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GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A.

RECIO,
respondent
G.R. No. 138322 /October 2, 2001

FACTS: The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal
in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court
issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired
Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single”
and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their
conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage
only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior
marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage
was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was
dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

HELD: The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws.
Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with
the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was
admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that
it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two
types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending
the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce
obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not
be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity
of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,


vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116 / June 30, 1989

Facts: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, married Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, in Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. After a year, their daughter
Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born. Thereafter, marital discord ensued, leading to the private
respondent initiating divorce after only three and a half years of marriage, in January 1983, which
was granted on 1986 by Division 20 of Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany.
Petitioner also filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 on January 1983, which was still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866.
Five months after the decree of the divorce, private respondent filed two criminal cases of adultery
against petitioner for allegedly having an affair with a certain William Chua on 1982 and Jesus
Chua on 1983. The respondent fiscal approved the resolution and the cases were filed in two
branches, one of which is Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 26, presided by the respondent
judge. The petitioner filed for the dismissal of the criminal cases with the Secretary of Justice,
where in response, it moved for the defferment of further proceedings and the elevation of the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. The respondent judge merely reset the date
of the arraignment, denied the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the
petitioner, and ordered the arraignment of the petitioner and William Chua. Chua pleaded not
guilty but petitioner initially refused to be arraigned, and only pleaded not guilty after the
respondent judge charged her with direct contempt, fined her and her counsel and ordered her
detainment until she submitted herself for arraignment. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking annulment of the order of
the lower court denying her motion to quash, on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction
since the complainant has no legal standing as husband of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground
of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.

Held: No. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that only the offended spouse can initiate
the complaint for adultery through a sworn written complaint. The Supreme Court contends that
the status, or legal capacity of the complainant, or in this case the offended spouse, is determined
at the time the complaint was filed. Since the complaint was filed five months after the decree of
divorce and thus dissolution of the marriage, the private respondent has no legal capacity as
husband to initiate the complaint of adultery.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 / October 8, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong. Thereafter, they established their residence
in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United
States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their
conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private
respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse
HELD: Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JOSE R.


BERNARDO AND LILIBETH R. BERNARDO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND
STYLE "JOLLY BEVERAGE ENTERPRISES," RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 190667 / November 07, 2016
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the large-scale manufacture, sale, and
distribution of beverages around the country.On the other hand, respondents, doing business
under the name "Jolly Beverage Enterprises," are wholesalers of softdrinks in Quezon City,
particularly in the vicinities of Bulacan Street, V. Luna Road, Katipunan Avenue, and Timog
Avenue.

For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious business partnership. While the
contracts contained a clause for breach, it was never enforced.
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired, petitioner required respondents
to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy defining its
territorial dealership in Quezon City. It assured respondents that their contract would be renewed
for a longer period, provided that they would submit the list. However, despite their compliance,
the promise did not materialize.

Respondents discovered that in February 1999, petitioner started to reach out to the persons
whose names were on the list. Respondents also received reports that their delivery trucks were
being trailed by petitioner's agents; and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach
the former's customers.] Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a different
pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors was significantly higher than that given to
supermarkets. It also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke
Alok" promo, in which it gave away one free bottle for every case purchased. It further engaged
a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower
price.

Respondents claimed that because of these schemes, they lost not only their major customers -
such as Peach Blossoms, May Flower Restaurant, Saisaki Restaurant, and Kim Hong
Restaurant but also small stores, such as the canteen in the hospital where respondent Jose
Bernardo worked. They admitted that they were unable to pay deliveries worth P449,154.

Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted
dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.
The Complaint was later amended to implead petitioner's officers and personnel, include
additional factual allegations, and increase the amount of damages prayed for.

The RTC held petitioner liable for damages for abuse of rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code and for unfair competition under Article 28. It found that petitioner's agents
solicited the list of clients in order to penetrate the market and directly supply customers with its
products. Moreover, the trial court found that petitioner had recklessly ignored the rights of
respondents to have a fair chance to engage in business or earn a living when it deliberately used
oppressive methods to deprive them of their business. Its officers were, however, absolved of
liability, as there was no showing that they had acted in their individual and personal capacities.

In the body of its Decision, the RTC stated that petitioner should pay respondents P500,000 as
temperate damages, and that it was only just and fair that the latter offset this amount against
their outstanding obligation to petitioner in the amount of P449,154.[34] In the fallo, the trial court
awarded P50,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 as
attorney's fees. It denied petitioner's counterclaim for damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.

Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Coca Cola violated Articles 19, 20, 21 or 28, making it liable for
damages and attorney's fees

Held: Yes. The CA did not err in affirming the finding that petitioner was liable for temperate,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, tor abuse of rights and unfair
competition.
Petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code.
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed
schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of respondents
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal
provision; or an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless
violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.[
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair
competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby sutlers damage.
It is not extraordinary for courts to award temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. In Canada
v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,[59] this Court awarded temperate damages in
recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered, after finding that actual damages could not be awarded
for lack of proof. In Public Estates Authority v. Chu,[60] this Court held that temperate damages
should have been awarded by the trial court considering that the plaintiff therein had suffered
some pecuniary loss.

In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that respondents had similarly suffered pecuniary
loss by reason of petitioner's high-handed machinations to eliminate competition in the market.[61]

With regard to moral damages, petitioner argues that respondents failed to provide satisfactory
proof that the latter had undergone any suffering or injury.[64] This is a factual question that has
been resolved by the trial court in a Decision affirmed by the CA. The award finds legal basis
under Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code, which states that moral damages may be recovered in
acts and actions referred to in Articles 21 and 28.[65]
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT
CENTER (PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189516 / June 08, 2016

Facts: Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias
(Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children.

On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity.2 Their
children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4 Edna demanded monthly support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.5 Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit, stating:

That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the Provost
Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by my
wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from the AFP;

That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated among my wife
and five (5) children;

That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into Agreement with my wife
covering the same;

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and whatever legal
purpose it may serve.6cralawred
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50%
of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children.7 The Deed of Assignment
was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement.8 It stated:
This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati
City, by the undersigned LTC Francisco B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married
and presently residing at Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M. OTAMIAS and the father of
Julie Ann, Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;

WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service and expects to receive
retirement benefits from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a share in his retirement
benefits to my wife and five (5) abovenamed children,

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the undersigned hereby
stipulated the following:
1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of
my retirement benefits to be pro rated among them.

2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash [sic] in the name of the legal
wife and five (5) children pro-rating the fifty (50%) percent of my retirement benefits.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City.9cralawred
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.

The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006.11 Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of
the] Philippines] suddenly decided not to honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and
his legitimate family.

In a letter13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.

Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support,
docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039.

The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias several times, to no avail.18
Substituted service was resorted to.19 Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default for
failure to file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial court.

The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of
support from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Manifestation/Opposition23 to the Decision of the trial court, but it was not given due course due
to its late filing.

Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution 25 dated February
22, 2008. The trial court granted the Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court
on April 10, 2008.

Issue: Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial
support of his legitimate family

Held: Yes. When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his
right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive
retirement benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement
benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to
receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced
or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and
parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in
accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for
the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.

Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of other
retired military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the
Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have received a
portion of their husbands' pensions.
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be
assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer
or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the
pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement
benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support
himself and his family.

On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article 194 of
the Family Code defines support as follows:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

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