v. CALIJAN
226 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 94592, September 28, 1993
Murder / Homicide
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FACTS: Intoxicated with alcohol, Ruben Calijan with Arnolfo Baya, enroute home, passed the house of Gregorio
Belnas, the landlord of Arnolfo. Standing at the front yard, Ruben called out to Gregorio: "Nong, let us smoke."

After a brief while, Gregorio came down bringing with him a lighted kerosene lamp and some tobacco leaves for
smoking. They all sat down on a bench by a bamboo table near a stove in the kitchen contiguous to the main house.
Arnolfo and Gregorio sat side by side, with Ruben facing them. They smoked for ten minutes. Then, for no apparent
reason, Ruben stood up saying, "Nong Gorio, you want to be killed?" Completely taken aback, the 55-year old
Gregorio could only mutter: "I have not done any offense against you, Ruben, because we have not quarreled with
each other." Ruben replied, "If I want to kill you, I may kill you now."

Arnolfo tried to pacify Ruben saying, "Dong, do not do that; Dong, let us go home." But Ruben could not be
dissuaded. Arnolfo stepped back and Gregorio ran towards the door. But Ruben, being much younger, was quicker.
He overtook Gregorio, held his left hand and stabbed him on his left chest with the hunting knife he had. The stab
wound proved to be fatal. Gregorio died of hemorrhage that same night. Seeing the fallen Gregorio, Arnolfo ran
away.

The ensuing events were witnessed by Edwin Baya, brother of Arnolfo. Edwin recounted that between 11:00 o’clock
and 12:00 o’clock midnight of 30 June 1989, Ruben went to his (Edwin) house and asked him, "Dong, come with me
because Gregorio is already dead." So, together they repaired to the house of Gregorio. Pointing to the prostrate
victim, Ruben told Edwin to lift him because they were going to throw the cadaver into the Sicopong River. Edwin
refused but Ruben threatened him with the hunting knife. After disposing of the corpse, Ruben and Edwin went to
the house of Ruben’s relative, Walter Calijan, and both slept there. Edwin heard Ruben admitting to the wife of
Walter that he (Ruben) killed Gregorio. Edwin left the following morning and reported the incident to a CAFGU
member who then formed a team to arrest Ruben and turn him over to the police. The trial court then declared
Ruben guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

In his appeal, he prays that he be adjudged guilty but only for homicide because there was neither treachery nor
evident premeditation that attended the killing, contrary to the conclusion of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder

HELD: No. After a careful assessment of the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as having qualified the crime to murder. Consequently, the killing
of Gregorio Belnas was simple homicide aggravated by scoffing at the corpse and mitigated on the other hand by
intoxication that was not habitual. It was emphasized that aggravating circumstances, especially those which qualify
criminal responsibility, must be proved indubitably as the crime itself. Mere presumptions or inferences are never
enough.

In the absence of other notorious acts evincing his determination to murder Gregorio, known premeditation in the
instant case cannot be deduced from the mere fact that six (6) hours before he stabbed Gregorio to death, Ruben
took the hunting knife of Gerry. There is nothing in the records to show that there was enmity between the two and
it is not for the Court to conjecture that there was. Indeed, it is foolhardy for us to draw from this single act a cold-
blooded intention to take the life of another. We simply characterize the killing as spur-of-the-moment, induced by
that degree of intoxication which then triggered off the bellicosity in Ruben who, incidentally, is known in the
community as an ex-convict and a killer. Indeed, as disclosed by Arnolfo, before they left Felipe’s place, Ruben got
into a tiff with fellow "hantak" players because after a particular game, Ruben forcibly gathered all the bets
amounting to P40.00. Quite obviously, Ruben was in a not-so-pleasant mood that night and was just itching to pick
a quarrel with anyone. It just so happened that Gregorio got the full brunt of it, resulting in his violent death. Neither
was there treachery, given the open confrontation between the aggressor and the victim moments before the actual
stabbing. This placed Gregorio on guard because he actually attempted to escape by running towards the door; only
he was overtaken by Ruben. The court a quo likewise took into account the "aggravating circumstance of adding
ignominy on the victim by throwing his cadaver (into) the river." Strictly speaking, the act of disposing of a cadaver
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into the river did not make the crime more shameful nor add to the victim’s moral suffering since it was done after
death had occurred and intended more to conceal the effects of the felony. The correct aggravating circumstance
to be appreciated is scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, as provided in Art. 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code,
which is a qualifying circumstance. However, since this attendant circumstance was not expressly alleged in the
Information, but only proved at the trial, it should be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.

---

PEOPLE v. BUTLER
120 SCRA 281, G.R. No. L-50276, January 27, 1983
Murder

FACTS: Michael Butler, an American Negro serving as a seaman in the U.S. Navy since February 3,1975 (he was born
on September 4, 1957), committed murder on August 8, 1975 when he killed a hostess, Enriquita Alipo, a Filipina, in
her residence in Olongapo City, as proven by his extrajudicial confession which was corroborated by evidence of the
corpus delicti. The confession was admissible in evidence, although it was taken during custodial interrogation, when
Butler was not assisted by counsel, because he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived in writing his
constitutional rights to have counsel and to remain silent.

Butler's confession shows that the murder was qualified by abuse of superiority. It was not aggravated by the
circumstance of outraging or scoffing at her person or corpse. The trial court appreciated that aggravating
circumstance because of the testimony of Doctor Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, that Butler had anal
intercourse with the victim after her death. Doctor Roxas based his conclusion on the fact that the victim's anus was
partly open and contained spermatozoa. He said that the anus would have completely closed had the intercourse
occurred while the victim was still alive. The trial court conjectured that "Butler not satisfied with a normal vaginal
intercourse demanded from the deceased (hospitality girl) an anal intercourse. Upon being refused, the accused
infuriated into a demonic frenzy, took hold of a saint figurine, knocked his victim unconscious, smothered her to
death with a pillow and after she was dead, performed anal coitus with the dead person."

Butler contends that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating
circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger
than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be proved. The Court said that the essence of this
circumstance is that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to that
of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence.

In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was an
abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height
that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11
inches tall, but also fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her
head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and
powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may
have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to
find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
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The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the
commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the
accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we
started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting
on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken
beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of
intracranial hemorrhage.

While the court rejected the presence of treachery, it, however, found and sustained the finding of the lower court
that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused
since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse
with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of
spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be
positive in the Laboratory Report, clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal
intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

RATIO: A guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior strength has been laid down. The court
ruled that to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be considered whenever
there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or
opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents
and episodes constituting the total development of the event.

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