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Beja Sr. v.

Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. is an employee of the Manila Port authority as a terminal
supervisor. Two administrative cases was filed against him by the PPA General Manager where
the first one was dismissed while the second one prospered. Both where for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The second charge consisted of six
(6) different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the
total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to
Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." Beja filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. 2
Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of thecertiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before
this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the
DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a
preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857
reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive
suspension" as a remedial measure with "suspension" as a penalty for administrative
dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged with
an administrative offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No.
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend
any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an
administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring employees on
the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants
said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who
may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General
Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The
investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D.
No. 807. 13 Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the
proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors. 14
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the
AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an investigation,
made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA
Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case
to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
EUGENIO vs. CSC et al
G.R. No. 115863
March 31, 1995
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES
eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive
Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB,
relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled
and set aside
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974 . It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the
legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read
together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program
coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister
of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of
the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.

What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.