MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY - versus - T.E.A.M.

ELECTRONICS
CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGY ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY and
MANAGEMENT PACIFIC CORPORATION; and ULTRA ELECTRONICS
INSTRUMENTS, INC.,
G.R. No. 131723 December 13, 2007

Doctrine:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 18, 1997 and its
Resolution dated December 3, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40282 denying the appeal filed by
petitioner Manila Electric Company.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation (TEC) was formerly known as NS Electronics
(Philippines), Inc. before 1982 and National Semi-Conductors (Phils.) before 1988. TEC is
wholly owned by respondent Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific
Corporation (TPC). On the other hand, petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) is a
utility company supplying electricity in the Metro Manila area.
Petitioner and NS Electronics (Philippines), Inc., the predecessor-in-interest of respondent
TEC, were parties to two separate contracts denominated as Agreements for the Sale of Electric
Energy under the following account numbers: 09341-1322-16 and 09341-1812-13. Under the
aforesaid agreements, petitioner undertook to supply TECs building known as Dyna Craft
International Manila (DCIM) located at Electronics Avenue, Food Terminal Complex, Taguig,
Metro Manila, with electric power. Another contract was entered into for the supply of electric
power to TECs NS Building under Account No. 19389-0900-10.
TEC demanded from petitioner the reconnection of electrical service, claiming that it had
nothing to do with the alleged tampering but the latter refused to heed the demand. Hence,
TEC filed a complaint on May 27, 1988 before the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) praying
that electric power be restored to the DCIM building.

Issue:
One of the issues for resolution can as follows: 1) whether or not TEC tampered with
the electric meters installed at its DCIM and NS buildings;

HELD:
The law in force at the time material to this controversy was Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 401 issued on March 1, 1974. The decree penalized unauthorized installation of water,
electrical or telephone connections and such acts as the use of tampered electrical meters. It was
issued in answer to the urgent need to put an end to illegal activities that prejudice the economic
well-being of both the companies concerned and the consuming public. P.D. 401 granted the
electric companies the right to conduct inspections of electric meters and the criminal
prosecution of erring consumers who were found to have tampered with their electric meters. It
did not expressly provide for more expedient remedies such as the charging of differential
billing and immediate disconnection against erring consumers. Thus, electric companies found
a creative way of availing themselves of such remedies by inserting into their service contracts
(or agreements for the sale of electric energy) a provision for differential billing with the option
of disconnection upon non-payment by the erring consumer.
 TIMOTEO H. SARONA vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROYALE SECURITY AGENCY
(FORMERLY SCEPTRE SECURITY AGENCY) and CESAR S. TAN
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the May 29, 2008

G.R. No. 185280 January 18, 2012

Facts:
On June 20, 2003, the petitioner, who was hired by Sceptre as a security guard sometime
in April 1976, was asked by Karen Therese Tan (Karen), Sceptre’s Operation Manager, to
submit a resignation letter as the same was supposedly required for applying for a position at
Royale. The petitioner was also asked to fill up Royale’s employment application form, which
was handed to him by Royale’s General Manager, respondent Cesar Antonio Tan II (Cesar).3
After several weeks of being in floating status, Royale’s Security Officer, Martin Gono
(Martin), assigned the petitioner at Highlight Metal Craft, Inc. (Highlight Metal) from July 29,
2003 to August 8, 2003.
On September 21, 2003, the petitioner was once again assigned at Highlight Metal, albeit for a
short period from September 22, 2003 to September 30, 2003. Subsequently, when the
petitioner reported at Royale’s office on October 1, 2003, Martin informed him that he would
no longer be given any assignment per the instructions of Aida Sabalones-Tan (Aida), general
manager of Sceptre. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal on October 4,
2003.

ISSUE:
Whether Royale’s corporate fiction should be pierced for the purpose of compelling it
to recognize the petitioner’s length of service with Sceptre and for holding it liable for the
benefits that have accrued to him arising from his employment with Sceptre

HELD:
"The immediate filing of a complaint for [i]llegal [d]ismissal by an employee is
inconsistent with abandonment."7
A Rule 45 Petition should be confined to questions of law. Nevertheless, this Court has the
power to resolve a question of fact, such as whether a corporation is a mere alter ego of another
entity or whether the corporate fiction was invoked for fraudulent or malevolent ends, if the
findings in assailed decision is not supported by the evidence on record or based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Nevertheless, this Court will not hesitate to deviate from what are clearly procedural guidelines
and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA and those of the labor tribunals if there is a
showing that they are unsupported by the evidence on record or there was a patent
misappreciation of facts. Indeed, that the impugned decision of the CA is consistent with the
findings of the labor tribunals does not per se conclusively demonstrate the correctness thereof.
By way of exception to the general rule, this Court will scrutinize the facts if only to rectify the
prejudice and injustice resulting from an incorrect assessment of the evidence presented.
 VALENTIN S. LOZADA, Petitioner, v. MAGTANGGOL MENDOZA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 196134, October 12, 2016

Facts:
On October 13, 1997, the petitioner Magtanggol Mendoza was employed as a technician
by VSL Service Center, a single proprietorship owned and managed by Valentin Lozada.
Sometime in August 2003, the VSL Service Center was incorporated and changed its business
name to LB&C Services Corporation. Subsequently, the petitioner was asked by respondent
Lozada to sign a new employment contract. The petitioner did not accede because the
respondent company did not consider the number of years of service that he had rendered to
VSL Service Center. From then on, the petitioner's work schedule was reduced to one to three
days a week.
In December 2003, the petitioner was given his regular working schedule by the
respondent company. However, on January 12, 2004, the petitioner was advised by the
respondent company's Executive Officer, Angeline Aguilar, not to report for work and just wait
for a cal1 from the respondent company regarding his work schedule.
The petitioner patiently waited for the respondent company's call regarding his work schedule.
However, he did not receive any call from it. Considering that his family depends on him for
support, he asked his wife to call the respondent company and inquire on when he would report
back to work. Still, the petitioner was not given any work schedule by the respondent company.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent company on January 21, 2004
for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of his 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay, holiday pay and separation pay and with a claim for moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
A mandatory conciliation conference was conducted, but to no avail, thus, they were
ordered by the Labor Arbiter to submit their respective position papers.

Issue:
Was the petitioner liable for the monetary awards granted to the respondent despite the
absence of a pronouncement of his being solidarity liable with LB&C Services Corporation?

Held:
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of
the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personality.
The petitioner might have acted in behalf of LB&C Services Corporation but the
corporation's failure to operate could not be hastily equated to bad faith on his part. Verily, the
closure of a business can be caused by a host of reasons, including mismanagement, bankruptcy,
lack of demand, negligence, or lack of business foresight.