G.R. No. 157984.
July 8, 2004]MOISES they knocked on the door, Lorna responded and
SIMANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Antecedents
The petitioner Moises Simangan and Loreto
Bergado were charged with murder in an Information
filed with the Circuit Criminal Court in Cagayan, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 10, 1980, in the
municipality of Solana, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto
Bergado y Rigor alias Boy, together with Bening
Gomabong (sic), who is still at large and not yet
apprehended, and two (2) John Does, who were not
identified, armed with guns and knives, conspiring
together and helping one another, with intent to kill;
with evident premeditation and with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Ernesto Flores, inflicting
upon him several wounds on his body which caused
his death.
Contrary to law.[2]
The accused, assisted by counsel, were duly
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Prosecution
At 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, the petitioner,
Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two other
male persons arrived at the store of the spouses
Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing in Barangay
Maasin, Solana, Cagayan. The Flores Spouses, along
with fifteen-year-old Lorna Saquing, Sofronias niece,
were then having dinner. The five men were in fatigue
uniforms and were armed with long firearms. When
1
inquired what they wanted, and she was told that
they wanted to buy cigarettes.Ernesto and Sofronia
entertained the men, two of whom were their
neighbors, Loreto Bergado and Bening Gumabong.
Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go
with them to serve as a guide. In response, Ernesto
invited the men to sleep at their house, but the latter
refused. Ernesto then agreed to accompany the
visitors. The petitioner warned Ernesto and Sofronia
not to tell anyone that they had been to the store. As
they were leaving, Romeo Galano, the couples helper
at the store, arrived. Ernesto ordered Romeo to go
with him, and the latter did as he was told. However,
at about 9:00 p.m., Romeo returned to the store and
told Sofronia that Ernesto had sent him back to get
money, matches and cigarettes. He also told Sofronia
that he and Ernesto were seated as they conversed
with each other. Sofronia gave P50.00, a box of
matches and a ream of Hope cigarettes. Romeo left
the store at about 9:30 p.m.[3] Ernesto did not return
that evening.[4]
The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at
Sofronias house and told her that Ernesto was dead,
and that his body had been found about three
hundred (300) meters away.Sofronia and Lorna
rushed to the place, and found Ernestos body near
the creek.[5] Ernesto was lying on the ground, face
down, with his hands tied behind his back. Police
investigators Pagulayan and Caronan arrived, along
with a photographer. Pictures of the victim were
taken.[6]
Dr. Anastacia Taguba, the Municipal Health
Officer, performed an autopsy of the cadaver and
found that the victim sustained multiple
stabwounds. She concluded that the victim died
because of shock due to massive internal and external
hemorrhage from multiple stab wounds.[7] She also
signed the Certificate of Death of Ernesto. [8]
On February 18, 1980, Fernando Saquing
attended his classes in civil engineering at the St.
Louis University in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He noticed
his seatmate and close friend, petitioner Moises
Simangan, writing on a piece of paper. He grabbed the
paper, read it, and saw that the petitioner had written
the following: Andres Buena alias Ka Ren, Cely
Pea alias Ka Laarni, Moises Simangan alias Ka Ronie
Ledesma. The petitioner warned Fernando not to
divulge his secret to anybody.[9]
On February 24, 1980, Fernando and the
petitioner were on their way home from their ROTC
classes at the St. Louis University. The petitioner then
narrated to Fernando that at about 7:00 p.m. on
February 10, 1980, after buying cigarettes from a
store, the store-owner agreed to go with him and his
four companions. The petitioner revealed that they
brought the victim over to the place where twenty of
his other comrades were waiting. He also told
Fernando that he and his companions stabbed the
victim over and over again, and tasted the latters
blood so that they would not get sick. The petitioner
warned that if Fernando divulged to anyone what he
had just revealed, he (the petitioner), would drink his
blood, too.[10]
The petitioner did not know that Fernando was
the first cousin of Sofronia, the widow of Ernesto
Flores, who was, in turn, the store-owner referred to
by Moises.[11] Fernando immediately told Sofronia
what the petitioner had told him.
On March 21, 24 and 25, 1980, Sofronia,
Fernando and Lorna gave their respective
statements[12] to Sgt. Quirino Espiritu of the
Philippine Constabulary in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in
which they identified Moises as one of Ernestos
assailants.
The Case for the Defense
The petitioner denied any involvement in the
killing of Ernesto. He testified that on the day that
Ernesto was killed, he was in his boarding house in
Tuguegarao. He was the classmate of Fernando at the
St. Louis University in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where
they were enrolled in the civil engineering course.
[13]
Sometime in February 1980, Fernando asked him
about Andres Balbuena who was from Solana,
Cagayan. A week later, he was arrested on suspicions
that he had something to do with the death of
Ernesto.[14] Fernando, who was in the PC barracks,
pointed to him as one of the assailants of Ernesto. He
was surprised at Fernandos accusation.[15]
The petitioner also denied knowing Loreto
Bergado, claiming that he only met the latter at the
provincial jail.[16] He had not been to Barangay
Maasin, Solana.
2
The accused Loreto Bergado also denied killing
Ernesto. He testified that he did not know Ernesto
and the latters wife, Sofronia. On February 10, 1980,
he was in his house at Nangalasauan, Amulung,
Cagayan. After waking up the next day, he went to his
farm.[17]
To corroborate his testimony, Bergado presented
his neighbor, Feliciano Trinidad, who testified that
after his classes on February 10, 1980, he went out of
their house at Barangay Nangalasauan, Amulung,
Cagayan, to get a breath of fresh air. He then saw
Bergado and spoke with him until 9:00 p.m.[18]
Cornelia Trinidad corroborated the testimony of
the petitioner that she boarded in the house of
Rosendo Tuddao in February 1980.
The defense also presented Leona Balunggaya,
who testified that between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on
February 11, 1980, Sofronia and Leon Rigor arrived
at their house, crying. Sofronia inquired if Ernesto
had passed by, because her husband had not slept in
their house. Balunggaya replied in the negative. When
Balunggaya asked Sofronia if she recognized the
armed men who were with her husband, Sofronia
replied that she did not because their faces were new
to her.[19] Aside from their house, there were no other
houses in the vicinity of Sofronias place. Right after
Sofronia and Leon had left, she and her husband
Romeo went to their farm to drive away the birds and
saw the cadaver of Ernesto, about three hundred
(300) meters away.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Moises Simangan y
Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor having been
found by the Court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal code, and considering
the presence of two aggravating circumstances, are
hereby sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Ernesto Flores the
sum of P30,000.00, proportionately and to pay
costs pro rata.
SO ORDERED.[20]
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it rendered
judgment, affirming with modification, the decision of
the trial court. It found the testimonies of Sofronia,
Lorna, and Fernando, credible and entitled to full
probative weight.
The Present Petition
Petitioner Moises Simangan filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari, asserting that:
I (5) that five days after the death of Ernesto,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.[21]
The petitioner contends that the prosecution
failed to adduce circumstantial evidence sufficient to
prove his guilt of the crime of homicide beyond
reasonable doubt. He asserts that Sofronia and Lorna
pointed to and identified him only upon the prodding
of Fernando, who told Sofronia that he (the
petitioner) had admitted to stabbing and killing the
victim together with twenty of his other
companions. The petitioner contends that the
testimony of Fernando is hearsay, as he had no
personal knowledge that he was one of those who
killed the victim.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals declared
in its assailed decision that the array of
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution
constitutes proof beyond cavil that the petitioner was
one of those who killed the victim. As catalogued by
the appellate court:
(1) at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of
February 10, 1980, accused Moises
Simangan, Loreto Bergado, Bening
Gumabong and two unidentified
companions each of whom were armed
with long rifles, went to the store of the
victim Ernesto Flores at Sitio Masin (sic),
Iraga, Solana and bought cigarettes;
3
(2) that Moises Simangan asked Ernesto
Flores to guide Simangan, Bergado,
Gumabong and their two companions on
their way to the road;
(3) that Simangan, Bergado and their two
companions, together with Ernesto
Flores and Romeo Galano, were out of
the house;
(4) that Simangan warned Sofronia and
Lorna not to tell anybody that he and his
companions went to the house;
Simangan became worried when told by
his classmate Fernando Saquing that
several persons were arrested at
Nangalasauan, Amulung, for the death of
Ernesto;
(6) that two weeks after the death of the
victim, Simangan admitted to Fernando
that he and twenty others had just killed
a person in Masin, (sic) Iraga, Solana,
after the victim accompanied them to
show them the way;
(7) and that Fernando was warned not to
relate it to any other person with the
threat that if it will be known by others,
Simangan will drink his blood.[22]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the contention of the petitioner to be
unmeritorious. Sofronia narrated in detail how the
petitioner and his companions, armed with long
firearms, managed to convince Ernesto to go with
them and be their guide on the road. Sofronia pointed
to and identified the petitioner in open court.
The testimony of Fernando, that the petitioner
admitted to him that he was one of the victims killers,
is not hearsay. The testimony of Fernando was offered
to prove the petitioners extrajudicial admission of his
involvement in the killing of Ernesto. Such admission
is an admission against personal interest, and is
admissible against the petitioner.[27]
We note that the petitioner admitted during trial
that he and Fernando were classmates in a civil
engineering subject at St. Louis University, and in the
ROTC training. The petitioner also admitted that he
and Fernando were friends. Hence, it was not
impossible for the petitioner to have revealed his
involvement in the killing to Fernando. The petitioner
did not hesitate to inform Fernando that he and his
companions had killed Ernesto because an informer
had told them that Ernesto was bad.
The petitioners alibi and denial of the crime
charged cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward identification made by Lorna and
Sofronia that he was one of the armed men who left
with Ernesto, coupled with the petitioners own
admission that he was one of the victims
assailants. We note that there is no evidence, nor any
showing of any ill-motive on the part of Lorna,
Sofronia and Fernando to prevaricate. In fact, the
petitioner and Fernando were close friends. Thus, the
presumption is that the said witness acted in good
faith; hence, their testimonies must be accorded
credence and full probative weight.
The three witnesses cannot be faulted, and their
credibility denigrated for giving their statements to
Sgt. Espiritu of the Philippine Constabulary only on
March 21 to 25, 1980. As copiously explained by the
Court of Appeals:
Appellants attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of
[the] positive identification made by Sofronia and
Lorna that they were among those five (5) armed
persons who took along the victim Ernesto Flores on
the pretext that appellant Simangan being new to the
place would need said victim to guide him on the
road. Both Lorna and Sofronia knew personally
appellant Bergado and Gumabong being Lornas
former friends and Sofronias neighbors. On the other
hand, the delay in revealing the identities of
appellants Bergado and Simangan had been
sufficiently explained. It must be recalled that
appellant Simangan had made a stern warning before
they left that Sofronia and Lorna should not tell
anybody about their presence in the place that
night. Those men being then armed and determined
to take along with them the victim out on the road,
even threatening Sofronia and Lorna not to divulge
the incident to others, there was strong reason for
said witnesses to keep mum on the identities of
appellants even when the police investigators arrived
the following morning and asked them about the
names of the five (5) persons or at least any of them
they had recognized. It is understandable when a
witness does not immediately report the identity of
the offender after a startling occurrence, more so
when he is related to the victim as this makes it all
4
the more traumatic. It is, likewise, understandable for
a witness to fear for his safety especially when town
mates are involved in the commission of the
crime. Even if the principal witnesses, Lorna and
Sofronia, did not witness the actual killing of Ernesto
Flores, the circumstances that the latter was last seen
alive together with the appellants and Gumabong,
along with two (2) other unidentified companions
that night who were armed with guns, that he was
never to return home that night, and his dead body
discovered in a nearby field, lying face down on the
ground, both his arms tied at his back with multiple
stab wounds on his neck and back the combination of
these circumstances leave no doubt on their minds
that those five (5) persons were responsible for
Ernestos gruesome death and such conviction was
enough to temporarily silence them from revealing
immediately to the police investigators the identities
of appellant Bergado and Gumabong, and
subsequently, Simangan.[29]
In sum, then, we find and so rule that the
appellate court correctly affirmed the decision of the
trial court convicting the petitioner of
homicide. However, the appellate court erred in
appreciating against the petitioner the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty and nighttime. In the first
place, such circumstances were not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. [30] Although
the petitioner committed the crime before the
effectivity date of said Rules, the same should be
applied retroactively as it is favorable to him.[31]
Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty
simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds,
three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance, there
must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds
on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate
the pain and suffering of the victim.[32] The number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.
Consequently, then, the penalty imposed by the
trial court on the petitioner must be modified. There
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of the
imposable penalty of homicide which is reclusion
temporal. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty lower
by one degree for reclusion temporal, which is prision
mayor.
 IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is
hereby sentenced an indeterminate penalty of from
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) Years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-95-1326. July 8, 1998]
ANNABELLE R. GUTIERREZ, complainant, vs. HON.
RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Complainant Annabelle R. Gutierrez was
convicted by respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Pallatao of
Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Manila, for
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22) and for Estafa under Article 315
(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Aggrieved by what
she perceived as a wrongful conviction, she filed this
administrative case against respondent for Serious
Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Decision, Falsification of Public
Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She
averred that, since the checks that were the bases of
the informations against her were not presented in
evidence by the prosecution, her conviction was
erroneous and the respondent should be held
administratively liable therefor.
The material facts, based on the pleadings, are as
follows:
Complainant borrowed the sum of Three
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000) from
one Ligaya V. Santos, for which she issued five (5)
checks as guarantee for the loan, to wit:
Drawee Bank Check No. Date Amount
UCPB SRD022496 April 7, 1993 P120,000.00
UCPB SRD022513 April 15,
1993 P 60,000.00
5
UCPB PTU031796 June 6,
1993 P 60,000.00
UCPB PTU031797 June 14,
1993 P 60,000.00
UCPB PTU031798 June 21, 1993 P 70,000.00
Santos deposited these checks in her account with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Upon presentment
by PNB of said checks to the drawee United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), they were dishonored, for the
reason: closed account
Thereafter, Santos made several verbal and
written demands for Gutierrez to pay the amounts
covered by the checks, but the latter allegedly refused
to make good her obligation to pay. Hence, Santos
filed five (5) criminal complaints for the Violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and one complaint for Estafa
against Gutierrez. After preliminary investigation, the
corresponding informations were filed in court and
the cases were raffled to respondent Judges sala.
On November 15, 1993, while the said
informations were pending in court, Santos executed
the following letter in her own handwriting:
Nov. 15, 1993
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I am dropping my
charges against Annabelle Rama and that
she already change (sic) the bouncing
checks with a (sic) new ones.
I hope for your kind understanding on this
case. ros
On the same day, Gutierrez also executed the
following document in her own handwriting:
I Annabelle Rama Gutierrez certify that I
received all my old checks from Mrs. Ligaya
Santos in exchange to (sic) the new ones I
gave her.
In agreement, Mrs. Santos agreed to
dropped (sic) her case against me
.
The foregoing documents were executed by
Santos and Gutierrez after the latter replaced the five
(5) checks subject of the informations. The
replacement checks were subsequently honored
except Check No. SRD-043939 dated May 10, 1994, in
the amount of P50,000.00, drawn against the
UCPB. This check was allegedly dishonored by the
UCPB upon presentment by PNB, Santos depository liability as the same was already paid. Since
bank, for the reason: stop payment the last check covered by Check No.
SRD043939 in the amount
The evidence for the prosecution was
of P50,000.00 was dishonored by the
summarized by respondent Judge in his Decision as
drawee bank, accused is hereby ordered to
follows:
indemnify the offended party the said
"To prove these cases against the accused, amount of P50,000.00.
the Fiscal called to the witness stand Ligaya
For violation of Article 315 of the Revised
V. Santos, the herein complainant who
Penal Code, accused is found guilty for the
identified herself as a widow,
crime of Estafa defined and punished under
businesswoman and who resides at Lions
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and in
Rd., Arroceros St., Ermita, Manila. In the
the absence of mitigating and aggravating
course of her testimony, the following
circumstances and applying the
exhibits were marked in evidence: Exhibit A-
indeterminate sentence law, she is hereby
letter dated November 15, 1993, Exhibit A-1
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
Signature of Ligaya V. Santos, Exhibits B
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
Check No. SRD-043979 for P50,000.00
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
Exhibit B-1 Notice of dishonor, Exhibit C
maximum. No pronouncement as to civil
letter of demand and Exhibit C-1 signature
liability as the same was already paid. The
of complainant. xxx.[1]
bailbond posted by herein accused for her
On the basis of the above evidence proffered by provisional liberty ordered cancelled.
the prosecution, respondent Judge convicted the
Dissatisfied and aggrieved, she filed before us,
accused in the aforestated five criminal cases for
this Administrative Complaint anchored on the
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and in one for Estafa. She was
following grounds:
sentenced as follows:
1. That respondent judge has no jurisdiction
"WHEREFORE, premises considered,
over the criminal cases for Violation of B.P.
judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
Blg. 22 because the imposable penalty
accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In
therefor, which is imprisonment of not more
Criminal Case No. 93-128841, accused
than one (1) year or a fine not
Annabelle R. Gutierrez is hereby sentenced
exceeding P200,000.00 or both, is within the
to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and
exclusive original jurisdiction of the
to pay a fine of P120,000.00 without
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) as provided
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
for by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691,
insolvency. In Criminal Case No. 93-128842,
otherwise known as the Law on the
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
Expanded Jurisdiction of the MTC.
imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a
fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary 2. That the venue and time of the
imprisonment in case of insolvency. For commission of the offenses charged were
Criminal Case No. 93-128843, accused is not established in violation of the
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of petitioners right due process.
one (1) year and to pay a fine of P60,000.00
3. That the original checks in question were
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
never offered in evidence, hence, the
insolvency.For Criminal Case No. 128844,
decision is not supported by evidence
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
of corpus delicti.
imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a
fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary 4. That the penalty of twelve (12) years
imprisonment in case of insolvency. And for of prision mayor to twenty (20) years
Criminal case No. 93-128845, she is hereby of reclusion temporal was arbitrarily and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) unjustly imposed.
year and to pay a fine of P70,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. No pronouncement as to civil
6
 5. That the decision was antedated and
promulgated in a rush in violation of
procedural rules.
6. That the cancellation of petitioners bail is
whimsical and arbitrary, constitutive of
grave abuse of discretion.
To refute these grounds for the complaint,
respondent Judge submitted specific arguments in his
Supplemental Comment dated July 7, 1995, which
could be summarized as follows:[2]
(1) The alleged lack of jurisdiction is based on Section
2 of RA 7961 which was approved on March 25,
1994. This law, however, is inapplicable to complaints
case because it did not provide for any retroactive
effect as to cover pending criminal cases. The
retroactivity therein applies only to civil cases which
did not reach the pre-trial stage (Section 7, R.A. No.
7691).
The cases against complainant were filed on
November 5, 1993, five (5) months before the
approval of the law on March 25, 1994. The law
became effective 15 days after its complete
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation (Section 8, R.A. No.
(7691).
(2) Concerning the alleged defect of the Informations
in not specifying the exact place and time of the
commission of the crime, a perusal of the
Informations filed by the City Prosecutor shows that
the situs (Manila) and date (first week of March,
1993) of the commission of the offenses charged
were sufficiently alleged. The specific place in Manila
and the precise time need not be stated, because they
are not essential elements of the offense charged. If
the stand of the complaint is that the charges in the
Informations did not constitute offenses, her remedy
would have been the timely filing of a motion to
quash before the trial and not to raise the issue
collaterally after the decision had been
rendered. After the decision, the complaints remedy
is to appeal, which she availed of by filing a notice of
appeal.
(3) Regarding the prosecutions failure to offer in
evidence the original checks issued by Gutierrez,
respondent Judge commented that the same is of no
moment because while the original checks were not
presented anymore, there is an admission that
accused Gutierrez got back the bouncing checks from
7
Ligaya Santos. This document was presented as an
exhibit by the prosecution and was not denied by the
accused.
(4) Anent the charge that the penalty of twelve (12)
years of Reclusion Temporal was arbitrarily and
unjustly imposed, the respondent argued that the
penalty is based on the amount subject of the fraud
which is P370,000.00. Under Art 315 (1st par.), the
penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period if the amount is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00. If there is an excess, for
every P10,000.00 excess, there is an additional
penalty of one year. If computed totally, the excess
would amount to 34.8 years. But under the same
Article, the maximum shall only be 20 years. In
imposing the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, respondent Judge merely
exercised his discretion as the penalty was within the
range fixed by law.
(5) On the charge that respondents decision was
antedated and promulgated in a rush, respondent
that this charge is unfair, unjust and baseless because
it was made to appear wrongly that the respondent
Judge falsified his own decision and promulgated it
without notice at all.
Accordingly to respondent, the records will show
that as early as October 25, 1994, he already set the
promulgation of the decision at 8:30 A.M. on
November 24, 1994. During the interim, the
complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA- G.R. SP No. 35373) questioning
the Order denying her Demurrer to Evidence,
resulting in the cancellation of the promulgation set
on November 24, 1994 which was reset to December
6, 1994. On said date, the decision was not
promulgated because of a Restraining Order issued
by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the
promulgation was reset to February 21, 1995, which
was intransferable in character. But since, the
respondent was still waiting for developments in the
Court of Appeals, the promulgation was reset for the
fourth time to March 23, 1995, and then for the 5th
time to April 18, 1995. Prior to April 18, 1995, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on
the certiorari case, dismissing the same but allowing
Gutierrez to present her evidence.
 Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the cases were set for reception of accuseds evidence
on three (3) dates: May 16, 23 and 25, 1995. On May
16, 1995, complainant asked for postponement. On
May 23, 1995, she asked for another
postponement. On May 25, 1995, when the accused
still failed to present evidence, so as not to frustrate
the wheels of justice and make a mockery of the
solemn judicial system, the respondent was left
without any recourse but to exercise the coercive
power of the court by promulgating the decision
which was supposed to have been promulgated way
back December 6, 1994. To conform with the actual
date of promulgation, the respondent Judge, who
found no justifiable basis to change his disposition of
the case, simply crossed out the previous date,
December 2, 1994, on the last page and
superimposed the current date May 25, 1995.
Contrary therefore to the complainants charge,
the promulgation of the Decision, in respondents
view was not precipitate. As a matter of fact, in
obedience to the Court of Appeals, the promulgation
was deferred several times.
According to respondent there was no basis to
change his mind, as the accused did not present
witnesses in her defense despite ample opportunities
granted her. After her counsels manifestation in court
that if Fiscal Velasco were around, he would be
presented to testify to the effect that it was before
him that the Affidavit of Desistance of Ligaya Santos
was sworn to, and to which the public prosecutor
offered no objection and even admitted the tenor of
the offer, there was nothing more to be done. This
was the only evidence offered by the accused. The
public prosecutor moved for the submission of the
case, which was granted. Hence, according to the
respondent, there was no reason to re-write the
whole decision where there was no reason for the
respondent Judge to change his disposition. He
added, this was not antedating. There would be
antedating, if the decision were made on May 25,
1995 but backdated December 2, 1994. Neither was it
pre-judgment, he said. Rather, it was a judgment
promulgated belatedly because of the Court of
Appeals restraining order, which order eventually
self-destructed after the lapse of twenty (20)
days. The accused was fully aware of the
developments in the cases, particularly the deferred
promulgation of the decision for several months, said
the respondent.
(6) Lastly, respondent averred that the
cancellation of complainants bail bond was not
8
whimsical nor arbitrary. After the promulgation of the
Decision convicting the accused for a penalty higher
than six (6) years, under Circular No. 12-94, the
accused must be ordered committed in jail. The
respondent could not question the wisdom of the
Circular, he was under obligation to implement it.
Considering carefully the complainants charges
and the respondent Judges Comments thereon, We
find that except for one issue, the aforementioned
charges have been sufficiently and satisfactorily
refuted by respondent. However, with respect to the
prosecutions failure to present in evidence the
original checks subject of the informations filed
against the accused Gutierrez, We are not in accord
with respondent Judges conclusion that same is
inconsequential for her conviction.
For, it is not disputed that the five (5) checks
subject of the five (5) information for Violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and the information for Estafa, are UCPB
checks with Nos. SRD022496, SRD022513,
PTU031796, PTU031797, and PTU031798. It is also
not disputed that all these five (5) checks were not
presented and formally offered in evidence. Rather,
the evidence of the prosecution consisted of the
replacement check drawn against UCPB, namely
Check No. SRD043939, the return deposit slip issued
by the PNB indicating that this replacement check
was dishonored by the UCPB for the reason, stop
payment, and the testimony of the PNB
representative, one Hernando Balmores, Jr. to the
effect that this replacement check was indeed
returned by the UCPB for the reason aforestated. This
was very explicit from the Order of respondent
Judge[3] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration from the denial of her Demurrer to
Evidence to wit:
x x x. On the matter of the failure of the
prosecution to mark in evidence the checks
as alleged in the information, the
prosecuting fiscal that what was marked is a
document executed by the accused to the
effect that said checks were in her
possession and that the same were replaced
with other checks. Now, as to the matter of
the representative of the bank not coming
from the drawee bank, the Court considers
this testimony of the witness as only part of
the evidence for the prosecution.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge based the
judgment of conviction, not on the checks themselves,
as these were not proffered in evidence, but on
petitioners written statement, dated November 15,
1995, which respondent judge considered as
admission on the part of the petitioner that, she had
indeed, issued the bouncing checks subject of the
informations but that she had replaced them with
new checks.
Evidently, respondent Judge misconstrued and
misapplied the rule with regard to admission in
criminal cases.
The issue of whether or not an admission in
criminal cases is adequate to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged has been settled in the case of People vs.
Solayao[4] where this Court made the following
pronouncements:
xxx xxx. By its very nature, an admission is
the mere acknowledgement of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may
inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker,
but not sufficient of itself to establish his
guilt. In other words, it is a statement by
defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues
pending, in connection with proof of other
facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but
which is of itself, insufficient to authorize
conviction. From the above principles, this
Court can infer that an admission in criminal
cases is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime charged."[5]
By itself, herein complainants letter dated
November 15, 1995, which respondent Judge
construed as an admission that she indeed issued the
checks subject of the Informations filed against her
and that she was replacing them with new ones, does
not prove beyond reasonable doubt her culpability
under B.P. 22 and Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code. To establish her guilt, it is indispensable
that the checks she issued for which she was
subsequently charged, be offered in evidence because
the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of
knowingly issuing a check with insufficient funds.
[6]
Clearly, it was error to convict complainant on the
basis of her letter alone.
Nevertheless, despite this incorrect
interpretation of a rule on evidence, we do not find
the same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of
gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly
rendering an unjust decision. Rather, it is at most an
error in judgement, for which, as a general rule, he
9
cannot be held administratively liable. In this regard,
we reiterate the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction as
established by current jurisprudence:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may
not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he
renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise,
assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would
make his position doubly unbearable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. The
error must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only
in this latter instance, when the judge acts
fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that
administrative sanctions are called for as an
imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the
law can find refuge. xxx xxx.[7]
Moreover, it must be stressed that in the case
of De la Cruz vs. Concepcion[8] this Court declared that:
Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence,
unless so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of ignorance or bad faith, or of
knowing rendition of an unjust decision, are
irrelevant and immaterial in an
administrative proceeding against him. No
one, called upon to try facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice,
can be infallible in his judgment. All that is
expected of him is that he follow the rules
prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial
hearing, assess the different factors that
emerge therefrom and bear on the issues
presented, and on the basis of the
conclusions he finds established, with only
his conscience and knowledge of the law to
guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly.[9]
In this case, the record is bereft of any evidence
to conclusively show that the respondent Judges
actuations were tainted with malice and bad faith,
hence the administrative charges against him must
fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint for Serious
Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Decision, Falsification of Public
Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law against
respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Palattao is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56294 May 20, 1991
SMITH BELL AND COMPANY (PHILIPPINES), INC.
and TOKYO MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS A. GO
THONG AND CO., respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In the early morning of 3 May 1970—at exactly 0350
hours, on the approaches to the port of Manila near
Caballo Island, a collision took place between the
M/V "Don Carlos," an inter-island vessel owned and
operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong
and Company ("Go Thong"), and the M/S "Yotai
Maru," a merchant vessel of Japanese registry. The
"Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound leaving the
port of Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai Maru" was
approaching the port of Manila, coming in from Kobe,
Japan. The bow of the "Don Carlos" rammed the
portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru" inflicting a
three (3) cm. gaping hole on her portside near Hatch
No. 3, through which seawater rushed in and flooded
that hatch and her bottom tanks, damaging all the
cargo stowed therein.
The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by
their insurance companies. The insurance companies
in turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the
consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced actions
against private respondent Go Thong for damages
sustained by the various shipments in the then Court
of First Instance of Manila.
Two (2) cases were filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. The first case, Civil Case No. 82567, was
commenced on 13 March 1971 by petitioner Smith
Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc. and Sumitomo
Marine and Fire Insurance Company Ltd., against
10
private respondent Go Thong, in Branch 3, which was
presided over by Judge Bernardo P. Fernandez. The
second case, Civil Case No. 82556, was filed on 15
March 1971 by petitioners Smith Bell and Company
(Philippines), Inc. and Tokyo Marine and Fire
Insurance Company, Inc. against private respondent
Go Thong in Branch 4, which was presided over by
then Judge, later Associate Justice of this Court,
Serafin R. Cuevas.
Civil Cases Nos. 82567 (Judge Fernandez) and 82556
(Judge Cuevas) were tried under the same issues and
evidence relating to the collision between the "Don
Carlos" and the "Yotai Maru" the parties in both cases
having agreed that the evidence on the collision
presented in one case would be simply adopted in the
other. In both cases, the Manila Court of First Instance
held that the officers and crew of the "Don
Carlos" had been negligent that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the collision and accordingly
held respondent Go Thong liable for damages to the
plaintiff insurance companies. Judge Fernandez
awarded the insurance companies P19,889.79 with
legal interest plus P3,000.00 as attorney's fees; while
Judge Cuevas awarded the plaintiff insurance
companies on two (2) claims US $ 68,640.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine currency plus attorney's fees
of P30,000.00, and P19,163.02 plus P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees, respectively.
The decision of Judge Fernandez in Civil Case No.
82567 was appealed by respondent Go Thong to the
Court of Appeals, and the appeal was there docketed
as C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. The decision of Judge
Cuevas in Civil Case No. 82556 was also appealed by
Go Thong to the Court of Appeals, the appeal being
docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R. Substantially
identical assignments of errors were made by Go
Thong in the two (2) appealed cases before the Court
of Appeals.
In C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, the Court of Appeals
through Reyes, L.B., J., rendered a Decision on 8
August 1978 affirming the Decision of Judge
Fernandez. Private respondent Go Thong moved for
reconsideration, without success. Go Thong then
went to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review, the
Petition being docketed as G.R. No. L-48839 ("Carlos
A. Go Thong and Company v. Smith Bell and Company
[Philippines], Inc., et al."). In its Resolution dated 6
December 1978, this Court, having considered "the
allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the
Petition for Review on Certiorari, of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as respondent's
comment", denied the Petition for lack of merit. Go
Thong filed a Motion for Reconsideration; the Motion
was denied by this Court on 24 January 1979.
In the other (Cuevas) case, C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R, the
Court of Appeals, on 26 November 1980 (or almost
two [2] years after the Decision of Reyes, L.B., J., in
C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court on Petition for Review) through Sison,
P.V., J., reversed the Cuevas Decision and held the
officers of the "Yotai Maru" at fault in the collision
with the "Don Carlos," and dismissed the insurance
companies' complaint. Herein petitioners asked for
reconsideration, to no avail.
The insurance companies are now before us on
Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the
Decision of Sison, P.V., J., in C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R.
Petitioners' principal contentions are:
a. that the Sison Decision had disregarded the
rule of res judicata;
b. that Sison P.V., J., was in serious and
reversible error in accepting Go Thong's
defense that the question of fault on the part
of the "Yotai Maru" had been settled by the
compromise agreement between the owner of
the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of
the "Don Carlos;" and
c. that Sison, P. V. J., was in serious and
reversible error in holding that the "Yotai
Maru" had been negligent and at fault in the
collision with the "Don Carlos."
I
The first contention of petitioners is that Sison, P. V. J.
in rendering his questioned Decision, failed to apply
the rule of res judicata. Petitioners maintain that the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 6 December
1978 in G.R. No. 48839 which dismissed Go Thong's
Petition for Review of the Decision of Reyes, L.B., J., in
C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, had effectively settled the
question of liability on the part of the "Don Carlos."
Under the doctrine of res judicata, petitioners
contend, Sison, P. V. J. should have followed the Reyes,
L.B., J. Decision since the latter had been affirmed by
the Supreme Court and had become final and
executory long before the Sison Decision was
rendered.
11
Private respondent Go Thong, upon the other hand,
argues that the Supreme Court, in rendering its
minute Resolution in G.R. No. L- 48839, had merely
dismissed Go Thong's Petition for Review of the
Reyes, L.B., J. Decision for lack of merit but had not
affirmed in toto that Decision. Private respondent, in
other words, purports to distinguish between denial
of a Petition for Review for lack of merit and
affirmance of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Thus, Go
Thong concludes, this Court did not hold that the
"Don Carlos" had been negligent in the collision.
Private respondent's argument must be rejected. That
this Court denied Go Thong's Petition for Review in a
minute Resolution did not in any way diminish the
legal significance of the denial so decreed by this
Court. The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a
definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall
be framed.1 It has long been settled that this Court
has discretion to decide whether a "minute
resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-blown
decision in any particular case and that a minute
Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review
on certiorariconstitutes an adjudication on the
merits of the controversy or subject matter of the
Petition.2 It has been stressed by the Court that the
grant of due course to a Petition for Review is "not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and
so there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion." 3 A
minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a
Decision of the Court of Appeals can only mean that
the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other
words, that the Decision sought to be reviewed and
set aside is correct.4
Private respondent Go Thong argues also that the
rule of res judicata cannot be invoked in the instant
case whether in respect of the Decision of Reyes,
L.B., J. or in respect of the Resolution of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-48839, for the reason that there
was no identity of parties and no identity of cause of
action between C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R and C.A.-G.R.
No. 61320-R.
The parties in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R Where the
decision of Judge Fernandez was affirmed, involved
Smith Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc., and
Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. while
the petitioners in the instant case (plaintiffs below)
are Smith Bell and Co. (Philippines), Inc. and Tokyo
Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. In other words,
there was a common petitioner in the two (2) cases,
although the co-petitioner in one was an insurance
company different from the insurance company co-
petitioner in the other case. It should be noted,
moreover, that the co-petitioner in both cases was an
insurance company arid that both petitioners in the
two (2) cases represented the same interest, i.e., the
cargo owner's interest as against the hull interest or
the interest of the shipowner. More importantly, both
cases had been brought against the same defendant,
private respondent Go Thong, the owner of the vessel
"Don Carlos." In sum, C.A.-G.R. No. 61320R and C.A-
G.R. No. 61206-R exhibited substantial identity of
parties.
It is conceded by petitioners that the subject matters
of the two (2) suits were not identical, in the sense
that the cargo which had been damaged in the one
case and for which indemnity was sought, was not the
very same cargo which had been damaged in the
other case indemnity for which was also sought. The
cause of action was, however, the same in the two (2)
cases, i.e., the same right of the cargo owners to the
safety and integrity of their cargo had been violated
by the same casualty, the ramming of the "Yotai Maru"
by the "Don Carlos." The judgments in both cases
were final judgments on the merits rendered by the
two (2) divisions of the Court of Appeals and by the
Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of which has not been
questioned.
Under the circumstances, we believe that the absence
of identity of subject matter, there being substantial
identity of parties and identity of cause of action, will
not preclude the application of res judicata.5
In Tingson v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court
distinguished one from the other the two (2)
concepts embraced in the principle of res judicata, i.e.,
"bar by former judgment" and "conclusiveness of
judgment:"
There is no question that where as between
the first case Where the judgment is rendered
and the second case where such judgment is
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject-
matter and cause of action, the judgment on
the merits in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the subsequent action not
only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but also as to any other admissible
12
matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and to all matters that could have
been adjudged in that case. This is designated
as "bar by former judgment."
But where the second action between the
same parties is upon a different claim or
demand, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to those
matters in issue or points controverted, upon
the determination of which the finding or
judgment was rendered. In fine, the previous
judgment is conclusive in the second case,
only as those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the
rule on 'conclusiveness of judgment' embodied
in subdivision (c) of Section 49 of Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of' Court. 7 (Citations
omitted) (Emphases supplied)
In Lopez v. Reyes,8 the Court elaborated further the
distinction between bar by former judgment which
bars the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action:
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects.
The first is the effect of a judgment as a bar to
the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. The
second aspect is that it precludes the
relitigation of a particular fact or issues in
another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue
and adjudicated in former action are
commonly applied to all matters essentially
connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends
to questions "necessarily involved in an issue,
and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily
implied in the final judgment, although no
specific finding may have been made in
reference thereto, and although such matters
were directly referred to in the pleadings and
were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
 former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties, and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they
are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an
adjudication on all the matters which are
essential to support it, and that every
proposition assumed or decided by the court
leading up to the final conclusion and upon
which such conclusion is based is as effectually
passed upon as the ultimate question which is
finally solved.9 (Citations omitted) (Emphases
supplied)
In the case at bar, the issue of which vessel ("Don
Carlos" or "Yotai Maru") had been negligent, or so
negligent as to have proximately caused the collision
between them, was an issue that was actually, directly
and expressly raised, controverted and litigated in
C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. Reyes, L.B., J., resolved that
issue in his Decision and held the "Don Carlos" to have
been negligent rather than the "Yotai Maru" and, as
already noted, that Decision was affirmed by this
Court in G.R. No. L-48839 in a Resolution dated 6
December 1978. The Reyes Decision thus became
final and executory approximately two (2) years
before the Sison Decision, which is assailed in the
case at bar, was promulgated. Applying the rule of
conclusiveness of judgment, the question of which
vessel had been negligent in the collision between the
two (2) vessels, had long been settled by this Court
and could no longer be relitigated in C.A.-G.R. No.
61206- R. Private respondent Go Thong was certainly
bound by the ruling or judgment of Reyes, L.B., J. and
that of this Court. The Court of Appeals fell into clear
and reversible error When it disregarded the
Decision of this Court affirming the Reyes Decision.10
Private respondent Go Thong also argues that a
compromise agreement entered into between Sanyo
Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and
Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos," under which
the former paid P268,000.00 to the latter, effectively
settled that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This
argument is wanting in both factual basis and legal
substance. True it is that by virtue of the compromise
agreement, the owner of the "Yotai Maru" paid a sum
of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere,
however, in the compromise agreement did the
owner of the "Yotai Maru " admit or concede that the
13
"Yotai Maru" had been at fault in the collision. The
familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not an
admission that anything is due, and is not admissible
in evidence against the person making the offer." 11 A
compromise is an agreement between two (2) or
more persons who, in order to forestall or put an end
to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual
consent, an adjustment which everyone of them
prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the
danger of losing more.12 An offer to compromise does
not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on
the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor on
the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is
groundless or even doubtful, since the compromise is
arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further
controversy and saving the expenses of litigation.13 It
is of the very nature of an offer of compromise that it
is made tentatively, hypothetically and in
contemplation of mutual concessions. 14 The above
rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of
the most insistent and basic kind; that the incidence
of litigation should be reduced and its duration
shortened to the maximum extent feasible.
The collision between the "Yotai Maru" and the "Don
Carlos" spawned not only sets of litigations but also
administrative proceedings before the Board of
Marine Inquiry ("BMI"). The collision was the subject
matter of an investigation by the BMI in BMI Case No.
228. On 12 July 1971, the BMI through Commodore
Leovegildo L. Gantioki, found both vessels to have
been negligent in the collision.
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the BMI's
decision. The Motions for Reconsideration were
resolved by the Philippine Coast Guard ("PCG") nine
(9) years later, in an order dated 19 May 1980 issued
by PCG Commandant, Commodore Simeon M.
Alejandro. The dispositive portion of the PCG decision
read as follows:
Premises considered, the Decision dated July
12, 1971 is hereby reconsidered and
amended absolving the officers of "YOTAI
MARU" from responsibility for the collision.
This Headquarters finds no reason to modify
the penalties imposed upon the officers of
Don Carlos. (Annex "C", Reply, September 5,
1981).15
Go Thong filed a second Motion for Reconsideration;
this was denied by the PCG in an order dated
September 1980.
Go Thong sought to appeal to the then Ministry of
National Defense from the orders of the PCG by filing
with the PCG on 6 January 1981 a motion for a 30-day
extension from 7 January 1981 within which to
submit its record on appeal. On 4 February 1981, Go
Thong filed a second urgent motion for another
extension of thirty (30) days from 7 February 1981.
On 12 March 1981, Go Thong filed a motion for a final
extension of time and filed its record on appeal on 17
March 1981. The PCG noted that Go Thong's record
on appeal was filed late, that is, seven (7) days after
the last extension granted by the PCG had expired.
Nevertheless, on 1 July 1981 (after the Petition for
Review on Certiorari in the case at bar had been filed
with this Court), the Ministry of Defense rendered a
decision reversing and setting aside the 19 May 1980
decision of the PCG
The owners of the "Yotai Maru" then filed with the
Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Defense Ministry's decision. The Office of the
President rendered a decision dated 17 April 1986
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The decision
of the Office of the President correctly recognized
that Go Thong had failed to appeal in a seasonable
manner:
MV "DON CARLOS" filed her Notice of Appeal
on January 5, 1981. However, the records also
show beyond peradventure of doubt that the
PCG Commandant's decision of May 19, 1980,
had already become final and executory When
MV "DON CARLOS" filed her Record on Appeal
on March 17, 1981, and When the motion for
third extension was filed after the expiry date.
Under Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f), Chapter
XVI, of the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules
and Regulations, decisions of the PCG
Commandant shall be final unless, within
thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy thereof,
an appeal to the Minister of National Defense
is filed and perfected by the filing of a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal. Such
administrative regulation has the force and
effect of law, and the failure of MV "DON
CARLOS" to comply therewith rendered the
PCG Commandant's decision on May 19, 1980,
as final and executory, (Antique Sawmills, Inc.
vs. Zayco, 17 SCRA 316; Deslata vs. Executive
Secretary, 19 SCRA 487; Macailing vs.
Andrada, 31 SCRA 126.) (Annex "A", Go
Thong's Manifestation and Motion for Early
14
Resolution, November 24, 1986).16 (Emphases
supplied)
Nonetheless, acting under the misapprehension that
certain "supervening" events had taken place, the
Office of the President held that the Minister of
National Defense could validly modify or alter the
PCG Commandant's decision:
However, the records likewise show that, on
November 26, 1980, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision in CA-G.R. No. 61206-R
(Smith Bell & Co., Inc., et al. vs. Carlos A. Go
Thong & Co.) holding that the proximate
cause of the collision between MV "DON
CARLOS" AND MS "YOTAI MARU" was the
negligence, failure and error of judgment of
the officers of MS "YOTAI MARU". Earlier, or
on February 27, 1976, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. R-11973 (Carlos A. Go Thong vs. San-
yo Marine Co.) holding that MS "YOTAI MARU"
was solely responsible for the collision, which
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
The foregoing judicial pronouncements
rendered after the finality of the PCG
Commandant's decision of May 19, 1980, were
supervening causes or reasons that rendered
the PCG Commandant's decision as no longer
enforceable and entitled MV "DON CARLOS" to
request the Minister of National Defense to
modify or alter the questioned decision to
harmonize the same with justice and tile facts.
(De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686; City of
Bututan vs. Ortiz, 3 SCRA 659; Candelario vs.
Canizares, 4 SCRA 738; Abellana vs. Dosdos,
13 SCRA 244). Under such precise
circumstances, the Minister of National
Defense may validly modify or alter the PCG
commandant's decision. (Sec. 37, Act 4007;
Secs. 79(c) and 550, Revised Administrative
Code; Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA
134; Estrelia vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA
640).17 (Emphasis supplied)
The multiple misapprehensions under which the
Office of the President labored, were the following:
It took account of the Decision of Sison, P.V., J. in C.A.-
G.R. No. 61206-R, the very decision that is the subject
of review in the Petition at bar and therefore not final.
At the same time, the Office of the President either
ignored or was unaware of the Reyes, L.B., J., Decision
in C.A.-G.R. No 61320-R finding the "Don Carlos"
solely liable for the collision, and of the fact that that
Decision had been affirmed by the Supreme Court
and had long ago become final and executory. A third
misapprehension of the Office of the President
related to a decision in a Cebu Court of First Instance
litigation which had been settled by the compromise
agreement between the Sanyo Marine Company and
Go Thong. The Office of the President mistakenly
believed that the Cebu Court of First Instance had
rendered a decision holding the "Yotai Maru" solely
responsible for the collision, When in truth the Cebu
court had rendered a judgment of dismissal on the
basis of the compromise agreement. The Cebu
decision was not, of course, appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
It thus appears that the decision of the Office of the
President upholding the belated reversal by the
Ministry of National Defense of the PCG'S decision
holding the "Don Carlos" solely liable for the collision,
is so deeply flawed as not to warrant any further
examination. Upon the other hand, the basic decision
of the PCG holding the "Don Carlos" solely negligent in
the collision remains in effect.
II
In their Petition for Review, petitioners assail the
finding and conclusion of the Sison Decision, that the
"Yotai Maru" was negligent and at fault in the
collision, rather than the "Don Carlos." In view of the
conclusions reached in Part I above, it may not be
strictly necessary to deal with the issue of the
correctness of the Sison Decision in this respect. The
Court considers, nonetheless, that in view of the
conflicting conclusions reached by Reyes, L.B., J., on
the one hand, and Sison, P.V., J., on the other, and since
in affirming the Reyes Decision, the Court did not
engage in a detailed written examination of the
question of which vessel had been negligent, and in
view of the importance of the issues of admiralty law
involved, the Court should undertake a careful review
of the record of the case at bar and discuss those
issues in extenso.
The decision of Judge Cuevas in Civil Case No. 82556
is marked by careful analysis of the evidence
concerning the collision. It is worth underscoring that
the findings of fact of Judge Fernandez in Civil Case
No. 82567 (which was affirmed by the Court of
15
Appeals in the Reyes Decision and by this Court in
G.R. No. L-48839) are just about identical with the
findings of Judge Cuevas. Examining the facts as
found by Judge Cuevas, the Court believes that there
are three (3) principal factors which are constitutive
of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos," which
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
The first of these factors was the failure of the "Don
Carlos" to comply with the requirements of Rule 18
(a) of the International Rules of the Road ("Rules"),"
which provides as follows
(a) When two power-driven vessels are
meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to
involve risk of collision, each shall alter her
course to starboard, so that each may pass on
the port side of the other. This Rule only
applies to cases where vessels are meeting
end on or nearly end on, in such a manner as
to involve risk of collision, and does not apply
to two vessels which must, if both keep on
their respective course, pass clear of each
other. The only cases to which it does apply
are when each of two vessels is end on, or
nearly end on, to the other; in other words, to
cases in which, by day, each vessel sees the
masts of the other in a line or nearly in a line
with her own; and by night to cases in which
each vessel is in such a position as to see both
the sidelights of the other. It does not apply,
by day, to cases in which a vessel sees another
ahead crossing her own course; or, by night,
to cases where the red light of one vessel is
opposed to the red light of the other or where
the green light of one vessel is opposed to the
green light of the other or where a red light
without a green light or a green light without
a red light is seen ahead, or Where both green
and red lights are seen anywhere but ahead.
(Emphasis supplied)
The evidence on this factor was summarized by Judge
Cuevas in the following manner:
Plaintiff's and defendant's evidence seem to
agree that each vessel made a visual sighting
of each other ten minute before the collision
which occurred at 0350. German's version of
the incident that followed, was that "Don
Carlos" was proceeding directly to [a] meeting
[on an] "end-on or nearly end-on situation"
(Exh. S, page 8). He also testified that "Yotai
 Maru's' headlights were "nearly in line at
0340 A.M." (t.s.n., June 6, 1974) clearly
indicating that both vessels were sailing on
exactly opposite paths (t.s.n. June 6, 1974,
page 56). Rule 18 (a) of the International
Rules of the Road provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
And yet German altered "Don Carlos" course by five
degrees to the left at 0343 hours instead of to the right
(t.s.n. June 6, 1974, pages 4445) which maneuver was
the error that caused the collision in question. Why
German did so is likewise explained by the evidence on
record. "Don Carlos" was overtaking another vessel,
the "Don Francisco",and was then at the starboard
(right side) of the aforesaid vessel at 3:40 a.m. It was in
the process of overtaking"Don Francisco" that "Don
Carlos' was finally brought into a situation where he
was meeting end-on or nearly end-on "Yotai Maru, thus
involving risk of collision. Hence, German in his
testimony before the Board of Marine inquiry stated:
Atty. Chung:
You said in answer to the cross-examination
that you took a change of course to the left.
Why did you not take a course to the right
instead?
German:
I did not take any course to the right because
the other vessel was in my mind at the
starboard side following me. Besides, I don't
want to get risk of the Caballo Island (Exh. 2,
pages 209 and 210).19 (Emphasis supplied)
For her part, the "Yotai Maru" did comply with its
obligations under Rule 18 (a). As the "Yotai
Maru" found herself on an "end-on" or a "nearly end-
on" situation vis-a-vis the "Don Carlos, " and as the
distance between them was rapidly shrinking, the
"Yotai Maru" turned starboard (to its right) and at the
same time gave the required signal consisting of one
short horn blast. The "Don Carlos" turned to portside
(to its left), instead of turning to starboard as
demanded by Rule 18 (a). The "Don Carlos" also
violated Rule 28 (c) for it failed to give the required
signal of two (2) short horn blasts meaning "I am
altering my course to port." When the "Yotai Maru"
saw that the "Don Carlos" was turning to port, the
master of the "Yotai Maru" ordered the vessel turned
16
"hard starboard" at 3:45 a.m. and stopped her
engines; at about 3:46 a.m. the "Yotai Maru" went
"full astern engine."20 The collision occurred at exactly
3:50 a.m.
The second circumstance constitutive of negligence
on the part of the "Don Carlos" was its failure to have
on board that night a "proper look-out" as required
by Rule I (B) Under Rule 29 of the same set of Rules,
all consequences arising from the failure of the "Don
Carlos" to keep a "proper look-out" must be borne by
the "Don Carlos." Judge Cuevas' summary of the
evidence said:
The evidence on record likewise discloses
very convincingly that "Don Carlos" did not
have "look-out" whose sole and only duty is
only to act as Such. . . .21
A "proper look-out" is one who has been trained as
such and who is given no other duty save to act as a
look-out and who is stationed where he can see and
hear best and maintain good communication with the
officer in charge of the vessel, and who must, of
course, be vigilant. Judge Cuevas wrote:
The "look-out" should have no other duty to
perform. (Chamberlain v. Ward, 21, N.O.W. 62,
U.S. 548, 571). He has only one duty, that
which its name implies—to keep "look-out".
So a deckhand who has other duties, is not a
proper "look-out" (Brooklyn Perry Co. v. U.S.,
122, Fed. 696). The navigating officer is not a
sufficient"look-out" (Larcen B. Myrtle, 44 Fed.
779)—Griffin on Collision, pages 277-
278). Neither the captain nor the [helmsman]
in the pilothouse can be considered to be
a "look-out" within the meaning of the
maritime law. Nor should he be stationed in
the bridge. He should be as near as practicable
to the surface of the water so as to be able to
see low-lying lights (Griffin on Collision, page
273).
On the strength of the foregoing authorities,
which do not appear to be disputed even by
the defendant, it is hardly probable that
neither German or Leo Enriquez may qualify
as "look-out" in the real sense of the
word.22(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the failure of the "Don Carlos" to
recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with
the "Yotai Maru" coming in from the opposite
direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the
"Don Carlos" to maintain a proper look-out.
The third factor constitutive of negligence on the part
of the "Don Carlos" relates to the fact that Second
Mate Benito German was, immediately before and
during the collision, in command of the "Don
Carlos." Judge Cuevas summed up the evidence on this
point in the following manner:
The evidence on record clearly discloses that
"Don Carlos" was, at the time of the collision
and immediately prior thereto, under the
command of Benito German, a second mate
although its captain, Captain Rivera, was very
much in the said vessel at the time. The
defendant's evidence appears bereft of
any explanation as to why second mate
German was at the helm of the aforesaid vessel
when Captain Rivera did not appear to be
under any disability at the time. In this
connection, Article [633] of the Code of
Commerce provides:
Art. [633] — The second mate shall
take command of the vessel in case of
the inability or disqualification of the
captain and sailing mate, assuming, in
such case, their powers and liability.
The fact that second mate German was
allowed to be in command of "Don Carlos"
and not the chief or the sailing mate in the
absence of Captain Rivera, gives rise to no
other conclusion except that said vessel [had]
no chief mate. Otherwise, the defense
evidence should have at least explained why it
was German, only a second mate, who was at
the helm of the vessel "Don Carlos" at the
time of the fatal collision.
But that is not all. Worst still, aside from
German's being only a second mate, is his
apparent lack of sufficient knowledge of the
basic and generally established rules of
navigation. For instance, he appeared unaware
of the necessity of employing a "look-
out" (t.s.n. June 6, 1974, page 27) which is
manifest even in his testimony before the
Board of Marine Inquiry on the same subject
(Exh. 2, page 209). There is, therefore, every
reasonable ground to believe that his inability
17
to grasp actual situation and the implication
brought about by inadequacy of experience
and technical know-how was mainly
responsible and decidedly accounted for the
collision of the vessels involved in this case.. . .
23
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Mate German simply did not have the level of
experience, judgment and skill essential for
recognizing and coping with the risk of collision as it
presented itself that early morning when the "Don
Carlos," running at maximum speed and having just
overtaken the "Don Francisco" then approximately
one mile behind to the starboard side of the "Don
Carlos," found itself head-on or nearly head on vis-a-
vis the "Yotai Maru. " It is essential to point out that
this situation was created by the "Don Carlos" itself.
The Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R did not
make any findings of fact which contradicted the
findings of fact made by Judge Cuevas. What Sison,
P.V., J. actually did was to disregard all the facts found
by Judge Cuevas, and discussed above and,
astonishingly, found a duty on the "Yotai
Maru" alone to avoid collision with and to give way to
the "Don Carlos ". Sison, P.V., J., wrote:
At a distance of eight (8) miles and with ten
(10) minutes before the impact, [Katoh] and
Chonabayashi had ample time to adopt
effective precautionary measures to steer
away from the Philippine vessel, particularly
because both [Katoh] and Chonabayashi also
deposed that at the time they had first
eyesight of the "Don Carlos" there was still
"no danger at all" of a
collision.1âwphi1 Having sighted the "Don
Carlos" at a comparatively safe distance—"no
danger at all" of a collision—the Japanese ship
should have observed with the highest
diligence the course and movements of the
Philippine interisland vessel as to enable the
former to adopt such precautions as will
necessarily present a collision, or give way, and
in case of a collision, the former is prima facie
at fault. In G. Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River
Plantation Co., 26 Phil. 632, the Supreme
Court held:
Nautical rules require that where a
steamship and sailing vessel are
approaching each other from opposite
directions, or on intersecting lines, the
 steamship, from the moment the
sailing vessel is seen, shall watch with
the highest diligence her course and
movements so as to enable it to adopt
such timely means of precaution as
will necessarily prevent the two boats
from coming in contact.'
(Underscoring in the original)
At 3:44 p.m., or 4 minutes after first sighting
the "Don Carlos", or 6 minutes before contact
time, Chonabayashi revealed that the "Yotai
Maru" gave a one-blast whistle to inform the
Philippine vessel that the Japanese ship was
turning to starboard or to the right and that
there was no blast or a proper signal from the
"Don Carlos" (pp. 67-68. Deposition of
Chonabayashi, List of Exhibits). The absence
of a reply signal from the"Don Carlos" placed
the "Yotai Maru" in a situation of doubt as to
the course the "Don Carlos" would take. Such
being the case, it was the duty of the Japanese
officers "to stop, reverse or come to a standstill
until the course of the "Don Carlos" has been
determined and the risk of a collision
removed (The Sabine, 21 F (2d) 121, 124,
cited in Standard Vacuum, etc. vs. Cebu
Stevedoring, etc., 5 C.A.R. 2d 853, 861-862).. . .
.24(Emphasis supplied)
The Court is unable to agree with the view thus taken
by Sison, P.V., J. By imposing an exclusive obligation
upon one of the vessels, the "Yotai Maru, " to avoid the
collision, the Court of Appeals not only chose to
overlook all the above facts constitutive of negligence
on the part of the "Don Carlos;" it also in effect used
the very negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" to
absolve it from responsibility and to shift that
responsibility exclusively onto the "Yotai Maru" the
vessel which had observed carefully the mandate of
Rule 18 (a). Moreover, G. Urrutia and Company v. Baco
River Plantation Company25 invoked by the Court of
Appeals seems simply inappropriate and
inapplicable. For the collision in the Urrutia case was
between a sailing vessel, on the one hand, and
a power-driven vessel, on the other; the Rules, of
course, imposed a special duty on the power-driven
vessel to watch the movements of a sailing vessel, the
latter being necessarily much slower and much less
maneuverable than the power-driven one. In the case
at bar, both the "Don Carlos" and the "Yotai Maru"
were power-driven and both were equipped with
radar; the maximum speed of the "Yotai Maru" was
18
thirteen (13) knots while that of the "Don Carlos" was
eleven (11) knots. Moreover, as already noted, the
"Yotai Maru" precisely took last minute measures to
avert collision as it saw the "Don Carlos" turning to
portside: the "Yotai Maru" turned "hard starboard"
and stopped its engines and then put its engines "full
astern."
Thus, the Court agrees with Judge Cuevas (just as it
had agreed with Reyes, L.B., J.), with Judge Fernandez
and Nocon, J.,26 that the "Don Carlos" had been
negligent and that its negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the collision and of the resulting
damages.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 26 November 1980 in C.A.-G.R. No.
61206-R is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court dated 22 September 1975 is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in its entirety.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR,
MARCELO LLANORA, JR. y BAYLON, ROBERT
GONZALES y MANZANO, RICKY PEÑA y BORRES @
RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO @ GER, JOSE
ADELANTAR y CAURTE, LOWHEN ALMONTE y
PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y AGGULIN @ KOBET,
and MOREY DADAAN, Accused-Appellants.
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on February 25, 2011 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 affirming, albeit with
modifications, the conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 of Betty
Salvador y Tabios (Betty), Monico Salvador (Monico),
Marcelo Llanora, Jr. y Baylon (Marcelo), Robert
Gonzales y Manzano (Robert), Ricky Penñ a y Borres @
Rick (Ricky), Roger Pesado y Pesado @ Ger (Roger),
Jose Adelantar y Caurte (Jose), Lowhen Almonte y
Pacete (Lowhen), Jubert Banatao y Aggulin @ Kobet
(Jubert), and Morey Dadaan (Morey) (herein accused-
appellants) for having conspired in kidnapping Albert
Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of extorting
ransom. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellants to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered
them to solidarily pay Albert the amount of PhP
100,000.00 as moral damages.3The CA Decision dated
February 25, 2011 concurred with the RTC’s factual
findings but expressly stated in its dispositive portion
the accused-appellants’ non-eligibility for parole. The
CA further ordered the accused-appellants to
solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC
and the CA, however, acquitted accused-appellants of
kidnapping a certain Pinky Gonzales (Pinky), who,
from the account of some of the prosecution
witnesses, was likewise taken with Albert during the
same abduction incident.
The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed
from the following Informations dated April 15, 2002:
(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834 against Betty,
Monico, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other
John Does for the kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of Pinky allegedly lasting for six days, the
Information, in part, reads:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the
evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena,
Cainta, Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
and take away PINKY GONZALES y TABORA against
her will; That in the process, she was forced to board
a Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported her, until
finally she was brought to an undisclosed location in
Caloocan City where she was kept for six (6) days;
That she was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by
police operatives from the Philippine National Police.4
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835 against Jose,
Lowhen, Betty, Monico, Morey, Jubert, Marcelo,
Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the
kidnapping of and demanding from Albert USD
1,000,000.00 as ransom money, the Information
states:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the
evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena,
Cainta, Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
and take away ALBERT YAM y LEE; That in the
process, he was forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van
19
which transported him, passing through the areas of
U.P. Balara and Fairview in Quezon City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, until finally
he was brought to an undisclosed location in
Caloocan City where he was kept for six (6) days;
That ransom in the amount of $1,000,000.00 was
demanded in exchange for his safe release until he
was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by police
operatives from the Philippine National Police.5
During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty to the charges.
On June 14, 2002, pre-trial was terminated without
the parties having entered into stipulations.
The Case for the Prosecution
During the trial, the prosecution witnesses, with their
corresponding testimonies, were:
(a) Albert, married to Evangeline Lim-Yam
(Evangeline), holds a Marketing degree from De La
Salle University. He also took some units under the
Ateneo de Manila University’s Masters in Business
Administration program. He is engaged in printing
and financing business. He is also a breeder of
fighting cocks and race horses. On February 2002, he
took over, with a partner, the operations of the New
Cainta Coliseum (Coliseum), a cockpit arena.
Albert testified6 that the lens grade of his eye glasses
is 275. With eye glasses on, his vision is normal.
Without the glasses, he can clearly see objects one to
two meters away from him, but beyond that, his
vision becomes blurry.7
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his
Toyota Prado (Prado) with Plate No. UTJ-112 and
drove out of the Coliseum’s parking lot. Ahead was a
white Honda Civic car (Civic), while behind was a
Toyota Hi-Ace van (Hi-Ace). Upon reaching Imelda
Avenue, the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was
about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped
and blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms
alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey
approached the Civic, which was just about two to
two and a half meters away from Albert,8 pointed
their guns at the driver, who turned out to be
Pinky,9 and motioned for her to step out of the car
and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men ran after the "watch-
your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot, but Albert no
longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-
Ace.10 Roger and Robert came near the Prado and
gestured for Albert to likewise alight from the vehicle
and ride the Hi-Ace.
When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the
driver’s seat and beside him was Ricky. Morey was
behind the driver. So too were Jubert. Roger and
Robert rode the Hi-Ace after Albert did.
Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made
to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Albert’s wallet
containing PhP 9,000.00, his driver’s license and
other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe
watch which costs PhP 400,000.00.
While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were
ordered to duck their heads. Notwithstanding the
position, Albert saw the lights emanating from the
blue eagle figure at the Ateneo gym. He also heard
one of the men telling the driver to pass by Balara.
After around 20 minutes, Albert also noticed having
passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview. They arrived in
their destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were
handcuffed separately. Albert and Pinky stayed in the
house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee
until they were rescued on April 12, 2002.
Albert described the house as "half
constructed". They were made to stay in the
11
basement around three and a half by four meters in
size, with a stairway, small sofa, bed, table and four
chairs. Behind the table was a sink and a comfort
room. There was a large window about three by five
feet in size, but it was covered with a blanket and a
plastic sack. Albert identified Monico as the person
who was beside him, pulling him up when he fell
while descending the basement stairs. 12 Albert
claimed that he was still handcuffed then and was
made to wear dark eye glasses. The kidnappers
allowed him to remove the dark eye glasses when he
laid down in bed on the first night of their
detention.13 On April 8, 2002, his own eye glasses
were returned to him upon his request.14
Albert told the men that he was the only person they
should talk to if they wanted ransom money. The men
inquired how much he can give. Albert replied that he
can shell out PhP 500,000.00. The men asked for
Albert’s phone and pin number to be able to call the
latter’s wife. He was ordered to write a letter to his
wife informing her that he was abducted and
indicating therein the names of persons from whom
she could borrow money to be paid to the accused-
20
appellants as ransom. Albert also claimed that he got
to talk, through the telephone, to the person, whom
the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their
boss. The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00 for
Albert’s release. One of the persons posted as guards
in the safehouse threatened Albert that the latter
would be killed unless ransom money be paid by
Friday, April 12, 2002.15
Albert had seen Jose a few times in the Coliseum.
Albert also recalled that immediately prior to his
abduction, Jose accompanied him to his Prado and
had asked for "balato".16 Albert identified Jose as the
"tipster" who acted as a look-out during the
abduction incident.17 Albert likewise stated that he
had seen Ricky in the Coliseum on April 7, 2002 and
on several other instances as the latter worked as a
"kristo" or bet taker.18 Albert recognized Marcelo as a
bettor.
Albert identified Betty as the person who brought
them food and who, in one occasion, had inquired
from the guard how Albert and Pinky were faring in
the basement.19
On April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., 20 seven
persons came down to the basement to threaten
Albert and Pinky.21 Albert later identified them as
Jubert and Morey,22 Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen and
Jose,23 and Nelson Ocampo y Ruiz @ Joselito
Estigoy24 (Nelson). Thereafter, the men left behind
Nelson and Lowhen to remain as guards, who took
their posts in the stairway. 25 At around lunch time,
Betty gave food to one of the guards, who in turn
handed the same to Albert and Pinky. Albert was then
sitting in the sofa, which was just a little over a meter
away from the stairway.26
Albert remembered having stayed in the basement
until the early hours of April 12, 2002. On that day, he
heard the ferocious barking of a dog, footsteps in the
second floor, and then a gun shot. Albert and Pinky
stayed inside the comfort room until a uniformed
man brought them out. One person, who acted as
among those guarding Albert and Pinky while they
were detained, was killed in the rescue operations. He
was subsequently identified as Nelson. Another guard
left in the evening of April 10, 2002 and he never
went back.27 Albert did not see Betty and Monico in
the premises of the safehouse on the day the rescue
operations were conducted by the police. He only saw
the couple in Camp Crame around 5:00 p.m. while the
former was making a statement.28
Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame
between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April 12, 2002.
Some time after lunch, a police line-up with about 15
men was presented.29 Albert identified seven persons,
to wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and
Roger, as among his abductors. At that time, he was
not yet able to pinpoint the rest of the accused-
appellants because they were not presented to him in
the police line-up.30
(b) Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo (S/Insp. Palomo),
who is assigned at the Anti-Organized Crime for
Businessmen’s Concern Division of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp
Crame, testified that on April 12, 2002, at around
6:30 a.m., he was in the vicinity of No. 3, Lumbang
Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City, where
they had just rescued Pinky, a victim of kidnapping.
Around an hour later, Betty arrived and introduced
herself as the owner of the house. She inquired why
the police officers were shooting at her house. She
was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer
queries anent why a crime was committed in her
house. While in Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky
identified her as the person who brought them food
while they were detained in the safehouse. Betty was
thus arrested.31
(c) Police Inspector Marites Bugnay (P/Insp. Bugnay),
Assistant Chief of the Firearms Identification Division
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, testified that at around 9:30 a.m. of April
12, 2002, she and her team, with six members, went
to Amparo Subdivision where a rescue operation had
just taken place. They recovered a 5.56 mm Elisco
rifle without serial number, a 9 mm Chinese made
pistol, two long and three short magazines for a
caliber 5.56 mm rifle, 188 live ammunitions, 24
pieces of cartridges fired from four different caliber
5.56 mm rifles, two lifted latent prints, among others.
She made a Spot Report of the physical evidence
recovered by her team. P/Insp. Bugnay, however,
stated that some of the police officers, who
participated in the rescue operations, also carried
caliber 5.56 mm firearms.32
(d) Evangeline, Albert’s wife, testified 33 having
received seven phone calls34 between April 7, 2002
and April 11, 2002 from the kidnappers informing
her that they took Albert and demanding USD
1,000,000.00 as ransom money. 35 On April 11, 2002,
she was instructed by the kidnappers to go to Jollibee
along EDSA Guadalupe. The kidnappers were
21
supposed to hand to her a letter from her husband. A
police operative acted as her driver. She and the
police operative got to the place between 11:30 and
11:45 in the morning. 36 The kidnappers called her
and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to
retrieve a letter taped in one of the toilet bowls.
Evangeline went back to her car. While she was
inside, three men tried to forcibly open her car. She
panicked, bowed down and screamed. She was,
however, only able to see the suspects from theirs
chests down.37 Thereafter, P/Insp. Ferdinand Vero
(Major Vero) approached the car and informed her
that they were able to apprehend three suspects. She
went home. The next morning, she received a call, got
to talk to Albert, and thereafter proceeded to Camp
Crame.
(e) PO1 Paul Pacris (PO1 Pacris) stated that he and
four other police officers from the CIDG were the
ones who assisted Evangeline when she met with
Albert’s kidnappers in Jollibee along EDSA
Guadalupe. They arrived in the area at around 11:00
a.m. and after about two hours, they arrested Ricky,
Jose and Marcelo who tried to forcibly open
Evangeline’s car. They recovered from Jose a .38
caliber Armscor with six live ammunitions. The
policemen frisked the three without opposition from
the latter.38
(f) PO3 Manuel Cube (PO3 Cube) corroborated 39 PO1
Pacris’ testimony relative to the arrest of Ricky, Jose
and Marcelo. PO3 Cube further stated that while it
was not his team which arrested the suspects, after
Jose and Ricky were turned over to them, they
brought the two to Camp Crame.40 While in the
investigation room, he heard Jose and Ricky admit
knowledge of Albert’s abduction. 41 Jose and Ricky
were then not assisted by counsel.42 Chief Police
Superintendent Zolio M. Lachica (Col. Lachica)
briefed PO3 Cube and the other policemen that the
arrested suspects divulged an information that the
Hi-Ace with Plate No. WNW-180 used in
Albert’s abduction was going to pass by Road C-5,
Commonwealth Avenue on April 12, 2002. 43 PO3
Cube, Major Vero and other police officers riding four
to five vehicles went to the place. At around 5:45 a.m.,
they spotted the Hi-Ace, chased it and blocked it with
a police car.44 Robert and Roger were inside the Hi-
Ace, and the former had a shotgun. After the
policemen drew their guns, the suspects surrendered.
(g) PO2 Arvin Garces (PO2 Garces), a field operative
and an in-house bomb technician assigned at the
CIDG’s Anti-Organized Crime and Businessmen’s
Concern Division, testified45 that on April 12, 2002,
between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., he and 20
policemen went to Sitio GSIS, Barangay San Martin de
Porres, Paranñ aque to arrest Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey. Their team leader knocked on the door of the
target house, which was partially open. Lowhen came
out. Jubert and Morey were in the adjacent room,
which was about five meters away from where
Lowhen was.46 PO2 Garces was uncertain though if
the said adjacent room was part of the same house
where Lowhen was found.47 The three suspects were
informed that they were being implicated for Albert’s
kidnapping and would thus be taken for investigation.
Following were among the object evidence likewise
offered by the prosecution: (a) sketches prepared by
Albert depicting the (1) exact location where the
kidnapping took place,48 (2) positions of Albert and
Pinky relative to the kidnappers while inside the Hi-
Ace,49 and (3) interior of the basement room where
Albert and Pinky were detained;50 (b) dark glasses
wrapped with black tape and handcuffs worn by
Albert and Pinky while they were detained; 51 (c)
Albert’s handwritten note dated April 10, 2002
addressed to "Vangie" and signed by "Boogs"; 52 and
(d) Sinumpaang Salaysay53 and Supplemental
Affidavit54 executed by Albert on April 13, 2002 and
April 15, 2002, respectively.
The Case for the Defense
The defense witnesses with their testimonies were:
(a) Marcelo, resident of Sta. Ana Compound, Manila
East Road, Taytay, Rizal, testified that he owns a beer
house and a billiard hall. He also renders mechanical
services. He claimed that from 12:00 noon until 9:00
p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was repairing a motor bike at
home. Marcelo was with a certain Bogs, the owner of
the motor bike, and Jober, the former’s helper.55
From April 8 to 9, 2002, Marcelo just stayed home
with his daughter.56
On April 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., Marcelo was
in his bedroom making an accounting of the earnings
of his beer house. He heard knocks at the door of his
billiard hall. Thereafter, around six unidentified men
entered, punched, tied him up, and threw him at the
back of a white Revo without a plate. Even when
22
Rosario, Marcelo’s daughter, was slapped and kicked
by the unidentified men after she inquired about
their identities, she insisted that she be taken with
her father. Marcelo and Rosario were brought to
Camp Crame. They were made to sit down in a room
with a hazy glass window. Rosario was thereafter
ordered to leave the room and when she refused, she
was dragged out. The men started showing Marcelo
photographs and asking him questions. When he
denied knowing any of the persons in the
photographs, he was blindfolded with a packing tape
and got kicked every time he refused to answer the
men’s queries. A plastic bag was likewise placed over
his head making it difficult for him to breathe. His
ordeal lasted for an hour, after which somebody told
him that if he had PhP 100,000.00, he would be
released.57
At around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Marcelo asked
Rosario to go home and look for a lawyer. At around
10:00 a.m. of the following day, April 11, 2002,
Rosario came back with a certain Atty. Platon.
Marcelo narrated to Atty. Platon the circumstances
surrounding his arrest.58 Atty. Platon informed
Marcelo that the latter was being charged of
kidnapping.59 Not long after, at around 10:30 a.m. to
11:00 a.m., a certain Dr. Arnold de Vera (Dr. de Vera)
arrived and conducted an examination of Marcelo’s
injuries and bruises.60 Marcelo asked Atty. Platon if he
can file a complaint against the men who mauled him.
Atty. Platon replied in the affirmative, but as of even
date, no complaint had been filed yet as Marcelo had
to attend to other pressing matters relative to the
kidnapping case.61 Atty. Platon and Dr. de Vera left
while Marcelo and Rosario stayed in Camp Crame for
two nights.62
On April 12, 2002, at around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m.,
Marcelo was brought to a building in Camp Crame
and was made to stand up alongside nine people with
whom he was not acquainted. There were cameras
around and a Chinese man and a woman started
pointing at them.63
Marcelo denied personal acquaintance with
Albert,64 PO1 Pacris,65 Jubert, Monico and Betty. 66 He
admitted having been to the Coliseum as he was into
cock fighting. The Coliseum, located in Cainta, is only
about two kilometers away from Taytay.67
Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera, 68 a
plastic surgeon from St. Luke’s Medical Center,
Quezon City, to prove that in the morning of April 11,
2002, the former was already under the CIDG’s
custody. The foregoing is contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that between 11:30 a.m. and
12:00 noon of the said date, Marcelo was arrested in
Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe while trying to
forcibly open Evangeline’s car. Dr. de Vera stated that
in the afternoon of April 10, 2002, Marcelo’s daughter
called asking for his help as her father was allegedly
being manhandled. Dr. de Vera went to the CIDG office
in the morning of April 11, 2002. He made a visual
examination of Marcelo’s body and saw hematoma in
the sternum and fresh abrasions in both hands of the
latter, but he did not reduce his observations into
writing.69 To stop Marcelo’s manhandling, Dr. de Vera
sought audience with the PNP Chief, but the latter
was not around.70
During cross-examination, Dr. de Vera stated that
once in a while, he sings and drinks in Marcelo’s beer
house in Taytay.71
SPO2 Eduardo Penñ ales’ testimony was dispensed
with since the parties stipulated that he was the
officer who, on April 10, 2002, at around 8:35 a.m.,
received and recorded in the logbook of the Taytay
Police Station a report from a certain Jover Porras y
Perla that Marcelo was abducted by unidentified men
earlier at 7:20 a.m.72
(b) Ricky is a "kristo" or bet taker in Araneta
Coliseum and U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, and
"mananari" or gaffer residing in San Luis Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.73 He was still asleep in bed
with his wife on April 10, 2002, at around 9:45
a.m.74 when he heard somebody knocking on the door.
When he opened it, a man pointed a gun at him and
told him not to ask any questions but just to go with
them. There were two men and they brought him to a
white Revo where he saw three other people. The
owner of the house saw Ricky being taken.75
Ricky was brought to Camp Crame, was asked if he
knew certain persons from the photographs shown to
him, and was mauled when he replied in the
negative.76
In the morning of April 12, 2002 while still detained
in Camp Crame, one of the men, who forcibly took
Ricky from his rented room on April 10, 2002,
informed the latter that if he had PhP 20,000.00, he
would be released. In the afternoon of April 12, 2002,
Ricky was handcuffed and placed in a police line-up
23
without being informed of the reason for his
inclusion therein.77
Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert
on April 7, 2002 and being present in the safehouse in
Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan at 6:00 a.m. of April
11, 2002.78 He did not know Albert personally and
had not seen him before. However, Ricky admitted
having been to the Coliseum and knowing that Albert
was renting the same.79Ricky was unaware of any
grudge Albert, PO1 Pacris or PO3 Cube may have
against him.80 Ricky did not have any document to
prove that he was detained in Camp Crame on April
10, 2002 and his Booking and Arrest Sheet were both
dated April 12, 2002.81
Ricky’s wife, May, testified82 that after the former was
taken by the unidentified men, she went to
Valenzuela Police Station and an officer opined that
her husband may be in Camp Crame.83 She went as
suggested and found her husband, who assured her
that he would be released. 84 She went home but got
back to Camp Crame at 12:00 noon of April 11, 2002,
during which time she was not anymore allowed to
talk to Ricky.85 She stayed in Camp Crame until past
10:00 p.m. and saw from TV Patrol that Ricky was
involved in a kidnapping incident. She got to talk to
her husband only on April 13, 2002.86
During cross-examination, May stated that Ricky was
with her at around 7:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002.87
Ritchelda Tugbo (Tugbo), a 63-year old widow and
Ricky’s landlady, testified88 that at around 9:30 a.m. of
April 10, 2002, while she was eating breakfast, three
unidentified men entered her house and took Ricky
from his rented room.89
Sabina Poliquit (Poliquit), an unemployed 50-year old
widow, and Rodolfo Buado (Buado), a 60-year old
retired employee, who were both Ricky’s neighbors,
corroborated Tugbo’s statements.90
(c) Jose is a trainer gaffer, breeder of fighting cocks,
part-time private martial during derbies, and a
resident of San Isidro, Fairview, Quezon City. During
the trial, he stated91 that in the evening of April 9,
2002, he went to U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong,
where a derby sponsored by a certain Pol Estrellado
was being held, to find prospective buyers of fighting
cocks and to place bets.92 He left the place at around
1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab, a
white Revo stopped in front of him, and three gun-
toting men alighted therefrom.93 He was shoved in the
front seat in between the driver and another man.
While inside the Revo, Jose’s eyes were covered with
packing tape. His wallet, money, watch, necklace and
ring were taken, and the men stepped on his head to
keep him down. A plastic bag was placed over his
head making it difficult for him to breathe, and he
was repeatedly punched when he denied involvement
in Albert’s kidnapping.94
When Jose regained consciousness, he did not know
where he was but there was a boy of around 16 years
of age removing the packing tape from his eyes.
Adelantar only learned that he was in Camp Crame
when he was brought to a room with a police line-up
at around 6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002. 95 He insisted
that from April 10, 2002 onwards, he was held by the
police in Camp Crame, hence, he could not have been
present at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in the safehouse
where Albert was detained, and at 11:00 a.m. of the
same day in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. 96The boy
who removed the packing tape from his eyes could
attest to the foregoing, but Jose did not know his
name and had not seen him anymore. 97 Further, Jose
had never been to the Coliseum and had not
personally met Albert and Pinky. 98 Jose alleged that
he and the rest of the accused-appellants were mere
fall guys.99 Jose claimed that he only met Marcelo after
they were both placed in the police line-up and in the
same detention cell.100 Jose admitted that he was
acquainted with Ricky, whom he had recommended
to be a
"kristo" in Araneta Cockpit.101 Out of fear, Jose had
neither informed his lawyer that he was mauled by
the policemen nor filed any action against them.102
(d) Betty and her husband Monico have been residing
for about 33 years in 224 Malanting Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City. Betty, an elementary
school graduate, is a housewife tending a sari-sari
store and a piggery. Monico is a drilling contractor
and plumber. Betty and Monico own the house in
Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City,
where Albert and Pinky were detained from April 7 to
12, 2002.
Betty testified103 that due to her busy schedule, she
had not visited their house in Lumbang Street during
the alleged period of Albert and Pinky’s detention.
Betty and Monico had rented out for PhP 3,000.00
per month the said house to Roger since the late
afternoon of April 7, 2002.
24
Roger was recommended to the spouses by a certain
Pidok Igat (Igat), their acquaintance. Betty saw Roger
once but the latter was wearing sunglasses.104
Betty stated that from April 7 to 12, 2002, Monico
was contracted to build a deep well in Narra Street,
Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. In the morning of
April 12, 2002, Igat told her that the house in
Lumbang Street was being fired at by the policemen.
She first instructed Monico to report the incident to
the police, then, she ran towards the said house. She
was still at a certain distance from the house when
the policemen held her by the arms after finding out
that she owned it. She denied knowledge of the
kidnapping incident, but she was still invited by the
police officers to go with them to Camp Crame.105
Betty was not allowed to go home but was detained
by the police in Camp Crame. At around 6:00 p.m. of
April 12, 2002, after Albert and Pinky arrived, Betty,
Roger, Jose, Marcelo, Ricky and other suspects were
placed in a police line-up composed of ten people.
Monico, Jubert and Morey were not among those in
the line-up yet. Albert and Pinky did not pinpoint
Betty from the line-up, but a police officer insisted
that she be included because she owned the
safehouse. Betty identified the officer as SPO1 Polero,
but she was uncertain of the name, albeit describing
the latter as the one who took Albert and Pinky’s
statements.106 Betty did not see Albert and Pinky
being brought out of the house during the rescue
operations on April 7, 2002. Betty did not personally
know Albert, but first saw him in Camp Crame in the
evening of April 12, 2002.107
During cross-examination, Betty stated that Monico
and Jubert were included in the police line-up.108
(e) Monico stated109 that he received PhP 3,000.00
from Roger and handed it to Betty as rental for their
house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision,
Caloocan City. The said house is about four streets
away from Betty’s sari-sari store and piggery in
Malanting Street. The amount was a mere deposit and
he was promised that before the end of the month,
PhP 6,000.00 would be paid as rental. 110 Monico did
not visit the house from April 7 to 11, 2002, hence, he
did not know if Roger actually occupied it. Within the
same period, Monico was not able to talk to Igat, who
was the person who referred Roger to him and
Betty.111
Monico testified that he was in Betty’s store in the
night of April 7, 2002 and denied having assisted
Albert in descending to the basement of the
safehouse.112
When their house in Lumbang Street was fired at by
the police in the early morning of April 11, 2002, he
was instructed by Betty to report the matter to the
authorities. He went to the Novaliches Police, but was
informed that Amparo Subdivision is not within the
said station’s jurisdiction. Monico got to Bagong
Silang Police Station at around 9:00 a.m., and an
officer took notes while talking to him, but the former
was not sure if it was a blotter. Monico was instructed
to wait. At around 3:00 p.m., a superior officer
arrived, asked Monico questions and informed the
latter that he knew about the shooting incident. He
stayed in the police station until 6:00 p.m. The officer
told Monico that the latter would be brought to Camp
Crame to be interviewed and will be allowed to go
home after.113 In Camp Crame, Monico was informed
that he was being implicated in Albert and Pinky’s
kidnapping. Although he and Betty denied any
involvement in the charges against them, to date, for
lack of opportunity on their part as they are both
detained, no complaints had been filed against the
officers who implicated them.114
(f) Jubert, a carpenter and a college undergraduate
from Asibanglan, Pinukpok, Kalinga Province,
testified115 that he came to Manila to look for a job on
January 2002.116 For two months, from February to
March 2002, he was among those who worked in
constructing the Globe Telecommunications tower in
Sucat. He resided in the house of his uncle, Daniel
Balanay (Balanay), in Bicutan, Taguig.117
Jubert met Lowhen, a resident of Paranñ aque, while
applying for a job to make cabinets for Perma Wood
Industries on March 27, 2002.118
At around 4:00 p.m. of April 11, 2002, Jubert went to
Lowhen’s house to inquire about the requirements in
applying as a security guard, but the latter was not
home yet. Lowhen arrived at around 5:00 p.m. Morey,
whom Jubert met for the first time, was also there.
Lowhen bought drinks for the three of them and
Jubert stayed overnight in the house of Morey, which
was just about 50 meters away. While they were
sleeping, men barged in, ordered them to lay face
down, and handcuffed them. Jubert and Morey were
taken out of the house where they saw Lowhen, who
was likewise boarded into a car. Out of fear of the
25
men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey
were no longer able to ask why they were being
taken. They were brought to Camp Crame. Jubert
denied being among those who abducted Albert and
Pinky on April 7, 2002, and guarding the latter two
who were detained in the basement of Betty and
Monico’s house in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan
City.119 Jubert insisted that on April 7, 2002, he was
fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in Bicutan,
Taguig, and with him were the latter’s brother and
two ladies.120 However, none of the mentioned
persons executed affidavits to corroborate Jubert’s
claim as to his whereabouts on April 7, 2002. 121 Jubert
vehemently denied having seen Albert prior to April
12, 2002, the day the former was arrested.122
(g) Robert, a farmer from Isabela, a driver since 1986,
and resident of Western Bicutan, Taguig since 1990,
alleged123 that on April 7, 2002, he was in Bontoc,
Mountain Province.124 From March 4 to April 8, 2002,
he was driving for Engineer Raymundo Vargas, Sr.
(Engr. Vargas), a contractor engineer.125 Robert
offered as evidence a certification, dated November 6,
2003, issued by the Pines Community Developers and
General Services Corporation, signed by Engr. Vargas,
stating that he was employed from February 10, 1987
to April 8, 2002, and five cash vouchers showing that
he was paid for his services.126 The cash voucher for
the payment of PhP 2,500.00, dated April 8, 2002,
which was allegedly received by Robert
himself,127 contained erasures. Engr. Vargas justified
the erasures by stating that the typewriter, which was
initially used, did not yield very clear impressions on
paper.128Copies of the cash vouchers were, however,
secured by his wife only much later upon his lawyer’s
instructions.129
On April 11, 2002, Robert was arrested in his house
in Bicutan by CIDG officers contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that he was riding the Hi-Ace
with Roger and carrying a shotgun when seized by
the police in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City on
April 12, 2002.130 Robert is not engaged in
cockfighting.
Angelita Alto (Alto), a member of the Barangay
Auxiliary Force of Western Bicutan, Taguig,
testified131 that at around 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002,
a van parked in the corner of Sunflower and Calantas
Streets, Western Bicutan, Taguig, and persons clad in
dark suits alighted therefrom.132 They proceeded to
Robert’s house where Alto’s cousin stays as a boarder.
The men kicked and broke the door, handcuffed,
blindfolded and took Robert to the van. Alto was
about three meters away from where the events
transpired. When the van left, Alto took two pictures
of the broken door, called up Robert’s wife and
recorded the events in page 1056 of the barangay’s
logbook.133
Engr. Vargas from Baguio City
corroborated134 Robert’s claim that they were
together in Bontoc, Mountain Province from February
10 to April 8, 2002. It takes 12 to 14 hours to reach
Manila from Bontoc.135 Robert was with Engr. Vargas
on April 7, 2002, but the former went to Baguio at
10:00 a.m. of the following day supposedly to collect
rentals. Robert said he would be back in two days, but
no longer showed up after. Engr. Vargas only found
out in October 2003 that Robert was being implicated
in a kidnapping incident after being informed by the
latter’s wife.136
(h) Roger, a businessman residing in Signal Village,
Bicutan, Taguig, claimed137 that on April 11, 2002, at
around 6:00 a.m., he was walking along Bravo Street
in Signal Village.138 He was on his way to his brother’s
wake when he was taken by four armed men wearing
civilian clothes, whom he later found out were police
officers from the CIDG.139 He only met his co-accused-
appellants in Camp Crame on April 11, 2002. 140 He
saw Albert for the first time on April 12, 2002 when
the police line-up was presented to the latter.141
(i) Morey, a warehouse care taker from Barangay
Sinakbat, Bacong, Benguet, stated142 that he was in
Burnham, Baguio City tending coconuts on April 7,
2002. The warehouse closed at 6:00 p.m., after which
he went to his uncle’s house in Trinidad, Benguet.143
At 1:00 p.m. of April 8, 2002, Morey and a certain
Harris Batawang (Batawang) left Baguio for Manila.
Morey was contracted to watch over a house bought
by Batawang in GSIS Village, Paranñ aque. They got to
Manila at around 9:00 p.m., spent the night in
Paranñ aque, and the following morning, Batawang
called Lowhen and introduced him to Morey.144
On April 10, 2002, Morey and Batawang bought
materials for the repair of the latter’s house. At 2:00
p.m. of the following day, Batawang returned to
Baguio to recruit workers to help Morey in repairing
the former’s house.145
In the evening of April 11, 2002, Lowhen called
Morey and informed him that the latter has a
26
province mate who was staying in the former’s house.
Lowhen was referring to Jubert. Morey went to
Lowhen’s house. The three drunk the gin bought by
Lowhen. Lowhen slept at 11:00 p.m., leaving Morey
and Jubert behind. Morey and Jubert slept in
Batawang’s house. The following day, men barged
into Batawang’s house and handcuffed Morey and
Jubert. The men asked if the two knew a certain Lito,
ordered them to surrender their guns, and ransacked
Batawang’s house. Lowhen, Morey and Batawang
were boarded into a Revo and brought to Camp
Crame.146
Morey denied being acquainted with the other
accused-appellants apart from Lowhen and Morey.
Morey initially saw Albert during the first day of
hearing of the kidnapping case.147
(j) Lowhen, a resident of Paranñ aque City,
stated148 that he had been employed by Regioner
Security and Investigation Agency (Regioner) as a
guard since 1993. He was posted in Perma Wood
Industries Corporation in Marian Road 2, Paranñ aque
from March 4 to April 11, 2002. He worked on a 24-
hour shift, usually starting at 7:00 a.m.149
On April 10, 2002, Lowhen reported for work in
Perma Wood Industries at 7:30 a.m. 150 He offered an
uncertified photocopy of his daily time record (DTR)
from March 16 to 31, 2002 with his signature on
it.151 Anent the DTR from April 1 to 15, 2002, it was
unsigned by Lowhen because at that time, he was
already arrested by CIDG officers.152Logbook entries
signed by Lowhen and a certain "S/G Pacete RA," the
outgoing guard, indicating that the former assumed
his posts at 7:00 a.m. of April 4, 6, 8 and 10, 2002
were likewise presented.153 Lowhen got off from work
at 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002, 154 but was no longer
able to assume duties the next day because he was
already taken by the CIDG officers. 155 He just walked
and got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast and went to
visit a certain Roger Batersal (Batersal) in Malugay
Street, Paranñ aque to have a picture frame repaired.
Batersal, Lowhen’s brother-in-law, was then having
coffee, so Lowhen went inside the house, laid down in
the sofa, turned on the television and slept till 4:00
p.m. The picture frame was already assembled and
Lowhen went home where he saw Jubert waiting for
him.156 Jubert asked Lowhen about the requirements
in applying for a security guard position. Lowhen
bought gin and while the two were drinking, he found
out that Jubert speaks Kalinga and Ilocano. Lowhen
called Morey, who hailed from Baguio and who was
then a boarder in the house of the former’s brother.
Morey joined the drinking session but Lowhen left at
around 11:00 p.m. as the latter was already dizzy and
still had to assume his post at 7:00 a.m. of the
following day.157
At 6:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, Lowhen’s wife woke
him up, but he went back to sleep. Thereafter,
Lowhen heard noises from the gate of the house, then
somebody shouted ordering for men to get out. When
Lowhen opened his eyes, a man wearing black was
pointing a long firearm at him. Lowhen went out of
the house and was directed to place his hands behind
his head and lie face down on the floor. The men
searched Lowhen’s house. Lowhen, Morey and Jubert
were taken to the nearby United Paranñ aque
Subdivision and after about 15 to 20 minutes, they
were boarded into a green Revo without a plate.
Lowhen’s wife wanted to tag along but she was
informed that she could no longer be accommodated
in the Revo, but she could just proceed on her own to
Camp Crame.158
When they reached Camp Crame, Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey were separated from each other. 159 Lowhen
was brought into a room and a police officer asked
him if he knew a certain Lito. Lowhen replied in the
negative, then he was questioned if he knew that a
man and a woman had been kidnapped. The officer
stepped out of the room, but he came back later with
a bald Chinese man.160 The Chinese man stood near
the door, looked at the officer, shook his head, then
left. The officer tapped Lowhen’s shoulder and asked
the latter to cooperate with the police by being a star
witness, for which he would be paid PhP 10,000.00 a
month, or be hanged. The officer typed an affidavit,
but Lowhen refused to receive it. Lowhen told the
officer that he could not do what was demanded of
him, then the latter left. Lowhen remained in the
room until 6:30 p.m. of April 12, 2002 when he was
put alongside more than 10 other persons in a police
line-up.161 Albert did not point at Lowhen in the line-
up.162 Prior to April 11, 2002, Lowhen did not
personally know Albert.163
During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was
on duty in the early morning of April 11, 2002, hence,
he could not have been in the basement of the
safehouse where Albert was detained at around the
same time.164
Redentor Pacete (Pacete), a construction worker who
used to work as a reliever guard at Regioner,
27
testified165 that he met Lowhen when they were both
assigned in Perma Wood Industries. 166 Pacete’s
signatures were affixed in Regioner’s logbook
indicating the times he assumed his posts before or
after Lowhen.
Domingo De Guzman (De Guzman), Lowhen’s
supervisor in Regioner, was called by the defense to
the witness stand to point out to the court that he
was the one who photocopied the logbook entries
and the DTR referred to by Lowhen and Pacete in
their testimonies.167 However, the originals cannot
anymore be presented to the court because Regioner
had ceased its operations in 2004 and the records
were no longer available.168 De Guzman brought two
index cards, prepared by Regioner’s secretary,
indicating Lowhen’s assignments from April 27, 1993
to April 11, 2002,169 and 27 payroll sheets likewise
including Lowhen’s name covering the period from
February 1, 2000 to April 15, 2002.170
The testimony171 of Elsie Batersal (Elsie), Lowhen’s
sister, to the effect that her brother went to her house
at around 8:30 a.m. of April 11, 2002 and slept there
until 4:00 p.m., was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed to stipulate and admit the same.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered a Decision172 on September 27,
2007. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834, the
accused-appellants were acquitted from the charges
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky.
The accused-appellants were, however, convicted of
conspiring the kidnapping of, and demanding of
ransom from Albert in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
108835. The RTC imposed upon the accused-
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a
solidary obligation to pay Albert the amount of PhP
100,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC ratiocinated
that:
Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert
Yam. He testified about how the kidnapping was
perpetrated; he testified that a Toyota Hi-Ace van
with eight (8) occupants blocked the path of the
Honda Civic car colored white driven by Pinky
Gonzales; he (Albert Yam) was driving a Toyota Prado
vehicle that was behind the Honda Civic car of Pinky
Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named before
this court four (4) of those who alighted from the van;
he testified that accused Morey Dadaan and accused
Jubert Banatao after going down from their van,
approached the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; he
also identified and named Roger Pesado accompanied
by Robert Gonzales who went down from their van
and approached his car; he testified that it was Roger
Pesado who told him (Albert Yam) to come out of his
vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky
Gonzales being boarded in the Toyota Hi-Ace van and
identified accused Marcelo Llanora as the driver of
the van, Ricky Penñ a who is seated beside the driver x
x x. Albert Yam also testified that after their
kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose
Adelantar acted as look out when they were being
kidnapped along the road coming from the Cainta
cockpit; x x x he also testified that when the ransom
was being demanded, seven (7) of their kidnappers
went down to talk to him and in court gave the
name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely: Jubert
Banatao, Morey Dadaan, Marcelo Llanora, Ricky Penñ a,
Jose Adelantar and Lowhen Almonte; Albert also
testified that at the instance when he fell down the
steps of the stairs, it was the accused Monico Salvador
who was escorting him and held him; in his
testimony, he stated that accused Betty Salvador
brought the food that they ate and on one occasion,
saw her asking another accused about their
condition; x x x Albert Yam testified that the ransom
demanded by the accused is in the amount of One
Million Dollars and there were possibly fifteen (15)
people who were involved in the kidnapping; he
further testified about the rescue operation and was
able to identify seven (7) of the accused in the police
line-up but mentioned in his testimony the names of
eight (8) accused as among those whom he identified
in the police line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his
testimony that he also identified the accused Lowhen
Almonte after the police line-up because said accused
was not among those included during the police line-
up and this is in accordance with a Supplemental
Affidavit which Albert Yam identified in court. x x x
The Court was able to deduce from the testimony of
Albert Yam that Monico Salvador and Betty Salvador
who are admittedly the owners of the place where
Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the
kidnapping ordeal, were not present at the precise
time that the rescue was conducted by the police.
xxxx
Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate
that the prosecution witness was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he is not so
actuated and that his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit. Also jurisprudence holds that if an
28
accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it
would be against the natural order of events and
human nature and against the presumption of good
faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify
against him. x x x
xxxx
Direct Proof of previous agreement to commit an
offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. It may
be deduced from the mode, method and manner in
which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. x x x
xxxx
Here, we find a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence towards a common unlawful purpose.
xxx
x x x There were very minor loose ends in the chain of
events and the testimony of these other witnesses
besides Albert Yam completed the narration of facts
for the prosecution. These other witnesses, most of
whom are police officers, provided the proofs for the
prosecution as to how the kidnapping case was
solved and why the accused were apprehended.
xxxx
Denial is a self-serving negative defense that cannot
be given greater weight than the declaration of a
credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.
xxx
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive
declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters. x x x
xxxx
Among the documentary evidence presented which
gives credence to the testimony of Albert Yam are the
three (3) sketches which he prepared x x x for the
prosecution. x x x Two (2) pieces of dark glasses
wrapped with black tape x x x, the two sets of
handcuffs x x x, and the handwritten note of Albert
Yam addressed to his wife x x x. Elisco 5.56 mm rifle,
9mm pistol, Armscor cal. 38 revolver, a shotgun,
magazines for the firearms, live
cartridges/ammunition and spent shells x x x.
x x x It must be emphasized that Pinky Gonzales
never testified in court so how could the prosecution
establish that she is indeed a kidnap victim. x x
x173 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
The Appeals Filed Against the RTC Decision and the
Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) Opposition
Thereto
The accused-appellants interposed separate
appeals174 essentially reiterating their respective
factual claims, which were in turn refuted 175 by the
OSG.
The OSG argued that the supposed eye defect
ascribed to Albert was not severe as to hinder his
ability to identify his kidnappers. The dark eye
glasses, which the kidnappers had ordered Albert to
put on, were loose and even slipped as he descended
the basement stairs, giving him the chance to see
Monico. Besides, Albert’s eye glasses were returned
to him on April 8, 2002. Further, it is settled that
when thrust into exceptional circumstances, victims
of crimes strive to remember the important details
and to see the faces of their assailants. Anent Betty
and Monico’s claim that it was unnatural for a person
involved in the commission of an offense to proceed
to the scene and report the matter to the police, the
OSG interpreted the foregoing as defensive acts
intended to mislead the authorities in the conduct of
the investigation.
Jubert offered no corroborative testimonies regarding
his whereabouts from April 7 to 11, 2002.
Robert’s alibi that he was in Bontoc, Mountain
Province driving for Engr. Vargas should be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. The said alibi
weighs weaker vis-aá -vis Albert’s positive testimony
relative to Robert’s participation in the abduction.
Engr. Vargas only testified on Robert’s employment.
Alto merely witnessed the circumstances of Robert’s
arrest on April 11, 2002.
Lowhen’s post in Perma Wood Industries was not that
far from the locations where the acts of kidnapping
were committed, hence, no physical impossibility to
get from one place to the other. The logbook, index
cards and payroll sheets offered by Lowhen had no
evidentiary value for being mere photocopies.
29
Lowhen claimed that Albert did not identify him from
the police line-up. However, Albert testified that he
did not see Lowhen from the line-up. Besides, even if
Lowhen was indeed included in the line-up, Albert, at
that time, had just been rescued, thus, stressed and
confused. Albert had modified his initial lapse by
categorically stating in his amended affidavit that
Lowhen was among those who went to the basement
in the early morning of April 11, 2002.
The OSG emphasized that Albert remained unfazed
and unwavering in his testimony and so were the rest
of the prosecution witnesses. The OSG likewise
stressed that the RTC’s evaluation of the credibility of
the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and
should be upheld in the absence of proof that the said
court had overlooked facts which if duly regarded,
may alter the result of the case.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 25, 2011, the CA rendered the herein
assailed Decision denying the appeal of the accused-
appellants. However, the CA modified the RTC ruling
by expressly stating the accused-appellants’ non-
eligibility for parole. Further, the accused-appellants
were ordered to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000 as
civil indemnity and PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The CA declared that:
The crucial issue in this case involves the assessment
of credibility of witnesses. Could the version
succinctly narrated by the victim, his wife and the
police officers who participated in the operation for
the rescue of the kidnap victims possibly be
concocted as so alleged by the appellants?
x x x Unless otherwise specifically required, the
testimony of a single eyewitness if credible and
trustworthy is sufficient to support a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. And since the
determination of credibility is within the province of
the trial court which has the opportunity to examine
and observe the demeanor of witnesses, appellate
courts will not generally interfere in this jurisdiction.
xxx
xxxx
The most crucial evidence submitted in this case was
the positive testimony of kidnap victim Albert Yam
recognizing appellants as his abductors. Common
experience tells us that when extraordinary
circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to
remember many of the important details. x x x The
most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the features and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime
is committed.
Yam positively identified appellants as his captors. x x
x the proceedings below relative to the alleged mauling,
xxxx
The evidence also shows that the accused-appellants
acted in concert in perpetrating the kidnapping. x x x
xxxx
x x x The fact that accused Betty Salvador’s role was
limited to giving victims their food is immaterial
whether she acted as a principal or as an accomplice
because the conspiracy and her participation therein
have been established. In fact, she was the owner of
the safehouse where the victims were kept. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.
xxxx
x x x Police officers are presumed to have acted
regularly in the performance of their official functions
in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will. x x
x.176 Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
Incidents after the Rendition of the CA Decision
The records of this case were elevated to us pursuant
to the Resolution177 issued by the CA on February 9,
2012 giving due course to the notices of appeal filed
by the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico.
In compliance with our Resolution178 dated July 2,
2012, a Supplemental Brief179 was filed by the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) in behalf of the accused-
appellants, except Betty and Monico. In lieu of a
supplemental brief, the OSG filed a must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
Manifestation180 stating that it is adopting the
arguments it had previously raised in the
Consolidated Brief181filed with the CA.
The Issue
30
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the
prosecution’s failure to overthrow the constitutional
presumption of innocence in their favor.182
The Supplemental Brief filed by the PAO once again
presented the accused-appellants’ factual claims in
irregular arrests and extortion attempts committed
by CIDG officers against Marcelo and Ricky. The PAO
stressed anew the alibis that on April 7, 2002, Morey
was in his uncle’s warehouse in Baguio, Robert was in
Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas,
while Lowhen assumed his security guard duties in
Perma Wood Industries in Paranñ aque. The PAO also
maintained that Roger was arrested at 6:00 a.m. of
April 11, 2002 in Bicutan, and not on April 12, 2002
in Commonwealth Avenue.
Our Ruling
The instant appeal lacks merit.
The CA correctly found that the
essential elements comprising the
crime of kidnapping for ransom
were present and that the accused-
appellants conspired in its commission.
People v. Uyboco,183 enumerated the elements of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz:
In order for the accused to be convicted of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
offense any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and
kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is
immaterial.184
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were
indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private
individuals. Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his
detention lasted for six days, during which period,
threats to kill him and demand for ransom were
made.
In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants,
we are guided by four-settled doctrines enunciated in
People v. Martinez,185 viz:186
(a) The trial court[‘]s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses must be accorded great respect owing to
its opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses
conduct and demeanor on the witness stand;
(b) When there is no evidence to show that the
prosecution witness is actuated by an improper
motive, identification of the accused-appellants as the
offenders should be given full faith and credit;187
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct
proof of prior agreement by the parties to commit a
crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the
accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to a
joint purpose, concerted action and community of
interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-
appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal
testimony of the victim categorically and positively
pointing to them as his abductors, and for the defense
of alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly
established and must not leave room for doubt.188
The accused-appellants all denied being personally
acquainted with Albert or having knowledge of any
grudge which the latter may harbour against them.
The RTC and the CA found Albert’s testimony on the
participation of the accused-appellants as
conspirators in the kidnapping incident, and the
manner by which he had subsequently identified
them, as clear and categorical.
When asked to identify the two men who approached
the Civic, Albert pointed to Jubert and Morey. Albert
31
named those who approached his Prado as Roger and
Robert. Roger and Robert gestured for him to alight
from the Prado and brought him to the Hi-Ace, where
he saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and Ricky in the
front passenger’s seat.190
At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men
went to the basement of the safehouse where Albert
and Pinky were detained. They threatened Albert
with bodily harm should he not accede to their
demand for ransom. Albert identified them as Jubert,
Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five
of the men left but Nelson and Lowhen were left
behind to guard Albert and Pinky.191
The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert,
Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger, Lowhen and
Jose were undoubtedly geared towards unlawfully
depriving Albert of his liberty and extorting ransom
in exchange for his release.
Albert was able to identify Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert,
Morey, Jose, Lowhen, Robert and Roger from a police
line-up of around 15 persons presented to him in
Camp Crame on April 12, 2002. 192 During cross-
examination, Albert clarified that Lowhen was not
among the seven persons he had identified as among
his captors from the initial police line-up of 15
persons presented to him. Albert justified the
omission by stating that he saw Lowhen only after the
line-up was presented and after he had already
executed his April 12, 2002 affidavit.193
In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert,
Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger offered their
respective alibis, which fail to persuade.
Marcelo claimed that from 12:00 noon to 9:00 p.m. of
April 7, 2002, he was at home repairing a motor bike.
On his part, Jubert insisted that he was fixing his
uncle’s house in Bicutan, Taguig on the same day.
Morey averred that he was in a coconut warehouse in
Burnham, Baguio City, and he left the place at around
6:00 p.m. to go to his uncle’s house in Trinidad,
Benguet. Noticeably, Marcelo, Jubert and Morey
offered no corroborative evidence to support their
bare allegations.
Ricky and his wife, May, alleged that they were
likewise at home on April 7, 2002. However, May’s
testimony does not carry much weight in view of her
relation to Ricky.
Robert posited that he was in Bontoc, Mountain
Province driving for Engr. Vargas from February 10,
2002 to April 8, 2002. Robert left at 10:00 a.m. of
April 8, 2002 on the pretext that he would just collect
rentals in Baguio. He informed Engr. Vargas that he
would be back in two days. Robert testified and Alto
corroborated his statement that the former was
arrested by CIDG officers in Bicutan, Taguig on April
11, 2002.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a
witness is whether such is in conformity with
knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial
cognizance.194 It defies logic to figure out why Engr.
Vargas was informed that Robert was implicated in
Albert’s kidnapping only on October 2003, or around
one and a half years after the latter’s indictment. If
Robert’s alibi were true, it would have been more in
accord with human experience if he promptly told
Engr. Vargas about his predicament for the latter was
then in the best position to corroborate the former’s
allegations. It is likewise perplexing why Robert, who
had been driving for Engr. Vargas for five years, was
in Taguig on April 11, 2002 and so lightly regarded
his commitment to the latter that he would be back in
two days. No explanations were offered to justify
Robert’s unreasonable omissions.
Lowhen insisted that he assumed his 24-hour duty in
Perma Wood Industries in Paranñ aque from 7:00 a.m.
of April 10, 2002 to 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002. He got
home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and thereafter
proceeded to his sister Elsie’s house where he slept in
the sofa until 4:00 p.m. The testimonies of Pacete, De
Guzman and Elsie were offered to support Lowhen’s
claims. However, we find more credence in the
positive and categorical statements of Albert, against
whom no ill motive was ascribed by the defense, on
one hand, than in the testimonies of persons, who are
in one way or another are related to Lowhen. Further,
there is no proof of absolute physical impossibility for
Lowhen to be in Amparo Subdivision in the morning
of April 11, 2002, considering that Paranñ aque is not
very far off. In Albert’s testimony, he merely made an
estimate of the time in the morning of April 11, 2002,
when Lowhen, along with six other men, went to the
basement. Although Albert testified that it was
around 6:00 a.m., he could have miscalculated the
time considering that he no longer had a watch and
they were in a basement. Besides, Lowhen was the
link between Jubert and Morey, whose participations
32
in the kidnapping incident on April 7, 2002 were
clearly established. This renders dubious Lowhen’s
claim of having introduced Jubert and Morey to each
other only on April 11, 2002, or four days after the
latter two had taken part in the abduction of Pinky
and Albert near the Coliseum.
Jose and Roger proffered nary an explanation anent
where they were on April 7, 2002. Jose anchored his
defense upon his presence at U-Cap Cockpit in
Mandaluyong from the night of April 9, 2002 until
1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab
going home, Jose claimed that CIDG officers arrested
him and brought him to Camp Crame where he
remained under the police’s custody. He thus claimed
that contrary to Albert’s claim, he could not have
been in the basement of the safehouse at 6:00 a.m. of
April 11, 2002. On the other hand, Roger alleged that
at around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, while he was
walking along Bravo Street, Signal Village,Bicutan,
Taguig on his way to his brother’s wake, he was
arrested by CIDG officers. However, like in the cases
of Marcelo, Jubert and Robert, Jose and Roger’s
averments were bare and unsupported by any
corroborative evidence.
All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not
overlook essential facts or circumstances which may
otherwise justify the acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky,
Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for
having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the
purpose of extorting ransom. That no ransom was
actually paid does not negate the fact of the
commission of the crime, it being sufficient that a
demand for it was made.195
We note Marcelo, Ricky, Jose and Lowhen’s claims of
having been subjected to mauling, illegal arrest,
intimidation and extortion attempts committed by
the police authorities.
It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of
the accused-appellants should have been timely
raised in their respective motions to quash the
Informations at any time before their arraignment,
failing at which they are deemed to have waived their
rights to assail the same.196 No such motions were
filed by the accused-appellants.
Further, without meaning to downplay or take the
allegations of the accused-appellants lightly, we,
however, note that these were unsubstantiated as to
the identities of the offenders and uncorroborated by
other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints
against the supposed abusive police officers had yet
been filed by the accused-appellants. If the abuses
were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-
appellants to initiate the proper administrative and
criminal proceedings to make the erring police
officers liable. We stress that while the criminal
justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is
no less the State’s duty to ensure that those who
administer it do so with clean hands.
Betty and Monico are to be held as
co-conspirators because they
knowingly provided the venue for
Albert’s detention.
When asked during cross examination about what
transpired while he was descending the basement
stairs, Albert stated:
Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7,
2002, Monico assisted him in descending the stairs
leading to the basement of the safehouse. Albert
likewise named Betty as the woman who brought him
and Pinky corned beef for dinner on April 10, 2002,
and food items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11,
2002.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime is committed. 201 It is also
settled that the victim’s in-court identification is
more than sufficient to establish the identities of
accused-appellants as among the malefactors, 202 and
previously executed affidavits are generally
considered inferior to statements that the victim
gives in open court.203 Hence, we hold that
notwithstanding Albert’s failure to identify Betty and
Monico from the police line-up presented on April 12,
2002, in which the spouses were allegedly included,
no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of
the latter two in the kidnapping. Further, Betty and
Monico’s postulation that if they were indeed
involved, they should not have proceeded to the scene
of the rescue operations and to the police station,
likewise deserves scant consideration. There is no
established doctrine to the effect that, in every
instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence. 204 It
33
is possible for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar
schemes or strategies to confuse the police
authorities.205
We stress though that conspiracy transcends
companionship.206 Mere presence at the locus
criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for
conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime.207
In the case at bar, Monico’s assistance extended to
Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs
and Betty’s visit to the safehouse to bring food could
not automatically be interpreted as the acts of
principals and conspirators in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
People of the Philippines v. Garcia208 is instructive
anent the distinctions between a conspirator and an
accomplice, viz:
In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator
from an accomplice in this manner –
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in
common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should
be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are
the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
xxxx
x x x As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some
exceptional situations, having community of design
with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from
being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was,
relatively speaking, of a minor character." x x
x.209 (Citations omitted)
Monico’s assistance to Albert when the latter
descended the basement stairs and Betty’s visit to the
safehouse to bring Jollibee food items were not
indispensable acts in the commission of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. If to be solely considered,
these acts, being of minor importance, pertain to
those committed by mere accomplices. Betty and
Monico were not among those persons who forcibly
abducted Albert while the latter was in the vicinity of
the Coliseum. Neither did the spouses perform
positive acts to actively detain Albert. What spells the
difference on why we still find the Betty and Monico
as principals and co-conspirators in the kidnapping is
the circumstance that their acts coincide with their
ownership of the safehouse.
Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the
criminal design, the owner of a place, which was used
to detain kidnapped victims, cannot necessarily be
considered as either a conspirator or an accomplice
in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, in
the case of Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance
relative to Albert’s detention in the basement of the
safehouse is belied by their presence therein. Albert
positively and repeatedly testified on the matter.
In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained
is logically a primary consideration. In the case of
Betty and Monico, their house in Lumbang Street,
Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose
of the kidnappers. Albert's detention was
accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint
exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the
safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a
place where escape became highly improbable. In
other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in
the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and
purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The
spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's
presence therein during Albert's arrival on the
evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring
food reasonably indicate that they were among those
who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred
with and participated in the execution of the criminal
design.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated February 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of civil
34
indemnity awarded to Albert Yam y Lee, to be
solidarily paid by the accused-appellants, is increased
from PhP 50,000.00 to PhP 75,000.00 in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence210
[G.R. No. 139531. January 31, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. REYNALDO BAGANO* alias Pugot a.k.a.
REYNALDO FRIOLO, and PABLITO CAETE, accused-
appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Crim. Case No. CBU-39045,
finding Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot and Pablito
Caete guilty of murder.
Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot a.k.a. Reynaldo Friolo
and Pablito Caete were charged with murder
qualified by conspiracy and aggravated by treachery
and evident premeditation in an Information dated 3
July 1995.[2] Upon arraignment, Reynaldo Bagano
and Pablito Caete pleaded "not guilty." On 15 October
1997 the trial court convicted both accused of
murder for the killing of Jeremias Montecino and
sentenced Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot, a recidivist,
to reclusion perpetua, and Pablito Caete to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. They were
further ordered solidarily to pay the heirs of Jerimias
Montecino P50,000.00 as death compensation and
P4,660.00 for burial expenses.
The court a quo rejected the defense of alibi and
denial raised by accused Bagano and Caete on the
basis of the following findings: On 23 May 1995,
about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Jeremias
Montecino and his wife Merlinda Montecino were
sleeping in their home in Sitio Wangyu, Alaska,
Barangay Mambaling, Cebu City, when they were
awakened by someone repeatedly calling Jeremias'
name. The call came from outside. Jeremias went to
the window to see who it was and thereafter left their
room to go outside. Merlinda remained in their room,
but peering through the window she saw Pablito
Canete suddenly embrace Jeremias as the latter was
opening the gate. Thereupon, Reynaldo Bagano with
ice pick in hand stabbed Jeremias on the chest.
Jeremias struggled to free himself from Pablito
Caete's clasp and ran, but Reynaldo Bagano gave
chase. Upon hearing Merlinda's screams for help[3]
Reynaldo withdrew and fled with Pablito Canete
following him. Merlinda rushed Jeremias to the Cebu
City Medical Center but he succumbed to severe
hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the left
side of his chest. He died upon arrival at the hospital.
Accused-appellants Bagano and Caete now argue that
their conviction was erroneous as the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
grounded as it was on the testimony of Merlinda
Montecino which they claim was unreliable and
incredible. They question her claim to have vividly
seen the stabbing incident when she admitted that
the attack occurred at 3:00 oclock in the morning
when it was still dark. Assuming that they were
indeed guilty of the killing of the victim, accused-
appellants argue that they should only be convicted
of homicide as the killing was not attended by
treachery that would qualify the offense to murder.
The arguments of the defense are bereft of merit.
Without falter or vacillation, Merlinda Montecino
narrated in open court how accused-appellants
attacked her husband; thus we have no reason to
disbelieve her. Indeed, she admitted that at 3:00
o'clock in the morning darkness enshrouded the
vicinity; nonetheless their front yard was well-lit by a
mercury bulb on a lamp post across their house
which adequately illumined the place that enabled
her to clearly identify the assailants,[4] particularly
so that they were not strangers to Merlinda as they
were friends of her husband who frequented their
home.[5] They were therefore easily recognizable to
her even in shadows.
As the widow of the victim and lone witness to the
crime, Merlinda Montecino would not impute the
killing of her husband on accused-appellants if she
was not certain that they were his tormentors. She
had no reason to. A witness' relationship to a victim
of a crime would even make his or her testimony
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative
who is interested in establishing the crime to accuse
somebody other than the real culprit.[6]
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellants,
treachery attended the killing of the victim. However,
it is not because the attack was made at an unholy
hour, or the victim was roused from his sleep, or that
accused-appellants were known to the victim,[7] that
we affirm the lower court's finding of treachery, but
rather for the suddenness of the attack and the fact
35
that the victim was unarmed with no opportunity to
defend himself from the aggression.
Section 16, Art. 14, of The Revised Penal Code
provides that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The
elements of treachery are: (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b)
the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means
of execution. The law therefore stresses the manner
of performance or accomplishment of the crime than
any other factor. Circumstances of time and
relationship will not be of relative importance unless
they aided or made easy the execution of the crime
and thus denied the victim the chance to defend
himself. The fact that the attack was made at dawn
and the victim who was the friend of the malefactors
had just awakened may have facilitated the
commission of the crime although the crime
nonetheless may have been committed even without
those circumstances. Treachery here was extant from
the act of accused-appellant Pablito Caete in locking
the victim in a sudden embrace and giving his co-
accused-appellant Reynaldo Bagano full opportunity
to stab their victim on his left chest. The suddenness
and the method employed by Caete completely
deprived Jeremias of any chance to defend himself.
As observed by Dr. Jesus Cerna, Police Medico-Legal
Officer who conducted the autopsy[8] on the victim,
the latter did not sustain any defensive wound, which
meant that it was possible that he was not able to
defend himself because somebody was holding his
hands[9] or that the attack was so sudden. For this
reason, we sustain the finding of treachery by the
trial court.
From the records it is clear that treachery attended
the commission of the crime, but this alone should be
appreciated against accused-appellants. The
aggravating circumstance of recidivism cannot be
held against Balano as it was not alleged in the
Information.[10] Be that as it may, treachery can only
be considered as a qualifying circumstance that
would affect the nature of the crime and not as a
generic aggravating circumstance that would raise
the penalty to death.

Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the

crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at
the time of the commission of the offense the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.[11] Proof of an actual planning of the
perpetuation of the crime is not a condition
precedent. From the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, and as can be inferred from
their acts, it is evident that Bagano and Caete were
one in their intention to kill Jeremias Montecino.
Hence, in accordance with the principle that in
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the fact that
it was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on
Montecino and Caete's participation was limited to a
mere embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows
upon them equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the
same fate for their acts.

Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes the

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime
of murder. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 15

October 1997 in Crim. Case No. CBU-39045, finding
accused-appellants Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot
a.k.a. Reynaldo Friolo and Pablito Caete guilty of
murder is AFFIRMED with the MODICATION that
both accused-appellants shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered, in addition
to P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P4,660.00
for burial expenses awarded by the trial court, to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Jeremias Montecino
P50,000.00 more for moral damages. Costs against
both accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

36