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ARNAULT v.

NAZARENO

FACTS: his case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses
called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L.
Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at
the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.”
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses
to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due
process of law.

G.R. No. L-6874 March 8, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
CAYETANO RAMAYRAT, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

n the 8th of February, 1911, the provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan, and Surigao presented against
the defendant a complaint of the following purport:

The undersigned charged of Cayetano Ramayrat with the crime of gross disobedience to the
authorities

ISSUE:
WON the facts charge do not constitute a crime.
RULING:
In view of the opinion we have formed of the facts alleged in the complaint, it becomes unnecessary
for us to decide the aforementioned questions set up in the Attorney-General's brief. We do not think
that the defendant disobeyed any judicial order whatever. The order issued by the justice of the
peace (Exhibit C) and alleged to have to have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and addressed,
as was natural and proper, to the competent sheriff, and not to the defendant. In it the sheriff is
commanded to place the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, who had won in the suit against the herein
defendant for the recovery of the property, in possession of the said disputed land. Such command
is made solely and exclusively to the sheriff, and not to the defendant. Absolutely no order
whatsoever is made to the latter; nothing is demanded on him and he is not restrained from doing
anything, neither is he required to do anything; he is not told to perform, or not to perform, any act
whatsoever; in a word, the writ or order in question in no wise refers to him.

PROTAClO T. BACANI,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents., G.R. No. 97032,
1993 July 5, 3rd Division
FACTS:
Petitioner Protacio T. Bacani was charged with two (2) separate offenses: homicide for allegedly
killing one Abetalib Usodan; and frustrated homicide said to have been committed against Khalik
Menor. The information for homicide.
After arraignment and trial, the trial court found petitioner Bacani guilty of homicide and of slight
physical injuries
In a decision that is remarkable for its conspicuous brevity and a lack of analysis and discussion of
evidence that had been presented before it, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

After conviction by the trial court, petitioner Bacani went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which,
however, in a Decision dated 26 July 1990, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:

WON the testimony is sufficient

RULING:

We are not unmindful of prior rulings of the Court that the testimony of one witness is sufficient
for conviction where such witness positively identified the accused as the wrongdoer. (People v. Tintero,
111 SCRA 714 [1982]; People v. Aquino, 122 SCRA 797 [1983]). In the instant case of Jose Bautista,
however, the totality of the circumstances here relating to him especially the milieu of tumult, disorder
and confusion, (which is perhaps most dramatically brought home by recalling that three supposed co-
accused remain, even today, unidentified: 'John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe' is such that a very
substantial doubt persist in our mind whether Jose had in fact stabbed Prospero at all. That milieu we
regard as imposing upon the prosecution a more exacting degree of proof than would be necessary in
the absence of confusion and turmoil . . ." (148 SCRA at 163).

PEOPLE v. DOMINGO CASE DIGEST


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY “LAURO” DOMINGO
584 SCRA 669 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere
affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time.

FACTS: Appellant Larry Domingo (Domingo) was charged with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and
two (2) counts of Estafa before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Domingo, denied all
the accusations against him and claimed that he was a driver hired by the real recruiter, Gimeno,
whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September, 2000 Domingo likewise
presented as witnesses private complainants Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated
his claim that it was Gimeno who actually recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against
appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located.
Prosecution witness Simeon Cabigao (Cabigao) testified that he was among those who were recruited
by Domingo, but he later on recanted his testimony. By Joint Decision, the trial court found Domingo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and of 2 counts of Estafa.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Domingo maintained that the trial court erred for failing to give
weight to Cabigao‘s retraction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on all
accounts. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the retraction of Cabigao should be given weight

HELD: That one of the original complaining witnesses, Cabigao, later recanted, via an affidavit and
his testimony in open court, does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other
testimony, the same is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with caution. For a
testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit
executed after the lapse of considerable time. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of Recantation was
executed three years after the complaint was filed. It is thus not unreasonable to consider his retraction
an afterthought to deny its probative value.

At all events, and even with Cabigao‘s recantation, the Supreme Court finds that the prosecution
evidence consisting of the testimonies of the four other complainants, whose credibility has not been
impaired, has not been overcome.
G.R. No. L-2578 July 31, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
LADISLAO BACOLOD, defendants-appellee

FACTS:

This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double jeopardy.

In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948. Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an
informations charging him the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed
on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was arraigned in another case for
having caused a public disturbance on the same date, the second information

His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of
the first information
The motion to quash was granted, and the people appealed in due time.
ISSUE:
WON double jeopardy is present in this case
RULING:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an offense
against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which,
the other does not an acquittal or conviction under one does not a bar prosecution under the other.4

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-4618. March 28, 1952.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO GOLEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Rafael P. Ceniza for Appellee.

Jose Garde for Appellant.

FACTS:
Convicted of treason on three counts (counts 3, 4, and 7) in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros
and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, a fine of P10,000, accessory penalties and costs, the
accused Romeo Golez appealed to the Court of Appeals but that court has certified the case to us on the
ground that the penalty to be imposed is life imprisonment.

The accused is a Filipino citizen. During the early part of the last war he worked for the guerrillas in the
mountains of Negros. But later he moved to the City of Bacolod where he was captured by the Japanese.
Thereafter he worked for the latter, committing the various acts of treason alleged in the information.

ISSUE:
WON being a guerilla is a excuse to treasonable activities
RULING
The accused is guilty of treason, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, he
should, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, be sentenced to the medium degree of the penalty
prescribed by law for that offense.

BEING A "GUERRILLA" IS NO LEGAL EXCUSE FOR TREASONABLE ACTIVITIES. — That the accused was once
a guerrilla does not necessarily preclude the idea that he later became a tool of the Japanese.

TWO-WITNESS RULE. — Where the testimonies of the witnesses agree on the overt acts of treason
committed by the accused in actively participating in the arrest of persons connected with the guerrillas,
that is a sufficient compliance with the two-witness rule.

PEOPLE v. PONTILLAS

FACTS:

The Governor-General, a pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of this sentence of six years one day
of prision correccional imposed upon him in criminal case of the CFI of Manila for the crime of illegal
marriage, which he began to serve., subject to condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal
claws of the Philippine Islands, which condition was accepted by him. Causing thereby his immediate
release on that date from the Bilibid Prison, did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously
violate the conditions of such pardon. By then and there committing the crime of damage to property
thru reckless driving, for which he was receive again in Bilibid Prison.

ISSUE:

WON a person who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive for illegal marriage after he
has served 19 months of the penalty be criminally prosecuted for violation of conditional pardon.

RULING:

A conditional pardon does not become perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it
with all its conditions. Accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is
bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its
strict terms. Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation before he was pardoned.

G.R. No. L-1809 January 23, 1948

NARCISO ALVAREZ Y CORTES, petitioner,


vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the Director of Prisons on the
ground that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, notwithstanding the fact that the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the recommendation of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner on December 23, 1946, absolute pardon of the crime
of murder which he committed and of which he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua
on June 5, 1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case no. 70022.

ISSUE:

WON there is illegal detention

RULING:
The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double jeopardy in case No. 14683 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where he was prosecuted again for the first evasion of sentence
of which he had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 73820;
but petitioner did not set up said defense, and was convicted on August 8, 1946, by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in case No. 14683 and sentenced two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional. And petitioner could also have successfully alleged the same defense in case
No. 74311 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time for
the evasion of which the petitioner had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in case No. 14862; but the petitioner did not set up said defense, and he was convicted on May 16,
1946 by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 74311 and sentenced to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As the petitioner has not yet
completed the service of the total penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of
imprisonment, to which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, it is not
necessary for us to decide now whether or not he has to serve also the sentences rendered in the
above mentioned cases Nos. 14683 and 74311.

PEOPLE V. ALICIA

FACTS:
It appears that the appellant, Alicia Rapirap, was charged with, and after due trial was convicted by the
Municipal Court of the City of Naga, of the crime of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to pay a fine
of P25.00. Not satisfied with said decision, she appealed to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
When the case was called for trial, the accused appeared with her counsel and manifested to the court that
she was changing her former plea of not guilty to that of guilty; and having been given the permission of the
court to do so, she withdrew her plea of not guilty and upon arraignment anew, Accused voluntarily pleaded
guilty to the crime described in the information

ISSUE:
The only issue, tendered in this appeal is whether or not the refusal of the lower court to permit the
withdrawal of the appeal from said court was proper under the circumstances. Appellant invokes section 12,
Rule 118, of the Rules of Court: jgc:chan robl
RULING: In the first place, it is clear from this provision of the Rules that the withdrawal of the appeal
should be allowed upon motion, only before the trial of the case on appeal, and not during or after it. In the
case of People v. Ilagan (58 Phil. 851), this Court implied that an accused is deemed to have been brought
to trial after issues are properly joined with a plea of not guilty. A plea of guilty does not merely join the
issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged
in the complaint or information (People v. Buco, G. R. No. L-2633, February 28, 1950; People v. Sabilul, *
49 Off. Gaz., 27434; Rules of Court Annotated, by Moran, Vol. II, p. 806), and in this sense takes the place
of the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and
purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law (People v. Ng Pek, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. [1] 360; 81
Phil., 562).