G.R. No.
L-38434 December 23, 1933 One (1) watch "Howard", gold, with an outside monogram containing the initials
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANO MEDINA y DIOKNO (alias MARIANO
MEDINA, alias ALEJANDRO DOLA), defendant-appellant.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of Judge Anacleto Diaz in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, finding the defendant guilty of robbery in an inhabited house and of being a habitual
delinquent, and sentencing him to suffer a principal penalty of ten years and one day
of prision mayor and additional penalty of ten years of prision mayorbecause of being four
times a recidivist, to indemnify James C. Rockwell in the sum of P320, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in finding and concluding that the finger prints which were
found impressed on the small silver box of the complainant James C. Rockwell
were identical to the fingerprints of the accused.
2. The trial court erred in findings and concluding that it was the accused-appellant
who took away the said small silver box from the room of Mrs. Rockwell and the
valuables worth P320 belonging to James C. Rockwell.
3. The trial court erred in finding and concluding that the accused-appellant is
guilty of the crime of robbery as defined in article 299, No. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code for which the trial court sentenced the accused to imprisonment of ten years
and one day plus an additional imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor as
recidivist and to indemnify the said James C. Rockwell in the amount of P320 and
to pay the cost of the action.
The defendant was tried on a plea of not guilty to the following information:
The undersigned accuses Marciano Medina y Diokno alias Mariano
Medina alias Alejandro Dola of the crime of robbery in an inhabited house,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of February, 1932, during the nighttime which was
purposely sought, in the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, within two and one-half miles from the limits of the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands and within the jurisdiction of this court, the said Marciano
Medina y Diokno alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola did then and there
willfully , unlawfully, and feloniously, and with intent of gain, break into and
enter through the window by tearing the wire screen thereof, an opening not
intended for entrance or egress, of house No. 1155 F.B. Harrison Street, in said
municipality of Pasay, the dwelling house of James C. Rockwell, and, once inside
said premises, take steal, and carry away without the consent of the owner thereof
the following personal property, to wit:
"JCR" valued at P200.00
One(1) "Green" wrist watch with a leather strap, valued at 120.00
Total 320.00
belongings to James C. Rockwell, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
thereof in the afore-mentioned sum of P320, Philippine currency.
That, at that time of the commission of this offense, the said accused Marciano
Medina y Diokno aliasMariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola has already been
convicted three (3) times of the crime of theft by virtue of final judgments
rendered by competent courts and is, therefore, a habitual delinquent, his last date
of conviction being on October 23, 1924 and his date of release being on October
26, 1927.
At the trial the defendant admitted that Mr. Rockwell's house was robbed on the night of
February 12, 1932, as alleged in the information, but denied that he was the author of the
crime; admitted that a silver box, which had been taken from the room of Mrs. Rockwell on
the night of the robbery, was found in the garden the next morning, and that when it was
examined in the Intelligence Division of the Constabulary it showed a finger print on the
top. The defendant further admitted the competency of the witness, Agripino Ruiz, as a
finger print expert; and the lastly the defendant admitted that he had been convicted three
times of theft, his last conviction being on October 23, 1924 and his release on October 26,
1927.
It appears from the evidence that while Agripino Ruiz, a Constabulary agent and finger print
expert, was investigating the robbery in question he went to see the accused, who was under
arrest for breaking into the house of Capt. Davidson in Parañaque. Ruiz took the finger
prints of the accused, and found when he compared them with his records that the accused
had served three terms in Bilibid prison theft. Ruiz then compared a photograph of the
impression of the middle finger of defendant's right hand with a photograph of the finger
print on the top of the silver box stolen from the bedroom of Mrs. Rockwell, and found that
they coincided in ten points. He concluded that the two impressions were from the same
person, and that the finger print on the box was that of the defendant.
The defense of the accused was an alibi. He asserted that on the night of the robbery in
question he was at home with a sore foot. This contention of the defendant rests on his
uncorroborated testimony.
It is now well settled that evidence as to the correspondence of finger prints is admissible
for the purpose of proving identity (Moon vs. State, Arizona Supreme Court, June 7, 1921,
198 Pac., 288; 16 A.L.R., 362, and the authorities there cited). The history of the finger print
system of identification is stated in one of the leading cases, People vs. Sallow (165 N.Y.
Supp., 915, 918), as follows:
Scientific authority declares that finger prints are reliable as a means of
identification. (10 Ency. Brit. [11th ed.], 376.) The first recorded finger prints
were used as a manual seal, to give a personal mark of authenticity to documents.
Such prints are found in the Assyrian clay tablets in the British Museum. Finger
 prints were first used to record the identity of individuals officially by Sir William
Herschel, in Bengal, to check forgeries by natives in India in 1858. (C. Ainsworth
Mitchell, in "Science and the Criminal" 1911, p. 51.) Finger print records have
been constantly used as a basis of information for the courts since Sir Francis
Galton proved that the papillay ridges which cover the inner surface of the hands
and the soles of the feet form patterns, the main details of which remain the same
from the sixth month of the embryonic period until decomposition sets in after
death, and Sir Edward Henry, the head of the Metropolitan Police Force of
London, formulated a practical system of classification, subsequently simplified
by an Argentine named Vucetich. The system has been in general use in the
criminal courts in England since 1891. It is claimed that by means of finger prints
the metropolitan police force of London during the 13 years from 1901 to 1914
have made over 103,000 identifications, and the Magistrates' Court of New York
City during the 4 years from 1911 to 1915 have made 31,000 identifications,
without error. (Report of Alfred H. Hart, Supervisor, Fingerprint Bureau, Ann.
Rep., N.Y. City Magistrates' Courts, 1915.) Their value has been recognized by
banks and other corporations, passport bureaus of foreign governments, and civil
service commissions as a certain protection against impersonation.
It was held in 1909 by the Lord Chief Justice of England that the court may accept
the evidence of finger prints, though it be the sole ground of identification.
(Castleton's Case, 3 Crim. App. C., 74.)
In the case at bar the principal contentions of appellant's attorney are that the identification
was incomplete and unreliable because the imprint of only one finger was found on the box,
and that was blurred, and could not served as a basis of comparison. There is a little merit
in this argument. Although a portion of the impression on the box was somewhat blurred, it
did not seriously interfere with the comparison of the two finger prints. It would of course
have been more satisfactory for the purpose of comparison if there had been an impression
of all the fingers of the thief on the box, but we are not justified in rejecting the evidence of
record merely because it might be more complete.
Referring to the care necessary in photographing accidental imprints, Wentworth and
Wilder in their work, "Personal Identification" (1932), say that these imprints at best will be
poor; that one will never find an accidental imprint that is absolutely perfect; that it is
seldom, indeed, that a very good one is found (p.260).
The only important question is whether or not the evidence identifies the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt as the person whose finger print appears on the box, because the box was
taken from the bedroom of Mrs. Rockwell on the night of the robbery, and the finger print
thereon, if that of the accused, could have been made only on the occasion when the robbery
was committed.
It might be here stated that the finger prints of the persons living in Mr. Rockwell's house
were taken, but that they did not correspond to the impression in question.
A photograph showing an enlargement of the finger print found on the box was marked at
the trial Exhibit A. Further enlargements of it are shown in Exhibits A-1 and
A-2. Exhibit B is an enlargement of a photograph of the impression of the middle finger of
defendant's right hand, taken while he was a prisoner in Bilibid.
When asked which were the ten points of agreement between the two impressions in
question, the finger print expert replied that there were three classes of characteristics,
namely: the endings of the ridges, the bifurcation of the ridges, and the core. The ten points
of identity, which were marked on the photographs, are as follows:
1. Upward end of a ridge,
2. Core,
3. Both ends of a short ridge,
4. Both ends of a short ridge,
5. Downward end of a ridge,
6. Upward end of a ridge,
7. Bifurcation,
8. Upward end of a ridge,
9. Upward end of a ridge,
10. Bifurcation.
The witness stated that in his opinion eight characteristics are sufficient to identify a person.
According to Frederick Kuhn of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, Police Department
of the City of New York, in the "Finger Print Instructor", p.12, "characteristics" are the
peculiarities of the ridges, such as abrupt endings, bifurcations, the formation of what is
termed an island, short ridge lines, ridge dots, some peculiarity as to the information of the
delta or core; in fact any peculiarity out of the ordinary may be considered a characteristic
point, and serve as a positive means of identification.
The Galton details, the ends, forks, islands and so on, are so numerous and so variable that
even in a small area a duplication is impossible; so far as we know all the infinite
possibilities in the formation of the ridges are widely open in each individual case, so that it
is quite safe to say that no two people in the world can have, even over a small area, the
same set of details, similarly related to the individual units; the only possible confusion
might result from an area so small and so featureless as to show nothing but complete and
parallel ridges, and without details, and could never occur in connection with the formation
of a pattern, where the ridges are called upon to make eccentric turns, and to fill up spaces
of irregular shape (Wentworth & Wilder, p. 126).
Explaining the ten points of identity, the expert witness in the case at bar testified that he
found four endings of ascending ridges in Exhibit B that corresponded exactly to those of
Exhibit A; that as to the number and location with respect to the core, which he marked 2 in
both photographs, he found that they agreed; that he found in Exhibit B two bifurcations or
forks that corresponded exactly to those in Exhibit A as to number and location; that he
found in Exhibit B a short ridge, the two ends of which he marked 3 and 4, that was identical
with the corresponding short ridge in Exhibit A, which he also marked 3 and 4.
The attorney for the appellant calls attention to the fact that there was the impression of
another finger on the that was not identified. That is true, but as it was the impression of
only a small part of the ball of a finger and was blurred, the expert did not make any
particular study of it. It may have been made by the person who picked up the box in the
garden. In any event it does not alter the fact that a finger print identical with that of the
defendant in ten homologous points of comparison was found on the box.
Although there is some differences of opinion among the authorities as to what constitutes
proof of identity, the older writers regarding twelve points as necessary to prove certain
identity; and more than that for absolute identification, the more recent writers think that six
or eight homologous points of comparison leave no room for reasonable doubt. "In the end
it is the microscopic identity of the ridge characteristics (Galton's minutiae) that settles the
question." (Personal Identification, p. 263.)

In the present case the qualifications of the expert witness were admitted. He stated under
oath that in his opinion the finger print in question is that of the defendant, and gave the
reasons for his conclusion, which seem to us to be reasonable and to be sustained by the best
authorities available. No reason has been adduced that would justify us in rejecting his
findings and conclusion. We wish to add, however, that the prosecuting attorney ought to
have addressed further questions to the expert witness to show how he arrived at his
findings, that is, his method of examination and comparison, his measurements, and other
pertinent facts. Another competent and experienced specialist might well have been called
to verify the findings of the Constabulary expert.

The only evidence for the defendant was his uncorroborated testimony that on the night in
question he was at home in San Luis, Batangas. In weighing the testimony of the defendant
it is proper to take into account the fact that he has already been convicted three times of
theft.

Robbery in an inhabited house is punished by prision mayor in its medium period

to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the value of the property taken exceeds
P250, if the malefactor entered the house by breaking a window, as in the present case, but
when the offender does not carry arms, as in this case, the penalty next lower in degree shall
be imposed (article 299 of the Revised Penal Code). The penalty next lower in degree
is prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or
from two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional to eight years of prision
mayor. In the present case in fixing the principal penalty, we must take into account the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism and nocturnity. The principal penalty imposed on
the accused is therefore reduced to six years and a one day of prision mayor.

The additional penalty of ten years imposed by the lower court is the maximum of the
maximum for a fourth conviction. We think that under the circumstances of this case the
minimum authorized by law would be sufficient, and the additional penalty of the appellant
is accordingly reduced to six years and one day.

Modified as hereinabove stated, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant.
G.R. No. 192274 February 8, 2012
NORBERTO LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED BANK, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Norberto Lee (Lee)assails the October 26, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 106247, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and
affirmed the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders2 of the public respondent Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143, Makati City (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to 00-1816.
In the questioned interlocutory orders, the RTC denied Lee’s Motion for Document and
Handwriting Examination by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and his subsequent
motion for the reconsideration of the denial.
The Facts
Lee was the New Account Service Representative of Manager’s Check and Gift Check
Processor at the Cash Department of Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank). The bank
filed a complaint against him alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of
responsible bank officers in several manager’s checks causing damage and prejudice to it.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, he was charged with Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Documents which were committed on separate dates involving separate
instruments in eight (8) Informations.3 Except for the details, the Informations were
uniformly worded as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of May 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[petitioner], being then the New Account Service Representative of Manager’s Check and
Gift Check Processor at Cash Department of complainant Allied Banking Corporation,
herein represented by Ketty Uy and taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit and
false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud said complainant in the following manner, to wit: the said accused forged and
falsified the signatures of Ketty Uy, Tess Chiong, Manuel Fronda, the approving officers of
complainant of the Man[a]ger’s Check No. MC 0000473205 in the amount of ₱ 200,500.00
dated May 20, 1999 payable to Noli Baldonado which was issued by complainant-bank in
favor of Filway Marketing, Inc., which is a commercial document, by then and there making
it appear that the approving officers of complainant-bank had signed and approved the said
Manager’s Check when in truth and in fact said accused knew, that the approving officers
had not participated or intervened in the signing of said manager’s check, thereafter the
accused encashed the said Manager’s Check and represented himself as the payee thereto
and received the amount of ₱ 200,500.00 from complainant-bank and then and there
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant Allied Banking Corporation, herein represented by
Ketty Uy in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On February 12, 2007, after the trial had started, Lee filed his Motion for Document and
Handwriting Examination by the NBI.5 In his motion, he claimed, among others, that:
1. The record of the preliminary investigation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
shows that Document Report No. 065-2000, dated 16 June 2000, prepared by the officials
of the Crime Laboratory of the National Headquarters of the Philippine National Police at
Camp Came, Quezon City, excluded and failed to examine the questioned and standard
signatures of the accused in relation to the questioned and standard documents and
signatures of the other signatories of the subject Allied Bank checks, application forms and
related documents.
xxxx
6. The accused [petitioner] is suspicious of the credibility, neutrality and sincerity of the
PNP Crime Laboratory examiners who had submitted the Report because they seemed to
have been prevailed upon and influenced by the officers of the Bank to conduct the partial,
biased and prejudiced examination without the participation of and said notice to the
accused.
7. In the interest of justice and fair play, there is a need for the forensic laboratory of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a new, confirmatory and independent
document and handwriting signature examination of the questioned and standard documents
and signatures of the concerned officers and staff of the Bank and the Filway Marketing
Inc., on one hand, and of the accused, on the other, in a manner that is complete,
comprehensive, fair, neutral, transparent and credible.6
On August 22, 2007, the RTC, presided by Judge Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr., denied Lee’s
motion, stating that:
After due assessment of the assertions of the contending counsels, the Court is disinclined
to grant instant motion. First, the trial of the case is already on-going and the accused has
the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense
evidence. And second, the Court is called upon to conduct its own evaluation of the
questioned signature even with the opinion on the matter coming from an NBI expert. For
this purpose, the Court may utilize, among others, the provisions of Sections 20 and 22,
Rules of Court, on the rules in authentication of private documents [Rule 132].
"It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the
NBI and the PC, are not binding upon [the] courts.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged Documents because
of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting (Heirs of
Severa P. Gregorio vs. CA, 300 SCRA, December 1998) A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct
an independent examination on the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity. (Boado, ‘Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code,’
2004 Ed., p. 428)."
Accordingly, defense motion for document and handwriting examination by the NBI is
hereby DENIED.7
Undaunted, Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration 8 on
September 26, 2007, or two (2)
days after the reglementary period of 15 days. For Lee’s failure to comply with the rules,
the RTC, through Presiding Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, denied his motion for
reconsideration.
In his petition before the CA, Lee raised the sole issue of whether or not the two questioned
interlocutory orders should be nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in the interest of fair play, justice,
due process, and equal protection of the law.
Without disputing the late filing of his motion for reconsideration, Lee sought the CA’s
liberal interpretation of the rules and the need to decide his case on the merits. He insisted
that it was legally and physically impossible for him to secure an NBI witness without a
compulsory judicial process or order.
In the assailed October 26, 2009 decision, the CA dismissed Lee’s petition and affirmed the
RTC orders. It stated that procedural rules are not stringently applied when an imperative
exists and a grave injustice may be committed if applied otherwise. Since, however, no such
imperative and grave injustice appeared in the case, the RTC clearly did not gravely abuse
its discretion on this point.
The CA further stated that the RTC did not err in denying petitioner’s motion for document
and handwriting examination by the NBI, as said motion was intended only to dispute the
examination of documents and handwritings conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory,
which was a matter that may be exercised during the presentation of defense evidence.
The CA added that Lee could not claim deprivation of his life, liberty and property with the
denial of his motion as both Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule
115(g) of the Rules of Court guarantee his right to the court’s compulsory processes to
ensure the attendance of his witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
Lastly, the CA stated that the trial court did not err, much less gravely, when it denied Lee’s
motion for consideration because it was filed out of time.
Persistent, Lee interposed this petition for review on certiorari raising the following:
ISSUES9
1. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in ignoring the traditional
"doctrine of liberality" in the interpretation and application of mechanical rules of
procedure.
2. Whether or not the petitioner was legally entitled to a new and credible NBI
document and handwriting examination of all the relevant and material documents
relative to the allegedly falsified bank documents and checks with his full
participation and submissions, as part of his right to constitutional due process
and equal protection rights.
3. Did the RTC and CA gravely err in denying the petitioner’s motion for a
credible NBI document and handwriting examination?
4. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in concluding that the two
(2) questioned interlocutory orders had attained "finality," as if they partook of
the legal nature of a "final and executory judgment" or of a "final order."
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in denying the subject motion and that the CA was correct in affirming
the denial. The RTC did not err either in turning down Lee’s motion for reconsideration for
being filed two days late.
Contrary to the claim of Lee, the RTC and the CA did not "ignore" the traditional "doctrine
of liberality" but merely relied upon the guidelines as to when it is applicable and, after
being so guided, chose not to apply it under the existing circumstances. It is true that rules
of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and weights reasons.
Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, there should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide
by the rules.10 In this case, however, Lee did not bother to offer any convincing reason for
this Court to relax the rules and just plainly sought its liberal interpretation. The Court, in
Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc v. Alberto J. Raza,11 stated:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons
proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause
justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantive justice.12 Utter
disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/181688.htm - _ftn
At any rate, the Court does not perceive any injustice in the denial of Lee’s motion. In fact,
the RTC wrote that "the accused has the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended
witness during the presentation of defense evidence."14 When his time comes to present
evidence, Lee can utilize the NBI by availing of the coercive power of the court.
The Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey P. Marquez v.
Sandiganbayan,15 where the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the
motion of the accused therein to cause the NBI to examine the documents already submitted
to the court. In said case, the Court wrote:
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook
rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures
were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded
reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the
actual examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier
investigative force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this
matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he
cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the original
documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.

At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court.1âwphi1 It will
still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132.
Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How
the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his
defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce
evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as long
as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.

The Marquez ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. In Marquez, the accused had
requested for the examination of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests by the NBI from the beginning. Records of the case showed that right
upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, while the case was still with the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the accused already sought referral of the disbursement
vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI for examination. At that
stage, OSP denied his plea. In the case at bench, the trial had already started and, worse, the
accused’s motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.

At any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was without prejudice as the
RTC stated that he could utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation
of defense evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 106247 is AFFIRMED.
Authentication and Verification System PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1575

REQUIRING PRACTITIONERS OF DENTISTRY TO KEEP RECORDS OF

THEIR PATIENTS

WHEREAS, the identification of persons is a necessary factor in solving crimes and in

settling certain disputes such as claims for damages, insurance, and inheritance;

WHEREAS, in those cases where the identification of persons cannot be established through
the regular means, identification through definition has been proven to be necessary and
effective;

WHEREAS, however, records of dentition of persons are often not available due to the lack
of systematic recording by dental practitioners of the dental history of their patients.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:

Section 1. It shall be obligatory upon all practitioners of dentistry to keep and maintain an
accurate and complete record of the dentition of all their patients which shall include a
history and description of the patient's dentition and the treatments made thereon.

Section 2. Upon the lapse of ten years from the last entry, dental practitioners shall turn over
the dental records of their patients to the National Bureau of Investigation for record
purposes: Provided, that the said practitioners may retain copies thereof for their own files.

Section 3. Any violation of the provisions of this Decree shall be punishable by a fine of
not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos.

Section 4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight.
Anatomy of Voice Production Republic of the Phi
 ARTICLE III (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
BILL OF RIGHTS
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
prescribed by law. witness in his behalf;

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
CIVIL CODE
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same
is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

(5) Freedom of suffrage; The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;